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23 changed files with 1590 additions and 299 deletions

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@ -12,7 +12,7 @@
#EndSection
#Section "Screen"
# Identifier "Screen0
# Identifier "Screen0"
# DefaultDepth 16
# Option "SecurityTypes" "VncAuth"
# Option "PasswordFile" "/root/.vnc/passwd"

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@ -0,0 +1,53 @@
diff --git a/po/CMakeLists.txt b/po/CMakeLists.txt
index 7d316e7..4f872d0 100644
--- a/po/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/po/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ if (GETTEXT_XGETTEXT_EXECUTABLE)
${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.h
${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.cxx
${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.desktop.in.in
- ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.metainfo.xml.in
)
add_custom_target(translations_update
diff --git a/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt b/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt
index 72904b2..6a39062 100644
--- a/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -108,36 +108,6 @@ if(UNIX)
add_custom_target(desktop ALL DEPENDS vncviewer.desktop)
install(FILES ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/vncviewer.desktop DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_FULL_DATADIR}/applications)
- if("${GETTEXT_VERSION_STRING}" VERSION_GREATER 0.19.6)
- add_custom_command(OUTPUT org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- COMMAND ${GETTEXT_MSGFMT_EXECUTABLE}
- --xml --template ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
- -d ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/po -o org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
- ${po_FILES}
- )
- elseif(INTLTOOL_MERGE_EXECUTABLE)
- add_custom_command(OUTPUT org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- COMMAND sed -e 's@<name>@<_name>@\;s@</name>@</_name>@'
- -e 's@<summary>@<_summary>@\;s@</summary>@</_summary>@'
- -e 's@<caption>@<_caption>@\;s@</caption>@</_caption>@'
- -e 's@<p>@<_p>@g\;s@</p>@</_p>@g'
- ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in > org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.intl
- COMMAND ${INTLTOOL_MERGE_EXECUTABLE}
- -x ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/po
- org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.intl org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
- ${po_FILES}
- )
- else()
- add_custom_command(OUTPUT org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- COMMAND cp ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
- )
- endif()
- add_custom_target(appstream ALL DEPENDS org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml)
- install(FILES ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_FULL_DATADIR}/metainfo)
-
foreach(res 16 22 24 32 48 64 128)
install(FILES ../media/icons/tigervnc_${res}.png DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_FULL_DATADIR}/icons/hicolor/${res}x${res}/apps RENAME tigervnc.png)
endforeach()

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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From ded614e74e7175927dd2bc5ef69accaf2de29939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2024 15:49:43 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] dix: keep a ref to the rootCursor
CreateCursor returns a cursor with refcount 1 - that refcount is used by
the resource system, any caller needs to call RefCursor to get their own
reference. That happens correctly for normal cursors but for our
rootCursor we keep a variable to the cursor despite not having a ref for
ourselves.
Fix this by reffing/unreffing the rootCursor to ensure our pointer is
valid.
Related to CVE-2025-26594, ZDI-CAN-25544
Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
dix/main.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/dix/main.c b/dix/main.c
index aa7b020b2..0c57ba605 100644
--- a/dix/main.c
+++ b/dix/main.c
@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ dix_main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
defaultCursorFont);
}
+ rootCursor = RefCursor(rootCursor);
+
#ifdef PANORAMIX
/*
* Consolidate window and colourmap information for each screen
@@ -275,6 +277,8 @@ dix_main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
Dispatch();
+ UnrefCursor(rootCursor);
+
UndisplayDevices();
DisableAllDevices();
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,52 @@
From efca605c45ff51b57f136222b966ce1d610ebc33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 11:27:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] Cursor: Refuse to free the root cursor
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
If a cursor reference count drops to 0, the cursor is freed.
The root cursor however is referenced with a specific global variable,
and when the root cursor is freed, the global variable may still point
to freed memory.
Make sure to prevent the rootCursor from being explicitly freed by a
client.
CVE-2025-26594, ZDI-CAN-25544
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
v2: Explicitly forbid XFreeCursor() on the root cursor (Peter Hutterer
<peter.hutterer@who-t.net>)
v3: Return BadCursor instead of BadValue (Michel Dänzer
<michel@daenzer.net>)
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
dix/dispatch.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c
index 5f7cfe02d..d1241fa96 100644
--- a/dix/dispatch.c
+++ b/dix/dispatch.c
@@ -3039,6 +3039,10 @@ ProcFreeCursor(ClientPtr client)
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pCursor, stuff->id, RT_CURSOR,
client, DixDestroyAccess);
if (rc == Success) {
+ if (pCursor == rootCursor) {
+ client->errorValue = stuff->id;
+ return BadCursor;
+ }
FreeResource(stuff->id, RT_NONE);
return Success;
}
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,60 @@
From 98602942c143075ab7464f917e0fc5d31ce28c3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 14:41:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText()
The code in XkbVModMaskText() allocates a fixed sized buffer on the
stack and copies the virtual mod name.
There's actually two issues in the code that can lead to a buffer
overflow.
First, the bound check mixes pointers and integers using misplaced
parenthesis, defeating the bound check.
But even though, if the check fails, the data is still copied, so the
stack overflow will occur regardless.
Change the logic to skip the copy entirely if the bound check fails.
CVE-2025-26595, ZDI-CAN-25545
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
xkb/xkbtext.c | 16 ++++++++--------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xkb/xkbtext.c b/xkb/xkbtext.c
index 018466420..93262528b 100644
--- a/xkb/xkbtext.c
+++ b/xkb/xkbtext.c
@@ -173,14 +173,14 @@ XkbVModMaskText(XkbDescPtr xkb,
len = strlen(tmp) + 1 + (str == buf ? 0 : 1);
if (format == XkbCFile)
len += 4;
- if ((str - (buf + len)) <= VMOD_BUFFER_SIZE) {
- if (str != buf) {
- if (format == XkbCFile)
- *str++ = '|';
- else
- *str++ = '+';
- len--;
- }
+ if ((str - buf) + len > VMOD_BUFFER_SIZE)
+ continue; /* Skip */
+ if (str != buf) {
+ if (format == XkbCFile)
+ *str++ = '|';
+ else
+ *str++ = '+';
+ len--;
}
if (format == XkbCFile)
sprintf(str, "%sMask", tmp);
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From b41f6fce201e77a174550935330e2f7772d4adf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 11:49:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix computation of XkbSizeKeySyms
The computation of the length in XkbSizeKeySyms() differs from what is
actually written in XkbWriteKeySyms(), leading to a heap overflow.
Fix the calculation in XkbSizeKeySyms() to match what kbWriteKeySyms()
does.
CVE-2025-26596, ZDI-CAN-25543
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 85659382d..744dba63d 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -1095,10 +1095,10 @@ XkbSizeKeySyms(XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply * rep)
len = rep->nKeySyms * SIZEOF(xkbSymMapWireDesc);
symMap = &xkb->map->key_sym_map[rep->firstKeySym];
for (i = nSyms = 0; i < rep->nKeySyms; i++, symMap++) {
- if (symMap->offset != 0) {
- nSymsThisKey = XkbNumGroups(symMap->group_info) * symMap->width;
- nSyms += nSymsThisKey;
- }
+ nSymsThisKey = XkbNumGroups(symMap->group_info) * symMap->width;
+ if (nSymsThisKey == 0)
+ continue;
+ nSyms += nSymsThisKey;
}
len += nSyms * 4;
rep->totalSyms = nSyms;
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From c5114475db18f29d639537d60e135bdfc11a5d3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 14:09:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey()
If XkbChangeTypesOfKey() is called with nGroups == 0, it will resize the
key syms to 0 but leave the key actions unchanged.
If later, the same function is called with a non-zero value for nGroups,
this will cause a buffer overflow because the key actions are of the wrong
size.
To avoid the issue, make sure to resize both the key syms and key actions
when nGroups is 0.
CVE-2025-26597, ZDI-CAN-25683
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
xkb/XKBMisc.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/xkb/XKBMisc.c b/xkb/XKBMisc.c
index abbfed90e..fd180fad2 100644
--- a/xkb/XKBMisc.c
+++ b/xkb/XKBMisc.c
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ XkbChangeTypesOfKey(XkbDescPtr xkb,
i = XkbSetNumGroups(i, 0);
xkb->map->key_sym_map[key].group_info = i;
XkbResizeKeySyms(xkb, key, 0);
+ XkbResizeKeyActions(xkb, key, 0);
return Success;
}
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
From 0f5ea9d269ac6225bcb302a1ec0f58878114da9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 11:25:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: Fix barrier device search
The function GetBarrierDevice() would search for the pointer device
based on its device id and return the matching value, or supposedly NULL
if no match was found.
Unfortunately, as written, it would return the last element of the list
if no matching device id was found which can lead to out of bounds
memory access.
Fix the search function to return NULL if not matching device is found,
and adjust the callers to handle the case where the device cannot be
found.
CVE-2025-26598, ZDI-CAN-25740
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xi/xibarriers.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xi/xibarriers.c b/Xi/xibarriers.c
index 80c4b5981..28bc0a24f 100644
--- a/Xi/xibarriers.c
+++ b/Xi/xibarriers.c
@@ -131,14 +131,15 @@ static void FreePointerBarrierClient(struct PointerBarrierClient *c)
static struct PointerBarrierDevice *GetBarrierDevice(struct PointerBarrierClient *c, int deviceid)
{
- struct PointerBarrierDevice *pbd = NULL;
+ struct PointerBarrierDevice *p, *pbd = NULL;
- xorg_list_for_each_entry(pbd, &c->per_device, entry) {
- if (pbd->deviceid == deviceid)
+ xorg_list_for_each_entry(p, &c->per_device, entry) {
+ if (p->deviceid == deviceid) {
+ pbd = p;
break;
+ }
}
- BUG_WARN(!pbd);
return pbd;
}
@@ -339,6 +340,9 @@ barrier_find_nearest(BarrierScreenPtr cs, DeviceIntPtr dev,
double distance;
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, dev->id);
+ if (!pbd)
+ continue;
+
if (pbd->seen)
continue;
@@ -447,6 +451,9 @@ input_constrain_cursor(DeviceIntPtr dev, ScreenPtr screen,
nearest = &c->barrier;
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, master->id);
+ if (!pbd)
+ continue;
+
new_sequence = !pbd->hit;
pbd->seen = TRUE;
@@ -487,6 +494,9 @@ input_constrain_cursor(DeviceIntPtr dev, ScreenPtr screen,
int flags = 0;
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, master->id);
+ if (!pbd)
+ continue;
+
pbd->seen = FALSE;
if (!pbd->hit)
continue;
@@ -681,6 +691,9 @@ BarrierFreeBarrier(void *data, XID id)
continue;
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, dev->id);
+ if (!pbd)
+ continue;
+
if (!pbd->hit)
continue;
@@ -740,6 +753,8 @@ static void remove_master_func(void *res, XID id, void *devid)
barrier = container_of(b, struct PointerBarrierClient, barrier);
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(barrier, *deviceid);
+ if (!pbd)
+ return;
if (pbd->hit) {
BarrierEvent ev = {
@@ -904,6 +919,10 @@ ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client)
barrier = container_of(b, struct PointerBarrierClient, barrier);
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(barrier, dev->id);
+ if (!pbd) {
+ client->errorValue = dev->id;
+ return BadDevice;
+ }
if (pbd->barrier_event_id == event_id)
pbd->release_event_id = event_id;
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
From f5ce639ff9d3af05e79efce6c51e084352d28ed1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 16:09:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] composite: initialize border clip even when
pixmap alloc fails
If it fails to allocate the pixmap, the function compAllocPixmap() would
return early and leave the borderClip region uninitialized, which may
lead to the use of uninitialized value as reported by valgrind:
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
at 0x4F9B33: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:317)
by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476)
by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679)
by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693)
by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446)
by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171)
by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592)
by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925)
by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
at 0x48EEDBC: pixman_region_translate (pixman-region.c:2233)
by 0x4F9255: RegionTranslate (regionstr.h:312)
by 0x4F9B7E: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:319)
by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476)
by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679)
by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693)
by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446)
by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171)
by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592)
by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925)
by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
at 0x48EEE33: UnknownInlinedFun (pixman-region.c:2241)
by 0x48EEE33: pixman_region_translate (pixman-region.c:2225)
by 0x4F9255: RegionTranslate (regionstr.h:312)
by 0x4F9B7E: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:319)
by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476)
by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679)
by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693)
by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446)
by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171)
by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592)
by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925)
by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Fix compAllocPixmap() to initialize the border clip even if the creation
of the backing pixmap has failed, to avoid depending later on
uninitialized border clip values.
Related to CVE-2025-26599, ZDI-CAN-25851
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
composite/compalloc.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/composite/compalloc.c b/composite/compalloc.c
index ecb1b6147..d1342799b 100644
--- a/composite/compalloc.c
+++ b/composite/compalloc.c
@@ -605,9 +605,12 @@ compAllocPixmap(WindowPtr pWin)
int h = pWin->drawable.height + (bw << 1);
PixmapPtr pPixmap = compNewPixmap(pWin, x, y, w, h);
CompWindowPtr cw = GetCompWindow(pWin);
+ Bool status;
- if (!pPixmap)
- return FALSE;
+ if (!pPixmap) {
+ status = FALSE;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (cw->update == CompositeRedirectAutomatic)
pWin->redirectDraw = RedirectDrawAutomatic;
else
@@ -621,14 +624,16 @@ compAllocPixmap(WindowPtr pWin)
DamageRegister(&pWin->drawable, cw->damage);
cw->damageRegistered = TRUE;
}
+ status = TRUE;
+out:
/* Make sure our borderClip is up to date */
RegionUninit(&cw->borderClip);
RegionCopy(&cw->borderClip, &pWin->borderClip);
cw->borderClipX = pWin->drawable.x;
cw->borderClipY = pWin->drawable.y;
- return TRUE;
+ return status;
}
void
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 10a24e364ac15983051d0bb90817c88bbe107036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 15:19:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] composite: Handle failure to redirect in
compRedirectWindow()
The function compCheckRedirect() may fail if it cannot allocate the
backing pixmap.
In that case, compRedirectWindow() will return a BadAlloc error.
However that failure code path will shortcut the validation of the
window tree marked just before, which leaves the validate data partly
initialized.
That causes a use of uninitialized pointer later.
The fix is to not shortcut the call to compHandleMarkedWindows() even in
the case of compCheckRedirect() returning an error.
CVE-2025-26599, ZDI-CAN-25851
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
composite/compalloc.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/composite/compalloc.c b/composite/compalloc.c
index e52c009bd..ecb1b6147 100644
--- a/composite/compalloc.c
+++ b/composite/compalloc.c
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ compRedirectWindow(ClientPtr pClient, WindowPtr pWin, int update)
CompScreenPtr cs = GetCompScreen(pWin->drawable.pScreen);
WindowPtr pLayerWin;
Bool anyMarked = FALSE;
+ int status = Success;
if (pWin == cs->pOverlayWin) {
return Success;
@@ -216,13 +217,13 @@ compRedirectWindow(ClientPtr pClient, WindowPtr pWin, int update)
if (!compCheckRedirect(pWin)) {
FreeResource(ccw->id, RT_NONE);
- return BadAlloc;
+ status = BadAlloc;
}
if (anyMarked)
compHandleMarkedWindows(pWin, pLayerWin);
- return Success;
+ return status;
}
void
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,64 @@
From 70ad5d36ae80f6e5a436eabfee642c2c013e51cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 16:18:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: Dequeue pending events on frozen device on
removal
When a device is removed while still frozen, the events queued for that
device remain while the device itself is freed.
As a result, replaying the events will cause a use after free.
To avoid the issue, make sure to dequeue and free any pending events on
a frozen device when removed.
CVE-2025-26600, ZDI-CAN-25871
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
dix/devices.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
index 969819534..740390207 100644
--- a/dix/devices.c
+++ b/dix/devices.c
@@ -966,6 +966,23 @@ FreeAllDeviceClasses(ClassesPtr classes)
}
+static void
+FreePendingFrozenDeviceEvents(DeviceIntPtr dev)
+{
+ QdEventPtr qe, tmp;
+
+ if (!dev->deviceGrab.sync.frozen)
+ return;
+
+ /* Dequeue any frozen pending events */
+ xorg_list_for_each_entry_safe(qe, tmp, &syncEvents.pending, next) {
+ if (qe->device == dev) {
+ xorg_list_del(&qe->next);
+ free(qe);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/**
* Close down a device and free all resources.
* Once closed down, the driver will probably not expect you that you'll ever
@@ -1030,6 +1047,7 @@ CloseDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev)
free(dev->last.touches[j].valuators);
free(dev->last.touches);
dev->config_info = NULL;
+ FreePendingFrozenDeviceEvents(dev);
dixFreePrivates(dev->devPrivates, PRIVATE_DEVICE);
free(dev);
}
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,80 @@
From 7dc3f11abb51cad8a59ecbff5278c8c8a318df41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 16:54:30 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] sync: Check values before applying changes
In SyncInitTrigger(), we would set the CheckTrigger function before
validating the counter value.
As a result, if the counter value overflowed, we would leave the
function SyncInitTrigger() with the CheckTrigger applied but without
updating the trigger object.
To avoid that issue, move the portion of code checking for the trigger
check value before updating the CheckTrigger function.
Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xext/sync.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
index 4267d3af6..4eab5a6ac 100644
--- a/Xext/sync.c
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
@@ -351,6 +351,24 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
}
}
+ if (changes & (XSyncCAValueType | XSyncCAValue)) {
+ if (pTrigger->value_type == XSyncAbsolute)
+ pTrigger->test_value = pTrigger->wait_value;
+ else { /* relative */
+ Bool overflow;
+
+ if (pCounter == NULL)
+ return BadMatch;
+
+ overflow = checked_int64_add(&pTrigger->test_value,
+ pCounter->value, pTrigger->wait_value);
+ if (overflow) {
+ client->errorValue = pTrigger->wait_value >> 32;
+ return BadValue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
if (changes & XSyncCATestType) {
if (pSync && SYNC_FENCE == pSync->type) {
@@ -379,24 +397,6 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
}
}
- if (changes & (XSyncCAValueType | XSyncCAValue)) {
- if (pTrigger->value_type == XSyncAbsolute)
- pTrigger->test_value = pTrigger->wait_value;
- else { /* relative */
- Bool overflow;
-
- if (pCounter == NULL)
- return BadMatch;
-
- overflow = checked_int64_add(&pTrigger->test_value,
- pCounter->value, pTrigger->wait_value);
- if (overflow) {
- client->errorValue = pTrigger->wait_value >> 32;
- return BadValue;
- }
- }
- }
-
if (changes & XSyncCACounter) {
if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */
SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger);
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,47 @@
From 4ccaa5134482b6be9c9a7f0b66cd221ef325d082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:06:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] sync: Do not fail SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject()
We do not want to return a failure at the very last step in
SyncInitTrigger() after having all changes applied.
SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject() must not fail on memory allocation, if the
allocation of the SyncTriggerList fails, trigger a FatalError() instead.
Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xext/sync.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
index 4eab5a6ac..c36de1a2e 100644
--- a/Xext/sync.c
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(SyncTrigger * pTrigger)
return Success;
}
- if (!(pCur = malloc(sizeof(SyncTriggerList))))
- return BadAlloc;
+ /* Failure is not an option, it's succeed or burst! */
+ pCur = XNFalloc(sizeof(SyncTriggerList));
pCur->pTrigger = pTrigger;
pCur->next = pTrigger->pSync->pTriglist;
@@ -409,8 +409,7 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
* a new counter on a trigger
*/
if (newSyncObject) {
- if ((rc = SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(pTrigger)) != Success)
- return rc;
+ SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(pTrigger);
}
else if (pCounter && IsSystemCounter(pCounter)) {
SyncComputeBracketValues(pCounter);
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,128 @@
From f0984082067f79b45383fa1eb889c6a901667331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:10:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] sync: Apply changes last in
SyncChangeAlarmAttributes()
SyncChangeAlarmAttributes() would apply the various changes while
checking for errors.
If one of the changes triggers an error, the changes for the trigger,
counter or delta value would remain, possibly leading to inconsistent
changes.
Postpone the actual changes until we're sure nothing else can go wrong.
Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xext/sync.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
index c36de1a2e..e282e6657 100644
--- a/Xext/sync.c
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
@@ -800,8 +800,14 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
int status;
XSyncCounter counter;
Mask origmask = mask;
+ SyncTrigger trigger;
+ Bool select_events_changed = FALSE;
+ Bool select_events_value;
+ int64_t delta;
- counter = pAlarm->trigger.pSync ? pAlarm->trigger.pSync->id : None;
+ trigger = pAlarm->trigger;
+ delta = pAlarm->delta;
+ counter = trigger.pSync ? trigger.pSync->id : None;
while (mask) {
int index2 = lowbit(mask);
@@ -817,24 +823,24 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
case XSyncCAValueType:
mask &= ~XSyncCAValueType;
/* sanity check in SyncInitTrigger */
- pAlarm->trigger.value_type = *values++;
+ trigger.value_type = *values++;
break;
case XSyncCAValue:
mask &= ~XSyncCAValue;
- pAlarm->trigger.wait_value = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
+ trigger.wait_value = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
values += 2;
break;
case XSyncCATestType:
mask &= ~XSyncCATestType;
/* sanity check in SyncInitTrigger */
- pAlarm->trigger.test_type = *values++;
+ trigger.test_type = *values++;
break;
case XSyncCADelta:
mask &= ~XSyncCADelta;
- pAlarm->delta = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
+ delta = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
values += 2;
break;
@@ -844,10 +850,8 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
client->errorValue = *values;
return BadValue;
}
- status = SyncEventSelectForAlarm(pAlarm, client,
- (Bool) (*values++));
- if (status != Success)
- return status;
+ select_events_value = (Bool) (*values++);
+ select_events_changed = TRUE;
break;
default:
@@ -856,25 +860,33 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
}
}
+ if (select_events_changed) {
+ status = SyncEventSelectForAlarm(pAlarm, client, select_events_value);
+ if (status != Success)
+ return status;
+ }
+
/* "If the test-type is PositiveComparison or PositiveTransition
* and delta is less than zero, or if the test-type is
* NegativeComparison or NegativeTransition and delta is
* greater than zero, a Match error is generated."
*/
if (origmask & (XSyncCADelta | XSyncCATestType)) {
- if ((((pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveComparison) ||
- (pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveTransition))
- && pAlarm->delta < 0)
+ if ((((trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveComparison) ||
+ (trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveTransition))
+ && delta < 0)
||
- (((pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeComparison) ||
- (pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeTransition))
- && pAlarm->delta > 0)
+ (((trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeComparison) ||
+ (trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeTransition))
+ && delta > 0)
) {
return BadMatch;
}
}
/* postpone this until now, when we're sure nothing else can go wrong */
+ pAlarm->delta = delta;
+ pAlarm->trigger = trigger;
if ((status = SyncInitTrigger(client, &pAlarm->trigger, counter, RTCounter,
origmask & XSyncCAAllTrigger)) != Success)
return status;
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,66 @@
From 573a2265aacfeaddcc1bb001905a6f7d4fa15ee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 16:52:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] sync: Do not let sync objects uninitialized
When changing an alarm, the change mask values are evaluated one after
the other, changing the trigger values as requested and eventually,
SyncInitTrigger() is called.
SyncInitTrigger() will evaluate the XSyncCACounter first and may free
the existing sync object.
Other changes are then evaluated and may trigger an error and an early
return, not adding the new sync object.
This can be used to cause a use after free when the alarm eventually
triggers.
To avoid the issue, delete the existing sync object as late as possible
only once we are sure that no further error will cause an early exit.
CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xext/sync.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
index b6417b3b0..4267d3af6 100644
--- a/Xext/sync.c
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
@@ -330,11 +330,6 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
client->errorValue = syncObject;
return rc;
}
- if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */
- SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger);
- pTrigger->pSync = pSync;
- newSyncObject = TRUE;
- }
}
/* if system counter, ask it what the current value is */
@@ -402,6 +397,14 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
}
}
+ if (changes & XSyncCACounter) {
+ if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */
+ SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger);
+ pTrigger->pSync = pSync;
+ newSyncObject = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
/* we wait until we're sure there are no errors before registering
* a new counter on a trigger
*/
--
2.48.1

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@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
From 53e0de91e307870b6790690bd74cf30ac501de50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2025 09:43:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] render: Avoid 0 or less animated cursors
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Animated cursors use a series of cursors that the client can set.
By default, the Xserver assumes at least one cursor is specified
while a client may actually pass no cursor at all.
That causes an out-of-bound read creating the animated cursor and a
crash of the Xserver:
| Invalid read of size 8
| at 0x5323F4: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
| by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Address 0x59aa010 is 0 bytes after a block of size 0 alloc'd
| at 0x48468D3: reallocarray (vg_replace_malloc.c:1803)
| by 0x52D3DA: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1802)
| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
| Invalid read of size 2
| at 0x5323F7: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
| by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Address 0x8 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd
To avoid the issue, check the number of cursors specified and return a
BadValue error in both the proc handler (early) and the animated cursor
creation (as this is a public function) if there is 0 or less cursor.
CVE-2025-49175
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9304e31035f97ddbfcc1d5f3c178da1d04a472ad)
---
render/animcur.c | 3 +++
render/render.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/render/animcur.c b/render/animcur.c
index ef27bda27..77942d846 100644
--- a/render/animcur.c
+++ b/render/animcur.c
@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@ AnimCursorCreate(CursorPtr *cursors, CARD32 *deltas, int ncursor,
int rc = BadAlloc, i;
AnimCurPtr ac;
+ if (ncursor <= 0)
+ return BadValue;
+
for (i = 0; i < screenInfo.numScreens; i++)
if (!GetAnimCurScreen(screenInfo.screens[i]))
return BadImplementation;
diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
index 5bc2a204b..a8c2da056 100644
--- a/render/render.c
+++ b/render/render.c
@@ -1795,6 +1795,8 @@ ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor(ClientPtr client)
ncursor =
(client->req_len -
(bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xRenderCreateAnimCursorReq)))) >> 1;
+ if (ncursor <= 0)
+ return BadValue;
cursors = xallocarray(ncursor, sizeof(CursorPtr) + sizeof(CARD32));
if (!cursors)
return BadAlloc;
--
2.49.0

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@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
From 57248c57e971bb7cc0ccae6de4c49a49ff13b45c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 16:13:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver] os: Do not overflow the integer size with BigRequest
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The BigRequest extension allows request larger than the 16-bit length
limit.
It uses integers for the request length and checks for the size not to
exceed the maxBigRequestSize limit, but does so after translating the
length to integer by multiplying the given size in bytes by 4.
In doing so, it might overflow the integer size limit before actually
checking for the overflow, defeating the purpose of the test.
To avoid the issue, make sure to check that the request size does not
overflow the maxBigRequestSize limit prior to any conversion.
The caller Dispatch() function however expects the return value to be in
bytes, so we cannot just return the converted value in case of error, as
that would also overflow the integer size.
To preserve the existing API, we use a negative value for the X11 error
code BadLength as the function only return positive values, 0 or -1 and
update the caller Dispatch() function to take that case into account to
return the error code to the offending client.
CVE-2025-49176
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b380b0a6c2022fbd3115552b1cd88251b5268daa)
---
dix/dispatch.c | 9 +++++----
os/io.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c
index 6f4e349e0..15e63e22a 100644
--- a/dix/dispatch.c
+++ b/dix/dispatch.c
@@ -518,9 +518,10 @@ Dispatch(void)
/* now, finally, deal with client requests */
result = ReadRequestFromClient(client);
- if (result <= 0) {
- if (result < 0)
- CloseDownClient(client);
+ if (result == 0)
+ break;
+ else if (result == -1) {
+ CloseDownClient(client);
break;
}
@@ -541,7 +542,7 @@ Dispatch(void)
client->index,
client->requestBuffer);
#endif
- if (result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
+ if (result < 0 || result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
result = BadLength;
else {
result = XaceHookDispatch(client, client->majorOp);
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
index 5b7fac349..5fc05821c 100644
--- a/os/io.c
+++ b/os/io.c
@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
}
client->req_len = needed;
+ if (needed > MAXINT >> 2) {
+ /* Check for potential integer overflow */
+ return -(BadLength);
+ }
needed <<= 2; /* needed is in bytes now */
}
if (gotnow < needed) {
--
2.49.0

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@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 6794bf46b1c76c0a424940c97be3576dc2e7e9b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:39:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] os: Check for integer overflow on BigRequest length
Check for another possible integer overflow once we get a complete xReq
with BigRequest.
Related to CVE-2025-49176
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Harris <pharris2@rocketsoftware.com>
---
os/io.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
index e7b76b9cea..167b40a720 100644
--- a/os/io.c
+++ b/os/io.c
@@ -394,6 +394,8 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
}
client->req_len = needed;
+ if (needed > MAXINT >> 2)
+ return -(BadLength);
needed <<= 2;
}
if (gotnow < needed) {
--
GitLab

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@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 90a13c564e7b9ba5c0d8d92acac80689cd051898 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 10:46:03 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver] os: Account for bytes to ignore when sharing input
buffer
When reading requests from the clients, the input buffer might be shared
and used between different clients.
If a given client sends a full request with non-zero bytes to ignore,
the bytes to ignore may still be non-zero even though the request is
full, in which case the buffer could be shared with another client who's
request will not be processed because of those bytes to ignore, leading
to a possible hang of the other client request.
To avoid the issue, make sure we have zero bytes to ignore left in the
input request when sharing the input buffer with another client.
CVE-2025-49178
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit b0c1cbf4f8e6baa372b1676d2f30512de8ab4ed3)
---
os/io.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
index 5fc05821c..26f9161ef 100644
--- a/os/io.c
+++ b/os/io.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
*/
gotnow -= needed;
- if (!gotnow)
+ if (!gotnow && !oci->ignoreBytes)
AvailableInput = oc;
if (move_header) {
if (client->req_len < bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xBigReq) - sizeof(xReq))) {
--
2.49.0

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@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 9a4f3012ba5752be1634455a3f0c7c125eabb328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 11:47:15 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver] record: Check for overflow in
RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients()
The RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients() checks for the request length,
but does not check for integer overflow.
A client might send a very large value for either the number of clients
or the number of protocol ranges that will cause an integer overflow in
the request length computation, defeating the check for request length.
To avoid the issue, explicitly check the number of clients against the
limit of clients (which is much lower than an maximum integer value) and
the number of protocol ranges (multiplied by the record length) do not
exceed the maximum integer value.
This way, we ensure that the final computation for the request length
will not overflow the maximum integer limit.
CVE-2025-49179
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit ea52403bf222f8bd6ee4c509bed5e34f0c789b00)
---
record/record.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c
index e123867a7..018e53f81 100644
--- a/record/record.c
+++ b/record/record.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ and Jim Haggerty of Metheus.
#include "inputstr.h"
#include "eventconvert.h"
#include "scrnintstr.h"
+#include "opaque.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>
@@ -1298,6 +1299,13 @@ RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients(RecordContextPtr pContext, ClientPtr client,
int i;
XID recordingClient;
+ /* LimitClients is 2048 at max, way less that MAXINT */
+ if (stuff->nClients > LimitClients)
+ return BadValue;
+
+ if (stuff->nRanges > (MAXINT - 4 * stuff->nClients) / SIZEOF(xRecordRange))
+ return BadValue;
+
if (((client->req_len << 2) - SIZEOF(xRecordRegisterClientsReq)) !=
4 * stuff->nClients + SIZEOF(xRecordRange) * stuff->nRanges)
return BadLength;
--
2.49.0

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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From 5e7a3a955853218536ba4a7e696360aab0064206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 15:18:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] randr: Check for overflow in
RRChangeProviderProperty()
A client might send a request causing an integer overflow when computing
the total size to allocate in RRChangeProviderProperty().
To avoid the issue, check that total length in bytes won't exceed the
maximum integer value.
CVE-2025-49180
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 1b0bf563a3a76b06ddcd6fc4d8e72d81f6773699)
---
randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
index 90c5a9a93..0aa35ad87 100644
--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ RRChangeProviderProperty(RRProviderPtr provider, Atom property, Atom type,
if (mode == PropModeReplace || len > 0) {
void *new_data = NULL, *old_data = NULL;
-
+ if (total_len > MAXINT / size_in_bytes)
+ return BadValue;
total_size = total_len * size_in_bytes;
new_value.data = (void *) malloc(total_size);
if (!new_value.data && total_size) {
--
2.49.0

View File

@ -32,7 +32,7 @@
Description=XVNC Per-Connection Daemon
[Service]
ExecStart=-/usr/bin/Xvnc -inetd -query localhost -geometry 1024x768 -depth 24 -once -SecurityTypes=None
ExecStart=-/usr/bin/Xvnc -inetd -query localhost -geometry 1024x768 -depth 24 -once -SecurityTypes=None -Log *:syslog:30
User=nobody
StandardInput=socket
StandardError=syslog

View File

@ -5,12 +5,12 @@
Name: tigervnc
Version: 1.15.0
Release: 5%{?dist}
Release: 7%{?dist}
Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system
%global _hardened_build 1
License: GPL-2.0-or-later
License: GPLv2+
URL: http://www.tigervnc.com
Source0: https://github.com/TigerVNC/%{name}/archive/v%{version}.tar.gz#/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
@ -25,10 +25,11 @@ Source5: vncserver
Patch1: tigervnc-use-gnome-as-default-session.patch
# https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/pull/1425
Patch2: tigervnc-vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service.patch
# https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/pull/1792
Patch3: tigervnc-add-option-allowing-to-connect-only-user-owning-session.patch
Patch3: tigervnc-dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch
# Only warn about passwords longer than 8 characters, but allow them to be used as in the past
Patch4: tigervnc-allow-use-of-passwords-longer-than-eight-characters.patch
# https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/pull/1792
Patch5: tigervnc-add-option-allowing-to-connect-only-user-owning-session.patch
# Upstream patches
Patch50: tigervnc-add-selinux-policy-rules-allowing-create-dirs-under-root-dir.patch
@ -41,7 +42,25 @@ Patch52: tigervnc-dont-print-xvnc-banner-before-parsing-args.patch
Patch100: 0001-rpath-hack.patch
# XServer patches
Patch200: xorg-CVE-2025-26594.patch
Patch201: xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2.patch
Patch202: xorg-CVE-2025-26595.patch
Patch203: xorg-CVE-2025-26596.patch
Patch204: xorg-CVE-2025-26597.patch
Patch205: xorg-CVE-2025-26598.patch
Patch206: xorg-CVE-2025-26599.patch
Patch207: xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2.patch
Patch208: xorg-CVE-2025-26600.patch
Patch209: xorg-CVE-2025-26601.patch
Patch210: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2.patch
Patch211: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3.patch
Patch212: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4.patch
Patch213: xorg-CVE-2025-49175.patch
Patch214: xorg-CVE-2025-49176-1.patch
Patch215: xorg-CVE-2025-49176-2.patch
Patch216: xorg-CVE-2025-49178.patch
Patch217: xorg-CVE-2025-49179.patch
Patch218: xorg-CVE-2025-49180.patch
BuildRequires: make
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
@ -94,7 +113,7 @@ BuildRequires: xorg-x11-xtrans-devel
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel
BuildRequires: selinux-policy-devel
# For RHEL-34880
# For RHEL-91104
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(dbus-1) >= 1.0
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libsystemd) >= 209
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libudev) >= 143
@ -203,13 +222,33 @@ for all in `find . -type f -perm -001`; do
done
%patch -P100 -p1 -b .rpath
cat ../xserver120.patch | patch -p1
%patch -P200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26594
%patch -P201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2
%patch -P202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26595
%patch -P203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26596
%patch -P204 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26597
%patch -P205 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26598
%patch -P206 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26599
%patch -P207 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2
%patch -P208 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26600
%patch -P209 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601
%patch -P210 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2
%patch -P211 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3
%patch -P212 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4
%patch -P213 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49175
%patch -P214 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49176-1
%patch -P215 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49176-2
%patch -P216 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49178
%patch -P217 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49179
%patch -P218 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49180
popd
# Tigervnc patches
%patch -P1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session
%patch -P2 -p1 -b .vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service
%patch -P3 -p1 -b .add-option-allowing-to-connect-only-user-owning-session
%patch -P3 -p1 -b .dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch
%patch -P4 -p1 -b .allow-use-of-passwords-longer-than-eight-characters
%patch -P5 -p1 -b .add-option-allowing-to-connect-only-user-owning-session
# Upstream patches
%patch -P50 -p1 -b .add-selinux-policy-rules-allowing-create-dirs-under-root-dir
@ -226,20 +265,10 @@ export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fpic"
%endif
export CXXFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=c++11"
%define __cmake_builddir %{_target_platform}
mkdir -p %{%__cmake_builddir}
%cmake
%cmake_build
%{cmake} .
make %{?_smp_mflags}
pushd unix/xserver
%if 0%{?fedora} > 32 || 0%{?rhel} >= 9
sed -i 's@TIGERVNC_BUILDDIR=${top_builddir}/\.\./\.\.@TIGERVNC_BUILDDIR=${TIGERVNC_SRCDIR}/%{_target_platform}@g' hw/vnc/Makefile.am
%endif
autoreconf -fiv
%configure \
--disable-xorg --disable-xnest --disable-xvfb --disable-dmx \
@ -261,11 +290,7 @@ make %{?_smp_mflags}
popd
# Build icons
%if 0%{?fedora} > 32 || 0%{?rhel} >= 9
pushd %{_target_platform}/media
%else
pushd media
%endif
make
popd
@ -274,22 +299,24 @@ pushd unix/vncserver/selinux
make
popd
%install
%cmake_install
rm -f %{buildroot}%{_docdir}/%{name}-%{version}/{README.rst,LICENCE.TXT}
%make_install
pushd unix/xserver/hw/vnc
%make_install
make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot}
popd
# Install systemd unit file
pushd unix/vncserver/selinux
make install DESTDIR=%{buildroot}
popd
# Install systemd unit file
install -m644 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/xvnc@.service
install -m644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/xvnc.socket
# Install old vncserver script
install -m 755 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/vncserver
# Install desktop stuff
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/{16x16,24x24,48x48}/apps
@ -300,21 +327,6 @@ install -m644 tigervnc_$s.png %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/${s}x$s/apps
done
popd
appstream-util validate-relax --nonet %{buildroot}%{_metainfodir}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
desktop-file-validate %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/applications/vncviewer.desktop
%if 0%{?rhel} > 9
# Install a replacement for /usr/bin/vncserver which will tell the user to read the
# HOWTO.md file
cat <<EOF > %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/vncserver
#!/bin/bash
echo "vncserver has been replaced by a systemd unit."
echo "Please read /usr/share/doc/tigervnc/HOWTO.md for more information."
EOF
chmod +x %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/vncserver
%else
install -m 755 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/vncserver
%endif
%find_lang %{name} %{name}.lang
@ -354,7 +366,6 @@ fi
%{_bindir}/vncviewer
%{_datadir}/applications/*
%{_mandir}/man1/vncviewer.1*
%{_datadir}/metainfo/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
%files server
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/tigervnc
@ -398,373 +409,315 @@ fi
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename}
%changelog
* Mon Jun 23 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-5
* Wed Jun 18 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-7
- Additional fix to CVE-2025-49176: xorg-x11-server: Integer Overflow in Big Requests Extension
Resolves: RHEL-97294
* Tue Jun 17 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-6
- Fix CVE-2025-49175: xorg-x11-server: Out-of-Bounds Read in X Rendering Extension Animated Cursors
Resolves: RHEL-97284
Resolves: RHEL-97268
- Fix CVE-2025-49176: xorg-x11-server: Integer Overflow in Big Requests Extension
Resolves: RHEL-97303
Resolves: RHEL-97294
- Fix CVE-2025-49178: xorg-x11-server: Unprocessed Client Request Due to Bytes to Ignore
Resolves: RHEL-97379
Resolves: RHEL-97364
- Fix CVE-2025-49179: xorg-x11-server: Integer overflow in X Record extension
Resolves: RHEL-97414
Resolves: RHEL-97397
- Fix CVE-2025-49180: xorg-x11-server: Integer Overflow in X Resize, Rotate and Reflect (RandR) Extension
Resolves: RHEL-97429
Resolves: RHEL-97232
* Tue May 27 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-4
* Tue May 27 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-5
- Fix broken authentication with x0vncserver
Resolves: RHEL-93573
Resolves: RHEL-93729
* Thu May 15 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-4
- Add option "ApproveLoggedUserOnly" allowing to connect only the user
owning the running session
Resolves: RHEL-91104
* Wed Apr 30 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-3
- Only warn about 8 characters limit, but let it proceed
Resolves: RHEL-89432
Resolves: RHEL-89430
* Wed Apr 16 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-2
- Fix inetd mode not working
Resolves: RHEL-86511
Resolves: RHEL-86513
* Fri Mar 07 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-1
* Wed Feb 26 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-1
- 1.15.0
Resolves: RHEL-78617
- Add SELinux policy rules allowing to access /proc/sys/fs/nr_open
Resolves: RHEL-77973
- Add SELinux policy rules allowing to create directories under /root
Resolves: RHEL-77975
Resolves: RHEL-79161
Resolves: RHEL-79982
* Wed Feb 26 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-15
- Fix CVE-2025-26594 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free of the root cursor
Resolves: RHEL-80208
Resolves: RHEL-79397
- Fix CVE-2025-26595 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText()
Resolves: RHEL-80189
Resolves: RHEL-79401
- Fix CVE-2025-26596 xorg-x11-server Heap overflow in XkbWriteKeySyms()
Resolves: RHEL-80194
Resolves: RHEL-79386
- Fix CVE-2025-26597 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey()
Resolves: RHEL-80196
Resolves: RHEL-79380
- Fix CVE-2025-26598 xorg-x11-server Out-of-bounds write in CreatePointerBarrierClient()
Resolves: RHEL-80197
Resolves: RHEL-79369
- Fix CVE-2025-26599 xorg-x11-server Use of uninitialized pointer in compRedirectWindow()
Resolves: RHEL-80206
Resolves: RHEL-79364
- Fix CVE-2025-26600 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in PlayReleasedEvents()
Resolves: RHEL-80205
Resolves: RHEL-79360
- Fix CVE-2025-26601 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in SyncInitTrigger()
Resolves: RHEL-80209
Resolves: RHEL-79348
* Tue Jan 21 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-4
- Fix crash in clipboard support in x0vncserver
Resolves: RHEL-74216
* Thu Jan 16 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-3
- Add clipboard support to x0vncserver
Resolves: RHEL-74216
* Thu Oct 31 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-2
* Thu Oct 31 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-14
- Fix CVE-2024-9632: xorg-x11-server: heap-based buffer overflow privilege escalation vulnerability
Resolves: RHEL-62001
Resolves: RHEL-61999
* Wed Oct 23 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-1
- 1.14.1
Resolves: RHEL-45316
* Mon Oct 07 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-6
- Make "ApproveLoggedUserOnly" to ignore "closing" sessions
Resolves: RHEL-34880
* Fri Oct 04 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-5
- Fix "ApproveLoggedUserOnly" option not working in some setups
Resolves: RHEL-34880
* Fri Sep 27 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-4
- Add option "ApproveLoggedUserOnly" allowing to connect only the user
owning the running session
Resolves: RHEL-34880
* Wed Sep 04 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-3
- Move old log to log.old if present (fix patch)
Resolves: RHEL-54294
* Tue Aug 20 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-2
- 1.14.0
Resolves: RHEL-45316
- Move old log to log.old if present
Resolves: RHEL-54294
- Fix shared memory leak
Resolves: RHEL-55768
* Mon Aug 05 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-11
* Mon Aug 05 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-13
- vncsession: use /bin/sh if the user shell is not set
Resolves: RHEL-50679
Resolves: RHEL-52827
* Tue May 28 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-10
* Fri Jul 12 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-12
- Fix FTBS: drop already applied Xorg patches
Resolves: RHEL-46696
* Tue May 28 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-11
- vncconfig: add option to force view-only remote client connections
Resolves: RHEL-12144
Resolves: RHEL-11908
* Tue Apr 16 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-9
* Mon Apr 15 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-10
- Drop patches that are already part of xorg-x11-server
Resolves: RHEL-30755
Resolves: RHEL-30767
Resolves: RHEL-30761
* Thu Apr 04 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-9
- Fix CVE-2024-31080 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overread/data leakage in ProcXIGetSelectedEvents
Resolves: RHEL-30756
Resolves: RHEL-30755
- Fix CVE-2024-31083 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: User-after-free in ProcRenderAddGlyphs
Resolves: RHEL-30768
Resolves: RHEL-30767
- Fix CVE-2024-31081 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overread/data leakage in ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice
Resolves: RHEL-30762
Resolves: RHEL-30761
* Wed Feb 07 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-8
- Fix copy/paste error in the DeviceStateNotify
Resolves: RHEL-20533
Resolves: RHEL-20530
* Mon Jan 22 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-7
- Fix CVE-2024-21886 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in DisableDevice
Resolves: RHEL-20389
Resolves: RHEL-20388
- Fix CVE-2024-21885 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent
Resolves: RHEL-20383
Resolves: RHEL-20382
- Fix CVE-2024-0229 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: reattaching to different master device may lead to out-of-bounds memory access
Resolves: RHEL-20533
Resolves: RHEL-20530
- Fix CVE-2023-6816 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overflow in DeviceFocusEvent and ProcXIQueryPointer
Resolves: RHEL-21213
Resolves: RHEL-21214
* Mon Jan 08 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-6
- Use dup() to get available file descriptor when using -inetd option
Resolves: RHEL-19858
Resolves: RHEL-21000
* Mon Dec 18 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-5
- Fix CVE-2023-6377 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory reads/writes in XKB button actions
Resolves: RHEL-18414
Resolves: RHEL-18410
- Fix CVE-2023-6478 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory read in RRChangeOutputProperty and RRChangeProviderProperty
Resolves: RHEL-18426
Resolves: RHEL-18422
* Wed Nov 01 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-4
- Fix CVE-2023-5380 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Use-after-free bug in DestroyWindow
Resolves: RHEL-15237
Resolves: RHEL-15236
- Fix CVE-2023-5367 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Out-of-bounds write in XIChangeDeviceProperty/RRChangeOutputProperty
Resolves: RHEL-15249
Resolves: RHEL-15230
* Mon Oct 09 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-3
- Support username alias in PlainUsers
Resolves: RHEL-8430
Resolves: RHEL-4258
* Tue Apr 11 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-2
- xorg-x11-server: X.Org Server Overlay Window Use-After-Free Local Privilege
Escalation Vulnerability
Resolves: bz#2180310
Resolves: bz#2180306
* Tue Mar 21 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-1
- 1.13.1
Resolves: bz#2175732
Resolves: bz#2175748
- Restore "--fallbacktofreeport" option in the vncserver script
Resolves: bz#2174398
* Tue Feb 21 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-12
- SELinux: allow vncsession create .vnc directory
Resolves: bz#2164703
* Thu Dec 08 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-9
- Bump build version to fix upgrade path
Resolves: bz#1437569
* Wed Feb 15 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-11
- Add sanity check when cleaning up keymap changes
Resolves: bz#2169965
* Mon Feb 06 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-10
- xorg-x11-server: DeepCopyPointerClasses use-after-free leads to privilege elevation
Resolves: bz#2167061
* Tue Dec 20 2022 Tomas Popela <tpopela@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-9
- Rebuild for xorg-x11-server CVE-2022-46340 follow up fix
* Fri Dec 16 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-8
- Rebuild for xorg-x11-server CVEs
Resolves: CVE-2022-4283 (bz#2154234)
Resolves: CVE-2022-46340 (bz#2154221)
Resolves: CVE-2022-46341 (bz#2154224)
Resolves: CVE-2022-46342 (bz#2154226)
Resolves: CVE-2022-46343 (bz#2154228)
Resolves: CVE-2022-46344 (bz#2154230)
* Thu Dec 01 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-7
* Fri Nov 18 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-8
- x0vncserver: add new keysym in case we don't find matching keycode
+ actually apply the patch
Resolves: bz#2119017
Resolves: bz#1437569
* Thu Dec 01 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-6
- x0vncserver: add new keysym in case we don't find matching keycode
Resolves: bz#2119017
* Mon Oct 24 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-5
* Wed Aug 24 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-7
- x0vncserver: fix ghost cursor in zaphod mode (better version)
Resolves: bz#2119016
Resolves: bz#2109679
* Tue May 31 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-4
- Add BR: libXdamage, libXfixes, libXrandr
Resolves: bz#2091833
* Wed Aug 17 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-6
- x0vncserver: fix ghost cursor in zaphod mode
Resolves: bz#2109679
* Tue Apr 05 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-3
- Do not run systemd_preun on Xvnc service file
Resolves: bz#2048011
* Tue May 31 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-5
- BR: libXdamage, libXfixes, libXrandr
Resolves: bz#2088733
* Mon Apr 04 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-2
- Drop unexisting option from the old vncserver script
Resolves: bz#2021893
* Wed Mar 23 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-1
- 1.12.0 + sync with Fedora
Resolves: bz#2048011
Resolves: bz#2021893
* Mon Feb 07 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-21
* Tue Feb 08 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-4
- Added vncsession-restore script for SELinux policy migration
Fix SELinux context for root user
Resolves: bz#2049506
Resolves: bz#2021892
* Fri Nov 26 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-20
- Rebuild for absence in RHEL 9.0
Resolves: bz#1985858
* Fri Jan 21 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-3
- Fix crash in vncviewer
Resolves: bz#2021892
* Mon Aug 16 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-19
- Sync upstream patches + drop unused patches
Resolves: bz#1985858
* Fri Jan 14 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-2
- Remove unavailable option from vncserver script
Resolves: bz#2021892
* Tue Aug 10 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-18
- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
Related: rhbz#1991688
* Fri Jan 14 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-1
- 1.12.0
Resolves: bz#2021892
* Mon Jul 19 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-17
* Mon Jul 19 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-9
- Fix logout from VNC session using vncserver
Resolves: bz#1983704
Resolves: bz#1983706
* Tue Jun 01 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-16
- Bump version for rebuild (binutils)
Resolves: bz#1961488
* Tue Jun 01 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-8
- Run all SELinux RPM macros on correct package
Resolves: bz#1907963
* Mon May 17 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-14
* Mon May 17 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-7
- SELinux improvements
Resolves: bz#1961488
Resolves: bz#1907963
- Fix endianness issue on s390x
Resolves: bz#1963029
* Tue Dec 15 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-6
- Use GNOME as default session
Resolves: bz#1853608
* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-13
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
* Thu Dec 03 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-5
- Make sure we log properly output to journal (actually log to syslog)
Resolves: bz#1841537
* Mon Mar 08 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-12
- Include RHEL8 patches
* Thu Dec 03 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-4
- Make sure we log properly output to journal
Resolves: bz#1841537
* Fri Mar 05 2021 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-11
- Enable old vncserver script for RHEL 9
* Wed Nov 18 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-3
- vncserver: ignore new "session" parameter from the new systemd support
Resolves: bz#1897504
* Wed Jan 27 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.11.0-10
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
* Wed Nov 18 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-2
- Revert removal of vncserver
Resolves: bz#1897504
- Correctly start vncsession as a daemon
Resolves: bz#1897498
* Thu Dec 10 07:45:46 CET 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-9
- vncserver: ignore new session parameter from the new systemd support
* Tue Oct 20 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-1
- Update to 1.11.0
Resolves: bz#1880985
- Backport fix to allow Tigervnc use boolean values in config files
Resolves: bz#1883415
* Fri Nov 13 14:08:29 CET 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-8
- Use /run instead of /var/run which is just a symlink
* Wed Sep 30 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-8
- Tolerate specifying -BoolParam 0 and similar
Resolves: bz#1883415
* Thu Nov 05 2020 Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@redhat.com> 1.11.0-7
- Require xkbcomp directly, not xorg-x11-xkb-utils. The latter has had
Provides xkbcomp for years.
* Wed Jul 08 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-7
- Enable server module on s390x
Resolves: bz#1854925
* Tue Sep 29 13:12:22 CEST 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-6
- Backport upstream fix allowing Tigervnc to specify boolean valus in configuration
- Revert removal of vncserver for F32 and F33
* Fri Jul 03 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-6
- Remove trailing spaces in user name
Resolves: bz#1852432
* Thu Sep 24 07:14:06 CEST 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-5
- Actually install the HOWTO.md file
* Wed Sep 23 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-4
- Call systemd macros on correct service file
* Tue Sep 22 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-3
- Do not overwrite libvnc.conf config file
* Thu Sep 17 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-2
* Thu Jun 25 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-5
- Install the HOWTO file to correct location
- Add /usr/bin/vncserver file informing users to read the HOWTO.md file
Resolves: bz#1790443
* Wed Sep 09 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.11.0-1
- 1.11.0
* Mon Jun 15 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-4
- Improve SELinux policy
Resolves: bz#1790443
* Mon Aug 24 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com. - 1.10.90-1
- Update to 1.10.90 (1.11.0 beta)
* Mon Jun 15 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-3
- Add a HOWTO.md file with instructions how to start VNC server
Resolves: bz#1790443
* Sat Aug 01 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.10.1-9
- Second attempt - Rebuilt for
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
* Tue May 26 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-2
- Make the systemd service run also for root user
Resolves: bz#1790443
* Wed Jul 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.10.1-8
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
* Tue Jul 14 2020 Tom Stellard <tstellar@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-7
- Use make macros
- https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/UseMakeBuildInstallMacro
* Sat Jul 11 2020 Jiri Vanek <jvanek@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-6
- Rebuilt for JDK-11, see https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Changes/Java11
* Sun Apr 19 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-5
- Requires: dbus-x11
Resolves: bz#1825331
* Fri Mar 13 2020 Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-4
- Fix build with xserver 1.20.7
* Fri Jan 31 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.10.1-3
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
* Mon Jan 13 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-2
- Build with -std=c++11
* Fri Dec 20 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-1
* Mon Apr 27 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.1-1
- Update to 1.10.1
Resolves: bz#1806992
* Tue Dec 10 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-2
- Properly install systemd files
- Add proper systemd support
Resolves: bz#1790443
* Mon Nov 18 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.10.0-1
- Update to 1.10.0
* Tue Jan 28 2020 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-13
- Bump build because of z-stream
Resolves: bz#1671714
* Fri Oct 18 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.90-1
- Update to 1.9.90 (1.10 beta)
- Add systemd user service file
- Use a wrapper for systemd system service file to workaround systemd limitations
* Wed Dec 11 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-12
- Fix installation of systemd files
Resolves: bz#1671714
* Sat Jul 27 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.9.0-7
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
* Wed Nov 20 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-11
- Use wrapper script to workaround systemd issues
Resolves: bz#1671714
* Fri Jul 19 2019 Dan Horák <dan[at]danny.cz> - 1.9.0-6
- drop the s390x special handling (related #1727029)
* Fri Jul 12 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-10
- Do not return returncode indicating error when running "vncserver -list"
Resolves: bz#1727860
* Wed Jun 12 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-5
- Add missing arguments to systemd_postun scriptlets
Resolves: bz#1716411
* Fri Feb 08 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-9
- Make tigervnc systemd service a user service
Resolves: bz#1639846
* Sun Feb 03 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.9.0-4
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
* Mon Jan 21 2019 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-8
- Kill the session automatically only when Gnome is installed
Resolves: bz#1665876
* Tue Sep 25 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-3
* Tue Nov 20 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-7
- Improve coverity scan fixes
Resolves: bz#1602714
Inform whether view-only password is used or not
Resolves: bz#1639169
Backport fixes from RHEL 7
Resolves: bz#1651254
* Tue Oct 09 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-6
- Do not crash passwd when using malloc perturb checks
Resolves: bz#1631483
Resolves: bz#1637086
* Mon Oct 08 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-5
- Improve coverity scan fixes
Resolves: bz#1602714
* Wed Oct 03 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-4
- Improve coverity scan fixes
Resolves: bz#1602714
* Wed Oct 03 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-3
- Fix some coverity scan issues
Resolves: bz#1602714
* Wed Aug 01 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-2
- Ignore buttons in mouse leave events
Resolves: bz#1609516
- Remove dependency on initscripts
* Tue Jul 17 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.9.0-1
- Update to 1.9.0
- Update to 1.9.0 + sync with Fedora
* Sat Jul 14 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.8.90-3
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
* Tue Jun 12 2018 Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-10
- Fix GLX initialization with Xorg 1.20
* Wed Jul 4 2018 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 1.8.90-2
- Clean up spec: use macros consistenly, drop old sys-v migrations
- Drop ancient obsolete/provides
* Tue May 29 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-9
- Build against Xorg 1.20
* Thu Jun 14 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.8.90-1
- Update to 1.8.90
* Wed Jun 13 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-10
- Fix tigervnc systemd unit file
Resolves: bz#1583159
* Wed Jun 06 2018 Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-9
- Fix GLX initialization with 1.20
* Wed Apr 04 2018 Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-8
- Rebuild for xserver 1.20
* Mon May 14 2018 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.8.0-8
- Drop BR: ImageMagick
* Fri Feb 09 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 1.8.0-7
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild