From d0e067d837eff638a2af450d92ea48d54a3e5e48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: AlmaLinux RelEng Bot Date: Tue, 19 May 2026 20:30:56 -0400 Subject: [PATCH] import UBI vim-8.2.2637-26.el9_8.4 --- SOURCES/vi_wrapper | 23 ----------------- SOURCES/view_wrapper | 2 +- SPECS/vim.spec | 59 ++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------- 3 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-) delete mode 100644 SOURCES/vi_wrapper diff --git a/SOURCES/vi_wrapper b/SOURCES/vi_wrapper deleted file mode 100644 index 1bb1aece..00000000 --- a/SOURCES/vi_wrapper +++ /dev/null @@ -1,23 +0,0 @@ -#!/usr/bin/sh - -# run vim if: -# - 'vi' command is used and 'vim' binary is available -# - 'vim' command is used -# NOTE: Set up a local alias if you want vim -> vi functionality. We will not -# do it globally, because it messes up with available startup options (see -# ':help starting', 'vi' is not capable of '-d'). The introducing an environment -# variable, which an user must set to get the feature, will do the same trick -# as setting an alias (needs user input, does not work with sudo), so it is left -# on user whether he decides to use an alias: -# -# alias vim=vi -# -# in bashrc file. - -if test -f /usr/bin/vim -then - exec /usr/bin/vim "$@" -fi - -# run vi otherwise -exec /usr/libexec/vi "$@" diff --git a/SOURCES/view_wrapper b/SOURCES/view_wrapper index 9e8d7207..a0b24c9d 100644 --- a/SOURCES/view_wrapper +++ b/SOURCES/view_wrapper @@ -7,4 +7,4 @@ then fi # run vi otherwise -exec /usr/libexec/vi -R "$@" +exec /usr/bin/vi -R "$@" diff --git a/SPECS/vim.spec b/SPECS/vim.spec index b267fe66..921b170c 100644 --- a/SPECS/vim.spec +++ b/SPECS/vim.spec @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ Summary: The VIM editor URL: http://www.vim.org/ Name: vim Version: %{baseversion}.%{patchlevel} -Release: 23%{?dist}.3 +Release: 26%{?dist}.4 License: Vim and MIT Source0: ftp://ftp.vim.org/pub/vim/unix/vim-%{baseversion}-%{patchlevel}.tar.bz2 Source1: virc @@ -42,7 +42,6 @@ Source9: vim-default-editor.sh Source10: vim-default-editor.csh Source11: vim-default-editor.fish Source12: view_wrapper -Source13: vi_wrapper %if %{withvimspell} Source100: vim-spell-files.tar.bz2 @@ -151,12 +150,12 @@ Patch3055: vim-CVE-2023-4752.patch Patch3056: 0001-patch-9.1.1552-security-path-traversal-issue-in-tar..patch # RHEL-112009 CVE-2025-53906 vim: Vim path traversal Patch3057: 0001-patch-9.1.1551-security-path-traversal-issue-in-zip..patch -# RHEL-147940 CVE-2026-25749 vim: Heap Overflow in Vim +# RHEL-147941 CVE-2026-25749 vim: Heap Overflow in Vim # 0001-patch-9.1.2132-security-buffer-overflow-in-helpfile-.patch # 0001-patch-9.1.2133-Another-case-of-buffer-overflow-with-.patch Patch3058: 0001-patch-9.1.2132-security-buffer-overflow-in-helpfile-.patch Patch3059: 0001-patch-9.1.2133-Another-case-of-buffer-overflow-with-.patch -# RHEL-155437 CVE-2026-28417 vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via OS command injection in the netrw plugin +# RHEL-155438 CVE-2026-28417 vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via OS command injection in the netrw plugin # 3 patches: # 0001-runtime-netrw-upstream-snapshot-of-v179.patch - introduces NetrwValidateHostname # 0001-patch-9.2.0073-security-possible-command-injection-u.patch - CVE patch which sanitizes hostnames @@ -165,17 +164,17 @@ Patch3059: 0001-patch-9.1.2133-Another-case-of-buffer-overflow-with-.patch Patch3060: 0001-runtime-netrw-upstream-snapshot-of-v179.patch Patch3061: 0001-patch-9.2.0073-security-possible-command-injection-u.patch Patch3062: 0001-patch-9.2.0089-netrw-does-not-take-port-into-account.patch -# RHEL-155422 CVE-2026-28421 vim: Vim: Denial of service and information disclosure via crafted swap file +# RHEL-155423 CVE-2026-28421 vim: Vim: Denial of service and information disclosure via crafted swap file # 0001-patch-9.0.1477-crash-when-recovering-from-corrupted-.patch - adds check for max page count, which fixes # crash which happens after applying 0001-patch-9.2.0077-security-Crash-when-recovering-a-corr.patch # 0001-patch-9.2.0077-security-Crash-when-recovering-a-corr.patch - validates line count and page count from # untrusted swap file before passing it to read and allocation functions Patch3063: 0001-patch-9.0.1477-crash-when-recovering-from-corrupted-.patch Patch3064: 0001-patch-9.2.0077-security-Crash-when-recovering-a-corr.patch -# RHEL-159629 CVE-2026-33412 vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via command injection in glob() function +# RHEL-159630 CVE-2026-33412 vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via command injection in glob() function Patch3065: 0001-patch-9.2.0202-security-command-injection-via-newlin.patch -# RHEL-164965 CVE-2026-34982 vim: arbitrary command execution via modeline sandbox bypass -# https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-164965 +# RHEL-164966 CVE-2026-34982 vim: arbitrary command execution via modeline sandbox bypass +# https://redhat.atlassian.net/browse/RHEL-164966 # https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/75661a66a1db1e1f3f1245c615f13a7de44c0587 # https://github.com/vim/vim/commit/8c8772c6b321d4955c8f09926e3eda2b4cd83680 Patch3066: 0001-patch-9.2.0276-security-modeline-security-bypass.patch @@ -433,7 +432,7 @@ perl -pi -e "s,bin/nawk,bin/awk,g" runtime/tools/mve.awk %patch -P 3063 -p1 -b .check-page-count %patch -P 3064 -p1 -b .CVE-2026-28421 %patch -P 3065 -p1 -b .CVE-2026-33412 -%patch -P 3066 -p1 -b .CVE-2026-34982 +%patch -P 3066 -p1 -b .modeline-bypass %patch -P 3067 -p1 -b .modeline-tests %build @@ -578,17 +577,13 @@ cd src # and put the stripped files into correct dirs. Build system (koji/brew) # does it for us, so there is no need to do it in Vim %make_install BINDIR=%{_bindir} VIMRCLOC=/etc VIMRUNTIMEDIR=/usr/share/vim/%{vimdir} STRIP=/bin/true -# make install creates vim binary and view symlink, they will be wrappers -# so remove them here -%{_bindir}/rm -f %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/{vim,view} + make installgtutorbin DESTDIR=%{buildroot} BINDIR=%{_bindir} VIMRCLOC=/etc VIMRUNTIMEDIR=/usr/share/vim/%{vimdir} mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/{16x16,32x32,48x48,64x64}/apps -mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir} -install -m755 minimal-vim %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}/vi +install -m755 minimal-vim %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/vi install -m755 enhanced-vim %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/vim install -m755 gvim %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/gvim install -m755 %{SOURCE12} %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/view -install -m755 %{SOURCE13} %{buildroot}%{_bindir}/vi install -p -m644 %{SOURCE3} \ %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/16x16/apps/gvim.png install -p -m644 %{SOURCE4} \ @@ -642,9 +637,9 @@ SentUpstream: 2014-05-22 EOF ( cd %{buildroot} - ln -sf %{_libexecdir}/vi .%{_bindir}/rvi - ln -sf %{_libexecdir}/vi .%{_bindir}/rview - ln -sf %{_libexecdir}/vi .%{_bindir}/ex + ln -sf %{_bindir}/vi .%{_bindir}/rvi + ln -sf %{_bindir}/vi .%{_bindir}/rview + ln -sf %{_bindir}/vi .%{_bindir}/ex ln -sf %{_bindir}/vim .%{_bindir}/rvim ln -sf %{_bindir}/vim .%{_bindir}/vimdiff perl -pi -e "s,%{buildroot},," .%{_mandir}/man1/vim.1 .%{_mandir}/man1/vimtutor.1 @@ -922,7 +917,6 @@ touch %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/%{name}/vimfiles/doc/tags %{_bindir}/rview %{_bindir}/vi %{_bindir}/view -%{_libexecdir}/vi %{_mandir}/man1/vi.* %{_mandir}/man1/ex.* %{_mandir}/man1/rvi.* @@ -992,16 +986,27 @@ touch %{buildroot}/%{_datadir}/%{name}/vimfiles/doc/tags %endif %changelog -* Wed Apr 08 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-23.3 -- Resolves: RHEL-164965 vim: arbitrary command execution via modeline sandbox bypass +* Wed Apr 08 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-26.4 +- Resolves: RHEL-164966 vim: arbitrary command execution via modeline sandbox bypass -* Thu Mar 26 2026 Petr Dancak - 2:8.2.2637-23.2 -- RHEL-155437 CVE-2026-28417 vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via OS command injection in the netrw plugin -- RHEL-155422 CVE-2026-28421 vim: Vim: Denial of service and information disclosure via crafted swap file -- RHEL-159629 CVE-2026-33412 vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via command injection in glob() function +* Tue Mar 31 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-26.3 +- Related: RHEL-159630 rebuild to build with exception target -* Wed Feb 25 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-23.1 -- RHEL-147940 CVE-2026-25749 vim: Heap Overflow in Vim +* Fri Mar 27 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-26.2 +- remove -O0 from flags + +* Wed Mar 25 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-26.1 +- RHEL-159630 CVE-2026-33412 vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via command injection in glob() function + +* Thu Mar 19 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-26 +- RHEL-155438 CVE-2026-28417 vim: Vim: Arbitrary code execution via OS command injection in the netrw plugin +- RHEL-155423 CVE-2026-28421 vim: Vim: Denial of service and information disclosure via crafted swap file + +* Tue Feb 10 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-25 +- RHEL-147941 CVE-2026-25749 vim: Heap Overflow in Vim + +* Mon Feb 02 2026 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-24 +- RHEL-143726 sudo not able to spawn "vi" command when NOEXEC is used to prevent escaping to shell * Wed Sep 17 2025 Zdenek Dohnal - 2:8.2.2637-23 - RHEL-112005 CVE-2025-53905 vim: Vim path traversial