Compare commits
No commits in common. "c8" and "c8-beta" have entirely different histories.
2
.gitignore
vendored
2
.gitignore
vendored
@ -1 +1 @@
|
||||
SOURCES/tigervnc-1.15.0.tar.gz
|
||||
SOURCES/tigervnc-1.13.1.tar.gz
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1 +1 @@
|
||||
fec424f110bdf5032cd5eb4df2596b8251d2e1ed SOURCES/tigervnc-1.15.0.tar.gz
|
||||
6f7a23f14833f552c88523da1a5e102f3b8d35c2 SOURCES/tigervnc-1.13.1.tar.gz
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,265 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 69b0fd6d77ea5968bd815188ee2bda3d282ebc60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2024 14:31:14 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Add option allowing to connect only the user owning the
|
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running session
|
||||
|
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Checks, whether the user who is trying to authenticate is already logged
|
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into the running session in order to allow or reject the connection.
|
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This is expected to be used with 'plain' security type in combination
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with 'PlainUsers=*' option allowing everyone to connect to the session.
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---
|
||||
common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx | 7 --
|
||||
unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx | 8 ++
|
||||
unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h | 7 ++
|
||||
unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man | 7 ++
|
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5 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
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|
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diff --git a/common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx b/common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx
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index b99d33b..aa8d53e 100644
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--- a/common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx
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+++ b/common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx
|
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@@ -682,13 +682,6 @@ void VNCServerST::queryConnection(VNCSConnectionST* client,
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return;
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}
|
||||
|
||||
- // - Are we configured to do queries?
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||||
- if (!rfb::Server::queryConnect &&
|
||||
- !client->getSock()->requiresQuery()) {
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||||
- approveConnection(client->getSock(), true, nullptr);
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- return;
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- }
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-
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// - Does the client have the right to bypass the query?
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if (client->accessCheck(AccessNoQuery))
|
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{
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||||
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
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index b43e3f7..3d00e23 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
|
||||
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
|
||||
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
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#include <network/Socket.h>
|
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|
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#include <rfb/LogWriter.h>
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+#include <rfb/ServerCore.h>
|
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|
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#include <x0vncserver/XDesktop.h>
|
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|
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@@ -320,6 +321,13 @@ void XDesktop::queryConnection(network::Socket* sock,
|
||||
{
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assert(isRunning());
|
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|
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+ // - Are we configured to do queries?
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+ if (!rfb::Server::queryConnect &&
|
||||
+ !sock->requiresQuery()) {
|
||||
+ server->approveConnection(sock, true, nullptr);
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||||
+ return;
|
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+ }
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+
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// Someone already querying?
|
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if (queryConnectSock) {
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std::list<network::Socket*> sockets;
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diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc
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index 260ed3a..c8741f6 100644
|
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--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc
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||||
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc
|
||||
@@ -51,6 +51,11 @@
|
||||
#include "XorgGlue.h"
|
||||
#include "vncInput.h"
|
||||
|
||||
+#if HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
|
||||
+# include <pwd.h>
|
||||
+# include <systemd/sd-login.h>
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
extern "C" {
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void vncSetGlueContext(int screenIndex);
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void vncPresentMscEvent(uint64_t id, uint64_t msc);
|
||||
@@ -71,6 +76,15 @@ IntParameter queryConnectTimeout("QueryConnectTimeout",
|
||||
"rejecting the connection",
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||||
10);
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
|
||||
+BoolParameter approveLoggedUserOnly
|
||||
+("ApproveLoggedUserOnly",
|
||||
+ "Approve only the user who is currently logged into the session."
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||||
+ "This is expected to be combined with 'plain' security type and with "
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||||
+ "'PlainUsers=*' option allowing everyone to connect to the session."
|
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+ "Default is off.",
|
||||
+ false);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
|
||||
XserverDesktop::XserverDesktop(int screenIndex_,
|
||||
std::list<network::SocketListener*> listeners_,
|
||||
@@ -164,11 +178,134 @@ void XserverDesktop::init(rfb::VNCServer* vs)
|
||||
// ready state
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
|
||||
+bool XserverDesktop::checkUserLogged(const char* userName)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ bool ret = false;
|
||||
+ bool noUserSession = true;
|
||||
+ int res;
|
||||
+ char **sessions;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ res = sd_get_sessions(&sessions);
|
||||
+ if (res < 0) {
|
||||
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to get sessions");
|
||||
+ return false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (sessions != nullptr && sessions[0] != nullptr) {
|
||||
+ for (int i = 0; sessions[i]; i++) {
|
||||
+ uid_t uid;
|
||||
+ char *clazz;
|
||||
+ char *display;
|
||||
+ char *type;
|
||||
+ char *state;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ res = sd_session_get_type(sessions[i], &type);
|
||||
+ if (res < 0) {
|
||||
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine session type");
|
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+ break;
|
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+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (strcmp(type, "x11") != 0) {
|
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+ free(type);
|
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+ continue;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ free(type);
|
||||
+
|
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+ res = sd_session_get_display(sessions[i], &display);
|
||||
+ if (res < 0) {
|
||||
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine display of session");
|
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+ break;
|
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+ }
|
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+
|
||||
+ std::string serverDisplay = ":" + std::to_string(screenIndex);
|
||||
+ std::string serverDisplayIPv4 = "127.0.0.1:" + std::to_string(screenIndex);
|
||||
+ std::string serverDisplayIPv6 = "::1:" + std::to_string(screenIndex);
|
||||
+ if ((strcmp(display, serverDisplay.c_str()) != 0) &&
|
||||
+ (strcmp(display, serverDisplayIPv4.c_str()) != 0) &&
|
||||
+ (strcmp(display, serverDisplayIPv6.c_str()) != 0)) {
|
||||
+ free(display);
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ free(display);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ res = sd_session_get_class(sessions[i], &clazz);
|
||||
+ if (res < 0) {
|
||||
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine session class");
|
||||
+ break;
|
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+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ res = sd_session_get_state(sessions[i], &state);
|
||||
+ if (res < 0) {
|
||||
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine session state");
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (strcmp(state, "closing") == 0) {
|
||||
+ free(state);
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ free(state);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ res = sd_session_get_uid(sessions[i], &uid);
|
||||
+ if (res < 0) {
|
||||
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine user id of session");
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (uid != 0 && strcmp(clazz, "user") == 0) {
|
||||
+ noUserSession = false;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ free(clazz);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(userName);
|
||||
+ if (!pw) {
|
||||
+ vlog.debug("logind: user not found");
|
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+ break;
|
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+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (uid == pw->pw_uid) {
|
||||
+ ret = true;
|
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+ break;
|
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+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
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+ if (sessions) {
|
||||
+ for (int i = 0; sessions[i]; i ++) {
|
||||
+ free(sessions[i]);
|
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+ }
|
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+
|
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+ free (sessions);
|
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+ }
|
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+
|
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+ // If we didn't find a matching user, we can still allow the user
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+ // to log in if there is no user session yet.
|
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+ return !ret ? noUserSession : ret;
|
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+}
|
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+#endif
|
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+
|
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void XserverDesktop::queryConnection(network::Socket* sock,
|
||||
const char* userName)
|
||||
{
|
||||
int count;
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
|
||||
+ // - Only owner of the session can be approved
|
||||
+ if (approveLoggedUserOnly && !checkUserLogged(userName)) {
|
||||
+ server->approveConnection(sock, false,
|
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+ "The user is not owner of the running session");
|
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+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ // - Are we configured to do queries?
|
||||
+ if (!rfb::Server::queryConnect &&
|
||||
+ !sock->requiresQuery()) {
|
||||
+ server->approveConnection(sock, true, nullptr);
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (queryConnectTimer.isStarted()) {
|
||||
server->approveConnection(sock, false, "Another connection is currently being queried.");
|
||||
return;
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h
|
||||
index 8c543db..8d6bde4 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h
|
||||
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h
|
||||
@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ public:
|
||||
void grabRegion(const rfb::Region& r) override;
|
||||
|
||||
protected:
|
||||
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
|
||||
+ // - Check whether user is logged into a session
|
||||
+ // Returns true if user is already logged or there is no
|
||||
+ // user session at all.
|
||||
+ bool checkUserLogged(const char* userName);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
bool handleListenerEvent(int fd,
|
||||
std::list<network::SocketListener*>* sockets,
|
||||
rfb::VNCServer* sockserv);
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
|
||||
index d6b1664..24384df 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
|
||||
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
|
||||
@@ -200,6 +200,13 @@ Never treat incoming connections as shared, regardless of the client-specified
|
||||
setting. Default is off.
|
||||
.
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
+.B \-ApproveLoggedUserOnly
|
||||
+Approve only the user who is currently logged into the session.
|
||||
+This is expected to be combined with "Plain" security type and with
|
||||
+"PlainUsers=*" option allowing everyone to connect to the session.
|
||||
+Default is off.
|
||||
+.
|
||||
+.TP
|
||||
.B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP
|
||||
PAM service name to use when authentication users using any of the "Plain"
|
||||
security types. Default is \fBvnc\fP.
|
||||
@ -1,27 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 313200978926cc7b7521c0d645918391b7609681 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 27 Feb 2025 13:49:02 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Add SELinux policy rules allowing to access
|
||||
/proc/sys/fs/nr_open
|
||||
|
||||
This is needed when the nofile limit is set to unlimited, otherwise we
|
||||
will fail to start a VNC session.
|
||||
---
|
||||
unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te b/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te
|
||||
index d92f1bd..2ce4fc8 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te
|
||||
+++ b/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te
|
||||
@@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ allow vnc_session_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
|
||||
allow vnc_session_t vnc_session_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
|
||||
files_pid_filetrans(vnc_session_t, vnc_session_var_run_t, file)
|
||||
|
||||
+# Allow access to /proc/sys/fs/nr_open
|
||||
+# Needed when the nofile limit is set to unlimited.
|
||||
+kernel_read_fs_sysctls(vnc_session_t)
|
||||
+
|
||||
# Allowed to create ~/.local
|
||||
optional_policy(`
|
||||
gnome_filetrans_home_content(vnc_session_t)
|
||||
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From e652f06940f84fd8e19d7b674ae8c6000530fb40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 7 Feb 2025 15:32:49 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Add SELinux policy rules allowing to create directories under
|
||||
/root
|
||||
|
||||
We have policy that allows to create ~/.local or ~/.config, but we don't
|
||||
have rule that allows the same under /root directory, where we fail in
|
||||
case any of these directories doesn't exist.
|
||||
---
|
||||
unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te | 10 ++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te b/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te
|
||||
index d92f1bda7d..2f49717077 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te
|
||||
+++ b/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te
|
||||
@@ -48,6 +48,14 @@ optional_policy(`
|
||||
create_dirs_pattern(vnc_session_t, gconf_home_t, gconf_home_t)
|
||||
')
|
||||
|
||||
+# Allowed to create /root/.local
|
||||
+optional_policy(`
|
||||
+ gen_require(`
|
||||
+ type admin_home_t;
|
||||
+ ')
|
||||
+ create_dirs_pattern(vnc_session_t, admin_home_t, admin_home_t)
|
||||
+')
|
||||
+
|
||||
# Manage TigerVNC files (mainly ~/.local/state/*.log)
|
||||
create_dirs_pattern(vnc_session_t, vnc_home_t, vnc_home_t)
|
||||
manage_files_pattern(vnc_session_t, vnc_home_t, vnc_home_t)
|
||||
@@ -88,6 +96,7 @@ optional_policy(`
|
||||
gen_require(`
|
||||
attribute userdomain;
|
||||
type gconf_home_t;
|
||||
+ type admin_home_t;
|
||||
')
|
||||
userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(userdomain, vnc_home_t, dir, ".vnc")
|
||||
userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(userdomain, vnc_home_t, dir, ".vnc")
|
||||
@@ -95,5 +104,6 @@ optional_policy(`
|
||||
gnome_config_filetrans(userdomain, vnc_home_t, dir, "tigervnc")
|
||||
gnome_data_filetrans(userdomain, vnc_home_t, dir, "tigervnc")
|
||||
filetrans_pattern(userdomain, gconf_home_t, vnc_home_t, dir, "tigervnc")
|
||||
+ filetrans_pattern(vnc_session_t, admin_home_t, vnc_home_t, dir, "tigervnc")
|
||||
filetrans_pattern(vnc_session_t, gconf_home_t, vnc_home_t, dir, "tigervnc")
|
||||
')
|
||||
@ -1,14 +0,0 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx b/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx
|
||||
index 466aa1a2..197d60dc 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx
|
||||
+++ b/unix/vncpasswd/vncpasswd.cxx
|
||||
@@ -147,8 +147,7 @@ static std::vector<uint8_t> readpassword() {
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (first.size() > 8) {
|
||||
- fprintf(stderr,"Password should not be greater than 8 characters\nBecause only 8 valid characters are used - try again\n");
|
||||
- continue;
|
||||
+ fprintf(stderr,"Password should not be greater than 8 characters\nBecause only 8 valid characters are used\n");
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef HAVE_PWQUALITY
|
||||
@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c
|
||||
index b3d0926d..d36a096f 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c
|
||||
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c
|
||||
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ void vncPointerMove(int x, int y)
|
||||
|
||||
void vncGetPointerPos(int *x, int *y)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- if (vncPointerDev != NULL) {
|
||||
+ if (vncPointerDev != NULL && !IsFloating(vncPointerDev)) {
|
||||
ScreenPtr ptrScreen;
|
||||
|
||||
miPointerGetPosition(vncPointerDev, &cursorPosX, &cursorPosY);
|
||||
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/po/CMakeLists.txt b/po/CMakeLists.txt
|
||||
index 7d316e7..4f872d0 100644
|
||||
index 052cfb3..c84fb0e 100644
|
||||
--- a/po/CMakeLists.txt
|
||||
+++ b/po/CMakeLists.txt
|
||||
@@ -15,7 +15,6 @@ if (GETTEXT_XGETTEXT_EXECUTABLE)
|
||||
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ if (GETTEXT_XGETTEXT_EXECUTABLE)
|
||||
${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.h
|
||||
${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.cxx
|
||||
${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.desktop.in.in
|
||||
@ -11,10 +11,10 @@ index 7d316e7..4f872d0 100644
|
||||
|
||||
add_custom_target(translations_update
|
||||
diff --git a/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt b/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt
|
||||
index 72904b2..6a39062 100644
|
||||
index 15eac66..450b732 100644
|
||||
--- a/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt
|
||||
+++ b/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt
|
||||
@@ -108,36 +108,6 @@ if(UNIX)
|
||||
@@ -100,34 +100,6 @@ if(UNIX)
|
||||
add_custom_target(desktop ALL DEPENDS vncviewer.desktop)
|
||||
install(FILES ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/vncviewer.desktop DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_FULL_DATADIR}/applications)
|
||||
|
||||
@ -24,7 +24,6 @@ index 72904b2..6a39062 100644
|
||||
- --xml --template ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
|
||||
- -d ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/po -o org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
|
||||
- DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
|
||||
- ${po_FILES}
|
||||
- )
|
||||
- elseif(INTLTOOL_MERGE_EXECUTABLE)
|
||||
- add_custom_command(OUTPUT org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
|
||||
@ -37,7 +36,6 @@ index 72904b2..6a39062 100644
|
||||
- -x ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/po
|
||||
- org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.intl org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
|
||||
- DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
|
||||
- ${po_FILES}
|
||||
- )
|
||||
- else()
|
||||
- add_custom_command(OUTPUT org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 1f1aaca09a1f9919f5169caea9c396b14c2af765 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 8 Apr 2025 14:41:04 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] Don't print Xvnc banner before parsing args
|
||||
|
||||
If we'll be running in inetd mode, then stdout and stderr will be a
|
||||
client socket and not an appropriate place for logging.
|
||||
|
||||
Mimic what Xorg does instead.
|
||||
---
|
||||
unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c | 9 +++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
|
||||
index ddb249937..a13168c47 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
|
||||
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
|
||||
@@ -446,7 +446,7 @@ ddxProcessArgument(int argc, char *argv[], int i)
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (!strcmp(argv[i], "-showconfig") || !strcmp(argv[i], "-version")) {
|
||||
- /* Already shown at start */
|
||||
+ vncPrintBanner();
|
||||
exit(0);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1171,8 +1171,11 @@ InitOutput(ScreenInfo * scrInfo, int argc, char **argv)
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
int NumFormats = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (serverGeneration == 1)
|
||||
+ if (serverGeneration == 1) {
|
||||
+ vncPrintBanner();
|
||||
+
|
||||
LoadExtensionList(vncExtensions, ARRAY_SIZE(vncExtensions), TRUE);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
#if XORG_AT_LEAST(1, 20, 0)
|
||||
xorgGlxCreateVendor();
|
||||
@@ -1266,7 +1269,5 @@ vncClientGone(int fd)
|
||||
int
|
||||
main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
- vncPrintBanner();
|
||||
-
|
||||
return dix_main(argc, argv, envp);
|
||||
}
|
||||
135
SOURCES/tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch
Normal file
135
SOURCES/tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx b/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx
|
||||
index 6f65e87..3142ba3 100644
|
||||
--- a/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx
|
||||
+++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
|
||||
#include <rdr/InStream.h>
|
||||
#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__APPLE__)
|
||||
#include <rfb/UnixPasswordValidator.h>
|
||||
+#include <unistd.h>
|
||||
+#include <pwd.h>
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
#ifdef WIN32
|
||||
#include <rfb/WinPasswdValidator.h>
|
||||
@@ -45,21 +47,22 @@ StringParameter PasswordValidator::plainUsers
|
||||
|
||||
bool PasswordValidator::validUser(const char* username)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- CharArray users(plainUsers.getValueStr()), user;
|
||||
+ std::vector<std::string> users;
|
||||
|
||||
- while (users.buf) {
|
||||
- strSplit(users.buf, ',', &user.buf, &users.buf);
|
||||
-#ifdef WIN32
|
||||
- if (0 == stricmp(user.buf, "*"))
|
||||
- return true;
|
||||
- if (0 == stricmp(user.buf, username))
|
||||
- return true;
|
||||
-#else
|
||||
- if (!strcmp(user.buf, "*"))
|
||||
- return true;
|
||||
- if (!strcmp(user.buf, username))
|
||||
- return true;
|
||||
+ users = split(plainUsers, ',');
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < users.size(); i++) {
|
||||
+ if (users[i] == "*")
|
||||
+ return true;
|
||||
+#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__APPLE__)
|
||||
+ if (users[i] == "%u") {
|
||||
+ struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(username);
|
||||
+ if (pw && pw->pw_uid == getuid())
|
||||
+ return true;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
+ if (users[i] == username)
|
||||
+ return true;
|
||||
}
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
diff --git a/common/rfb/util.cxx b/common/rfb/util.cxx
|
||||
index 649eb0b..cce73a0 100644
|
||||
--- a/common/rfb/util.cxx
|
||||
+++ b/common/rfb/util.cxx
|
||||
@@ -99,6 +99,26 @@ namespace rfb {
|
||||
return false;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ std::vector<std::string> split(const char* src,
|
||||
+ const char delimiter)
|
||||
+ {
|
||||
+ std::vector<std::string> out;
|
||||
+ const char *start, *stop;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ start = src;
|
||||
+ do {
|
||||
+ stop = strchr(start, delimiter);
|
||||
+ if (stop == NULL) {
|
||||
+ out.push_back(start);
|
||||
+ } else {
|
||||
+ out.push_back(std::string(start, stop-start));
|
||||
+ start = stop + 1;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ } while (stop != NULL);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ return out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
bool strContains(const char* src, char c) {
|
||||
int l=strlen(src);
|
||||
for (int i=0; i<l; i++)
|
||||
diff --git a/common/rfb/util.h b/common/rfb/util.h
|
||||
index f0ac9ef..ed15c28 100644
|
||||
--- a/common/rfb/util.h
|
||||
+++ b/common/rfb/util.h
|
||||
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
|
||||
#include <limits.h>
|
||||
#include <string.h>
|
||||
|
||||
+#include <string>
|
||||
+#include <vector>
|
||||
+
|
||||
struct timeval;
|
||||
|
||||
#ifdef __GNUC__
|
||||
@@ -76,6 +79,10 @@ namespace rfb {
|
||||
// that part of the string. Obviously, setting both to 0 is not useful...
|
||||
bool strSplit(const char* src, const char limiter, char** out1, char** out2, bool fromEnd=false);
|
||||
|
||||
+ // Splits a string with the specified delimiter
|
||||
+ std::vector<std::string> split(const char* src,
|
||||
+ const char delimiter);
|
||||
+
|
||||
// Returns true if src contains c
|
||||
bool strContains(const char* src, char c);
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
|
||||
index c36ae34..78db730 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
|
||||
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
|
||||
@@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ parameter instead.
|
||||
.B \-PlainUsers \fIuser-list\fP
|
||||
A comma separated list of user names that are allowed to authenticate via
|
||||
any of the "Plain" security types (Plain, TLSPlain, etc.). Specify \fB*\fP
|
||||
-to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Default is to
|
||||
-deny all users.
|
||||
+to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Specify \fB%u\fP
|
||||
+to allow the user of the server process. Default is to deny all users.
|
||||
.
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
|
||||
index ea87dea..e9fb654 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
|
||||
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
|
||||
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ parameter instead.
|
||||
.B \-PlainUsers \fIuser-list\fP
|
||||
A comma separated list of user names that are allowed to authenticate via
|
||||
any of the "Plain" security types (Plain, TLSPlain, etc.). Specify \fB*\fP
|
||||
-to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Default is to
|
||||
-deny all users.
|
||||
+to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Specify \fB%u\fP
|
||||
+to allow the user of the server process. Default is to deny all users.
|
||||
.
|
||||
.TP
|
||||
.B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP
|
||||
17
SOURCES/tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch
Normal file
17
SOURCES/tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
|
||||
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
|
||||
index f8141959..c5c36539 100644
|
||||
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
|
||||
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
|
||||
@@ -366,8 +366,10 @@ ddxProcessArgument(int argc, char *argv[], int i)
|
||||
if (strcmp(argv[i], "-inetd") == 0) {
|
||||
int nullfd;
|
||||
|
||||
- dup2(0, 3);
|
||||
- vncInetdSock = 3;
|
||||
+ if ((vncInetdSock = dup(0)) == -1)
|
||||
+ FatalError
|
||||
+ ("Xvnc error: failed to allocate a new file descriptor for -inetd: %s\n", strerror(errno));
|
||||
+
|
||||
|
||||
/* Avoid xserver >= 1.19's epoll-fd becoming fd 2 / stderr only to be
|
||||
replaced by /dev/null by OsInit() because the pollfd is not
|
||||
91
SOURCES/tigervnc-xserver120.patch
Normal file
91
SOURCES/tigervnc-xserver120.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,91 @@
|
||||
diff -up xserver/configure.ac.xserver116-rebased xserver/configure.ac
|
||||
--- xserver/configure.ac.xserver116-rebased 2016-09-29 13:14:45.595441590 +0200
|
||||
+++ xserver/configure.ac 2016-09-29 13:14:45.631442006 +0200
|
||||
@@ -74,6 +74,7 @@ dnl forcing an entire recompile.x
|
||||
AC_CONFIG_HEADERS(include/version-config.h)
|
||||
|
||||
AM_PROG_AS
|
||||
+AC_PROG_CXX
|
||||
AC_PROG_LN_S
|
||||
LT_PREREQ([2.2])
|
||||
LT_INIT([disable-static win32-dll])
|
||||
@@ -1863,6 +1864,10 @@ if test "x$XVFB" = xyes; then
|
||||
AC_SUBST([XVFB_SYS_LIBS])
|
||||
fi
|
||||
|
||||
+dnl Xvnc DDX
|
||||
+AC_SUBST([XVNC_CPPFLAGS], ["-DHAVE_DIX_CONFIG_H $XSERVER_CFLAGS"])
|
||||
+AC_SUBST([XVNC_LIBS], ["$FB_LIB $FIXES_LIB $XEXT_LIB $CONFIG_LIB $DBE_LIB $RECORD_LIB $GLX_LIBS $RANDR_LIB $RENDER_LIB $DAMAGE_LIB $DRI3_LIB $PRESENT_LIB $MIEXT_SYNC_LIB $MIEXT_DAMAGE_LIB $MIEXT_SHADOW_LIB $XI_LIB $XKB_LIB $XKB_STUB_LIB $COMPOSITE_LIB $MAIN_LIB"])
|
||||
+AC_SUBST([XVNC_SYS_LIBS], ["$GLX_SYS_LIBS"])
|
||||
|
||||
dnl Xnest DDX
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -1898,6 +1903,8 @@ if test "x$XORG" = xauto; then
|
||||
fi
|
||||
AC_MSG_RESULT([$XORG])
|
||||
|
||||
+AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(XORG_VERSION_CURRENT, [$VENDOR_RELEASE], [Current Xorg version])
|
||||
+
|
||||
if test "x$XORG" = xyes; then
|
||||
XORG_DDXINCS='-I$(top_srcdir)/hw/xfree86 -I$(top_srcdir)/hw/xfree86/include -I$(top_srcdir)/hw/xfree86/common'
|
||||
XORG_OSINCS='-I$(top_srcdir)/hw/xfree86/os-support -I$(top_srcdir)/hw/xfree86/os-support/bus -I$(top_srcdir)/os'
|
||||
@@ -2116,7 +2123,6 @@ if test "x$XORG" = xyes; then
|
||||
AC_DEFINE(XORG_SERVER, 1, [Building Xorg server])
|
||||
AC_DEFINE(XORGSERVER, 1, [Building Xorg server])
|
||||
AC_DEFINE(XFree86Server, 1, [Building XFree86 server])
|
||||
- AC_DEFINE_UNQUOTED(XORG_VERSION_CURRENT, [$VENDOR_RELEASE], [Current Xorg version])
|
||||
AC_DEFINE(NEED_XF86_TYPES, 1, [Need XFree86 typedefs])
|
||||
AC_DEFINE(NEED_XF86_PROTOTYPES, 1, [Need XFree86 helper functions])
|
||||
AC_DEFINE(__XSERVERNAME__, "Xorg", [Name of X server])
|
||||
@@ -2691,6 +2697,7 @@ hw/dmx/Makefile
|
||||
hw/dmx/man/Makefile
|
||||
hw/vfb/Makefile
|
||||
hw/vfb/man/Makefile
|
||||
+hw/vnc/Makefile
|
||||
hw/xnest/Makefile
|
||||
hw/xnest/man/Makefile
|
||||
hw/xwin/Makefile
|
||||
diff -up xserver/hw/Makefile.am.xserver116-rebased xserver/hw/Makefile.am
|
||||
--- xserver/hw/Makefile.am.xserver116-rebased 2016-09-29 13:14:45.601441659 +0200
|
||||
+++ xserver/hw/Makefile.am 2016-09-29 13:14:45.631442006 +0200
|
||||
@@ -38,7 +38,8 @@ SUBDIRS = \
|
||||
$(DMX_SUBDIRS) \
|
||||
$(KDRIVE_SUBDIRS) \
|
||||
$(XQUARTZ_SUBDIRS) \
|
||||
- $(XWAYLAND_SUBDIRS)
|
||||
+ $(XWAYLAND_SUBDIRS) \
|
||||
+ vnc
|
||||
|
||||
DIST_SUBDIRS = dmx xfree86 vfb xnest xwin xquartz kdrive xwayland
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git xserver/mi/miinitext.c xserver/mi/miinitext.c
|
||||
index 5596e21..003fc3c 100644
|
||||
--- xserver/mi/miinitext.c
|
||||
+++ xserver/mi/miinitext.c
|
||||
@@ -107,8 +107,15 @@ SOFTWARE.
|
||||
#include "os.h"
|
||||
#include "globals.h"
|
||||
|
||||
+#ifdef TIGERVNC
|
||||
+extern void vncExtensionInit(INITARGS);
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* List of built-in (statically linked) extensions */
|
||||
static const ExtensionModule staticExtensions[] = {
|
||||
+#ifdef TIGERVNC
|
||||
+ {vncExtensionInit, "VNC-EXTENSION", NULL},
|
||||
+#endif
|
||||
{GEExtensionInit, "Generic Event Extension", &noGEExtension},
|
||||
{ShapeExtensionInit, "SHAPE", NULL},
|
||||
#ifdef MITSHM
|
||||
--- xserver/include/os.h~ 2016-10-03 09:07:29.000000000 +0200
|
||||
+++ xserver/include/os.h 2016-10-03 14:13:00.013654506 +0200
|
||||
@@ -621,7 +621,7 @@
|
||||
extern _X_EXPORT void
|
||||
LogClose(enum ExitCode error);
|
||||
extern _X_EXPORT Bool
|
||||
-LogSetParameter(LogParameter param, int value);
|
||||
+LogSetParameter(enum _LogParameter param, int value);
|
||||
extern _X_EXPORT void
|
||||
LogVWrite(int verb, const char *f, va_list args)
|
||||
_X_ATTRIBUTE_PRINTF(2, 0);
|
||||
32
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup.patch
Normal file
32
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup.patch
Normal file
@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
|
||||
From 133e0d651c5d12bf01999d6289e84e224ba77adc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 22 Jan 2024 14:22:12 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] dix: fix valuator copy/paste error in the DeviceStateNotify
|
||||
event
|
||||
|
||||
Fixes 219c54b8a3337456ce5270ded6a67bcde53553d5
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/enterleave.c | 6 +++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/enterleave.c b/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
index 7b7ba1098b..c1e6ac600e 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/enterleave.c
|
||||
@@ -619,11 +619,11 @@ FixDeviceValuator(DeviceIntPtr dev, deviceValuator * ev, ValuatorClassPtr v,
|
||||
ev->first_valuator = first;
|
||||
switch (ev->num_valuators) {
|
||||
case 6:
|
||||
- ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
|
||||
+ ev->valuator5 = v->axisVal[first + 5];
|
||||
case 5:
|
||||
- ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
|
||||
+ ev->valuator4 = v->axisVal[first + 4];
|
||||
case 4:
|
||||
- ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
|
||||
+ ev->valuator3 = v->axisVal[first + 3];
|
||||
case 3:
|
||||
ev->valuator2 = v->axisVal[first + 2];
|
||||
case 2:
|
||||
--
|
||||
GitLab
|
||||
@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From ded614e74e7175927dd2bc5ef69accaf2de29939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2024 15:49:43 +1000
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] dix: keep a ref to the rootCursor
|
||||
|
||||
CreateCursor returns a cursor with refcount 1 - that refcount is used by
|
||||
the resource system, any caller needs to call RefCursor to get their own
|
||||
reference. That happens correctly for normal cursors but for our
|
||||
rootCursor we keep a variable to the cursor despite not having a ref for
|
||||
ourselves.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix this by reffing/unreffing the rootCursor to ensure our pointer is
|
||||
valid.
|
||||
|
||||
Related to CVE-2025-26594, ZDI-CAN-25544
|
||||
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/main.c | 4 ++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/main.c b/dix/main.c
|
||||
index aa7b020b2..0c57ba605 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/main.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/main.c
|
||||
@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ dix_main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
|
||||
defaultCursorFont);
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ rootCursor = RefCursor(rootCursor);
|
||||
+
|
||||
#ifdef PANORAMIX
|
||||
/*
|
||||
* Consolidate window and colourmap information for each screen
|
||||
@@ -275,6 +277,8 @@ dix_main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
|
||||
|
||||
Dispatch();
|
||||
|
||||
+ UnrefCursor(rootCursor);
|
||||
+
|
||||
UndisplayDevices();
|
||||
DisableAllDevices();
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From efca605c45ff51b57f136222b966ce1d610ebc33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 11:27:05 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] Cursor: Refuse to free the root cursor
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
If a cursor reference count drops to 0, the cursor is freed.
|
||||
|
||||
The root cursor however is referenced with a specific global variable,
|
||||
and when the root cursor is freed, the global variable may still point
|
||||
to freed memory.
|
||||
|
||||
Make sure to prevent the rootCursor from being explicitly freed by a
|
||||
client.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-26594, ZDI-CAN-25544
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
v2: Explicitly forbid XFreeCursor() on the root cursor (Peter Hutterer
|
||||
<peter.hutterer@who-t.net>)
|
||||
v3: Return BadCursor instead of BadValue (Michel Dänzer
|
||||
<michel@daenzer.net>)
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Suggested-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/dispatch.c | 4 ++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c
|
||||
index 5f7cfe02d..d1241fa96 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/dispatch.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/dispatch.c
|
||||
@@ -3039,6 +3039,10 @@ ProcFreeCursor(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pCursor, stuff->id, RT_CURSOR,
|
||||
client, DixDestroyAccess);
|
||||
if (rc == Success) {
|
||||
+ if (pCursor == rootCursor) {
|
||||
+ client->errorValue = stuff->id;
|
||||
+ return BadCursor;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
FreeResource(stuff->id, RT_NONE);
|
||||
return Success;
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 98602942c143075ab7464f917e0fc5d31ce28c3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 14:41:45 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText()
|
||||
|
||||
The code in XkbVModMaskText() allocates a fixed sized buffer on the
|
||||
stack and copies the virtual mod name.
|
||||
|
||||
There's actually two issues in the code that can lead to a buffer
|
||||
overflow.
|
||||
|
||||
First, the bound check mixes pointers and integers using misplaced
|
||||
parenthesis, defeating the bound check.
|
||||
|
||||
But even though, if the check fails, the data is still copied, so the
|
||||
stack overflow will occur regardless.
|
||||
|
||||
Change the logic to skip the copy entirely if the bound check fails.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-26595, ZDI-CAN-25545
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
xkb/xkbtext.c | 16 ++++++++--------
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/xkb/xkbtext.c b/xkb/xkbtext.c
|
||||
index 018466420..93262528b 100644
|
||||
--- a/xkb/xkbtext.c
|
||||
+++ b/xkb/xkbtext.c
|
||||
@@ -173,14 +173,14 @@ XkbVModMaskText(XkbDescPtr xkb,
|
||||
len = strlen(tmp) + 1 + (str == buf ? 0 : 1);
|
||||
if (format == XkbCFile)
|
||||
len += 4;
|
||||
- if ((str - (buf + len)) <= VMOD_BUFFER_SIZE) {
|
||||
- if (str != buf) {
|
||||
- if (format == XkbCFile)
|
||||
- *str++ = '|';
|
||||
- else
|
||||
- *str++ = '+';
|
||||
- len--;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ if ((str - buf) + len > VMOD_BUFFER_SIZE)
|
||||
+ continue; /* Skip */
|
||||
+ if (str != buf) {
|
||||
+ if (format == XkbCFile)
|
||||
+ *str++ = '|';
|
||||
+ else
|
||||
+ *str++ = '+';
|
||||
+ len--;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (format == XkbCFile)
|
||||
sprintf(str, "%sMask", tmp);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From b41f6fce201e77a174550935330e2f7772d4adf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 11:49:34 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix computation of XkbSizeKeySyms
|
||||
|
||||
The computation of the length in XkbSizeKeySyms() differs from what is
|
||||
actually written in XkbWriteKeySyms(), leading to a heap overflow.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix the calculation in XkbSizeKeySyms() to match what kbWriteKeySyms()
|
||||
does.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-26596, ZDI-CAN-25543
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
xkb/xkb.c | 8 ++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
|
||||
index 85659382d..744dba63d 100644
|
||||
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
|
||||
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
|
||||
@@ -1095,10 +1095,10 @@ XkbSizeKeySyms(XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply * rep)
|
||||
len = rep->nKeySyms * SIZEOF(xkbSymMapWireDesc);
|
||||
symMap = &xkb->map->key_sym_map[rep->firstKeySym];
|
||||
for (i = nSyms = 0; i < rep->nKeySyms; i++, symMap++) {
|
||||
- if (symMap->offset != 0) {
|
||||
- nSymsThisKey = XkbNumGroups(symMap->group_info) * symMap->width;
|
||||
- nSyms += nSymsThisKey;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
+ nSymsThisKey = XkbNumGroups(symMap->group_info) * symMap->width;
|
||||
+ if (nSymsThisKey == 0)
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+ nSyms += nSymsThisKey;
|
||||
}
|
||||
len += nSyms * 4;
|
||||
rep->totalSyms = nSyms;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From c5114475db18f29d639537d60e135bdfc11a5d3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 14:09:04 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey()
|
||||
|
||||
If XkbChangeTypesOfKey() is called with nGroups == 0, it will resize the
|
||||
key syms to 0 but leave the key actions unchanged.
|
||||
|
||||
If later, the same function is called with a non-zero value for nGroups,
|
||||
this will cause a buffer overflow because the key actions are of the wrong
|
||||
size.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, make sure to resize both the key syms and key actions
|
||||
when nGroups is 0.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-26597, ZDI-CAN-25683
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
xkb/XKBMisc.c | 1 +
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/xkb/XKBMisc.c b/xkb/XKBMisc.c
|
||||
index abbfed90e..fd180fad2 100644
|
||||
--- a/xkb/XKBMisc.c
|
||||
+++ b/xkb/XKBMisc.c
|
||||
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ XkbChangeTypesOfKey(XkbDescPtr xkb,
|
||||
i = XkbSetNumGroups(i, 0);
|
||||
xkb->map->key_sym_map[key].group_info = i;
|
||||
XkbResizeKeySyms(xkb, key, 0);
|
||||
+ XkbResizeKeyActions(xkb, key, 0);
|
||||
return Success;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 0f5ea9d269ac6225bcb302a1ec0f58878114da9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 11:25:11 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: Fix barrier device search
|
||||
|
||||
The function GetBarrierDevice() would search for the pointer device
|
||||
based on its device id and return the matching value, or supposedly NULL
|
||||
if no match was found.
|
||||
|
||||
Unfortunately, as written, it would return the last element of the list
|
||||
if no matching device id was found which can lead to out of bounds
|
||||
memory access.
|
||||
|
||||
Fix the search function to return NULL if not matching device is found,
|
||||
and adjust the callers to handle the case where the device cannot be
|
||||
found.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-26598, ZDI-CAN-25740
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xi/xibarriers.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xi/xibarriers.c b/Xi/xibarriers.c
|
||||
index 80c4b5981..28bc0a24f 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xi/xibarriers.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xi/xibarriers.c
|
||||
@@ -131,14 +131,15 @@ static void FreePointerBarrierClient(struct PointerBarrierClient *c)
|
||||
|
||||
static struct PointerBarrierDevice *GetBarrierDevice(struct PointerBarrierClient *c, int deviceid)
|
||||
{
|
||||
- struct PointerBarrierDevice *pbd = NULL;
|
||||
+ struct PointerBarrierDevice *p, *pbd = NULL;
|
||||
|
||||
- xorg_list_for_each_entry(pbd, &c->per_device, entry) {
|
||||
- if (pbd->deviceid == deviceid)
|
||||
+ xorg_list_for_each_entry(p, &c->per_device, entry) {
|
||||
+ if (p->deviceid == deviceid) {
|
||||
+ pbd = p;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- BUG_WARN(!pbd);
|
||||
return pbd;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -339,6 +340,9 @@ barrier_find_nearest(BarrierScreenPtr cs, DeviceIntPtr dev,
|
||||
double distance;
|
||||
|
||||
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, dev->id);
|
||||
+ if (!pbd)
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (pbd->seen)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -447,6 +451,9 @@ input_constrain_cursor(DeviceIntPtr dev, ScreenPtr screen,
|
||||
nearest = &c->barrier;
|
||||
|
||||
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, master->id);
|
||||
+ if (!pbd)
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+
|
||||
new_sequence = !pbd->hit;
|
||||
|
||||
pbd->seen = TRUE;
|
||||
@@ -487,6 +494,9 @@ input_constrain_cursor(DeviceIntPtr dev, ScreenPtr screen,
|
||||
int flags = 0;
|
||||
|
||||
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, master->id);
|
||||
+ if (!pbd)
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+
|
||||
pbd->seen = FALSE;
|
||||
if (!pbd->hit)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
@@ -681,6 +691,9 @@ BarrierFreeBarrier(void *data, XID id)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, dev->id);
|
||||
+ if (!pbd)
|
||||
+ continue;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (!pbd->hit)
|
||||
continue;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -740,6 +753,8 @@ static void remove_master_func(void *res, XID id, void *devid)
|
||||
barrier = container_of(b, struct PointerBarrierClient, barrier);
|
||||
|
||||
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(barrier, *deviceid);
|
||||
+ if (!pbd)
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
|
||||
if (pbd->hit) {
|
||||
BarrierEvent ev = {
|
||||
@@ -904,6 +919,10 @@ ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
barrier = container_of(b, struct PointerBarrierClient, barrier);
|
||||
|
||||
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(barrier, dev->id);
|
||||
+ if (!pbd) {
|
||||
+ client->errorValue = dev->id;
|
||||
+ return BadDevice;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
|
||||
if (pbd->barrier_event_id == event_id)
|
||||
pbd->release_event_id = event_id;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From f5ce639ff9d3af05e79efce6c51e084352d28ed1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 16:09:43 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] composite: initialize border clip even when
|
||||
pixmap alloc fails
|
||||
|
||||
If it fails to allocate the pixmap, the function compAllocPixmap() would
|
||||
return early and leave the borderClip region uninitialized, which may
|
||||
lead to the use of uninitialized value as reported by valgrind:
|
||||
|
||||
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
|
||||
at 0x4F9B33: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:317)
|
||||
by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476)
|
||||
by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679)
|
||||
by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693)
|
||||
by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922)
|
||||
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
|
||||
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
|
||||
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
||||
Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
|
||||
at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446)
|
||||
by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171)
|
||||
by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592)
|
||||
by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925)
|
||||
by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768)
|
||||
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
|
||||
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
|
||||
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
||||
|
||||
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
|
||||
at 0x48EEDBC: pixman_region_translate (pixman-region.c:2233)
|
||||
by 0x4F9255: RegionTranslate (regionstr.h:312)
|
||||
by 0x4F9B7E: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:319)
|
||||
by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476)
|
||||
by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679)
|
||||
by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693)
|
||||
by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922)
|
||||
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
|
||||
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
|
||||
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
||||
Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
|
||||
at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446)
|
||||
by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171)
|
||||
by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592)
|
||||
by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925)
|
||||
by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768)
|
||||
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
|
||||
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
|
||||
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
||||
|
||||
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
|
||||
at 0x48EEE33: UnknownInlinedFun (pixman-region.c:2241)
|
||||
by 0x48EEE33: pixman_region_translate (pixman-region.c:2225)
|
||||
by 0x4F9255: RegionTranslate (regionstr.h:312)
|
||||
by 0x4F9B7E: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:319)
|
||||
by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476)
|
||||
by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679)
|
||||
by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693)
|
||||
by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922)
|
||||
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
|
||||
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
|
||||
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
||||
Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
|
||||
at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446)
|
||||
by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171)
|
||||
by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592)
|
||||
by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925)
|
||||
by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768)
|
||||
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
|
||||
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
|
||||
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
||||
|
||||
Fix compAllocPixmap() to initialize the border clip even if the creation
|
||||
of the backing pixmap has failed, to avoid depending later on
|
||||
uninitialized border clip values.
|
||||
|
||||
Related to CVE-2025-26599, ZDI-CAN-25851
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
composite/compalloc.c | 11 ++++++++---
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/composite/compalloc.c b/composite/compalloc.c
|
||||
index ecb1b6147..d1342799b 100644
|
||||
--- a/composite/compalloc.c
|
||||
+++ b/composite/compalloc.c
|
||||
@@ -605,9 +605,12 @@ compAllocPixmap(WindowPtr pWin)
|
||||
int h = pWin->drawable.height + (bw << 1);
|
||||
PixmapPtr pPixmap = compNewPixmap(pWin, x, y, w, h);
|
||||
CompWindowPtr cw = GetCompWindow(pWin);
|
||||
+ Bool status;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!pPixmap)
|
||||
- return FALSE;
|
||||
+ if (!pPixmap) {
|
||||
+ status = FALSE;
|
||||
+ goto out;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
if (cw->update == CompositeRedirectAutomatic)
|
||||
pWin->redirectDraw = RedirectDrawAutomatic;
|
||||
else
|
||||
@@ -621,14 +624,16 @@ compAllocPixmap(WindowPtr pWin)
|
||||
DamageRegister(&pWin->drawable, cw->damage);
|
||||
cw->damageRegistered = TRUE;
|
||||
}
|
||||
+ status = TRUE;
|
||||
|
||||
+out:
|
||||
/* Make sure our borderClip is up to date */
|
||||
RegionUninit(&cw->borderClip);
|
||||
RegionCopy(&cw->borderClip, &pWin->borderClip);
|
||||
cw->borderClipX = pWin->drawable.x;
|
||||
cw->borderClipY = pWin->drawable.y;
|
||||
|
||||
- return TRUE;
|
||||
+ return status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 10a24e364ac15983051d0bb90817c88bbe107036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 15:19:45 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] composite: Handle failure to redirect in
|
||||
compRedirectWindow()
|
||||
|
||||
The function compCheckRedirect() may fail if it cannot allocate the
|
||||
backing pixmap.
|
||||
|
||||
In that case, compRedirectWindow() will return a BadAlloc error.
|
||||
|
||||
However that failure code path will shortcut the validation of the
|
||||
window tree marked just before, which leaves the validate data partly
|
||||
initialized.
|
||||
|
||||
That causes a use of uninitialized pointer later.
|
||||
|
||||
The fix is to not shortcut the call to compHandleMarkedWindows() even in
|
||||
the case of compCheckRedirect() returning an error.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-26599, ZDI-CAN-25851
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
composite/compalloc.c | 5 +++--
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/composite/compalloc.c b/composite/compalloc.c
|
||||
index e52c009bd..ecb1b6147 100644
|
||||
--- a/composite/compalloc.c
|
||||
+++ b/composite/compalloc.c
|
||||
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ compRedirectWindow(ClientPtr pClient, WindowPtr pWin, int update)
|
||||
CompScreenPtr cs = GetCompScreen(pWin->drawable.pScreen);
|
||||
WindowPtr pLayerWin;
|
||||
Bool anyMarked = FALSE;
|
||||
+ int status = Success;
|
||||
|
||||
if (pWin == cs->pOverlayWin) {
|
||||
return Success;
|
||||
@@ -216,13 +217,13 @@ compRedirectWindow(ClientPtr pClient, WindowPtr pWin, int update)
|
||||
|
||||
if (!compCheckRedirect(pWin)) {
|
||||
FreeResource(ccw->id, RT_NONE);
|
||||
- return BadAlloc;
|
||||
+ status = BadAlloc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
if (anyMarked)
|
||||
compHandleMarkedWindows(pWin, pLayerWin);
|
||||
|
||||
- return Success;
|
||||
+ return status;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
void
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 70ad5d36ae80f6e5a436eabfee642c2c013e51cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 16:18:04 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: Dequeue pending events on frozen device on
|
||||
removal
|
||||
|
||||
When a device is removed while still frozen, the events queued for that
|
||||
device remain while the device itself is freed.
|
||||
|
||||
As a result, replaying the events will cause a use after free.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, make sure to dequeue and free any pending events on
|
||||
a frozen device when removed.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-26600, ZDI-CAN-25871
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/devices.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
index 969819534..740390207 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/devices.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/devices.c
|
||||
@@ -966,6 +966,23 @@ FreeAllDeviceClasses(ClassesPtr classes)
|
||||
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static void
|
||||
+FreePendingFrozenDeviceEvents(DeviceIntPtr dev)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ QdEventPtr qe, tmp;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (!dev->deviceGrab.sync.frozen)
|
||||
+ return;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ /* Dequeue any frozen pending events */
|
||||
+ xorg_list_for_each_entry_safe(qe, tmp, &syncEvents.pending, next) {
|
||||
+ if (qe->device == dev) {
|
||||
+ xorg_list_del(&qe->next);
|
||||
+ free(qe);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
/**
|
||||
* Close down a device and free all resources.
|
||||
* Once closed down, the driver will probably not expect you that you'll ever
|
||||
@@ -1030,6 +1047,7 @@ CloseDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev)
|
||||
free(dev->last.touches[j].valuators);
|
||||
free(dev->last.touches);
|
||||
dev->config_info = NULL;
|
||||
+ FreePendingFrozenDeviceEvents(dev);
|
||||
dixFreePrivates(dev->devPrivates, PRIVATE_DEVICE);
|
||||
free(dev);
|
||||
}
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 7dc3f11abb51cad8a59ecbff5278c8c8a318df41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 16:54:30 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] sync: Check values before applying changes
|
||||
|
||||
In SyncInitTrigger(), we would set the CheckTrigger function before
|
||||
validating the counter value.
|
||||
|
||||
As a result, if the counter value overflowed, we would leave the
|
||||
function SyncInitTrigger() with the CheckTrigger applied but without
|
||||
updating the trigger object.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid that issue, move the portion of code checking for the trigger
|
||||
check value before updating the CheckTrigger function.
|
||||
|
||||
Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xext/sync.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
index 4267d3af6..4eab5a6ac 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
@@ -351,6 +351,24 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (changes & (XSyncCAValueType | XSyncCAValue)) {
|
||||
+ if (pTrigger->value_type == XSyncAbsolute)
|
||||
+ pTrigger->test_value = pTrigger->wait_value;
|
||||
+ else { /* relative */
|
||||
+ Bool overflow;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (pCounter == NULL)
|
||||
+ return BadMatch;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ overflow = checked_int64_add(&pTrigger->test_value,
|
||||
+ pCounter->value, pTrigger->wait_value);
|
||||
+ if (overflow) {
|
||||
+ client->errorValue = pTrigger->wait_value >> 32;
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (changes & XSyncCATestType) {
|
||||
|
||||
if (pSync && SYNC_FENCE == pSync->type) {
|
||||
@@ -379,24 +397,6 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (changes & (XSyncCAValueType | XSyncCAValue)) {
|
||||
- if (pTrigger->value_type == XSyncAbsolute)
|
||||
- pTrigger->test_value = pTrigger->wait_value;
|
||||
- else { /* relative */
|
||||
- Bool overflow;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- if (pCounter == NULL)
|
||||
- return BadMatch;
|
||||
-
|
||||
- overflow = checked_int64_add(&pTrigger->test_value,
|
||||
- pCounter->value, pTrigger->wait_value);
|
||||
- if (overflow) {
|
||||
- client->errorValue = pTrigger->wait_value >> 32;
|
||||
- return BadValue;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
- }
|
||||
-
|
||||
if (changes & XSyncCACounter) {
|
||||
if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */
|
||||
SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 4ccaa5134482b6be9c9a7f0b66cd221ef325d082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:06:07 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] sync: Do not fail SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject()
|
||||
|
||||
We do not want to return a failure at the very last step in
|
||||
SyncInitTrigger() after having all changes applied.
|
||||
|
||||
SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject() must not fail on memory allocation, if the
|
||||
allocation of the SyncTriggerList fails, trigger a FatalError() instead.
|
||||
|
||||
Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xext/sync.c | 7 +++----
|
||||
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
index 4eab5a6ac..c36de1a2e 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(SyncTrigger * pTrigger)
|
||||
return Success;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
- if (!(pCur = malloc(sizeof(SyncTriggerList))))
|
||||
- return BadAlloc;
|
||||
+ /* Failure is not an option, it's succeed or burst! */
|
||||
+ pCur = XNFalloc(sizeof(SyncTriggerList));
|
||||
|
||||
pCur->pTrigger = pTrigger;
|
||||
pCur->next = pTrigger->pSync->pTriglist;
|
||||
@@ -409,8 +409,7 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
|
||||
* a new counter on a trigger
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (newSyncObject) {
|
||||
- if ((rc = SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(pTrigger)) != Success)
|
||||
- return rc;
|
||||
+ SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(pTrigger);
|
||||
}
|
||||
else if (pCounter && IsSystemCounter(pCounter)) {
|
||||
SyncComputeBracketValues(pCounter);
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From f0984082067f79b45383fa1eb889c6a901667331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:10:31 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] sync: Apply changes last in
|
||||
SyncChangeAlarmAttributes()
|
||||
|
||||
SyncChangeAlarmAttributes() would apply the various changes while
|
||||
checking for errors.
|
||||
|
||||
If one of the changes triggers an error, the changes for the trigger,
|
||||
counter or delta value would remain, possibly leading to inconsistent
|
||||
changes.
|
||||
|
||||
Postpone the actual changes until we're sure nothing else can go wrong.
|
||||
|
||||
Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xext/sync.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
|
||||
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
index c36de1a2e..e282e6657 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
@@ -800,8 +800,14 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
|
||||
int status;
|
||||
XSyncCounter counter;
|
||||
Mask origmask = mask;
|
||||
+ SyncTrigger trigger;
|
||||
+ Bool select_events_changed = FALSE;
|
||||
+ Bool select_events_value;
|
||||
+ int64_t delta;
|
||||
|
||||
- counter = pAlarm->trigger.pSync ? pAlarm->trigger.pSync->id : None;
|
||||
+ trigger = pAlarm->trigger;
|
||||
+ delta = pAlarm->delta;
|
||||
+ counter = trigger.pSync ? trigger.pSync->id : None;
|
||||
|
||||
while (mask) {
|
||||
int index2 = lowbit(mask);
|
||||
@@ -817,24 +823,24 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
|
||||
case XSyncCAValueType:
|
||||
mask &= ~XSyncCAValueType;
|
||||
/* sanity check in SyncInitTrigger */
|
||||
- pAlarm->trigger.value_type = *values++;
|
||||
+ trigger.value_type = *values++;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case XSyncCAValue:
|
||||
mask &= ~XSyncCAValue;
|
||||
- pAlarm->trigger.wait_value = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
|
||||
+ trigger.wait_value = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
|
||||
values += 2;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case XSyncCATestType:
|
||||
mask &= ~XSyncCATestType;
|
||||
/* sanity check in SyncInitTrigger */
|
||||
- pAlarm->trigger.test_type = *values++;
|
||||
+ trigger.test_type = *values++;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
case XSyncCADelta:
|
||||
mask &= ~XSyncCADelta;
|
||||
- pAlarm->delta = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
|
||||
+ delta = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
|
||||
values += 2;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -844,10 +850,8 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
|
||||
client->errorValue = *values;
|
||||
return BadValue;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- status = SyncEventSelectForAlarm(pAlarm, client,
|
||||
- (Bool) (*values++));
|
||||
- if (status != Success)
|
||||
- return status;
|
||||
+ select_events_value = (Bool) (*values++);
|
||||
+ select_events_changed = TRUE;
|
||||
break;
|
||||
|
||||
default:
|
||||
@@ -856,25 +860,33 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (select_events_changed) {
|
||||
+ status = SyncEventSelectForAlarm(pAlarm, client, select_events_value);
|
||||
+ if (status != Success)
|
||||
+ return status;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* "If the test-type is PositiveComparison or PositiveTransition
|
||||
* and delta is less than zero, or if the test-type is
|
||||
* NegativeComparison or NegativeTransition and delta is
|
||||
* greater than zero, a Match error is generated."
|
||||
*/
|
||||
if (origmask & (XSyncCADelta | XSyncCATestType)) {
|
||||
- if ((((pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveComparison) ||
|
||||
- (pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveTransition))
|
||||
- && pAlarm->delta < 0)
|
||||
+ if ((((trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveComparison) ||
|
||||
+ (trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveTransition))
|
||||
+ && delta < 0)
|
||||
||
|
||||
- (((pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeComparison) ||
|
||||
- (pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeTransition))
|
||||
- && pAlarm->delta > 0)
|
||||
+ (((trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeComparison) ||
|
||||
+ (trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeTransition))
|
||||
+ && delta > 0)
|
||||
) {
|
||||
return BadMatch;
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* postpone this until now, when we're sure nothing else can go wrong */
|
||||
+ pAlarm->delta = delta;
|
||||
+ pAlarm->trigger = trigger;
|
||||
if ((status = SyncInitTrigger(client, &pAlarm->trigger, counter, RTCounter,
|
||||
origmask & XSyncCAAllTrigger)) != Success)
|
||||
return status;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 573a2265aacfeaddcc1bb001905a6f7d4fa15ee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 16:52:01 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] sync: Do not let sync objects uninitialized
|
||||
|
||||
When changing an alarm, the change mask values are evaluated one after
|
||||
the other, changing the trigger values as requested and eventually,
|
||||
SyncInitTrigger() is called.
|
||||
|
||||
SyncInitTrigger() will evaluate the XSyncCACounter first and may free
|
||||
the existing sync object.
|
||||
|
||||
Other changes are then evaluated and may trigger an error and an early
|
||||
return, not adding the new sync object.
|
||||
|
||||
This can be used to cause a use after free when the alarm eventually
|
||||
triggers.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, delete the existing sync object as late as possible
|
||||
only once we are sure that no further error will cause an early exit.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
|
||||
|
||||
This vulnerability was discovered by:
|
||||
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
---
|
||||
Xext/sync.c | 13 ++++++++-----
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
index b6417b3b0..4267d3af6 100644
|
||||
--- a/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
|
||||
@@ -330,11 +330,6 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
|
||||
client->errorValue = syncObject;
|
||||
return rc;
|
||||
}
|
||||
- if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */
|
||||
- SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger);
|
||||
- pTrigger->pSync = pSync;
|
||||
- newSyncObject = TRUE;
|
||||
- }
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
/* if system counter, ask it what the current value is */
|
||||
@@ -402,6 +397,14 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
|
||||
}
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (changes & XSyncCACounter) {
|
||||
+ if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */
|
||||
+ SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger);
|
||||
+ pTrigger->pSync = pSync;
|
||||
+ newSyncObject = TRUE;
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* we wait until we're sure there are no errors before registering
|
||||
* a new counter on a trigger
|
||||
*/
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.48.1
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,87 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 53e0de91e307870b6790690bd74cf30ac501de50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2025 09:43:52 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] render: Avoid 0 or less animated cursors
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
Animated cursors use a series of cursors that the client can set.
|
||||
|
||||
By default, the Xserver assumes at least one cursor is specified
|
||||
while a client may actually pass no cursor at all.
|
||||
|
||||
That causes an out-of-bound read creating the animated cursor and a
|
||||
crash of the Xserver:
|
||||
|
||||
| Invalid read of size 8
|
||||
| at 0x5323F4: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
|
||||
| by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
|
||||
| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
|
||||
| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
|
||||
| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
|
||||
| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
||||
| Address 0x59aa010 is 0 bytes after a block of size 0 alloc'd
|
||||
| at 0x48468D3: reallocarray (vg_replace_malloc.c:1803)
|
||||
| by 0x52D3DA: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1802)
|
||||
| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
|
||||
| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
|
||||
| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
|
||||
| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
||||
|
|
||||
| Invalid read of size 2
|
||||
| at 0x5323F7: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
|
||||
| by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
|
||||
| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
|
||||
| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
|
||||
| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
|
||||
| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
||||
| Address 0x8 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, check the number of cursors specified and return a
|
||||
BadValue error in both the proc handler (early) and the animated cursor
|
||||
creation (as this is a public function) if there is 0 or less cursor.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-49175
|
||||
|
||||
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
|
||||
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 9304e31035f97ddbfcc1d5f3c178da1d04a472ad)
|
||||
---
|
||||
render/animcur.c | 3 +++
|
||||
render/render.c | 2 ++
|
||||
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/render/animcur.c b/render/animcur.c
|
||||
index ef27bda27..77942d846 100644
|
||||
--- a/render/animcur.c
|
||||
+++ b/render/animcur.c
|
||||
@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@ AnimCursorCreate(CursorPtr *cursors, CARD32 *deltas, int ncursor,
|
||||
int rc = BadAlloc, i;
|
||||
AnimCurPtr ac;
|
||||
|
||||
+ if (ncursor <= 0)
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
+
|
||||
for (i = 0; i < screenInfo.numScreens; i++)
|
||||
if (!GetAnimCurScreen(screenInfo.screens[i]))
|
||||
return BadImplementation;
|
||||
diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
|
||||
index 5bc2a204b..a8c2da056 100644
|
||||
--- a/render/render.c
|
||||
+++ b/render/render.c
|
||||
@@ -1795,6 +1795,8 @@ ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
ncursor =
|
||||
(client->req_len -
|
||||
(bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xRenderCreateAnimCursorReq)))) >> 1;
|
||||
+ if (ncursor <= 0)
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
cursors = xallocarray(ncursor, sizeof(CursorPtr) + sizeof(CARD32));
|
||||
if (!cursors)
|
||||
return BadAlloc;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.49.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,88 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 57248c57e971bb7cc0ccae6de4c49a49ff13b45c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 16:13:34 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] os: Do not overflow the integer size with BigRequest
|
||||
MIME-Version: 1.0
|
||||
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
|
||||
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
|
||||
|
||||
The BigRequest extension allows request larger than the 16-bit length
|
||||
limit.
|
||||
|
||||
It uses integers for the request length and checks for the size not to
|
||||
exceed the maxBigRequestSize limit, but does so after translating the
|
||||
length to integer by multiplying the given size in bytes by 4.
|
||||
|
||||
In doing so, it might overflow the integer size limit before actually
|
||||
checking for the overflow, defeating the purpose of the test.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, make sure to check that the request size does not
|
||||
overflow the maxBigRequestSize limit prior to any conversion.
|
||||
|
||||
The caller Dispatch() function however expects the return value to be in
|
||||
bytes, so we cannot just return the converted value in case of error, as
|
||||
that would also overflow the integer size.
|
||||
|
||||
To preserve the existing API, we use a negative value for the X11 error
|
||||
code BadLength as the function only return positive values, 0 or -1 and
|
||||
update the caller Dispatch() function to take that case into account to
|
||||
return the error code to the offending client.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-49176
|
||||
|
||||
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
|
||||
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit b380b0a6c2022fbd3115552b1cd88251b5268daa)
|
||||
---
|
||||
dix/dispatch.c | 9 +++++----
|
||||
os/io.c | 4 ++++
|
||||
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c
|
||||
index 6f4e349e0..15e63e22a 100644
|
||||
--- a/dix/dispatch.c
|
||||
+++ b/dix/dispatch.c
|
||||
@@ -518,9 +518,10 @@ Dispatch(void)
|
||||
|
||||
/* now, finally, deal with client requests */
|
||||
result = ReadRequestFromClient(client);
|
||||
- if (result <= 0) {
|
||||
- if (result < 0)
|
||||
- CloseDownClient(client);
|
||||
+ if (result == 0)
|
||||
+ break;
|
||||
+ else if (result == -1) {
|
||||
+ CloseDownClient(client);
|
||||
break;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
@@ -541,7 +542,7 @@ Dispatch(void)
|
||||
client->index,
|
||||
client->requestBuffer);
|
||||
#endif
|
||||
- if (result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
|
||||
+ if (result < 0 || result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
|
||||
result = BadLength;
|
||||
else {
|
||||
result = XaceHookDispatch(client, client->majorOp);
|
||||
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
|
||||
index 5b7fac349..5fc05821c 100644
|
||||
--- a/os/io.c
|
||||
+++ b/os/io.c
|
||||
@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
|
||||
}
|
||||
client->req_len = needed;
|
||||
+ if (needed > MAXINT >> 2) {
|
||||
+ /* Check for potential integer overflow */
|
||||
+ return -(BadLength);
|
||||
+ }
|
||||
needed <<= 2; /* needed is in bytes now */
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (gotnow < needed) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.49.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 6794bf46b1c76c0a424940c97be3576dc2e7e9b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:39:02 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] os: Check for integer overflow on BigRequest length
|
||||
|
||||
Check for another possible integer overflow once we get a complete xReq
|
||||
with BigRequest.
|
||||
|
||||
Related to CVE-2025-49176
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Suggested-by: Peter Harris <pharris2@rocketsoftware.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
os/io.c | 2 ++
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
|
||||
index e7b76b9cea..167b40a720 100644
|
||||
--- a/os/io.c
|
||||
+++ b/os/io.c
|
||||
@@ -394,6 +394,8 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
|
||||
}
|
||||
client->req_len = needed;
|
||||
+ if (needed > MAXINT >> 2)
|
||||
+ return -(BadLength);
|
||||
needed <<= 2;
|
||||
}
|
||||
if (gotnow < needed) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
GitLab
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 90a13c564e7b9ba5c0d8d92acac80689cd051898 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 10:46:03 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] os: Account for bytes to ignore when sharing input
|
||||
buffer
|
||||
|
||||
When reading requests from the clients, the input buffer might be shared
|
||||
and used between different clients.
|
||||
|
||||
If a given client sends a full request with non-zero bytes to ignore,
|
||||
the bytes to ignore may still be non-zero even though the request is
|
||||
full, in which case the buffer could be shared with another client who's
|
||||
request will not be processed because of those bytes to ignore, leading
|
||||
to a possible hang of the other client request.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, make sure we have zero bytes to ignore left in the
|
||||
input request when sharing the input buffer with another client.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-49178
|
||||
|
||||
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
|
||||
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit b0c1cbf4f8e6baa372b1676d2f30512de8ab4ed3)
|
||||
---
|
||||
os/io.c | 2 +-
|
||||
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
|
||||
index 5fc05821c..26f9161ef 100644
|
||||
--- a/os/io.c
|
||||
+++ b/os/io.c
|
||||
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
|
||||
*/
|
||||
|
||||
gotnow -= needed;
|
||||
- if (!gotnow)
|
||||
+ if (!gotnow && !oci->ignoreBytes)
|
||||
AvailableInput = oc;
|
||||
if (move_header) {
|
||||
if (client->req_len < bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xBigReq) - sizeof(xReq))) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.49.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 9a4f3012ba5752be1634455a3f0c7c125eabb328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 11:47:15 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver] record: Check for overflow in
|
||||
RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients()
|
||||
|
||||
The RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients() checks for the request length,
|
||||
but does not check for integer overflow.
|
||||
|
||||
A client might send a very large value for either the number of clients
|
||||
or the number of protocol ranges that will cause an integer overflow in
|
||||
the request length computation, defeating the check for request length.
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, explicitly check the number of clients against the
|
||||
limit of clients (which is much lower than an maximum integer value) and
|
||||
the number of protocol ranges (multiplied by the record length) do not
|
||||
exceed the maximum integer value.
|
||||
|
||||
This way, we ensure that the final computation for the request length
|
||||
will not overflow the maximum integer limit.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-49179
|
||||
|
||||
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
|
||||
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit ea52403bf222f8bd6ee4c509bed5e34f0c789b00)
|
||||
---
|
||||
record/record.c | 8 ++++++++
|
||||
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c
|
||||
index e123867a7..018e53f81 100644
|
||||
--- a/record/record.c
|
||||
+++ b/record/record.c
|
||||
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ and Jim Haggerty of Metheus.
|
||||
#include "inputstr.h"
|
||||
#include "eventconvert.h"
|
||||
#include "scrnintstr.h"
|
||||
+#include "opaque.h"
|
||||
|
||||
#include <stdio.h>
|
||||
#include <assert.h>
|
||||
@@ -1298,6 +1299,13 @@ RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients(RecordContextPtr pContext, ClientPtr client,
|
||||
int i;
|
||||
XID recordingClient;
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* LimitClients is 2048 at max, way less that MAXINT */
|
||||
+ if (stuff->nClients > LimitClients)
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ if (stuff->nRanges > (MAXINT - 4 * stuff->nClients) / SIZEOF(xRecordRange))
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
+
|
||||
if (((client->req_len << 2) - SIZEOF(xRecordRegisterClientsReq)) !=
|
||||
4 * stuff->nClients + SIZEOF(xRecordRange) * stuff->nRanges)
|
||||
return BadLength;
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.49.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 5e7a3a955853218536ba4a7e696360aab0064206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 15:18:19 +0200
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] randr: Check for overflow in
|
||||
RRChangeProviderProperty()
|
||||
|
||||
A client might send a request causing an integer overflow when computing
|
||||
the total size to allocate in RRChangeProviderProperty().
|
||||
|
||||
To avoid the issue, check that total length in bytes won't exceed the
|
||||
maximum integer value.
|
||||
|
||||
CVE-2025-49180
|
||||
|
||||
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
|
||||
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
|
||||
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
|
||||
(cherry picked from commit 1b0bf563a3a76b06ddcd6fc4d8e72d81f6773699)
|
||||
---
|
||||
randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 3 ++-
|
||||
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
||||
index 90c5a9a93..0aa35ad87 100644
|
||||
--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
||||
+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
|
||||
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ RRChangeProviderProperty(RRProviderPtr provider, Atom property, Atom type,
|
||||
|
||||
if (mode == PropModeReplace || len > 0) {
|
||||
void *new_data = NULL, *old_data = NULL;
|
||||
-
|
||||
+ if (total_len > MAXINT / size_in_bytes)
|
||||
+ return BadValue;
|
||||
total_size = total_len * size_in_bytes;
|
||||
new_value.data = (void *) malloc(total_size);
|
||||
if (!new_value.data && total_size) {
|
||||
--
|
||||
2.49.0
|
||||
|
||||
@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
|
||||
%global modulename vncsession
|
||||
|
||||
Name: tigervnc
|
||||
Version: 1.15.0
|
||||
Release: 7%{?dist}
|
||||
Version: 1.13.1
|
||||
Release: 8%{?dist}
|
||||
Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system
|
||||
|
||||
%global _hardened_build 1
|
||||
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system
|
||||
License: GPLv2+
|
||||
URL: http://www.tigervnc.com
|
||||
|
||||
Source0: https://github.com/TigerVNC/%{name}/archive/v%{version}.tar.gz#/%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
|
||||
Source0: %{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
|
||||
Source1: xvnc.service
|
||||
Source2: xvnc.socket
|
||||
Source3: 10-libvnc.conf
|
||||
@ -23,44 +23,25 @@ Source5: vncserver
|
||||
|
||||
# Downstream patches
|
||||
Patch1: tigervnc-use-gnome-as-default-session.patch
|
||||
# https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/pull/1425
|
||||
Patch2: tigervnc-vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service.patch
|
||||
Patch3: tigervnc-dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch
|
||||
# Only warn about passwords longer than 8 characters, but allow them to be used as in the past
|
||||
Patch4: tigervnc-allow-use-of-passwords-longer-than-eight-characters.patch
|
||||
# https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/pull/1792
|
||||
Patch5: tigervnc-add-option-allowing-to-connect-only-user-owning-session.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# Upstream patches
|
||||
Patch50: tigervnc-add-selinux-policy-rules-allowing-create-dirs-under-root-dir.patch
|
||||
Patch51: tigervnc-add-selinux-policy-rules-allowing-access-to-proc-sys-fs-nr-open.patch
|
||||
Patch52: tigervnc-dont-print-xvnc-banner-before-parsing-args.patch
|
||||
Patch50: tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch
|
||||
Patch51: tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# Upstreamable patches
|
||||
Patch80: tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# This is tigervnc-%%{version}/unix/xserver116.patch rebased on the latest xorg
|
||||
Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch
|
||||
# 1326867 - [RHEL7.3] GLX applications in an Xvnc session fails to start
|
||||
Patch100: 0001-rpath-hack.patch
|
||||
Patch101: 0001-rpath-hack.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# XServer patches
|
||||
Patch200: xorg-CVE-2025-26594.patch
|
||||
Patch201: xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2.patch
|
||||
Patch202: xorg-CVE-2025-26595.patch
|
||||
Patch203: xorg-CVE-2025-26596.patch
|
||||
Patch204: xorg-CVE-2025-26597.patch
|
||||
Patch205: xorg-CVE-2025-26598.patch
|
||||
Patch206: xorg-CVE-2025-26599.patch
|
||||
Patch207: xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2.patch
|
||||
Patch208: xorg-CVE-2025-26600.patch
|
||||
Patch209: xorg-CVE-2025-26601.patch
|
||||
Patch210: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2.patch
|
||||
Patch211: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3.patch
|
||||
Patch212: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4.patch
|
||||
Patch213: xorg-CVE-2025-49175.patch
|
||||
Patch214: xorg-CVE-2025-49176-1.patch
|
||||
Patch215: xorg-CVE-2025-49176-2.patch
|
||||
Patch216: xorg-CVE-2025-49178.patch
|
||||
Patch217: xorg-CVE-2025-49179.patch
|
||||
Patch218: xorg-CVE-2025-49180.patch
|
||||
# CVE-2024-0229
|
||||
# https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1251
|
||||
Patch200: xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup.patch
|
||||
|
||||
BuildRequires: make
|
||||
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
|
||||
@ -97,26 +78,18 @@ BuildRequires: libXinerama-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: libXt-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: libXtst-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: libdrm-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: mesa-libgbm-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: libtool
|
||||
BuildRequires: libxkbfile-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: libxshmfence-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: mesa-libGL-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(fontutil)
|
||||
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(xkbcomp)
|
||||
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-font-utils
|
||||
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-server-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-server-source
|
||||
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-util-macros
|
||||
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-xtrans-devel
|
||||
|
||||
# SELinux
|
||||
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel
|
||||
BuildRequires: selinux-policy-devel
|
||||
|
||||
# For RHEL-91104
|
||||
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(dbus-1) >= 1.0
|
||||
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libsystemd) >= 209
|
||||
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libudev) >= 143
|
||||
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel, selinux-policy-devel, systemd
|
||||
|
||||
Requires(post): coreutils
|
||||
Requires(postun):coreutils
|
||||
@ -124,7 +97,6 @@ Requires(postun):coreutils
|
||||
Requires: hicolor-icon-theme
|
||||
Requires: tigervnc-license
|
||||
Requires: tigervnc-icons
|
||||
Requires: which
|
||||
|
||||
%description
|
||||
Virtual Network Computing (VNC) is a remote display system which
|
||||
@ -155,16 +127,11 @@ X session.
|
||||
|
||||
%package server-minimal
|
||||
Summary: A minimal installation of TigerVNC server
|
||||
Requires(post): systemd
|
||||
Requires(preun): systemd
|
||||
Requires(postun): systemd
|
||||
Requires(post): systemd
|
||||
Requires(post): chkconfig
|
||||
Requires(preun):chkconfig
|
||||
|
||||
Requires: dbus-x11
|
||||
Requires: mesa-dri-drivers
|
||||
Requires: tigervnc-license
|
||||
Requires: xkbcomp
|
||||
Requires: xkeyboard-config
|
||||
Requires: mesa-dri-drivers, xkeyboard-config, xorg-x11-xkb-utils
|
||||
Requires: tigervnc-license, dbus-x11
|
||||
|
||||
%description server-minimal
|
||||
The VNC system allows you to access the same desktop from a wide
|
||||
@ -220,42 +187,21 @@ pushd unix/xserver
|
||||
for all in `find . -type f -perm -001`; do
|
||||
chmod -x "$all"
|
||||
done
|
||||
%patch -P100 -p1 -b .rpath
|
||||
cat ../xserver120.patch | patch -p1
|
||||
|
||||
%patch -P200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26594
|
||||
%patch -P201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2
|
||||
%patch -P202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26595
|
||||
%patch -P203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26596
|
||||
%patch -P204 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26597
|
||||
%patch -P205 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26598
|
||||
%patch -P206 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26599
|
||||
%patch -P207 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2
|
||||
%patch -P208 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26600
|
||||
%patch -P209 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601
|
||||
%patch -P210 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2
|
||||
%patch -P211 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3
|
||||
%patch -P212 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4
|
||||
%patch -P213 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49175
|
||||
%patch -P214 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49176-1
|
||||
%patch -P215 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49176-2
|
||||
%patch -P216 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49178
|
||||
%patch -P217 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49179
|
||||
%patch -P218 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49180
|
||||
%patch100 -p1 -b .xserver120-rebased
|
||||
%patch101 -p1 -b .rpath
|
||||
%patch200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-0229-followup
|
||||
popd
|
||||
|
||||
%patch -P1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session
|
||||
%patch -P2 -p1 -b .vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service
|
||||
%patch -P3 -p1 -b .dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch
|
||||
%patch -P4 -p1 -b .allow-use-of-passwords-longer-than-eight-characters
|
||||
%patch -P5 -p1 -b .add-option-allowing-to-connect-only-user-owning-session
|
||||
%patch1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session
|
||||
%patch2 -p1 -b .vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service
|
||||
%patch3 -p1 -b .dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch
|
||||
|
||||
# Upstream patches
|
||||
%patch -P50 -p1 -b .add-selinux-policy-rules-allowing-create-dirs-under-root-dir
|
||||
%patch -P51 -p1 -b .add-selinux-policy-rules-allowing-access-to-proc-sys-fs-nr-open
|
||||
%patch -P52 -p1 -b .dont-print-xvnc-banner-before-parsing-args
|
||||
%patch50 -p1 -b .support-username-alias-in-plainusers
|
||||
%patch51 -p1 -b .use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd
|
||||
|
||||
# Upstreamable patches
|
||||
%patch80 -p1 -b .dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device
|
||||
|
||||
%build
|
||||
%ifarch sparcv9 sparc64 s390 s390x
|
||||
@ -263,7 +209,7 @@ export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fPIC"
|
||||
%else
|
||||
export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS -fpic"
|
||||
%endif
|
||||
export CXXFLAGS="$CFLAGS -std=c++11"
|
||||
export CXXFLAGS="$CFLAGS"
|
||||
|
||||
%{cmake} .
|
||||
make %{?_smp_mflags}
|
||||
@ -274,17 +220,18 @@ autoreconf -fiv
|
||||
--disable-xorg --disable-xnest --disable-xvfb --disable-dmx \
|
||||
--disable-xwin --disable-xephyr --disable-kdrive --disable-xwayland \
|
||||
--with-pic --disable-static \
|
||||
--with-default-font-path="catalogue:/etc/X11/fontpath.d,built-ins" \
|
||||
--with-default-font-path="catalogue:%{_sysconfdir}/X11/fontpath.d,built-ins" \
|
||||
--with-fontdir=%{_datadir}/X11/fonts \
|
||||
--with-xkb-output=%{_localstatedir}/lib/xkb \
|
||||
--enable-glx --disable-dri --enable-dri2 --enable-dri3 \
|
||||
--enable-install-libxf86config \
|
||||
--enable-glx --disable-dri --enable-dri2 --disable-dri3 \
|
||||
--disable-unit-tests \
|
||||
--disable-config-hal \
|
||||
--disable-config-udev \
|
||||
--with-dri-driver-path=%{_libdir}/dri \
|
||||
--without-dtrace \
|
||||
--disable-devel-docs \
|
||||
--disable-selective-werror \
|
||||
--enable-systemd-logind \
|
||||
--enable-config-udev
|
||||
--disable-selective-werror
|
||||
|
||||
make %{?_smp_mflags}
|
||||
popd
|
||||
@ -315,8 +262,6 @@ popd
|
||||
# Install systemd unit file
|
||||
install -m644 %{SOURCE1} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/xvnc@.service
|
||||
install -m644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/xvnc.socket
|
||||
# Install old vncserver script
|
||||
install -m 755 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/vncserver
|
||||
|
||||
# Install desktop stuff
|
||||
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/{16x16,24x24,48x48}/apps
|
||||
@ -327,6 +272,7 @@ install -m644 tigervnc_$s.png %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/${s}x$s/apps
|
||||
done
|
||||
popd
|
||||
|
||||
install -m 755 %{SOURCE5} %{buildroot}/%{_bindir}/vncserver
|
||||
|
||||
%find_lang %{name} %{name}.lang
|
||||
|
||||
@ -337,14 +283,15 @@ mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/X11/xorg.conf.d/
|
||||
install -m 644 %{SOURCE3} %{buildroot}%{_sysconfdir}/X11/xorg.conf.d/10-libvnc.conf
|
||||
|
||||
%post server
|
||||
%systemd_post xvnc@.service
|
||||
%systemd_post xvnc.service
|
||||
%systemd_post xvnc.socket
|
||||
|
||||
%preun server
|
||||
%systemd_preun xvnc.service
|
||||
%systemd_preun xvnc.socket
|
||||
|
||||
%postun server
|
||||
%systemd_postun xvnc@.service
|
||||
%systemd_postun xvnc.service
|
||||
%systemd_postun xvnc.socket
|
||||
|
||||
%pre selinux
|
||||
@ -375,8 +322,8 @@ fi
|
||||
%{_unitdir}/vncserver@.service
|
||||
%{_unitdir}/xvnc@.service
|
||||
%{_unitdir}/xvnc.socket
|
||||
%{_bindir}/vncserver
|
||||
%{_bindir}/x0vncserver
|
||||
%{_bindir}/vncserver
|
||||
%{_sbindir}/vncsession
|
||||
%{_libexecdir}/vncserver
|
||||
%{_libexecdir}/vncsession-start
|
||||
@ -396,7 +343,7 @@ fi
|
||||
|
||||
%files server-module
|
||||
%{_libdir}/xorg/modules/extensions/libvnc.so
|
||||
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/X11/xorg.conf.d/10-libvnc.conf
|
||||
%config %{_sysconfdir}/X11/xorg.conf.d/10-libvnc.conf
|
||||
|
||||
%files license
|
||||
%{_docdir}/tigervnc/LICENCE.TXT
|
||||
@ -409,92 +356,6 @@ fi
|
||||
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename}
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Wed Jun 18 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-7
|
||||
- Additional fix to CVE-2025-49176: xorg-x11-server: Integer Overflow in Big Requests Extension
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-97294
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue Jun 17 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-6
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-49175: xorg-x11-server: Out-of-Bounds Read in X Rendering Extension Animated Cursors
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-97268
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-49176: xorg-x11-server: Integer Overflow in Big Requests Extension
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-97294
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-49178: xorg-x11-server: Unprocessed Client Request Due to Bytes to Ignore
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-97364
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-49179: xorg-x11-server: Integer overflow in X Record extension
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-97397
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-49180: xorg-x11-server: Integer Overflow in X Resize, Rotate and Reflect (RandR) Extension
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-97232
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue May 27 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-5
|
||||
- Fix broken authentication with x0vncserver
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-93729
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu May 15 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-4
|
||||
- Add option "ApproveLoggedUserOnly" allowing to connect only the user
|
||||
owning the running session
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-91104
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Apr 30 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-3
|
||||
- Only warn about 8 characters limit, but let it proceed
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-89430
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Apr 16 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-2
|
||||
- Fix inetd mode not working
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-86513
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Feb 26 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.15.0-1
|
||||
- 1.15.0
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79161
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79982
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Feb 26 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-15
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-26594 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free of the root cursor
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79397
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-26595 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText()
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79401
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-26596 xorg-x11-server Heap overflow in XkbWriteKeySyms()
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79386
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-26597 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey()
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79380
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-26598 xorg-x11-server Out-of-bounds write in CreatePointerBarrierClient()
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79369
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-26599 xorg-x11-server Use of uninitialized pointer in compRedirectWindow()
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79364
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-26600 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in PlayReleasedEvents()
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79360
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2025-26601 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in SyncInitTrigger()
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-79348
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Oct 31 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-14
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2024-9632: xorg-x11-server: heap-based buffer overflow privilege escalation vulnerability
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-61999
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Aug 05 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-13
|
||||
- vncsession: use /bin/sh if the user shell is not set
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-52827
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jul 12 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-12
|
||||
- Fix FTBS: drop already applied Xorg patches
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-46696
|
||||
|
||||
* Tue May 28 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-11
|
||||
- vncconfig: add option to force view-only remote client connections
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-11908
|
||||
|
||||
* Mon Apr 15 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-10
|
||||
- Drop patches that are already part of xorg-x11-server
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-30755
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-30767
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-30761
|
||||
|
||||
* Thu Apr 04 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-9
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2024-31080 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overread/data leakage in ProcXIGetSelectedEvents
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-30755
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2024-31083 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: User-after-free in ProcRenderAddGlyphs
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-30767
|
||||
- Fix CVE-2024-31081 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overread/data leakage in ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-30761
|
||||
|
||||
* Wed Feb 07 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-8
|
||||
- Fix copy/paste error in the DeviceStateNotify
|
||||
Resolves: RHEL-20530
|
||||
|
||||
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user