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Merged update from upstream sources

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This is an automated DistroBaker update from upstream sources.
If you do not know what this is about or would like to opt out,
contact the OSCI team.

Source: https://src.fedoraproject.org/rpms/trousers.git#16f74e55185e71ad1d63e31e50c8639e5a0b8a4b
This commit is contained in:
DistroBaker 2020-11-07 03:02:08 +00:00
parent 6d0c24adf3
commit dbf057f2f4
10 changed files with 17 additions and 735 deletions
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1
.gitignore vendored
View File

@ -6,3 +6,4 @@ trousers-0.3.4.tar.gz
/trousers-0.3.11.2.tar.gz
/trousers-0.3.13.tar.gz
/trousers-0.3.14.tar.gz
/trousers-0.3.15.tar.gz

2
sources
View File

@ -1 +1 @@
SHA512 (trousers-0.3.14.tar.gz) = bf87f00329cf1d76a12cf6b6181fa22f90e76af3c5786e6e2db98438d2d3f0c0e05364374664173f45e3a2f6c0e2364948d0b958a7845cb23fcb340150cd9b21
SHA512 (trousers-0.3.15.tar.gz) = 769c7d891c6306c1b3252448f86e3043ee837e566c9431f5b4353512113e2907f6ce29c91e8044c420025b79c5f3ff2396ddce93f73b1eb2a15ea1de89ac0fdb

70
trousers-0.3.13-noinline.patch
View File

@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
diff -up trousers-0.3.13/src/include/tcsps.h.noinline trousers-0.3.13/src/include/tcsps.h
--- trousers-0.3.13/src/include/tcsps.h.noinline 2014-04-24 20:05:44.000000000 +0200
+++ trousers-0.3.13/src/include/tcsps.h 2015-05-26 16:36:20.685075185 +0200
@@ -27,8 +27,8 @@ void ps_destroy();
TSS_RESULT read_data(int, void *, UINT32);
TSS_RESULT write_data(int, void *, UINT32);
#else
-inline TSS_RESULT read_data(int, void *, UINT32);
-inline TSS_RESULT write_data(int, void *, UINT32);
+TSS_RESULT read_data(int, void *, UINT32);
+TSS_RESULT write_data(int, void *, UINT32);
#endif
int write_key_init(int, UINT32, UINT32, UINT32);
TSS_RESULT cache_key(UINT32, UINT16, TSS_UUID *, TSS_UUID *, UINT16, UINT32, UINT32);
diff -up trousers-0.3.13/src/include/tspps.h.noinline trousers-0.3.13/src/include/tspps.h
--- trousers-0.3.13/src/include/tspps.h.noinline 2014-04-24 20:05:44.000000000 +0200
+++ trousers-0.3.13/src/include/tspps.h 2015-05-26 16:36:31.730325291 +0200
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@
TSS_RESULT get_file(int *);
int put_file(int);
-inline TSS_RESULT read_data(int, void *, UINT32);
-inline TSS_RESULT write_data(int, void *, UINT32);
+TSS_RESULT read_data(int, void *, UINT32);
+TSS_RESULT write_data(int, void *, UINT32);
UINT32 psfile_get_num_keys(int);
TSS_RESULT psfile_get_parent_uuid_by_uuid(int, TSS_UUID *, TSS_UUID *);
TSS_RESULT psfile_remove_key_by_uuid(int, TSS_UUID *);
diff -up trousers-0.3.13/src/tcs/ps/ps_utils.c.noinline trousers-0.3.13/src/tcs/ps/ps_utils.c
--- trousers-0.3.13/src/tcs/ps/ps_utils.c.noinline 2014-04-24 20:05:44.000000000 +0200
+++ trousers-0.3.13/src/tcs/ps/ps_utils.c 2015-05-26 16:38:33.626085483 +0200
@@ -45,7 +45,7 @@ struct key_disk_cache *key_disk_cache_he
#ifdef SOLARIS
TSS_RESULT
#else
-inline TSS_RESULT
+TSS_RESULT
#endif
read_data(int fd, void *data, UINT32 size)
{
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ read_data(int fd, void *data, UINT32 siz
#ifdef SOLARIS
TSS_RESULT
#else
-inline TSS_RESULT
+TSS_RESULT
#endif
write_data(int fd, void *data, UINT32 size)
{
diff -up trousers-0.3.13/src/tspi/ps/ps_utils.c.noinline trousers-0.3.13/src/tspi/ps/ps_utils.c
--- trousers-0.3.13/src/tspi/ps/ps_utils.c.noinline 2014-04-24 20:05:44.000000000 +0200
+++ trousers-0.3.13/src/tspi/ps/ps_utils.c 2015-05-26 16:39:30.881381965 +0200
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@
#include "tspps.h"
#include "tsplog.h"
-inline TSS_RESULT
+TSS_RESULT
read_data(int fd, void *data, UINT32 size)
{
int rc;
@@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ read_data(int fd, void *data, UINT32 siz
return TSS_SUCCESS;
}
-inline TSS_RESULT
+TSS_RESULT
write_data(int fd, void *data, UINT32 size)
{
int rc;

89
trousers-0.3.14-correct-security-issues.patch
View File

@ -1,89 +0,0 @@
From e74dd1d96753b0538192143adf58d04fcd3b242b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
Date: Fri, 14 Aug 2020 22:14:36 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Correct multiple security issues that are present if the
tcsd is started by root instead of the tss user.
Patch fixes the following 3 CVEs:
CVE-2020-24332
If the tcsd daemon is started with root privileges,
the creation of the system.data file is prone to symlink attacks
CVE-2020-24330
If the tcsd daemon is started with root privileges,
it fails to drop the root gid after it is no longer needed
CVE-2020-24331
If the tcsd daemon is started with root privileges,
the tss user has read and write access to the /etc/tcsd.conf file
Authored-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
Signed-off-by: Debora Velarde Babb <debora@linux.ibm.com>
---
src/tcs/ps/tcsps.c | 2 +-
src/tcsd/svrside.c | 1 +
src/tcsd/tcsd_conf.c | 10 +++++-----
3 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/tcs/ps/tcsps.c b/src/tcs/ps/tcsps.c
index e47154b20612..85d45a96b7c3 100644
--- a/src/tcs/ps/tcsps.c
+++ b/src/tcs/ps/tcsps.c
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ get_file()
}
/* open and lock the file */
- system_ps_fd = open(tcsd_options.system_ps_file, O_CREAT|O_RDWR, 0600);
+ system_ps_fd = open(tcsd_options.system_ps_file, O_CREAT|O_RDWR|O_NOFOLLOW, 0600);
if (system_ps_fd < 0) {
LogError("system PS: open() of %s failed: %s",
tcsd_options.system_ps_file, strerror(errno));
diff --git a/src/tcsd/svrside.c b/src/tcsd/svrside.c
index 1ae1636f8730..1c12ff3afdd0 100644
--- a/src/tcsd/svrside.c
+++ b/src/tcsd/svrside.c
@@ -473,6 +473,7 @@ main(int argc, char **argv)
}
return TCSERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
+ setgid(pwd->pw_gid);
setuid(pwd->pw_uid);
#endif
#endif
diff --git a/src/tcsd/tcsd_conf.c b/src/tcsd/tcsd_conf.c
index a31503df3f1f..ea8ea13f5f16 100644
--- a/src/tcsd/tcsd_conf.c
+++ b/src/tcsd/tcsd_conf.c
@@ -743,7 +743,7 @@ conf_file_init(struct tcsd_config *conf)
#ifndef SOLARIS
struct group *grp;
struct passwd *pw;
- mode_t mode = (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR);
+ mode_t mode = (S_IRUSR|S_IWUSR|S_IRGRP);
#endif /* SOLARIS */
TSS_RESULT result;
@@ -798,15 +798,15 @@ conf_file_init(struct tcsd_config *conf)
}
/* make sure user/group TSS owns the conf file */
- if (pw->pw_uid != stat_buf.st_uid || grp->gr_gid != stat_buf.st_gid) {
+ if (stat_buf.st_uid != 0 || grp->gr_gid != stat_buf.st_gid) {
LogError("TCSD config file (%s) must be user/group %s/%s", tcsd_config_file,
- TSS_USER_NAME, TSS_GROUP_NAME);
+ "root", TSS_GROUP_NAME);
return TCSERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
- /* make sure only the tss user can manipulate the config file */
+ /* make sure only the tss user can read (but not manipulate) the config file */
if (((stat_buf.st_mode & 0777) ^ mode) != 0) {
- LogError("TCSD config file (%s) must be mode 0600", tcsd_config_file);
+ LogError("TCSD config file (%s) must be mode 0640", tcsd_config_file);
return TCSERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
}
#endif /* SOLARIS */
--
2.27.0

27
trousers-0.3.14-double-free.patch
View File

@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
diff -ur trousers-0.3.14/src/tspi/tsp_auth.c trousers-0.3.14-new/src/tspi/tsp_auth.c
--- trousers-0.3.14/src/tspi/tsp_auth.c 2014-07-23 12:42:45.000000000 -0700
+++ trousers-0.3.14-new/src/tspi/tsp_auth.c 2019-05-27 13:41:57.316000945 -0700
@@ -1221,7 +1221,7 @@
}
*handles = handle;
- handles_track = handles;
+ handles_track = handles;
// Since the call tree of this function can possibly alloc memory
// (check RPC_ExecuteTransport_TP function), its better to keep track of
@@ -1229,9 +1229,11 @@
result = obj_context_transport_execute(tspContext, TPM_ORD_Terminate_Handle, 0, NULL,
NULL, &handlesLen, &handles, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- free(handles);
- handles = NULL;
- free(handles_track);
+ if (handles != handles_track) {
+ free(handles);
+ }
+
+ free(handles_track);
return result;
}

49
trousers-0.3.14-no-optimize.patch
View File

@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
From 6edef3777f9b9a26e63168bb81c8d4f4ddb17017 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 5 Jun 2019 11:51:33 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 2/2] trousers: don't use __no_optimize
The trousers is failing annocheck hardened check due to
__no_optimize being used for __tspi_memset(). Instead of
__no_optimize use a asm memory barrier.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Signed-off-by: Debora Velarde Babb <debora@linux.ibm.com>
---
src/include/spi_utils.h | 2 +-
src/tspi/tsp_context_mem.c | 6 ++++--
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/spi_utils.h b/src/include/spi_utils.h
index 11255b20a21d..6ef21ce0cc83 100644
--- a/src/include/spi_utils.h
+++ b/src/include/spi_utils.h
@@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ MUTEX_DECLARE_EXTERN(mem_cache_lock);
void *calloc_tspi(TSS_HCONTEXT, UINT32);
TSS_RESULT free_tspi(TSS_HCONTEXT, void *);
TSS_RESULT __tspi_add_mem_entry(TSS_HCONTEXT, void *);
-void * __no_optimize __tspi_memset(void *, int, size_t);
+void * __tspi_memset(void *, int, size_t);
/* secrets.c */
diff --git a/src/tspi/tsp_context_mem.c b/src/tspi/tsp_context_mem.c
index 2982df9fed06..2769af3662b9 100644
--- a/src/tspi/tsp_context_mem.c
+++ b/src/tspi/tsp_context_mem.c
@@ -258,8 +258,10 @@ free_tspi(TSS_HCONTEXT tspContext, void *memPointer)
}
/* definition for a memset that cannot be optimized away */
-void * __no_optimize
+void *
__tspi_memset(void *s, int c, size_t n)
{
- return memset(s, c, n);
+ memset(s, c, n);
+ asm volatile("" ::: "memory");
+ return s;
}
--
2.27.0

6
trousers-0.3.14-noinline.patch
View File

@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
diff -ur a/src/include/tspps.h b/src/include/tspps.h
--- a/src/include/tspps.h 2014-07-23 12:42:44.000000000 -0700
+++ b/src/include/tspps.h 2018-08-01 19:33:42.454192873 -0700
diff -ur trousers-0.3.15/src/include/tspps.h trousers-0.3.15-new/src/include/tspps.h
--- trousers-0.3.15/src/include/tspps.h 2020-05-27 23:01:45.000000000 -0700
+++ trousers-0.3.15-new/src/include/tspps.h 2020-11-06 17:46:53.796319788 -0700
@@ -18,8 +18,8 @@
TSS_RESULT get_file(int *);

37
trousers-0.3.14-tcsd-header-fix.patch
View File

@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
From b692f86a93c8f7e6ac938277a9aec434b02c252b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Mar 2020 13:35:22 -0700
Subject: [PATCH] trousers: resolve build failure
The global variables tcsd_sa_chld and tcsd_sa_int in tcsd.h are
causing build failures in latest Fedora release:
/usr/bin/ld: ../../src/tcs/libtcs.a(libtcs_a-tcsi_changeauth.o):/builddir/build/BUILD/trousers-0.3.13/src/tcs/../include/tcsd.h:169: multiple definition of `tcsd_sa_chld'; tcsd-svrside.o:/builddir/build/BUILD/trousers-0.3.13/src/tcsd/../../src/include/tcsd.h:169: first defined here
/usr/bin/ld: ../../src/tcs/libtcs.a(libtcs_a-tcsi_changeauth.o):/builddir/build/BUILD/trousers-0.3.13/src/tcs/../include/tcsd.h:168: multiple definition of `tcsd_sa_int'; tcsd-svrside.o:/builddir/build/BUILD/trousers-0.3.13/src/tcsd/../../src/include/tcsd.h:168: first defined here
They are no longer used since 9b40e581470b ("Improved daemon's signal
handling") so just remove them.
Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
---
src/include/tcsd.h | 6 ------
1 file changed, 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/include/tcsd.h b/src/include/tcsd.h
index 5b9462b85ed6..f5c286e01c86 100644
--- a/src/include/tcsd.h
+++ b/src/include/tcsd.h
@@ -164,10 +164,4 @@ TSS_RESULT tcsd_thread_create(int, char *);
void *tcsd_thread_run(void *);
void thread_signal_init();
-/* signal handling */
-#ifndef __APPLE__
-struct sigaction tcsd_sa_int;
-struct sigaction tcsd_sa_chld;
-#endif
-
#endif
--
2.24.0

448
trousers-openssl1.1.patch
View File

@ -1,448 +0,0 @@
@@ -, +, @@
---
src/tcs/crypto/openssl/crypto.c | 15 ++++++---
src/trspi/crypto/openssl/hash.c | 17 ++++++----
src/trspi/crypto/openssl/rsa.c | 64 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
src/trspi/crypto/openssl/symmetric.c | 65 +++++++++++++++++++++---------------
4 files changed, 115 insertions(+), 46 deletions(-)
--- a/src/tcs/crypto/openssl/crypto.c
+++ a/src/tcs/crypto/openssl/crypto.c
@@ -31,13 +31,17 @@
TSS_RESULT
Hash(UINT32 HashType, UINT32 BufSize, BYTE* Buf, BYTE* Digest)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
unsigned int result_size;
int rv;
+ md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md_ctx == NULL)
+ return TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
+
switch (HashType) {
case TSS_HASH_SHA1:
- rv = EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx, EVP_sha1());
+ rv = EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, EVP_sha1());
break;
default:
rv = TCSERR(TSS_E_BAD_PARAMETER);
@@ -50,19 +54,20 @@ Hash(UINT32 HashType, UINT32 BufSize, BYTE* Buf, BYTE* Digest)
goto out;
}
- rv = EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, Buf, BufSize);
+ rv = EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, Buf, BufSize);
if (rv != EVP_SUCCESS) {
rv = TCSERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto out;
}
- result_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(&md_ctx);
- rv = EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, Digest, &result_size);
+ result_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(md_ctx);
+ rv = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, Digest, &result_size);
if (rv != EVP_SUCCESS) {
rv = TCSERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
} else
rv = TSS_SUCCESS;
out:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return rv;
}
--- a/src/trspi/crypto/openssl/hash.c
+++ a/src/trspi/crypto/openssl/hash.c
@@ -56,13 +56,17 @@ int MGF1(unsigned char *, long, const unsigned char *, long);
TSS_RESULT
Trspi_Hash(UINT32 HashType, UINT32 BufSize, BYTE* Buf, BYTE* Digest)
{
- EVP_MD_CTX md_ctx;
+ EVP_MD_CTX *md_ctx;
unsigned int result_size;
int rv;
+ md_ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
+ if (md_ctx == NULL)
+ return TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
+
switch (HashType) {
case TSS_HASH_SHA1:
- rv = EVP_DigestInit(&md_ctx, EVP_sha1());
+ rv = EVP_DigestInit(md_ctx, EVP_sha1());
break;
default:
rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_BAD_PARAMETER);
@@ -75,14 +79,14 @@ Trspi_Hash(UINT32 HashType, UINT32 BufSize, BYTE* Buf, BYTE* Digest)
goto err;
}
- rv = EVP_DigestUpdate(&md_ctx, Buf, BufSize);
+ rv = EVP_DigestUpdate(md_ctx, Buf, BufSize);
if (rv != EVP_SUCCESS) {
rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
}
- result_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(&md_ctx);
- rv = EVP_DigestFinal(&md_ctx, Digest, &result_size);
+ result_size = EVP_MD_CTX_size(md_ctx);
+ rv = EVP_DigestFinal(md_ctx, Digest, &result_size);
if (rv != EVP_SUCCESS) {
rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto err;
@@ -94,6 +98,7 @@ Trspi_Hash(UINT32 HashType, UINT32 BufSize, BYTE* Buf, BYTE* Digest)
err:
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
out:
+ EVP_MD_CTX_free(md_ctx);
return rv;
}
@@ -112,7 +117,7 @@ Trspi_HashInit(Trspi_HashCtx *ctx, UINT32 HashType)
break;
}
- if ((ctx->ctx = malloc(sizeof(EVP_MD_CTX))) == NULL)
+ if ((ctx->ctx = EVP_MD_CTX_new()) == NULL)
return TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
rv = EVP_DigestInit((EVP_MD_CTX *)ctx->ctx, (const EVP_MD *)md);
--- a/src/trspi/crypto/openssl/rsa.c
+++ a/src/trspi/crypto/openssl/rsa.c
@@ -38,6 +38,25 @@
#define DEBUG_print_openssl_errors()
#endif
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_NUMBER < 0x10100001L
+static int
+RSA_set0_key(RSA *r, BIGNUM *n, BIGNUM *e, BIGNUM *d)
+{
+ if (n != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->n);
+ r->n = n;
+ }
+ if (e != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->e);
+ r->e = e;
+ }
+ if (d != NULL) {
+ BN_free(r->d);
+ r->d = d;
+ }
+ return 1;
+}
+#endif
/*
* Hopefully this will make the code clearer since
@@ -61,6 +80,7 @@ Trspi_RSA_Encrypt(unsigned char *dataToEncrypt, /* in */
RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
BYTE encodedData[256];
int encodedDataLen;
+ BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
if (rsa == NULL) {
rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
@@ -68,12 +88,20 @@ Trspi_RSA_Encrypt(unsigned char *dataToEncrypt, /* in */
}
/* set the public key value in the OpenSSL object */
- rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(publicKey, keysize, rsa->n);
+ rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(publicKey, keysize, NULL);
/* set the public exponent */
- rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(exp, sizeof(exp), rsa->e);
+ rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(exp, sizeof(exp), NULL);
- if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+ if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
+ BN_free(rsa_n);
+ BN_free(rsa_e);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
+ rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_FAIL);
+ BN_free(rsa_n);
+ BN_free(rsa_e);
goto err;
}
@@ -123,6 +151,7 @@ Trspi_Verify(UINT32 HashType, BYTE *pHash, UINT32 iHashLength,
unsigned char exp[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 }; /* The default public exponent for the TPM */
unsigned char buf[256];
RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+ BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
if (rsa == NULL) {
rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
@@ -146,12 +175,20 @@ Trspi_Verify(UINT32 HashType, BYTE *pHash, UINT32 iHashLength,
}
/* set the public key value in the OpenSSL object */
- rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(pModulus, iKeyLength, rsa->n);
+ rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(pModulus, iKeyLength, NULL);
/* set the public exponent */
- rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(exp, sizeof(exp), rsa->e);
+ rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(exp, sizeof(exp), NULL);
- if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+ if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
+ BN_free(rsa_n);
+ BN_free(rsa_e);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
+ rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_FAIL);
+ BN_free(rsa_n);
+ BN_free(rsa_e);
goto err;
}
@@ -195,6 +232,7 @@ Trspi_RSA_Public_Encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
int rv, e_size = 3;
unsigned char exp[] = { 0x01, 0x00, 0x01 };
RSA *rsa = RSA_new();
+ BIGNUM *rsa_n = NULL, *rsa_e = NULL;
if (rsa == NULL) {
rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
@@ -237,12 +275,20 @@ Trspi_RSA_Public_Encrypt(unsigned char *in, unsigned int inlen,
}
/* set the public key value in the OpenSSL object */
- rsa->n = BN_bin2bn(pubkey, pubsize, rsa->n);
+ rsa_n = BN_bin2bn(pubkey, pubsize, NULL);
/* set the public exponent */
- rsa->e = BN_bin2bn(exp, e_size, rsa->e);
+ rsa_e = BN_bin2bn(exp, e_size, NULL);
- if (rsa->n == NULL || rsa->e == NULL) {
+ if (rsa_n == NULL || rsa_e == NULL) {
rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
+ BN_free(rsa_n);
+ BN_free(rsa_e);
+ goto err;
+ }
+ if (!RSA_set0_key(rsa, rsa_n, rsa_e, NULL)) {
+ rv = TSPERR(TSS_E_FAIL);
+ BN_free(rsa_n);
+ BN_free(rsa_e);
goto err;
}
--- a/src/trspi/crypto/openssl/symmetric.c
+++ a/src/trspi/crypto/openssl/symmetric.c
@@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ Trspi_Encrypt_ECB(UINT16 alg, BYTE *key, BYTE *in, UINT32 in_len, BYTE *out,
UINT32 *out_len)
{
TSS_RESULT result = TSS_SUCCESS;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
UINT32 tmp;
switch (alg) {
@@ -64,33 +64,37 @@ Trspi_Encrypt_ECB(UINT16 alg, BYTE *key, BYTE *in, UINT32 in_len, BYTE *out,
break;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ result = TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
+ goto done;
+ }
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_ecb(), key, NULL)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit(ctx, EVP_aes_256_ecb(), key, NULL)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
- if (*out_len < in_len + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx) - 1) {
+ if (*out_len < in_len + EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx) - 1) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto done;
}
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, out, (int *)out_len, in, in_len)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, out, (int *)out_len, in, in_len)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, out + *out_len, (int *)&tmp)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, out + *out_len, (int *)&tmp)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
*out_len += tmp;
done:
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return result;
}
@@ -99,7 +103,7 @@ Trspi_Decrypt_ECB(UINT16 alg, BYTE *key, BYTE *in, UINT32 in_len, BYTE *out,
UINT32 *out_len)
{
TSS_RESULT result = TSS_SUCCESS;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
UINT32 tmp;
switch (alg) {
@@ -111,28 +115,32 @@ Trspi_Decrypt_ECB(UINT16 alg, BYTE *key, BYTE *in, UINT32 in_len, BYTE *out,
break;
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ result = TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
+ goto done;
+ }
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit(&ctx, EVP_aes_256_ecb(), key, NULL)) {
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, EVP_aes_256_ecb(), key, NULL)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, out, (int *)out_len, in, in_len)) {
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out, (int *)out_len, in, in_len)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, out + *out_len, (int *)&tmp)) {
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, out + *out_len, (int *)&tmp)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
*out_len += tmp;
done:
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return result;
}
@@ -255,7 +263,7 @@ Trspi_SymEncrypt(UINT16 alg, UINT16 mode, BYTE *key, BYTE *iv, BYTE *in, UINT32
UINT32 *out_len)
{
TSS_RESULT result = TSS_SUCCESS;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx;
EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
BYTE *def_iv = NULL, *outiv_ptr;
UINT32 tmp;
@@ -269,7 +277,9 @@ Trspi_SymEncrypt(UINT16 alg, UINT16 mode, BYTE *key, BYTE *iv, BYTE *in, UINT32
if ((cipher = get_openssl_cipher(alg, mode)) == NULL)
return TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL)
+ return TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
/* If the iv passed in is NULL, create a new random iv and prepend it to the ciphertext */
iv_len = EVP_CIPHER_iv_length(cipher);
@@ -289,25 +299,25 @@ Trspi_SymEncrypt(UINT16 alg, UINT16 mode, BYTE *key, BYTE *iv, BYTE *in, UINT32
outiv_ptr = out;
}
- if (!EVP_EncryptInit(&ctx, (const EVP_CIPHER *)cipher, key, def_iv)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptInit(ctx, (const EVP_CIPHER *)cipher, key, def_iv)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
- if ((UINT32)outiv_len < in_len + (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(&ctx) * 2) - 1) {
+ if ((UINT32)outiv_len < in_len + (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_block_size(ctx) * 2) - 1) {
LogDebug("Not enough space to do symmetric encryption");
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
goto done;
}
- if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(&ctx, outiv_ptr, &outiv_len, in, in_len)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptUpdate(ctx, outiv_ptr, &outiv_len, in, in_len)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
- if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(&ctx, outiv_ptr + outiv_len, (int *)&tmp)) {
+ if (!EVP_EncryptFinal(ctx, outiv_ptr + outiv_len, (int *)&tmp)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
@@ -320,7 +330,7 @@ done:
*out_len += iv_len;
free(def_iv);
}
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return result;
}
@@ -329,7 +339,7 @@ Trspi_SymDecrypt(UINT16 alg, UINT16 mode, BYTE *key, BYTE *iv, BYTE *in, UINT32
UINT32 *out_len)
{
TSS_RESULT result = TSS_SUCCESS;
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX ctx;
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx = NULL;
EVP_CIPHER *cipher;
BYTE *def_iv = NULL, *iniv_ptr;
UINT32 tmp;
@@ -341,7 +351,10 @@ Trspi_SymDecrypt(UINT16 alg, UINT16 mode, BYTE *key, BYTE *iv, BYTE *in, UINT32
if ((cipher = get_openssl_cipher(alg, mode)) == NULL)
return TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_init(&ctx);
+ ctx = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_new();
+ if (ctx == NULL) {
+ return TSPERR(TSS_E_OUTOFMEMORY);
+ }
/* If the iv is NULL, assume that its prepended to the ciphertext */
if (iv == NULL) {
@@ -361,19 +374,19 @@ Trspi_SymDecrypt(UINT16 alg, UINT16 mode, BYTE *key, BYTE *iv, BYTE *in, UINT32
iniv_len = in_len;
}
- if (!EVP_DecryptInit(&ctx, cipher, key, def_iv)) {
+ if (!EVP_DecryptInit(ctx, cipher, key, def_iv)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
- if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(&ctx, out, (int *)out_len, iniv_ptr, iniv_len)) {
+ if (!EVP_DecryptUpdate(ctx, out, (int *)out_len, iniv_ptr, iniv_len)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
}
- if (!EVP_DecryptFinal(&ctx, out + *out_len, (int *)&tmp)) {
+ if (!EVP_DecryptFinal(ctx, out + *out_len, (int *)&tmp)) {
result = TSPERR(TSS_E_INTERNAL_ERROR);
DEBUG_print_openssl_errors();
goto done;
@@ -383,6 +396,6 @@ Trspi_SymDecrypt(UINT16 alg, UINT16 mode, BYTE *key, BYTE *iv, BYTE *in, UINT32
done:
if (def_iv != iv)
free(def_iv);
- EVP_CIPHER_CTX_cleanup(&ctx);
+ EVP_CIPHER_CTX_free(ctx);
return result;
}
--

19
trousers.spec
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Name: trousers
Summary: TCG's Software Stack v1.2
Version: 0.3.14
Release: 4%{?dist}
Version: 0.3.15
Release: 1%{?dist}
License: BSD
Url: http://trousers.sourceforge.net
@ -11,13 +11,9 @@ Patch1: trousers-0.3.14-noinline.patch
# submitted upstream
Patch2: trousers-0.3.14-unlock-in-err-path.patch
Patch3: trousers-0.3.14-fix-indent-obj_policy.patch
Patch4: trousers-0.3.14-double-free.patch
Patch5: trousers-0.3.14-fix-indent-tspi_key.patch
Patch6: trousers-0.3.14-tcsd-header-fix.patch
Patch7: trousers-0.3.14-correct-security-issues.patch
Patch8: trousers-0.3.14-no-optimize.patch
Patch4: trousers-0.3.14-fix-indent-tspi_key.patch
BuildRequires: libtool, openssl-devel
BuildRequires: libtool openssl-devel gettext-devel autoconf automake
BuildRequires: systemd
Requires(pre): shadow-utils
Requires(post): systemd-units
@ -59,11 +55,13 @@ Header files and man pages for use in creating Trusted Computing enabled
applications.
%prep
%autosetup -c -p1
%autosetup -p1
# fix man page paths
sed -i -e 's|/var/tpm|/var/lib/tpm|g' -e 's|/usr/local/var|/var|g' man/man5/tcsd.conf.5.in man/man8/tcsd.8.in
%build
chmod +x ./bootstrap.sh
./bootstrap.sh
%configure --with-gui=openssl
make -k %{?_smp_mflags}
@ -120,6 +118,9 @@ exit 0
%{_libdir}/libtddl.a
%changelog
* Fri Nov 06 2020 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 0.3.15-1
- Rebase to 0.3.15 release.
* Thu Oct 29 2020 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 0.3.14-4
- Fix for CVE-2020-24330 (RHBZ#1874824)
- Fix for CVE-2020-24331 (RHBZ#1870057)