78 lines
2.5 KiB
Diff
78 lines
2.5 KiB
Diff
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Index: validator/validator.c
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===================================================================
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--- validator/validator.c (revision 1669)
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+++ validator/validator.c (revision 1670)
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@@ -479,6 +479,36 @@
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}
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/**
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+ * Detect wrong truncated response, by a bad recursor out there.
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+ * The positive response has a mangled authority section.
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+ * Remove that authority section.
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+ * @param rep: reply
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+ * @return true if a wrongly truncated response.
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+ */
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+static int
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+detect_wrongly_truncated(struct reply_info* rep)
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+{
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+ size_t i;
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+ /* no additional, only NS in authority, and it is bogus */
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+ if(rep->ar_numrrsets != 0 || rep->ns_numrrsets != 1 ||
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+ rep->an_numrrsets == 0)
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+ return 0;
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+ if(ntohs(rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]->rk.type) != LDNS_RR_TYPE_NS)
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+ return 0;
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+ if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ rep->an_numrrsets ]
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+ ->entry.data)->security != sec_status_bogus)
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+ return 0;
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+ /* answer section is present and secure */
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+ for(i=0; i<rep->an_numrrsets; i++) {
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+ if(((struct packed_rrset_data*)rep->rrsets[ i ]
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+ ->entry.data)->security != sec_status_secure)
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+ return 1;
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+}
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+
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+
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+/**
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* Given a "positive" response -- a response that contains an answer to the
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* question, and no CNAME chain, validate this response.
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*
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@@ -1449,17 +1479,31 @@
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vq->chase_reply->security = sec_status_bogus;
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return 1;
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}
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+ subtype = val_classify_response(qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo,
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+ &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip);
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/* check signatures in the message;
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* answer and authority must be valid, additional is only checked. */
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if(!validate_msg_signatures(qstate->env, ve, &vq->qchase,
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vq->chase_reply, vq->key_entry)) {
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- verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Validate: message contains bad rrsets");
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- return 1;
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+ /* workaround bad recursor out there that truncates (even
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+ * with EDNS4k) to 512 by removing RRSIG from auth section
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+ * for positive replies*/
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+ if(subtype == VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE &&
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+ detect_wrongly_truncated(vq->orig_msg->rep)) {
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+ /* truncate the message some more */
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+ vq->orig_msg->rep->ns_numrrsets = 0;
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+ vq->orig_msg->rep->rrset_count--;
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+ vq->chase_reply->ns_numrrsets = 0;
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+ vq->chase_reply->rrset_count--;
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+ }
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+ else {
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+ verbose(VERB_DETAIL, "Validate: message contains "
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+ "bad rrsets");
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+ return 1;
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+ }
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}
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- subtype = val_classify_response(qstate->query_flags, &qstate->qinfo,
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- &vq->qchase, vq->orig_msg->rep, vq->rrset_skip);
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switch(subtype) {
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case VAL_CLASS_POSITIVE:
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verbose(VERB_ALGO, "Validating a positive response");
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