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This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2025-06-04 10:19:10 +00:00
parent aaf8ced8cf
commit 24ebab017a
6 changed files with 443 additions and 114 deletions
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2
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
SOURCES/pkg-varnish-cache-0ad2f22.tar.gz
SOURCES/varnish-6.0.8.tgz
SOURCES/varnish-6.0.13.tgz

2
.varnish.metadata
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@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
db2cd6c296e7f19d65c09e642b7011338d9d0e04 SOURCES/pkg-varnish-cache-0ad2f22.tar.gz
7c5e50eabcd3c0ddb6c463ba4645678a2f71233a SOURCES/varnish-6.0.8.tgz
614d305e69b01255347f33000f76ed6a4fa3c3f7 SOURCES/varnish-6.0.13.tgz

418
SOURCES/varnish-6.0.13-CVE-2025-47905.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,418 @@
commit 1fef8cc747030259d61bf8e451b4317bff5b2ed5
Author: Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com>
Date: Wed May 21 18:09:51 2025 +0200
Fix for CVE-2025-47905
diff --git a/bin/varnishd/http1/cache_http1_vfp.c b/bin/varnishd/http1/cache_http1_vfp.c
index 374bcac..32176b3 100644
--- a/bin/varnishd/http1/cache_http1_vfp.c
+++ b/bin/varnishd/http1/cache_http1_vfp.c
@@ -90,76 +90,118 @@ v1f_read(const struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct http_conn *htc, void *d, ssize_t len)
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------
- * Read a chunked HTTP object.
+ * read (CR)?LF at the end of a chunk
+ */
+static enum vfp_status
+v1f_chunk_end(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct http_conn *htc)
+{
+ char c;
+
+ if (v1f_read(vc, htc, &c, 1) <= 0)
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked read err"));
+ if (c == '\r' && v1f_read(vc, htc, &c, 1) <= 0)
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked read err"));
+ if (c != '\n')
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked tail no NL"));
+ return (VFP_OK);
+}
+
+
+/*--------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Parse a chunk header and, for VFP_OK, return size in a pointer
*
* XXX: Reading one byte at a time is pretty pessimal.
*/
-static enum vfp_status v_matchproto_(vfp_pull_f)
-v1f_pull_chunked(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct vfp_entry *vfe, void *ptr,
- ssize_t *lp)
+static enum vfp_status
+v1f_chunked_hdr(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct http_conn *htc, ssize_t *szp)
{
- struct http_conn *htc;
char buf[20]; /* XXX: 20 is arbitrary */
- char *q;
unsigned u;
uintmax_t cll;
- ssize_t cl, l, lr;
+ ssize_t cl, lr;
+ char *q;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(vc, VFP_CTX_MAGIC);
- CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(vfe, VFP_ENTRY_MAGIC);
- CAST_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, vfe->priv1, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
- AN(ptr);
- AN(lp);
+ CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
+ AN(szp);
+ assert(*szp == -1);
- l = *lp;
- *lp = 0;
- if (vfe->priv2 == -1) {
- /* Skip leading whitespace */
- do {
- lr = v1f_read(vc, htc, buf, 1);
- if (lr <= 0)
- return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked read err"));
- } while (vct_islws(buf[0]));
-
- if (!vct_ishex(buf[0]))
- return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked header non-hex"));
-
- /* Collect hex digits, skipping leading zeros */
- for (u = 1; u < sizeof buf; u++) {
- do {
- lr = v1f_read(vc, htc, buf + u, 1);
- if (lr <= 0)
- return (VFP_Error(vc,
- "chunked read err"));
- } while (u == 1 && buf[0] == '0' && buf[u] == '0');
- if (!vct_ishex(buf[u]))
- break;
- }
+ /* Skip leading whitespace */
+ do {
+ lr = v1f_read(vc, htc, buf, 1);
+ if (lr <= 0)
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked read err"));
+ } while (vct_isows(buf[0]));
- if (u >= sizeof buf)
- return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked header too long"));
+ if (!vct_ishex(buf[0]))
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked header non-hex"));
- /* Skip trailing white space */
- while (vct_islws(buf[u]) && buf[u] != '\n') {
+ /* Collect hex digits, skipping leading zeros */
+ for (u = 1; u < sizeof buf; u++) {
+ do {
lr = v1f_read(vc, htc, buf + u, 1);
if (lr <= 0)
return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked read err"));
- }
+ } while (u == 1 && buf[0] == '0' && buf[u] == '0');
+ if (!vct_ishex(buf[u]))
+ break;
+ }
- if (buf[u] != '\n')
- return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked header no NL"));
+ if (u >= sizeof buf)
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked header too long"));
- buf[u] = '\0';
+ /* Skip trailing white space */
+ while (vct_isows(buf[u])) {
+ lr = v1f_read(vc, htc, buf + u, 1);
+ if (lr <= 0)
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked read err"));
+ }
+
+ if (buf[u] == '\r' && v1f_read(vc, htc, buf + u, 1) <= 0)
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked read err"));
+ if (buf[u] != '\n')
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked header no NL"));
- cll = strtoumax(buf, &q, 16);
- if (q == NULL || *q != '\0')
- return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked header number syntax"));
- cl = (ssize_t)cll;
- if (cl < 0 || (uintmax_t)cl != cll)
- return (VFP_Error(vc, "bogusly large chunk size"));
+ buf[u] = '\0';
- vfe->priv2 = cl;
+ cll = strtoumax(buf, &q, 16);
+ if (q == NULL || *q != '\0')
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked header number syntax"));
+ cl = (ssize_t)cll;
+ if (cl < 0 || (uintmax_t)cl != cll)
+ return (VFP_Error(vc, "bogusly large chunk size"));
+
+ *szp = cl;
+ return (VFP_OK);
+}
+
+
+/*--------------------------------------------------------------------
+ * Read a chunked HTTP object.
+ *
+ */
+
+static enum vfp_status v_matchproto_(vfp_pull_f)
+v1f_chunked_pull(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct vfp_entry *vfe, void *ptr,
+ ssize_t *lp)
+{
+ static enum vfp_status vfps;
+ struct http_conn *htc;
+ ssize_t l, lr;
+
+ CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(vc, VFP_CTX_MAGIC);
+ CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(vfe, VFP_ENTRY_MAGIC);
+ CAST_OBJ_NOTNULL(htc, vfe->priv1, HTTP_CONN_MAGIC);
+ AN(ptr);
+ AN(lp);
+
+ l = *lp;
+ *lp = 0;
+ if (vfe->priv2 == -1) {
+ vfps = v1f_chunked_hdr(vc, htc, &vfe->priv2);
+ if (vfps != VFP_OK)
+ return (vfps);
}
if (vfe->priv2 > 0) {
if (vfe->priv2 < l)
@@ -169,30 +211,27 @@ v1f_pull_chunked(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct vfp_entry *vfe, void *ptr,
return (VFP_Error(vc, "straight insufficient bytes"));
*lp = lr;
vfe->priv2 -= lr;
- if (vfe->priv2 == 0)
- vfe->priv2 = -1;
- return (VFP_OK);
+ if (vfe->priv2 != 0)
+ return (VFP_OK);
+
+ vfe->priv2 = -1;
+ return (v1f_chunk_end(vc, htc));
}
AZ(vfe->priv2);
- if (v1f_read(vc, htc, buf, 1) <= 0)
- return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked read err"));
- if (buf[0] == '\r' && v1f_read(vc, htc, buf, 1) <= 0)
- return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked read err"));
- if (buf[0] != '\n')
- return (VFP_Error(vc, "chunked tail no NL"));
- return (VFP_END);
+ vfps = v1f_chunk_end(vc, htc);
+ return (vfps == VFP_OK ? VFP_END : vfps);
}
static const struct vfp v1f_chunked = {
.name = "V1F_CHUNKED",
- .pull = v1f_pull_chunked,
+ .pull = v1f_chunked_pull,
};
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
static enum vfp_status v_matchproto_(vfp_pull_f)
-v1f_pull_straight(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct vfp_entry *vfe, void *p,
+v1f_straight_pull(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct vfp_entry *vfe, void *p,
ssize_t *lp)
{
ssize_t l, lr;
@@ -223,13 +262,13 @@ v1f_pull_straight(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct vfp_entry *vfe, void *p,
static const struct vfp v1f_straight = {
.name = "V1F_STRAIGHT",
- .pull = v1f_pull_straight,
+ .pull = v1f_straight_pull,
};
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------*/
static enum vfp_status v_matchproto_(vfp_pull_f)
-v1f_pull_eof(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct vfp_entry *vfe, void *p, ssize_t *lp)
+v1f_eof_pull(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct vfp_entry *vfe, void *p, ssize_t *lp)
{
ssize_t l, lr;
struct http_conn *htc;
@@ -254,7 +293,7 @@ v1f_pull_eof(struct vfp_ctx *vc, struct vfp_entry *vfe, void *p, ssize_t *lp)
static const struct vfp v1f_eof = {
.name = "V1F_EOF",
- .pull = v1f_pull_eof,
+ .pull = v1f_eof_pull,
};
/*--------------------------------------------------------------------
diff --git a/bin/varnishtest/tests/f00016.vtc b/bin/varnishtest/tests/f00016.vtc
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..a38b8b1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/bin/varnishtest/tests/f00016.vtc
@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+varnishtest "Do not tolerate anything else than CRLF as chunked ending"
+
+server s0 {
+ rxreq
+ expect_close
+} -dispatch
+
+varnish v1 -vcl+backend {} -start
+
+logexpect l1 -v v1 {
+ expect * 1001 FetchError "chunked tail no NL"
+ expect * 1004 FetchError "chunked tail no NL"
+ expect * 1007 FetchError "chunked header non-hex"
+ expect * 1010 FetchError "chunked header non-hex"
+} -start
+
+client c1 {
+ non_fatal
+ txreq -req POST -hdr "Transfer-encoding: chunked"
+ send "1\r\n"
+ send "This is more than one byte of data\r\n"
+ send "0\r\n"
+ send "\r\n"
+ fatal
+ rxresp
+ expect resp.status == 503
+ expect_close
+} -run
+
+client c2 {
+ non_fatal
+ txreq -req POST -hdr "Transfer-encoding: chunked"
+ send "1\r\n"
+ send "Z 2\r\n"
+ send "3d\r\n"
+ send "0\r\n\r\nPOST /evil HTTP/1.1\r\nHost: whatever\r\nContent-Length: 5\r\n\r\n"
+ send "0\r\n"
+ send "\r\n"
+ fatal
+ rxresp
+ expect resp.status == 503
+ expect_close
+} -run
+
+client c3 {
+ non_fatal
+ txreq -req POST -hdr "Transfer-encoding: chunked"
+ send "d\r\n"
+ send "Spurious CRLF\r\n\r\n"
+ send "0\r\n"
+ send "\r\n"
+ fatal
+ rxresp
+ expect resp.status == 503
+ expect_close
+} -run
+
+client c4 {
+ non_fatal
+ txreq -req POST -hdr "Transfer-encoding: chunked"
+ send "\n0\r\n"
+ send "\r\n"
+ fatal
+ rxresp
+ expect resp.status == 503
+ expect_close
+} -run
+
+logexpect l1 -wait
diff --git a/bin/varnishtest/tests/r01184.vtc b/bin/varnishtest/tests/r01184.vtc
index d5aba32..f7cd8d7 100644
--- a/bin/varnishtest/tests/r01184.vtc
+++ b/bin/varnishtest/tests/r01184.vtc
@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ server s1 {
sendhex " 10 45 f3 a9 83 b8 18 1c 7b c2 30 55 04 17 13 c4"
sendhex " 0f 07 5f 7a 38 f4 8e 50 b3 37 d4 3a 32 4a 34 07"
sendhex " FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 72 ea 06 5f b3 1c fa dd"
+ send "\n"
expect_close
} -start
@@ -93,6 +94,7 @@ server s1 {
sendhex " 10 45 f3 a9 83 b8 18 1c 7b c2 30 55 04 17 13 c4"
sendhex " 0f 07 5f 7a 38 f4 8e 50 b3 37 d4 3a 32 4a 34 07"
sendhex " FF FF FF FF FF FF FF FF 72 ea 06 5f b3 1c fa dd"
+ send "\n"
expect_close
} -start
diff --git a/bin/varnishtest/tests/r01729.vtc b/bin/varnishtest/tests/r01729.vtc
index 883a60c..f6a01e9 100644
--- a/bin/varnishtest/tests/r01729.vtc
+++ b/bin/varnishtest/tests/r01729.vtc
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ server s1 {
send "\r\n"
send "14\r\n"
send "0123456789"
- send "0123456789"
+ send "0123456789\n"
send "0\r\n"
send "\r\n"
@@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ client c1 {
send "\r\n"
send "14\r\n"
send "0123456789"
- send "0123456789"
+ send "0123456789\n"
send "0\r\n"
send "\r\n"
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ client c1 {
send "\r\n"
send "14\r\n"
send "0123456789"
- send "0123456789"
+ send "0123456789\n"
send "0\r\n"
send "\r\n"
diff --git a/include/vct.h b/include/vct.h
index 1b7ffbd..e68e465 100644
--- a/include/vct.h
+++ b/include/vct.h
@@ -30,9 +30,9 @@
/* from libvarnish/vct.c */
-#define VCT_SP (1<<0)
+#define VCT_OWS (1<<0)
#define VCT_CRLF (1<<1)
-#define VCT_LWS (VCT_CRLF | VCT_SP)
+#define VCT_LWS (VCT_CRLF | VCT_OWS)
#define VCT_CTL (1<<2)
#define VCT_ALPHA (1<<3)
#define VCT_SEPARATOR (1<<4)
@@ -59,7 +59,8 @@ vct_is(int x, uint16_t y)
return (vct_typtab[x] & (y));
}
-#define vct_issp(x) vct_is(x, VCT_SP)
+#define vct_isows(x) vct_is(x, VCT_OWS)
+#define vct_issp(x) vct_is(x, VCT_OWS)
#define vct_ishex(x) vct_is(x, VCT_HEX)
#define vct_islws(x) vct_is(x, VCT_LWS)
#define vct_isctl(x) vct_is(x, VCT_CTL)
diff --git a/lib/libvarnish/vct.c b/lib/libvarnish/vct.c
index 73b784e..43853c9 100644
--- a/lib/libvarnish/vct.c
+++ b/lib/libvarnish/vct.c
@@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ const uint16_t vct_typtab[256] = {
[0x06] = VCT_CTL,
[0x07] = VCT_CTL,
[0x08] = VCT_CTL,
- [0x09] = VCT_CTL | VCT_SP,
+ [0x09] = VCT_CTL | VCT_OWS,
[0x0a] = VCT_CTL | VCT_CRLF,
[0x0b] = VCT_CTL | VCT_VT,
[0x0c] = VCT_CTL,
@@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ const uint16_t vct_typtab[256] = {
[0x1d] = VCT_CTL,
[0x1e] = VCT_CTL,
[0x1f] = VCT_CTL,
- [0x20] = VCT_SP,
+ [0x20] = VCT_OWS,
[0x21] = VCT_TCHAR,
[0x22] = VCT_SEPARATOR,
[0x23] = VCT_TCHAR,

85
SOURCES/varnish-6.0.8-CVE-2022-45060.patch
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@ -1,85 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/bin/varnishd/http2/cache_http2_hpack.c b/bin/varnishd/http2/cache_http2_hpack.c
index d432629..b0dacb9 100644
--- a/bin/varnishd/http2/cache_http2_hpack.c
+++ b/bin/varnishd/http2/cache_http2_hpack.c
@@ -93,18 +93,25 @@ static h2_error
h2h_addhdr(struct http *hp, char *b, size_t namelen, size_t len)
{
/* XXX: This might belong in cache/cache_http.c */
+ const char *b0;
unsigned n;
+ int disallow_empty;
+ char *p;
+ int i;
CHECK_OBJ_NOTNULL(hp, HTTP_MAGIC);
AN(b);
assert(namelen >= 2); /* 2 chars from the ': ' that we added */
assert(namelen <= len);
+
+ disallow_empty = 0;
if (len > UINT_MAX) { /* XXX: cache_param max header size */
VSLb(hp->vsl, SLT_BogoHeader, "Header too large: %.20s", b);
return (H2SE_ENHANCE_YOUR_CALM);
}
+ b0 = b;
if (b[0] == ':') {
/* Match H/2 pseudo headers */
/* XXX: Should probably have some include tbl for
@@ -113,10 +120,24 @@ h2h_addhdr(struct http *hp, char *b, size_t namelen, size_t len)
b += namelen;
len -= namelen;
n = HTTP_HDR_METHOD;
+ disallow_empty = 1;
+
+ /* First field cannot contain SP or CTL */
+ for (p = b, i = 0; i < len; p++, i++) {
+ if (vct_issp(*p) || vct_isctl(*p))
+ return (H2SE_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+ }
} else if (!strncmp(b, ":path: ", namelen)) {
b += namelen;
len -= namelen;
n = HTTP_HDR_URL;
+ disallow_empty = 1;
+
+ /* Second field cannot contain LWS or CTL */
+ for (p = b, i = 0; i < len; p++, i++) {
+ if (vct_islws(*p) || vct_isctl(*p))
+ return (H2SE_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+ }
} else if (!strncmp(b, ":scheme: ", namelen)) {
/* XXX: What to do about this one? (typically
"http" or "https"). For now set it as a normal
@@ -124,6 +145,15 @@ h2h_addhdr(struct http *hp, char *b, size_t namelen, size_t len)
b++;
len-=1;
n = hp->nhd;
+
+ for (p = b + namelen, i = 0; i < len-namelen;
+ p++, i++) {
+ if (vct_issp(*p) || vct_isctl(*p))
+ return (H2SE_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+ }
+
+ if (!i)
+ return (H2SE_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
} else if (!strncmp(b, ":authority: ", namelen)) {
b+=6;
len-=6;
@@ -160,6 +190,13 @@ h2h_addhdr(struct http *hp, char *b, size_t namelen, size_t len)
hp->hd[n].b = b;
hp->hd[n].e = b + len;
+ if (disallow_empty && !Tlen(hp->hd[n])) {
+ VSLb(hp->vsl, SLT_BogoHeader,
+ "Empty pseudo-header %.*s",
+ (int)namelen, b0);
+ return (H2SE_PROTOCOL_ERROR);
+ }
+
return (0);
}

13
SOURCES/varnish-6.0.8.CVE-2022-23959.patch
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@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/bin/varnishd/cache/cache_req_body.c b/bin/varnishd/cache/cache_req_body.c
index 463b75b..982bd73 100644
--- a/bin/varnishd/cache/cache_req_body.c
+++ b/bin/varnishd/cache/cache_req_body.c
@@ -254,6 +254,8 @@ VRB_Ignore(struct req *req)
if (req->req_body_status == REQ_BODY_WITH_LEN ||
req->req_body_status == REQ_BODY_WITHOUT_LEN)
(void)VRB_Iterate(req, httpq_req_body_discard, NULL);
+ if (req->req_body_status == REQ_BODY_FAIL)
+ req->doclose = SC_RX_BODY;
return(0);
}

37
SPECS/varnish.spec
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@ -18,8 +18,8 @@
Summary: High-performance HTTP accelerator
Name: varnish
Version: 6.0.8
Release: 2%{?dist}.1
Version: 6.0.13
Release: 1%{?dist}.1
License: BSD
Group: System Environment/Daemons
URL: https://www.varnish-cache.org/
@ -32,11 +32,9 @@ Patch9: varnish-5.1.1.fix_python_version.patch
# https://github.com/varnishcache/varnish-cache/commit/5220c394232c25bb7a807a35e7394059ecefa821#diff-2279587378a4426edde05f42e1acca5e
Patch11: varnish-6.0.0.fix_el6_fortify_source.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2045031
Patch100: varnish-6.0.8.CVE-2022-23959.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2141844
Patch101: varnish-6.0.8-CVE-2022-45060.patch
# Security patches ...
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2364235
Patch100: varnish-6.0.13-CVE-2025-47905.patch
Obsoletes: varnish-libs
@ -145,9 +143,7 @@ sed -i '8 i\RPM_BUILD_ROOT=%{buildroot}' find-provides
%patch9 -p0
%patch11 -p0
%endif
%patch100 -p1
%patch101 -p1
%build
%if 0%{?rhel} == 6
@ -214,6 +210,10 @@ sed -i 's/48/128/g;' bin/varnishtest/tests/c00057.vtc
%endif
#make %{?_smp_mflags} check LD_LIBRARY_PATH="%{buildroot}%{_libdir}:%{buildroot}%{_libdir}/%{name}" VERBOSE=1
# disable test because of CVE-2023-44487 fix
# https://github.com/varnishcache/varnish-cache/pull/3998#issuecomment-1764649216
rm bin/varnishtest/tests/t02014.vtc
%install
rm -rf %{buildroot}
make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot} INSTALL="install -p"
@ -380,12 +380,21 @@ fi
%changelog
* Mon Nov 14 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 6.0.8-2.1
- Resolves: #2142092 - CVE-2022-45060 varnish:6/varnish: Request Forgery
Vulnerability
* Wed May 21 2025 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 6.0.13-1.1
- Resolves: RHEL-89695 - varnish: request smuggling attacks (CVE-2025-47905)
* Tue Feb 01 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 6.0.8-2
- Resolves: #2047650 - CVE-2022-23959 varnish:6/varnish: Varnish HTTP/1 Request
* Thu Mar 28 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 6.0.13-1
- new version 6.0.13
- Resolves: RHEL-30379 - varnish:6/varnish: HTTP/2 Broken Window Attack may
result in denial of service (CVE-2024-30156)
* Mon Oct 23 2023 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 6.0.8-4
- Add parameters h2_rst_allowance and h2_rst_allowance_period to mitigate CVE-2023-44487
- CVE-2022-45060 varnish:6/varnish: Request Forgery
- Resolves: RHEL-12814
* Tue Feb 01 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 6.0.8-1.1
- Resolves: #2047648 - CVE-2022-23959 varnish:6/varnish: Varnish HTTP/1 Request
Smuggling Vulnerability
* Thu Jul 22 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 6.0.8-1