import unbound-1.7.3-8.el8

This commit is contained in:
CentOS Sources 2019-05-07 05:46:32 -04:00 committed by Andrew Lukoshko
commit e4a827766d
23 changed files with 3531 additions and 0 deletions

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.gitignore vendored Normal file
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SOURCES/unbound-1.7.3.tar.gz

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.unbound.metadata Normal file
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106789bdca173d033d769c67be3441b47611612a SOURCES/unbound-1.7.3.tar.gz

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# entries in this file override toe global DNS
#
# Example blocking email going out to example.com
#
# local-data: "example.com. 3600 IN MX 5 127.0.0.1"
# local-data: "example.com. 3600 IN A 127.0.0.1"
# This can also be done dynamically using: unbound-control local-data [...]
# For more complicated redirection, use conf.d/ with stub-add: or forward-add:

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SOURCES/example.com.conf Normal file
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# Example of an override of the "public DNS tree" with an "internal view"
# override, for example to add an internal-only corporate DNS zone.
#
# The stub-zone/stub-addr must point to AUTHORITATIVE servers. If you want to
# point to an internal RECURSIVE server, use forward-zone/forward-addr instead.
#stub-zone:
# name: example.com
# stub-prime: no
# # if you could trust a lookup, use:
# stub-host: a.iana-servers.net.
# stub-host: b.iana-servers.net.
# # else specify the IP's using:
# stub-addr: 199.43.132.53
# stub-addr: 2001:500:8c::53
# stub-addr: 199.43.133.53
# stub-addr: 2001:500:8d::53

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SOURCES/example.com.key Normal file
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; // format is BIND trusted-keys format
; // Ensure to only put KSKs (usually 257) here, not ZSKs (usually 256)
; // trusted-keys {
; // "example.com." 257 3 8 "AwEAAawt7HplI5M8GGAsxuyCyjF0l+QlcgVN11CRZ4vP66qbDCX0BnShZ11BGb//4zSG/8mmBHirL2FLg+mVuIIxig+iroZYjh4iTKVOhv2hZftRwyrQHK++qXvCCWN3ki51RG/e8R4kOEV71rZ8OgQvPWx6F91qroqOPpcf7PPxippeHOn+PxnP0hpyLyo1mx1rPs/cMpL3jOMufGP+LJYh+fBU7lt0sP5i09HaJPruzyZML9BPtpv8ZAdQhwtXVG0+MnET2qT/1+TljpxZn6yeegFRCFRHBjMo6iiRJnUWra/klkrgEn2Q+BXGTOMTTKQdYz4OxYEa1z7apu3a09dYNBM="; // key id = 51605
; // "example.com." 257 3 8 "AwEAAeikvxboZpn9VCxm3YDLHo40SvA9EmRwJHHQyJ0OCzrQSRBSipojrW7yESXWiDDyzflS8rgzDs7M3fIdSduOdyNi55DmXPdkS8HYORTMNyzFsSOg+xx6tUySK2p4WAhlbsJNLz4IkQCek59NoDBOLyQ15npsr7Tgfb/HHU7zmCMvnxh0SqO2lyhnQfk29Thc3nC4KNJNb3drjWKOuCw5mg+2GrEZYc/VqdeGvrOCQ2el8jWZpSU5cxb7EdEy4B9nEeZiBpHXaZ5XJ+ewi4vmcUK5/445mGJqV4rDeicy5/ShC/BJ81v3bIRPWebvDRJmDbjr2d9MnLXUE7yyETrQd18="; // key id = 31589
; // };

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SOURCES/icannbundle.pem Normal file
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Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 1 (0x1)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: O=ICANN, OU=ICANN Certification Authority, CN=ICANN Root CA, C=US
Validity
Not Before: Dec 23 04:19:12 2009 GMT
Not After : Dec 18 04:19:12 2029 GMT
Subject: O=ICANN, OU=ICANN Certification Authority, CN=ICANN Root CA, C=US
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus (2048 bit):
00:a0:db:70:b8:4f:34:da:9c:d4:d0:7e:bb:ea:15:
bc:e9:c9:11:2a:1f:61:2f:6a:b9:bd:3f:3d:76:a0:
9a:0a:f7:ee:93:6e:6e:55:53:84:8c:f2:2c:f1:82:
27:c8:0f:9a:cf:52:1b:54:da:28:d2:2c:30:8e:dd:
fb:92:20:33:2d:d6:c8:f1:0e:10:21:88:71:fa:84:
22:4b:5d:47:56:16:7c:9b:9f:5d:c3:11:79:9c:14:
e2:ff:c0:74:ac:dd:39:d7:e0:38:d8:b0:73:aa:fb:
d1:db:84:af:52:22:a8:f6:d5:9b:94:f4:e6:5d:5e:
e8:3f:87:90:0b:c7:1a:77:f5:2e:d3:8f:1a:ce:02:
1d:07:69:21:47:32:da:46:ae:00:4c:b6:a5:a2:9c:
39:c1:c0:4a:f6:d3:1c:ae:d3:6d:bb:c7:18:f0:7e:
ed:f6:80:ce:d0:01:2e:89:de:12:ba:ee:11:cb:a6:
7a:d7:0d:7c:f3:08:8d:72:9d:bf:55:75:13:70:bb:
31:22:4a:cb:e8:c0:aa:a4:09:aa:36:68:40:60:74:
9d:e7:19:81:43:22:52:fe:c9:2b:52:0f:41:13:36:
09:72:65:95:cc:89:ae:6f:56:17:16:34:73:52:a3:
04:ed:bd:88:82:8a:eb:d7:dc:82:52:9c:06:e1:52:
85:41
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Digital Signature, Non Repudiation, Key Encipherment, Data Encipherment, Key Agreement, Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
BA:52:E9:49:83:24:86:52:2F:C7:99:CD:FC:8D:6B:69:08:4D:C0:50
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
0f:f1:e9:82:a2:0a:87:9f:2d:94:60:5a:b2:c0:4b:a1:2f:2b:
3b:47:d5:0a:99:86:38:b2:ec:c6:3b:89:e4:6e:07:cf:14:c7:
c7:e8:cf:99:8f:aa:30:c3:19:70:b9:e6:6d:d6:3f:c8:68:26:
b2:a0:a5:37:42:ca:d8:62:80:d1:a2:5a:48:2e:1f:85:3f:0c:
7b:c2:c7:94:11:5f:19:2a:95:ac:a0:3a:03:d8:91:5b:2e:0d:
9c:7c:1f:2e:fc:e9:44:e1:16:26:73:1c:45:4a:65:c1:83:4c:
90:f3:f2:28:42:df:db:c4:e7:04:12:18:62:43:5e:bc:1f:6c:
84:e6:bc:49:32:df:61:d7:99:ee:e4:90:52:7b:0a:c2:91:8a:
98:62:66:b1:c8:e0:b7:5a:b5:46:7c:76:71:54:8e:cc:a4:81:
5c:19:db:d2:6f:66:b5:bb:2b:ae:6b:c9:74:04:a8:24:de:e8:
c5:d3:fc:2c:1c:d7:8f:db:6a:8d:c9:53:be:5d:50:73:ac:cf:
1f:93:c0:52:50:5b:a2:4f:fe:ad:65:36:17:46:d1:2d:e5:a2:
90:66:05:db:29:4e:5d:50:5d:e3:4f:da:a0:8f:f0:6b:e4:16:
70:dd:7f:f3:77:7d:b9:4e:f9:ec:c3:33:02:d7:e9:63:2f:31:
e7:40:61:a4
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 11 (0xb)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: O=ICANN, OU=ICANN Certification Authority, CN=ICANN Root CA, C=US
Validity
Not Before: Nov 8 23:39:47 2016 GMT
Not After : Nov 6 23:39:47 2026 GMT
Subject: O=ICANN, CN=ICANN EMAIL CA
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus (2048 bit):
00:d2:19:1e:22:69:33:f6:a4:d2:76:c5:80:11:75:
8e:d0:e8:6f:bf:89:f8:2a:6a:da:8a:85:28:40:ba:
c5:23:5f:47:ed:72:e2:8e:d3:5c:c8:8a:3a:99:a9:
57:2c:0a:2b:22:f3:54:7b:8b:f7:8c:21:a2:50:01:
4f:8b:af:34:df:72:fc:78:31:d0:1d:eb:bc:9b:e6:
fa:c1:84:d0:05:07:8a:74:53:a5:60:9e:eb:75:9e:
a8:5d:32:c8:02:32:e4:bf:cb:97:9b:7a:fa:2c:f6:
6a:1d:b8:57:ad:e3:03:22:93:d0:f4:4f:a8:b8:01:
db:82:33:98:b6:87:ed:3d:67:40:00:27:2e:d5:95:
d2:ad:36:46:14:c6:17:79:65:7f:65:f3:88:80:65:
7c:22:67:08:23:3c:cf:a5:10:38:72:30:97:92:6f:
20:4a:ba:24:4c:4a:c8:4a:a5:dc:2a:44:a1:29:78:
b4:9f:fe:84:ff:27:5b:3a:72:ea:31:c1:ad:06:22:
d6:44:a0:4a:57:32:9c:f2:46:47:d0:89:6e:20:23:
2c:ea:b0:83:7e:c1:f3:ea:da:dd:e3:63:59:97:21:
fa:1b:11:39:27:cf:82:8b:56:15:d4:36:92:0c:a5:
7e:80:e0:18:c9:50:08:42:0a:df:97:3c:9c:b8:0a:
4d:b1
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:BA:52:E9:49:83:24:86:52:2F:C7:99:CD:FC:8D:6B:69:08:4D:C0:50
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
7B:3F:BA:CE:A1:B3:A6:13:2E:5A:82:84:D4:D2:EA:A5:24:F1:CD:B4
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
0e:8a:c9:ea:6f:9c:e9:23:b6:9c:a6:a4:c2:d1:b1:ee:25:18:
24:2b:79:d4:a8:f2:99:b9:5c:91:4d:e6:2b:32:2e:01:f5:87:
95:64:fc:6d:f1:87:fa:24:b4:43:4b:49:f3:84:54:44:eb:af:
41:ab:49:ab:c8:b7:32:6c:14:83:5b:d7:2c:41:f9:89:d5:c4:
2b:9a:55:c5:b6:ad:17:d5:4d:bc:41:58:56:72:0d:db:b7:7d:
57:c6:a2:9c:7e:6b:67:ae:26:f8:26:45:bb:c4:95:2e:ea:71:
e3:b4:7a:69:95:a4:8a:80:f8:59:dc:88:6e:e1:a7:fc:bb:8e:
b2:aa:a8:b6:1b:2f:2c:97:a5:12:d5:82:ae:a0:e8:a6:15:fd:
d1:e0:5d:e4:84:b1:76:db:0a:e2:ca:58:2e:d3:df:48:4e:46:
ac:c6:35:79:17:99:ce:e9:be:2c:e4:c2:50:ff:5b:96:15:cd:
64:ac:1b:db:fe:d2:ac:43:61:c8:5f:ee:24:b6:a4:3b:d2:ff:
0a:f4:0c:88:58:a1:9d:a4:c1:1f:6a:6c:67:90:98:e8:1f:5e:
2d:55:60:91:26:2a:b1:66:80:e4:e6:0e:05:2c:75:a9:ca:0b:
e4:a0:8f:e1:47:a8:8f:61:5d:7c:ce:09:60:88:48:c3:46:bf:
be:7e:36:be
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----
Certificate:
Data:
Version: 3 (0x2)
Serial Number: 10 (0xa)
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
Issuer: O=ICANN, OU=ICANN Certification Authority, CN=ICANN Root CA, C=US
Validity
Not Before: Nov 8 23:38:16 2016 GMT
Not After : Nov 6 23:38:16 2026 GMT
Subject: O=ICANN, CN=ICANN SSL CA
Subject Public Key Info:
Public Key Algorithm: rsaEncryption
RSA Public Key: (2048 bit)
Modulus (2048 bit):
00:dd:c6:ab:bf:7c:66:9d:b3:2b:96:00:14:c7:60:
7a:8d:62:5b:26:4b:30:d7:b3:4c:82:69:c6:4d:4d:
73:f3:d4:91:21:5d:ab:35:f0:c8:04:0e:f4:a3:35:
e2:e1:18:a9:98:12:03:58:f8:9f:eb:77:54:5b:89:
81:26:c9:aa:c2:f4:c9:0c:82:57:2a:5e:05:e9:61:
17:cc:19:18:71:eb:35:83:c1:86:9d:ec:f1:6b:ca:
dd:a1:96:0b:95:d4:e1:0f:9e:24:6f:dc:3c:d0:28:
9e:f2:53:47:2b:a1:ad:32:03:c8:3f:0d:80:80:7d:
f0:02:d2:6e:5a:2c:44:21:9b:09:50:15:3f:a1:3d:
d3:c9:c8:24:e7:ea:4e:92:2f:94:90:2e:de:e7:68:
f6:c6:b3:90:1f:bc:c9:7b:a2:65:d7:11:e9:8b:f0:
3a:5a:b7:17:07:df:69:e3:6e:b9:54:6a:8e:3a:aa:
94:7f:2c:0a:a1:ad:ba:b7:d9:60:62:27:a7:71:40:
3b:8e:b0:84:7b:b8:c8:67:ef:66:ba:3d:ac:c3:85:
e5:86:bb:a7:9c:fd:b6:e1:c0:10:53:3d:d4:7e:1b:
09:e6:9f:22:5c:a7:27:09:7e:27:12:33:fa:df:9b:
20:2f:14:f7:17:c0:e4:1e:07:91:1f:f9:9a:cd:a8:
e2:c5
Exponent: 65537 (0x10001)
X509v3 extensions:
X509v3 Basic Constraints: critical
CA:TRUE
X509v3 Key Usage: critical
Certificate Sign, CRL Sign
X509v3 Authority Key Identifier:
keyid:BA:52:E9:49:83:24:86:52:2F:C7:99:CD:FC:8D:6B:69:08:4D:C0:50
X509v3 Subject Key Identifier:
6E:77:A8:40:10:4A:D8:9C:0C:F2:B7:5A:3A:A5:2F:79:4A:61:14:D8
Signature Algorithm: sha256WithRSAEncryption
47:46:4f:c7:5f:46:e3:d1:dc:fc:2b:f8:fc:65:ce:36:b1:f4:
5f:ee:14:75:a3:d9:5f:de:75:4b:fa:7b:88:9f:10:8c:2e:97:
cc:35:1b:ce:24:d3:36:60:95:d5:ae:11:b6:3f:8b:f4:12:69:
85:b5:3b:2a:b6:ab:7a:81:85:c2:55:57:ed:d0:b5:e7:4f:54:
37:51:24:c9:d5:07:3a:ef:b6:c5:1a:3e:14:29:a7:a6:f8:08:
2a:0b:26:79:f9:62:85:4a:e5:ea:90:ca:71:38:16:91:4e:7e:
fd:e3:b3:f3:55:8f:5a:d0:86:cf:33:94:88:f1:90:99:cb:81:
e2:81:92:68:2f:c3:61:d5:52:8d:e6:9a:5b:00:83:42:27:88:
f6:d9:fa:d1:bc:bb:b0:bc:b5:14:0b:4e:1a:54:ef:fa:d6:9d:
c4:0c:fc:ed:15:ab:21:4b:45:b5:d9:3b:ed:3c:d5:1e:2e:7a:
83:6f:24:45:d4:4c:b4:ef:60:43:18:d0:84:5d:16:7b:f5:50:
80:b1:a9:c2:8f:3b:c8:90:08:fd:aa:17:13:19:38:19:d1:8e:
85:7c:1e:57:16:8c:f9:8a:e8:29:25:38:cd:bb:55:8e:4a:6a:
6f:e5:7d:fc:d7:55:d6:ae:38:07:96:c1:97:ff:e5:2b:4f:99:
2d:70:f2:08
-----BEGIN CERTIFICATE-----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-----END CERTIFICATE-----

2
SOURCES/root.anchor Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
. 172800 IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAaz/tAm8yTn4Mfeh5eyI96WSVexTBAvkMgJzkKTOiW1vkIbzxeF3+/4RgWOq7HrxRixHlFlExOLAJr5emLvN7SWXgnLh4+B5xQlNVz8Og8kvArMtNROxVQuCaSnIDdD5LKyWbRd2n9WGe2R8PzgCmr3EgVLrjyBxWezF0jLHwVN8efS3rCj/EWgvIWgb9tarpVUDK/b58Da+sqqls3eNbuv7pr+eoZG+SrDK6nWeL3c6H5Apxz7LjVc1uTIdsIXxuOLYA4/ilBmSVIzuDWfdRUfhHdY6+cn8HFRm+2hM8AnXGXws9555KrUB5qihylGa8subX2Nn6UwNR1AkUTV74bU= ;{id = 20326 (ksk), size = 2048b}
. 98799 IN DNSKEY 257 3 8 AwEAAagAIKlVZrpC6Ia7gEzahOR+9W29euxhJhVVLOyQbSEW0O8gcCjFFVQUTf6v58fLjwBd0YI0EzrAcQqBGCzh/RStIoO8g0NfnfL2MTJRkxoXbfDaUeVPQuYEhg37NZWAJQ9VnMVDxP/VHL496M/QZxkjf5/Efucp2gaDX6RS6CXpoY68LsvPVjR0ZSwzz1apAzvN9dlzEheX7ICJBBtuA6G3LQpzW5hOA2hzCTMjJPJ8LbqF6dsV6DoBQzgul0sGIcGOYl7OyQdXfZ57relSQageu+ipAdTTJ25AsRTAoub8ONGcLmqrAmRLKBP1dfwhYB4N7knNnulqQxA+Uk1ihz0= ;{id = 19036 (ksk), size = 2048b}

8
SOURCES/root.key Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,8 @@
; // The root key in bind format. This can be read by most tools, including
; // named, unbound, et. For libunbound, use ub_ctx_trustedkeys() to load this
trusted-keys {
"." 257 3 8 "AwEAAaz/tAm8yTn4Mfeh5eyI96WSVexTBAvkMgJzkKTOiW1vkIbzxeF3+/4RgWOq7HrxRixHlFlExOLAJr5emLvN7SWXgnLh4+B5xQlNVz8Og8kvArMtNROxVQuCaSnIDdD5LKyWbRd2n9WGe2R8PzgCmr3EgVLrjyBxWezF0jLHwVN8efS3rCj/EWgvIWgb9tarpVUDK/b58Da+sqqls3eNbuv7pr+eoZG+SrDK6nWeL3c6H5Apxz7LjVc1uTIdsIXxuOLYA4/ilBmSVIzuDWfdRUfhHdY6+cn8HFRm+2hM8AnXGXws9555KrUB5qihylGa8subX2Nn6UwNR1AkUTV74bU="; // key id = 20326
"." 257 3 8 "AwEAAagAIKlVZrpC6Ia7gEzahOR+9W29euxhJhVVLOyQbSEW0O8gcCjFFVQUTf6v58fLjwBd0YI0EzrAcQqBGCzh/RStIoO8g0NfnfL2MTJRkxoXbfDaUeVPQuYEhg37NZWAJQ9VnMVDxP/VHL496M/QZxkjf5/Efucp2gaDX6RS6CXpoY68LsvPVjR0ZSwzz1apAzvN9dlzEheX7ICJBBtuA6G3LQpzW5hOA2hzCTMjJPJ8LbqF6dsV6DoBQzgul0sGIcGOYl7OyQdXfZ57relSQageu+ipAdTTJ25AsRTAoub8ONGcLmqrAmRLKBP1dfwhYB4N7knNnulqQxA+Uk1ihz0="; // key id = 19036
};

View File

@ -0,0 +1 @@
D /var/run/unbound 0755 unbound unbound -

View File

@ -0,0 +1,320 @@
From b5aab36d41f374eddb0f66f28f251588f53a1e1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wouter Wijngaards <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 05:46:36 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] - #4109: Fix that package config depends on python
unconditionally.
git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@4757 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
---
configure | 257 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------------
configure.ac | 5 +-
2 files changed, 137 insertions(+), 125 deletions(-)
diff --git a/configure b/configure
index 3f1c372a..2a1687ae 100755
--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
@@ -670,9 +670,6 @@ SYSTEMD_DAEMON_LIBS
SYSTEMD_DAEMON_CFLAGS
SYSTEMD_LIBS
SYSTEMD_CFLAGS
-PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR
-PKG_CONFIG_PATH
-PKG_CONFIG
staticexe
PC_LIBEVENT_DEPENDENCY
UNBOUND_EVENT_UNINSTALL
@@ -697,6 +694,9 @@ swig
SWIG_LIB
SWIG
PC_PY_DEPENDENCY
+PKG_CONFIG_LIBDIR
+PKG_CONFIG_PATH
+PKG_CONFIG
PY_MAJOR_VERSION
PYTHON_SITE_PKG
PYTHON_LDFLAGS
@@ -16930,7 +16930,136 @@ $as_echo "#define HAVE_PYTHON 1" >>confdefs.h
CPPFLAGS="$PYTHON_CPPFLAGS"
fi
ub_have_python=yes
- PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python"
+
+
+
+
+
+
+
+if test "x$ac_cv_env_PKG_CONFIG_set" != "xset"; then
+ if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
+ # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $PKG_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+PKG_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG
+if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKG_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$PKG_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+
+fi
+if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG"; then
+ ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
+ # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
+set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
+if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG+:} false; then :
+ $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
+else
+ case $ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG in
+ [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG="$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
+ ;;
+ *)
+ as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
+for as_dir in $PATH
+do
+ IFS=$as_save_IFS
+ test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
+ for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
+ if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
+ ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
+ break 2
+ fi
+done
+ done
+IFS=$as_save_IFS
+
+ ;;
+esac
+fi
+ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG
+if test -n "$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG"; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" >&5
+$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" >&6; }
+else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+fi
+
+ if test "x$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" = x; then
+ PKG_CONFIG=""
+ else
+ case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
+yes:)
+{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
+$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
+ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
+esac
+ PKG_CONFIG=$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG
+ fi
+else
+ PKG_CONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG"
+fi
+
+fi
+if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
+ _pkg_min_version=0.9.0
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version" >&5
+$as_echo_n "checking pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version... " >&6; }
+ if $PKG_CONFIG --atleast-pkgconfig-version $_pkg_min_version; then
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
+$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
+ else
+ { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
+$as_echo "no" >&6; }
+ PKG_CONFIG=""
+ fi
+fi
+ if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG" && \
+ { { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$PKG_CONFIG --exists --print-errors \"\"python\${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}\"\""; } >&5
+ ($PKG_CONFIG --exists --print-errors ""python${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}"") 2>&5
+ ac_status=$?
+ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: \$? = $ac_status" >&5
+ test $ac_status = 0; }; then
+ PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}"
+else
+ PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python"
+fi
# Check for SWIG
@@ -18960,126 +19089,6 @@ else
fi
have_systemd=no
-
-
-
-
-
-
-
-if test "x$ac_cv_env_PKG_CONFIG_set" != "xset"; then
- if test -n "$ac_tool_prefix"; then
- # Extract the first word of "${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy ${ac_tool_prefix}pkg-config; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $PKG_CONFIG in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG="$PKG_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
- ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-PKG_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG
-if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $PKG_CONFIG" >&5
-$as_echo "$PKG_CONFIG" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
-
-fi
-if test -z "$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG"; then
- ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG=$PKG_CONFIG
- # Extract the first word of "pkg-config", so it can be a program name with args.
-set dummy pkg-config; ac_word=$2
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking for $ac_word" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking for $ac_word... " >&6; }
-if ${ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG+:} false; then :
- $as_echo_n "(cached) " >&6
-else
- case $ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG in
- [\\/]* | ?:[\\/]*)
- ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG="$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" # Let the user override the test with a path.
- ;;
- *)
- as_save_IFS=$IFS; IFS=$PATH_SEPARATOR
-for as_dir in $PATH
-do
- IFS=$as_save_IFS
- test -z "$as_dir" && as_dir=.
- for ac_exec_ext in '' $ac_executable_extensions; do
- if as_fn_executable_p "$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"; then
- ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG="$as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext"
- $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: found $as_dir/$ac_word$ac_exec_ext" >&5
- break 2
- fi
-done
- done
-IFS=$as_save_IFS
-
- ;;
-esac
-fi
-ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG=$ac_cv_path_ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG
-if test -n "$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG"; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: $ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" >&5
-$as_echo "$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" >&6; }
-else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
-fi
-
- if test "x$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG" = x; then
- PKG_CONFIG=""
- else
- case $cross_compiling:$ac_tool_warned in
-yes:)
-{ $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&5
-$as_echo "$as_me: WARNING: using cross tools not prefixed with host triplet" >&2;}
-ac_tool_warned=yes ;;
-esac
- PKG_CONFIG=$ac_pt_PKG_CONFIG
- fi
-else
- PKG_CONFIG="$ac_cv_path_PKG_CONFIG"
-fi
-
-fi
-if test -n "$PKG_CONFIG"; then
- _pkg_min_version=0.9.0
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: checking pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version" >&5
-$as_echo_n "checking pkg-config is at least version $_pkg_min_version... " >&6; }
- if $PKG_CONFIG --atleast-pkgconfig-version $_pkg_min_version; then
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: yes" >&5
-$as_echo "yes" >&6; }
- else
- { $as_echo "$as_me:${as_lineno-$LINENO}: result: no" >&5
-$as_echo "no" >&6; }
- PKG_CONFIG=""
- fi
-fi
if test "x$enable_systemd" != xno; then :
diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
index 1828253c..b2c95d1a 100644
--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
@@ -586,7 +586,10 @@ if test x_$ub_test_python != x_no; then
CPPFLAGS="$PYTHON_CPPFLAGS"
fi
ub_have_python=yes
- PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python"
+ PKG_PROG_PKG_CONFIG
+ PKG_CHECK_EXISTS(["python${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}"],
+ [PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python${PY_MAJOR_VERSION}"],
+ [PC_PY_DEPENDENCY="python"])
AC_SUBST(PC_PY_DEPENDENCY)
# Check for SWIG
--
2.14.4

View File

@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
From bca54a8b252d4a75e940424dc761c6a4e487eb84 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wouter Wijngaards <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Wed, 27 Jun 2018 06:07:31 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] =?UTF-8?q?-=20Patch,=20do=20not=20export=20python=20f?=
=?UTF-8?q?rom=20pkg-config,=20from=20Petr=20Men=C5=A1=C3=ADk.?=
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@4758 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
---
contrib/libunbound.pc.in | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/contrib/libunbound.pc.in b/contrib/libunbound.pc.in
index 0cb9f875..810c5713 100644
--- a/contrib/libunbound.pc.in
+++ b/contrib/libunbound.pc.in
@@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ Name: unbound
Description: Library with validating, recursive, and caching DNS resolver
URL: http://www.unbound.net
Version: @PACKAGE_VERSION@
-Requires: @PC_LIBEVENT_DEPENDENCY@ @PC_PY_DEPENDENCY@
+Requires: libcrypto libssl @PC_LIBEVENT_DEPENDENCY@
+Requires.private: @PC_PY_DEPENDENCY@
Libs: -L${libdir} -lunbound -lssl -lcrypto
Libs.private: @SSLLIB@ @LIBS@
Cflags: -I${includedir}
--
2.14.4

View File

@ -0,0 +1,182 @@
From 81e9f82a8ddd811d7ebafe2fd0ee5af836d0b405 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Wouter Wijngaards <wouter@nlnetlabs.nl>
Date: Wed, 4 Jul 2018 10:02:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] - Fix #4112: Fix that unbound-anchor -f /etc/resolv.conf will
not pass if DNSSEC is not enabled. New option -R allows fallback from
resolv.conf to direct queries.
git-svn-id: file:///svn/unbound/trunk@4770 be551aaa-1e26-0410-a405-d3ace91eadb9
---
doc/unbound-anchor.8.in | 5 ++++
smallapp/unbound-anchor.c | 66 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
2 files changed, 53 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in b/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in
index 02a3e781..e114eb25 100644
--- a/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in
+++ b/doc/unbound-anchor.8.in
@@ -109,6 +109,11 @@ It does so, because the tool when used for bootstrapping the recursive
resolver, cannot use that recursive resolver itself because it is bootstrapping
that server.
.TP
+.B \-R
+Allow fallback from \-f resolv.conf file to direct root servers query.
+It allows you to prefer local resolvers, but fallback automatically
+to direct root query if they do not respond or do not support DNSSEC.
+.TP
.B \-v
More verbose. Once prints informational messages, multiple times may enable
large debug amounts (such as full certificates or byte\-dumps of downloaded
diff --git a/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c b/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c
index b3009108..f3985090 100644
--- a/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c
+++ b/smallapp/unbound-anchor.c
@@ -192,9 +192,10 @@ usage(void)
printf("-n name signer's subject emailAddress, default %s\n", P7SIGNER);
printf("-4 work using IPv4 only\n");
printf("-6 work using IPv6 only\n");
- printf("-f resolv.conf use given resolv.conf to resolve -u name\n");
- printf("-r root.hints use given root.hints to resolve -u name\n"
+ printf("-f resolv.conf use given resolv.conf\n");
+ printf("-r root.hints use given root.hints\n"
" builtin root hints are used by default\n");
+ printf("-R fallback from -f to root query on error\n");
printf("-v more verbose\n");
printf("-C conf debug, read config\n");
printf("-P port use port for https connect, default 443\n");
@@ -1920,8 +1921,7 @@ static int
do_certupdate(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
const char* urlname, const char* xmlname, const char* p7sname,
const char* p7signer, const char* res_conf, const char* root_hints,
- const char* debugconf, int ip4only, int ip6only, int port,
- struct ub_result* dnskey)
+ const char* debugconf, int ip4only, int ip6only, int port)
{
STACK_OF(X509)* cert;
BIO *xml, *p7s;
@@ -1961,7 +1961,6 @@ do_certupdate(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
#ifndef S_SPLINT_S
sk_X509_pop_free(cert, X509_free);
#endif
- ub_resolve_free(dnskey);
ip_list_free(ip_list);
return 1;
}
@@ -2199,16 +2198,33 @@ probe_date_allows_certupdate(const char* root_anchor_file)
return 0;
}
+static struct ub_result *
+fetch_root_key(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* res_conf,
+ const char* root_hints, const char* debugconf,
+ int ip4only, int ip6only)
+{
+ struct ub_ctx* ctx;
+ struct ub_result* dnskey;
+
+ ctx = create_unbound_context(res_conf, root_hints, debugconf,
+ ip4only, ip6only);
+ add_5011_probe_root(ctx, root_anchor_file);
+ dnskey = prime_root_key(ctx);
+ ub_ctx_delete(ctx);
+ return dnskey;
+}
+
/** perform the unbound-anchor work */
static int
do_root_update_work(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
const char* urlname, const char* xmlname, const char* p7sname,
const char* p7signer, const char* res_conf, const char* root_hints,
- const char* debugconf, int ip4only, int ip6only, int force, int port)
+ const char* debugconf, int ip4only, int ip6only, int force,
+ int res_conf_fallback, int port)
{
- struct ub_ctx* ctx;
struct ub_result* dnskey;
int used_builtin = 0;
+ int rcode;
/* see if builtin rootanchor needs to be provided, or if
* rootanchor is 'revoked-trust-point' */
@@ -2217,12 +2233,22 @@ do_root_update_work(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
/* make unbound context with 5011-probe for root anchor,
* and probe . DNSKEY */
- ctx = create_unbound_context(res_conf, root_hints, debugconf,
- ip4only, ip6only);
- add_5011_probe_root(ctx, root_anchor_file);
- dnskey = prime_root_key(ctx);
- ub_ctx_delete(ctx);
-
+ dnskey = fetch_root_key(root_anchor_file, res_conf,
+ root_hints, debugconf, ip4only, ip6only);
+ rcode = dnskey->rcode;
+
+ if (res_conf_fallback && res_conf && !dnskey->secure) {
+ if (verb) printf("%s failed, retrying direct\n", res_conf);
+ ub_resolve_free(dnskey);
+ /* try direct query without res_conf */
+ dnskey = fetch_root_key(root_anchor_file, NULL,
+ root_hints, debugconf, ip4only, ip6only);
+ if (rcode != 0 && dnskey->rcode == 0) {
+ res_conf = NULL;
+ rcode = 0;
+ }
+ }
+
/* if secure: exit */
if(dnskey->secure && !force) {
if(verb) printf("success: the anchor is ok\n");
@@ -2230,18 +2256,18 @@ do_root_update_work(const char* root_anchor_file, const char* root_cert_file,
return used_builtin;
}
if(force && verb) printf("debug cert update forced\n");
+ ub_resolve_free(dnskey);
/* if not (and NOERROR): check date and do certupdate */
- if((dnskey->rcode == 0 &&
+ if((rcode == 0 &&
probe_date_allows_certupdate(root_anchor_file)) || force) {
if(do_certupdate(root_anchor_file, root_cert_file, urlname,
xmlname, p7sname, p7signer, res_conf, root_hints,
- debugconf, ip4only, ip6only, port, dnskey))
+ debugconf, ip4only, ip6only, port))
return 1;
return used_builtin;
}
if(verb) printf("fail: the anchor is NOT ok and could not be fixed\n");
- ub_resolve_free(dnskey);
return used_builtin;
}
@@ -2264,8 +2290,9 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
const char* root_hints = NULL;
const char* debugconf = NULL;
int dolist=0, ip4only=0, ip6only=0, force=0, port = HTTPS_PORT;
+ int res_conf_fallback = 0;
/* parse the options */
- while( (c=getopt(argc, argv, "46C:FP:a:c:f:hln:r:s:u:vx:")) != -1) {
+ while( (c=getopt(argc, argv, "46C:FRP:a:c:f:hln:r:s:u:vx:")) != -1) {
switch(c) {
case 'l':
dolist = 1;
@@ -2300,6 +2327,9 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
case 'r':
root_hints = optarg;
break;
+ case 'R':
+ res_conf_fallback = 1;
+ break;
case 'C':
debugconf = optarg;
break;
@@ -2346,5 +2376,5 @@ int main(int argc, char* argv[])
return do_root_update_work(root_anchor_file, root_cert_file, urlname,
xmlname, p7sname, p7signer, res_conf, root_hints, debugconf,
- ip4only, ip6only, force, port);
+ ip4only, ip6only, force, res_conf_fallback, port);
}
--
2.14.4

View File

@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
diff --git a/smallapp/unbound-host.c b/smallapp/unbound-host.c
index 53bf3277..f02511fe 100644
--- a/smallapp/unbound-host.c
+++ b/smallapp/unbound-host.c
@@ -340,6 +340,7 @@ pretty_output(char* q, int t, int c, struct ub_result* result, int docname)
exit(1);
}
printf("%s\n", s);
+ free(s);
} else printf(" has no %s record", tstr);
printf(" %s\n", secstatus);
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
[Unit]
Description=update of the root trust anchor for DNSSEC validation in unbound
Documentation=man:unbound-anchor(8)
[Service]
Type=oneshot
User=unbound
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/unbound-anchor -a /var/lib/unbound/root.key -c /etc/unbound/icannbundle.pem -f /etc/resolv.conf -R
SuccessExitStatus=1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,14 @@
[Unit]
Description=daily update of the root trust anchor for DNSSEC
Documentation=man:unbound-anchor(8)
[Timer]
# Current DNSKEY TTL in root zone is 172800 seconds, i.e. 172800/60/60/24 = 2 days.
# It means that unboud-anchor should be run at least once a day.
OnCalendar=daily
Persistent=true
AccuracySec=24h
[Install]
WantedBy=timers.target

View File

@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
[Unit]
Description=Unbound Control Key And Certificate Generator
After=syslog.target
Before=unbound.service
ConditionPathExists=!/etc/unbound/unbound_control.key
[Service]
Type=oneshot
Group=unbound
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/unbound-control-setup -d /etc/unbound/
ExecStart=/sbin/restorecon /etc/unbound/*
RemainAfterExit=yes
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

View File

@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
To activate the munin plugins, run (as root):
cd /etc/munin/plugins
for i in /usr/share/munin/plugins/unbound_*; do ln -s $i; done

957
SOURCES/unbound.conf Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,957 @@
#
# Example configuration file.
#
# See unbound.conf(5) man page
#
# this is a comment.
#Use this to include other text into the file.
#include: "otherfile.conf"
# The server clause sets the main parameters.
server:
# whitespace is not necessary, but looks cleaner.
# verbosity number, 0 is least verbose. 1 is default.
verbosity: 1
# print statistics to the log (for every thread) every N seconds.
# Set to "" or 0 to disable. Default is disabled.
# Needs to be disabled for munin plugin
statistics-interval: 0
# enable shm for stats, default no. if you enable also enable
# statistics-interval, every time it also writes stats to the
# shared memory segment keyed with shm-key.
# shm-enable: no
# shm for stats uses this key, and key+1 for the shared mem segment.
# shm-key: 11777
# enable cumulative statistics, without clearing them after printing.
# Needs to be disabled for munin plugin
statistics-cumulative: no
# enable extended statistics (query types, answer codes, status)
# printed from unbound-control. default off, because of speed.
# Needs to be enabled for munin plugin
extended-statistics: yes
# number of threads to create. 1 disables threading.
num-threads: 4
# specify the interfaces to answer queries from by ip-address.
# The default is to listen to localhost (127.0.0.1 and ::1).
# specify 0.0.0.0 and ::0 to bind to all available interfaces.
# specify every interface[@port] on a new 'interface:' labelled line.
# The listen interfaces are not changed on reload, only on restart.
# interface: 0.0.0.0
# interface: ::0
# interface: 192.0.2.153
# interface: 192.0.2.154
# interface: 192.0.2.154@5003
# interface: 2001:DB8::5
#
# for dns over tls and raw dns over port 80
# interface: 0.0.0.0@443
# interface: ::0@443
# interface: 0.0.0.0@80
# interface: ::0@80
# enable this feature to copy the source address of queries to reply.
# Socket options are not supported on all platforms. experimental.
# interface-automatic: yes
#
# NOTE: Enable this option when specifying interface 0.0.0.0 or ::0
# NOTE: Disabled per Fedora policy not to listen to * on default install
# NOTE: If deploying on non-default port, eg 80/443, this needs to be disabled
interface-automatic: no
# port to answer queries from
# port: 53
# specify the interfaces to send outgoing queries to authoritative
# server from by ip-address. If none, the default (all) interface
# is used. Specify every interface on a 'outgoing-interface:' line.
# outgoing-interface: 192.0.2.153
# outgoing-interface: 2001:DB8::5
# outgoing-interface: 2001:DB8::6
# Specify a netblock to use remainder 64 bits as random bits for
# upstream queries. Uses freebind option (Linux).
# outgoing-interface: 2001:DB8::/64
# Also (Linux:) ip -6 addr add 2001:db8::/64 dev lo
# And: ip -6 route add local 2001:db8::/64 dev lo
# And set prefer-ip6: yes to use the ip6 randomness from a netblock.
# Set this to yes to prefer ipv6 upstream servers over ipv4.
# prefer-ip6: no
# number of ports to allocate per thread, determines the size of the
# port range that can be open simultaneously. About double the
# num-queries-per-thread, or, use as many as the OS will allow you.
# outgoing-range: 4096
# permit unbound to use this port number or port range for
# making outgoing queries, using an outgoing interface.
# Only ephemeral ports are allowed by SElinux
outgoing-port-permit: 32768-60999
# deny unbound the use this of port number or port range for
# making outgoing queries, using an outgoing interface.
# Use this to make sure unbound does not grab a UDP port that some
# other server on this computer needs. The default is to avoid
# IANA-assigned port numbers.
# If multiple outgoing-port-permit and outgoing-port-avoid options
# are present, they are processed in order.
# Our SElinux policy does not allow non-ephemeral ports to be used
outgoing-port-avoid: 0-32767
# number of outgoing simultaneous tcp buffers to hold per thread.
# outgoing-num-tcp: 10
# number of incoming simultaneous tcp buffers to hold per thread.
# incoming-num-tcp: 10
# buffer size for UDP port 53 incoming (SO_RCVBUF socket option).
# 0 is system default. Use 4m to catch query spikes for busy servers.
# so-rcvbuf: 0
# buffer size for UDP port 53 outgoing (SO_SNDBUF socket option).
# 0 is system default. Use 4m to handle spikes on very busy servers.
# so-sndbuf: 0
# use SO_REUSEPORT to distribute queries over threads.
so-reuseport: yes
# use IP_TRANSPARENT so the interface: addresses can be non-local
# and you can config non-existing IPs that are going to work later on
# (uses IP_BINDANY on FreeBSD).
ip-transparent: yes
# use IP_FREEBIND so the interface: addresses can be non-local
# and you can bind to nonexisting IPs and interfaces that are down.
# Linux only. On Linux you also have ip-transparent that is similar.
# ip-freebind: no
# EDNS reassembly buffer to advertise to UDP peers (the actual buffer
# is set with msg-buffer-size). 1472 can solve fragmentation (timeouts).
# edns-buffer-size: 4096
# Maximum UDP response size (not applied to TCP response).
# Suggested values are 512 to 4096. Default is 4096. 65536 disables it.
# 3072 causes +dnssec any isc.org queries to need TC=1.
# Helps mitigating DDOS
max-udp-size: 3072
# buffer size for handling DNS data. No messages larger than this
# size can be sent or received, by UDP or TCP. In bytes.
# msg-buffer-size: 65552
# the amount of memory to use for the message cache.
# plain value in bytes or you can append k, m or G. default is "4Mb".
# msg-cache-size: 4m
# the number of slabs to use for the message cache.
# the number of slabs must be a power of 2.
# more slabs reduce lock contention, but fragment memory usage.
# msg-cache-slabs: 4
# the number of queries that a thread gets to service.
# num-queries-per-thread: 1024
# if very busy, 50% queries run to completion, 50% get timeout in msec
# jostle-timeout: 200
# msec to wait before close of port on timeout UDP. 0 disables.
# delay-close: 0
# the amount of memory to use for the RRset cache.
# plain value in bytes or you can append k, m or G. default is "4Mb".
# rrset-cache-size: 4m
# the number of slabs to use for the RRset cache.
# the number of slabs must be a power of 2.
# more slabs reduce lock contention, but fragment memory usage.
# rrset-cache-slabs: 4
# the time to live (TTL) value lower bound, in seconds. Default 0.
# If more than an hour could easily give trouble due to stale data.
# cache-min-ttl: 0
# the time to live (TTL) value cap for RRsets and messages in the
# cache. Items are not cached for longer. In seconds.
# cache-max-ttl: 86400
# the time to live (TTL) value cap for negative responses in the cache
# cache-max-negative-ttl: 3600
# the time to live (TTL) value for cached roundtrip times, lameness and
# EDNS version information for hosts. In seconds.
# infra-host-ttl: 900
# minimum wait time for responses, increase if uplink is long. In msec.
# infra-cache-min-rtt: 50
# the number of slabs to use for the Infrastructure cache.
# the number of slabs must be a power of 2.
# more slabs reduce lock contention, but fragment memory usage.
# infra-cache-slabs: 4
# the maximum number of hosts that are cached (roundtrip, EDNS, lame).
# infra-cache-numhosts: 10000
# define a number of tags here, use with local-zone, access-control.
# repeat the define-tag statement to add additional tags.
# define-tag: "tag1 tag2 tag3"
# Enable IPv4, "yes" or "no".
# do-ip4: yes
# Enable IPv6, "yes" or "no".
# do-ip6: yes
# Enable UDP, "yes" or "no".
# NOTE: if setting up an unbound on tls443 for public use, you might want to
# disable UDP to avoid being used in DNS amplification attacks.
# do-udp: yes
# Enable TCP, "yes" or "no".
# do-tcp: yes
# upstream connections use TCP only (and no UDP), "yes" or "no"
# useful for tunneling scenarios, default no.
# tcp-upstream: no
# upstream connections also use UDP (even if do-udp is no).
# useful if if you want UDP upstream, but don't provide UDP downstream.
# udp-upstream-without-downstream: no
# Maximum segment size (MSS) of TCP socket on which the server
# responds to queries. Default is 0, system default MSS.
# tcp-mss: 0
# Maximum segment size (MSS) of TCP socket for outgoing queries.
# Default is 0, system default MSS.
# outgoing-tcp-mss: 0
# Fedora note: do not activate this - can cause a crash
# Use systemd socket activation for UDP, TCP, and control sockets.
# use-systemd: no
# Detach from the terminal, run in background, "yes" or "no".
# Set the value to "no" when unbound runs as systemd service.
# do-daemonize: yes
# control which clients are allowed to make (recursive) queries
# to this server. Specify classless netblocks with /size and action.
# By default everything is refused, except for localhost.
# Choose deny (drop message), refuse (polite error reply),
# allow (recursive ok), allow_setrd (recursive ok, rd bit is forced on),
# allow_snoop (recursive and nonrecursive ok)
# deny_non_local (drop queries unless can be answered from local-data)
# refuse_non_local (like deny_non_local but polite error reply).
# access-control: 0.0.0.0/0 refuse
# access-control: 127.0.0.0/8 allow
# access-control: ::0/0 refuse
# access-control: ::1 allow
# access-control: ::ffff:127.0.0.1 allow
# tag access-control with list of tags (in "" with spaces between)
# Clients using this access control element use localzones that
# are tagged with one of these tags.
# access-control-tag: 192.0.2.0/24 "tag2 tag3"
# set action for particular tag for given access control element
# if you have multiple tag values, the tag used to lookup the action
# is the first tag match between access-control-tag and local-zone-tag
# where "first" comes from the order of the define-tag values.
# access-control-tag-action: 192.0.2.0/24 tag3 refuse
# set redirect data for particular tag for access control element
# access-control-tag-data: 192.0.2.0/24 tag2 "A 127.0.0.1"
# Set view for access control element
# access-control-view: 192.0.2.0/24 viewname
# if given, a chroot(2) is done to the given directory.
# i.e. you can chroot to the working directory, for example,
# for extra security, but make sure all files are in that directory.
#
# If chroot is enabled, you should pass the configfile (from the
# commandline) as a full path from the original root. After the
# chroot has been performed the now defunct portion of the config
# file path is removed to be able to reread the config after a reload.
#
# All other file paths (working dir, logfile, roothints, and
# key files) can be specified in several ways:
# o as an absolute path relative to the new root.
# o as a relative path to the working directory.
# o as an absolute path relative to the original root.
# In the last case the path is adjusted to remove the unused portion.
#
# The pid file can be absolute and outside of the chroot, it is
# written just prior to performing the chroot and dropping permissions.
#
# Additionally, unbound may need to access /dev/random (for entropy).
# How to do this is specific to your OS.
#
# If you give "" no chroot is performed. The path must not end in a /.
# chroot: "/var/lib/unbound"
chroot: ""
# if given, user privileges are dropped (after binding port),
# and the given username is assumed. Default is user "unbound".
# If you give "" no privileges are dropped.
username: "unbound"
# the working directory. The relative files in this config are
# relative to this directory. If you give "" the working directory
# is not changed.
# If you give a server: directory: dir before include: file statements
# then those includes can be relative to the working directory.
directory: "/etc/unbound"
# the log file, "" means log to stderr.
# Use of this option sets use-syslog to "no".
# logfile: ""
# Log to syslog(3) if yes. The log facility LOG_DAEMON is used to
# log to. If yes, it overrides the logfile.
# use-syslog: yes
# Log identity to report. if empty, defaults to the name of argv[0]
# (usually "unbound").
# log-identity: ""
# print UTC timestamp in ascii to logfile, default is epoch in seconds.
log-time-ascii: yes
# print one line with time, IP, name, type, class for every query.
# log-queries: no
# print one line per reply, with time, IP, name, type, class, rcode,
# timetoresolve, fromcache and responsesize.
# log-replies: no
# the pid file. Can be an absolute path outside of chroot/work dir.
pidfile: "/var/run/unbound/unbound.pid"
# file to read root hints from.
# get one from https://www.internic.net/domain/named.cache
# root-hints: ""
# enable to not answer id.server and hostname.bind queries.
# hide-identity: no
# enable to not answer version.server and version.bind queries.
# hide-version: no
# enable to not answer trustanchor.unbound queries.
# hide-trustanchor: no
# the identity to report. Leave "" or default to return hostname.
# identity: ""
# the version to report. Leave "" or default to return package version.
# version: ""
# the target fetch policy.
# series of integers describing the policy per dependency depth.
# The number of values in the list determines the maximum dependency
# depth the recursor will pursue before giving up. Each integer means:
# -1 : fetch all targets opportunistically,
# 0: fetch on demand,
# positive value: fetch that many targets opportunistically.
# Enclose the list of numbers between quotes ("").
# target-fetch-policy: "3 2 1 0 0"
# Harden against very small EDNS buffer sizes.
# harden-short-bufsize: no
# Harden against unseemly large queries.
# harden-large-queries: no
# Harden against out of zone rrsets, to avoid spoofing attempts.
harden-glue: yes
# Harden against receiving dnssec-stripped data. If you turn it
# off, failing to validate dnskey data for a trustanchor will
# trigger insecure mode for that zone (like without a trustanchor).
# Default on, which insists on dnssec data for trust-anchored zones.
harden-dnssec-stripped: yes
# Harden against queries that fall under dnssec-signed nxdomain names.
harden-below-nxdomain: yes
# Harden the referral path by performing additional queries for
# infrastructure data. Validates the replies (if possible).
# Default off, because the lookups burden the server. Experimental
# implementation of draft-wijngaards-dnsext-resolver-side-mitigation.
harden-referral-path: yes
# Harden against algorithm downgrade when multiple algorithms are
# advertised in the DS record. If no, allows the weakest algorithm
# to validate the zone.
# harden-algo-downgrade: no
# Sent minimum amount of information to upstream servers to enhance
# privacy. Only sent minimum required labels of the QNAME and set QTYPE
# to NS when possible.
qname-minimisation: yes
# QNAME minimisation in strict mode. Do not fall-back to sending full
# QNAME to potentially broken nameservers. A lot of domains will not be
# resolvable when this option in enabled.
# This option only has effect when qname-minimisation is enabled.
# qname-minimisation-strict: no
# Aggressive NSEC uses the DNSSEC NSEC chain to synthesize NXDOMAIN
# and other denials, using information from previous NXDOMAINs answers.
aggressive-nsec: yes
# Use 0x20-encoded random bits in the query to foil spoof attempts.
# This feature is an experimental implementation of draft dns-0x20.
# use-caps-for-id: no
# Domains (and domains in them) without support for dns-0x20 and
# the fallback fails because they keep sending different answers.
# caps-whitelist: "licdn.com"
# caps-whitelist: "senderbase.org"
# Enforce privacy of these addresses. Strips them away from answers.
# It may cause DNSSEC validation to additionally mark it as bogus.
# Protects against 'DNS Rebinding' (uses browser as network proxy).
# Only 'private-domain' and 'local-data' names are allowed to have
# these private addresses. No default.
# private-address: 10.0.0.0/8
# private-address: 172.16.0.0/12
# private-address: 192.168.0.0/16
# private-address: 169.254.0.0/16
# private-address: fd00::/8
# private-address: fe80::/10
# private-address: ::ffff:0:0/96
# Allow the domain (and its subdomains) to contain private addresses.
# local-data statements are allowed to contain private addresses too.
# private-domain: "example.com"
# If nonzero, unwanted replies are not only reported in statistics,
# but also a running total is kept per thread. If it reaches the
# threshold, a warning is printed and a defensive action is taken,
# the cache is cleared to flush potential poison out of it.
# A suggested value is 10000000, the default is 0 (turned off).
unwanted-reply-threshold: 10000000
# Do not query the following addresses. No DNS queries are sent there.
# List one address per entry. List classless netblocks with /size,
# do-not-query-address: 127.0.0.1/8
# do-not-query-address: ::1
# if yes, the above default do-not-query-address entries are present.
# if no, localhost can be queried (for testing and debugging).
# do-not-query-localhost: yes
# if yes, perform prefetching of almost expired message cache entries.
prefetch: yes
# if yes, perform key lookups adjacent to normal lookups.
prefetch-key: yes
# if yes, Unbound rotates RRSet order in response.
rrset-roundrobin: yes
# if yes, Unbound doesn't insert authority/additional sections
# into response messages when those sections are not required.
minimal-responses: yes
# true to disable DNSSEC lameness check in iterator.
# disable-dnssec-lame-check: no
# module configuration of the server. A string with identifiers
# separated by spaces. Syntax: "[dns64] [validator] iterator"
module-config: "ipsecmod validator iterator"
# File with trusted keys, kept uptodate using RFC5011 probes,
# initial file like trust-anchor-file, then it stores metadata.
# Use several entries, one per domain name, to track multiple zones.
#
# If you want to perform DNSSEC validation, run unbound-anchor before
# you start unbound (i.e. in the system boot scripts). And enable:
# Please note usage of unbound-anchor root anchor is at your own risk
# and under the terms of our LICENSE (see that file in the source).
# auto-trust-anchor-file: "/var/lib/unbound/root.key"
# trust anchor signaling sends a RFC8145 key tag query after priming.
trust-anchor-signaling: yes
# Root key trust anchor sentinel (draft-ietf-dnsop-kskroll-sentinel)
root-key-sentinel: yes
# File with DLV trusted keys. Same format as trust-anchor-file.
# There can be only one DLV configured, it is trusted from root down.
# DLV is going to be decommissioned. Please do not use it any more.
# dlv-anchor-file: "dlv.isc.org.key"
# File with trusted keys for validation. Specify more than one file
# with several entries, one file per entry.
# Zone file format, with DS and DNSKEY entries.
# Note this gets out of date, use auto-trust-anchor-file please.
# trust-anchor-file: ""
# Trusted key for validation. DS or DNSKEY. specify the RR on a
# single line, surrounded by "". TTL is ignored. class is IN default.
# Note this gets out of date, use auto-trust-anchor-file please.
# (These examples are from August 2007 and may not be valid anymore).
# trust-anchor: "nlnetlabs.nl. DNSKEY 257 3 5 AQPzzTWMz8qSWIQlfRnPckx2BiVmkVN6LPupO3mbz7FhLSnm26n6iG9N Lby97Ji453aWZY3M5/xJBSOS2vWtco2t8C0+xeO1bc/d6ZTy32DHchpW 6rDH1vp86Ll+ha0tmwyy9QP7y2bVw5zSbFCrefk8qCUBgfHm9bHzMG1U BYtEIQ=="
# trust-anchor: "jelte.nlnetlabs.nl. DS 42860 5 1 14D739EB566D2B1A5E216A0BA4D17FA9B038BE4A"
# File with trusted keys for validation. Specify more than one file
# with several entries, one file per entry. Like trust-anchor-file
# but has a different file format. Format is BIND-9 style format,
# the trusted-keys { name flag proto algo "key"; }; clauses are read.
# you need external update procedures to track changes in keys.
# trusted-keys-file: ""
#
trusted-keys-file: /etc/unbound/keys.d/*.key
auto-trust-anchor-file: "/var/lib/unbound/root.key"
# Ignore chain of trust. Domain is treated as insecure.
# domain-insecure: "example.com"
# Override the date for validation with a specific fixed date.
# Do not set this unless you are debugging signature inception
# and expiration. "" or "0" turns the feature off. -1 ignores date.
# val-override-date: ""
# The time to live for bogus data, rrsets and messages. This avoids
# some of the revalidation, until the time interval expires. in secs.
# val-bogus-ttl: 60
# The signature inception and expiration dates are allowed to be off
# by 10% of the signature lifetime (expir-incep) from our local clock.
# This leeway is capped with a minimum and a maximum. In seconds.
# val-sig-skew-min: 3600
# val-sig-skew-max: 86400
# Should additional section of secure message also be kept clean of
# unsecure data. Useful to shield the users of this validator from
# potential bogus data in the additional section. All unsigned data
# in the additional section is removed from secure messages.
val-clean-additional: yes
# Turn permissive mode on to permit bogus messages. Thus, messages
# for which security checks failed will be returned to clients,
# instead of SERVFAIL. It still performs the security checks, which
# result in interesting log files and possibly the AD bit in
# replies if the message is found secure. The default is off.
# NOTE: TURNING THIS ON DISABLES ALL DNSSEC SECURITY
val-permissive-mode: no
# Ignore the CD flag in incoming queries and refuse them bogus data.
# Enable it if the only clients of unbound are legacy servers (w2008)
# that set CD but cannot validate themselves.
# ignore-cd-flag: no
# Serve expired responses from cache, with TTL 0 in the response,
# and then attempt to fetch the data afresh.
serve-expired: yes
# Have the validator log failed validations for your diagnosis.
# 0: off. 1: A line per failed user query. 2: With reason and bad IP.
val-log-level: 1
# It is possible to configure NSEC3 maximum iteration counts per
# keysize. Keep this table very short, as linear search is done.
# A message with an NSEC3 with larger count is marked insecure.
# List in ascending order the keysize and count values.
# val-nsec3-keysize-iterations: "1024 150 2048 500 4096 2500"
# instruct the auto-trust-anchor-file probing to add anchors after ttl.
# add-holddown: 2592000 # 30 days
# instruct the auto-trust-anchor-file probing to del anchors after ttl.
# del-holddown: 2592000 # 30 days
# auto-trust-anchor-file probing removes missing anchors after ttl.
# If the value 0 is given, missing anchors are not removed.
# keep-missing: 31622400 # 366 days
# debug option that allows very small holddown times for key rollover,
# otherwise the RFC mandates probe intervals must be at least 1 hour.
# permit-small-holddown: no
# the amount of memory to use for the key cache.
# plain value in bytes or you can append k, m or G. default is "4Mb".
# key-cache-size: 4m
# the number of slabs to use for the key cache.
# the number of slabs must be a power of 2.
# more slabs reduce lock contention, but fragment memory usage.
# key-cache-slabs: 4
# the amount of memory to use for the negative cache (used for DLV).
# plain value in bytes or you can append k, m or G. default is "1Mb".
# neg-cache-size: 1m
# By default, for a number of zones a small default 'nothing here'
# reply is built-in. Query traffic is thus blocked. If you
# wish to serve such zone you can unblock them by uncommenting one
# of the nodefault statements below.
# You may also have to use domain-insecure: zone to make DNSSEC work,
# unless you have your own trust anchors for this zone.
# local-zone: "localhost." nodefault
# local-zone: "127.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "1.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "onion." nodefault
# local-zone: "test." nodefault
# local-zone: "invalid." nodefault
# local-zone: "10.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "16.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "17.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "18.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "19.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "20.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "21.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "22.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "23.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "24.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "25.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "26.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "27.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "28.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "29.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "30.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "31.172.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "168.192.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "0.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "254.169.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "2.0.192.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "100.51.198.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "113.0.203.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "255.255.255.255.in-addr.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.0.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "d.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "8.e.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "9.e.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "a.e.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "b.e.f.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# local-zone: "8.b.d.0.1.0.0.2.ip6.arpa." nodefault
# And for 64.100.in-addr.arpa. to 127.100.in-addr.arpa.
# If unbound is running service for the local host then it is useful
# to perform lan-wide lookups to the upstream, and unblock the
# long list of local-zones above. If this unbound is a dns server
# for a network of computers, disabled is better and stops information
# leakage of local lan information.
# unblock-lan-zones: no
# The insecure-lan-zones option disables validation for
# these zones, as if they were all listed as domain-insecure.
# insecure-lan-zones: no
# a number of locally served zones can be configured.
# local-zone: <zone> <type>
# local-data: "<resource record string>"
# o deny serves local data (if any), else, drops queries.
# o refuse serves local data (if any), else, replies with error.
# o static serves local data, else, nxdomain or nodata answer.
# o transparent gives local data, but resolves normally for other names
# o redirect serves the zone data for any subdomain in the zone.
# o nodefault can be used to normally resolve AS112 zones.
# o typetransparent resolves normally for other types and other names
# o inform acts like transparent, but logs client IP address
# o inform_deny drops queries and logs client IP address
# o always_transparent, always_refuse, always_nxdomain, resolve in
# that way but ignore local data for that name
# o noview breaks out of that view towards global local-zones.
#
# defaults are localhost address, reverse for 127.0.0.1 and ::1
# and nxdomain for AS112 zones. If you configure one of these zones
# the default content is omitted, or you can omit it with 'nodefault'.
#
# If you configure local-data without specifying local-zone, by
# default a transparent local-zone is created for the data.
#
# You can add locally served data with
# local-zone: "local." static
# local-data: "mycomputer.local. IN A 192.0.2.51"
# local-data: 'mytext.local TXT "content of text record"'
#
# You can override certain queries with
# local-data: "adserver.example.com A 127.0.0.1"
#
# You can redirect a domain to a fixed address with
# (this makes example.com, www.example.com, etc, all go to 192.0.2.3)
# local-zone: "example.com" redirect
# local-data: "example.com A 192.0.2.3"
#
# Shorthand to make PTR records, "IPv4 name" or "IPv6 name".
# You can also add PTR records using local-data directly, but then
# you need to do the reverse notation yourself.
# local-data-ptr: "192.0.2.3 www.example.com"
include: /etc/unbound/local.d/*.conf
# tag a localzone with a list of tag names (in "" with spaces between)
# local-zone-tag: "example.com" "tag2 tag3"
# add a netblock specific override to a localzone, with zone type
# local-zone-override: "example.com" 192.0.2.0/24 refuse
# service clients over SSL (on the TCP sockets), with plain DNS inside
# the SSL stream. Give the certificate to use and private key.
# default is "" (disabled). requires restart to take effect.
# tls-service-key: "/etc/unbound/unbound_server.key"
# tls-service-pem: "/etc/unbound/unbound_server.pem"
# tls-port: 853
#
# request upstream over SSL (with plain DNS inside the SSL stream).
# Default is no. Can be turned on and off with unbound-control.
# tls-upstream: no
# Certificates used to authenticate connections made upstream.
# tls-cert-bundle: ""
# Add system certs to the cert bundle, from the Windows Cert Store
# tls-win-cert: no
# Also serve tls on these port numbers (eg. 443, ...), by listing
# tls-additional-ports: portno for each of the port numbers.
# DNS64 prefix. Must be specified when DNS64 is use.
# Enable dns64 in module-config. Used to synthesize IPv6 from IPv4.
# dns64-prefix: 64:ff9b::0/96
# ratelimit for uncached, new queries, this limits recursion effort.
# ratelimiting is experimental, and may help against randomqueryflood.
# if 0(default) it is disabled, otherwise state qps allowed per zone.
# ratelimit: 0
# ratelimits are tracked in a cache, size in bytes of cache (or k,m).
# ratelimit-size: 4m
# ratelimit cache slabs, reduces lock contention if equal to cpucount.
# ratelimit-slabs: 4
# 0 blocks when ratelimited, otherwise let 1/xth traffic through
# ratelimit-factor: 10
# what is considered a low rtt (ping time for upstream server), in msec
# low-rtt: 45
# select low rtt this many times out of 1000. 0 means the fast server
# select is disabled. prefetches are not sped up.
# low-rtt-permil: 0
# override the ratelimit for a specific domain name.
# give this setting multiple times to have multiple overrides.
# ratelimit-for-domain: example.com 1000
# override the ratelimits for all domains below a domain name
# can give this multiple times, the name closest to the zone is used.
# ratelimit-below-domain: com 1000
# global query ratelimit for all ip addresses.
# feature is experimental.
# if 0(default) it is disabled, otherwise states qps allowed per ip address
# ip-ratelimit: 0
# ip ratelimits are tracked in a cache, size in bytes of cache (or k,m).
# ip-ratelimit-size: 4m
# ip ratelimit cache slabs, reduces lock contention if equal to cpucount.
# ip-ratelimit-slabs: 4
# 0 blocks when ip is ratelimited, otherwise let 1/xth traffic through
# ip-ratelimit-factor: 10
# Specific options for ipsecmod. unbound needs to be configured with
# --enable-ipsecmod for these to take effect.
#
# Enable or disable ipsecmod (it still needs to be defined in
# module-config above). Can be used when ipsecmod needs to be
# enabled/disabled via remote-control(below).
# Fedora: module will be enabled on-demand by libreswan
ipsecmod-enabled: no
# Path to executable external hook. It must be defined when ipsecmod is
# listed in module-config (above).
# ipsecmod-hook: "./my_executable"
ipsecmod-hook:/usr/libexec/ipsec/_unbound-hook
# When enabled unbound will reply with SERVFAIL if the return value of
# the ipsecmod-hook is not 0.
# ipsecmod-strict: no
#
# Maximum time to live (TTL) for cached A/AAAA records with IPSECKEY.
# ipsecmod-max-ttl: 3600
#
# Reply with A/AAAA even if the relevant IPSECKEY is bogus. Mainly used for
# testing.
# ipsecmod-ignore-bogus: no
#
# Domains for which ipsecmod will be triggered. If not defined (default)
# all domains are treated as being whitelisted.
# ipsecmod-whitelist: "libreswan.org"
# ipsecmod-whitelist: "nlnetlabs.nl"
# Python config section. To enable:
# o use --with-pythonmodule to configure before compiling.
# o list python in the module-config string (above) to enable.
# o and give a python-script to run.
python:
# Script file to load
# python-script: "/etc/unbound/ubmodule-tst.py"
# Remote control config section.
remote-control:
# Enable remote control with unbound-control(8) here.
# set up the keys and certificates with unbound-control-setup.
# Note: required for unbound-munin package
control-enable: yes
# Set to no and use an absolute path as control-interface to use
# a unix local named pipe for unbound-control.
# control-use-cert: yes
# what interfaces are listened to for remote control.
# give 0.0.0.0 and ::0 to listen to all interfaces.
# control-interface: 127.0.0.1
# control-interface: ::1
# port number for remote control operations.
# control-port: 8953
# unbound server key file.
server-key-file: "/etc/unbound/unbound_server.key"
# unbound server certificate file.
server-cert-file: "/etc/unbound/unbound_server.pem"
# unbound-control key file.
control-key-file: "/etc/unbound/unbound_control.key"
# unbound-control certificate file.
control-cert-file: "/etc/unbound/unbound_control.pem"
# Stub and Forward zones
include: /etc/unbound/conf.d/*.conf
# Stub zones.
# Create entries like below, to make all queries for 'example.com' and
# 'example.org' go to the given list of nameservers. list zero or more
# nameservers by hostname or by ipaddress. If you set stub-prime to yes,
# the list is treated as priming hints (default is no).
# With stub-first yes, it attempts without the stub if it fails.
# Consider adding domain-insecure: name and local-zone: name nodefault
# to the server: section if the stub is a locally served zone.
# stub-zone:
# name: "example.com"
# stub-addr: 192.0.2.68
# stub-prime: no
# stub-first: no
# stub-tls-upstream: no
# stub-zone:
# name: "example.org"
# stub-host: ns.example.com.
# You can now also dynamically create and delete stub-zone's using
# unbound-control stub_add domain.com 1.2.3.4 5.6.7.8
# unbound-control stub_remove domain.com 1.2.3.4 5.6.7.8
# Forward zones
# Create entries like below, to make all queries for 'example.com' and
# 'example.org' go to the given list of servers. These servers have to handle
# recursion to other nameservers. List zero or more nameservers by hostname
# or by ipaddress. Use an entry with name "." to forward all queries.
# If you enable forward-first, it attempts without the forward if it fails.
# forward-zone:
# name: "example.com"
# forward-addr: 192.0.2.68
# forward-addr: 192.0.2.73@5355 # forward to port 5355.
# forward-first: no
# forward-tls-upstream: no
# forward-zone:
# name: "example.org"
# forward-host: fwd.example.com
#
# You can now also dynamically create and delete forward-zone's using
# unbound-control forward_add domain.com 1.2.3.4 5.6.7.8
# unbound-control forward_remove domain.com 1.2.3.4 5.6.7.8
# Authority zones
# The data for these zones is kept locally, from a file or downloaded.
# The data can be served to downstream clients, or used instead of the
# upstream (which saves a lookup to the upstream). The first example
# has a copy of the root for local usage. The second serves example.org
# authoritatively. zonefile: reads from file (and writes to it if you also
# download it), master: fetches with AXFR and IXFR, or url to zonefile.
auth-zone:
name: "."
for-downstream: no
for-upstream: yes
fallback-enabled: yes
master: b.root-servers.net
master: c.root-servers.net
master: e.root-servers.net
master: f.root-servers.net
master: g.root-servers.net
master: k.root-servers.net
# auth-zone:
# name: "example.org"
# for-downstream: yes
# for-upstream: yes
# zonefile: "example.org.zone"
# Views
# Create named views. Name must be unique. Map views to requests using
# the access-control-view option. Views can contain zero or more local-zone
# and local-data options. Options from matching views will override global
# options. Global options will be used if no matching view is found.
# With view-first yes, it will try to answer using the global local-zone and
# local-data elements if there is no view specific match.
# view:
# name: "viewname"
# local-zone: "example.com" redirect
# local-data: "example.com A 192.0.2.3"
# local-data-ptr: "192.0.2.3 www.example.com"
# view-first: no
# view:
# name: "anotherview"
# local-zone: "example.com" refuse
# Fedora: DNSCrypt support not enabled since it requires linking to
# another crypto library
#
# DNSCrypt
# Caveats:
# 1. the keys/certs cannot be produced by unbound. You can use dnscrypt-wrapper
# for this: https://github.com/cofyc/dnscrypt-wrapper/blob/master/README.md#usage
# 2. dnscrypt channel attaches to an interface. you MUST set interfaces to
# listen on `dnscrypt-port` with the follo0wing snippet:
# server:
# interface: 0.0.0.0@443
# interface: ::0@443
#
# Finally, `dnscrypt` config has its own section.
# dnscrypt:
# dnscrypt-enable: yes
# dnscrypt-port: 443
# dnscrypt-provider: 2.dnscrypt-cert.example.com.
# dnscrypt-secret-key: /path/unbound-conf/keys1/1.key
# dnscrypt-secret-key: /path/unbound-conf/keys2/1.key
# dnscrypt-provider-cert: /path/unbound-conf/keys1/1.cert
# dnscrypt-provider-cert: /path/unbound-conf/keys2/1.cert
# CacheDB
# Enable external backend DB as auxiliary cache. Specify the backend name
# (default is "testframe", which has no use other than for debugging and
# testing) and backend-specific options. The 'cachedb' module must be
# included in module-config.
# cachedb:
# backend: "testframe"
# # secret seed string to calculate hashed keys
# secret-seed: "default"
# # For "redis" backend:
# # redis server's IP address or host name
# redis-server-host: 127.0.0.1
# # redis server's TCP port
# redis-server-port: 6379
# # timeout (in ms) for communication with the redis server
# redis-timeout: 100

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#
# For this plugin to work, unbound.conf needs to have:
# remote-control: control-enable: yes
#
[unbound*]
user root
env.statefile /var/lib/munin/plugin-state/unbound-state
env.unbound_conf /etc/unbound/unbound.conf
env.unbound_control /usr/sbin/unbound-control
env.spoof_warn 1000
env.spoof_crit 100000

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[Unit]
Description=Unbound recursive Domain Name Server
After=network.target
After=unbound-keygen.service
Wants=unbound-keygen.service
Wants=unbound-anchor.timer
Before=nss-lookup.target
Wants=nss-lookup.target
[Service]
Type=simple
EnvironmentFile=-/etc/sysconfig/unbound
ExecStartPre=/usr/sbin/unbound-checkconf
ExecStartPre=-/usr/sbin/unbound-anchor -a /var/lib/unbound/root.key -c /etc/unbound/icannbundle.pem -f /etc/resolv.conf -R
ExecStart=/usr/sbin/unbound -d $UNBOUND_OPTIONS
ExecReload=/usr/sbin/unbound-control reload
[Install]
WantedBy=multi-user.target

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# for extra debug, add "-v -v" or change verbosity: in unbound.conf
UNBOUND_OPTIONS=""

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#!/bin/sh
#
# plugin for munin to monitor usage of unbound servers.
#
# (C) 2008 W.C.A. Wijngaards. BSD Licensed.
#
# To install; enable statistics and unbound-control in unbound.conf
# server: extended-statistics: yes
# statistics-cumulative: no
# statistics-interval: 0
# remote-control: control-enable: yes
# Run the command unbound-control-setup to generate the key files.
#
# Environment variables for this script
# statefile - where to put temporary statefile.
# unbound_conf - where the unbound.conf file is located.
# unbound_control - where to find unbound-control executable.
# spoof_warn - what level to warn about spoofing
# spoof_crit - what level to crit about spoofing
#
# You can set them in your munin/plugin-conf.d/plugins.conf file
# with:
# [unbound*]
# user root
# env.statefile /usr/local/var/munin/plugin-state/unbound-state
# env.unbound_conf /usr/local/etc/unbound/unbound.conf
# env.unbound_control /usr/local/sbin/unbound-control
# env.spoof_warn 1000
# env.spoof_crit 100000
#
# This plugin can create different graphs depending on what name
# you link it as (with ln -s) into the plugins directory
# You can link it multiple times.
# If you are only a casual user, the _hits and _by_type are most interesting,
# possibly followed by _by_rcode.
#
# unbound_munin_hits - base volume, cache hits, unwanted traffic
# unbound_munin_queue - to monitor the internal requestlist
# unbound_munin_memory - memory usage
# unbound_munin_by_type - incoming queries by type
# unbound_munin_by_class - incoming queries by class
# unbound_munin_by_opcode - incoming queries by opcode
# unbound_munin_by_rcode - answers by rcode, validation status
# unbound_munin_by_flags - incoming queries by flags
# unbound_munin_histogram - histogram of query resolving times
#
# Magic markers - optional - used by installation scripts and
# munin-config:
#
#%# family=contrib
#%# capabilities=autoconf suggest
# POD documentation
: <<=cut
=head1 NAME
unbound_munin_ - Munin plugin to monitor the Unbound DNS resolver.
=head1 APPLICABLE SYSTEMS
System with unbound daemon.
=head1 CONFIGURATION
[unbound*]
user root
env.statefile /var/lib/munin/plugin-state/unbound-state
env.unbound_conf /etc/unbound/unbound.conf
env.unbound_control /usr/sbin/unbound-control
env.spoof_warn 1000
env.spoof_crit 100000
Use the .env settings to override the defaults.
=head1 USAGE
Can be used to present different graphs. Use ln -s for that name in
the plugins directory to enable the graph.
unbound_munin_hits - base volume, cache hits, unwanted traffic
unbound_munin_queue - to monitor the internal requestlist
unbound_munin_memory - memory usage
unbound_munin_by_type - incoming queries by type
unbound_munin_by_class - incoming queries by class
unbound_munin_by_opcode - incoming queries by opcode
unbound_munin_by_rcode - answers by rcode, validation status
unbound_munin_by_flags - incoming queries by flags
unbound_munin_histogram - histogram of query resolving times
=head1 AUTHOR
Copyright 2008 W.C.A. Wijngaards
=head1 LICENSE
BSD
=cut
state=${statefile:-/var/lib/munin/plugin-state/unbound-state}
conf=${unbound_conf:-/etc/unbound/unbound.conf}
ctrl=${unbound_control:-/usr/sbin/unbound-control}
warn=${spoof_warn:-1000}
crit=${spoof_crit:-100000}
lock=$state.lock
# number of seconds between polling attempts.
# makes the statefile hang around for at least this many seconds,
# so that multiple links of this script can share the results.
lee=55
# to keep things within 19 characters
ABBREV="-e s/total/t/ -e s/thread/t/ -e s/num/n/ -e s/query/q/ -e s/answer/a/ -e s/unwanted/u/ -e s/requestlist/ql/ -e s/type/t/ -e s/class/c/ -e s/opcode/o/ -e s/rcode/r/ -e s/edns/e/ -e s/mem/m/ -e s/cache/c/ -e s/mod/m/"
# get value from $1 into return variable $value
get_value ( ) {
value="`grep '^'$1'=' $state | sed -e 's/^.*=//'`"
if test "$value"x = ""x; then
value="0"
fi
}
# download the state from the unbound server.
get_state ( ) {
# obtain lock for fetching the state
# because there is a race condition in fetching and writing to file
# see if the lock is stale, if so, take it
if test -f $lock ; then
pid="`cat $lock 2>&1`"
kill -0 "$pid" >/dev/null 2>&1
if test $? -ne 0 -a "$pid" != $$ ; then
echo $$ >$lock
fi
fi
i=0
while test ! -f $lock || test "`cat $lock 2>&1`" != $$; do
while test -f $lock; do
# wait
i=`expr $i + 1`
if test $i -gt 1000; then
sleep 1;
fi
if test $i -gt 1500; then
echo "error locking $lock" "=" `cat $lock`
rm -f $lock
exit 1
fi
done
# try to get it
echo $$ >$lock
done
# do not refetch if the file exists and only LEE seconds old
if test -f $state; then
now=`date +%s`
get_value "time.now"
value="`echo $value | sed -e 's/\..*$//'`"
if test $now -lt `expr $value + $lee`; then
rm -f $lock
return
fi
fi
$ctrl -c $conf stats > $state
if test $? -ne 0; then
echo "error retrieving data from unbound server"
rm -f $lock
exit 1
fi
rm -f $lock
}
if test "$1" = "autoconf" ; then
if test ! -f $conf; then
echo no "($conf does not exist)"
exit 1
fi
if test ! -d `dirname $state`; then
echo no "($state directory does not exist)"
exit 1
fi
echo yes
exit 0
fi
if test "$1" = "suggest" ; then
echo "hits"
echo "queue"
echo "memory"
echo "by_type"
echo "by_class"
echo "by_opcode"
echo "by_rcode"
echo "by_flags"
echo "histogram"
exit 0
fi
# determine my type, by name
id=`echo $0 | sed -e 's/^.*unbound_munin_//'`
if test "$id"x = ""x; then
# some default to keep people sane.
id="hits"
fi
# if $1 exists in statefile, config is echoed with label $2
exist_config ( ) {
mn=`echo $1 | sed $ABBREV | tr . _`
if grep '^'$1'=' $state >/dev/null 2>&1; then
echo "$mn.label $2"
echo "$mn.min 0"
fi
}
# print label and min 0 for a name $1 in unbound format
p_config ( ) {
mn=`echo $1 | sed $ABBREV | tr . _`
echo $mn.label "$2"
echo $mn.min 0
}
if test "$1" = "config" ; then
if test ! -f $state; then
get_state
fi
case $id in
hits)
echo "graph_title Unbound DNS traffic and cache hits"
echo "graph_args --base 1000 -l 0"
echo "graph_vlabel queries / second"
echo "graph_category DNS"
for x in thread0.num.queries thread1.num.queries \
thread2.num.queries thread3.num.queries thread4.num.queries \
thread5.num.queries thread6.num.queries thread7.num.queries; do
exist_config $x "queries handled by `basename $x .num.queries`"
done
p_config "total.num.queries" "total queries from clients"
p_config "total.num.cachehits" "cache hits"
p_config "total.num.prefetch" "cache prefetch"
p_config "num.query.tcp" "TCP queries"
p_config "num.query.ipv6" "IPv6 queries"
p_config "unwanted.queries" "queries that failed acl"
p_config "unwanted.replies" "unwanted or unsolicited replies"
echo "u_replies.warning $warn"
echo "u_replies.critical $crit"
echo "graph_info DNS queries to the recursive resolver. The unwanted replies could be innocent duplicate packets, late replies, or spoof threats."
;;
queue)
echo "graph_title Unbound requestlist size"
echo "graph_args --base 1000 -l 0"
echo "graph_vlabel number of queries"
echo "graph_category DNS"
p_config "total.requestlist.avg" "Average size of queue on insert"
p_config "total.requestlist.max" "Max size of queue (in 5 min)"
p_config "total.requestlist.overwritten" "Number of queries replaced by new ones"
p_config "total.requestlist.exceeded" "Number of queries dropped due to lack of space"
echo "graph_info The queries that did not hit the cache and need recursion service take up space in the requestlist. If there are too many queries, first queries get overwritten, and at last resort dropped."
;;
memory)
echo "graph_title Unbound memory usage"
echo "graph_args --base 1024 -l 0"
echo "graph_vlabel memory used in bytes"
echo "graph_category DNS"
p_config "mem.total.sbrk" "Total memory"
p_config "mem.cache.rrset" "RRset cache memory"
p_config "mem.cache.message" "Message cache memory"
p_config "mem.mod.iterator" "Iterator module memory"
p_config "mem.mod.validator" "Validator module and key cache memory"
echo "graph_info The memory used by unbound."
;;
by_type)
echo "graph_title Unbound DNS queries by type"
echo "graph_args --base 1000 -l 0"
echo "graph_vlabel queries / second"
echo "graph_category DNS"
for x in `grep "^num.query.type" $state`; do
nm=`echo $x | sed -e 's/=.*$//'`
tp=`echo $nm | sed -e s/num.query.type.//`
p_config "$nm" "$tp"
done
echo "graph_info queries by DNS RR type queried for"
;;
by_class)
echo "graph_title Unbound DNS queries by class"
echo "graph_args --base 1000 -l 0"
echo "graph_vlabel queries / second"
echo "graph_category DNS"
for x in `grep "^num.query.class" $state`; do
nm=`echo $x | sed -e 's/=.*$//'`
tp=`echo $nm | sed -e s/num.query.class.//`
p_config "$nm" "$tp"
done
echo "graph_info queries by DNS RR class queried for."
;;
by_opcode)
echo "graph_title Unbound DNS queries by opcode"
echo "graph_args --base 1000 -l 0"
echo "graph_vlabel queries / second"
echo "graph_category DNS"
for x in `grep "^num.query.opcode" $state`; do
nm=`echo $x | sed -e 's/=.*$//'`
tp=`echo $nm | sed -e s/num.query.opcode.//`
p_config "$nm" "$tp"
done
echo "graph_info queries by opcode in the query packet."
;;
by_rcode)
echo "graph_title Unbound DNS answers by return code"
echo "graph_args --base 1000 -l 0"
echo "graph_vlabel answer packets / second"
echo "graph_category DNS"
for x in `grep "^num.answer.rcode" $state`; do
nm=`echo $x | sed -e 's/=.*$//'`
tp=`echo $nm | sed -e s/num.answer.rcode.//`
p_config "$nm" "$tp"
done
p_config "num.answer.secure" "answer secure"
p_config "num.answer.bogus" "answer bogus"
p_config "num.rrset.bogus" "num rrsets marked bogus"
echo "graph_info answers sorted by return value. rrsets bogus is the number of rrsets marked bogus per second by the validator"
;;
by_flags)
echo "graph_title Unbound DNS incoming queries by flags"
echo "graph_args --base 1000 -l 0"
echo "graph_vlabel queries / second"
echo "graph_category DNS"
p_config "num.query.flags.QR" "QR (query reply) flag"
p_config "num.query.flags.AA" "AA (auth answer) flag"
p_config "num.query.flags.TC" "TC (truncated) flag"
p_config "num.query.flags.RD" "RD (recursion desired) flag"
p_config "num.query.flags.RA" "RA (rec avail) flag"
p_config "num.query.flags.Z" "Z (zero) flag"
p_config "num.query.flags.AD" "AD (auth data) flag"
p_config "num.query.flags.CD" "CD (check disabled) flag"
p_config "num.query.edns.present" "EDNS OPT present"
p_config "num.query.edns.DO" "DO (DNSSEC OK) flag"
echo "graph_info This graphs plots the flags inside incoming queries. For example, if QR, AA, TC, RA, Z flags are set, the query can be rejected. RD, AD, CD and DO are legitimately set by some software."
;;
histogram)
echo "graph_title Unbound DNS histogram of reply time"
echo "graph_args --base 1000 -l 0"
echo "graph_vlabel queries / second"
echo "graph_category DNS"
echo hcache.label "cache hits"
echo hcache.min 0
echo hcache.draw AREA
echo hcache.colour 999999
echo h64ms.label "0 msec - 66 msec"
echo h64ms.min 0
echo h64ms.draw STACK
echo h64ms.colour 0000FF
echo h128ms.label "66 msec - 131 msec"
echo h128ms.min 0
echo h128ms.colour 1F00DF
echo h128ms.draw STACK
echo h256ms.label "131 msec - 262 msec"
echo h256ms.min 0
echo h256ms.draw STACK
echo h256ms.colour 3F00BF
echo h512ms.label "262 msec - 524 msec"
echo h512ms.min 0
echo h512ms.draw STACK
echo h512ms.colour 5F009F
echo h1s.label "524 msec - 1 sec"
echo h1s.min 0
echo h1s.draw STACK
echo h1s.colour 7F007F
echo h2s.label "1 sec - 2 sec"
echo h2s.min 0
echo h2s.draw STACK
echo h2s.colour 9F005F
echo h4s.label "2 sec - 4 sec"
echo h4s.min 0
echo h4s.draw STACK
echo h4s.colour BF003F
echo h8s.label "4 sec - 8 sec"
echo h8s.min 0
echo h8s.draw STACK
echo h8s.colour DF001F
echo h16s.label "8 sec - ..."
echo h16s.min 0
echo h16s.draw STACK
echo h16s.colour FF0000
echo "graph_info Histogram of the reply times for queries."
;;
esac
exit 0
fi
# do the stats itself
get_state
# get the time elapsed
get_value "time.elapsed"
if test $value = 0 || test $value = "0.000000"; then
echo "error: time elapsed 0 or could not retrieve data"
exit 1
fi
elapsed="$value"
# print value for $1 / elapsed
print_qps ( ) {
mn=`echo $1 | sed $ABBREV | tr . _`
get_value $1
echo "$mn.value" `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
}
# print qps if line already found in $2
print_qps_line ( ) {
mn=`echo $1 | sed $ABBREV | tr . _`
value="`echo $2 | sed -e 's/^.*=//'`"
echo "$mn.value" `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
}
# print value for $1
print_value ( ) {
mn=`echo $1 | sed $ABBREV | tr . _`
get_value $1
echo "$mn.value" $value
}
case $id in
hits)
for x in thread0.num.queries thread1.num.queries thread2.num.queries \
thread3.num.queries thread4.num.queries thread5.num.queries \
thread6.num.queries thread7.num.queries total.num.queries \
total.num.cachehits total.num.prefetch num.query.tcp \
num.query.ipv6 unwanted.queries unwanted.replies; do
if grep "^"$x"=" $state >/dev/null 2>&1; then
print_qps $x
fi
done
;;
queue)
for x in total.requestlist.avg total.requestlist.max \
total.requestlist.overwritten total.requestlist.exceeded; do
print_value $x
done
;;
memory)
mn=`echo mem.total.sbrk | sed $ABBREV | tr . _`
get_value 'mem.total.sbrk'
if test $value -eq 0; then
chk=`echo $ctrl | sed -e 's/-control$/-checkconf/'`
pidf=`$chk -o pidfile $conf 2>&1`
pid=`cat $pidf 2>&1`
value=`ps -p "$pid" -o rss= 2>&1`
if test "`expr $value + 1 - 1 2>&1`" -eq "$value" 2>&1; then
value=`expr $value \* 1024`
else
value=0
fi
fi
echo "$mn.value" $value
for x in mem.cache.rrset mem.cache.message \
mem.mod.iterator mem.mod.validator; do
print_value $x
done
;;
by_type)
for x in `grep "^num.query.type" $state`; do
nm=`echo $x | sed -e 's/=.*$//'`
print_qps_line $nm $x
done
;;
by_class)
for x in `grep "^num.query.class" $state`; do
nm=`echo $x | sed -e 's/=.*$//'`
print_qps_line $nm $x
done
;;
by_opcode)
for x in `grep "^num.query.opcode" $state`; do
nm=`echo $x | sed -e 's/=.*$//'`
print_qps_line $nm $x
done
;;
by_rcode)
for x in `grep "^num.answer.rcode" $state`; do
nm=`echo $x | sed -e 's/=.*$//'`
print_qps_line $nm $x
done
print_qps "num.answer.secure"
print_qps "num.answer.bogus"
print_qps "num.rrset.bogus"
;;
by_flags)
for x in num.query.flags.QR num.query.flags.AA num.query.flags.TC num.query.flags.RD num.query.flags.RA num.query.flags.Z num.query.flags.AD num.query.flags.CD num.query.edns.present num.query.edns.DO; do
print_qps $x
done
;;
histogram)
get_value total.num.cachehits
echo hcache.value `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
r=0
for x in histogram.000000.000000.to.000000.000001 \
histogram.000000.000001.to.000000.000002 \
histogram.000000.000002.to.000000.000004 \
histogram.000000.000004.to.000000.000008 \
histogram.000000.000008.to.000000.000016 \
histogram.000000.000016.to.000000.000032 \
histogram.000000.000032.to.000000.000064 \
histogram.000000.000064.to.000000.000128 \
histogram.000000.000128.to.000000.000256 \
histogram.000000.000256.to.000000.000512 \
histogram.000000.000512.to.000000.001024 \
histogram.000000.001024.to.000000.002048 \
histogram.000000.002048.to.000000.004096 \
histogram.000000.004096.to.000000.008192 \
histogram.000000.008192.to.000000.016384 \
histogram.000000.016384.to.000000.032768 \
histogram.000000.032768.to.000000.065536; do
get_value $x
r=`expr $r + $value`
done
echo h64ms.value `echo scale=6';' $r / $elapsed | bc `
get_value histogram.000000.065536.to.000000.131072
echo h128ms.value `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
get_value histogram.000000.131072.to.000000.262144
echo h256ms.value `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
get_value histogram.000000.262144.to.000000.524288
echo h512ms.value `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
get_value histogram.000000.524288.to.000001.000000
echo h1s.value `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
get_value histogram.000001.000000.to.000002.000000
echo h2s.value `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
get_value histogram.000002.000000.to.000004.000000
echo h4s.value `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
get_value histogram.000004.000000.to.000008.000000
echo h8s.value `echo scale=6';' $value / $elapsed | bc `
r=0
for x in histogram.000008.000000.to.000016.000000 \
histogram.000016.000000.to.000032.000000 \
histogram.000032.000000.to.000064.000000 \
histogram.000064.000000.to.000128.000000 \
histogram.000128.000000.to.000256.000000 \
histogram.000256.000000.to.000512.000000 \
histogram.000512.000000.to.001024.000000 \
histogram.001024.000000.to.002048.000000 \
histogram.002048.000000.to.004096.000000 \
histogram.004096.000000.to.008192.000000 \
histogram.008192.000000.to.016384.000000 \
histogram.016384.000000.to.032768.000000 \
histogram.032768.000000.to.065536.000000 \
histogram.065536.000000.to.131072.000000 \
histogram.131072.000000.to.262144.000000 \
histogram.262144.000000.to.524288.000000; do
get_value $x
r=`expr $r + $value`
done
echo h16s.value `echo scale=6';' $r / $elapsed | bc `
;;
esac

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