.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/tpm2-tools-4.1.1.tar.gz
+SOURCES/tpm2-tools-5.2.tar.gz

.tpm2-tools.metadata

@@ -1 +1 @@
-d097d321237983435f05c974533ad90e6f20acef SOURCES/tpm2-tools-4.1.1.tar.gz
+00dc3b052d3b4ea44aeda95a9b3a6809ee471358 SOURCES/tpm2-tools-5.2.tar.gz

SOURCES/0001-Fix-ESYS_TR-hierarchy-transition.patch

@@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
-From e607f78a054acfdbe119499c3608bdb2a44423d9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de>
-Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 11:51:17 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix ESYS_TR hierarchy transition
-
-Fix those cases of TPM2_RH_ to ESYS_TR_RH_ translations that were missed in
-780800c0be69a49b9097f8eae653cdb0623d2100
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de>
----
- lib/tpm2.c | 20 ++++++++++++++------
- 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/tpm2.c b/lib/tpm2.c
-index e7ff77047bef..909a4422339d 100644
---- a/lib/tpm2.c
-+++ b/lib/tpm2.c
-@@ -656,6 +656,12 @@ uint32_t fix_esys_hierarchy(TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy)
- {
- #if defined(ESYS_3_0)
-     switch (hierarchy) {
-+        case ESYS_TR_RH_NULL:
-+        case ESYS_TR_RH_OWNER:
-+        case ESYS_TR_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
-+        case ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM:
-+        case ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM_NV:
-+            return hierarchy;
-         case TPM2_RH_NULL:
-             return ESYS_TR_RH_NULL;
-         case TPM2_RH_OWNER:
-@@ -664,14 +670,16 @@ uint32_t fix_esys_hierarchy(TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy)
-             return ESYS_TR_RH_ENDORSEMENT;
-         case TPM2_RH_PLATFORM:
-             return ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM;
-+        case TPM2_RH_PLATFORM_NV:
-+            return ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM_NV;
-         default:
--            return TSS2_ESYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
-+            LOG_ERR("An unknown hierarchy handle was passed: 0x%08x", hierarchy);
-+            return 0xffffffff;
-     }
- #elif defined(ESYS_2_3)
-     return hierarchy;
- #else
--    UNUSED(hierarchy);
--    return TSS2_ESYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
-+#error "Need to define either ESYS_3_0 or ESYS_2_3"
- #endif
- }
- 
-@@ -1154,7 +1162,7 @@ tool_rc tpm2_hierarchycontrol(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context,
-     }
- 
-     TSS2_RC rval = Esys_HierarchyControl(esys_context, auth_hierarchy->tr_handle,
--            shandle, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, enable, state);
-+            shandle, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, fix_esys_hierarchy(enable), state);
-     if (rval != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS && rval != TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE) {
-         LOG_PERR(Esys_HierarchyControl, rval);
-         return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-@@ -1251,7 +1259,7 @@ tool_rc tpm2_hmac_sequencecomplete(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context,
- 
-     TPM2_RC rval = Esys_SequenceComplete(esys_context, sequence_handle,
-             hmac_key_obj_shandle, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, input_buffer,
--            TPM2_RH_NULL, result, validation);
-+            fix_esys_hierarchy(TPM2_RH_NULL), result, validation);
-     if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-         LOG_PERR(Esys_HMAC, rval);
-         return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-@@ -1907,7 +1915,7 @@ tool_rc tpm2_loadexternal(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, const TPM2B_SENSITIVE *private,
- 
-     TSS2_RC rval = Esys_LoadExternal(ectx,
-             ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE,
--            private, public, hierarchy,
-+            private, public, fix_esys_hierarchy(hierarchy),
-             object_handle);
-     if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-         LOG_PERR(Esys_LoadExternal, rval);
--- 
-2.27.0
-

SOURCES/0001-Fix-nv_readpublic.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From 4dffb4295392f69f00003b2879f60bd36076f22d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
+Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 13:21:58 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 01/17] Fix nv_readpublic
+
+Based on 4af3e6b4 tpm2_nvreadpublic: Add option to output cpHash
+---
+ lib/tpm2.c         | 11 +++++++++--
+ lib/tpm2_nv_util.h | 14 +-------------
+ 2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2.c b/lib/tpm2.c
+index 4ee27c8c..d91072ae 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2.c
+@@ -101,9 +101,16 @@ tool_rc tpm2_close(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context, ESYS_TR *rsrc_handle) {
+ tool_rc tpm2_nv_readpublic(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context, ESYS_TR nv_index,
+         TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC **nv_public, TPM2B_NAME **nv_name) {
+ 
+-    TSS2_RC rval = Esys_NV_ReadPublic(esys_context, nv_index,
+-            ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, nv_public, nv_name);
++    ESYS_TR esys_tr_nv_index;
++    TSS2_RC rval = Esys_TR_FromTPMPublic(esys_context, nv_index, ESYS_TR_NONE,
++            ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, &esys_tr_nv_index);
++    if (rval != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
++        LOG_PERR(Esys_TR_FromTPMPublic, rval);
++        return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
++    }
+ 
++    rval = Esys_NV_ReadPublic(esys_context, esys_tr_nv_index,
++            ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, nv_public, nv_name);
+     if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+         LOG_PERR(Esys_NV_ReadPublic, rval);
+         return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_nv_util.h b/lib/tpm2_nv_util.h
+index 99843156..daf8b624 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_nv_util.h
++++ b/lib/tpm2_nv_util.h
+@@ -28,19 +28,7 @@
+ static inline tool_rc tpm2_util_nv_read_public(ESYS_CONTEXT *context,
+         TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX nv_index, TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC **nv_public) {
+ 
+-    ESYS_TR tr_object;
+-    tool_rc rc = tpm2_from_tpm_public(context, nv_index, ESYS_TR_NONE,
+-            ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, &tr_object);
+-    if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+-        return rc;
+-    }
+-
+-    rc = tpm2_nv_readpublic(context, tr_object, nv_public, NULL);
+-    tool_rc tmp_rc = tpm2_close(context, &tr_object);
+-    if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
+-        rc = tmp_rc;
+-    }
+-    return rc;
++    return tpm2_nv_readpublic(context, nv_index, nv_public, 0);
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0001-Refactor-fix_esys_hierarchies.patch

@@ -1,211 +0,0 @@
-From 2e7839b905f7a493f739d36e3e550e0cee30049e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de>
-Date: Thu, 7 May 2020 19:12:36 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Refactor fix_esys_hierarchies()
-
-Refactor fix_esys_hierarchies() to return an actual TSS2_RC return code
-and have an output parameter.
-
-Signed-off-by: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@sit.fraunhofer.de>
----
- lib/tpm2.c                | 88 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- lib/tpm2.h                |  2 +-
- tools/tpm2_loadexternal.c |  9 +++-
- 3 files changed, 75 insertions(+), 24 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/tpm2.c b/lib/tpm2.c
-index 909a4422339d..744fed8c529f 100644
---- a/lib/tpm2.c
-+++ b/lib/tpm2.c
-@@ -645,39 +645,51 @@ tool_rc tpm2_evictcontrol(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context,
- }
- 
- /* This function addresses ESAPI change that changes parameter type from
-- * Esys_TR to TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY and breaks backwards compatibility.
-+ * Esys_TR to TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY or TPMI_RH_ENABLES and breaks backwards
-+ * compatibility.
-  * To keep the tools parameters consistent after v4.0 release we need to
-  * map the values to appropriate type based on the version of the ESYS API.
-  * Note: the mapping is based on the ESYS version recognized at compile time.
-  * The TSS change can be found here:
-  * https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tss/pull/1531
-  */
--uint32_t fix_esys_hierarchy(TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy)
-+TSS2_RC fix_esys_hierarchy(uint32_t in, uint32_t *out)
- {
- #if defined(ESYS_3_0)
--    switch (hierarchy) {
-+    switch (in) {
-         case ESYS_TR_RH_NULL:
-+            /* FALLTHRU */
-         case ESYS_TR_RH_OWNER:
-+            /* FALLTHRU */
-         case ESYS_TR_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
-+            /* FALLTHRU */
-         case ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM:
-+            /* FALLTHRU */
-         case ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM_NV:
--            return hierarchy;
-+            *out = in;
-+            return TSS2_RC_SUCCESS;
-         case TPM2_RH_NULL:
--            return ESYS_TR_RH_NULL;
-+            *out = ESYS_TR_RH_NULL;
-+            return TSS2_RC_SUCCESS;
-         case TPM2_RH_OWNER:
--            return ESYS_TR_RH_OWNER;
-+            *out = ESYS_TR_RH_OWNER;
-+            return TSS2_RC_SUCCESS;
-         case TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT:
--            return ESYS_TR_RH_ENDORSEMENT;
-+            *out = ESYS_TR_RH_ENDORSEMENT;
-+            return TSS2_RC_SUCCESS;
-         case TPM2_RH_PLATFORM:
--            return ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM;
-+            *out = ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM;
-+            return TSS2_RC_SUCCESS;
-         case TPM2_RH_PLATFORM_NV:
--            return ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM_NV;
-+            *out = ESYS_TR_RH_PLATFORM_NV;
-+            return TSS2_RC_SUCCESS;
-         default:
--            LOG_ERR("An unknown hierarchy handle was passed: 0x%08x", hierarchy);
--            return 0xffffffff;
-+            LOG_ERR("An unknown hierarchy handle was passed: 0x%08x", in);
-+            return TSS2_ESYS_RC_BAD_VALUE;
-     }
- #elif defined(ESYS_2_3)
--    return hierarchy;
-+    *out = in;
-+    return TSS2_RC_SUCCESS;
- #else
- #error "Need to define either ESYS_3_0 or ESYS_2_3"
- #endif
-@@ -688,8 +700,14 @@ tool_rc tpm2_hash(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2
-         TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy, TPM2B_DIGEST **out_hash,
-         TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK **validation) {
- 
--    TSS2_RC rval = Esys_Hash(esys_context, shandle1, shandle2, shandle3, data,
--            hash_alg, fix_esys_hierarchy(hierarchy), out_hash, validation);
-+    TSS2_RC rval = fix_esys_hierarchy(hierarchy, &hierarchy);
-+    if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-+        LOG_ERR("Unknown hierarchy");
-+        return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-+    }
-+
-+    rval = Esys_Hash(esys_context, shandle1, shandle2, shandle3, data,
-+            hash_alg, hierarchy, out_hash, validation);
-     if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-         LOG_PERR(Esys_Hash, rval);
-         return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-@@ -729,9 +747,15 @@ tool_rc tpm2_sequence_complete(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context,
-         TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy, TPM2B_DIGEST **result,
-         TPMT_TK_HASHCHECK **validation) {
- 
--    TSS2_RC rval = Esys_SequenceComplete(esys_context, sequence_handle,
-+    TSS2_RC rval = fix_esys_hierarchy(hierarchy, &hierarchy);
-+    if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-+        LOG_ERR("Unknown hierarchy");
-+        return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-+    }
-+
-+    rval = Esys_SequenceComplete(esys_context, sequence_handle,
-             ESYS_TR_PASSWORD, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, buffer,
--            fix_esys_hierarchy(hierarchy), result, validation);
-+            hierarchy, result, validation);
-     if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-         LOG_PERR(Esys_SequenceComplete, rval);
-         return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-@@ -1161,8 +1185,14 @@ tool_rc tpm2_hierarchycontrol(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context,
-         return rc;
-     }
- 
--    TSS2_RC rval = Esys_HierarchyControl(esys_context, auth_hierarchy->tr_handle,
--            shandle, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, fix_esys_hierarchy(enable), state);
-+    TSS2_RC rval = fix_esys_hierarchy(enable, &enable);
-+    if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-+        LOG_ERR("Unknown hierarchy");
-+        return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-+    }
-+
-+    rval = Esys_HierarchyControl(esys_context, auth_hierarchy->tr_handle,
-+            shandle, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, enable, state);
-     if (rval != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS && rval != TPM2_RC_INITIALIZE) {
-         LOG_PERR(Esys_HierarchyControl, rval);
-         return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-@@ -1257,9 +1287,17 @@ tool_rc tpm2_hmac_sequencecomplete(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context,
-         return rc;
-     }
- 
--    TPM2_RC rval = Esys_SequenceComplete(esys_context, sequence_handle,
-+    uint32_t hierarchy;
-+
-+    TSS2_RC rval = fix_esys_hierarchy(TPM2_RH_NULL, &hierarchy);
-+    if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-+        LOG_ERR("Unknown hierarchy");
-+        return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-+    }
-+
-+    rval = Esys_SequenceComplete(esys_context, sequence_handle,
-             hmac_key_obj_shandle, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, input_buffer,
--            fix_esys_hierarchy(TPM2_RH_NULL), result, validation);
-+            hierarchy, result, validation);
-     if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-         LOG_PERR(Esys_HMAC, rval);
-         return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-@@ -1913,9 +1951,15 @@ tool_rc tpm2_loadexternal(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, const TPM2B_SENSITIVE *private,
-         const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy,
-         ESYS_TR *object_handle) {
- 
--    TSS2_RC rval = Esys_LoadExternal(ectx,
-+    TSS2_RC rval = fix_esys_hierarchy(hierarchy, &hierarchy);
-+    if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-+        LOG_ERR("Unknown hierarchy");
-+        return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-+    }
-+
-+    rval = Esys_LoadExternal(ectx,
-             ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE,
--            private, public, fix_esys_hierarchy(hierarchy),
-+            private, public, hierarchy,
-             object_handle);
-     if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-         LOG_PERR(Esys_LoadExternal, rval);
-diff --git a/lib/tpm2.h b/lib/tpm2.h
-index a37e05606c7a..2e4ae5e7dddc 100644
---- a/lib/tpm2.h
-+++ b/lib/tpm2.h
-@@ -389,7 +389,7 @@ tool_rc tpm2_policy_nv_written(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context,
-         ESYS_TR policy_session, ESYS_TR shandle1, ESYS_TR shandle2,
-         ESYS_TR shandle3, TPMI_YES_NO written_set);
- 
--uint32_t fix_esys_hierarchy(TPMI_RH_HIERARCHY hierarchy);
-+TSS2_RC fix_esys_hierarchy(uint32_t in, uint32_t *out);
- 
- tool_rc tpm2_certifycreation(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context,
-     tpm2_loaded_object *signingkey_obj, tpm2_loaded_object *certifiedkey_obj,
-diff --git a/tools/tpm2_loadexternal.c b/tools/tpm2_loadexternal.c
-index 70fb72877aae..4127ca1b524b 100644
---- a/tools/tpm2_loadexternal.c
-+++ b/tools/tpm2_loadexternal.c
-@@ -48,9 +48,16 @@ static tpm_loadexternal_ctx ctx = {
- static tool_rc load_external(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, TPM2B_PUBLIC *pub,
-         TPM2B_SENSITIVE *priv, bool has_priv, TPM2B_NAME **name) {
- 
-+    uint32_t hierarchy;
-+    TSS2_RC rval = fix_esys_hierarchy(ctx.hierarchy_value, &hierarchy);
-+    if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
-+        LOG_ERR("Unknown hierarchy");
-+        return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
-+    }
-+
-     tool_rc rc = tpm2_loadexternal(ectx,
-             has_priv ? priv : NULL, pub,
--            fix_esys_hierarchy(ctx.hierarchy_value), &ctx.handle);
-+            hierarchy, &ctx.handle);
-     if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
-         return rc;
-     }
--- 
-2.27.0
-

SOURCES/0001-lib-files-fix-an-error-message-in-files_load_-name.patch

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From 012249ad9d06d7534a94690a33638691f5104839 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Radoslav Gerganov <rgerganov@vmware.com>
-Date: Wed, 26 Feb 2020 10:40:26 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] lib/files: fix an error message in files_load_##name
-
-Signed-off-by: Radoslav Gerganov <rgerganov@vmware.com>
----
- lib/files.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/files.c b/lib/files.c
-index a6beea5b8ff2..ef2170b079e1 100644
---- a/lib/files.c
-+++ b/lib/files.c
-@@ -687,7 +687,7 @@ tool_rc files_save_ESYS_TR(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, ESYS_TR handle, const char *path)
-         size_t offset = 0; \
-         TSS2_RC rc = Tss2_MU_##type##_Unmarshal(buffer, size, &offset, name); \
-         if (rc != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) { \
--            LOG_ERR("Error serializing "str(name)" structure: 0x%x", rc); \
-+            LOG_ERR("Error deserializing "str(name)" structure: 0x%x", rc); \
-             LOG_ERR("The input file needs to be a valid "xstr(type)" data structure"); \
-             return false; \
-         } \
--- 
-2.31.0
-

SOURCES/0001-lib-files.c-Fix-an-issue-where-execution-could-not-r.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-From a20415d6f1d3fa09300ff1181646fe7e1785fd15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 10:14:28 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] lib/files.c: Fix an issue where execution could not reach
- function return
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- lib/files.c | 8 +++-----
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/files.c b/lib/files.c
-index ef2170b079e1..501f88d11b48 100644
---- a/lib/files.c
-+++ b/lib/files.c
-@@ -607,9 +607,7 @@ bool files_load_bytes_from_buffer_or_file_or_stdin(const char *input_buffer,
-         return true;
-     }
- 
--//    printf("Reading file: %s\n", path);
--//    printf("size: %u\n", *size);
--
-+    bool retval = true;
-     /* Read from stdin */
-     if (!input_buffer && !path) {
-         UINT16 read_bytes = 0;
-@@ -640,10 +638,10 @@ bool files_load_bytes_from_buffer_or_file_or_stdin(const char *input_buffer,
-             return true;
-         }
-     } else if (path) {
--        return files_load_bytes_from_path(path, buf, size);
-+        retval = files_load_bytes_from_path(path, buf, size);
-     }
- 
--    return false;
-+    return retval;
- }
- 
- tool_rc files_save_ESYS_TR(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, ESYS_TR handle, const char *path) {
--- 
-2.31.0
-

SOURCES/0001-lib-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-use-char16_t-for-UEFI-charact.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 4351d850bb664941f88463229758171c2603080a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Erik Larsson <who+github@cnackers.org>
+Date: Mon, 4 Oct 2021 10:21:49 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 1/9] lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml: use char16_t for UEFI characters
+
+Signed-off-by: Erik Larsson <who+github@cnackers.org>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+index 6e6923e5..9b048db1 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+@@ -475,7 +475,7 @@ static bool yaml_uefi_var(UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *data, size_t size, UINT32 type,
+                 tpm2_tool_output("      Description: \"");
+                 int i;
+                 for (i = 0; (wchar_t)loadopt->Description[i] != 0; i++) {
+-                    wchar_t c = (wchar_t)loadopt->Description[i];
++                    char16_t c = (char16_t)loadopt->Description[i];
+                     tpm2_tool_output("%lc", c);
+                 }
+                 tpm2_tool_output("\"\n");
+-- 
+2.37.3
+

SOURCES/0001-testparms-fix-condition-for-negative-test.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 0789bf264a108c4718875a050d00b1fdee4478b7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jonas Witschel <git@diabonas.de>
+Date: Wed, 29 Sep 2021 17:08:07 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] testparms: fix condition for negative test
+Content-type: text/plain
+
+Commit e858dec76686bb4c42e74e0984b433231e530f93 ("testparms: ensure curve not
+supported before negative test") is supposed to ensure that the negative test
+is run only if ecc521 is *not* supported, but instead it runs the negative test
+if ecc521 is *available*. This worked anyway for libtpms < 0.9.0 because camellia
+was not supported, but since libtpms 0.9.0 added support for this algorithm, the
+test suite fails now with swtpm.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jonas Witschel <git@diabonas.de>
+---
+ test/integration/tests/testparms.sh | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/integration/tests/testparms.sh b/test/integration/tests/testparms.sh
+index 8c3548e58f39..a587a60a34cf 100644
+--- a/test/integration/tests/testparms.sh
++++ b/test/integration/tests/testparms.sh
+@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ else
+ fi
+ 
+ # Attempt to specify a suite that is not supported (error from TPM)
+-if tpm2 getcap ecc-curves | grep -q TPM2_ECC_NIST_P521; then
++if ! tpm2 getcap ecc-curves | grep -q TPM2_ECC_NIST_P521; then
+     if tpm2 testparms "ecc521:ecdsa:camellia" &>/dev/null; then
+         echo "tpm2 testparms succeeded while it shouldn't or TPM failed"
+         exit 1
+-- 
+2.35.3
+

SOURCES/0001-tools-tpm2_nvcertify.c-Fix-incompatible-pointer-cast.patch

@@ -1,63 +0,0 @@
-From 77d4592e3eec9ec2c7932586f41f925b43ecc5ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 10:22:42 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tools/tpm2_nvcertify.c: Fix incompatible pointer cast that
- may cause memory leak
-
-Pointer "&ctx.size" and "&ctx.offset" points to an object whose effective type is
-"unsigned short" (16 bits, unsigned) but is dereferenced as a wider
-"unsigned int" (32 bits, unsigned). This may lead to memory corruption.
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- tools/tpm2_nvcertify.c | 17 +++++++++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tpm2_nvcertify.c b/tools/tpm2_nvcertify.c
-index b49f38dbff20..414cbea85574 100644
---- a/tools/tpm2_nvcertify.c
-+++ b/tools/tpm2_nvcertify.c
-@@ -80,6 +80,7 @@ static bool set_signature_format(char *value) {
- static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
- 
-     bool result = true;
-+    uint32_t input_value;
- 
-     switch (key) {
-     case 'C':
-@@ -110,18 +111,30 @@ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
-         ctx.policy_qualifier_arg = value;
-         break;
-     case 0:
--        result = tpm2_util_string_to_uint32(value, (uint32_t*)&ctx.size);
-+        result = tpm2_util_string_to_uint32(value, &input_value);
-         if (!result) {
-             LOG_ERR("Could not convert size to number, got: \"%s\"", value);
-             return false;
-         }
-+        if (input_value > UINT16_MAX) {
-+            LOG_ERR("Specified size is larger than that allowed by command");
-+            return false;
-+        } else {
-+            ctx.size = input_value;
-+        }
-         break;
-     case 1:
--        result = tpm2_util_string_to_uint32(value, (uint32_t*)&ctx.offset);
-+        result = tpm2_util_string_to_uint32(value, &input_value);
-         if (!result) {
-             LOG_ERR("Could not convert offset to number, got: \"%s\"", value);
-             return false;
-         }
-+        if (input_value > UINT16_MAX) {
-+            LOG_ERR("Specified offset is larger than that allowed by command");
-+            return false;
-+        } else {
-+            ctx.offset = input_value;
-+        }
-         break;
-     case 2:
-         ctx.certify_info_path = value;
--- 
-2.31.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tools-tpm2_nvreadpublic-Fix-resource-leak.patch

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-From 023ec5c0eafe8dfb5b71e400cb0c2c337fb8c108 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Sun, 29 Mar 2020 10:49:12 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tools/tpm2_nvreadpublic: Fix resource leak
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- tools/tpm2_nvreadpublic.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tpm2_nvreadpublic.c b/tools/tpm2_nvreadpublic.c
-index 7f8e46cbf863..eca1fd715a79 100644
---- a/tools/tpm2_nvreadpublic.c
-+++ b/tools/tpm2_nvreadpublic.c
-@@ -41,6 +41,7 @@ static tool_rc print_nv_public(ESYS_CONTEXT *context, TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX index, TP
-     rc = tpm2_tr_get_name(context, tr_handle,
-             &name);
-     if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
-+        free(attrs);
-         return rc;
-     }
- 
--- 
-2.31.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_alg_util.c-fix-a-bug-where-the-string-rsa3072-w.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From c28932caef2036039901a91cf55eb7ff093c70f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Fri, 24 Jan 2020 15:53:39 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_alg_util.c: fix a bug where the string rsa3072 wasnt
- being parsed
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- lib/tpm2_alg_util.c | 3 +++
- 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c b/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c
-index b83c387a05bd..fcad480e0c3d 100644
---- a/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c
-+++ b/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c
-@@ -301,6 +301,9 @@ static alg_parser_rc handle_rsa(const char *ext, TPM2B_PUBLIC *public) {
-     } else if (!strncmp(ext, "4096", 4)) {
-         r->keyBits = 4096;
-         ext += 4;
-+    } else if (!strncmp(ext, "3072", 4)) {
-+        r->keyBits = 3072;
-+        ext += 4;
-     } else {
-         r->keyBits = 2048;
-     }
--- 
-2.27.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_create.c-Fix-an-issue-where-userwithauth-attr-c.patch

@@ -1,186 +0,0 @@
-From 696a17861c38b38fb2acf888119d918eb9c12329 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Thu, 21 May 2020 11:31:43 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_create.c: Fix an issue where userwithauth attr cleared
- if policy specified
-
-Fixes #2037
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- man/tpm2_create.1.md                 |  9 +++-
- test/integration/tests/import_tpm.sh | 78 +++++++++++++++++-----------
- tools/tpm2_create.c                  | 10 ++--
- 3 files changed, 60 insertions(+), 37 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/man/tpm2_create.1.md b/man/tpm2_create.1.md
-index e8e5eaac49c3..9a7ba33e6017 100644
---- a/man/tpm2_create.1.md
-+++ b/man/tpm2_create.1.md
-@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
- **tpm2_create**(1) - Create a child object. The object can either be a key or
- a sealing object. A sealing object allows to seal user data to the TPM, with a
- maximum size of 256 bytes. Additionally it will load the created object if the
--**-o** is specified.
-+**-c** is specified.
- 
- # OPTIONS
- 
-@@ -55,6 +55,13 @@ These options for creating the TPM entity:
-     and unsealing. I.e. one cannot use an object for sealing and cryptography
-     operations.
- 
-+    When **-L** is specified for adding policy based authorization information
-+    AND no string password is specified, the  attribute `TPMA_OBJECT_USERWITHAUTH`
-+    is cleared unless an explicit choice is made by setting of the attribute
-+    with **-a** option. This prevents creation of objects with inadvertant auth
-+    model where in user intended to enforce a policy but inadvertantly created
-+    an object with empty auth which can be used instead of policy authorization.
-+
-   * **-i**, **\--sealing-input**=_FILE_ or _STDIN_:
- 
-     The data file to be sealed, optional. If file is -, read from stdin.
-diff --git a/test/integration/tests/import_tpm.sh b/test/integration/tests/import_tpm.sh
-index ff48185aba70..3d1e10820844 100755
---- a/test/integration/tests/import_tpm.sh
-+++ b/test/integration/tests/import_tpm.sh
-@@ -54,8 +54,13 @@ load_new_parent() {
- create_load_duplicatee() {
-     # Create the key we want to duplicate
-     create_policy dpolicy.dat TPM2_CC_Duplicate
--    tpm2_create -Q -C primary.ctx -g sha256 -G $1 -p foo -r key.prv -u key.pub \
--    -L dpolicy.dat -a "sensitivedataorigin|decrypt|userwithauth"
-+    if [ -z "$2" ];then
-+        tpm2_create -Q -C primary.ctx -g sha256 -G $1 -r key.prv \
-+        -u key.pub -L dpolicy.dat -a "sensitivedataorigin|decrypt|userwithauth"
-+    else
-+        tpm2_create -Q -C primary.ctx -g sha256 -G $1 -p "$2" -r key.prv \
-+        -u key.pub -L dpolicy.dat -a "sensitivedataorigin|decrypt|userwithauth"
-+    fi
-     # Load the key
-     tpm2_load -Q -C primary.ctx -r key.prv -u key.pub -c key.ctx
-     # Extract the public part for import later
-@@ -113,34 +118,45 @@ for dup_key_type in aes rsa ecc; do
-     done
- done
- 
--# Part 2 :
--# Create a rsa key (Kd)
--# Encrypt a message using Kd
--# Duplicate Kd
--# Import & Load Kd
--# Decrypt the message and verify
--tpm2_createprimary -Q -C o -g sha256 -G rsa -c primary.ctx
--# New parent ...
--create_load_new_parent
--# Key to be duplicated
--create_load_duplicatee rsa
--# Encrypt a secret message
--echo "Mary had a little lamb ..." > plain.txt
--tpm2_rsaencrypt -Q -c key.ctx -o cipher.txt plain.txt
--# Duplicate the key
--do_duplication null
--# Remove, we're done with it
--rm new_parent.ctx
--# Load the full thing this time
--load_new_parent
--# Import & load the duplicate
--do_import_load null
--# Decrypt the secret message using duplicated key
--tpm2_rsadecrypt -Q -p foo -c dup.ctx -o recovered.txt cipher.txt
--# Check we got it right ...
--diff recovered.txt plain.txt
--# Cleanup
--rm plain.txt recovered.txt cipher.txt
--cleanup "no-shut-down"
-+test_key_usage() {
-+    # Part 2 :
-+    # Create a rsa key (Kd)
-+    # Encrypt a message using Kd
-+    # Duplicate Kd
-+    # Import & Load Kd
-+    # Decrypt the message and verify
-+    tpm2_createprimary -Q -C o -g sha256 -G rsa -c primary.ctx
-+    # New parent ...
-+    create_load_new_parent
-+    # Key to be duplicated
-+    create_load_duplicatee rsa "$1"
-+    # Encrypt a secret message
-+    echo "Mary had a little lamb ..." > plain.txt
-+    tpm2_rsaencrypt -Q -c key.ctx -o cipher.txt plain.txt
-+    # Duplicate the key
-+    do_duplication null
-+    # Remove, we're done with it
-+    rm new_parent.ctx
-+    # Load the full thing this time
-+    load_new_parent
-+    # Import & load the duplicate
-+    do_import_load null
-+    # Decrypt the secret message using duplicated key
-+    if [ -z "$1" ];then
-+        tpm2_rsadecrypt -Q -c dup.ctx -o recovered.txt cipher.txt
-+    else
-+        tpm2_rsadecrypt -Q -p "$1" -c dup.ctx -o recovered.txt cipher.txt
-+    fi
-+    # Check we got it right ...
-+    diff recovered.txt plain.txt
-+    # Cleanup
-+    rm plain.txt recovered.txt cipher.txt
-+    cleanup "no-shut-down"
-+}
-+
-+#Test key with password
-+test_key_usage foo
-+#Test key without password
-+test_key_usage
- 
- exit 0
-diff --git a/tools/tpm2_create.c b/tools/tpm2_create.c
-index 941b77655f55..8e92cc747e17 100644
---- a/tools/tpm2_create.c
-+++ b/tools/tpm2_create.c
-@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ struct tpm_create_ctx {
-     TPML_PCR_SELECTION creation_pcr;
- 
-     struct {
--        UINT8 b :1;
-+        UINT8 a :1;
-         UINT8 i :1;
-         UINT8 L :1;
-         UINT8 u :1;
-@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
-         break;
-     case 'a':
-         ctx.object.attrs = value;
--        ctx.flags.b = 1;
-+        ctx.flags.a = 1;
-         break;
-     case 'i':
-         ctx.object.sealed_data = strcmp("-", value) ? value : NULL;
-@@ -346,12 +346,12 @@ tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
- 
-         ctx.object.alg = "keyedhash";
- 
--        if (!ctx.flags.b) {
-+        if (!ctx.flags.a) {
-             attrs &= ~TPMA_OBJECT_SIGN_ENCRYPT;
-             attrs &= ~TPMA_OBJECT_DECRYPT;
-             attrs &= ~TPMA_OBJECT_SENSITIVEDATAORIGIN;
-         }
--    } else if (!ctx.flags.b && !strncmp("hmac", ctx.object.alg, 4)) {
-+    } else if (!ctx.flags.a && !strncmp("hmac", ctx.object.alg, 4)) {
-         attrs &= ~TPMA_OBJECT_DECRYPT;
-     }
- 
-@@ -362,7 +362,7 @@ tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
-         return tool_rc_general_error;
-     }
- 
--    if (ctx.flags.L && !ctx.object.auth_str) {
-+    if (!ctx.flags.a && ctx.flags.L && !ctx.object.auth_str) {
-         ctx.object.public.publicArea.objectAttributes &=
-                 ~TPMA_OBJECT_USERWITHAUTH;
-     }
--- 
-2.27.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_getekcertificate-add-default-web-address.patch

@@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
-From 8c72f7402d8977807f531b08976760d62676cf8a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 11:21:58 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_getekcertificate: add default web address
-
-Currently only Intel (R) PTT certificates are hosted online.
-A default web address pointing to the endorsement key certificate
-hosting will help reduce user input.
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- test/integration/tests/getekcertificate.sh | 6 ++----
- tools/tpm2_getekcertificate.c              | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/test/integration/tests/getekcertificate.sh b/test/integration/tests/getekcertificate.sh
-index 33f4f8b2e4c0..e8c521756d2a 100755
---- a/test/integration/tests/getekcertificate.sh
-+++ b/test/integration/tests/getekcertificate.sh
-@@ -38,12 +38,10 @@ else
-     fi
- fi
- 
--tpm2_getekcertificate -u test_ek.pub -x -X -o ECcert.bin \
--https://ekop.intel.com/ekcertservice/
-+tpm2_getekcertificate -u test_ek.pub -x -X -o ECcert.bin
- 
- # Test that stdoutput is the same
--tpm2_getekcertificate -u test_ek.pub -x https://ekop.intel.com/ekcertservice/ \
---X > ECcert2.bin
-+tpm2_getekcertificate -u test_ek.pub -x -X > ECcert2.bin
- 
- # stdout file should match -E file.
- cmp ECcert.bin ECcert2.bin
-diff --git a/tools/tpm2_getekcertificate.c b/tools/tpm2_getekcertificate.c
-index 233d04d8b3d7..6a8fe894bb1c 100644
---- a/tools/tpm2_getekcertificate.c
-+++ b/tools/tpm2_getekcertificate.c
-@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ struct tpm_getekcertificate_ctx {
- 
- static tpm_getekcertificate_ctx ctx = {
-     .is_tpm2_device_active = true,
-+    .ek_server_addr = "https://ekop.intel.com/ekcertservice/",
- };
- 
- static unsigned char *hash_ek_public(void) {
--- 
-2.31.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_hierarchycontrol-Fixed-bug-where-hierarchycontr.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From 334b4c739fa575fb4ea58f92df6de87c38e59e15 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 08:06:56 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_hierarchycontrol: Fixed bug where hierarchycontrol
- operation failed silently
-
-Fixes #1841
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- tools/tpm2_hierarchycontrol.c | 10 ++++++++--
- 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tpm2_hierarchycontrol.c b/tools/tpm2_hierarchycontrol.c
-index 0baf2ca487d3..7e9e2c657544 100644
---- a/tools/tpm2_hierarchycontrol.c
-+++ b/tools/tpm2_hierarchycontrol.c
-@@ -32,8 +32,14 @@ static tool_rc hierarchycontrol(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx) {
-         ctx.enable == TPM2_RH_ENDORSEMENT ? "ehEnable" : "phEnableNV",
-         ctx.state ? "SET" : "CLEAR");
- 
--    return tpm2_hierarchycontrol(ectx, &ctx.auth_hierarchy.object, ctx.enable,
--            ctx.state);
-+    tool_rc rc = tpm2_hierarchycontrol(ectx, &ctx.auth_hierarchy.object,
-+        ctx.enable, ctx.state);
-+
-+    if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
-+        LOG_ERR("Failed hierarchycontrol operation.");
-+    }
-+
-+    return rc;
- }
- 
- bool on_arg(int argc, char **argv) {
--- 
-2.27.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_import-fix-fixed-AES-key-CVE-2021-3565.patch

@@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
-From c069e4f179d5e6653a84fb236816c375dca82515 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
-Date: Fri, 21 May 2021 12:22:31 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_import: fix fixed AES key CVE-2021-3565
-
-tpm2_import used a fixed AES key for the inner wrapper, which means that
-a MITM attack would be able to unwrap the imported key. Even the
-use of an encrypted session will not prevent this. The TPM only
-encrypts the first parameter which is the fixed symmetric key.
-
-To fix this, ensure the key size is 16 bytes or bigger and use
-OpenSSL to generate a secure random AES key.
-
-Fixes: #2738
-
-Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
----
- tools/tpm2_import.c | 12 +++++++++++-
- 1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tpm2_import.c b/tools/tpm2_import.c
-index cfb6f207ba9c..f44326c87e7e 100644
---- a/tools/tpm2_import.c
-+++ b/tools/tpm2_import.c
-@@ -118,7 +118,17 @@ static tool_rc key_import(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, TPM2B_PUBLIC *parent_pub,
-     TPM2B_DATA enc_sensitive_key = {
-         .size = parent_pub->publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.symmetric.keyBits.sym / 8
-     };
--    memset(enc_sensitive_key.buffer, 0xFF, enc_sensitive_key.size);
-+
-+    if(enc_sensitive_key.size < 16) {
-+        LOG_ERR("Calculated wrapping keysize is less than 16 bytes, got: %u", enc_sensitive_key.size);
-+        return tool_rc_general_error;
-+    }
-+
-+    int ossl_rc = RAND_bytes(enc_sensitive_key.buffer, enc_sensitive_key.size);
-+    if (ossl_rc != 1) {
-+        LOG_ERR("RAND_bytes failed: %s", ERR_error_string(ERR_get_error(), NULL));
-+        return tool_rc_general_error;
-+    }
- 
-     /*
-      * Calculate the object name.
--- 
-2.31.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_nvdefine.c-Fixed-error-reporting-message.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-From 652322f7278ec8c384fde9ec2204b06d084a24e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Thu, 23 Jan 2020 07:54:58 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_nvdefine.c: Fixed error reporting message
-
-Fixes #1861
-
-NV define failure error message had the wording to suggest NV index
-was successfully defined.
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- tools/tpm2_nvdefine.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tpm2_nvdefine.c b/tools/tpm2_nvdefine.c
-index cb2949c4dddc..71203cb6c80d 100644
---- a/tools/tpm2_nvdefine.c
-+++ b/tools/tpm2_nvdefine.c
-@@ -65,7 +65,7 @@ static tool_rc nv_space_define(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx) {
-     tool_rc rc = tpm2_nv_definespace(ectx, &ctx.auth_hierarchy.object,
-             &ctx.nv_auth, &public_info);
-     if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
--        LOG_INFO("Success to define NV area at index 0x%x.", ctx.nv_index);
-+        LOG_ERR("Failed to create NV index 0x%x.", ctx.nv_index);
-         return rc;
-     }
- 
--- 
-2.27.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_policy.c-restrict-policy-digest-size.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From e556da0a2099573f82391c16477fba08584a7a12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 09:15:55 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_policy.c: restrict policy digest size
-
-Fixes #1916
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- lib/tpm2_policy.c | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/tpm2_policy.c b/lib/tpm2_policy.c
-index 6c352b2b41ae..01387ba01645 100644
---- a/lib/tpm2_policy.c
-+++ b/lib/tpm2_policy.c
-@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ tool_rc tpm2_policy_build_policyauthorize(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx,
-     bool result = true;
-     TPM2B_DIGEST approved_policy = { .size = 0 };
-     if (policy_digest_path) {
--        approved_policy.size = UINT16_MAX;
-+        approved_policy.size = sizeof(TPMU_HA);
-         result = files_load_bytes_from_path(policy_digest_path,
-             approved_policy.buffer, &approved_policy.size);
-     }
--- 
-2.31.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_policycountertimer-Fix-an-issue-where-operandB-.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-From cab7b3edcc6a44aece0642c0c2621a4bb70d449b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Tue, 10 Mar 2020 18:19:04 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_policycountertimer: Fix an issue where operandB array
- was reversed
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- tools/tpm2_policycountertimer.c | 5 ++++-
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/tools/tpm2_policycountertimer.c b/tools/tpm2_policycountertimer.c
-index 1c72d525dab7..170a544f2203 100644
---- a/tools/tpm2_policycountertimer.c
-+++ b/tools/tpm2_policycountertimer.c
-@@ -81,7 +81,10 @@ static bool convert_keyvalue_to_operand_buffer(const char *value,
-     }
- 
-     ctx.operand_b.size = size;
--    memcpy(ctx.operand_b.buffer, &data.b, size);
-+    size_t i = 0;
-+    for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
-+        ctx.operand_b.buffer[i] = *(&data.b + size - i - 1);
-+    }
- 
-     return true;
- }
--- 
-2.31.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_policyor-Silent-failure-bug-fix-for-invalid-uns.patch

@@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-From 44d0d2d17dc693e029e0557ec985c9b68c3efeb5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
-Date: Wed, 22 Jan 2020 14:15:48 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] tpm2_policyor: Silent failure bug fix for invalid/unspecified
- policy digest alg
-
-Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
----
- lib/tpm2_policy.c | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/lib/tpm2_policy.c b/lib/tpm2_policy.c
-index 3d9b5491f9ce..8460bd1d9ae9 100644
---- a/lib/tpm2_policy.c
-+++ b/lib/tpm2_policy.c
-@@ -588,6 +588,7 @@ bool tpm2_policy_parse_policy_list(char *str, TPML_DIGEST *policy_list) {
-                 hash = tpm2_alg_util_from_optarg(subtoken,
-                         tpm2_alg_util_flags_hash);
-                 if (hash == TPM2_ALG_ERROR) {
-+                    LOG_ERR("Invalid/ Unspecified policy digest algorithm.");
-                     return false;
-                 }
-             }
--- 
-2.27.0
-

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_sessionconfig-fix-usage-of-disable-continuesess.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+From c2dff7cfac16a857fcd5161d6e171483221ab003 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Sun, 17 Dec 2023 09:53:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] tpm2_sessionconfig fix usage of --disable-continuesession
+
+Conflicts: context change due to missing 6169d8c22
+
+If continue session was disabled a error did occur in the function for
+restoring the session context.
+Now after usage of an session with continue session disabled the
+context will not be saved and the session context file will be
+deleted.
+In one integration test continue session is now disabled and the
+flush for this session is removed.
+
+Fixes: #3295
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_session.c               | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ test/integration/tests/unseal.sh |  7 +++--
+ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_session.c b/lib/tpm2_session.c
+index 60b8643b..3e5503db 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_session.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_session.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct tpm2_session {
+         char *path;
+         ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx;
+         bool is_final;
++        bool delete;
+     } internal;
+ };
+ 
+@@ -290,18 +291,23 @@ tool_rc tpm2_session_restore(ESYS_CONTEXT *ctx, const char *path, bool is_final,
+     dup_path = NULL;
+ 
+     TPMA_SESSION attrs = 0;
++    s->internal.delete = false;
++    s->internal.is_final = is_final;
++    *session = s;
+ 
+     if (ctx) {
+-
+         /* hack this in here, should be done when starting the session */
+         tmp_rc = tpm2_sess_get_attributes(ctx, handle, &attrs);
+-        UNUSED(tmp_rc);
++        if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
++            rc = tmp_rc;
++            LOG_ERR("Can't get session attributes.");
++            goto out;
++        }
++        if ((attrs & TPMA_SESSION_CONTINUESESSION) == 0) {
++            s->internal.delete = true;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+-    s->internal.is_final = is_final;
+-
+-    *session = s;
+-
+     LOG_INFO("Restored session: ESYS_TR(0x%x) attrs(0x%x)", handle, attrs);
+ 
+     rc = tool_rc_success;
+@@ -341,22 +347,35 @@ tool_rc tpm2_session_close(tpm2_session **s) {
+     }
+ 
+     const char *path = session->internal.path;
+-    FILE *session_file = path ? fopen(path, "w+b") : NULL;
+-    if (path && !session_file) {
+-        LOG_ERR("Could not open path \"%s\", due to error: \"%s\"", path,
+-                strerror(errno));
+-        rc = tool_rc_general_error;
+-        goto out;
+-    }
+ 
+     bool flush = path ? session->internal.is_final : true;
+     if (flush) {
+         rc = tpm2_flush_context(session->internal.ectx,
+                 session->output.session_handle);
+         /* done, use rc to indicate status */
++        goto out2;
++    }
++
++    if ((*s)->internal.delete && path) {
++        if (remove(path)) {
++            LOG_ERR("File \"%s\" can't be deleted.", path);
++            rc = tool_rc_general_error;
++            goto out2;
++        } else {
++            rc = tool_rc_success;
++            goto out2;
++        }
++    }
++
++    FILE *session_file = path ? fopen(path, "w+b") : NULL;
++    if (path && !session_file) {
++        LOG_ERR("Could not open path \"%s\", due to error: \"%s\"", path,
++                strerror(errno));
++        rc = tool_rc_general_error;
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
++
+     /*
+      * Now write the session_type, handle and auth hash data to disk
+      */
+diff --git a/test/integration/tests/unseal.sh b/test/integration/tests/unseal.sh
+index dd6c2bc6..d0f7104f 100644
+--- a/test/integration/tests/unseal.sh
++++ b/test/integration/tests/unseal.sh
+@@ -152,10 +152,13 @@ tpm2 sessionconfig enc_session.ctx --disable-encrypt
+ tpm2 create -Q -C prim.ctx -u seal_key.pub -r seal_key.priv -c seal_key.ctx \
+ -p sealkeypass -i- <<< $secret -S enc_session.ctx
+ 
+-tpm2 sessionconfig enc_session.ctx --enable-encrypt
++tpm2 sessionconfig enc_session.ctx --enable-encrypt --disable-continuesession
+ unsealed=`tpm2 unseal -c seal_key.ctx -p sealkeypass -S enc_session.ctx`
+ test "$unsealed" == "$secret"
+ 
+-tpm2 flushcontext enc_session.ctx
++if [ -e enc_session.ctx ]; then
++    echo "enc_session.ctx was not deleted.";
++    exit 1
++fi
+ 
+ exit 0
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0002-Patch-set-for-handling-of-new-event-types-in-tpm2_ev.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,151 @@
+From 2558005814e4a64f8941216b9dc3d3c3a9b35c51 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: George Almasi <gheorghe@us.ibm.com>
+Date: Fri, 8 Apr 2022 15:27:05 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 2/9] Patch set for handling of new event types in
+ tpm2_eventlog: EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2, EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES2,
+ EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2
+
+Signed-off-by: George Almasi <gheorghe@us.ibm.com>
+---
+ lib/efi_event.h                     | 11 ++++++++
+ lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c            | 42 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c |  6 +++++
+ 3 files changed, 58 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/efi_event.h b/lib/efi_event.h
+index 0136e32b..cc2ffc98 100644
+--- a/lib/efi_event.h
++++ b/lib/efi_event.h
+@@ -41,6 +41,10 @@
+ #define EV_EFI_ACTION                    EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE + 0x7
+ #define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB    EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE + 0x8
+ #define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES            EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE + 0x9
++#define EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2   EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE + 0xa
++#define EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES2           EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE + 0xb
++#define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2            EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE + 0xc
++
+ #define EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY        EV_EFI_EVENT_BASE + 0xe0
+ 
+ #ifndef PACKED
+@@ -96,6 +100,13 @@ typedef struct {
+     UINT64 BlobLength;
+ } PACKED UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB;
+ 
++
++typedef struct {
++  UINT8 BlobDescriptionSize;
++  BYTE  BlobDescription[];
++  /* UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB comes next */
++} PACKED UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2;
++
+ typedef struct {
+     UINT32 pcrIndex;
+     UINT32 eventType;
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+index 9b048db1..d2d4aefe 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+@@ -90,6 +90,12 @@ char const *eventtype_to_string (UINT32 event_type) {
+         return "EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB";
+     case EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES:
+         return "EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES";
++    case EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2:
++        return "EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2";
++    case EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES2:
++        return "EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES2";
++    case EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2:
++        return "EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2";
+     case EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY:
+         return "EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY";
+     default:
+@@ -433,7 +439,7 @@ static bool yaml_uefi_var(UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *data, size_t size, UINT32 type,
+                              uuidstr, sdata);
+             free(sdata);
+             return true;
+-        } else if (type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT) {
++        } else if (type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT || type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2) {
+             if ((strlen(ret) == 9 && strncmp(ret, "BootOrder", 9) == 0)) {
+                 free(ret);
+                 tpm2_tool_output("    VariableData:\n");
+@@ -526,6 +532,37 @@ bool yaml_uefi_platfwblob(UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB *data) {
+                      data->BlobLength);
+     return true;
+ }
++
++/* TCG PC Client PFP (02 dec 2020) section 10.2.5 */
++bool yaml_uefi_platfwblob2(UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2 *data) {
++  UINT8 blobdescsize = data->BlobDescriptionSize;
++  UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB * data2 = (UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB *)((UINT8 *)data + sizeof(UINT8) + blobdescsize);
++
++  char * eventdesc = (char *)calloc (1, 2*blobdescsize+1);
++  if (!eventdesc) {
++    LOG_ERR("failed to allocate memory: %s\n", strerror(errno));
++    return false;
++  }
++
++  bytes_to_str (data->BlobDescription, blobdescsize, eventdesc, 2*blobdescsize);
++
++  tpm2_tool_output("  Event:\n"
++                   "    BlobDescriptionSize: %d\n"
++                   "    BlobDescription: \"%.*s\"\n"
++                   "    BlobBase: 0x%" PRIx64 "\n"
++                   "    BlobLength: 0x%" PRIx64 "\n",
++                   blobdescsize,
++                   2*blobdescsize,
++                   eventdesc,
++                   data2->BlobBase,
++                   data2->BlobLength);
++
++  free(eventdesc);
++  return true;
++}
++
++
++
+ /* TCG PC Client PFP section 9.4.4 */
+ bool yaml_uefi_action(UINT8 const *action, size_t size) {
+ 
+@@ -713,6 +750,7 @@ bool yaml_event2data(TCG_EVENT2 const *event, UINT32 type, uint32_t eventlog_ver
+     switch (type) {
+     case EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG:
+     case EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT:
++    case EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2:
+     case EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY:
+         return yaml_uefi_var((UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA*)event->Event,
+                                 event->EventSize, type, eventlog_version);
+@@ -721,6 +759,8 @@ bool yaml_event2data(TCG_EVENT2 const *event, UINT32 type, uint32_t eventlog_ver
+     case EV_S_CRTM_CONTENTS:
+     case EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB:
+         return yaml_uefi_platfwblob((UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB*)event->Event);
++    case EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2:
++        return yaml_uefi_platfwblob2((UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2*)event->Event);
+     case EV_EFI_ACTION:
+         return yaml_uefi_action(event->Event, event->EventSize);
+     case EV_IPL:
+diff --git a/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c b/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+index d4e30b0e..6881703b 100644
+--- a/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
++++ b/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+@@ -47,6 +47,9 @@ def_eventtype_to_string(EV_EFI_GPT_EVENT)
+ def_eventtype_to_string(EV_EFI_ACTION)
+ def_eventtype_to_string(EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB)
+ def_eventtype_to_string(EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES)
++def_eventtype_to_string(EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2)
++def_eventtype_to_string(EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES2)
++def_eventtype_to_string(EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2)
+ def_eventtype_to_string(EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY)
+ 
+ static void eventtype_to_string_default(void **state) {
+@@ -141,6 +144,9 @@ int main(void) {
+         cmocka_unit_test(eventtype_to_string_EV_EFI_ACTION),
+         cmocka_unit_test(eventtype_to_string_EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB),
+         cmocka_unit_test(eventtype_to_string_EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES),
++        cmocka_unit_test(eventtype_to_string_EV_EFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2),
++        cmocka_unit_test(eventtype_to_string_EV_EFI_HANDOFF_TABLES2),
++        cmocka_unit_test(eventtype_to_string_EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2),
+         cmocka_unit_test(eventtype_to_string_EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY),
+         cmocka_unit_test(eventtype_to_string_default),
+         cmocka_unit_test(test_yaml_event2hdr_callback),
+-- 
+2.37.3
+

SOURCES/0002-tpm2_encodeobject-New-tool-to-encode-TPM2-object.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
+From ba7682dc511f4ef6bbb8a15ca3bb0edf67ec39ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 07:14:20 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 02/17] tpm2_encodeobject: New tool to encode TPM2 object
+
+This adds a new tool tpm2_encodeobject in tools/misc.  It takes
+public and private portions of an object and encode them in a combined
+PEM form used by tpm2-tss-engine and other applications.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
+---
+ Makefile.am                    |   2 +
+ man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md     |  92 +++++++++++++
+ tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c | 240 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 334 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
+ create mode 100644 tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
+
+diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
+index 71322159..e1a51ebf 100644
+--- a/Makefile.am
++++ b/Makefile.am
+@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ tools_tpm2_SOURCES = \
+ tpm2_tools = \
+     tools/misc/tpm2_certifyX509certutil.c \
+     tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c \
++    tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c \
+     tools/misc/tpm2_eventlog.c \
+     tools/misc/tpm2_print.c \
+     tools/misc/tpm2_rc_decode.c \
+@@ -376,6 +377,7 @@ if HAVE_MAN_PAGES
+     man/man1/tpm2_createprimary.1 \
+     man/man1/tpm2_dictionarylockout.1 \
+     man/man1/tpm2_duplicate.1 \
++    man/man1/tpm2_encodeobject.1 \
+     man/man1/tpm2_getcap.1 \
+     man/man1/tpm2_encryptdecrypt.1 \
+     man/man1/tpm2_eventlog.1 \
+diff --git a/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md b/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..791eafbd
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
+@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
++% tpm2_encodeobject(1) tpm2-tools | General Commands Manual
++
++# NAME
++
++**tpm2_encodeobject**(1) - Encode an object into a combined PEM format.
++
++# SYNOPSIS
++
++**tpm2_encodeobject** [*OPTIONS*]
++
++# DESCRIPTION
++
++**tpm2_encodeobject**(1) - Encode both the private and public portions of an
++object into a combined PEM format used by tpm2-tss-engine.
++
++The tool reads private and public portions of an object and encodes it
++into a combined PEM format used by tpm2-tss-engine and other
++applications.
++
++**NOTE**: Both private and public portions of the tpm key must be specified.
++
++# OPTIONS
++
++  * **-C**, **\--parent-context**=_OBJECT_:
++
++    The parent object.
++
++  * **-P**, **\--auth**=_AUTH_:
++
++    The authorization value of the parent object specified by **-C**.
++
++  * **-u**, **\--public**=_FILE_:
++
++    A file containing the public portion of the object.
++
++  * **-r**, **\--private**=_FILE_:
++
++    A file containing the sensitive portion of the object.
++
++  * **-o**, **\--output**=_FILE_:
++
++    The output file path, recording the public portion of the object.
++
++## References
++
++[context object format](common/ctxobj.md) details the methods for specifying
++_OBJECT_.
++
++[authorization formatting](common/authorizations.md) details the methods for
++specifying _AUTH_.
++
++[common options](common/options.md) collection of common options that provide
++information many users may expect.
++
++[common tcti options](common/tcti.md) collection of options used to configure
++the various known TCTI modules.
++
++# EXAMPLES
++
++## Setup
++To load an object you first must create an object under a primary object. So the
++first step is to create the primary object.
++
++```bash
++tpm2_createprimary -c primary.ctx
++```
++
++Step 2 is to create an object under the primary object.
++
++```bash
++tpm2_create -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -f pem -o pub.pem
++```
++
++This creates the private and public portions of the TPM object. With these
++object portions, it is now possible to load that object into the TPM for
++subsequent use.
++
++## Encoding an Object into a combined PEM format
++
++The final step, is encoding the public and private portions of the object into a
++PEM format.
++
++```bash
++tpm2_encodeobject -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -c priv.pem
++```
++
++The generated `priv.pem` can be used together with `pub.pem` created in the
++step 2 of Setup section.
++
++[returns](common/returns.md)
++
++[footer](common/footer.md)
+diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..2341c3a1
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
++/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */
++
++/*
++ * Part of this file is copied from tpm2-tss-engine.
++ *
++ * Copyright 2017-2018, Fraunhofer SIT sponsored by Infineon Technologies AG
++ * All rights reserved.
++ * Copyright (c) 2019, Wind River Systems.
++ * All rights reserved.
++ */
++
++#include <inttypes.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <openssl/asn1.h>
++#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
++#include <openssl/pem.h>
++#include <tss2/tss2_mu.h>
++
++#include "files.h"
++#include "log.h"
++#include "tpm2.h"
++#include "tpm2_options.h"
++#include "tpm2_tool.h"
++
++#define OID_loadableKey "2.23.133.10.1.3"
++
++typedef struct {
++	ASN1_OBJECT *type;
++	ASN1_BOOLEAN emptyAuth;
++	ASN1_INTEGER *parent;
++	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pubkey;
++	ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privkey;
++} TSSPRIVKEY;
++
++DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(TSSPRIVKEY);
++DECLARE_PEM_write_bio(TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY);
++
++ASN1_SEQUENCE(TSSPRIVKEY) = {
++	ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
++	ASN1_EXP_OPT(TSSPRIVKEY, emptyAuth, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 0),
++	ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, parent, ASN1_INTEGER),
++	ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, pubkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
++	ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, privkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
++} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TSSPRIVKEY)
++
++#define TSSPRIVKEY_PEM_STRING "TSS2 PRIVATE KEY"
++
++IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(TSSPRIVKEY);
++IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio(TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY_PEM_STRING, TSSPRIVKEY);
++IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_bio(TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY_PEM_STRING, TSSPRIVKEY);
++
++typedef struct tpm_encodeobject_ctx tpm_encodeobject_ctx;
++struct tpm_encodeobject_ctx {
++    struct {
++        const char *ctx_path;
++        const char *auth_str;
++        tpm2_loaded_object object;
++    } parent;
++
++    struct {
++        const char *pubpath;
++        TPM2B_PUBLIC public;
++        const char *privpath;
++        TPM2B_PRIVATE private;
++        ESYS_TR handle;
++    } object;
++
++    char *output_path;
++};
++
++static tpm_encodeobject_ctx ctx;
++
++static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
++    switch (key) {
++    case 'P':
++        ctx.parent.auth_str = value;
++        break;
++    case 'u':
++        ctx.object.pubpath = value;
++        break;
++    case 'r':
++        ctx.object.privpath = value;
++        break;
++    case 'C':
++        ctx.parent.ctx_path = value;
++        break;
++    case 'o':
++	ctx.output_path = value;
++	break;
++    }
++
++    return true;
++}
++
++static bool tpm2_tool_onstart(tpm2_options **opts) {
++    const struct option topts[] = {
++      { "auth",           required_argument, NULL, 'P' },
++      { "public",         required_argument, NULL, 'u' },
++      { "private",        required_argument, NULL, 'r' },
++      { "parent-context", required_argument, NULL, 'C' },
++      { "output",         required_argument, NULL, 'o' },
++    };
++
++    *opts = tpm2_options_new("P:u:r:C:o:", ARRAY_LEN(topts), topts, on_option,
++            NULL, 0);
++
++    return *opts != NULL;
++}
++
++static tool_rc check_opts(void) {
++    tool_rc rc = tool_rc_success;
++    if (!ctx.parent.ctx_path) {
++        LOG_ERR("Expected parent object via -C");
++        rc = tool_rc_option_error;
++    }
++
++    if (!ctx.object.pubpath) {
++        LOG_ERR("Expected public object portion via -u");
++        rc = tool_rc_option_error;
++    }
++
++    if (!ctx.object.privpath) {
++        LOG_ERR("Expected private object portion via -r");
++        rc = tool_rc_option_error;
++    }
++
++    if (!ctx.output_path) {
++        LOG_ERR("Expected output file path via -o");
++        rc = tool_rc_option_error;
++    }
++
++    return rc;
++}
++
++static tool_rc init(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx) {
++    bool res = files_load_public(ctx.object.pubpath, &ctx.object.public);
++    if (!res) {
++        return tool_rc_general_error;
++    }
++
++    res = files_load_private(ctx.object.privpath, &ctx.object.private);
++    if (!res) {
++        return tool_rc_general_error;
++    }
++
++    return tpm2_util_object_load_auth(ectx, ctx.parent.ctx_path,
++            ctx.parent.auth_str, &ctx.parent.object, false,
++            TPM2_HANDLE_ALL_W_NV);
++}
++
++static int
++encode(void)
++{
++    TSS2_RC rc;
++    BIO *bio = NULL;
++    TSSPRIVKEY *tpk = NULL;
++
++    uint8_t private_buf[sizeof(ctx.object.private)];
++    uint8_t public_buf[sizeof(ctx.object.public)];
++    size_t private_len = 0, public_len = 0;
++
++    rc = Tss2_MU_TPM2B_PRIVATE_Marshal(&ctx.object.private, private_buf,
++				       sizeof(private_buf), &private_len);
++    if (rc) {
++        LOG_ERR("Error serializing private portion of object");
++        goto error;
++    }
++
++    rc = Tss2_MU_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Marshal(&ctx.object.public, public_buf,
++				      sizeof(public_buf), &public_len);
++    if (rc) {
++        LOG_ERR("Error serializing public portion of object");
++        goto error;
++    }
++
++    tpk = TSSPRIVKEY_new();
++    if (!tpk) {
++        LOG_ERR("oom");
++        goto error;
++    }
++
++    tpk->type = OBJ_txt2obj(OID_loadableKey, 1);
++    tpk->parent = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
++    tpk->privkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
++    tpk->pubkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
++    if (!tpk->type || !tpk->privkey || !tpk->pubkey || !tpk->parent) {
++        LOG_ERR("oom");
++        goto error;
++    }
++
++    tpk->emptyAuth = ctx.parent.auth_str == NULL ? 0xFF : 0;
++
++    if ((ctx.parent.object.handle >> TPM2_HR_SHIFT) == TPM2_HT_PERSISTENT) {
++	ASN1_INTEGER_set(tpk->parent, ctx.parent.object.handle);
++    } else {
++	/* Indicate that the parent is a primary object generated on the fly. */
++	ASN1_INTEGER_set(tpk->parent, TPM2_RH_OWNER);
++    }
++
++    ASN1_STRING_set(tpk->privkey, private_buf, private_len);
++    ASN1_STRING_set(tpk->pubkey, public_buf, public_len);
++
++    if ((bio = BIO_new_file(ctx.output_path, "w")) == NULL) {
++	LOG_ERR("Could not open file: \"%s\"", ctx.output_path);
++        goto error;
++    }
++
++    PEM_write_bio_TSSPRIVKEY(bio, tpk);
++    TSSPRIVKEY_free(tpk);
++    BIO_free(bio);
++
++    return tool_rc_success;
++ error:
++    if (bio)
++        BIO_free(bio);
++    if (tpk)
++        TSSPRIVKEY_free(tpk);
++    return tool_rc_general_error;
++}
++
++static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
++    UNUSED(flags);
++
++    tool_rc rc = check_opts();
++    if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
++        return rc;
++    }
++
++    rc = init(ectx);
++    if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
++        return rc;
++    }
++
++    return encode();
++}
++
++// Register this tool with tpm2_tool.c
++TPM2_TOOL_REGISTER("encodeobject", tpm2_tool_onstart, tpm2_tool_onrun, NULL, NULL)
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0002-tpm2_tool.c-Fix-missing-include-for-basename.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 2e4d5da9a5e8808b1b075e0bde11c13fdd4c60b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 17:24:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] tpm2_tool.c Fix missing include for basename.
+
+tpm2_tool.c did not compile without the include libgen.h on netbsd.
+Fixes: #3321
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ tools/tpm2_tool.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_tool.c b/tools/tpm2_tool.c
+index edd04c83..f59e316a 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_tool.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_tool.c
+@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
+ #include <stdbool.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <libgen.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0003-Code-clarity-fix-for-calculation-of-data-member-addr.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,27 @@
+From 18f211c7f28d204e5676a30480b681519316d87f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: George Almasi <gheorghe@us.ibm.com>
+Date: Mon, 11 Apr 2022 12:12:45 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH 3/9] Code clarity fix for calculation of data member addresses
+ when printing out UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2 structures.
+
+Signed-off-by: George Almasi <gheorghe@us.ibm.com>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+index d2d4aefe..647a2225 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+@@ -536,7 +536,7 @@ bool yaml_uefi_platfwblob(UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB *data) {
+ /* TCG PC Client PFP (02 dec 2020) section 10.2.5 */
+ bool yaml_uefi_platfwblob2(UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB2 *data) {
+   UINT8 blobdescsize = data->BlobDescriptionSize;
+-  UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB * data2 = (UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB *)((UINT8 *)data + sizeof(UINT8) + blobdescsize);
++  UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB * data2 = (UEFI_PLATFORM_FIRMWARE_BLOB *)((UINT8 *)data + sizeof(data->BlobDescriptionSize) + blobdescsize);
+ 
+   char * eventdesc = (char *)calloc (1, 2*blobdescsize+1);
+   if (!eventdesc) {
+-- 
+2.37.3
+

SOURCES/0003-tools-tpm2_evictconrol-fix-for-call-to-Esys_TR_Close.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
+From be8b4cb178332f24fb06f30d3211a24ea3c9e632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:24:31 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 03/17] tools/tpm2_evictconrol: fix for call to Esys_TR_Close
+ on bad handle
+
+Fixes #2254
+
+Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
+---
+ tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c b/tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c
+index 0ae4edc6..8199be39 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c
+@@ -106,20 +106,18 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+     bool evicted = false;
+ 
+     /* load up the object/handle to work on */
+-    tool_rc tmp_rc = tpm2_util_object_load(ectx, ctx.to_persist_key.ctx_path,
+-            &ctx.to_persist_key.object, TPM2_HANDLE_ALL_W_NV);
+-    if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
+-        rc = tmp_rc;
+-        goto out;
++    rc = tpm2_util_object_load(ectx, ctx.to_persist_key.ctx_path,
++        &ctx.to_persist_key.object, TPM2_HANDLE_ALL_W_NV);
++    if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
++        return rc;
+     }
+ 
+     /* load up the auth hierarchy */
+-    tmp_rc = tpm2_util_object_load_auth(ectx, ctx.auth_hierarchy.ctx_path,
++    rc = tpm2_util_object_load_auth(ectx, ctx.auth_hierarchy.ctx_path,
+             ctx.auth_hierarchy.auth_str, &ctx.auth_hierarchy.object, false,
+             TPM2_HANDLE_FLAGS_O | TPM2_HANDLE_FLAGS_P);
+-    if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
+-        rc = tmp_rc;
+-        goto out;
++    if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
++        return rc;
+     }
+ 
+     if (ctx.to_persist_key.object.handle >> TPM2_HR_SHIFT
+@@ -136,11 +134,10 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+      */
+     if (ctx.flags.c && !ctx.flags.p) {
+         bool is_platform = ctx.auth_hierarchy.object.handle == TPM2_RH_PLATFORM;
+-        tmp_rc = tpm2_capability_find_vacant_persistent_handle(ectx,
++        rc = tpm2_capability_find_vacant_persistent_handle(ectx,
+                 is_platform, &ctx.persist_handle);
+-        if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
+-            rc = tmp_rc;
+-            goto out;
++        if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
++            return rc;
+         }
+         /* we searched and found a persistent handle, so mark that peristent handle valid */
+         ctx.flags.p = 1;
+@@ -148,7 +145,7 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+ 
+     if (ctx.flags.o && !ctx.flags.p) {
+         LOG_ERR("Cannot specify -o without using a persistent handle");
+-        goto out;
++        return tool_rc_option_error;
+     }
+ 
+     ESYS_TR out_tr;
+@@ -175,7 +172,7 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+     rc = tpm2_evictcontrol(ectx, &ctx.auth_hierarchy.object,
+             &ctx.to_persist_key.object, ctx.persist_handle, &out_tr, NULL);
+     if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+-        goto out;
++        return rc;
+     }
+ 
+     /*
+@@ -191,19 +188,16 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+     evicted = out_tr == ESYS_TR_NONE;
+     tpm2_tool_output("persistent-handle: 0x%x\n", ctx.persist_handle);
+     tpm2_tool_output("action: %s\n", evicted ? "evicted" : "persisted");
+-
++    tool_rc tmp_rc = tool_rc_success;
+     if (ctx.output_arg) {
+-        rc = files_save_ESYS_TR(ectx, out_tr, ctx.output_arg);
+-    } else {
+-        rc = tool_rc_success;
++        tmp_rc = files_save_ESYS_TR(ectx, out_tr, ctx.output_arg);
+     }
+ 
+-out:
+     if (!evicted) {
+         rc = tpm2_close(ectx, &out_tr);
+     }
+ 
+-    return rc;
++    return (tmp_rc == tool_rc_success) ? rc : tmp_rc;
+ }
+ 
+ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onstop(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx) {
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0003-tpm2_nvread-fix-input-handling-no-nv-index.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 5b5dd6263f1f2d41f08abd60134396a12756c5e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bill Roberts <bill.c.roberts+gh@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Dec 2023 10:26:33 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] tpm2_nvread: fix input handling no nv index
+
+Fixes:
+./tools/tpm2 nvread
+WARN: Reading full size of the NV index
+ERROR: object string is empty
+ERROR: Invalid handle authorization.
+ERROR: Unable to run nvread
+
+with:
+./tools/tpm2 nvread
+ERROR: Must specify NV index argument
+Usage: nvread [<options>] <arguments>
+Where <options> are:
+    [ -C | --hierarchy=<value>] [ -o | --output=<value>] [ -s | --size=<value>] [ --offset=<value>]
+    [ --cphash=<value>] [ --rphash=<value>] [ -n | --name=<value>] [ -P | --auth=<value>]
+    [ -S | --session=<value>] [ --print-yaml]
+
+Signed-off-by: Bill Roberts <bill.c.roberts+gh@gmail.com>
+---
+ tools/tpm2_nvread.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_nvread.c b/tools/tpm2_nvread.c
+index f64d00c1..8f9c61cc 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_nvread.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_nvread.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct tpm_nvread_ctx {
+     TPM2B_NAME precalc_nvname;
+     UINT32 size_to_read;
+     UINT32 offset;
++    bool nv_specified;
+ 
+     /*
+      * Outputs
+@@ -192,6 +193,11 @@ static tool_rc check_options(tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+         return tool_rc_option_error;
+     }
+ 
++    if(!ctx.nv_specified) {
++        LOG_ERR("Must specify NV index argument");
++        return tool_rc_option_error;
++    }
++
+     /*
+      * Peculiar to this and some other tools, the object (nvindex) name must
+      * be specified when only calculating the cpHash.
+@@ -266,7 +272,8 @@ static bool on_arg(int argc, char **argv) {
+     if (!ctx.auth_hierarchy.ctx_path) {
+         ctx.auth_hierarchy.ctx_path = argv[0];
+     }
+-    return on_arg_nv_index(argc, argv, &ctx.nv_index);
++
++    return ctx.nv_specified = on_arg_nv_index(argc, argv, &ctx.nv_index);
+ }
+ 
+ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0004-Fix-argument-parsing-in-tpm2_policylocality.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
+From f365a0adca8379ce89ff86fdf740082cf6a56f1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen1033@gmail.com>
+Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2021 12:41:52 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 04/17] Fix argument parsing in tpm2_policylocality
+
+This patch fixes a bug that caused tpm2_policylocality to almost
+always generate PolicyLocality(0).
+
+There was a logical inversion that caused almost any argument
+(including invalid ones) to be interpreted as zero, except "zero"
+would be interpreted as one.
+
+Signed-off-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen1033@gmail.com>
+---
+ tools/tpm2_policylocality.c | 10 +++++-----
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_policylocality.c b/tools/tpm2_policylocality.c
+index 81edbe65..b1d43d02 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_policylocality.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_policylocality.c
+@@ -54,15 +54,15 @@ static bool on_arg(int argc, char **argv) {
+         return false;
+     }
+ 
+-    if (strcmp(argv[0], "zero")) {
++    if (strcmp(argv[0], "zero") == 0) {
+         ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_ZERO;
+-    } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "one")) {
++    } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "one") == 0) {
+         ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_ONE;
+-    } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "two")) {
++    } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "two") == 0) {
+         ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_TWO;
+-    } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "three")) {
++    } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "three") == 0) {
+         ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_THREE;
+-    } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "four")) {
++    } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "four") == 0) {
+         ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_FOUR;
+     } else {
+         bool result = tpm2_util_string_to_uint8(argv[0], &ctx.locality);
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0004-tpm2_checkquote-Add-comparison-of-pcr-selection.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 7076608db4b8a2cdcab6ff4bc47c23c935618e3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 22:11:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] tpm2_checkquote: Add comparison of pcr selection.
+
+The pcr selection which is passed with the --pcr parameter it not
+compared with the attest. So it's possible to fake a valid
+attestation.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2024-29039
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Signed-off-by: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@infineon.com>
+---
+ tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
+index 6ce086f8..8a2a154e 100644
+--- a/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
++++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,37 @@ static tpm2_verifysig_ctx ctx = {
+         .pcr_hash = TPM2B_TYPE_INIT(TPM2B_DIGEST, buffer),
+ };
+ 
++static bool compare_pcr_selection(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *attest_sel, TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcr_sel) {
++    if (attest_sel->count != pcr_sel->count) {
++        LOG_ERR("Selection sizes do not match.");
++        return false;
++    }
++    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < attest_sel->count; i++) {
++        for (uint32_t j = 0; j < pcr_sel->count; j++) {
++            if (attest_sel->pcrSelections[i].hash ==
++                pcr_sel->pcrSelections[j].hash) {
++                if (attest_sel->pcrSelections[i].sizeofSelect !=
++                        pcr_sel->pcrSelections[j].sizeofSelect) {
++                    LOG_ERR("Bitmask size does not match");
++                    return false;
++                }
++                if (memcmp(&attest_sel->pcrSelections[i].pcrSelect[0],
++                           &pcr_sel->pcrSelections[j].pcrSelect[0],
++                           attest_sel->pcrSelections[i].sizeofSelect) != 0) {
++                    LOG_ERR("Selection bitmasks do not match");
++                    return false;
++                }
++                break;
++            }
++            if (j == pcr_sel->count - 1) {
++                LOG_ERR("Hash selections to not match.");
++                return false;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++    return true;
++}
++
+ static bool verify(void) {
+ 
+     bool result = false;
+@@ -374,7 +405,7 @@ static tool_rc init(void) {
+     }
+ 
+     TPM2B_ATTEST *msg = NULL;
+-    TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_select;
++    TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_select = { 0 };
+     tpm2_pcrs *pcrs;
+     tpm2_pcrs temp_pcrs = {};
+     tool_rc return_value = tool_rc_general_error;
+@@ -537,6 +568,14 @@ static tool_rc init(void) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (ctx.flags.pcr) {
++        if (!compare_pcr_selection(&ctx.attest.attested.quote.pcrSelect,
++                                   &pcr_select)) {
++            LOG_ERR("PCR selection does not match PCR slection from attest!");
++            goto err;
++        }
++    }
++
+     // Figure out the digest for this message
+     res = tpm2_openssl_hash_compute_data(ctx.halg, msg->attestationData,
+             msg->size, &ctx.msg_hash);
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0004-tpm2_eventlog-clean-up-some-magic-numbers.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,55 @@
+From 2781de8cb60d0e8efb72d57eb1178f2f6df9415c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 2 Aug 2022 11:59:06 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 4/9] tpm2_eventlog: clean up some magic numbers
+
+Make the code a bit clearer by making it clear
+we are subtracting the size of the EFI_GUID member
+from the EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA size.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c | 12 ++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+index 647a2225..fee78027 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+@@ -374,13 +374,13 @@ static bool yaml_uefi_var(UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *data, size_t size, UINT32 type,
+                     for (i = 0; i < signatures; i++) {
+                         EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *s = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)signature;
+                         char *sdata = calloc (1,
+-                            BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(slist->SignatureSize-16));
++                            BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(slist->SignatureSize - sizeof(EFI_GUID)));
+                         if (sdata == NULL) {
+                             LOG_ERR("Failled to allocate data: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+                             return false;
+                         }
+-                        bytes_to_str(s->SignatureData, slist->SignatureSize-16,
+-                            sdata, BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(slist->SignatureSize-16));
++                        bytes_to_str(s->SignatureData, slist->SignatureSize - sizeof(EFI_GUID),
++                            sdata, BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(slist->SignatureSize - sizeof(EFI_GUID)));
+                         guid_unparse_lower(s->SignatureOwner, uuidstr);
+                         tpm2_tool_output("      - SignatureOwner: %s\n"
+                                          "        SignatureData: %s\n",
+@@ -426,13 +426,13 @@ static bool yaml_uefi_var(UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *data, size_t size, UINT32 type,
+             EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *s= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)&data->UnicodeName[
+                 data->UnicodeNameLength];
+             char *sdata = calloc (1,
+-                BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(data->VariableDataLength - 16));
++                BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(data->VariableDataLength - sizeof(EFI_GUID)));
+             if (sdata == NULL) {
+                 LOG_ERR("Failled to allocate data: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+                 return false;
+             }
+-            bytes_to_str(s->SignatureData, data->VariableDataLength - 16,
+-                sdata, BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(data->VariableDataLength - 16));
++            bytes_to_str(s->SignatureData, data->VariableDataLength - sizeof(EFI_GUID),
++                sdata, BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(data->VariableDataLength - sizeof(EFI_GUID)));
+             guid_unparse_lower(s->SignatureOwner, uuidstr);
+             tpm2_tool_output("    - SignatureOwner: %s\n"
+                              "      SignatureData: %s\n",
+-- 
+2.37.3
+

SOURCES/0005-tools-tpm2_tool.c-Fix-an-issue-where-LOG_WARN-is-alw.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
+From 221d8e557ab5a00246f7b09746377819cfbaec5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
+Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 10:24:45 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 05/17] tools/tpm2_tool.c: Fix an issue where LOG_WARN is
+ always displayed
+
+Despite setting the 'quiet' flag with -Q the warning messages were
+always displayed.
+
+Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_options.c          | 12 +++++++++---
+ tools/tpm2_makecredential.c |  9 ++++++---
+ 2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_options.c b/lib/tpm2_options.c
+index 8c8af2af..1238e440 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_options.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_options.c
+@@ -456,12 +456,16 @@ tpm2_option_code tpm2_handle_options(int argc, char **argv,
+ 
+         /* tool doesn't request a sapi, don't initialize one */
+         if (flags->tcti_none && is_optional_sapi) {
+-            LOG_WARN("Tool optionally uses SAPI. Continuing with tcti=none");
++            if (!flags->quiet) {
++                LOG_WARN("Tool optionally uses SAPI. Continuing with tcti=none");
++            }
+             goto none;
+         }
+ 
+         if (flags->tcti_none && is_no_sapi) {
+-            LOG_WARN("Tool does not use SAPI. Continuing with tcti=none");
++            if (!flags->quiet) {
++                LOG_WARN("Tool does not use SAPI. Continuing with tcti=none");
++            }
+             goto none;
+         }
+ 
+@@ -481,7 +485,9 @@ tpm2_option_code tpm2_handle_options(int argc, char **argv,
+         bool is_optional_fake_tcti = (flags->tcti_none && tool_opts &&
+             tool_opts->flags & TPM2_OPTIONS_OPTIONAL_SAPI_AND_FAKE_TCTI);
+         if (is_optional_fake_tcti) {
+-            LOG_WARN("Tool optionally uses SAPI. Continuing with tcti=fake");
++            if (!flags->quiet) {
++                LOG_WARN("Tool optionally uses SAPI. Continuing with tcti=fake");
++            }
+             *tcti = (TSS2_TCTI_CONTEXT *)&fake_tcti;
+             goto none;
+         }
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_makecredential.c b/tools/tpm2_makecredential.c
+index 0b0fa123..5bd5b484 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_makecredential.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_makecredential.c
+@@ -310,11 +310,14 @@ static void set_default_TCG_EK_template(TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC alg) {
+     ctx.public.publicArea.nameAlg = TPM2_ALG_SHA256;
+ }
+ 
+-static tool_rc process_input(void) {
++static tool_rc process_input(tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+ 
+     TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC alg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+     if (ctx.key_type) {
+-        LOG_WARN("Because **-G** is specified, assuming input encryption public key is in PEM format.");
++        if (!flags.quiet) {
++            LOG_WARN("Because **-G** is specified, assuming input encryption "
++                     "public key is in PEM format.");
++        }
+         alg = tpm2_alg_util_from_optarg(ctx.key_type,
+             tpm2_alg_util_flags_asymmetric);
+         if (alg == TPM2_ALG_ERROR ||
+@@ -379,7 +382,7 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+ 
+     UNUSED(flags);
+ 
+-    tool_rc rc = process_input();
++    tool_rc rc = process_input(flags);
+     if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+         return rc;
+     }
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0005-tpm2_checkquote-Fix-check-of-magic-number.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 0f122ba3f7bdee12f8ee725db41d90e737fb3e49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2023 11:29:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] tpm2_checkquote: Fix check of magic number.
+
+It was not checked whether the magic number in the
+attest is equal to TPM2_GENERATED_VALUE.
+So an malicious attacker could generate arbitrary quote data
+which was not detected by tpm2 checkquote.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2024-29038
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
+index 8a2a154e..5083d855 100644
+--- a/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
++++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
+@@ -146,6 +146,13 @@ static bool verify(void) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    // check magic
++    if (ctx.attest.magic != TPM2_GENERATED_VALUE) {
++        LOG_ERR("Bad magic, got: 0x%x, expected: 0x%x",
++                ctx.attest.magic, TPM2_GENERATED_VALUE);
++        return false;
++    }
++
+     // Also ensure digest from quote matches PCR digest
+     if (ctx.flags.pcr) {
+         if (!tpm2_util_verify_digests(&ctx.attest.attested.quote.pcrDigest,
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0005-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-fix-malformed-YAML-for-EV_IPL-dat.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,209 @@
+From cef0317b83e06fdca25ef52a8bfd59b74d318e5a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Daniel=20P=2E=20Berrang=C3=A9?= <berrange@redhat.com>
+Date: Thu, 29 Sep 2022 10:48:36 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 5/9] tpm2_eventlog_yaml: fix malformed YAML for EV_IPL data
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+The code for printing EV_IPL data was fairly crude and often
+did not generate valid YAML syntax. Some problems
+
+ * Data starting with a space would result in invalid
+   indentation, a leading space requires a quoted string
+ * Non-printable cahracters must generally be escaped,
+   using a quoted string
+ * Embedded NUL bytes were turned into newlines, which
+   mangled any UTF16 encoded data.
+
+This change attempts to make the YAML output much safer. It
+is not pefect as it just processes the data bytewise and
+thus could potentially emit invalid UTF-8 bytes. In practice
+this won't be a problem for known bootloader emitting EV_IPL
+events.
+
+This changes the formatting slightly
+
+  - All strings are now surrounded with double quotes
+
+  - All NUL bytes, including the final trailing NUL
+    are displayed in escaped format.
+
+  - Non-printable ASCII chars are escaped, including
+    the tab character, per YAML recommendations
+
+A much better long term solution would be to switch to
+using libyaml for generating the output which would give
+a strong guarantee of correct formatting.
+
+Signed-off-by: Daniel P. Berrangé <berrange@redhat.com>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c | 141 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 130 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+index fee78027..66a20701 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+@@ -571,6 +571,125 @@ bool yaml_uefi_action(UINT8 const *action, size_t size) {
+ 
+     return true;
+ }
++
++
++/*
++ * The yaml_ipl description is received as raw bytes, but the
++ * data will represent a printable string. Unfortunately we
++ * are not told its encoding, and this can vary. For example,
++ * grub will use UTF8, while sd-boot will UTF16LE.
++ *
++ * We need to emit YAML with some rules:
++ *
++ *  - No leading ' ' without quoting it
++ *  - Escape non-printable ascii chars
++ *  - Double quotes if using escape sequences
++ *  - Valid UTF8 string
++ *
++ * This method will ignore the question of original data
++ * encoding and apply a few simple rules to make the data
++ * mostly YAML compliant. Where it falls down is not
++ * guaranteeing valid UTF8, if the input was not already
++ * valid UTF8. In practice this limitation shouldn't be
++ * a problem given expected measured data.
++ *
++ * Note: one consequence of this approach is that most
++ * UTF16LE data will be rendered with lots of \0 bytes
++ * escaped.
++ *
++ * For ease of output reading, the data is also split on newlines
++ */
++char **yaml_split_escape_string(UINT8 const *description, size_t size)
++{
++    char **lines = NULL, **tmp;
++    size_t nlines = 0;
++    size_t i, j, k;
++    size_t len;
++    UINT8 *nl;
++
++    i = 0;
++    do {
++        nl = memchr(description + i, '\n', size - i);
++        len = nl ? (size_t)(nl - (description + i)) : size - i;
++
++        tmp = realloc(lines, sizeof(char *) * (nlines + 2));
++        if (!tmp) {
++            LOG_ERR("failed to allocate memory for description lines: %s\n",
++                    strerror(errno));
++            goto error;
++        }
++        lines = tmp;
++        lines[nlines + 1] = NULL;
++        k = 0;
++
++        /* Worst case: every byte needs escaping, plus start/end quotes, plus nul */
++        lines[nlines] = calloc(1, (len * 2) + 2 + 1);
++        if (!lines[nlines]) {
++            LOG_ERR("failed to allocate memory for escaped string: %s\n",
++                    strerror(errno));
++            goto error;
++        }
++
++        lines[nlines][k++] = '"';
++        for (j = i; j < (i + len); j++) {
++            char escape = '\0';
++
++            switch (description[j]) {
++            case '\0':
++              escape = '0';
++              break;
++            case '\a':
++              escape = 'a';
++              break;
++            case '\b':
++              escape = 'b';
++              break;
++            case '\t':
++              escape = 't';
++              break;
++            case '\v':
++              escape = 'v';
++              break;
++            case '\f':
++              escape = 'f';
++              break;
++            case '\r':
++              escape = 'r';
++              break;
++            case '\e':
++              escape = 'e';
++              break;
++            case '\'':
++              escape = '\'';
++              break;
++            case '\\':
++              escape = '\\';
++              break;
++            }
++
++            if (escape == '\0') {
++                lines[nlines][k++] = description[j];
++            } else {
++                lines[nlines][k++] = '\\';
++                lines[nlines][k++] = escape;
++            }
++        }
++        lines[nlines][k++] = '"';
++
++        nlines++;
++        i += len + 1;
++    } while (i < size);
++
++    return lines;
++
++ error:
++    for (i = 0; lines != NULL && lines[i] != NULL; i++) {
++      free(lines[i]);
++    }
++    free(lines);
++    return NULL;
++}
++
+ /*
+  * TCG PC Client PFP section 9.4.1
+  * This event type is extensively used by the Shim and Grub on a wide varities
+@@ -578,21 +697,21 @@ bool yaml_uefi_action(UINT8 const *action, size_t size) {
+  * the loading of grub, kernel, and initrd images.
+  */
+ bool yaml_ipl(UINT8 const *description, size_t size) {
+-
++    char **lines = NULL;
++    size_t i;
+     tpm2_tool_output("  Event:\n"
+                      "    String: |-\n");
+ 
+-    /* We need to handle when description contains multiple lines. */
+-    size_t i, j;
+-    for (i = 0; i < size; i++) {
+-        for (j = i; j < size; j++) {
+-            if (description[j] == '\n' || description[j] == '\0') {
+-                break;
+-            }
+-        }
+-        tpm2_tool_output("      %.*s\n", (int)(j - i), description+i);
+-        i = j;
++    lines = yaml_split_escape_string(description, size);
++    if (!lines) {
++        return false;
++    }
++
++    for (i = 0; lines[i] != NULL; i++) {
++        tpm2_tool_output("      %s\n", lines[i]);
++        free(lines[i]);
+     }
++    free(lines);
+ 
+     return true;
+ }
+-- 
+2.37.3
+

SOURCES/0006-import-fix-bug-on-using-scheme.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
+From acc82191f519f8bcdfcc0827faf024dcd2f56f78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 10:49:04 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 06/17] import: fix bug on using scheme
+
+When scheme is specified in the template, the openssl load functions
+clobber the scheme value and set it to TPM2_ALG_NULL. Only set the
+algorithm to NULL if zero value is specified.
+
+Fixes: #2997
+
+Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_openssl.c               | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
+ test/integration/tests/import.sh | 13 +++++++++----
+ 2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_openssl.c b/lib/tpm2_openssl.c
+index 01bfc9ef..ad43c8e1 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_openssl.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_openssl.c
+@@ -534,9 +534,15 @@ static bool load_public_RSA_from_key(EVP_PKEY *key, TPM2B_PUBLIC *pub) {
+     pt->type = TPM2_ALG_RSA;
+ 
+     TPMS_RSA_PARMS *rdetail = &pub->publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail;
+-    rdetail->scheme.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+-    rdetail->symmetric.algorithm = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+-    rdetail->scheme.details.anySig.hashAlg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
++    /*
++     * If the scheme is not TPM2_ALG_ERROR (0),
++     * its a valid scheme so don't set it to NULL scheme
++     */
++    if (rdetail->scheme.scheme == TPM2_ALG_ERROR) {
++        rdetail->scheme.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
++        rdetail->symmetric.algorithm = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
++        rdetail->scheme.details.anySig.hashAlg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
++    }
+ 
+     /* NULL out sym details */
+     TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *sym = &rdetail->symmetric;
+@@ -809,9 +815,15 @@ static bool load_public_ECC_from_key(EVP_PKEY *key, TPM2B_PUBLIC *pub) {
+      * no kdf - not sure what this should be
+      */
+     pp->kdf.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+-    pp->scheme.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+-    pp->symmetric.algorithm = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+-    pp->scheme.details.anySig.hashAlg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
++
++    /*
++     * If the scheme is not TPM2_ALG_ERROR (0),
++     * its a valid scheme so don't set it to NULL scheme
++     */
++    if (pp->scheme.scheme == TPM2_ALG_ERROR) {
++        pp->scheme.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
++        pp->scheme.details.anySig.hashAlg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
++    }
+ 
+     /* NULL out sym details */
+     TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *sym = &pp->symmetric;
+diff --git a/test/integration/tests/import.sh b/test/integration/tests/import.sh
+index 9f6a474e..9cb6096f 100644
+--- a/test/integration/tests/import.sh
++++ b/test/integration/tests/import.sh
+@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ source helpers.sh
+ 
+ cleanup() {
+     rm -f import_key.ctx import_key.name import_key.priv import_key.pub \
+-    parent.ctx plain.dec.ssl  plain.enc plain.txt sym.key import_rsa_key.pub \
+-    import_rsa_key.priv import_rsa_key.ctx import_rsa_key.name private.pem \
++    parent.ctx plain.dec.ssl  plain.enc plain.txt sym.key import_rsa_key*.pub \
++    import_rsa_key*.priv import_rsa_key.ctx import_rsa_key.name private.pem \
+     public.pem plain.rsa.enc plain.rsa.dec public.pem data.in.raw \
+     data.in.digest data.out.signed ticket.out ecc.pub ecc.priv ecc.name \
+     ecc.ctx private.ecc.pem public.ecc.pem passfile aes.key policy.dat \
+@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ run_rsa_import_test() {
+     tpm2 import -Q -G rsa -g "$name_alg" -i private.pem -C $1 \
+     -u import_rsa_key.pub -r import_rsa_key.priv
+ 
++    # test in import with scheme and discard
++    tpm2 import -G rsa:rsassa-sha256 -g "$name_alg" -i private.pem -C $1 \
++    -u import_rsa_key2.pub -r import_rsa_key2.priv | grep -q 'rsassa'
++
+     tpm2 load -Q -C $1 -u import_rsa_key.pub -r import_rsa_key.priv \
+     -n import_rsa_key.name -c import_rsa_key.ctx
+ 
+@@ -118,8 +122,9 @@ run_ecc_import_test() {
+     shasum -a 256 data.in.raw | awk '{ print "000000 " $1 }' | xxd -r -c 32 > \
+     data.in.digest
+ 
+-    tpm2 import -Q -G ecc -g "$name_alg" -i private.ecc.pem -C $1 -u ecc.pub \
+-    -r ecc.priv
++    # test import with scheme
++    tpm2 import -G ecc:ecdsa-sha256 -g "$name_alg" -i private.ecc.pem -C $1 -u ecc.pub \
++    -r ecc.priv | grep -q 'ecdsa'
+ 
+     tpm2 load -Q -C $1 -u ecc.pub -r ecc.priv -n ecc.name -c ecc.ctx
+ 
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0006-tpm2_setprimarypolicy-Fix-resource-leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From d7c541d839d6c470fbd273d0c482091a1fe59fe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 15:42:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] tpm2_setprimarypolicy: Fix resource leak
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Signed-off-by: Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com>
+---
+ tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c b/tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c
+index 140a8083..459d3d03 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c
+@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ static tool_rc process_setprimarypolicy_input(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx,
+                 (*auth_policy)->buffer, &((*auth_policy)->size));
+         if (!result) {
+             LOG_ERR("Failed loading policy digest from path");
++            free(*auth_policy);
+             return tool_rc_general_error;
+         }
+     }
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0007-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-fix-parsing-for-MokListTrusted.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+From c26464eb59b71b40bea11b4829b2a848343081f2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thore Sommer <mail@thson.de>
+Date: Sat, 8 Oct 2022 21:29:18 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 7/9] tpm2_eventlog_yaml: fix parsing for MokListTrusted
+
+Not all data in events of the EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY are
+EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA. The entry for MokListTrusted is a boolean
+encoded as an integer similar to SecureBoot variable.
+
+Fixes #3050
+
+Signed-off-by: Thore Sommer <mail@thson.de>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 41 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+index 66a20701..0b1d0318 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+@@ -418,27 +418,49 @@ static bool yaml_uefi_var(UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *data, size_t size, UINT32 type,
+                 }
+                 return true;
+             }
+-            /* Other variables will be printed as a hex string */
+         } else if (type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY) {
+-            free(ret);
+-            tpm2_tool_output("    VariableData:\n");
+-            
+-            EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *s= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)&data->UnicodeName[
+-                data->UnicodeNameLength];
+-            char *sdata = calloc (1,
+-                BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(data->VariableDataLength - sizeof(EFI_GUID)));
+-            if (sdata == NULL) {
+-                LOG_ERR("Failled to allocate data: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+-                return false;
++            /* The MokListTrusted is boolean option, not a EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*/
++            if ((strlen(ret) == 14 && strncmp(ret, "MokListTrusted", 14) == 0)) {
++                free(ret);
++                tpm2_tool_output("    VariableData:\n"
++                                 "      Enabled: ");
++                if (data->VariableDataLength == 0) {
++                    tpm2_tool_output("'No'\n");
++                } else if (data->VariableDataLength > 1) {
++                    LOG_ERR("MokListTrusted value length %" PRIu64 " is unexpectedly > 1\n",
++                            data->VariableDataLength);
++                    return false;
++                } else {
++                    uint8_t *variable_data = (uint8_t *)&data->UnicodeName[
++                        data->UnicodeNameLength];
++                    if (*variable_data == 0) {
++                        tpm2_tool_output("'No'\n");
++                    } else {
++                        tpm2_tool_output("'Yes'\n");
++                    }
++                }
++                return true;
++            } else {
++                /* Other variables will be printed as a hex string */
++                free(ret);
++                tpm2_tool_output("    VariableData:\n");
++                EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *s= (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)&data->UnicodeName[
++                    data->UnicodeNameLength];
++                char *sdata = calloc (1,
++                    BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(data->VariableDataLength - sizeof(EFI_GUID)));
++                if (sdata == NULL) {
++                    LOG_ERR("Failled to allocate data: %s\n", strerror(errno));
++                    return false;
++                }
++                bytes_to_str(s->SignatureData, data->VariableDataLength - sizeof(EFI_GUID),
++                    sdata, BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(data->VariableDataLength - sizeof(EFI_GUID)));
++                guid_unparse_lower(s->SignatureOwner, uuidstr);
++                tpm2_tool_output("    - SignatureOwner: %s\n"
++                                "      SignatureData: %s\n",
++                                uuidstr, sdata);
++                free(sdata);
++                return true;
+             }
+-            bytes_to_str(s->SignatureData, data->VariableDataLength - sizeof(EFI_GUID),
+-                sdata, BYTES_TO_HEX_STRING_SIZE(data->VariableDataLength - sizeof(EFI_GUID)));
+-            guid_unparse_lower(s->SignatureOwner, uuidstr);
+-            tpm2_tool_output("    - SignatureOwner: %s\n"
+-                             "      SignatureData: %s\n",
+-                             uuidstr, sdata);
+-            free(sdata);
+-            return true;
+         } else if (type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT || type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2) {
+             if ((strlen(ret) == 9 && strncmp(ret, "BootOrder", 9) == 0)) {
+                 free(ret);
+-- 
+2.37.3
+

SOURCES/0007-tpm2_policyor-fix-unallocated-policy-list.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
+From d35bff8cf06cec386afd24bdbed9828caf063a2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 11:31:51 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 07/17] tpm2_policyor: fix unallocated policy list
+
+The TPML_DIGEST policy list was calloc'd for some reason, however it
+could just be statically allocated in the context. The side effect is
+that when no options or arguments were given a NPD occured when checking
+the count of the policy list. TO fix this, just statically allocate it.
+
+Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+---
+ tools/tpm2_policyor.c | 15 ++++++---------
+ 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_policyor.c b/tools/tpm2_policyor.c
+index e4f6541b..d27fff8b 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_policyor.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_policyor.c
+@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ struct tpm2_policyor_ctx {
+     //File path for the session context data
+     const char *session_path;
+     //List of policy digests that will be compounded
+-    TPML_DIGEST *policy_list;
++    TPML_DIGEST policy_list;
+     //File path for storing the policy digest output
+     const char *out_policy_dgst_path;
+ 
+@@ -36,8 +36,7 @@ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
+         ctx.session_path = value;
+         break;
+     case 'l':
+-        ctx.policy_list = calloc(1, sizeof(TPML_DIGEST));
+-        result = tpm2_policy_parse_policy_list(value, ctx.policy_list);
++        result = tpm2_policy_parse_policy_list(value, &ctx.policy_list);
+         if (!result) {
+             return false;
+         }
+@@ -54,8 +53,7 @@ static bool on_arg(int argc, char **argv) {
+         return false;
+     }
+ 
+-    ctx.policy_list = calloc(1, sizeof(TPML_DIGEST));
+-    bool result = tpm2_policy_parse_policy_list(argv[0], ctx.policy_list);
++    bool result = tpm2_policy_parse_policy_list(argv[0], &ctx.policy_list);
+     if (!result) {
+         return false;
+     }
+@@ -85,7 +83,7 @@ static bool is_input_option_args_valid(void) {
+     }
+ 
+     //Minimum two policies needed to be specified for compounding
+-    if (ctx.policy_list->count < 1) {
++    if (ctx.policy_list.count < 1) {
+         LOG_ERR("Must specify at least 2 policy digests for compounding.");
+         return false;
+     }
+@@ -109,14 +107,14 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+     }
+ 
+     /* Policy digest hash alg should match that of the session */
+-    if (ctx.policy_list->digests[0].size
++    if (ctx.policy_list.digests[0].size
+             != tpm2_alg_util_get_hash_size(
+                     tpm2_session_get_authhash(ctx.session))) {
+         LOG_ERR("Policy digest hash alg should match that of the session.");
+         return tool_rc_general_error;
+     }
+ 
+-    rc = tpm2_policy_build_policyor(ectx, ctx.session, ctx.policy_list);
++    rc = tpm2_policy_build_policyor(ectx, ctx.session, &ctx.policy_list);
+     if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+         LOG_ERR("Could not build policyor TPM");
+         return rc;
+@@ -127,7 +125,6 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+ 
+ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onstop(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx) {
+     UNUSED(ectx);
+-    free(ctx.policy_list);
+     free(ctx.policy_digest);
+     return tpm2_session_close(&ctx.session);
+ }
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0008-lib-tpm2_alg_util.c-Fix-potential-null-pointer-deref.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
+From cfb18410e8f706646adce2bd9f6cffecbd363d2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
+Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2022 15:19:36 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 08/17] lib/tpm2_alg_util.c: Fix potential null pointer
+ dereference
+
+Must test ext_alg_str before dereferencing in
+tpm2_alg_util_handle_rsa_ext_alg
+
+char *ext_alg_str = calloc(1, strlen(alg_spec) + strlen("rsa") +
+        RSA_KEYBITS_STRLEN)
+
+Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_alg_util.c | 4 ++++
+ 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c b/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c
+index 1e984d74..580f41cb 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c
+@@ -601,6 +601,10 @@ tool_rc tpm2_alg_util_handle_rsa_ext_alg(const char *alg_spec,
+     #define RSA_KEYBITS_STRLEN 6
+     char *ext_alg_str = calloc(1, strlen(alg_spec) + strlen("rsa") +
+         RSA_KEYBITS_STRLEN);
++    if (ext_alg_str == NULL) {
++        LOG_ERR("oom");
++        return tool_rc_general_error;
++    }
+ 
+     strcat(ext_alg_str, "rsa");
+     switch(public->publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.keyBits) {
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0009-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-use-defines-for-Unicode-variables.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
+From e05d4ac57960b9aa81943254f5757405a5217616 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Thore Sommer <mail@thson.de>
+Date: Tue, 11 Oct 2022 08:44:44 +0300
+Subject: [PATCH 9/9] tpm2_eventlog_yaml: use defines for Unicode variables
+
+The used variables and their length are defined as the following:
+
+ - Name: NAME_{VARIABLE_NAME}
+ - Length: NAME_{VARIABLE_NAME}_LEN
+
+Signed-off-by: Thore Sommer <mail@thson.de>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c | 30 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
+ 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+index 0b1d0318..59a5d8fc 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog_yaml.c
+@@ -23,6 +23,22 @@
+ #include <efivar/efivar.h>
+ #endif
+ 
++/* Valid variable unicode names and their length */
++#define NAME_DB "db"
++#define NAME_DB_LEN 2
++#define NAME_DBX "dbx"
++#define NAME_DBX_LEN 3
++#define NAME_KEK "KEK"
++#define NAME_KEK_LEN 3
++#define NAME_PK "PK"
++#define NAME_PK_LEN 2
++#define NAME_MOKLISTTRUSTED "MokListTrusted"
++#define NAME_MOKLISTTRUSTED_LEN 14
++#define NAME_SECUREBOOT "SecureBoot"
++#define NAME_SECUREBOOT_LEN 10
++#define NAME_BOOTORDER "BootOrder"
++#define NAME_BOOTORDER_LEN 9
++
+ static void guid_unparse_lower(EFI_GUID guid, char guid_buf[37]) {
+ 
+     snprintf(guid_buf, 37, "%08x-%04x-%04x-%02x%02x-%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x%02x",
+@@ -321,10 +337,10 @@ static bool yaml_uefi_var(UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *data, size_t size, UINT32 type,
+          * respectively.
+          */
+         if (type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_DRIVER_CONFIG) {
+-            if ((strlen(ret) == 2 && strncmp(ret, "PK", 2) == 0) ||
+-                (strlen(ret) == 3 && strncmp(ret, "KEK", 3) == 0) ||
+-                (strlen(ret) == 2 && strncmp(ret, "db", 2) == 0) ||
+-                (strlen(ret) == 3 && strncmp(ret, "dbx", 3) == 0)) {
++            if ((strlen(ret) == NAME_PK_LEN && strncmp(ret, NAME_PK, NAME_PK_LEN) == 0) ||
++                (strlen(ret) == NAME_KEK_LEN && strncmp(ret, NAME_KEK, NAME_KEK_LEN) == 0) ||
++                (strlen(ret) == NAME_DB_LEN && strncmp(ret, NAME_DB, NAME_DB_LEN) == 0) ||
++                (strlen(ret) == NAME_DBX_LEN && strncmp(ret, NAME_DBX, NAME_DBX_LEN) == 0)) {
+ 
+                 free(ret);
+                 tpm2_tool_output("    VariableData:\n");
+@@ -397,7 +413,7 @@ static bool yaml_uefi_var(UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *data, size_t size, UINT32 type,
+                     variable_data += slist->SignatureListSize;
+                 }
+                 return true;
+-            } else if ((strlen(ret) == 10 && strncmp(ret, "SecureBoot", 10) == 0)) {
++            } else if ((strlen(ret) == NAME_SECUREBOOT_LEN && strncmp(ret, NAME_SECUREBOOT, NAME_SECUREBOOT_LEN) == 0)) {
+                 free(ret);
+                 tpm2_tool_output("    VariableData:\n"
+                                  "      Enabled: ");
+@@ -420,7 +436,7 @@ static bool yaml_uefi_var(UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *data, size_t size, UINT32 type,
+             }
+         } else if (type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_AUTHORITY) {
+             /* The MokListTrusted is boolean option, not a EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA*/
+-            if ((strlen(ret) == 14 && strncmp(ret, "MokListTrusted", 14) == 0)) {
++            if ((strlen(ret) == NAME_MOKLISTTRUSTED_LEN && strncmp(ret, NAME_MOKLISTTRUSTED, NAME_MOKLISTTRUSTED_LEN) == 0)) {
+                 free(ret);
+                 tpm2_tool_output("    VariableData:\n"
+                                  "      Enabled: ");
+@@ -462,7 +478,7 @@ static bool yaml_uefi_var(UEFI_VARIABLE_DATA *data, size_t size, UINT32 type,
+                 return true;
+             }
+         } else if (type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT || type == EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT2) {
+-            if ((strlen(ret) == 9 && strncmp(ret, "BootOrder", 9) == 0)) {
++            if ((strlen(ret) == NAME_BOOTORDER_LEN && strncmp(ret, NAME_BOOTORDER, NAME_BOOTORDER_LEN) == 0)) {
+                 free(ret);
+                 tpm2_tool_output("    VariableData:\n");
+                 
+-- 
+2.37.3
+

SOURCES/0009-tss2_provision-fix-usage-of-L-parameter.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From d783e7962e268b45c13ad800fca636bb922005fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 10:32:43 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 09/17] tss2_provision: fix usage of -L parameter.
+
+The -L short parameter was not marked as parameter with required
+arg in the short opt list.
+Fixes #3147.
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c b/tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c
+index 5be7b4dc..7edf2dd3 100644
+--- a/tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c
++++ b/tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c
+@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static bool tss2_tool_onstart(tpm2_options **opts) {
+         {"authValueSh",         required_argument, NULL, 'S'},
+         {"authValueLockout",    required_argument, NULL, 'L'},
+     };
+-    return (*opts = tpm2_options_new ("E:S:L",
++    return (*opts = tpm2_options_new ("E:S:L:",
+         ARRAY_LEN(topts), topts, on_option, NULL, 0)) != NULL;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0010-tpm2_encodeobject-fix-formatting.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+From 0582b619c3a2c407bf5eace8d83d832688781789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 10:31:05 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 10/17] tpm2_encodeobject: fix formatting
+
+Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+---
+ tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
+index 2341c3a1..ccbd0e01 100644
+--- a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
++++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
+@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
+         ctx.parent.ctx_path = value;
+         break;
+     case 'o':
+-	ctx.output_path = value;
++        ctx.output_path = value;
+ 	break;
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0011-tpm2_encodeobject-fix-auth-boolean-flag.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
+From 579bb674b5bdf2a0d50e8d3a3d6f5391d233bdff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 10:48:18 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH 11/17] tpm2_encodeobject: fix auth boolean flag
+
+The flag for wether or not a key needs a password was being set based on
+if the parent needed a password or not when it should be set based on if
+the child object needs a password or not.
+
+Correct this by adding a -p/--key-auth option to indicate the value of
+this boolean.
+
+$ tpm2 encodeobject -C 0x81000000 -u key.pub -r key.priv -o key.pem
+$ openssl asn1parse -dump -inform PEM -in key.pem
+   <snip>
+   14:d=2  hl=2 l=   1 prim: BOOLEAN           :0
+   </snip>
+
+$ tpm2 encodeobject -C 0x81000000 -u key.pub -r key.priv -o key.pem -p
+$ openssl asn1parse -dump -inform PEM -in key.pem
+   <snip>
+   14:d=2  hl=2 l=   1 prim: BOOLEAN           :1
+   </snip>
+
+A workaround would be manually modifying the ASN1 PEM file boolean flag
+OR creating the same parent key but with a password and specifying the
+password via `-P`. Note that a primary key is the same given the same
+inputs and password doesn't change the generated key.
+
+Fixes: #3152
+
+Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+---
+ man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md     | 5 +++++
+ tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c | 9 +++++++--
+ 2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md b/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
+index 791eafbd..2e83fa7d 100644
+--- a/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
++++ b/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
+@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@ applications.
+ 
+     A file containing the sensitive portion of the object.
+ 
++  * **-p**, **\--key-auth**:
++
++    Indicates if an authorization value is needed for the object specified by
++    **-r** and **-u**.
++
+   * **-o**, **\--output**=_FILE_:
+ 
+     The output file path, recording the public portion of the object.
+diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
+index ccbd0e01..80de14f5 100644
+--- a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
++++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
+@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct tpm_encodeobject_ctx {
+         const char *privpath;
+         TPM2B_PRIVATE private;
+         ESYS_TR handle;
++        bool needs_auth;
+     } object;
+ 
+     char *output_path;
+@@ -89,6 +90,9 @@ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
+     case 'o':
+         ctx.output_path = value;
+ 	break;
++    case 'p':
++        ctx.object.needs_auth = true;
++        break;
+     }
+ 
+     return true;
+@@ -101,9 +105,10 @@ static bool tpm2_tool_onstart(tpm2_options **opts) {
+       { "private",        required_argument, NULL, 'r' },
+       { "parent-context", required_argument, NULL, 'C' },
+       { "output",         required_argument, NULL, 'o' },
++      { "key-auth",       no_argument,       NULL, 'p' },
+     };
+ 
+-    *opts = tpm2_options_new("P:u:r:C:o:", ARRAY_LEN(topts), topts, on_option,
++    *opts = tpm2_options_new("P:u:r:C:o:p", ARRAY_LEN(topts), topts, on_option,
+             NULL, 0);
+ 
+     return *opts != NULL;
+@@ -190,7 +195,7 @@ encode(void)
+         goto error;
+     }
+ 
+-    tpk->emptyAuth = ctx.parent.auth_str == NULL ? 0xFF : 0;
++    tpk->emptyAuth = ctx.object.needs_auth;
+ 
+     if ((ctx.parent.object.handle >> TPM2_HR_SHIFT) == TPM2_HT_PERSISTENT) {
+ 	ASN1_INTEGER_set(tpk->parent, ctx.parent.object.handle);
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0012-bugfix-fix-convert-sm2-public-key-in-openssl3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 3848000b934b9e2546a506ab0922c028491d2284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: mayuanchen <94815698+mayuanchenma@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 21:44:22 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 12/17] bugfix: fix convert sm2 public key in openssl3.
+
+Signed-off-by: mayuanchen <94815698+mayuanchenma@users.noreply.github.com>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_convert.c | 6 +++++-
+ 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_convert.c b/lib/tpm2_convert.c
+index 1bba370f..edb9bed0 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_convert.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_convert.c
+@@ -335,7 +335,11 @@ EVP_PKEY *convert_pubkey_ECC(TPMT_PUBLIC *public) {
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
+-    ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL);
++    if (nid == NID_sm2) {
++        ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "SM2", NULL);
++    } else {
++        ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL);
++    }
+     if (!ctx) {
+         print_ssl_error("Failed to allocate EC key context");
+         goto out;
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0013-readpublic-fix-reading-and-writing-serialized-trs.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From 62f6cdaa36e1c9e8f39e1ca60d8e3049de6860bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 15:32:55 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH 13/17] readpublic: fix reading and writing serialized trs
+
+Fix reading and writing a serialized persistent ESYS_TR handles. This
+occurs becuase the TPM2_HANDLE is never set after loading and decisions
+are made on it.
+
+Fixes:
+tpm2_readpublic -t handle2.tr -c handle.tr
+ERROR: Can only output a serialized handle for persistent object handles
+ERROR: Unable to run tpm2_readpublic
+
+Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
+---
+ lib/object.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/object.c b/lib/object.c
+index c186a820..1279a8e5 100644
+--- a/lib/object.c
++++ b/lib/object.c
+@@ -15,7 +15,18 @@ static tool_rc do_ctx_file(ESYS_CONTEXT *ctx, const char *objectstr, FILE *f,
+     /* assign a dummy transient handle */
+     outobject->handle = TPM2_TRANSIENT_FIRST;
+     outobject->path = objectstr;
+-    return files_load_tpm_context_from_file(ctx, &outobject->tr_handle, f);
++    tool_rc rc = files_load_tpm_context_from_file(ctx, &outobject->tr_handle, f);
++    if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
++        return rc;
++    }
++
++    TSS2_RC rval = Esys_TR_GetTpmHandle(ctx, outobject->tr_handle, &outobject->handle);
++    if (rval != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
++        LOG_ERR("Failed to acquire SAPI handle");
++        return tool_rc_general_error;
++    }
++
++    return tool_rc_success;
+ }
+ 
+ static tool_rc tpm2_util_object_load2(ESYS_CONTEXT *ctx, const char *objectstr,
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0014-fix-wrong-function-name-of-Esys_Load.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
+From f1515918ebba36a540432425f7cd01ca3c44aaac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: yuxiaojun <yuxiaojun@uniontech.com>
+Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 11:47:40 +0800
+Subject: [PATCH 14/17] fix:wrong function name of "Esys_Load"
+
+LOG_PERR(Eys_Load, rval);
+The first parameter in the function should be Esys_Load.
+
+Signed-off-by: yuxiaojun <yuxiaojun@uniontech.com>
+---
+ lib/tpm2.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2.c b/lib/tpm2.c
+index d91072ae..27f101e9 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2.c
+@@ -1921,7 +1921,7 @@ tpm2_load_free_name1:
+             parent_object_session_handle, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, in_private,
+             in_public, object_handle);
+     if (rval != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+-        LOG_PERR(Eys_Load, rval);
++        LOG_PERR(Esys_Load, rval);
+         return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
+     }
+ 
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0015-tpm-errata-switch-to-twos-complement.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
+From 510d570d9c4f34d4768af3453dcfcc4f74006e32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2023 14:02:33 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 15/17] tpm errata: switch to twos-complement.
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Errata TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Revision 1.59 Version 1.4,
+Section 2.5 TPM_EO – two’s complement states:
+"The signed arithmetic operations are performed using twos-complement."
+The tests policynv and policycountertimer were adapted to work with the
+complement representation of signed numbers. If the tests return the error 0x126
+the test will be skipped.
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ .../tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh         | 35 +++++++--
+ test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh      | 75 +++++++++++++------
+ 2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh b/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh
+index 58fcf1b9..80afc541 100644
+--- a/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh
++++ b/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh
+@@ -11,6 +11,27 @@ cleanup() {
+   fi
+ }
+ 
++call_policy_countertimer () {
++    trap - ERR
++    output=$(tpm2 policycountertimer $@ 2>&1)
++    result=$?
++
++    if [ $result != 0 ] && echo $output | grep "ErrorCode.*0126" > /dev/null
++    then
++        echo "This test failed due to a TPM bug regarding signed comparison as described"
++        echo "in TCG's Errata for TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Revision 1.59 Version 1.4,"
++        echo "Section 2.5 TPM_EO – two’s complement"
++        tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
++        skip_test
++    else
++        if [ $result != 0 ]; then
++            tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
++            exit 1
++        fi
++    fi
++    trap onerror ERR
++}
++
+ trap cleanup EXIT
+ 
+ start_up
+@@ -25,8 +46,7 @@ tpm2 clear
+ #
+ tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx
+ 
+-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx -L policy.countertimer.minute --ult \
+-60000
++call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx -L policy.countertimer.minute --ult 60000
+ 
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ 
+@@ -42,8 +62,7 @@ tpm2 create -Q -u key.pub -r key.priv -i- -C prim.ctx \
+ #
+ tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
+ 
+-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx -L policy.countertimer.minute --ult \
+-60000
++call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx -L policy.countertimer.minute --ult 60000
+ 
+ tpm2 unseal -c key.ctx -p session:session.ctx
+ 
+@@ -54,7 +73,7 @@ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ #
+ tpm2 clear
+ tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
+-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx --ult clock=60000
++call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx --ult clock=60000
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ 
+ #
+@@ -63,7 +82,7 @@ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ #
+ tpm2 clear
+ tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
+-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx safe
++call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx safe
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ 
+ #
+@@ -72,7 +91,7 @@ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ #
+ tpm2 clear
+ tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
+-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx resets=0
++call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx resets=0
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ 
+ #
+@@ -81,7 +100,7 @@ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ #
+ tpm2 clear
+ tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
+-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx restarts=0
++call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx restarts=0
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ 
+ exit 0
+diff --git a/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh b/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh
+index b75cabb8..220edec0 100644
+--- a/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh
++++ b/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh
+@@ -36,10 +36,34 @@ evaluate_failing_test_case() {
+ }
+ 
+ evaluate_passing_test_case() {
+-  tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
+-  echo $operandB | xxd -r -p | \
+-  tpm2 policynv -S session.ctx -i- -P nvpass $nv_test_index $1
+-  tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
++    tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
++    if [[ ${1:0:1} == "s" ]]; then
++        echo "Test sign: $1 $operandA $operandB"
++        # check whether sign compare fails with 0x126
++        trap - ERR
++        output=$(echo $operandB | xxd -r -p | \
++                     tpm2 policynv -S session.ctx -i- -P nvpass $nv_test_index $1 2>&1)
++        result=$?
++        if [ $result != 0 ] && echo $output | grep "ErrorCode.*0126" > /dev/null
++        then
++            echo "This test failed due to a TPM bug regarding signed comparison as described"
++            echo "in TCG's Errata for TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Revision 1.59 Version 1.4,"
++            echo "Section 2.5 TPM_EO – two’s complement"
++            tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
++            skip_test
++        else
++            if [ $result != 0 ]; then
++                tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
++                exit 1
++            fi
++        fi
++        tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
++        trap onerror ERR
++    else
++        echo $operandB | xxd -r -p | \
++            tpm2 policynv -S session.ctx -i- -P nvpass $nv_test_index $1
++        tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
++    fi
+ }
+ 
+ trap cleanup EXIT
+@@ -70,40 +94,20 @@ evaluate_passing_test_case eq
+ operandB=0x80
+ evaluate_passing_test_case neq
+ 
+-# Perform comparison operation "sgt"
+-operandB=0x82
+-evaluate_passing_test_case sgt
+-
+ # Perform comparison operation "ugt"
+ operandB=0x80
+ evaluate_passing_test_case ugt
+ 
+-# Perform comparison operation "slt"
+-operandB=0x80
+-evaluate_passing_test_case slt
+-
+ # Perform comparison operation "ult"
+ operandB=0x82
+ evaluate_passing_test_case ult
+ 
+-# Perform comparison operation "sge"
+-operandB=0x82
+-evaluate_passing_test_case sge
+-operandB=0x81
+-evaluate_passing_test_case sge
+-
+ # Perform comparison operation "uge"
+ operandB=0x80
+ evaluate_passing_test_case uge
+ operandB=0x81
+ evaluate_passing_test_case uge
+ 
+-# Perform comparison operation "sle"
+-operandB=0x80
+-evaluate_passing_test_case sle
+-operandB=0x81
+-evaluate_passing_test_case sle
+-
+ # Perform comparison operation "ule"
+ operandB=0x82
+ evaluate_passing_test_case ule
+@@ -118,4 +122,27 @@ evaluate_passing_test_case bs
+ operandB=0x7E
+ evaluate_passing_test_case bc
+ 
++operandA=0xfe # -1
++echo $operandA | xxd -r -p | tpm2 nvwrite -P nvpass -i- $nv_test_index
++
++# Perform comparison operation "sgt"
++operandB=0xfd # -2
++evaluate_passing_test_case sgt
++
++# Perform comparison operation "slt"
++operandB=0xff # 0
++evaluate_passing_test_case slt
++
++# Perform comparison operation "sle"
++operandB=0xff #0
++evaluate_passing_test_case sle
++operandB=0xfe # -1
++evaluate_passing_test_case sle
++
++# Perform comparison operation "sge"
++operandB=0xfd # -2
++evaluate_passing_test_case sge
++operandB=0xfe # -1
++evaluate_passing_test_case sge
++
+ exit 0
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0016-tpm2_eventlog.c-Fix-pcr-extension-for-EV_NO_ACTION.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
+From 2f6a737efddce480803c02a5e3b65ce739c6acf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 17:29:36 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 16/17] tpm2_eventlog.c Fix pcr extension for EV_NO_ACTION
+
+EV_NO_ACTION events should not be extended to PCR registers.
+Fixes: #3224
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_eventlog.c            | 14 +++++++++-----
+ lib/tpm2_eventlog.h            |  2 +-
+ test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c | 15 ++++++++-------
+ 3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog.c b/lib/tpm2_eventlog.c
+index 1b59eeeb..e2e27f02 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog.c
+@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ bool digest2_accumulator_callback(TCG_DIGEST2 const *digest, size_t size,
+  * hold the digest. The size of the digest is passed to the callback in the
+  * 'size' parameter.
+  */
+-bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, unsigned pcr_index, TCG_DIGEST2 const *digest, size_t count, size_t size) {
++bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, UINT32 eventType, unsigned pcr_index,
++                     TCG_DIGEST2 const *digest, size_t count, size_t size) {
+ 
+     if (digest == NULL) {
+         LOG_ERR("digest cannot be NULL");
+@@ -80,7 +81,8 @@ bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, unsigned pcr_index, TCG_DIGEST2
+             LOG_WARN("PCR%d algorithm %d unsupported", pcr_index, alg);
+         }
+ 
+-        if (pcr && !tpm2_openssl_pcr_extend(alg, pcr, digest->Digest, alg_size)) {
++        if (eventType != EV_NO_ACTION && pcr &&
++            !tpm2_openssl_pcr_extend(alg, pcr, digest->Digest, alg_size)) {
+             LOG_ERR("PCR%d extend failed", pcr_index);
+             return false;
+         }
+@@ -179,7 +181,8 @@ bool parse_event2(TCG_EVENT_HEADER2 const *eventhdr, size_t buf_size,
+         .data = digests_size,
+         .digest2_cb = digest2_accumulator_callback,
+     };
+-    ret = foreach_digest2(&ctx, eventhdr->PCRIndex,
++    ret = foreach_digest2(&ctx, eventhdr->EventType,
++                          eventhdr->PCRIndex, 
+                           eventhdr->Digests, eventhdr->DigestCount,
+                           buf_size - sizeof(*eventhdr));
+     if (ret != true) {
+@@ -216,7 +219,7 @@ bool parse_sha1_log_event(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, TCG_EVENT const *event, si
+     *event_size = sizeof(*event);
+ 
+     pcr = ctx->sha1_pcrs[ event->pcrIndex];
+-    if (pcr) {
++    if (event->eventType != EV_NO_ACTION && pcr) {
+         tpm2_openssl_pcr_extend(TPM2_ALG_SHA1, pcr, &event->digest[0], 20);
+         ctx->sha1_used |= (1 << event->pcrIndex);
+     }
+@@ -451,7 +454,8 @@ bool foreach_event2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, TCG_EVENT_HEADER2 const *eventhd
+         }
+ 
+         /* digest callback foreach digest */
+-        ret = foreach_digest2(ctx, eventhdr->PCRIndex, eventhdr->Digests, eventhdr->DigestCount, digests_size);
++        ret = foreach_digest2(ctx, eventhdr->EventType, eventhdr->PCRIndex,
++                              eventhdr->Digests, eventhdr->DigestCount, digests_size);
+         if (ret != true) {
+             return false;
+         }
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog.h b/lib/tpm2_eventlog.h
+index 2a91ed60..f141e806 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog.h
++++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog.h
+@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ bool digest2_accumulator_callback(TCG_DIGEST2 const *digest, size_t size,
+                                   void *data);
+ 
+ bool parse_event2body(TCG_EVENT2 const *event, UINT32 type);
+-bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, unsigned pcr_index,
++bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, UINT32 eventType, unsigned pcr_index,
+                      TCG_DIGEST2 const *event_hdr, size_t count, size_t size);
+ bool parse_event2(TCG_EVENT_HEADER2 const *eventhdr, size_t buf_size,
+                   size_t *event_size, size_t *digests_size);
+diff --git a/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c b/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c
+index ebf50e80..e48404d8 100644
+--- a/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c
++++ b/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c
+@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2_null(void **state){
+     (void)state;
+     tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = {0};
+ 
+-    assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, NULL, 0, sizeof(TCG_DIGEST2)));
++    assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, NULL, 0, sizeof(TCG_DIGEST2)));
+ }
+ static void test_foreach_digest2_size(void **state) {
+ 
+@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2_size(void **state) {
+     TCG_DIGEST2 *digest = (TCG_DIGEST2*)buf;
+     tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = { .digest2_cb = foreach_digest2_test_callback };
+ 
+-    assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, digest, 1, sizeof(TCG_DIGEST2) - 1));
++    assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, digest, 1, sizeof(TCG_DIGEST2) - 1));
+ }
+ static void test_foreach_digest2(void **state) {
+ 
+@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2(void **state) {
+     will_return(foreach_digest2_test_callback, true);
+ 
+     tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = { .digest2_cb = foreach_digest2_test_callback };
+-    assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
++    assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
+ }
+ static void test_foreach_digest2_cbnull(void **state){
+ 
+@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2_cbnull(void **state){
+     TCG_DIGEST2* digest = (TCG_DIGEST2*)buf;
+ 
+     tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = {0};
+-    assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
++    assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
+ }
+ static void test_sha1(void **state){
+ 
+@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static void test_sha1(void **state){
+     memcpy(digest->Digest, "the magic words are:", TPM2_SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ 
+     tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = {0};
+-    assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, pcr_index, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
++    assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, pcr_index, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
+     assert_memory_equal(ctx.sha1_pcrs[pcr_index], sha1sum, sizeof(sha1sum));
+ }
+ static void test_sha256(void **state){
+@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void test_sha256(void **state){
+     memcpy(digest->Digest, "The Magic Words are Squeamish Ossifrage, for RSA-129 (from 1977)", TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ 
+     tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = {0};
+-    assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, pcr_index, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA256_SIZE));
++    assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, pcr_index, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA256_SIZE));
+     assert_memory_equal(ctx.sha256_pcrs[pcr_index], sha256sum, sizeof(sha256sum));
+ }
+ static void test_foreach_digest2_cbfail(void **state){
+@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2_cbfail(void **state){
+     will_return(foreach_digest2_test_callback, false);
+ 
+     tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = { .digest2_cb = foreach_digest2_test_callback };
+-    assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
++    assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
+ }
+ static void test_digest2_accumulator_callback(void **state) {
+ 
+@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ static void test_foreach_event2_parse_event2body_fail(void **state){
+ 
+     eventhdr->DigestCount = 1;
+     eventhdr->EventType = EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT;
++    eventhdr->PCRIndex = 0;
+     digest->AlgorithmId = TPM2_ALG_SHA1;
+     event->EventSize = 1;
+ 
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0017-kdfa.c-Fix-problem-with-FORTIFY_SOURCE-on-Fedora.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
+From 72b6a5497df8757987dfedd6263346154adb921e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:16:05 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 17/17] kdfa.c Fix problem with FORTIFY_SOURCE on Fedora
+
+The original kdfa implementation did produce an error caused by the flags
+-flto -_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 on Fedora rawhide.
+This error can be avoided by switching off the optimization with pragma.
+Fixes: #3210.
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_kdfa.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_kdfa.c b/lib/tpm2_kdfa.c
+index 5eb8d558..e97c06f6 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_kdfa.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_kdfa.c
+@@ -13,6 +13,15 @@
+ #include "tpm2_kdfa.h"
+ #include "tpm2_openssl.h"
+ 
++/*
++ * Disable optimization because of an error in FORTIFY_SOURCE
++ */
++ 
++#ifdef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
++#pragma GCC push_options
++#pragma GCC optimize ("O0")
++#endif
++
+ TSS2_RC tpm2_kdfa(TPMI_ALG_HASH hash_alg, TPM2B *key, char *label,
+         TPM2B *context_u, TPM2B *context_v, UINT16 bits,
+         TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *result_key) {
+@@ -139,3 +148,13 @@ err:
+ 
+     return rval;
+ }
++#ifdef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
++
++#endif
++
++#ifdef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
++#pragma GCC pop_options
++#endif
++
++
++
+-- 
+2.40.1
+

SOURCES/0019-build-Use-hardcoded-version-variable.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+From 395651f059ceb21d56c44cddda05e055caa0fd19 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?=C5=A0t=C4=9Bp=C3=A1n=20Hor=C3=A1=C4=8Dek?=
+ <shoracek@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 18 Oct 2021 19:04:54 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] build: Use hardcoded version variable
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Before this commit the version was generated from git tag/commit hash.
+This caused problems with having empty version variable while building
+outside of git. Fix this by hardcoding the variable.
+
+Signed-off-by: Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com>
+---
+ configure.ac | 3 +--
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 9561fa86..2bf3a790 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -1,5 +1,4 @@
+-AC_INIT([tpm2-tools],
+-    [m4_esyscmd_s([git describe --tags --always --dirty])])
++AC_INIT([tpm2-tools], [5.2])
+ AC_CONFIG_MACRO_DIR([m4])
+ 
+ AX_IS_RELEASE([dash-version])
+-- 
+2.31.1
+

SOURCES/add_pregenerated_doc.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
+diff --git a/man/man1/tpm2_encodeobject.1 b/man/man1/tpm2_encodeobject.1
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..9b616bb0
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/man/man1/tpm2_encodeobject.1
+@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
++.\" Automatically generated by Pandoc 2.5
++.\"
++.TH "tpm2_encodeobject" "1" "" "tpm2\-tools" "General Commands Manual"
++.hy
++.SH NAME
++.PP
++\f[B]tpm2_encodeobject\f[R](1) \- Encode an object into a combined PEM
++format.
++.SH SYNOPSIS
++.PP
++\f[B]tpm2_encodeobject\f[R] [\f[I]OPTIONS\f[R]]
++.SH DESCRIPTION
++.PP
++\f[B]tpm2_encodeobject\f[R](1) \- Encode both the private and public
++portions of an object into a combined PEM format used by
++tpm2\-tss\-engine.
++.PP
++The tool reads private and public portions of an object and encodes it
++into a combined PEM format used by tpm2\-tss\-engine and other
++applications.
++.PP
++\f[B]NOTE\f[R]: Both private and public portions of the tpm key must be
++specified.
++.SH OPTIONS
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-C\f[R], \f[B]\-\-parent\-context\f[R]=\f[I]OBJECT\f[R]:
++.RS 2
++.PP
++The parent object.
++.RE
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-P\f[R], \f[B]\-\-auth\f[R]=\f[I]AUTH\f[R]:
++.RS 2
++.PP
++The authorization value of the parent object specified by \f[B]\-C\f[R].
++.RE
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-u\f[R], \f[B]\-\-public\f[R]=\f[I]FILE\f[R]:
++.RS 2
++.PP
++A file containing the public portion of the object.
++.RE
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-r\f[R], \f[B]\-\-private\f[R]=\f[I]FILE\f[R]:
++.RS 2
++.PP
++A file containing the sensitive portion of the object.
++.RE
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-p\f[R], \f[B]\-\-key\-auth\f[R]:
++.RS 2
++.PP
++Indicates if an authorization value is needed for the object specified
++by \f[B]\-r\f[R] and \f[B]\-u\f[R].
++.RE
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-o\f[R], \f[B]\-\-output\f[R]=\f[I]FILE\f[R]:
++.RS 2
++.PP
++The output file path, recording the public portion of the object.
++.RE
++.SS References
++.SH Context Object Format
++.PP
++The type of a context object, whether it is a handle or file name, is
++determined according to the following logic \f[I]in\-order\f[R]:
++.IP \[bu] 2
++If the argument is a file path, then the file is loaded as a restored
++TPM transient object.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++If the argument is a \f[I]prefix\f[R] match on one of:
++.RS 2
++.IP \[bu] 2
++owner: the owner hierarchy
++.IP \[bu] 2
++platform: the platform hierarchy
++.IP \[bu] 2
++endorsement: the endorsement hierarchy
++.IP \[bu] 2
++lockout: the lockout control persistent object
++.RE
++.IP \[bu] 2
++If the argument argument can be loaded as a number it will be treat as a
++handle, e.g.\ 0x81010013 and used directly._OBJECT_.
++.SH Authorization Formatting
++.PP
++Authorization for use of an object in TPM2.0 can come in 3 different
++forms: 1.
++Password 2.
++HMAC 3.
++Sessions
++.PP
++\f[B]NOTE:\f[R] \[lq]Authorizations default to the \f[B]EMPTY
++PASSWORD\f[R] when not specified\[rq].
++.SS Passwords
++.PP
++Passwords are interpreted in the following forms below using prefix
++identifiers.
++.PP
++\f[B]Note\f[R]: By default passwords are assumed to be in the string
++form when they do not have a prefix.
++.SS String
++.PP
++A string password, specified by prefix \[lq]str:\[rq] or it\[cq]s
++absence (raw string without prefix) is not interpreted, and is directly
++used for authorization.
++.SS Examples
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++foobar
++str:foobar
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.SS Hex\-string
++.PP
++A hex\-string password, specified by prefix \[lq]hex:\[rq] is converted
++from a hexidecimal form into a byte array form, thus allowing passwords
++with non\-printable and/or terminal un\-friendly characters.
++.SS Example
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++hex:1122334455667788
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.SS File
++.PP
++A file based password, specified be prefix \[lq]file:\[rq] should be the
++path of a file containing the password to be read by the tool or a
++\[lq]\-\[rq] to use stdin.
++Storing passwords in files prevents information leakage, passwords
++passed as options can be read from the process list or common shell
++history features.
++.SS Examples
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++# to use stdin and be prompted
++file:\-
++
++# to use a file from a path
++file:path/to/password/file
++
++# to echo a password via stdin:
++echo foobar | tpm2_tool \-p file:\-
++
++# to use a bash here\-string via stdin:
++
++tpm2_tool \-p file:\- <<< foobar
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.SS Sessions
++.PP
++When using a policy session to authorize the use of an object, prefix
++the option argument with the \f[I]session\f[R] keyword.
++Then indicate a path to a session file that was created with
++tpm2_startauthsession(1).
++Optionally, if the session requires an auth value to be sent with the
++session handle (eg policy password), then append a + and a string as
++described in the \f[B]Passwords\f[R] section.
++.SS Examples
++.PP
++To use a session context file called \f[I]session.ctx\f[R].
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++session:session.ctx
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.PP
++To use a session context file called \f[I]session.ctx\f[R] \f[B]AND\f[R]
++send the authvalue mypassword.
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++session:session.ctx+mypassword
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.PP
++To use a session context file called \f[I]session.ctx\f[R] \f[B]AND\f[R]
++send the \f[I]HEX\f[R] authvalue 0x11223344.
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++session:session.ctx+hex:11223344
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.SS PCR Authorizations
++.PP
++You can satisfy a PCR policy using the \[lq]pcr:\[rq] prefix and the PCR
++minilanguage.
++The PCR minilanguage is as follows:
++\f[C]<pcr\-spec>=<raw\-pcr\-file>\f[R]
++.PP
++The PCR spec is documented in in the section \[lq]PCR bank
++specifiers\[rq].
++.PP
++The \f[C]raw\-pcr\-file\f[R] is an \f[B]optional\f[R] argument that
++contains the output of the raw PCR contents as returned by
++\f[I]tpm2_pcrread(1)\f[R].
++.PP
++PCR bank specifiers (pcr.md)
++.SS Examples
++.PP
++To satisfy a PCR policy of sha256 on banks 0, 1, 2 and 3 use a specifier
++of:
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++pcr:sha256:0,1,2,3
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.PP
++specifying \f[I]AUTH\f[R].
++.SH COMMON OPTIONS
++.PP
++This collection of options are common to many programs and provide
++information that many users may expect.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-h\f[R], \f[B]\-\-help=[man|no\-man]\f[R]: Display the tools
++manpage.
++By default, it attempts to invoke the manpager for the tool, however, on
++failure will output a short tool summary.
++This is the same behavior if the \[lq]man\[rq] option argument is
++specified, however if explicit \[lq]man\[rq] is requested, the tool will
++provide errors from man on stderr.
++If the \[lq]no\-man\[rq] option if specified, or the manpager fails, the
++short options will be output to stdout.
++.RS 2
++.PP
++To successfully use the manpages feature requires the manpages to be
++installed or on \f[I]MANPATH\f[R], See man(1) for more details.
++.RE
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-v\f[R], \f[B]\-\-version\f[R]: Display version information for
++this tool, supported tctis and exit.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-V\f[R], \f[B]\-\-verbose\f[R]: Increase the information that the
++tool prints to the console during its execution.
++When using this option the file and line number are printed.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-Q\f[R], \f[B]\-\-quiet\f[R]: Silence normal tool output to
++stdout.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]\-Z\f[R], \f[B]\-\-enable\-errata\f[R]: Enable the application of
++errata fixups.
++Useful if an errata fixup needs to be applied to commands sent to the
++TPM.
++Defining the environment TPM2TOOLS_ENABLE_ERRATA is equivalent.
++information many users may expect.
++.SH TCTI Configuration
++.PP
++The TCTI or \[lq]Transmission Interface\[rq] is the communication
++mechanism with the TPM.
++TCTIs can be changed for communication with TPMs across different
++mediums.
++.PP
++To control the TCTI, the tools respect:
++.IP "1." 3
++The command line option \f[B]\-T\f[R] or \f[B]\-\-tcti\f[R]
++.IP "2." 3
++The environment variable: \f[I]TPM2TOOLS_TCTI\f[R].
++.PP
++\f[B]Note:\f[R] The command line option always overrides the environment
++variable.
++.PP
++The current known TCTIs are:
++.IP \[bu] 2
++tabrmd \- The resource manager, called
++tabrmd (https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-abrmd).
++Note that tabrmd and abrmd as a tcti name are synonymous.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++mssim \- Typically used for communicating to the TPM software simulator.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++device \- Used when talking directly to a TPM device file.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++none \- Do not initalize a connection with the TPM.
++Some tools allow for off\-tpm options and thus support not using a TCTI.
++Tools that do not support it will error when attempted to be used
++without a TCTI connection.
++Does not support \f[I]ANY\f[R] options and \f[I]MUST BE\f[R] presented
++as the exact text of \[lq]none\[rq].
++.PP
++The arguments to either the command line option or the environment
++variable are in the form:
++.PP
++\f[C]<tcti\-name>:<tcti\-option\-config>\f[R]
++.PP
++Specifying an empty string for either the \f[C]<tcti\-name>\f[R] or
++\f[C]<tcti\-option\-config>\f[R] results in the default being used for
++that portion respectively.
++.SS TCTI Defaults
++.PP
++When a TCTI is not specified, the default TCTI is searched for using
++\f[I]dlopen(3)\f[R] semantics.
++The tools will search for \f[I]tabrmd\f[R], \f[I]device\f[R] and
++\f[I]mssim\f[R] TCTIs \f[B]IN THAT ORDER\f[R] and \f[B]USE THE FIRST ONE
++FOUND\f[R].
++You can query what TCTI will be chosen as the default by using the
++\f[B]\-v\f[R] option to print the version information.
++The \[lq]default\-tcti\[rq] key\-value pair will indicate which of the
++aforementioned TCTIs is the default.
++.SS Custom TCTIs
++.PP
++Any TCTI that implements the dynamic TCTI interface can be loaded.
++The tools internally use \f[I]dlopen(3)\f[R], and the raw
++\f[I]tcti\-name\f[R] value is used for the lookup.
++Thus, this could be a path to the shared library, or a library name as
++understood by \f[I]dlopen(3)\f[R] semantics.
++.SH TCTI OPTIONS
++.PP
++This collection of options are used to configure the various known TCTI
++modules available:
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]device\f[R]: For the device TCTI, the TPM character device file for
++use by the device TCTI can be specified.
++The default is \f[I]/dev/tpm0\f[R].
++.RS 2
++.PP
++Example: \f[B]\-T device:/dev/tpm0\f[R] or \f[B]export
++\f[BI]TPM2TOOLS_TCTI\f[B]=\[lq]device:/dev/tpm0\[rq]\f[R]
++.RE
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]mssim\f[R]: For the mssim TCTI, the domain name or IP address and
++port number used by the simulator can be specified.
++The default are 127.0.0.1 and 2321.
++.RS 2
++.PP
++Example: \f[B]\-T mssim:host=localhost,port=2321\f[R] or \f[B]export
++\f[BI]TPM2TOOLS_TCTI\f[B]=\[lq]mssim:host=localhost,port=2321\[rq]\f[R]
++.RE
++.IP \[bu] 2
++\f[B]abrmd\f[R]: For the abrmd TCTI, the configuration string format is
++a series of simple key value pairs separated by a `,' character.
++Each key and value string are separated by a `=' character.
++.RS 2
++.IP \[bu] 2
++TCTI abrmd supports two keys:
++.RS 2
++.IP "1." 3
++`bus_name' : The name of the tabrmd service on the bus (a string).
++.IP "2." 3
++`bus_type' : The type of the dbus instance (a string) limited to
++`session' and `system'.
++.RE
++.PP
++Specify the tabrmd tcti name and a config string of
++\f[C]bus_name=com.example.FooBar\f[R]:
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++\[rs]\-\-tcti=tabrmd:bus_name=com.example.FooBar
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.PP
++Specify the default (abrmd) tcti and a config string of
++\f[C]bus_type=session\f[R]:
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++\[rs]\-\-tcti:bus_type=session
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.PP
++\f[B]NOTE\f[R]: abrmd and tabrmd are synonymous.
++the various known TCTI modules.
++.RE
++.SH EXAMPLES
++.SS Setup
++.PP
++To load an object you first must create an object under a primary
++object.
++So the first step is to create the primary object.
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++tpm2_createprimary \-c primary.ctx
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.PP
++Step 2 is to create an object under the primary object.
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++tpm2_create \-C primary.ctx \-u key.pub \-r key.priv \-f pem \-o pub.pem
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.PP
++This creates the private and public portions of the TPM object.
++With these object portions, it is now possible to load that object into
++the TPM for subsequent use.
++.SS Encoding an Object into a combined PEM format
++.PP
++The final step, is encoding the public and private portions of the
++object into a PEM format.
++.IP
++.nf
++\f[C]
++tpm2_encodeobject \-C primary.ctx \-u key.pub \-r key.priv \-o priv.pem
++\f[R]
++.fi
++.PP
++The generated \f[C]priv.pem\f[R] can be used together with
++\f[C]pub.pem\f[R] created in the step 2 of Setup section.
++.SH Returns
++.PP
++Tools can return any of the following codes:
++.IP \[bu] 2
++0 \- Success.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++1 \- General non\-specific error.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++2 \- Options handling error.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++3 \- Authentication error.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++4 \- TCTI related error.
++.IP \[bu] 2
++5 \- Non supported scheme.
++Applicable to tpm2_testparams.
++.SH BUGS
++.PP
++Github Issues (https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/issues)
++.SH HELP
++.PP
++See the Mailing
++List (https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/tpm2)

SOURCES/test-fixup.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,12 @@
+diff -ur tpm2-tools-5.2/test/integration/helpers.sh tpm2-tools-5.2-new/test/integration/helpers.sh
+--- tpm2-tools-5.2/test/integration/helpers.sh	2021-08-23 09:47:20.000000000 -0700
++++ tpm2-tools-5.2-new/test/integration/helpers.sh	2022-05-31 16:06:07.939025537 -0700
+@@ -409,7 +409,7 @@
+         echo "Starting tpm2-abrmd"
+         # Start tpm2-abrmd
+         start_abrmd || exit 1
+-        run_startup=false
++        # run_startup=false
+     else
+         echo "not starting abrmd"
+     fi

SPECS/tpm2-tools.spec

@@ -1,31 +1,55 @@
-Name: tpm2-tools
+#global candidate rc2
-Version: 4.1.1
+
-Release: 5%{?dist}
+Name:    tpm2-tools
-Summary: A TPM2.0 testing tool build upon TPM2.0-TSS
+Version: 5.2
+Release: 4%{?candidate:.%{candidate}}%{?dist}
+Summary: A bunch of TPM testing toolS build upon tpm2-tss
 
 License: BSD
 URL:     https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools
-Source0: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/releases/download/%{version}/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
+Source0: https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/releases/download/%{version}%{?candidate:-%{candidate}}/%{name}-%{version}%{?candidate:-%{candidate}}.tar.gz
-Patch0:  0001-tpm2_hierarchycontrol-Fixed-bug-where-hierarchycontr.patch
+Patch0: 0019-build-Use-hardcoded-version-variable.patch
-Patch1:  0001-tpm2_nvdefine.c-Fixed-error-reporting-message.patch
+Patch1: test-fixup.patch
-Patch2:  0001-tpm2_policyor-Silent-failure-bug-fix-for-invalid-uns.patch
+Patch2: 0001-testparms-fix-condition-for-negative-test.patch
-Patch3:  0001-tpm2_alg_util.c-fix-a-bug-where-the-string-rsa3072-w.patch
+Patch3: 0001-lib-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-use-char16_t-for-UEFI-charact.patch
-Patch4:  0001-Fix-ESYS_TR-hierarchy-transition.patch
+Patch4: 0002-Patch-set-for-handling-of-new-event-types-in-tpm2_ev.patch
-Patch5:  0001-Refactor-fix_esys_hierarchies.patch
+Patch5: 0003-Code-clarity-fix-for-calculation-of-data-member-addr.patch
-Patch6:  0001-tpm2_create.c-Fix-an-issue-where-userwithauth-attr-c.patch
+Patch6: 0004-tpm2_eventlog-clean-up-some-magic-numbers.patch
-Patch7:  0001-tpm2_getekcertificate-add-default-web-address.patch
+Patch7: 0005-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-fix-malformed-YAML-for-EV_IPL-dat.patch
-Patch8:  0001-lib-files-fix-an-error-message-in-files_load_-name.patch
+Patch8: 0006-test-track-expected-YAML-output-for-eventlog.patch
-Patch9:  0001-tpm2_policy.c-restrict-policy-digest-size.patch
+Patch9: 0007-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-fix-parsing-for-MokListTrusted.patch
-Patch10: 0001-tpm2_policycountertimer-Fix-an-issue-where-operandB-.patch
+Patch10: 0008-tests-add-eventlog-for-parsing-MokListTrusted.patch
-Patch11: 0001-tools-tpm2_nvcertify.c-Fix-incompatible-pointer-cast.patch
+Patch11: 0009-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-use-defines-for-Unicode-variables.patch
-Patch12: 0001-tools-tpm2_nvreadpublic-Fix-resource-leak.patch
+Patch101: 0001-Fix-nv_readpublic.patch
-Patch13: 0001-lib-files.c-Fix-an-issue-where-execution-could-not-r.patch
+Patch102: 0002-tpm2_encodeobject-New-tool-to-encode-TPM2-object.patch
-Patch14: 0001-tpm2_import-fix-fixed-AES-key-CVE-2021-3565.patch
+Patch103: 0003-tools-tpm2_evictconrol-fix-for-call-to-Esys_TR_Close.patch
+Patch104: 0004-Fix-argument-parsing-in-tpm2_policylocality.patch
+Patch105: 0005-tools-tpm2_tool.c-Fix-an-issue-where-LOG_WARN-is-alw.patch
+Patch106: 0006-import-fix-bug-on-using-scheme.patch
+Patch107: 0007-tpm2_policyor-fix-unallocated-policy-list.patch
+Patch108: 0008-lib-tpm2_alg_util.c-Fix-potential-null-pointer-deref.patch
+Patch109: 0009-tss2_provision-fix-usage-of-L-parameter.patch
+Patch110: 0010-tpm2_encodeobject-fix-formatting.patch
+Patch111: 0011-tpm2_encodeobject-fix-auth-boolean-flag.patch
+Patch112: 0012-bugfix-fix-convert-sm2-public-key-in-openssl3.patch
+Patch113: 0013-readpublic-fix-reading-and-writing-serialized-trs.patch
+Patch114: 0014-fix-wrong-function-name-of-Esys_Load.patch
+Patch115: 0015-tpm-errata-switch-to-twos-complement.patch
+Patch116: 0016-tpm2_eventlog.c-Fix-pcr-extension-for-EV_NO_ACTION.patch
+Patch117: 0017-kdfa.c-Fix-problem-with-FORTIFY_SOURCE-on-Fedora.patch
+Patch118: add_pregenerated_doc.patch
+Patch201: 0001-tpm2_sessionconfig-fix-usage-of-disable-continuesess.patch
+Patch202: 0002-tpm2_tool.c-Fix-missing-include-for-basename.patch
+Patch203: 0003-tpm2_nvread-fix-input-handling-no-nv-index.patch
+Patch204: 0004-tpm2_checkquote-Add-comparison-of-pcr-selection.patch
+Patch205: 0005-tpm2_checkquote-Fix-check-of-magic-number.patch
+Patch206: 0006-tpm2_setprimarypolicy-Fix-resource-leak.patch
 
+BuildRequires: git
+BuildRequires: make
 BuildRequires: gcc-c++
 BuildRequires: libtool
 BuildRequires: autoconf-archive
-BuildRequires: pandoc
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(cmocka)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libcurl)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(openssl)
@@ -33,94 +57,182 @@ BuildRequires: pkgconfig(openssl)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(tss2-mu)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(tss2-sys)
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(tss2-esys)
+BuildRequires: pkgconfig(uuid)
 
 # tpm2-tools is heavily depending on TPM2.0-TSS project, matched tss is required
-Requires: tpm2-tss%{?_isa} >= 2.3.2-1%{?dist}
+Requires: tpm2-tss%{?_isa} >= 2.3.1
-
-# tpm2-tools project changed the install path for binaries and man page section
-Obsoletes: tpm2-tools <= 2.1.1-2
 
 %description
-tpm2-tools is a batch of testing tools for tpm2.0. It is based on tpm2-tss.
+tpm2-tools is a batch of tools for tpm2.0. It is based on tpm2-tss.
 
 %prep
-%autosetup -p1 -n %{name}-%{version}
+%autosetup -S git -p1 -n %{name}-%{version}%{?candidate:-%{candidate}}
 
 %build
-%configure --prefix=/usr --disable-static --disable-silent-rules
+autoreconf -i
+# LTO exposes a latent uninitialized variable "value" in the function # "nt".
+# This has been reported to the maintainer (Yunying), but they have not
+# responded and I am not comfortable enough with the code to know if a trivial
+# initialization to zero is appropriate/safe.  So LTO is disabled for now.
+%define _lto_cflags %{nil}
+%configure --prefix=/usr --disable-static --disable-silent-rules CFLAGS="%{optflags} -Wno-error=deprecated-declarations"
 %make_build
 
 %install
 %make_install
 
 %files
-%doc README.md CHANGELOG.md
+%license doc/LICENSE
-%license LICENSE
+%doc doc/README.md doc/CHANGELOG.md
+%{_bindir}/tpm2
 %{_bindir}/tpm2_*
+%{_bindir}/tss2
+%{_bindir}/tss2_*
 %{_datadir}/bash-completion/completions/tpm2*
+%{_datadir}/bash-completion/completions/tss2*
 %{_mandir}/man1/tpm2_*.1.gz
+%{_mandir}/man1/tpm2.1.gz
+%{_mandir}/man1/tss2_*.1.gz
 
 %changelog
-* Mon Aug 09 2021 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 4.1.1-5
+* Wed Jun 19 2024 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.2-4
-- Bump nvr to trigger osci.
+- Backport upstream fixes.
-resolves: rhbz#1965981
+- tpm2_checkquote: Fix check of magic number. (CVE-2024-29038)
+- tpm2_checkquote: Add comparison of pcr selection. (CVE-2024-29039)
+- Fix check of magic number.
+  Resolves: RHEL-23198
+  Resolves: RHEL-41031
+  Resolves: RHEL-41035
 
-* Tue Jun 01 2021 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 4.1.1-4
+* Wed May 24 2023 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.2-3
-- Fix CVE-2021-3565
+- Backport fixes.
-resolves: rhbz#1965981
+- Add tpm2_encodeobject tool.
+  Resolves: rhbz#2160304
+  Resolves: rhbz#2047342
 
-* Fri May 14 2021 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 4.1.1-3
+* Wed Oct 19 2022 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.2-2
-- Fix resource leak.
+- Fix eventlog output.
-- Fix to restrict policy digest size.
+  Resolves: rhbz#2136215
-- Fix incompatible pointer cast.
-- Fix error message in files_load_##name
-- Fix issue where execution couldn't reach function return.
-resolves: rhbz#1920821
 
-* Mon Nov 16 2020 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 4.1.1-2
+* Tue May 31 2022 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 5.2-1
-- Fix ESYS_TR hierarchy transition.
+- Rebase to 5.2 release.
-- Refactor fix_esys_hierarchies to return actual TSS2_RC return code.
+Resolves: rhbz#2090748
-- tpm2_alg_util.c: fix a bug where the string rsa3072 wasn't being parsed.
-- tpm2_create.c: Fix an issue where userwithauth attr cleared if policy specified.
-- tpm2_hierarchycontrol: Fix bug where hierarchycontrol operation failed silently.
-- tpm2_nvdefine.c: Fix error reporting message.
-- tpm2_policyor: Fix silent failure for invalid/unspecified policy digest alg.
-resolves: rhbz#1854774
 
-* Wed Apr 29 2020 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 4.1.1-1
+* Mon Oct 25 2021 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.0-10
-- Update to 4.1.1 release
+- Fix the version not being reported
-resolves: rhbz#1789682
+  Resolves: rhbz#2015941
 
-* Tue Oct 22 2019 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 3.2.1-1
+* Fri Oct 1 2021 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.0-9
-- Update to 3.2.1 release
+- Fix a segfault on ppc64le and add support for OpenSSL 3
-resolves: rhbz#1725714
+  Resolves: rhbz#1989617
 
-* Tue May 28 2019 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 3.1.4-5
+* Tue Aug 10 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 5.0-8
-- Another dependency needed for CI gating
+- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
-resolves: rhbz#1682417
+  Related: rhbz#1991688
 
-* Tue May 28 2019 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 3.1.4-4
+* Mon Jun 28 2021 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 5.0-7
-- Fix CI dependency
+- Fix for CVE-2021-3565
-resolves: rhbz#1682417
+Resolves: rhbz#1965982
 
-* Tue May 28 2019 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 3.1.4-3
+* Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 5.0-6
-- Add CI gating test
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
-resolves: rhbz#1682417
+  Related: rhbz#1971065
 
-* Tue May 14 2019 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 3.1.4-2
+* Mon May 24 2021 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 5.0-5
-- Add initial CI gating support
+- Remove pandoc dependency. Related: rhbz#1943528
-resolves: rhbz#1682417
 
-* Tue Apr 30 2019 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 3.1.4-1
+* Wed May 19 2021 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 5.0-4
-- Rebase to 3.1.4 release.
+- Work around for openssl 3.0 update. Related: rhbz#1958029
-resolves: rhbz#1664498
 
-* Thu Nov 08 2018 Jerry Snitselaar <jsnitsel@redhat.com> - 3.1.1-4
+* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 5.0-3
-- lib/tpm2_options: restore TCTI configuration environment variables
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
-- tpm2_getcap: restore tool output to print properties with TPM_PT prefix
-resolves: rhbz#1648001
 
-* Sat Jul 14 2018 Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> - - 3.1.1-3
+* Wed Jan 27 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 5.0-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Nov 23 2020 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> - 5.0-1
+- Update tp tpm2-tools 5.0
+
+* Sat Aug 29 2020 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> - 4.3.0-1
+- Update to 4.3.0
+
+* Mon Aug 10 2020 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> - 4.2.1-4
+- Rebuild for tpm2-tss 3.0
+
+* Wed Jul 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.2.1-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jun 30 2020 Jeff Law <law@redhat.com> - 4.2.1-2
+- Disable LTO due to latent uninitialized variable exposed by LTO
+
+* Wed May 27 2020 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> - 4.2.1-1
+- Update to 4.2.1
+
+* Tue Apr 14 2020 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> - 4.2-1
+- Update to 4.2
+
+* Fri Jan 31 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 4.1-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Nov 28 2019 Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com> - 4.1-1
+- Update to 4.1 release
+
+* Tue Oct 29 2019 Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com> - 4.0.1-1
+- Update to 4.0.1 release
+
+* Tue Sep 10 2019 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 4.0-1
+- Update to 4.0
+
+* Fri Sep  6 2019 Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> 4.0-0.4-rc2
+- Use a release tarball instead of a source code tarball
+
+* Fri Sep  6 2019 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 4.0-0.3-rc2
+- Update to 4.0 RC2
+
+* Tue Aug 27 2019 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 4.0-0.2-rc1
+- Update to 4.0 RC1
+
+* Tue Aug 20 2019 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 4.0-0.1-rc0
+- Update to 4.0 RC0
+
+* Thu Aug  1 2019 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 3.2.0-3
+- Fix for crash for max PCRs available
+
+* Sat Jul 27 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.2.0-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jun 21 2019 Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com> - 3.2.0-1
+- Update to 3.2.0 release
+- Removed patches since all have been included in 3.2.0 release
+
+* Fri May 10 2019 Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> - 3.1.4-2
+- Allow tpm2_makecredential to run without a TPM (jetwhiz)
+- Add tpm2_pcrreset and tpm2_checkquote tools (jetwhiz)
+
+* Fri Mar 15 2019 Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com> - 3.1.4-1
+- Update to 3.1.4 release
+- Removed the 4 patches since all have been included in 3.1.4 release
+
+* Sun Feb 03 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.1.3-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jan 7 2019 Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-3
+- Fix broken -T option when passing additional arguments
+
+* Mon Jan 7 2019 Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> - 3.1.3-2
+- Fix broken -T option and a couple of minor fixes
+- Add pandoc BuildRequires
+
+* Wed Nov 7 2018 Yunying Sun <yunying.sun@intel.com> - 3.1.3-1
+- Update to 3.1.3 release
+
+* Wed Sep 12 2018 Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> - 3.1.2-1
+- Update to 3.1.2 release
+- Restore TCTI configuration environment for tools
+- Restore tpm2_getcap tool properties output
+  Resolves: rhbz#1625647
+
+* Sat Jul 14 2018 Javier Martinez Canillas <javierm@redhat.com> - 3.1.1-3
 - Revert backward incompatible change that removes default object attributes
 
 * Sat Jul 14 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 3.1.1-2