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eabdullin 2024-05-15 09:03:00 +00:00
parent 041e39d64d
commit 1d9f48fcab
19 changed files with 2052 additions and 1 deletions
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62
SOURCES/0001-Fix-nv_readpublic.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 4dffb4295392f69f00003b2879f60bd36076f22d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
Date: Tue, 7 Dec 2021 13:21:58 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 01/17] Fix nv_readpublic
Based on 4af3e6b4 tpm2_nvreadpublic: Add option to output cpHash
---
lib/tpm2.c | 11 +++++++++--
lib/tpm2_nv_util.h | 14 +-------------
2 files changed, 10 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/tpm2.c b/lib/tpm2.c
index 4ee27c8c..d91072ae 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2.c
+++ b/lib/tpm2.c
@@ -101,9 +101,16 @@ tool_rc tpm2_close(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context, ESYS_TR *rsrc_handle) {
tool_rc tpm2_nv_readpublic(ESYS_CONTEXT *esys_context, ESYS_TR nv_index,
TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC **nv_public, TPM2B_NAME **nv_name) {
- TSS2_RC rval = Esys_NV_ReadPublic(esys_context, nv_index,
- ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, nv_public, nv_name);
+ ESYS_TR esys_tr_nv_index;
+ TSS2_RC rval = Esys_TR_FromTPMPublic(esys_context, nv_index, ESYS_TR_NONE,
+ ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, &esys_tr_nv_index);
+ if (rval != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+ LOG_PERR(Esys_TR_FromTPMPublic, rval);
+ return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
+ }
+ rval = Esys_NV_ReadPublic(esys_context, esys_tr_nv_index,
+ ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, nv_public, nv_name);
if (rval != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS) {
LOG_PERR(Esys_NV_ReadPublic, rval);
return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
diff --git a/lib/tpm2_nv_util.h b/lib/tpm2_nv_util.h
index 99843156..daf8b624 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2_nv_util.h
+++ b/lib/tpm2_nv_util.h
@@ -28,19 +28,7 @@
static inline tool_rc tpm2_util_nv_read_public(ESYS_CONTEXT *context,
TPMI_RH_NV_INDEX nv_index, TPM2B_NV_PUBLIC **nv_public) {
- ESYS_TR tr_object;
- tool_rc rc = tpm2_from_tpm_public(context, nv_index, ESYS_TR_NONE,
- ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, &tr_object);
- if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
- return rc;
- }
-
- rc = tpm2_nv_readpublic(context, tr_object, nv_public, NULL);
- tool_rc tmp_rc = tpm2_close(context, &tr_object);
- if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
- rc = tmp_rc;
- }
- return rc;
+ return tpm2_nv_readpublic(context, nv_index, nv_public, 0);
}
/**
--
2.40.1

385
SOURCES/0002-tpm2_encodeobject-New-tool-to-encode-TPM2-object.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,385 @@
From ba7682dc511f4ef6bbb8a15ca3bb0edf67ec39ce Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
Date: Fri, 17 Sep 2021 07:14:20 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 02/17] tpm2_encodeobject: New tool to encode TPM2 object
This adds a new tool tpm2_encodeobject in tools/misc. It takes
public and private portions of an object and encode them in a combined
PEM form used by tpm2-tss-engine and other applications.
Signed-off-by: Daiki Ueno <ueno@gnu.org>
---
Makefile.am | 2 +
man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md | 92 +++++++++++++
tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c | 240 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 334 insertions(+)
create mode 100644 man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
create mode 100644 tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index 71322159..e1a51ebf 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -103,6 +103,7 @@ tools_tpm2_SOURCES = \
tpm2_tools = \
tools/misc/tpm2_certifyX509certutil.c \
tools/misc/tpm2_checkquote.c \
+ tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c \
tools/misc/tpm2_eventlog.c \
tools/misc/tpm2_print.c \
tools/misc/tpm2_rc_decode.c \
@@ -376,6 +377,7 @@ if HAVE_MAN_PAGES
man/man1/tpm2_createprimary.1 \
man/man1/tpm2_dictionarylockout.1 \
man/man1/tpm2_duplicate.1 \
+ man/man1/tpm2_encodeobject.1 \
man/man1/tpm2_getcap.1 \
man/man1/tpm2_encryptdecrypt.1 \
man/man1/tpm2_eventlog.1 \
diff --git a/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md b/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..791eafbd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
@@ -0,0 +1,92 @@
+% tpm2_encodeobject(1) tpm2-tools | General Commands Manual
+
+# NAME
+
+**tpm2_encodeobject**(1) - Encode an object into a combined PEM format.
+
+# SYNOPSIS
+
+**tpm2_encodeobject** [*OPTIONS*]
+
+# DESCRIPTION
+
+**tpm2_encodeobject**(1) - Encode both the private and public portions of an
+object into a combined PEM format used by tpm2-tss-engine.
+
+The tool reads private and public portions of an object and encodes it
+into a combined PEM format used by tpm2-tss-engine and other
+applications.
+
+**NOTE**: Both private and public portions of the tpm key must be specified.
+
+# OPTIONS
+
+ * **-C**, **\--parent-context**=_OBJECT_:
+
+ The parent object.
+
+ * **-P**, **\--auth**=_AUTH_:
+
+ The authorization value of the parent object specified by **-C**.
+
+ * **-u**, **\--public**=_FILE_:
+
+ A file containing the public portion of the object.
+
+ * **-r**, **\--private**=_FILE_:
+
+ A file containing the sensitive portion of the object.
+
+ * **-o**, **\--output**=_FILE_:
+
+ The output file path, recording the public portion of the object.
+
+## References
+
+[context object format](common/ctxobj.md) details the methods for specifying
+_OBJECT_.
+
+[authorization formatting](common/authorizations.md) details the methods for
+specifying _AUTH_.
+
+[common options](common/options.md) collection of common options that provide
+information many users may expect.
+
+[common tcti options](common/tcti.md) collection of options used to configure
+the various known TCTI modules.
+
+# EXAMPLES
+
+## Setup
+To load an object you first must create an object under a primary object. So the
+first step is to create the primary object.
+
+```bash
+tpm2_createprimary -c primary.ctx
+```
+
+Step 2 is to create an object under the primary object.
+
+```bash
+tpm2_create -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -f pem -o pub.pem
+```
+
+This creates the private and public portions of the TPM object. With these
+object portions, it is now possible to load that object into the TPM for
+subsequent use.
+
+## Encoding an Object into a combined PEM format
+
+The final step, is encoding the public and private portions of the object into a
+PEM format.
+
+```bash
+tpm2_encodeobject -C primary.ctx -u key.pub -r key.priv -c priv.pem
+```
+
+The generated `priv.pem` can be used together with `pub.pem` created in the
+step 2 of Setup section.
+
+[returns](common/returns.md)
+
+[footer](common/footer.md)
diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..2341c3a1
--- /dev/null
+++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
@@ -0,0 +1,240 @@
+/* SPDX-License-Identifier: BSD-3-Clause */
+
+/*
+ * Part of this file is copied from tpm2-tss-engine.
+ *
+ * Copyright 2017-2018, Fraunhofer SIT sponsored by Infineon Technologies AG
+ * All rights reserved.
+ * Copyright (c) 2019, Wind River Systems.
+ * All rights reserved.
+ */
+
+#include <inttypes.h>
+#include <stdbool.h>
+#include <stdio.h>
+#include <string.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1.h>
+#include <openssl/asn1t.h>
+#include <openssl/pem.h>
+#include <tss2/tss2_mu.h>
+
+#include "files.h"
+#include "log.h"
+#include "tpm2.h"
+#include "tpm2_options.h"
+#include "tpm2_tool.h"
+
+#define OID_loadableKey "2.23.133.10.1.3"
+
+typedef struct {
+ ASN1_OBJECT *type;
+ ASN1_BOOLEAN emptyAuth;
+ ASN1_INTEGER *parent;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *pubkey;
+ ASN1_OCTET_STRING *privkey;
+} TSSPRIVKEY;
+
+DECLARE_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(TSSPRIVKEY);
+DECLARE_PEM_write_bio(TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY);
+
+ASN1_SEQUENCE(TSSPRIVKEY) = {
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, type, ASN1_OBJECT),
+ ASN1_EXP_OPT(TSSPRIVKEY, emptyAuth, ASN1_BOOLEAN, 0),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, parent, ASN1_INTEGER),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, pubkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING),
+ ASN1_SIMPLE(TSSPRIVKEY, privkey, ASN1_OCTET_STRING)
+} ASN1_SEQUENCE_END(TSSPRIVKEY)
+
+#define TSSPRIVKEY_PEM_STRING "TSS2 PRIVATE KEY"
+
+IMPLEMENT_ASN1_FUNCTIONS(TSSPRIVKEY);
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_write_bio(TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY_PEM_STRING, TSSPRIVKEY);
+IMPLEMENT_PEM_read_bio(TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY, TSSPRIVKEY_PEM_STRING, TSSPRIVKEY);
+
+typedef struct tpm_encodeobject_ctx tpm_encodeobject_ctx;
+struct tpm_encodeobject_ctx {
+ struct {
+ const char *ctx_path;
+ const char *auth_str;
+ tpm2_loaded_object object;
+ } parent;
+
+ struct {
+ const char *pubpath;
+ TPM2B_PUBLIC public;
+ const char *privpath;
+ TPM2B_PRIVATE private;
+ ESYS_TR handle;
+ } object;
+
+ char *output_path;
+};
+
+static tpm_encodeobject_ctx ctx;
+
+static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
+ switch (key) {
+ case 'P':
+ ctx.parent.auth_str = value;
+ break;
+ case 'u':
+ ctx.object.pubpath = value;
+ break;
+ case 'r':
+ ctx.object.privpath = value;
+ break;
+ case 'C':
+ ctx.parent.ctx_path = value;
+ break;
+ case 'o':
+ ctx.output_path = value;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+static bool tpm2_tool_onstart(tpm2_options **opts) {
+ const struct option topts[] = {
+ { "auth", required_argument, NULL, 'P' },
+ { "public", required_argument, NULL, 'u' },
+ { "private", required_argument, NULL, 'r' },
+ { "parent-context", required_argument, NULL, 'C' },
+ { "output", required_argument, NULL, 'o' },
+ };
+
+ *opts = tpm2_options_new("P:u:r:C:o:", ARRAY_LEN(topts), topts, on_option,
+ NULL, 0);
+
+ return *opts != NULL;
+}
+
+static tool_rc check_opts(void) {
+ tool_rc rc = tool_rc_success;
+ if (!ctx.parent.ctx_path) {
+ LOG_ERR("Expected parent object via -C");
+ rc = tool_rc_option_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx.object.pubpath) {
+ LOG_ERR("Expected public object portion via -u");
+ rc = tool_rc_option_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx.object.privpath) {
+ LOG_ERR("Expected private object portion via -r");
+ rc = tool_rc_option_error;
+ }
+
+ if (!ctx.output_path) {
+ LOG_ERR("Expected output file path via -o");
+ rc = tool_rc_option_error;
+ }
+
+ return rc;
+}
+
+static tool_rc init(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx) {
+ bool res = files_load_public(ctx.object.pubpath, &ctx.object.public);
+ if (!res) {
+ return tool_rc_general_error;
+ }
+
+ res = files_load_private(ctx.object.privpath, &ctx.object.private);
+ if (!res) {
+ return tool_rc_general_error;
+ }
+
+ return tpm2_util_object_load_auth(ectx, ctx.parent.ctx_path,
+ ctx.parent.auth_str, &ctx.parent.object, false,
+ TPM2_HANDLE_ALL_W_NV);
+}
+
+static int
+encode(void)
+{
+ TSS2_RC rc;
+ BIO *bio = NULL;
+ TSSPRIVKEY *tpk = NULL;
+
+ uint8_t private_buf[sizeof(ctx.object.private)];
+ uint8_t public_buf[sizeof(ctx.object.public)];
+ size_t private_len = 0, public_len = 0;
+
+ rc = Tss2_MU_TPM2B_PRIVATE_Marshal(&ctx.object.private, private_buf,
+ sizeof(private_buf), &private_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ LOG_ERR("Error serializing private portion of object");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ rc = Tss2_MU_TPM2B_PUBLIC_Marshal(&ctx.object.public, public_buf,
+ sizeof(public_buf), &public_len);
+ if (rc) {
+ LOG_ERR("Error serializing public portion of object");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ tpk = TSSPRIVKEY_new();
+ if (!tpk) {
+ LOG_ERR("oom");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ tpk->type = OBJ_txt2obj(OID_loadableKey, 1);
+ tpk->parent = ASN1_INTEGER_new();
+ tpk->privkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ tpk->pubkey = ASN1_OCTET_STRING_new();
+ if (!tpk->type || !tpk->privkey || !tpk->pubkey || !tpk->parent) {
+ LOG_ERR("oom");
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ tpk->emptyAuth = ctx.parent.auth_str == NULL ? 0xFF : 0;
+
+ if ((ctx.parent.object.handle >> TPM2_HR_SHIFT) == TPM2_HT_PERSISTENT) {
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(tpk->parent, ctx.parent.object.handle);
+ } else {
+ /* Indicate that the parent is a primary object generated on the fly. */
+ ASN1_INTEGER_set(tpk->parent, TPM2_RH_OWNER);
+ }
+
+ ASN1_STRING_set(tpk->privkey, private_buf, private_len);
+ ASN1_STRING_set(tpk->pubkey, public_buf, public_len);
+
+ if ((bio = BIO_new_file(ctx.output_path, "w")) == NULL) {
+ LOG_ERR("Could not open file: \"%s\"", ctx.output_path);
+ goto error;
+ }
+
+ PEM_write_bio_TSSPRIVKEY(bio, tpk);
+ TSSPRIVKEY_free(tpk);
+ BIO_free(bio);
+
+ return tool_rc_success;
+ error:
+ if (bio)
+ BIO_free(bio);
+ if (tpk)
+ TSSPRIVKEY_free(tpk);
+ return tool_rc_general_error;
+}
+
+static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
+ UNUSED(flags);
+
+ tool_rc rc = check_opts();
+ if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ rc = init(ectx);
+ if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ return encode();
+}
+
+// Register this tool with tpm2_tool.c
+TPM2_TOOL_REGISTER("encodeobject", tpm2_tool_onstart, tpm2_tool_onrun, NULL, NULL)
--
2.40.1

104
SOURCES/0003-tools-tpm2_evictconrol-fix-for-call-to-Esys_TR_Close.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,104 @@
From be8b4cb178332f24fb06f30d3211a24ea3c9e632 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Sep 2021 11:24:31 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 03/17] tools/tpm2_evictconrol: fix for call to Esys_TR_Close
on bad handle
Fixes #2254
Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
---
tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c | 36 +++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c b/tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c
index 0ae4edc6..8199be39 100644
--- a/tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c
+++ b/tools/tpm2_evictcontrol.c
@@ -106,20 +106,18 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
bool evicted = false;
/* load up the object/handle to work on */
- tool_rc tmp_rc = tpm2_util_object_load(ectx, ctx.to_persist_key.ctx_path,
- &ctx.to_persist_key.object, TPM2_HANDLE_ALL_W_NV);
- if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
- rc = tmp_rc;
- goto out;
+ rc = tpm2_util_object_load(ectx, ctx.to_persist_key.ctx_path,
+ &ctx.to_persist_key.object, TPM2_HANDLE_ALL_W_NV);
+ if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+ return rc;
}
/* load up the auth hierarchy */
- tmp_rc = tpm2_util_object_load_auth(ectx, ctx.auth_hierarchy.ctx_path,
+ rc = tpm2_util_object_load_auth(ectx, ctx.auth_hierarchy.ctx_path,
ctx.auth_hierarchy.auth_str, &ctx.auth_hierarchy.object, false,
TPM2_HANDLE_FLAGS_O | TPM2_HANDLE_FLAGS_P);
- if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
- rc = tmp_rc;
- goto out;
+ if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+ return rc;
}
if (ctx.to_persist_key.object.handle >> TPM2_HR_SHIFT
@@ -136,11 +134,10 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
*/
if (ctx.flags.c && !ctx.flags.p) {
bool is_platform = ctx.auth_hierarchy.object.handle == TPM2_RH_PLATFORM;
- tmp_rc = tpm2_capability_find_vacant_persistent_handle(ectx,
+ rc = tpm2_capability_find_vacant_persistent_handle(ectx,
is_platform, &ctx.persist_handle);
- if (tmp_rc != tool_rc_success) {
- rc = tmp_rc;
- goto out;
+ if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+ return rc;
}
/* we searched and found a persistent handle, so mark that peristent handle valid */
ctx.flags.p = 1;
@@ -148,7 +145,7 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
if (ctx.flags.o && !ctx.flags.p) {
LOG_ERR("Cannot specify -o without using a persistent handle");
- goto out;
+ return tool_rc_option_error;
}
ESYS_TR out_tr;
@@ -175,7 +172,7 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
rc = tpm2_evictcontrol(ectx, &ctx.auth_hierarchy.object,
&ctx.to_persist_key.object, ctx.persist_handle, &out_tr, NULL);
if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
- goto out;
+ return rc;
}
/*
@@ -191,19 +188,16 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
evicted = out_tr == ESYS_TR_NONE;
tpm2_tool_output("persistent-handle: 0x%x\n", ctx.persist_handle);
tpm2_tool_output("action: %s\n", evicted ? "evicted" : "persisted");
-
+ tool_rc tmp_rc = tool_rc_success;
if (ctx.output_arg) {
- rc = files_save_ESYS_TR(ectx, out_tr, ctx.output_arg);
- } else {
- rc = tool_rc_success;
+ tmp_rc = files_save_ESYS_TR(ectx, out_tr, ctx.output_arg);
}
-out:
if (!evicted) {
rc = tpm2_close(ectx, &out_tr);
}
- return rc;
+ return (tmp_rc == tool_rc_success) ? rc : tmp_rc;
}
static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onstop(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx) {
--
2.40.1

45
SOURCES/0004-Fix-argument-parsing-in-tpm2_policylocality.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From f365a0adca8379ce89ff86fdf740082cf6a56f1b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen1033@gmail.com>
Date: Thu, 25 Nov 2021 12:41:52 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 04/17] Fix argument parsing in tpm2_policylocality
This patch fixes a bug that caused tpm2_policylocality to almost
always generate PolicyLocality(0).
There was a logical inversion that caused almost any argument
(including invalid ones) to be interpreted as zero, except "zero"
would be interpreted as one.
Signed-off-by: Tien-Ren Chen <trchen1033@gmail.com>
---
tools/tpm2_policylocality.c | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/tpm2_policylocality.c b/tools/tpm2_policylocality.c
index 81edbe65..b1d43d02 100644
--- a/tools/tpm2_policylocality.c
+++ b/tools/tpm2_policylocality.c
@@ -54,15 +54,15 @@ static bool on_arg(int argc, char **argv) {
return false;
}
- if (strcmp(argv[0], "zero")) {
+ if (strcmp(argv[0], "zero") == 0) {
ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_ZERO;
- } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "one")) {
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "one") == 0) {
ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_ONE;
- } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "two")) {
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "two") == 0) {
ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_TWO;
- } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "three")) {
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "three") == 0) {
ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_THREE;
- } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "four")) {
+ } else if (strcmp(argv[0], "four") == 0) {
ctx.locality = TPMA_LOCALITY_TPM2_LOC_FOUR;
} else {
bool result = tpm2_util_string_to_uint8(argv[0], &ctx.locality);
--
2.40.1

82
SOURCES/0005-tools-tpm2_tool.c-Fix-an-issue-where-LOG_WARN-is-alw.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,82 @@
From 221d8e557ab5a00246f7b09746377819cfbaec5e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
Date: Wed, 9 Mar 2022 10:24:45 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 05/17] tools/tpm2_tool.c: Fix an issue where LOG_WARN is
always displayed
Despite setting the 'quiet' flag with -Q the warning messages were
always displayed.
Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
---
lib/tpm2_options.c | 12 +++++++++---
tools/tpm2_makecredential.c | 9 ++++++---
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/tpm2_options.c b/lib/tpm2_options.c
index 8c8af2af..1238e440 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2_options.c
+++ b/lib/tpm2_options.c
@@ -456,12 +456,16 @@ tpm2_option_code tpm2_handle_options(int argc, char **argv,
/* tool doesn't request a sapi, don't initialize one */
if (flags->tcti_none && is_optional_sapi) {
- LOG_WARN("Tool optionally uses SAPI. Continuing with tcti=none");
+ if (!flags->quiet) {
+ LOG_WARN("Tool optionally uses SAPI. Continuing with tcti=none");
+ }
goto none;
}
if (flags->tcti_none && is_no_sapi) {
- LOG_WARN("Tool does not use SAPI. Continuing with tcti=none");
+ if (!flags->quiet) {
+ LOG_WARN("Tool does not use SAPI. Continuing with tcti=none");
+ }
goto none;
}
@@ -481,7 +485,9 @@ tpm2_option_code tpm2_handle_options(int argc, char **argv,
bool is_optional_fake_tcti = (flags->tcti_none && tool_opts &&
tool_opts->flags & TPM2_OPTIONS_OPTIONAL_SAPI_AND_FAKE_TCTI);
if (is_optional_fake_tcti) {
- LOG_WARN("Tool optionally uses SAPI. Continuing with tcti=fake");
+ if (!flags->quiet) {
+ LOG_WARN("Tool optionally uses SAPI. Continuing with tcti=fake");
+ }
*tcti = (TSS2_TCTI_CONTEXT *)&fake_tcti;
goto none;
}
diff --git a/tools/tpm2_makecredential.c b/tools/tpm2_makecredential.c
index 0b0fa123..5bd5b484 100644
--- a/tools/tpm2_makecredential.c
+++ b/tools/tpm2_makecredential.c
@@ -310,11 +310,14 @@ static void set_default_TCG_EK_template(TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC alg) {
ctx.public.publicArea.nameAlg = TPM2_ALG_SHA256;
}
-static tool_rc process_input(void) {
+static tool_rc process_input(tpm2_option_flags flags) {
TPMI_ALG_PUBLIC alg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
if (ctx.key_type) {
- LOG_WARN("Because **-G** is specified, assuming input encryption public key is in PEM format.");
+ if (!flags.quiet) {
+ LOG_WARN("Because **-G** is specified, assuming input encryption "
+ "public key is in PEM format.");
+ }
alg = tpm2_alg_util_from_optarg(ctx.key_type,
tpm2_alg_util_flags_asymmetric);
if (alg == TPM2_ALG_ERROR ||
@@ -379,7 +382,7 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
UNUSED(flags);
- tool_rc rc = process_input();
+ tool_rc rc = process_input(flags);
if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
return rc;
}
--
2.40.1

100
SOURCES/0006-import-fix-bug-on-using-scheme.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,100 @@
From acc82191f519f8bcdfcc0827faf024dcd2f56f78 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Date: Fri, 20 May 2022 10:49:04 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 06/17] import: fix bug on using scheme
When scheme is specified in the template, the openssl load functions
clobber the scheme value and set it to TPM2_ALG_NULL. Only set the
algorithm to NULL if zero value is specified.
Fixes: #2997
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
---
lib/tpm2_openssl.c | 24 ++++++++++++++++++------
test/integration/tests/import.sh | 13 +++++++++----
2 files changed, 27 insertions(+), 10 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/tpm2_openssl.c b/lib/tpm2_openssl.c
index 01bfc9ef..ad43c8e1 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2_openssl.c
+++ b/lib/tpm2_openssl.c
@@ -534,9 +534,15 @@ static bool load_public_RSA_from_key(EVP_PKEY *key, TPM2B_PUBLIC *pub) {
pt->type = TPM2_ALG_RSA;
TPMS_RSA_PARMS *rdetail = &pub->publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail;
- rdetail->scheme.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
- rdetail->symmetric.algorithm = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
- rdetail->scheme.details.anySig.hashAlg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+ /*
+ * If the scheme is not TPM2_ALG_ERROR (0),
+ * its a valid scheme so don't set it to NULL scheme
+ */
+ if (rdetail->scheme.scheme == TPM2_ALG_ERROR) {
+ rdetail->scheme.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+ rdetail->symmetric.algorithm = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+ rdetail->scheme.details.anySig.hashAlg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+ }
/* NULL out sym details */
TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *sym = &rdetail->symmetric;
@@ -809,9 +815,15 @@ static bool load_public_ECC_from_key(EVP_PKEY *key, TPM2B_PUBLIC *pub) {
* no kdf - not sure what this should be
*/
pp->kdf.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
- pp->scheme.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
- pp->symmetric.algorithm = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
- pp->scheme.details.anySig.hashAlg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+
+ /*
+ * If the scheme is not TPM2_ALG_ERROR (0),
+ * its a valid scheme so don't set it to NULL scheme
+ */
+ if (pp->scheme.scheme == TPM2_ALG_ERROR) {
+ pp->scheme.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+ pp->scheme.details.anySig.hashAlg = TPM2_ALG_NULL;
+ }
/* NULL out sym details */
TPMT_SYM_DEF_OBJECT *sym = &pp->symmetric;
diff --git a/test/integration/tests/import.sh b/test/integration/tests/import.sh
index 9f6a474e..9cb6096f 100644
--- a/test/integration/tests/import.sh
+++ b/test/integration/tests/import.sh
@@ -4,8 +4,8 @@ source helpers.sh
cleanup() {
rm -f import_key.ctx import_key.name import_key.priv import_key.pub \
- parent.ctx plain.dec.ssl plain.enc plain.txt sym.key import_rsa_key.pub \
- import_rsa_key.priv import_rsa_key.ctx import_rsa_key.name private.pem \
+ parent.ctx plain.dec.ssl plain.enc plain.txt sym.key import_rsa_key*.pub \
+ import_rsa_key*.priv import_rsa_key.ctx import_rsa_key.name private.pem \
public.pem plain.rsa.enc plain.rsa.dec public.pem data.in.raw \
data.in.digest data.out.signed ticket.out ecc.pub ecc.priv ecc.name \
ecc.ctx private.ecc.pem public.ecc.pem passfile aes.key policy.dat \
@@ -67,6 +67,10 @@ run_rsa_import_test() {
tpm2 import -Q -G rsa -g "$name_alg" -i private.pem -C $1 \
-u import_rsa_key.pub -r import_rsa_key.priv
+ # test in import with scheme and discard
+ tpm2 import -G rsa:rsassa-sha256 -g "$name_alg" -i private.pem -C $1 \
+ -u import_rsa_key2.pub -r import_rsa_key2.priv | grep -q 'rsassa'
+
tpm2 load -Q -C $1 -u import_rsa_key.pub -r import_rsa_key.priv \
-n import_rsa_key.name -c import_rsa_key.ctx
@@ -118,8 +122,9 @@ run_ecc_import_test() {
shasum -a 256 data.in.raw | awk '{ print "000000 " $1 }' | xxd -r -c 32 > \
data.in.digest
- tpm2 import -Q -G ecc -g "$name_alg" -i private.ecc.pem -C $1 -u ecc.pub \
- -r ecc.priv
+ # test import with scheme
+ tpm2 import -G ecc:ecdsa-sha256 -g "$name_alg" -i private.ecc.pem -C $1 -u ecc.pub \
+ -r ecc.priv | grep -q 'ecdsa'
tpm2 load -Q -C $1 -u ecc.pub -r ecc.priv -n ecc.name -c ecc.ctx
--
2.40.1

85
SOURCES/0007-tpm2_policyor-fix-unallocated-policy-list.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,85 @@
From d35bff8cf06cec386afd24bdbed9828caf063a2f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Jul 2022 11:31:51 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 07/17] tpm2_policyor: fix unallocated policy list
The TPML_DIGEST policy list was calloc'd for some reason, however it
could just be statically allocated in the context. The side effect is
that when no options or arguments were given a NPD occured when checking
the count of the policy list. TO fix this, just statically allocate it.
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
---
tools/tpm2_policyor.c | 15 ++++++---------
1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/tools/tpm2_policyor.c b/tools/tpm2_policyor.c
index e4f6541b..d27fff8b 100644
--- a/tools/tpm2_policyor.c
+++ b/tools/tpm2_policyor.c
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ struct tpm2_policyor_ctx {
//File path for the session context data
const char *session_path;
//List of policy digests that will be compounded
- TPML_DIGEST *policy_list;
+ TPML_DIGEST policy_list;
//File path for storing the policy digest output
const char *out_policy_dgst_path;
@@ -36,8 +36,7 @@ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
ctx.session_path = value;
break;
case 'l':
- ctx.policy_list = calloc(1, sizeof(TPML_DIGEST));
- result = tpm2_policy_parse_policy_list(value, ctx.policy_list);
+ result = tpm2_policy_parse_policy_list(value, &ctx.policy_list);
if (!result) {
return false;
}
@@ -54,8 +53,7 @@ static bool on_arg(int argc, char **argv) {
return false;
}
- ctx.policy_list = calloc(1, sizeof(TPML_DIGEST));
- bool result = tpm2_policy_parse_policy_list(argv[0], ctx.policy_list);
+ bool result = tpm2_policy_parse_policy_list(argv[0], &ctx.policy_list);
if (!result) {
return false;
}
@@ -85,7 +83,7 @@ static bool is_input_option_args_valid(void) {
}
//Minimum two policies needed to be specified for compounding
- if (ctx.policy_list->count < 1) {
+ if (ctx.policy_list.count < 1) {
LOG_ERR("Must specify at least 2 policy digests for compounding.");
return false;
}
@@ -109,14 +107,14 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
}
/* Policy digest hash alg should match that of the session */
- if (ctx.policy_list->digests[0].size
+ if (ctx.policy_list.digests[0].size
!= tpm2_alg_util_get_hash_size(
tpm2_session_get_authhash(ctx.session))) {
LOG_ERR("Policy digest hash alg should match that of the session.");
return tool_rc_general_error;
}
- rc = tpm2_policy_build_policyor(ectx, ctx.session, ctx.policy_list);
+ rc = tpm2_policy_build_policyor(ectx, ctx.session, &ctx.policy_list);
if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
LOG_ERR("Could not build policyor TPM");
return rc;
@@ -127,7 +125,6 @@ static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onrun(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx, tpm2_option_flags flags) {
static tool_rc tpm2_tool_onstop(ESYS_CONTEXT *ectx) {
UNUSED(ectx);
- free(ctx.policy_list);
free(ctx.policy_digest);
return tpm2_session_close(&ctx.session);
}
--
2.40.1

35
SOURCES/0008-lib-tpm2_alg_util.c-Fix-potential-null-pointer-deref.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,35 @@
From cfb18410e8f706646adce2bd9f6cffecbd363d2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
Date: Thu, 21 Jul 2022 15:19:36 -0700
Subject: [PATCH 08/17] lib/tpm2_alg_util.c: Fix potential null pointer
dereference
Must test ext_alg_str before dereferencing in
tpm2_alg_util_handle_rsa_ext_alg
char *ext_alg_str = calloc(1, strlen(alg_spec) + strlen("rsa") +
RSA_KEYBITS_STRLEN)
Signed-off-by: Imran Desai <imran.desai@intel.com>
---
lib/tpm2_alg_util.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c b/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c
index 1e984d74..580f41cb 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c
+++ b/lib/tpm2_alg_util.c
@@ -601,6 +601,10 @@ tool_rc tpm2_alg_util_handle_rsa_ext_alg(const char *alg_spec,
#define RSA_KEYBITS_STRLEN 6
char *ext_alg_str = calloc(1, strlen(alg_spec) + strlen("rsa") +
RSA_KEYBITS_STRLEN);
+ if (ext_alg_str == NULL) {
+ LOG_ERR("oom");
+ return tool_rc_general_error;
+ }
strcat(ext_alg_str, "rsa");
switch(public->publicArea.parameters.rsaDetail.keyBits) {
--
2.40.1

30
SOURCES/0009-tss2_provision-fix-usage-of-L-parameter.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From d783e7962e268b45c13ad800fca636bb922005fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
Date: Tue, 18 Oct 2022 10:32:43 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 09/17] tss2_provision: fix usage of -L parameter.
The -L short parameter was not marked as parameter with required
arg in the short opt list.
Fixes #3147.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
---
tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c b/tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c
index 5be7b4dc..7edf2dd3 100644
--- a/tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c
+++ b/tools/fapi/tss2_provision.c
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ static bool tss2_tool_onstart(tpm2_options **opts) {
{"authValueSh", required_argument, NULL, 'S'},
{"authValueLockout", required_argument, NULL, 'L'},
};
- return (*opts = tpm2_options_new ("E:S:L",
+ return (*opts = tpm2_options_new ("E:S:L:",
ARRAY_LEN(topts), topts, on_option, NULL, 0)) != NULL;
}
--
2.40.1

26
SOURCES/0010-tpm2_encodeobject-fix-formatting.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
From 0582b619c3a2c407bf5eace8d83d832688781789 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 10:31:05 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 10/17] tpm2_encodeobject: fix formatting
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
---
tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
index 2341c3a1..ccbd0e01 100644
--- a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
+++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
@@ -87,7 +87,7 @@ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
ctx.parent.ctx_path = value;
break;
case 'o':
- ctx.output_path = value;
+ ctx.output_path = value;
break;
}
--
2.40.1

99
SOURCES/0011-tpm2_encodeobject-fix-auth-boolean-flag.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,99 @@
From 579bb674b5bdf2a0d50e8d3a3d6f5391d233bdff Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 24 Oct 2022 10:48:18 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 11/17] tpm2_encodeobject: fix auth boolean flag
The flag for wether or not a key needs a password was being set based on
if the parent needed a password or not when it should be set based on if
the child object needs a password or not.
Correct this by adding a -p/--key-auth option to indicate the value of
this boolean.
$ tpm2 encodeobject -C 0x81000000 -u key.pub -r key.priv -o key.pem
$ openssl asn1parse -dump -inform PEM -in key.pem
<snip>
14:d=2 hl=2 l= 1 prim: BOOLEAN :0
</snip>
$ tpm2 encodeobject -C 0x81000000 -u key.pub -r key.priv -o key.pem -p
$ openssl asn1parse -dump -inform PEM -in key.pem
<snip>
14:d=2 hl=2 l= 1 prim: BOOLEAN :1
</snip>
A workaround would be manually modifying the ASN1 PEM file boolean flag
OR creating the same parent key but with a password and specifying the
password via `-P`. Note that a primary key is the same given the same
inputs and password doesn't change the generated key.
Fixes: #3152
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
---
man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md | 5 +++++
tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c | 9 +++++++--
2 files changed, 12 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md b/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
index 791eafbd..2e83fa7d 100644
--- a/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
+++ b/man/tpm2_encodeobject.1.md
@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@ applications.
A file containing the sensitive portion of the object.
+ * **-p**, **\--key-auth**:
+
+ Indicates if an authorization value is needed for the object specified by
+ **-r** and **-u**.
+
* **-o**, **\--output**=_FILE_:
The output file path, recording the public portion of the object.
diff --git a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
index ccbd0e01..80de14f5 100644
--- a/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
+++ b/tools/misc/tpm2_encodeobject.c
@@ -65,6 +65,7 @@ struct tpm_encodeobject_ctx {
const char *privpath;
TPM2B_PRIVATE private;
ESYS_TR handle;
+ bool needs_auth;
} object;
char *output_path;
@@ -89,6 +90,9 @@ static bool on_option(char key, char *value) {
case 'o':
ctx.output_path = value;
break;
+ case 'p':
+ ctx.object.needs_auth = true;
+ break;
}
return true;
@@ -101,9 +105,10 @@ static bool tpm2_tool_onstart(tpm2_options **opts) {
{ "private", required_argument, NULL, 'r' },
{ "parent-context", required_argument, NULL, 'C' },
{ "output", required_argument, NULL, 'o' },
+ { "key-auth", no_argument, NULL, 'p' },
};
- *opts = tpm2_options_new("P:u:r:C:o:", ARRAY_LEN(topts), topts, on_option,
+ *opts = tpm2_options_new("P:u:r:C:o:p", ARRAY_LEN(topts), topts, on_option,
NULL, 0);
return *opts != NULL;
@@ -190,7 +195,7 @@ encode(void)
goto error;
}
- tpk->emptyAuth = ctx.parent.auth_str == NULL ? 0xFF : 0;
+ tpk->emptyAuth = ctx.object.needs_auth;
if ((ctx.parent.object.handle >> TPM2_HR_SHIFT) == TPM2_HT_PERSISTENT) {
ASN1_INTEGER_set(tpk->parent, ctx.parent.object.handle);
--
2.40.1

30
SOURCES/0012-bugfix-fix-convert-sm2-public-key-in-openssl3.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
From 3848000b934b9e2546a506ab0922c028491d2284 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: mayuanchen <94815698+mayuanchenma@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Dec 2022 21:44:22 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 12/17] bugfix: fix convert sm2 public key in openssl3.
Signed-off-by: mayuanchen <94815698+mayuanchenma@users.noreply.github.com>
---
lib/tpm2_convert.c | 6 +++++-
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/tpm2_convert.c b/lib/tpm2_convert.c
index 1bba370f..edb9bed0 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2_convert.c
+++ b/lib/tpm2_convert.c
@@ -335,7 +335,11 @@ EVP_PKEY *convert_pubkey_ECC(TPMT_PUBLIC *public) {
goto out;
}
- ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL);
+ if (nid == NID_sm2) {
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "SM2", NULL);
+ } else {
+ ctx = EVP_PKEY_CTX_new_from_name(NULL, "EC", NULL);
+ }
if (!ctx) {
print_ssl_error("Failed to allocate EC key context");
goto out;
--
2.40.1

46
SOURCES/0013-readpublic-fix-reading-and-writing-serialized-trs.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 62f6cdaa36e1c9e8f39e1ca60d8e3049de6860bf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
Date: Mon, 27 Feb 2023 15:32:55 -0600
Subject: [PATCH 13/17] readpublic: fix reading and writing serialized trs
Fix reading and writing a serialized persistent ESYS_TR handles. This
occurs becuase the TPM2_HANDLE is never set after loading and decisions
are made on it.
Fixes:
tpm2_readpublic -t handle2.tr -c handle.tr
ERROR: Can only output a serialized handle for persistent object handles
ERROR: Unable to run tpm2_readpublic
Signed-off-by: William Roberts <william.c.roberts@intel.com>
---
lib/object.c | 13 ++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/object.c b/lib/object.c
index c186a820..1279a8e5 100644
--- a/lib/object.c
+++ b/lib/object.c
@@ -15,7 +15,18 @@ static tool_rc do_ctx_file(ESYS_CONTEXT *ctx, const char *objectstr, FILE *f,
/* assign a dummy transient handle */
outobject->handle = TPM2_TRANSIENT_FIRST;
outobject->path = objectstr;
- return files_load_tpm_context_from_file(ctx, &outobject->tr_handle, f);
+ tool_rc rc = files_load_tpm_context_from_file(ctx, &outobject->tr_handle, f);
+ if (rc != tool_rc_success) {
+ return rc;
+ }
+
+ TSS2_RC rval = Esys_TR_GetTpmHandle(ctx, outobject->tr_handle, &outobject->handle);
+ if (rval != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
+ LOG_ERR("Failed to acquire SAPI handle");
+ return tool_rc_general_error;
+ }
+
+ return tool_rc_success;
}
static tool_rc tpm2_util_object_load2(ESYS_CONTEXT *ctx, const char *objectstr,
--
2.40.1

29
SOURCES/0014-fix-wrong-function-name-of-Esys_Load.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,29 @@
From f1515918ebba36a540432425f7cd01ca3c44aaac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: yuxiaojun <yuxiaojun@uniontech.com>
Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 11:47:40 +0800
Subject: [PATCH 14/17] fix:wrong function name of "Esys_Load"
LOG_PERR(Eys_Load, rval);
The first parameter in the function should be Esys_Load.
Signed-off-by: yuxiaojun <yuxiaojun@uniontech.com>
---
lib/tpm2.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/tpm2.c b/lib/tpm2.c
index d91072ae..27f101e9 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2.c
+++ b/lib/tpm2.c
@@ -1921,7 +1921,7 @@ tpm2_load_free_name1:
parent_object_session_handle, ESYS_TR_NONE, ESYS_TR_NONE, in_private,
in_public, object_handle);
if (rval != TPM2_RC_SUCCESS) {
- LOG_PERR(Eys_Load, rval);
+ LOG_PERR(Esys_Load, rval);
return tool_rc_from_tpm(rval);
}
--
2.40.1

224
SOURCES/0015-tpm-errata-switch-to-twos-complement.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,224 @@
From 510d570d9c4f34d4768af3453dcfcc4f74006e32 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
Date: Fri, 7 Apr 2023 14:02:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 15/17] tpm errata: switch to twos-complement.
MIME-Version: 1.0
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Errata TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Revision 1.59 Version 1.4,
Section 2.5 TPM_EO – two’s complement states:
"The signed arithmetic operations are performed using twos-complement."
The tests policynv and policycountertimer were adapted to work with the
complement representation of signed numbers. If the tests return the error 0x126
the test will be skipped.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
---
.../tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh | 35 +++++++--
test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh | 75 +++++++++++++------
2 files changed, 78 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh b/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh
index 58fcf1b9..80afc541 100644
--- a/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh
+++ b/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policycountertimer.sh
@@ -11,6 +11,27 @@ cleanup() {
fi
}
+call_policy_countertimer () {
+ trap - ERR
+ output=$(tpm2 policycountertimer $@ 2>&1)
+ result=$?
+
+ if [ $result != 0 ] && echo $output | grep "ErrorCode.*0126" > /dev/null
+ then
+ echo "This test failed due to a TPM bug regarding signed comparison as described"
+ echo "in TCG's Errata for TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Revision 1.59 Version 1.4,"
+ echo "Section 2.5 TPM_EO – two’s complement"
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ skip_test
+ else
+ if [ $result != 0 ]; then
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ fi
+ trap onerror ERR
+}
+
trap cleanup EXIT
start_up
@@ -25,8 +46,7 @@ tpm2 clear
#
tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx
-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx -L policy.countertimer.minute --ult \
-60000
+call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx -L policy.countertimer.minute --ult 60000
tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
@@ -42,8 +62,7 @@ tpm2 create -Q -u key.pub -r key.priv -i- -C prim.ctx \
#
tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx -L policy.countertimer.minute --ult \
-60000
+call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx -L policy.countertimer.minute --ult 60000
tpm2 unseal -c key.ctx -p session:session.ctx
@@ -54,7 +73,7 @@ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
#
tpm2 clear
tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx --ult clock=60000
+call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx --ult clock=60000
tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
#
@@ -63,7 +82,7 @@ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
#
tpm2 clear
tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx safe
+call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx safe
tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
#
@@ -72,7 +91,7 @@ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
#
tpm2 clear
tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx resets=0
+call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx resets=0
tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
#
@@ -81,7 +100,7 @@ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
#
tpm2 clear
tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
-tpm2 policycountertimer -S session.ctx restarts=0
+call_policy_countertimer -S session.ctx restarts=0
tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
exit 0
diff --git a/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh b/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh
index b75cabb8..220edec0 100644
--- a/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh
+++ b/test/integration/tests/abrmd_policynv.sh
@@ -36,10 +36,34 @@ evaluate_failing_test_case() {
}
evaluate_passing_test_case() {
- tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
- echo $operandB | xxd -r -p | \
- tpm2 policynv -S session.ctx -i- -P nvpass $nv_test_index $1
- tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ tpm2 startauthsession -S session.ctx --policy-session
+ if [[ ${1:0:1} == "s" ]]; then
+ echo "Test sign: $1 $operandA $operandB"
+ # check whether sign compare fails with 0x126
+ trap - ERR
+ output=$(echo $operandB | xxd -r -p | \
+ tpm2 policynv -S session.ctx -i- -P nvpass $nv_test_index $1 2>&1)
+ result=$?
+ if [ $result != 0 ] && echo $output | grep "ErrorCode.*0126" > /dev/null
+ then
+ echo "This test failed due to a TPM bug regarding signed comparison as described"
+ echo "in TCG's Errata for TCG Trusted Platform Module Library Revision 1.59 Version 1.4,"
+ echo "Section 2.5 TPM_EO – two’s complement"
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ skip_test
+ else
+ if [ $result != 0 ]; then
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ exit 1
+ fi
+ fi
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ trap onerror ERR
+ else
+ echo $operandB | xxd -r -p | \
+ tpm2 policynv -S session.ctx -i- -P nvpass $nv_test_index $1
+ tpm2 flushcontext session.ctx
+ fi
}
trap cleanup EXIT
@@ -70,40 +94,20 @@ evaluate_passing_test_case eq
operandB=0x80
evaluate_passing_test_case neq
-# Perform comparison operation "sgt"
-operandB=0x82
-evaluate_passing_test_case sgt
-
# Perform comparison operation "ugt"
operandB=0x80
evaluate_passing_test_case ugt
-# Perform comparison operation "slt"
-operandB=0x80
-evaluate_passing_test_case slt
-
# Perform comparison operation "ult"
operandB=0x82
evaluate_passing_test_case ult
-# Perform comparison operation "sge"
-operandB=0x82
-evaluate_passing_test_case sge
-operandB=0x81
-evaluate_passing_test_case sge
-
# Perform comparison operation "uge"
operandB=0x80
evaluate_passing_test_case uge
operandB=0x81
evaluate_passing_test_case uge
-# Perform comparison operation "sle"
-operandB=0x80
-evaluate_passing_test_case sle
-operandB=0x81
-evaluate_passing_test_case sle
-
# Perform comparison operation "ule"
operandB=0x82
evaluate_passing_test_case ule
@@ -118,4 +122,27 @@ evaluate_passing_test_case bs
operandB=0x7E
evaluate_passing_test_case bc
+operandA=0xfe # -1
+echo $operandA | xxd -r -p | tpm2 nvwrite -P nvpass -i- $nv_test_index
+
+# Perform comparison operation "sgt"
+operandB=0xfd # -2
+evaluate_passing_test_case sgt
+
+# Perform comparison operation "slt"
+operandB=0xff # 0
+evaluate_passing_test_case slt
+
+# Perform comparison operation "sle"
+operandB=0xff #0
+evaluate_passing_test_case sle
+operandB=0xfe # -1
+evaluate_passing_test_case sle
+
+# Perform comparison operation "sge"
+operandB=0xfd # -2
+evaluate_passing_test_case sge
+operandB=0xfe # -1
+evaluate_passing_test_case sge
+
exit 0
--
2.40.1

159
SOURCES/0016-tpm2_eventlog.c-Fix-pcr-extension-for-EV_NO_ACTION.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,159 @@
From 2f6a737efddce480803c02a5e3b65ce739c6acf2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
Date: Tue, 28 Mar 2023 17:29:36 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 16/17] tpm2_eventlog.c Fix pcr extension for EV_NO_ACTION
EV_NO_ACTION events should not be extended to PCR registers.
Fixes: #3224
Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
---
lib/tpm2_eventlog.c | 14 +++++++++-----
lib/tpm2_eventlog.h | 2 +-
test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c | 15 ++++++++-------
3 files changed, 18 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog.c b/lib/tpm2_eventlog.c
index 1b59eeeb..e2e27f02 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog.c
+++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog.c
@@ -30,7 +30,8 @@ bool digest2_accumulator_callback(TCG_DIGEST2 const *digest, size_t size,
* hold the digest. The size of the digest is passed to the callback in the
* 'size' parameter.
*/
-bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, unsigned pcr_index, TCG_DIGEST2 const *digest, size_t count, size_t size) {
+bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, UINT32 eventType, unsigned pcr_index,
+ TCG_DIGEST2 const *digest, size_t count, size_t size) {
if (digest == NULL) {
LOG_ERR("digest cannot be NULL");
@@ -80,7 +81,8 @@ bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, unsigned pcr_index, TCG_DIGEST2
LOG_WARN("PCR%d algorithm %d unsupported", pcr_index, alg);
}
- if (pcr && !tpm2_openssl_pcr_extend(alg, pcr, digest->Digest, alg_size)) {
+ if (eventType != EV_NO_ACTION && pcr &&
+ !tpm2_openssl_pcr_extend(alg, pcr, digest->Digest, alg_size)) {
LOG_ERR("PCR%d extend failed", pcr_index);
return false;
}
@@ -179,7 +181,8 @@ bool parse_event2(TCG_EVENT_HEADER2 const *eventhdr, size_t buf_size,
.data = digests_size,
.digest2_cb = digest2_accumulator_callback,
};
- ret = foreach_digest2(&ctx, eventhdr->PCRIndex,
+ ret = foreach_digest2(&ctx, eventhdr->EventType,
+ eventhdr->PCRIndex,
eventhdr->Digests, eventhdr->DigestCount,
buf_size - sizeof(*eventhdr));
if (ret != true) {
@@ -216,7 +219,7 @@ bool parse_sha1_log_event(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, TCG_EVENT const *event, si
*event_size = sizeof(*event);
pcr = ctx->sha1_pcrs[ event->pcrIndex];
- if (pcr) {
+ if (event->eventType != EV_NO_ACTION && pcr) {
tpm2_openssl_pcr_extend(TPM2_ALG_SHA1, pcr, &event->digest[0], 20);
ctx->sha1_used |= (1 << event->pcrIndex);
}
@@ -451,7 +454,8 @@ bool foreach_event2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, TCG_EVENT_HEADER2 const *eventhd
}
/* digest callback foreach digest */
- ret = foreach_digest2(ctx, eventhdr->PCRIndex, eventhdr->Digests, eventhdr->DigestCount, digests_size);
+ ret = foreach_digest2(ctx, eventhdr->EventType, eventhdr->PCRIndex,
+ eventhdr->Digests, eventhdr->DigestCount, digests_size);
if (ret != true) {
return false;
}
diff --git a/lib/tpm2_eventlog.h b/lib/tpm2_eventlog.h
index 2a91ed60..f141e806 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2_eventlog.h
+++ b/lib/tpm2_eventlog.h
@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ bool digest2_accumulator_callback(TCG_DIGEST2 const *digest, size_t size,
void *data);
bool parse_event2body(TCG_EVENT2 const *event, UINT32 type);
-bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, unsigned pcr_index,
+bool foreach_digest2(tpm2_eventlog_context *ctx, UINT32 eventType, unsigned pcr_index,
TCG_DIGEST2 const *event_hdr, size_t count, size_t size);
bool parse_event2(TCG_EVENT_HEADER2 const *eventhdr, size_t buf_size,
size_t *event_size, size_t *digests_size);
diff --git a/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c b/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c
index ebf50e80..e48404d8 100644
--- a/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c
+++ b/test/unit/test_tpm2_eventlog.c
@@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2_null(void **state){
(void)state;
tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = {0};
- assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, NULL, 0, sizeof(TCG_DIGEST2)));
+ assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, NULL, 0, sizeof(TCG_DIGEST2)));
}
static void test_foreach_digest2_size(void **state) {
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2_size(void **state) {
TCG_DIGEST2 *digest = (TCG_DIGEST2*)buf;
tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = { .digest2_cb = foreach_digest2_test_callback };
- assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, digest, 1, sizeof(TCG_DIGEST2) - 1));
+ assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, digest, 1, sizeof(TCG_DIGEST2) - 1));
}
static void test_foreach_digest2(void **state) {
@@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2(void **state) {
will_return(foreach_digest2_test_callback, true);
tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = { .digest2_cb = foreach_digest2_test_callback };
- assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
+ assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
}
static void test_foreach_digest2_cbnull(void **state){
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2_cbnull(void **state){
TCG_DIGEST2* digest = (TCG_DIGEST2*)buf;
tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = {0};
- assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
+ assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
}
static void test_sha1(void **state){
@@ -73,7 +73,7 @@ static void test_sha1(void **state){
memcpy(digest->Digest, "the magic words are:", TPM2_SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = {0};
- assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, pcr_index, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
+ assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, pcr_index, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
assert_memory_equal(ctx.sha1_pcrs[pcr_index], sha1sum, sizeof(sha1sum));
}
static void test_sha256(void **state){
@@ -93,7 +93,7 @@ static void test_sha256(void **state){
memcpy(digest->Digest, "The Magic Words are Squeamish Ossifrage, for RSA-129 (from 1977)", TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = {0};
- assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, pcr_index, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA256_SIZE));
+ assert_true(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, pcr_index, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA256_SIZE));
assert_memory_equal(ctx.sha256_pcrs[pcr_index], sha256sum, sizeof(sha256sum));
}
static void test_foreach_digest2_cbfail(void **state){
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ static void test_foreach_digest2_cbfail(void **state){
will_return(foreach_digest2_test_callback, false);
tpm2_eventlog_context ctx = { .digest2_cb = foreach_digest2_test_callback };
- assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
+ assert_false(foreach_digest2(&ctx, 0, 0, digest, 1, TCG_DIGEST2_SHA1_SIZE));
}
static void test_digest2_accumulator_callback(void **state) {
@@ -292,6 +292,7 @@ static void test_foreach_event2_parse_event2body_fail(void **state){
eventhdr->DigestCount = 1;
eventhdr->EventType = EV_EFI_VARIABLE_BOOT;
+ eventhdr->PCRIndex = 0;
digest->AlgorithmId = TPM2_ALG_SHA1;
event->EventSize = 1;
--
2.40.1

52
SOURCES/0017-kdfa.c-Fix-problem-with-FORTIFY_SOURCE-on-Fedora.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From 72b6a5497df8757987dfedd6263346154adb921e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
Date: Mon, 6 Mar 2023 12:16:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/17] kdfa.c Fix problem with FORTIFY_SOURCE on Fedora
The original kdfa implementation did produce an error caused by the flags
-flto -_FORTIFY_SOURCE=3 on Fedora rawhide.
This error can be avoided by switching off the optimization with pragma.
Fixes: #3210.
Signed-off-by: Juergen Repp <juergen_repp@web.de>
---
lib/tpm2_kdfa.c | 19 +++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 19 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/tpm2_kdfa.c b/lib/tpm2_kdfa.c
index 5eb8d558..e97c06f6 100644
--- a/lib/tpm2_kdfa.c
+++ b/lib/tpm2_kdfa.c
@@ -13,6 +13,15 @@
#include "tpm2_kdfa.h"
#include "tpm2_openssl.h"
+/*
+ * Disable optimization because of an error in FORTIFY_SOURCE
+ */
+
+#ifdef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
+#pragma GCC push_options
+#pragma GCC optimize ("O0")
+#endif
+
TSS2_RC tpm2_kdfa(TPMI_ALG_HASH hash_alg, TPM2B *key, char *label,
TPM2B *context_u, TPM2B *context_v, UINT16 bits,
TPM2B_MAX_BUFFER *result_key) {
@@ -139,3 +148,13 @@ err:
return rval;
}
+#ifdef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
+
+#endif
+
+#ifdef _FORTIFY_SOURCE
+#pragma GCC pop_options
+#endif
+
+
+
--
2.40.1

434
SOURCES/add_pregenerated_doc.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,434 @@
diff --git a/man/man1/tpm2_encodeobject.1 b/man/man1/tpm2_encodeobject.1
new file mode 100644
index 00000000..9b616bb0
--- /dev/null
+++ b/man/man1/tpm2_encodeobject.1
@@ -0,0 +1,428 @@
+.\" Automatically generated by Pandoc 2.5
+.\"
+.TH "tpm2_encodeobject" "1" "" "tpm2\-tools" "General Commands Manual"
+.hy
+.SH NAME
+.PP
+\f[B]tpm2_encodeobject\f[R](1) \- Encode an object into a combined PEM
+format.
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.PP
+\f[B]tpm2_encodeobject\f[R] [\f[I]OPTIONS\f[R]]
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+.PP
+\f[B]tpm2_encodeobject\f[R](1) \- Encode both the private and public
+portions of an object into a combined PEM format used by
+tpm2\-tss\-engine.
+.PP
+The tool reads private and public portions of an object and encodes it
+into a combined PEM format used by tpm2\-tss\-engine and other
+applications.
+.PP
+\f[B]NOTE\f[R]: Both private and public portions of the tpm key must be
+specified.
+.SH OPTIONS
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-C\f[R], \f[B]\-\-parent\-context\f[R]=\f[I]OBJECT\f[R]:
+.RS 2
+.PP
+The parent object.
+.RE
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-P\f[R], \f[B]\-\-auth\f[R]=\f[I]AUTH\f[R]:
+.RS 2
+.PP
+The authorization value of the parent object specified by \f[B]\-C\f[R].
+.RE
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-u\f[R], \f[B]\-\-public\f[R]=\f[I]FILE\f[R]:
+.RS 2
+.PP
+A file containing the public portion of the object.
+.RE
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-r\f[R], \f[B]\-\-private\f[R]=\f[I]FILE\f[R]:
+.RS 2
+.PP
+A file containing the sensitive portion of the object.
+.RE
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-p\f[R], \f[B]\-\-key\-auth\f[R]:
+.RS 2
+.PP
+Indicates if an authorization value is needed for the object specified
+by \f[B]\-r\f[R] and \f[B]\-u\f[R].
+.RE
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-o\f[R], \f[B]\-\-output\f[R]=\f[I]FILE\f[R]:
+.RS 2
+.PP
+The output file path, recording the public portion of the object.
+.RE
+.SS References
+.SH Context Object Format
+.PP
+The type of a context object, whether it is a handle or file name, is
+determined according to the following logic \f[I]in\-order\f[R]:
+.IP \[bu] 2
+If the argument is a file path, then the file is loaded as a restored
+TPM transient object.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+If the argument is a \f[I]prefix\f[R] match on one of:
+.RS 2
+.IP \[bu] 2
+owner: the owner hierarchy
+.IP \[bu] 2
+platform: the platform hierarchy
+.IP \[bu] 2
+endorsement: the endorsement hierarchy
+.IP \[bu] 2
+lockout: the lockout control persistent object
+.RE
+.IP \[bu] 2
+If the argument argument can be loaded as a number it will be treat as a
+handle, e.g.\ 0x81010013 and used directly._OBJECT_.
+.SH Authorization Formatting
+.PP
+Authorization for use of an object in TPM2.0 can come in 3 different
+forms: 1.
+Password 2.
+HMAC 3.
+Sessions
+.PP
+\f[B]NOTE:\f[R] \[lq]Authorizations default to the \f[B]EMPTY
+PASSWORD\f[R] when not specified\[rq].
+.SS Passwords
+.PP
+Passwords are interpreted in the following forms below using prefix
+identifiers.
+.PP
+\f[B]Note\f[R]: By default passwords are assumed to be in the string
+form when they do not have a prefix.
+.SS String
+.PP
+A string password, specified by prefix \[lq]str:\[rq] or it\[cq]s
+absence (raw string without prefix) is not interpreted, and is directly
+used for authorization.
+.SS Examples
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+foobar
+str:foobar
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.SS Hex\-string
+.PP
+A hex\-string password, specified by prefix \[lq]hex:\[rq] is converted
+from a hexidecimal form into a byte array form, thus allowing passwords
+with non\-printable and/or terminal un\-friendly characters.
+.SS Example
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+hex:1122334455667788
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.SS File
+.PP
+A file based password, specified be prefix \[lq]file:\[rq] should be the
+path of a file containing the password to be read by the tool or a
+\[lq]\-\[rq] to use stdin.
+Storing passwords in files prevents information leakage, passwords
+passed as options can be read from the process list or common shell
+history features.
+.SS Examples
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+# to use stdin and be prompted
+file:\-
+
+# to use a file from a path
+file:path/to/password/file
+
+# to echo a password via stdin:
+echo foobar | tpm2_tool \-p file:\-
+
+# to use a bash here\-string via stdin:
+
+tpm2_tool \-p file:\- <<< foobar
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.SS Sessions
+.PP
+When using a policy session to authorize the use of an object, prefix
+the option argument with the \f[I]session\f[R] keyword.
+Then indicate a path to a session file that was created with
+tpm2_startauthsession(1).
+Optionally, if the session requires an auth value to be sent with the
+session handle (eg policy password), then append a + and a string as
+described in the \f[B]Passwords\f[R] section.
+.SS Examples
+.PP
+To use a session context file called \f[I]session.ctx\f[R].
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+session:session.ctx
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.PP
+To use a session context file called \f[I]session.ctx\f[R] \f[B]AND\f[R]
+send the authvalue mypassword.
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+session:session.ctx+mypassword
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.PP
+To use a session context file called \f[I]session.ctx\f[R] \f[B]AND\f[R]
+send the \f[I]HEX\f[R] authvalue 0x11223344.
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+session:session.ctx+hex:11223344
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.SS PCR Authorizations
+.PP
+You can satisfy a PCR policy using the \[lq]pcr:\[rq] prefix and the PCR
+minilanguage.
+The PCR minilanguage is as follows:
+\f[C]<pcr\-spec>=<raw\-pcr\-file>\f[R]
+.PP
+The PCR spec is documented in in the section \[lq]PCR bank
+specifiers\[rq].
+.PP
+The \f[C]raw\-pcr\-file\f[R] is an \f[B]optional\f[R] argument that
+contains the output of the raw PCR contents as returned by
+\f[I]tpm2_pcrread(1)\f[R].
+.PP
+PCR bank specifiers (pcr.md)
+.SS Examples
+.PP
+To satisfy a PCR policy of sha256 on banks 0, 1, 2 and 3 use a specifier
+of:
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+pcr:sha256:0,1,2,3
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.PP
+specifying \f[I]AUTH\f[R].
+.SH COMMON OPTIONS
+.PP
+This collection of options are common to many programs and provide
+information that many users may expect.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-h\f[R], \f[B]\-\-help=[man|no\-man]\f[R]: Display the tools
+manpage.
+By default, it attempts to invoke the manpager for the tool, however, on
+failure will output a short tool summary.
+This is the same behavior if the \[lq]man\[rq] option argument is
+specified, however if explicit \[lq]man\[rq] is requested, the tool will
+provide errors from man on stderr.
+If the \[lq]no\-man\[rq] option if specified, or the manpager fails, the
+short options will be output to stdout.
+.RS 2
+.PP
+To successfully use the manpages feature requires the manpages to be
+installed or on \f[I]MANPATH\f[R], See man(1) for more details.
+.RE
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-v\f[R], \f[B]\-\-version\f[R]: Display version information for
+this tool, supported tctis and exit.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-V\f[R], \f[B]\-\-verbose\f[R]: Increase the information that the
+tool prints to the console during its execution.
+When using this option the file and line number are printed.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-Q\f[R], \f[B]\-\-quiet\f[R]: Silence normal tool output to
+stdout.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]\-Z\f[R], \f[B]\-\-enable\-errata\f[R]: Enable the application of
+errata fixups.
+Useful if an errata fixup needs to be applied to commands sent to the
+TPM.
+Defining the environment TPM2TOOLS_ENABLE_ERRATA is equivalent.
+information many users may expect.
+.SH TCTI Configuration
+.PP
+The TCTI or \[lq]Transmission Interface\[rq] is the communication
+mechanism with the TPM.
+TCTIs can be changed for communication with TPMs across different
+mediums.
+.PP
+To control the TCTI, the tools respect:
+.IP "1." 3
+The command line option \f[B]\-T\f[R] or \f[B]\-\-tcti\f[R]
+.IP "2." 3
+The environment variable: \f[I]TPM2TOOLS_TCTI\f[R].
+.PP
+\f[B]Note:\f[R] The command line option always overrides the environment
+variable.
+.PP
+The current known TCTIs are:
+.IP \[bu] 2
+tabrmd \- The resource manager, called
+tabrmd (https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-abrmd).
+Note that tabrmd and abrmd as a tcti name are synonymous.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+mssim \- Typically used for communicating to the TPM software simulator.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+device \- Used when talking directly to a TPM device file.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+none \- Do not initalize a connection with the TPM.
+Some tools allow for off\-tpm options and thus support not using a TCTI.
+Tools that do not support it will error when attempted to be used
+without a TCTI connection.
+Does not support \f[I]ANY\f[R] options and \f[I]MUST BE\f[R] presented
+as the exact text of \[lq]none\[rq].
+.PP
+The arguments to either the command line option or the environment
+variable are in the form:
+.PP
+\f[C]<tcti\-name>:<tcti\-option\-config>\f[R]
+.PP
+Specifying an empty string for either the \f[C]<tcti\-name>\f[R] or
+\f[C]<tcti\-option\-config>\f[R] results in the default being used for
+that portion respectively.
+.SS TCTI Defaults
+.PP
+When a TCTI is not specified, the default TCTI is searched for using
+\f[I]dlopen(3)\f[R] semantics.
+The tools will search for \f[I]tabrmd\f[R], \f[I]device\f[R] and
+\f[I]mssim\f[R] TCTIs \f[B]IN THAT ORDER\f[R] and \f[B]USE THE FIRST ONE
+FOUND\f[R].
+You can query what TCTI will be chosen as the default by using the
+\f[B]\-v\f[R] option to print the version information.
+The \[lq]default\-tcti\[rq] key\-value pair will indicate which of the
+aforementioned TCTIs is the default.
+.SS Custom TCTIs
+.PP
+Any TCTI that implements the dynamic TCTI interface can be loaded.
+The tools internally use \f[I]dlopen(3)\f[R], and the raw
+\f[I]tcti\-name\f[R] value is used for the lookup.
+Thus, this could be a path to the shared library, or a library name as
+understood by \f[I]dlopen(3)\f[R] semantics.
+.SH TCTI OPTIONS
+.PP
+This collection of options are used to configure the various known TCTI
+modules available:
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]device\f[R]: For the device TCTI, the TPM character device file for
+use by the device TCTI can be specified.
+The default is \f[I]/dev/tpm0\f[R].
+.RS 2
+.PP
+Example: \f[B]\-T device:/dev/tpm0\f[R] or \f[B]export
+\f[BI]TPM2TOOLS_TCTI\f[B]=\[lq]device:/dev/tpm0\[rq]\f[R]
+.RE
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]mssim\f[R]: For the mssim TCTI, the domain name or IP address and
+port number used by the simulator can be specified.
+The default are 127.0.0.1 and 2321.
+.RS 2
+.PP
+Example: \f[B]\-T mssim:host=localhost,port=2321\f[R] or \f[B]export
+\f[BI]TPM2TOOLS_TCTI\f[B]=\[lq]mssim:host=localhost,port=2321\[rq]\f[R]
+.RE
+.IP \[bu] 2
+\f[B]abrmd\f[R]: For the abrmd TCTI, the configuration string format is
+a series of simple key value pairs separated by a `,' character.
+Each key and value string are separated by a `=' character.
+.RS 2
+.IP \[bu] 2
+TCTI abrmd supports two keys:
+.RS 2
+.IP "1." 3
+`bus_name' : The name of the tabrmd service on the bus (a string).
+.IP "2." 3
+`bus_type' : The type of the dbus instance (a string) limited to
+`session' and `system'.
+.RE
+.PP
+Specify the tabrmd tcti name and a config string of
+\f[C]bus_name=com.example.FooBar\f[R]:
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+\[rs]\-\-tcti=tabrmd:bus_name=com.example.FooBar
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.PP
+Specify the default (abrmd) tcti and a config string of
+\f[C]bus_type=session\f[R]:
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+\[rs]\-\-tcti:bus_type=session
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.PP
+\f[B]NOTE\f[R]: abrmd and tabrmd are synonymous.
+the various known TCTI modules.
+.RE
+.SH EXAMPLES
+.SS Setup
+.PP
+To load an object you first must create an object under a primary
+object.
+So the first step is to create the primary object.
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+tpm2_createprimary \-c primary.ctx
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.PP
+Step 2 is to create an object under the primary object.
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+tpm2_create \-C primary.ctx \-u key.pub \-r key.priv \-f pem \-o pub.pem
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.PP
+This creates the private and public portions of the TPM object.
+With these object portions, it is now possible to load that object into
+the TPM for subsequent use.
+.SS Encoding an Object into a combined PEM format
+.PP
+The final step, is encoding the public and private portions of the
+object into a PEM format.
+.IP
+.nf
+\f[C]
+tpm2_encodeobject \-C primary.ctx \-u key.pub \-r key.priv \-o priv.pem
+\f[R]
+.fi
+.PP
+The generated \f[C]priv.pem\f[R] can be used together with
+\f[C]pub.pem\f[R] created in the step 2 of Setup section.
+.SH Returns
+.PP
+Tools can return any of the following codes:
+.IP \[bu] 2
+0 \- Success.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+1 \- General non\-specific error.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+2 \- Options handling error.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+3 \- Authentication error.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+4 \- TCTI related error.
+.IP \[bu] 2
+5 \- Non supported scheme.
+Applicable to tpm2_testparams.
+.SH BUGS
+.PP
+Github Issues (https://github.com/tpm2-software/tpm2-tools/issues)
+.SH HELP
+.PP
+See the Mailing
+List (https://lists.linuxfoundation.org/mailman/listinfo/tpm2)

26
SPECS/tpm2-tools.spec
View File

@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
Name: tpm2-tools Name: tpm2-tools
Version: 5.2 Version: 5.2
Release: 2%{?candidate:.%{candidate}}%{?dist} Release: 3%{?candidate:.%{candidate}}%{?dist}
Summary: A bunch of TPM testing toolS build upon tpm2-tss Summary: A bunch of TPM testing toolS build upon tpm2-tss
License: BSD License: BSD
@ -20,6 +20,24 @@ Patch8: 0006-test-track-expected-YAML-output-for-eventlog.patch
Patch9: 0007-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-fix-parsing-for-MokListTrusted.patch Patch9: 0007-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-fix-parsing-for-MokListTrusted.patch
Patch10: 0008-tests-add-eventlog-for-parsing-MokListTrusted.patch Patch10: 0008-tests-add-eventlog-for-parsing-MokListTrusted.patch
Patch11: 0009-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-use-defines-for-Unicode-variables.patch Patch11: 0009-tpm2_eventlog_yaml-use-defines-for-Unicode-variables.patch
Patch101: 0001-Fix-nv_readpublic.patch
Patch102: 0002-tpm2_encodeobject-New-tool-to-encode-TPM2-object.patch
Patch103: 0003-tools-tpm2_evictconrol-fix-for-call-to-Esys_TR_Close.patch
Patch104: 0004-Fix-argument-parsing-in-tpm2_policylocality.patch
Patch105: 0005-tools-tpm2_tool.c-Fix-an-issue-where-LOG_WARN-is-alw.patch
Patch106: 0006-import-fix-bug-on-using-scheme.patch
Patch107: 0007-tpm2_policyor-fix-unallocated-policy-list.patch
Patch108: 0008-lib-tpm2_alg_util.c-Fix-potential-null-pointer-deref.patch
Patch109: 0009-tss2_provision-fix-usage-of-L-parameter.patch
Patch110: 0010-tpm2_encodeobject-fix-formatting.patch
Patch111: 0011-tpm2_encodeobject-fix-auth-boolean-flag.patch
Patch112: 0012-bugfix-fix-convert-sm2-public-key-in-openssl3.patch
Patch113: 0013-readpublic-fix-reading-and-writing-serialized-trs.patch
Patch114: 0014-fix-wrong-function-name-of-Esys_Load.patch
Patch115: 0015-tpm-errata-switch-to-twos-complement.patch
Patch116: 0016-tpm2_eventlog.c-Fix-pcr-extension-for-EV_NO_ACTION.patch
Patch117: 0017-kdfa.c-Fix-problem-with-FORTIFY_SOURCE-on-Fedora.patch
Patch118: add_pregenerated_doc.patch
BuildRequires: git BuildRequires: git
BuildRequires: make BuildRequires: make
@ -71,6 +89,12 @@ autoreconf -i
%{_mandir}/man1/tss2_*.1.gz %{_mandir}/man1/tss2_*.1.gz
%changelog %changelog
* Wed May 24 2023 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.2-3
- Backport fixes.
- Add tpm2_encodeobject tool.
Resolves: rhbz#2160304
Resolves: rhbz#2047342
* Wed Oct 19 2022 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.2-2 * Wed Oct 19 2022 Štěpán Horáček <shoracek@redhat.com> - 5.2-2
- Fix eventlog output. - Fix eventlog output.
Resolves: rhbz#2136215 Resolves: rhbz#2136215