77 lines
3.3 KiB
Diff
77 lines
3.3 KiB
Diff
From 1cc9e07b7c36fe9f9784b40b58f0a2a3694dd328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Debarshi Ray <rishi@fedoraproject.org>
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Date: Thu, 13 Jul 2023 13:08:40 +0200
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Subject: [PATCH] cmd/initContainer: Be aware of security hardened mount points
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Sometimes locations such as /var/lib/flatpak, /var/lib/systemd/coredump
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and /var/log/journal sit on security hardened mount points that are
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marked as 'nosuid,nodev,noexec' [1]. In such cases, when Toolbx is used
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rootless, an attempt to bind mount these locations read-only at runtime
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with mount(8) fails because of permission problems:
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# mount --rbind -o ro <source> <containerPath>
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mount: <containerPath>: filesystem was mounted, but any subsequent
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operation failed: Unknown error 5005.
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(Note that the above error message from mount(8) was subsequently
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improved to show something more meaningful than 'Unknown error' [2].)
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The problem is that 'init-container' is running inside the container's
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mount and user namespace, and the source paths were mounted inside the
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host's namespace with 'nosuid,nodev,noexec'. The above mount(8) call
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tries to remove the 'nosuid,nodev,noexec' flags from the mount point and
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replace them with only 'ro', which is something that can't be done from
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a child namespace.
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Note that this doesn't fail when Toolbx is running as root. This is
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because the container uses the host's user namespace and is able to
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remove the 'nosuid,nodev,noexec' flags from the mount point and replace
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them with only 'ro'. Even though it doesn't fail, the flags shouldn't
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get replaced like that inside the container, because it removes the
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security hardening of those mount points.
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There's actually no benefit in bind mounting these paths as read-only.
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It was historically done this way 'just to be safe' because a user isn't
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expected to write to these locations from inside a container. However,
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Toolbx doesn't intend to provide any heightened security beyond what's
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already available on the host.
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Hence, it's better to get out of the way and leave it to the permissions
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on the source location from the host operating system to guard the
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castle. This is accomplished by not passing any file system options to
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mount(8) [1].
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Based on an idea from Si.
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[1] https://man7.org/linux/man-pages/man8/mount.8.html
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[2] util-linux commit 9420ca34dc8b6f0f
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https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/commit/9420ca34dc8b6f0f
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https://github.com/util-linux/util-linux/pull/2376
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https://github.com/containers/toolbox/issues/911
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---
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src/cmd/initContainer.go | 6 +++---
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1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/cmd/initContainer.go b/src/cmd/initContainer.go
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index 222aa42e1036..41b825b33f58 100644
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--- a/src/cmd/initContainer.go
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+++ b/src/cmd/initContainer.go
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@@ -62,10 +62,10 @@ var (
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{"/run/udev/data", "/run/host/run/udev/data", ""},
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{"/run/udev/tags", "/run/host/run/udev/tags", ""},
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{"/tmp", "/run/host/tmp", "rslave"},
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- {"/var/lib/flatpak", "/run/host/var/lib/flatpak", "ro"},
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+ {"/var/lib/flatpak", "/run/host/var/lib/flatpak", ""},
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{"/var/lib/libvirt", "/run/host/var/lib/libvirt", ""},
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- {"/var/lib/systemd/coredump", "/run/host/var/lib/systemd/coredump", "ro"},
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- {"/var/log/journal", "/run/host/var/log/journal", "ro"},
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+ {"/var/lib/systemd/coredump", "/run/host/var/lib/systemd/coredump", ""},
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+ {"/var/log/journal", "/run/host/var/log/journal", ""},
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{"/var/mnt", "/run/host/var/mnt", "rslave"},
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}
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)
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--
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2.41.0
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