import CS tpm2-tools-5.2-4.el9

SOURCES/0001-tpm2_sessionconfig-fix-usage-of-disable-continuesess.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,131 @@
+From c2dff7cfac16a857fcd5161d6e171483221ab003 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Sun, 17 Dec 2023 09:53:01 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] tpm2_sessionconfig fix usage of --disable-continuesession
+
+Conflicts: context change due to missing 6169d8c22
+
+If continue session was disabled a error did occur in the function for
+restoring the session context.
+Now after usage of an session with continue session disabled the
+context will not be saved and the session context file will be
+deleted.
+In one integration test continue session is now disabled and the
+flush for this session is removed.
+
+Fixes: #3295
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ lib/tpm2_session.c               | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++++---------
+ test/integration/tests/unseal.sh |  7 +++--
+ 2 files changed, 37 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/tpm2_session.c b/lib/tpm2_session.c
+index 60b8643b..3e5503db 100644
+--- a/lib/tpm2_session.c
++++ b/lib/tpm2_session.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ struct tpm2_session {
+         char *path;
+         ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx;
+         bool is_final;
++        bool delete;
+     } internal;
+ };
+ 
+@@ -290,18 +291,23 @@ tool_rc tpm2_session_restore(ESYS_CONTEXT *ctx, const char *path, bool is_final,
+     dup_path = NULL;
+ 
+     TPMA_SESSION attrs = 0;
++    s->internal.delete = false;
++    s->internal.is_final = is_final;
++    *session = s;
+ 
+     if (ctx) {
+-
+         /* hack this in here, should be done when starting the session */
+         tmp_rc = tpm2_sess_get_attributes(ctx, handle, &attrs);
+-        UNUSED(tmp_rc);
++        if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
++            rc = tmp_rc;
++            LOG_ERR("Can't get session attributes.");
++            goto out;
++        }
++        if ((attrs & TPMA_SESSION_CONTINUESESSION) == 0) {
++            s->internal.delete = true;
++        }
+     }
+ 
+-    s->internal.is_final = is_final;
+-
+-    *session = s;
+-
+     LOG_INFO("Restored session: ESYS_TR(0x%x) attrs(0x%x)", handle, attrs);
+ 
+     rc = tool_rc_success;
+@@ -341,22 +347,35 @@ tool_rc tpm2_session_close(tpm2_session **s) {
+     }
+ 
+     const char *path = session->internal.path;
+-    FILE *session_file = path ? fopen(path, "w+b") : NULL;
+-    if (path && !session_file) {
+-        LOG_ERR("Could not open path \"%s\", due to error: \"%s\"", path,
+-                strerror(errno));
+-        rc = tool_rc_general_error;
+-        goto out;
+-    }
+ 
+     bool flush = path ? session->internal.is_final : true;
+     if (flush) {
+         rc = tpm2_flush_context(session->internal.ectx,
+                 session->output.session_handle);
+         /* done, use rc to indicate status */
++        goto out2;
++    }
++
++    if ((*s)->internal.delete && path) {
++        if (remove(path)) {
++            LOG_ERR("File \"%s\" can't be deleted.", path);
++            rc = tool_rc_general_error;
++            goto out2;
++        } else {
++            rc = tool_rc_success;
++            goto out2;
++        }
++    }
++
++    FILE *session_file = path ? fopen(path, "w+b") : NULL;
++    if (path && !session_file) {
++        LOG_ERR("Could not open path \"%s\", due to error: \"%s\"", path,
++                strerror(errno));
++        rc = tool_rc_general_error;
+         goto out;
+     }
+ 
++
+     /*
+      * Now write the session_type, handle and auth hash data to disk
+      */
+diff --git a/test/integration/tests/unseal.sh b/test/integration/tests/unseal.sh
+index dd6c2bc6..d0f7104f 100644
+--- a/test/integration/tests/unseal.sh
++++ b/test/integration/tests/unseal.sh
+@@ -152,10 +152,13 @@ tpm2 sessionconfig enc_session.ctx --disable-encrypt
+ tpm2 create -Q -C prim.ctx -u seal_key.pub -r seal_key.priv -c seal_key.ctx \
+ -p sealkeypass -i- <<< $secret -S enc_session.ctx
+ 
+-tpm2 sessionconfig enc_session.ctx --enable-encrypt
++tpm2 sessionconfig enc_session.ctx --enable-encrypt --disable-continuesession
+ unsealed=`tpm2 unseal -c seal_key.ctx -p sealkeypass -S enc_session.ctx`
+ test "$unsealed" == "$secret"
+ 
+-tpm2 flushcontext enc_session.ctx
++if [ -e enc_session.ctx ]; then
++    echo "enc_session.ctx was not deleted.";
++    exit 1
++fi
+ 
+ exit 0
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0002-tpm2_tool.c-Fix-missing-include-for-basename.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From 2e4d5da9a5e8808b1b075e0bde11c13fdd4c60b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Tue, 19 Dec 2023 17:24:26 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] tpm2_tool.c Fix missing include for basename.
+
+tpm2_tool.c did not compile without the include libgen.h on netbsd.
+Fixes: #3321
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ tools/tpm2_tool.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_tool.c b/tools/tpm2_tool.c
+index edd04c83..f59e316a 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_tool.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_tool.c
+@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@
+ #include <stdbool.h>
+ #include <stdlib.h>
+ #include <string.h>
++#include <libgen.h>
+ 
+ #include <openssl/err.h>
+ #include <openssl/evp.h>
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0003-tpm2_nvread-fix-input-handling-no-nv-index.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From 5b5dd6263f1f2d41f08abd60134396a12756c5e7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Bill Roberts <bill.c.roberts+gh@gmail.com>
+Date: Sun, 10 Dec 2023 10:26:33 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] tpm2_nvread: fix input handling no nv index
+
+Fixes:
+./tools/tpm2 nvread
+WARN: Reading full size of the NV index
+ERROR: object string is empty
+ERROR: Invalid handle authorization.
+ERROR: Unable to run nvread
+
+with:
+./tools/tpm2 nvread
+ERROR: Must specify NV index argument
+Usage: nvread [<options>] <arguments>
+Where <options> are:
+    [ -C | --hierarchy=<value>] [ -o | --output=<value>] [ -s | --size=<value>] [ --offset=<value>]
+    [ --cphash=<value>] [ --rphash=<value>] [ -n | --name=<value>] [ -P | --auth=<value>]
+    [ -S | --session=<value>] [ --print-yaml]
+
+Signed-off-by: Bill Roberts <bill.c.roberts+gh@gmail.com>
+---
+ tools/tpm2_nvread.c | 9 ++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_nvread.c b/tools/tpm2_nvread.c
+index f64d00c1..8f9c61cc 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_nvread.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_nvread.c
+@@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ struct tpm_nvread_ctx {
+     TPM2B_NAME precalc_nvname;
+     UINT32 size_to_read;
+     UINT32 offset;
++    bool nv_specified;
+ 
+     /*
+      * Outputs
+@@ -192,6 +193,11 @@ static tool_rc check_options(tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+         return tool_rc_option_error;
+     }
+ 
++    if(!ctx.nv_specified) {
++        LOG_ERR("Must specify NV index argument");
++        return tool_rc_option_error;
++    }
++
+     /*
+      * Peculiar to this and some other tools, the object (nvindex) name must
+      * be specified when only calculating the cpHash.
+@@ -266,7 +272,8 @@ static bool on_arg(int argc, char **argv) {
+     if (!ctx.auth_hierarchy.ctx_path) {
+         ctx.auth_hierarchy.ctx_path = argv[0];
+     }
+-    return on_arg_nv_index(argc, argv, &ctx.nv_index);
++
++    return ctx.nv_specified = on_arg_nv_index(argc, argv, &ctx.nv_index);
+ }
+ 
+ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0004-tpm2_checkquote-Add-comparison-of-pcr-selection.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,86 @@
+From 7076608db4b8a2cdcab6ff4bc47c23c935618e3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Tue, 5 Mar 2024 22:11:38 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] tpm2_checkquote: Add comparison of pcr selection.
+
+The pcr selection which is passed with the --pcr parameter it not
+compared with the attest. So it's possible to fake a valid
+attestation.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2024-29039
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Signed-off-by: Andreas Fuchs <andreas.fuchs@infineon.com>
+---
+ tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
+ 1 file changed, 40 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
+index 6ce086f8..8a2a154e 100644
+--- a/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
++++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
+@@ -54,6 +54,37 @@ static tpm2_verifysig_ctx ctx = {
+         .pcr_hash = TPM2B_TYPE_INIT(TPM2B_DIGEST, buffer),
+ };
+ 
++static bool compare_pcr_selection(TPML_PCR_SELECTION *attest_sel, TPML_PCR_SELECTION *pcr_sel) {
++    if (attest_sel->count != pcr_sel->count) {
++        LOG_ERR("Selection sizes do not match.");
++        return false;
++    }
++    for (uint32_t i = 0; i < attest_sel->count; i++) {
++        for (uint32_t j = 0; j < pcr_sel->count; j++) {
++            if (attest_sel->pcrSelections[i].hash ==
++                pcr_sel->pcrSelections[j].hash) {
++                if (attest_sel->pcrSelections[i].sizeofSelect !=
++                        pcr_sel->pcrSelections[j].sizeofSelect) {
++                    LOG_ERR("Bitmask size does not match");
++                    return false;
++                }
++                if (memcmp(&attest_sel->pcrSelections[i].pcrSelect[0],
++                           &pcr_sel->pcrSelections[j].pcrSelect[0],
++                           attest_sel->pcrSelections[i].sizeofSelect) != 0) {
++                    LOG_ERR("Selection bitmasks do not match");
++                    return false;
++                }
++                break;
++            }
++            if (j == pcr_sel->count - 1) {
++                LOG_ERR("Hash selections to not match.");
++                return false;
++            }
++        }
++    }
++    return true;
++}
++
+ static bool verify(void) {
+ 
+     bool result = false;
+@@ -374,7 +405,7 @@ static tool_rc init(void) {
+     }
+ 
+     TPM2B_ATTEST *msg = NULL;
+-    TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_select;
++    TPML_PCR_SELECTION pcr_select = { 0 };
+     tpm2_pcrs *pcrs;
+     tpm2_pcrs temp_pcrs = {};
+     tool_rc return_value = tool_rc_general_error;
+@@ -537,6 +568,14 @@ static tool_rc init(void) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    if (ctx.flags.pcr) {
++        if (!compare_pcr_selection(&ctx.attest.attested.quote.pcrSelect,
++                                   &pcr_select)) {
++            LOG_ERR("PCR selection does not match PCR slection from attest!");
++            goto err;
++        }
++    }
++
+     // Figure out the digest for this message
+     res = tpm2_openssl_hash_compute_data(ctx.halg, msg->attestationData,
+             msg->size, &ctx.msg_hash);
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0005-tpm2_checkquote-Fix-check-of-magic-number.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
+From 0f122ba3f7bdee12f8ee725db41d90e737fb3e49 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+Date: Tue, 31 Oct 2023 11:29:50 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] tpm2_checkquote: Fix check of magic number.
+
+It was not checked whether the magic number in the
+attest is equal to TPM2_GENERATED_VALUE.
+So an malicious attacker could generate arbitrary quote data
+which was not detected by tpm2 checkquote.
+
+Fixes: CVE-2024-29038
+
+Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
+---
+ tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c | 7 +++++++
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
+index 8a2a154e..5083d855 100644
+--- a/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
++++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c
+@@ -146,6 +146,13 @@ static bool verify(void) {
+         goto err;
+     }
+ 
++    // check magic
++    if (ctx.attest.magic != TPM2_GENERATED_VALUE) {
++        LOG_ERR("Bad magic, got: 0x%x, expected: 0x%x",
++                ctx.attest.magic, TPM2_GENERATED_VALUE);
++        return false;
++    }
++
+     // Also ensure digest from quote matches PCR digest
+     if (ctx.flags.pcr) {
+         if (!tpm2_util_verify_digests(&ctx.attest.attested.quote.pcrDigest,
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SOURCES/0006-tpm2_setprimarypolicy-Fix-resource-leak.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
+From d7c541d839d6c470fbd273d0c482091a1fe59fe6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: rpm-build <rpm-build>
+Date: Tue, 18 Jun 2024 15:42:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] tpm2_setprimarypolicy: Fix resource leak
+MIME-Version: 1.0
+Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
+Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
+
+Signed-off-by: Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com>
+---
+ tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c | 1 +
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
+
+diff --git a/tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c b/tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c
+index 140a8083..459d3d03 100644
+--- a/tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c
++++ b/tools/tpm2_setprimarypolicy.c
+@@ -134,6 +134,7 @@ static tool_rc process_setprimarypolicy_input(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx,
+                 (*auth_policy)->buffer, &((*auth_policy)->size));
+         if (!result) {
+             LOG_ERR("Failed loading policy digest from path");
++            free(*auth_policy);
+             return tool_rc_general_error;
+         }
+     }
+-- 
+2.45.2
+

SPECS/tpm2-tools.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:    tpm2-tools
 Version: 5.2
-Release: 3%{?candidate:.%{candidate}}%{?dist}
+Release: 4%{?candidate:.%{candidate}}%{?dist}
 Summary: A bunch of TPM testing toolS build upon tpm2-tss
 
 License: BSD
@@ -38,6 +38,12 @@ Patch115: 0015-tpm-errata-switch-to-twos-complement.patch
 Patch116: 0016-tpm2_eventlog.c-Fix-pcr-extension-for-EV_NO_ACTION.patch
 Patch117: 0017-kdfa.c-Fix-problem-with-FORTIFY_SOURCE-on-Fedora.patch
 Patch118: add_pregenerated_doc.patch
+Patch201: 0001-tpm2_sessionconfig-fix-usage-of-disable-continuesess.patch
+Patch202: 0002-tpm2_tool.c-Fix-missing-include-for-basename.patch
+Patch203: 0003-tpm2_nvread-fix-input-handling-no-nv-index.patch
+Patch204: 0004-tpm2_checkquote-Add-comparison-of-pcr-selection.patch
+Patch205: 0005-tpm2_checkquote-Fix-check-of-magic-number.patch
+Patch206: 0006-tpm2_setprimarypolicy-Fix-resource-leak.patch
 
 BuildRequires: git
 BuildRequires: make
@@ -89,6 +95,15 @@ autoreconf -i
 %{_mandir}/man1/tss2_*.1.gz
 
 %changelog
+* Wed Jun 19 2024 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.2-4
+- Backport upstream fixes.
+- tpm2_checkquote: Fix check of magic number. (CVE-2024-29038)
+- tpm2_checkquote: Add comparison of pcr selection. (CVE-2024-29039)
+- Fix check of magic number.
+  Resolves: RHEL-23198
+  Resolves: RHEL-41031
+  Resolves: RHEL-41035
+
 * Wed May 24 2023 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.2-3
 - Backport fixes.
 - Add tpm2_encodeobject tool.