rpms/tigervnc
6
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity

import OL tigervnc-1.14.1-8.el9_6

Browse Source
This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2025-06-25 08:04:28 +00:00
parent 3e8b754b88
commit f910a74ef7
25 changed files with 1317 additions and 1035 deletions
Show Stats Download Patch File Download Diff File Expand all files Collapse all files

543
SOURCES/tigervnc-add-clipboard-support-to-x0vncserver.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,543 @@
From c23be952f50ba34c49134b6280ce503f154dc9bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Gaurav Ujjwal <gujjwal00@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Sep 2024 21:21:26 +0530
Subject: [PATCH] Add clipboard support to x0vncserver
---
unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx | 13 ++-
unix/tx/TXWindow.h | 3 +-
unix/x0vncserver/CMakeLists.txt | 1 +
unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx | 49 +++++++-
unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h | 13 ++-
unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx | 195 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.h | 58 +++++++++
unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.cxx | 5 -
unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man | 21 ++++
9 files changed, 344 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx
create mode 100644 unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.h
diff --git a/unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx b/unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx
index ee097e4..b10ed84 100644
--- a/unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx
+++ b/unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx
@@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ std::list<TXWindow*> windows;
Atom wmProtocols, wmDeleteWindow, wmTakeFocus;
Atom xaTIMESTAMP, xaTARGETS, xaSELECTION_TIME, xaSELECTION_STRING;
-Atom xaCLIPBOARD;
+Atom xaCLIPBOARD, xaUTF8_STRING, xaINCR;
unsigned long TXWindow::black, TXWindow::white;
unsigned long TXWindow::defaultFg, TXWindow::defaultBg;
unsigned long TXWindow::lightBg, TXWindow::darkBg;
@@ -65,6 +65,8 @@ void TXWindow::init(Display* dpy, const char* defaultWindowClass_)
xaSELECTION_TIME = XInternAtom(dpy, "SELECTION_TIME", False);
xaSELECTION_STRING = XInternAtom(dpy, "SELECTION_STRING", False);
xaCLIPBOARD = XInternAtom(dpy, "CLIPBOARD", False);
+ xaUTF8_STRING = XInternAtom(dpy, "UTF8_STRING", False);
+ xaINCR = XInternAtom(dpy, "INCR", False);
XColor cols[6];
cols[0].red = cols[0].green = cols[0].blue = 0x0000;
cols[1].red = cols[1].green = cols[1].blue = 0xbbbb;
@@ -462,17 +464,18 @@ void TXWindow::handleXEvent(XEvent* ev)
} else {
se.property = ev->xselectionrequest.property;
if (se.target == xaTARGETS) {
- Atom targets[2];
+ Atom targets[3];
targets[0] = xaTIMESTAMP;
targets[1] = XA_STRING;
+ targets[2] = xaUTF8_STRING;
XChangeProperty(dpy, se.requestor, se.property, XA_ATOM, 32,
- PropModeReplace, (unsigned char*)targets, 2);
+ PropModeReplace, (unsigned char*)targets, 3);
} else if (se.target == xaTIMESTAMP) {
Time t = selectionOwnTime[se.selection];
XChangeProperty(dpy, se.requestor, se.property, XA_INTEGER, 32,
PropModeReplace, (unsigned char*)&t, 1);
- } else if (se.target == XA_STRING) {
- if (!selectionRequest(se.requestor, se.selection, se.property))
+ } else if (se.target == XA_STRING || se.target == xaUTF8_STRING) {
+ if (!selectionRequest(se.requestor, se.selection, se.target, se.property))
se.property = None;
} else {
se.property = None;
diff --git a/unix/tx/TXWindow.h b/unix/tx/TXWindow.h
index 223c07a..32ae9a3 100644
--- a/unix/tx/TXWindow.h
+++ b/unix/tx/TXWindow.h
@@ -155,6 +155,7 @@ public:
// returning true if successful, false otherwise.
virtual bool selectionRequest(Window /*requestor*/,
Atom /*selection*/,
+ Atom /*target*/,
Atom /*property*/) { return false;}
// Static methods
@@ -224,6 +225,6 @@ private:
extern Atom wmProtocols, wmDeleteWindow, wmTakeFocus;
extern Atom xaTIMESTAMP, xaTARGETS, xaSELECTION_TIME, xaSELECTION_STRING;
-extern Atom xaCLIPBOARD;
+extern Atom xaCLIPBOARD, xaUTF8_STRING, xaINCR;
#endif
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/CMakeLists.txt b/unix/x0vncserver/CMakeLists.txt
index 5ce9577..9d6d213 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ add_executable(x0vncserver
XPixelBuffer.cxx
XDesktop.cxx
RandrGlue.c
+ XSelection.cxx
../vncconfig/QueryConnectDialog.cxx
)
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
index 1e52987..db5b6ae 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
@@ -43,6 +43,7 @@
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_XFIXES
#include <X11/extensions/Xfixes.h>
+#include <X11/Xatom.h>
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_XRANDR
#include <X11/extensions/Xrandr.h>
@@ -81,7 +82,7 @@ static const char * ledNames[XDESKTOP_N_LEDS] = {
XDesktop::XDesktop(Display* dpy_, Geometry *geometry_)
: dpy(dpy_), geometry(geometry_), pb(0), server(0),
- queryConnectDialog(0), queryConnectSock(0),
+ queryConnectDialog(0), queryConnectSock(0), selection(dpy_, this),
oldButtonMask(0), haveXtest(false), haveDamage(false),
maxButtons(0), running(false), ledMasks(), ledState(0),
codeMap(0), codeMapLen(0)
@@ -179,10 +180,15 @@ XDesktop::XDesktop(Display* dpy_, Geometry *geometry_)
if (XFixesQueryExtension(dpy, &xfixesEventBase, &xfixesErrorBase)) {
XFixesSelectCursorInput(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy),
XFixesDisplayCursorNotifyMask);
+
+ XFixesSelectSelectionInput(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy), XA_PRIMARY,
+ XFixesSetSelectionOwnerNotifyMask);
+ XFixesSelectSelectionInput(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy), xaCLIPBOARD,
+ XFixesSetSelectionOwnerNotifyMask);
} else {
#endif
vlog.info("XFIXES extension not present");
- vlog.info("Will not be able to display cursors");
+ vlog.info("Will not be able to display cursors or monitor clipboard");
#ifdef HAVE_XFIXES
}
#endif
@@ -892,6 +898,20 @@ bool XDesktop::handleGlobalEvent(XEvent* ev) {
return false;
return setCursor();
+ }
+ else if (ev->type == xfixesEventBase + XFixesSelectionNotify) {
+ XFixesSelectionNotifyEvent* sev = (XFixesSelectionNotifyEvent*)ev;
+
+ if (!running)
+ return true;
+
+ if (sev->subtype != XFixesSetSelectionOwnerNotify)
+ return false;
+
+ selection.handleSelectionOwnerChange(sev->owner, sev->selection,
+ sev->timestamp);
+
+ return true;
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_XRANDR
} else if (ev->type == Expose) {
@@ -1039,3 +1059,28 @@ bool XDesktop::setCursor()
return true;
}
#endif
+
+// X selection availability changed, let VNC clients know
+void XDesktop::handleXSelectionAnnounce(bool available) {
+ server->announceClipboard(available);
+}
+
+// A VNC client wants data, send request to selection owner
+void XDesktop::handleClipboardRequest() {
+ selection.requestSelectionData();
+}
+
+// Data is available, send it to clients
+void XDesktop::handleXSelectionData(const char* data) {
+ server->sendClipboardData(data);
+}
+
+// When a client says it has clipboard data, request it
+void XDesktop::handleClipboardAnnounce(bool available) {
+ if(available) server->requestClipboard();
+}
+
+// Client has sent the data
+void XDesktop::handleClipboardData(const char* data) {
+ if (data) selection.handleClientClipboardData(data);
+}
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h
index 4777a65..bc8d2a9 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h
@@ -32,6 +32,8 @@
#include <vncconfig/QueryConnectDialog.h>
+#include "XSelection.h"
+
class Geometry;
class XPixelBuffer;
@@ -46,7 +48,8 @@ struct AddedKeySym
class XDesktop : public rfb::SDesktop,
public TXGlobalEventHandler,
- public QueryResultCallback
+ public QueryResultCallback,
+ public XSelectionHandler
{
public:
XDesktop(Display* dpy_, Geometry *geometry);
@@ -65,6 +68,13 @@ public:
virtual void clientCutText(const char* str);
virtual unsigned int setScreenLayout(int fb_width, int fb_height,
const rfb::ScreenSet& layout);
+ void handleClipboardRequest() override;
+ void handleClipboardAnnounce(bool available) override;
+ void handleClipboardData(const char* data) override;
+
+ // -=- XSelectionHandler interface
+ void handleXSelectionAnnounce(bool available) override;
+ void handleXSelectionData(const char* data) override;
// -=- TXGlobalEventHandler interface
virtual bool handleGlobalEvent(XEvent* ev);
@@ -80,6 +90,7 @@ protected:
rfb::VNCServer* server;
QueryConnectDialog* queryConnectDialog;
network::Socket* queryConnectSock;
+ XSelection selection;
int oldButtonMask;
bool haveXtest;
bool haveDamage;
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx b/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..72dd537
--- /dev/null
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx
@@ -0,0 +1,195 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 2024 Gaurav Ujjwal. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this software; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#include <X11/Xatom.h>
+#include <rfb/Configuration.h>
+#include <rfb/LogWriter.h>
+#include <rfb/util.h>
+#include <x0vncserver/XSelection.h>
+
+rfb::BoolParameter setPrimary("SetPrimary",
+ "Set the PRIMARY as well as the CLIPBOARD selection",
+ true);
+rfb::BoolParameter sendPrimary("SendPrimary",
+ "Send the PRIMARY as well as the CLIPBOARD selection",
+ true);
+
+static rfb::LogWriter vlog("XSelection");
+
+XSelection::XSelection(Display* dpy_, XSelectionHandler* handler_)
+ : TXWindow(dpy_, 1, 1, nullptr), handler(handler_), announcedSelection(None)
+{
+ probeProperty = XInternAtom(dpy, "TigerVNC_ProbeProperty", False);
+ transferProperty = XInternAtom(dpy, "TigerVNC_TransferProperty", False);
+ timestampProperty = XInternAtom(dpy, "TigerVNC_TimestampProperty", False);
+ setName("TigerVNC Clipboard (x0vncserver)");
+ addEventMask(PropertyChangeMask); // Required for PropertyNotify events
+}
+
+static Bool PropertyEventMatcher(Display* /* dpy */, XEvent* ev, XPointer prop)
+{
+ if (ev->type == PropertyNotify && ev->xproperty.atom == *((Atom*)prop))
+ return True;
+ else
+ return False;
+}
+
+Time XSelection::getXServerTime()
+{
+ XEvent ev;
+ uint8_t data = 0;
+
+ // Trigger a PropertyNotify event to extract server time
+ XChangeProperty(dpy, win(), timestampProperty, XA_STRING, 8, PropModeReplace,
+ &data, sizeof(data));
+ XIfEvent(dpy, &ev, &PropertyEventMatcher, (XPointer)&timestampProperty);
+ return ev.xproperty.time;
+}
+
+// Takes ownership of selections, backed by given data.
+void XSelection::handleClientClipboardData(const char* data)
+{
+ vlog.debug("Received client clipboard data, taking selection ownership");
+
+ Time time = getXServerTime();
+ ownSelection(xaCLIPBOARD, time);
+ if (!selectionOwner(xaCLIPBOARD))
+ vlog.error("Unable to own CLIPBOARD selection");
+
+ if (setPrimary) {
+ ownSelection(XA_PRIMARY, time);
+ if (!selectionOwner(XA_PRIMARY))
+ vlog.error("Unable to own PRIMARY selection");
+ }
+
+ if (selectionOwner(xaCLIPBOARD) || selectionOwner(XA_PRIMARY))
+ clientData = data;
+}
+
+// We own the selection and another X app has asked for data
+bool XSelection::selectionRequest(Window requestor, Atom selection, Atom target,
+ Atom property)
+{
+ if (clientData.empty() || requestor == win() || !selectionOwner(selection))
+ return false;
+
+ if (target == XA_STRING) {
+ std::string latin1 = rfb::utf8ToLatin1(clientData.data(), clientData.length());
+ XChangeProperty(dpy, requestor, property, XA_STRING, 8, PropModeReplace,
+ (unsigned char*)latin1.data(), latin1.length());
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ if (target == xaUTF8_STRING) {
+ XChangeProperty(dpy, requestor, property, xaUTF8_STRING, 8, PropModeReplace,
+ (unsigned char*)clientData.data(), clientData.length());
+ return true;
+ }
+
+ return false;
+}
+
+// Selection-owner change implies a change in selection data.
+void XSelection::handleSelectionOwnerChange(Window owner, Atom selection, Time time)
+{
+ if (selection != XA_PRIMARY && selection != xaCLIPBOARD)
+ return;
+ if (selection == XA_PRIMARY && !sendPrimary)
+ return;
+
+ if (selection == announcedSelection)
+ announceSelection(None);
+
+ if (owner == None || owner == win())
+ return;
+
+ if (!selectionOwner(XA_PRIMARY) && !selectionOwner(xaCLIPBOARD))
+ clientData = "";
+
+ XConvertSelection(dpy, selection, xaTARGETS, probeProperty, win(), time);
+}
+
+void XSelection::announceSelection(Atom selection)
+{
+ announcedSelection = selection;
+ handler->handleXSelectionAnnounce(selection != None);
+}
+
+void XSelection::requestSelectionData()
+{
+ if (announcedSelection != None)
+ XConvertSelection(dpy, announcedSelection, xaTARGETS, transferProperty, win(),
+ CurrentTime);
+}
+
+// Some information about selection is received from current owner
+void XSelection::selectionNotify(XSelectionEvent* ev, Atom type, int format,
+ int nitems, void* data)
+{
+ if (!ev || !data || type == None)
+ return;
+
+ if (ev->target == xaTARGETS) {
+ if (format != 32 || type != XA_ATOM)
+ return;
+
+ Atom* targets = (Atom*)data;
+ bool utf8Supported = false;
+ bool stringSupported = false;
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < nitems; i++) {
+ if (targets[i] == xaUTF8_STRING)
+ utf8Supported = true;
+ else if (targets[i] == XA_STRING)
+ stringSupported = true;
+ }
+
+ if (ev->property == probeProperty) {
+ // Only probing for now, will issue real request when client asks for data
+ if (stringSupported || utf8Supported)
+ announceSelection(ev->selection);
+ return;
+ }
+
+ // Prefer UTF-8 if available
+ if (utf8Supported)
+ XConvertSelection(dpy, ev->selection, xaUTF8_STRING, transferProperty, win(),
+ ev->time);
+ else if (stringSupported)
+ XConvertSelection(dpy, ev->selection, XA_STRING, transferProperty, win(),
+ ev->time);
+ } else if (ev->target == xaUTF8_STRING || ev->target == XA_STRING) {
+ if (type == xaINCR) {
+ // Incremental transfer is not supported
+ vlog.debug("Selected data is too big!");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ if (format != 8)
+ return;
+
+ if (type == xaUTF8_STRING) {
+ std::string result = rfb::convertLF((char*)data, nitems);
+ handler->handleXSelectionData(result.c_str());
+ } else if (type == XA_STRING) {
+ std::string result = rfb::convertLF((char*)data, nitems);
+ result = rfb::latin1ToUTF8(result.data(), result.length());
+ handler->handleXSelectionData(result.c_str());
+ }
+ }
+}
\ No newline at end of file
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.h b/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.h
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..fbe1f29
--- /dev/null
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.h
@@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
+/* Copyright (C) 2024 Gaurav Ujjwal. All Rights Reserved.
+ *
+ * This is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+ * it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
+ * the Free Software Foundation; either version 2 of the License, or
+ * (at your option) any later version.
+ *
+ * This software is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
+ * but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
+ * MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
+ * GNU General Public License for more details.
+ *
+ * You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+ * along with this software; if not, write to the Free Software
+ * Foundation, Inc., 59 Temple Place - Suite 330, Boston, MA 02111-1307,
+ * USA.
+ */
+
+#ifndef __XSELECTION_H__
+#define __XSELECTION_H__
+
+#include <string>
+#include <tx/TXWindow.h>
+
+class XSelectionHandler
+{
+public:
+ virtual void handleXSelectionAnnounce(bool available) = 0;
+ virtual void handleXSelectionData(const char* data) = 0;
+};
+
+class XSelection : TXWindow
+{
+public:
+ XSelection(Display* dpy_, XSelectionHandler* handler_);
+
+ void handleSelectionOwnerChange(Window owner, Atom selection, Time time);
+ void requestSelectionData();
+ void handleClientClipboardData(const char* data);
+
+private:
+ XSelectionHandler* handler;
+ Atom probeProperty;
+ Atom transferProperty;
+ Atom timestampProperty;
+ Atom announcedSelection;
+ std::string clientData; // Always in UTF-8
+
+ Time getXServerTime();
+ void announceSelection(Atom selection);
+
+ bool selectionRequest(Window requestor, Atom selection, Atom target,
+ Atom property) override;
+ void selectionNotify(XSelectionEvent* ev, Atom type, int format, int nitems,
+ void* data) override;
+};
+
+#endif
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.cxx b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.cxx
index d2999e2..b31450b 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.cxx
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.cxx
@@ -281,11 +281,6 @@ int main(int argc, char** argv)
Configuration::enableServerParams();
- // FIXME: We don't support clipboard yet
- Configuration::removeParam("AcceptCutText");
- Configuration::removeParam("SendCutText");
- Configuration::removeParam("MaxCutText");
-
// Assume different defaults when socket activated
if (hasSystemdListeners())
rfbport.setParam(-1);
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
index 347e50e..5bc8807 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
@@ -222,6 +222,27 @@ Accept pointer movement and button events from clients. Default is on.
Accept requests to resize the size of the desktop. Default is on.
.
.TP
+.B \-AcceptCutText
+Accept clipboard updates from clients. Default is on.
+.
+.TP
+.B \-SetPrimary
+Set the PRIMARY as well as the CLIPBOARD selection. Default is on.
+.
+.TP
+.B \-MaxCutText \fIbytes\fP
+The maximum permitted size of an incoming clipboard update.
+Default is \fB262144\fP.
+.
+.TP
+.B \-SendCutText
+Send clipboard changes to clients. Default is on.
+.
+.TP
+.B \-SendPrimary
+Send the PRIMARY as well as the CLIPBOARD selection to clients. Default is on.
+.
+.TP
.B \-RemapKeys \fImapping
Sets up a keyboard mapping.
.I mapping

265
SOURCES/tigervnc-add-option-allowing-to-connect-only-user-owning-session.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,265 @@
From 69b0fd6d77ea5968bd815188ee2bda3d282ebc60 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 29 Jul 2024 14:31:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Add option allowing to connect only the user owning the
running session
Checks, whether the user who is trying to authenticate is already logged
into the running session in order to allow or reject the connection.
This is expected to be used with 'plain' security type in combination
with 'PlainUsers=*' option allowing everyone to connect to the session.
---
common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx | 7 --
unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx | 8 ++
unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc | 137 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++
unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h | 7 ++
unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man | 7 ++
5 files changed, 159 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx b/common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx
index 35a8384..80fdb86 100644
--- a/common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx
+++ b/common/rfb/VNCServerST.cxx
@@ -699,13 +699,6 @@ void VNCServerST::queryConnection(VNCSConnectionST* client,
return;
}
- // - Are we configured to do queries?
- if (!rfb::Server::queryConnect &&
- !client->getSock()->requiresQuery()) {
- approveConnection(client->getSock(), true, NULL);
- return;
- }
-
// - Does the client have the right to bypass the query?
if (client->accessCheck(AccessNoQuery))
{
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
index 1e52987..a87373b 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
@@ -30,6 +30,7 @@
#include <rfb/LogWriter.h>
#include <rfb/Exception.h>
+#include <rfb/ServerCore.h>
#include <x0vncserver/XDesktop.h>
@@ -313,6 +314,13 @@ void XDesktop::queryConnection(network::Socket* sock,
{
assert(isRunning());
+ // - Are we configured to do queries?
+ if (!rfb::Server::queryConnect &&
+ !sock->requiresQuery()) {
+ server->approveConnection(sock, true, nullptr);
+ return;
+ }
+
// Someone already querying?
if (queryConnectSock) {
std::list<network::Socket*> sockets;
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc
index d4ee16b..e12b88c 100644
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.cc
@@ -52,6 +52,11 @@
#include "XorgGlue.h"
#include "vncInput.h"
+#if HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
+# include <pwd.h>
+# include <systemd/sd-login.h>
+#endif
+
extern "C" {
void vncSetGlueContext(int screenIndex);
void vncPresentMscEvent(uint64_t id, uint64_t msc);
@@ -72,6 +77,15 @@ IntParameter queryConnectTimeout("QueryConnectTimeout",
"rejecting the connection",
10);
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
+BoolParameter approveLoggedUserOnly
+("ApproveLoggedUserOnly",
+ "Approve only the user who is currently logged into the session."
+ "This is expected to be combined with 'plain' security type and with "
+ "'PlainUsers=*' option allowing everyone to connect to the session."
+ "Default is off.",
+ false);
+#endif
XserverDesktop::XserverDesktop(int screenIndex_,
std::list<network::SocketListener*> listeners_,
@@ -168,11 +182,134 @@ void XserverDesktop::init(rfb::VNCServer* vs)
// ready state
}
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
+bool XserverDesktop::checkUserLogged(const char* userName)
+{
+ bool ret = false;
+ bool noUserSession = true;
+ int res;
+ char **sessions;
+
+ res = sd_get_sessions(&sessions);
+ if (res < 0) {
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to get sessions");
+ return false;
+ }
+
+ if (sessions != nullptr && sessions[0] != nullptr) {
+ for (int i = 0; sessions[i]; i++) {
+ uid_t uid;
+ char *clazz;
+ char *display;
+ char *type;
+ char *state;
+
+ res = sd_session_get_type(sessions[i], &type);
+ if (res < 0) {
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine session type");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(type, "x11") != 0) {
+ free(type);
+ continue;
+ }
+ free(type);
+
+ res = sd_session_get_display(sessions[i], &display);
+ if (res < 0) {
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine display of session");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ std::string serverDisplay = ":" + std::to_string(screenIndex);
+ std::string serverDisplayIPv4 = "127.0.0.1:" + std::to_string(screenIndex);
+ std::string serverDisplayIPv6 = "::1:" + std::to_string(screenIndex);
+ if ((strcmp(display, serverDisplay.c_str()) != 0) &&
+ (strcmp(display, serverDisplayIPv4.c_str()) != 0) &&
+ (strcmp(display, serverDisplayIPv6.c_str()) != 0)) {
+ free(display);
+ continue;
+ }
+ free(display);
+
+ res = sd_session_get_class(sessions[i], &clazz);
+ if (res < 0) {
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine session class");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ res = sd_session_get_state(sessions[i], &state);
+ if (res < 0) {
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine session state");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (strcmp(state, "closing") == 0) {
+ free(state);
+ continue;
+ }
+ free(state);
+
+ res = sd_session_get_uid(sessions[i], &uid);
+ if (res < 0) {
+ vlog.debug("logind: failed to determine user id of session");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (uid != 0 && strcmp(clazz, "user") == 0) {
+ noUserSession = false;
+ }
+ free(clazz);
+
+ struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(userName);
+ if (!pw) {
+ vlog.debug("logind: user not found");
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (uid == pw->pw_uid) {
+ ret = true;
+ break;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (sessions) {
+ for (int i = 0; sessions[i]; i ++) {
+ free(sessions[i]);
+ }
+
+ free (sessions);
+ }
+
+ // If we didn't find a matching user, we can still allow the user
+ // to log in if there is no user session yet.
+ return !ret ? noUserSession : ret;
+}
+#endif
+
void XserverDesktop::queryConnection(network::Socket* sock,
const char* userName)
{
int count;
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
+ // - Only owner of the session can be approved
+ if (approveLoggedUserOnly && !checkUserLogged(userName)) {
+ server->approveConnection(sock, false,
+ "The user is not owner of the running session");
+ return;
+ }
+#endif
+
+ // - Are we configured to do queries?
+ if (!rfb::Server::queryConnect &&
+ !sock->requiresQuery()) {
+ server->approveConnection(sock, true, nullptr);
+ return;
+ }
+
if (queryConnectTimer.isStarted()) {
server->approveConnection(sock, false, "Another connection is currently being queried.");
return;
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h
index e604295..aed188e 100644
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/XserverDesktop.h
@@ -108,6 +108,13 @@ public:
virtual void grabRegion(const rfb::Region& r);
protected:
+#ifdef HAVE_SYSTEMD_DAEMON
+ // - Check whether user is logged into a session
+ // Returns true if user is already logged or there is no
+ // user session at all.
+ bool checkUserLogged(const char* userName);
+#endif
+
bool handleListenerEvent(int fd,
std::list<network::SocketListener*>* sockets,
rfb::VNCServer* sockserv);
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
index b9c429f..5762125 100644
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
@@ -204,6 +204,13 @@ to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Specify \fB%u\fP
to allow the user of the server process. Default is to deny all users.
.
.TP
+.B \-ApproveLoggedUserOnly
+Approve only the user who is currently logged into the session.
+This is expected to be combined with "Plain" security type and with
+"PlainUsers=*" option allowing everyone to connect to the session.
+Default is off.
+.
+.TP
.B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP
PAM service name to use when authentication users using any of the "Plain"
security types. Default is \fBvnc\fP.

24
SOURCES/tigervnc-avoid-invalid-xfree-for-xclasshint.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
From 6c8387018b130eb4ef69ea377e9154ba04f0fd50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 09:58:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Avoid invalid XFree for XClassHint
It seems XGetClassHint() doesn't set the pointers to NULL if there is no
name, so we need to make sure it is cleared beforehand. Otherwise we can
get an invalid pointer given to XFree().
---
unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx b/unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx
index b6a29d679..639c13827 100644
--- a/unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx
+++ b/unix/tx/TXWindow.cxx
@@ -313,6 +313,7 @@ void TXWindow::toplevel(const char* name, TXDeleteWindowCallback* dwc_,
void TXWindow::setName(const char* name)
{
XClassHint classHint;
+ memset(&classHint, 0, sizeof(classHint));
XGetClassHint(dpy, win(), &classHint);
XFree(classHint.res_name);
classHint.res_name = (char*)name;

22
SOURCES/tigervnc-do-proper-toplevel-window-setup-for-selection-window.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,22 @@
From 9e15952d02e01b8e19e7459bcabcd47dc63a1726 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
Date: Tue, 22 Oct 2024 09:59:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] Do proper top level window setup for selection window
---
unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx b/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx
index 72dd537f4..c724d2ac4 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XSelection.cxx
@@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ XSelection::XSelection(Display* dpy_, XSelectionHandler* handler_)
probeProperty = XInternAtom(dpy, "TigerVNC_ProbeProperty", False);
transferProperty = XInternAtom(dpy, "TigerVNC_TransferProperty", False);
timestampProperty = XInternAtom(dpy, "TigerVNC_TimestampProperty", False);
- setName("TigerVNC Clipboard (x0vncserver)");
+ toplevel("TigerVNC Clipboard (x0vncserver)");
addEventMask(PropertyChangeMask); // Required for PropertyNotify events
}

54
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-9632.patch
View File

@ -1,54 +0,0 @@
From 56351307017e2501f7cd6e31efcfb55c19aba75a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Matthieu Herrb <matthieu@herrb.eu>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 10:37:28 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in _XkbSetCompatMap()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The _XkbSetCompatMap() function attempts to resize the `sym_interpret`
buffer.
However, It didn't update its size properly. It updated `num_si` only,
without updating `size_si`.
This may lead to local privilege escalation if the server is run as root
or remote code execution (e.g. x11 over ssh).
CVE-2024-9632, ZDI-CAN-24756
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Tested-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index f203270d5..70e8279aa 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -2991,13 +2991,13 @@ _XkbSetCompatMap(ClientPtr client, DeviceIntPtr dev,
XkbSymInterpretPtr sym;
unsigned int skipped = 0;
- if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->num_si) {
- compat->num_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
+ if ((unsigned) (req->firstSI + req->nSI) > compat->size_si) {
+ compat->num_si = compat->size_si = req->firstSI + req->nSI;
compat->sym_interpret = reallocarray(compat->sym_interpret,
- compat->num_si,
+ compat->size_si,
sizeof(XkbSymInterpretRec));
if (!compat->sym_interpret) {
- compat->num_si = 0;
+ compat->num_si = compat->size_si = 0;
return BadAlloc;
}
}
--
2.46.2

46
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2.patch
View File

@ -1,46 +0,0 @@
From ded614e74e7175927dd2bc5ef69accaf2de29939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2024 15:49:43 +1000
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] dix: keep a ref to the rootCursor
CreateCursor returns a cursor with refcount 1 - that refcount is used by
the resource system, any caller needs to call RefCursor to get their own
reference. That happens correctly for normal cursors but for our
rootCursor we keep a variable to the cursor despite not having a ref for
ourselves.
Fix this by reffing/unreffing the rootCursor to ensure our pointer is
valid.
Related to CVE-2025-26594, ZDI-CAN-25544
Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
dix/main.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/dix/main.c b/dix/main.c
index aa7b020b2..0c57ba605 100644
--- a/dix/main.c
+++ b/dix/main.c
@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ dix_main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
defaultCursorFont);
}
+ rootCursor = RefCursor(rootCursor);
+
#ifdef PANORAMIX
/*
* Consolidate window and colourmap information for each screen
@@ -275,6 +277,8 @@ dix_main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[])
Dispatch();
+ UnrefCursor(rootCursor);
+
UndisplayDevices();
DisableAllDevices();
--
2.48.1

52
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26594.patch
View File

@ -1,52 +0,0 @@
From efca605c45ff51b57f136222b966ce1d610ebc33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 11:27:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] Cursor: Refuse to free the root cursor
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
If a cursor reference count drops to 0, the cursor is freed.
The root cursor however is referenced with a specific global variable,
and when the root cursor is freed, the global variable may still point
to freed memory.
Make sure to prevent the rootCursor from being explicitly freed by a
client.
CVE-2025-26594, ZDI-CAN-25544
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
v2: Explicitly forbid XFreeCursor() on the root cursor (Peter Hutterer
<peter.hutterer@who-t.net>)
v3: Return BadCursor instead of BadValue (Michel Dänzer
<michel@daenzer.net>)
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
dix/dispatch.c | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c
index 5f7cfe02d..d1241fa96 100644
--- a/dix/dispatch.c
+++ b/dix/dispatch.c
@@ -3039,6 +3039,10 @@ ProcFreeCursor(ClientPtr client)
rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pCursor, stuff->id, RT_CURSOR,
client, DixDestroyAccess);
if (rc == Success) {
+ if (pCursor == rootCursor) {
+ client->errorValue = stuff->id;
+ return BadCursor;
+ }
FreeResource(stuff->id, RT_NONE);
return Success;
}
--
2.48.1

60
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26595.patch
View File

@ -1,60 +0,0 @@
From 98602942c143075ab7464f917e0fc5d31ce28c3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 14:41:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText()
The code in XkbVModMaskText() allocates a fixed sized buffer on the
stack and copies the virtual mod name.
There's actually two issues in the code that can lead to a buffer
overflow.
First, the bound check mixes pointers and integers using misplaced
parenthesis, defeating the bound check.
But even though, if the check fails, the data is still copied, so the
stack overflow will occur regardless.
Change the logic to skip the copy entirely if the bound check fails.
CVE-2025-26595, ZDI-CAN-25545
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
xkb/xkbtext.c | 16 ++++++++--------
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xkb/xkbtext.c b/xkb/xkbtext.c
index 018466420..93262528b 100644
--- a/xkb/xkbtext.c
+++ b/xkb/xkbtext.c
@@ -173,14 +173,14 @@ XkbVModMaskText(XkbDescPtr xkb,
len = strlen(tmp) + 1 + (str == buf ? 0 : 1);
if (format == XkbCFile)
len += 4;
- if ((str - (buf + len)) <= VMOD_BUFFER_SIZE) {
- if (str != buf) {
- if (format == XkbCFile)
- *str++ = '|';
- else
- *str++ = '+';
- len--;
- }
+ if ((str - buf) + len > VMOD_BUFFER_SIZE)
+ continue; /* Skip */
+ if (str != buf) {
+ if (format == XkbCFile)
+ *str++ = '|';
+ else
+ *str++ = '+';
+ len--;
}
if (format == XkbCFile)
sprintf(str, "%sMask", tmp);
--
2.48.1

44
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26596.patch
View File

@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
From b41f6fce201e77a174550935330e2f7772d4adf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 11:49:34 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix computation of XkbSizeKeySyms
The computation of the length in XkbSizeKeySyms() differs from what is
actually written in XkbWriteKeySyms(), leading to a heap overflow.
Fix the calculation in XkbSizeKeySyms() to match what kbWriteKeySyms()
does.
CVE-2025-26596, ZDI-CAN-25543
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
xkb/xkb.c | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c
index 85659382d..744dba63d 100644
--- a/xkb/xkb.c
+++ b/xkb/xkb.c
@@ -1095,10 +1095,10 @@ XkbSizeKeySyms(XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply * rep)
len = rep->nKeySyms * SIZEOF(xkbSymMapWireDesc);
symMap = &xkb->map->key_sym_map[rep->firstKeySym];
for (i = nSyms = 0; i < rep->nKeySyms; i++, symMap++) {
- if (symMap->offset != 0) {
- nSymsThisKey = XkbNumGroups(symMap->group_info) * symMap->width;
- nSyms += nSymsThisKey;
- }
+ nSymsThisKey = XkbNumGroups(symMap->group_info) * symMap->width;
+ if (nSymsThisKey == 0)
+ continue;
+ nSyms += nSymsThisKey;
}
len += nSyms * 4;
rep->totalSyms = nSyms;
--
2.48.1

41
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26597.patch
View File

@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
From c5114475db18f29d639537d60e135bdfc11a5d3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 14:09:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey()
If XkbChangeTypesOfKey() is called with nGroups == 0, it will resize the
key syms to 0 but leave the key actions unchanged.
If later, the same function is called with a non-zero value for nGroups,
this will cause a buffer overflow because the key actions are of the wrong
size.
To avoid the issue, make sure to resize both the key syms and key actions
when nGroups is 0.
CVE-2025-26597, ZDI-CAN-25683
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
xkb/XKBMisc.c | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/xkb/XKBMisc.c b/xkb/XKBMisc.c
index abbfed90e..fd180fad2 100644
--- a/xkb/XKBMisc.c
+++ b/xkb/XKBMisc.c
@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ XkbChangeTypesOfKey(XkbDescPtr xkb,
i = XkbSetNumGroups(i, 0);
xkb->map->key_sym_map[key].group_info = i;
XkbResizeKeySyms(xkb, key, 0);
+ XkbResizeKeyActions(xkb, key, 0);
return Success;
}
--
2.48.1

115
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26598.patch
View File

@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
From 0f5ea9d269ac6225bcb302a1ec0f58878114da9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 11:25:11 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: Fix barrier device search
The function GetBarrierDevice() would search for the pointer device
based on its device id and return the matching value, or supposedly NULL
if no match was found.
Unfortunately, as written, it would return the last element of the list
if no matching device id was found which can lead to out of bounds
memory access.
Fix the search function to return NULL if not matching device is found,
and adjust the callers to handle the case where the device cannot be
found.
CVE-2025-26598, ZDI-CAN-25740
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xi/xibarriers.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xi/xibarriers.c b/Xi/xibarriers.c
index 80c4b5981..28bc0a24f 100644
--- a/Xi/xibarriers.c
+++ b/Xi/xibarriers.c
@@ -131,14 +131,15 @@ static void FreePointerBarrierClient(struct PointerBarrierClient *c)
static struct PointerBarrierDevice *GetBarrierDevice(struct PointerBarrierClient *c, int deviceid)
{
- struct PointerBarrierDevice *pbd = NULL;
+ struct PointerBarrierDevice *p, *pbd = NULL;
- xorg_list_for_each_entry(pbd, &c->per_device, entry) {
- if (pbd->deviceid == deviceid)
+ xorg_list_for_each_entry(p, &c->per_device, entry) {
+ if (p->deviceid == deviceid) {
+ pbd = p;
break;
+ }
}
- BUG_WARN(!pbd);
return pbd;
}
@@ -339,6 +340,9 @@ barrier_find_nearest(BarrierScreenPtr cs, DeviceIntPtr dev,
double distance;
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, dev->id);
+ if (!pbd)
+ continue;
+
if (pbd->seen)
continue;
@@ -447,6 +451,9 @@ input_constrain_cursor(DeviceIntPtr dev, ScreenPtr screen,
nearest = &c->barrier;
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, master->id);
+ if (!pbd)
+ continue;
+
new_sequence = !pbd->hit;
pbd->seen = TRUE;
@@ -487,6 +494,9 @@ input_constrain_cursor(DeviceIntPtr dev, ScreenPtr screen,
int flags = 0;
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, master->id);
+ if (!pbd)
+ continue;
+
pbd->seen = FALSE;
if (!pbd->hit)
continue;
@@ -681,6 +691,9 @@ BarrierFreeBarrier(void *data, XID id)
continue;
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, dev->id);
+ if (!pbd)
+ continue;
+
if (!pbd->hit)
continue;
@@ -740,6 +753,8 @@ static void remove_master_func(void *res, XID id, void *devid)
barrier = container_of(b, struct PointerBarrierClient, barrier);
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(barrier, *deviceid);
+ if (!pbd)
+ return;
if (pbd->hit) {
BarrierEvent ev = {
@@ -904,6 +919,10 @@ ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client)
barrier = container_of(b, struct PointerBarrierClient, barrier);
pbd = GetBarrierDevice(barrier, dev->id);
+ if (!pbd) {
+ client->errorValue = dev->id;
+ return BadDevice;
+ }
if (pbd->barrier_event_id == event_id)
pbd->release_event_id = event_id;
--
2.48.1

124
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2.patch
View File

@ -1,124 +0,0 @@
From f5ce639ff9d3af05e79efce6c51e084352d28ed1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 16:09:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] composite: initialize border clip even when
pixmap alloc fails
If it fails to allocate the pixmap, the function compAllocPixmap() would
return early and leave the borderClip region uninitialized, which may
lead to the use of uninitialized value as reported by valgrind:
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
at 0x4F9B33: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:317)
by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476)
by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679)
by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693)
by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446)
by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171)
by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592)
by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925)
by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
at 0x48EEDBC: pixman_region_translate (pixman-region.c:2233)
by 0x4F9255: RegionTranslate (regionstr.h:312)
by 0x4F9B7E: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:319)
by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476)
by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679)
by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693)
by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446)
by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171)
by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592)
by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925)
by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s)
at 0x48EEE33: UnknownInlinedFun (pixman-region.c:2241)
by 0x48EEE33: pixman_region_translate (pixman-region.c:2225)
by 0x4F9255: RegionTranslate (regionstr.h:312)
by 0x4F9B7E: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:319)
by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476)
by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679)
by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693)
by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation
at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446)
by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171)
by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592)
by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925)
by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768)
by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282)
by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34)
Fix compAllocPixmap() to initialize the border clip even if the creation
of the backing pixmap has failed, to avoid depending later on
uninitialized border clip values.
Related to CVE-2025-26599, ZDI-CAN-25851
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
composite/compalloc.c | 11 ++++++++---
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/composite/compalloc.c b/composite/compalloc.c
index ecb1b6147..d1342799b 100644
--- a/composite/compalloc.c
+++ b/composite/compalloc.c
@@ -605,9 +605,12 @@ compAllocPixmap(WindowPtr pWin)
int h = pWin->drawable.height + (bw << 1);
PixmapPtr pPixmap = compNewPixmap(pWin, x, y, w, h);
CompWindowPtr cw = GetCompWindow(pWin);
+ Bool status;
- if (!pPixmap)
- return FALSE;
+ if (!pPixmap) {
+ status = FALSE;
+ goto out;
+ }
if (cw->update == CompositeRedirectAutomatic)
pWin->redirectDraw = RedirectDrawAutomatic;
else
@@ -621,14 +624,16 @@ compAllocPixmap(WindowPtr pWin)
DamageRegister(&pWin->drawable, cw->damage);
cw->damageRegistered = TRUE;
}
+ status = TRUE;
+out:
/* Make sure our borderClip is up to date */
RegionUninit(&cw->borderClip);
RegionCopy(&cw->borderClip, &pWin->borderClip);
cw->borderClipX = pWin->drawable.x;
cw->borderClipY = pWin->drawable.y;
- return TRUE;
+ return status;
}
void
--
2.48.1

62
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26599.patch
View File

@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
From 10a24e364ac15983051d0bb90817c88bbe107036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 15:19:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] composite: Handle failure to redirect in
compRedirectWindow()
The function compCheckRedirect() may fail if it cannot allocate the
backing pixmap.
In that case, compRedirectWindow() will return a BadAlloc error.
However that failure code path will shortcut the validation of the
window tree marked just before, which leaves the validate data partly
initialized.
That causes a use of uninitialized pointer later.
The fix is to not shortcut the call to compHandleMarkedWindows() even in
the case of compCheckRedirect() returning an error.
CVE-2025-26599, ZDI-CAN-25851
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Acked-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
composite/compalloc.c | 5 +++--
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/composite/compalloc.c b/composite/compalloc.c
index e52c009bd..ecb1b6147 100644
--- a/composite/compalloc.c
+++ b/composite/compalloc.c
@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ compRedirectWindow(ClientPtr pClient, WindowPtr pWin, int update)
CompScreenPtr cs = GetCompScreen(pWin->drawable.pScreen);
WindowPtr pLayerWin;
Bool anyMarked = FALSE;
+ int status = Success;
if (pWin == cs->pOverlayWin) {
return Success;
@@ -216,13 +217,13 @@ compRedirectWindow(ClientPtr pClient, WindowPtr pWin, int update)
if (!compCheckRedirect(pWin)) {
FreeResource(ccw->id, RT_NONE);
- return BadAlloc;
+ status = BadAlloc;
}
if (anyMarked)
compHandleMarkedWindows(pWin, pLayerWin);
- return Success;
+ return status;
}
void
--
2.48.1

64
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26600.patch
View File

@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
From 70ad5d36ae80f6e5a436eabfee642c2c013e51cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 16:18:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: Dequeue pending events on frozen device on
removal
When a device is removed while still frozen, the events queued for that
device remain while the device itself is freed.
As a result, replaying the events will cause a use after free.
To avoid the issue, make sure to dequeue and free any pending events on
a frozen device when removed.
CVE-2025-26600, ZDI-CAN-25871
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
dix/devices.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+)
diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c
index 969819534..740390207 100644
--- a/dix/devices.c
+++ b/dix/devices.c
@@ -966,6 +966,23 @@ FreeAllDeviceClasses(ClassesPtr classes)
}
+static void
+FreePendingFrozenDeviceEvents(DeviceIntPtr dev)
+{
+ QdEventPtr qe, tmp;
+
+ if (!dev->deviceGrab.sync.frozen)
+ return;
+
+ /* Dequeue any frozen pending events */
+ xorg_list_for_each_entry_safe(qe, tmp, &syncEvents.pending, next) {
+ if (qe->device == dev) {
+ xorg_list_del(&qe->next);
+ free(qe);
+ }
+ }
+}
+
/**
* Close down a device and free all resources.
* Once closed down, the driver will probably not expect you that you'll ever
@@ -1030,6 +1047,7 @@ CloseDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev)
free(dev->last.touches[j].valuators);
free(dev->last.touches);
dev->config_info = NULL;
+ FreePendingFrozenDeviceEvents(dev);
dixFreePrivates(dev->devPrivates, PRIVATE_DEVICE);
free(dev);
}
--
2.48.1

80
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2.patch
View File

@ -1,80 +0,0 @@
From 7dc3f11abb51cad8a59ecbff5278c8c8a318df41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 16:54:30 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] sync: Check values before applying changes
In SyncInitTrigger(), we would set the CheckTrigger function before
validating the counter value.
As a result, if the counter value overflowed, we would leave the
function SyncInitTrigger() with the CheckTrigger applied but without
updating the trigger object.
To avoid that issue, move the portion of code checking for the trigger
check value before updating the CheckTrigger function.
Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xext/sync.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
index 4267d3af6..4eab5a6ac 100644
--- a/Xext/sync.c
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
@@ -351,6 +351,24 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
}
}
+ if (changes & (XSyncCAValueType | XSyncCAValue)) {
+ if (pTrigger->value_type == XSyncAbsolute)
+ pTrigger->test_value = pTrigger->wait_value;
+ else { /* relative */
+ Bool overflow;
+
+ if (pCounter == NULL)
+ return BadMatch;
+
+ overflow = checked_int64_add(&pTrigger->test_value,
+ pCounter->value, pTrigger->wait_value);
+ if (overflow) {
+ client->errorValue = pTrigger->wait_value >> 32;
+ return BadValue;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
if (changes & XSyncCATestType) {
if (pSync && SYNC_FENCE == pSync->type) {
@@ -379,24 +397,6 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
}
}
- if (changes & (XSyncCAValueType | XSyncCAValue)) {
- if (pTrigger->value_type == XSyncAbsolute)
- pTrigger->test_value = pTrigger->wait_value;
- else { /* relative */
- Bool overflow;
-
- if (pCounter == NULL)
- return BadMatch;
-
- overflow = checked_int64_add(&pTrigger->test_value,
- pCounter->value, pTrigger->wait_value);
- if (overflow) {
- client->errorValue = pTrigger->wait_value >> 32;
- return BadValue;
- }
- }
- }
-
if (changes & XSyncCACounter) {
if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */
SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger);
--
2.48.1

47
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3.patch
View File

@ -1,47 +0,0 @@
From 4ccaa5134482b6be9c9a7f0b66cd221ef325d082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:06:07 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] sync: Do not fail SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject()
We do not want to return a failure at the very last step in
SyncInitTrigger() after having all changes applied.
SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject() must not fail on memory allocation, if the
allocation of the SyncTriggerList fails, trigger a FatalError() instead.
Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xext/sync.c | 7 +++----
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
index 4eab5a6ac..c36de1a2e 100644
--- a/Xext/sync.c
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(SyncTrigger * pTrigger)
return Success;
}
- if (!(pCur = malloc(sizeof(SyncTriggerList))))
- return BadAlloc;
+ /* Failure is not an option, it's succeed or burst! */
+ pCur = XNFalloc(sizeof(SyncTriggerList));
pCur->pTrigger = pTrigger;
pCur->next = pTrigger->pSync->pTriglist;
@@ -409,8 +409,7 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
* a new counter on a trigger
*/
if (newSyncObject) {
- if ((rc = SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(pTrigger)) != Success)
- return rc;
+ SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(pTrigger);
}
else if (pCounter && IsSystemCounter(pCounter)) {
SyncComputeBracketValues(pCounter);
--
2.48.1

128
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4.patch
View File

@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
From f0984082067f79b45383fa1eb889c6a901667331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:10:31 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] sync: Apply changes last in
SyncChangeAlarmAttributes()
SyncChangeAlarmAttributes() would apply the various changes while
checking for errors.
If one of the changes triggers an error, the changes for the trigger,
counter or delta value would remain, possibly leading to inconsistent
changes.
Postpone the actual changes until we're sure nothing else can go wrong.
Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xext/sync.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
index c36de1a2e..e282e6657 100644
--- a/Xext/sync.c
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
@@ -800,8 +800,14 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
int status;
XSyncCounter counter;
Mask origmask = mask;
+ SyncTrigger trigger;
+ Bool select_events_changed = FALSE;
+ Bool select_events_value;
+ int64_t delta;
- counter = pAlarm->trigger.pSync ? pAlarm->trigger.pSync->id : None;
+ trigger = pAlarm->trigger;
+ delta = pAlarm->delta;
+ counter = trigger.pSync ? trigger.pSync->id : None;
while (mask) {
int index2 = lowbit(mask);
@@ -817,24 +823,24 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
case XSyncCAValueType:
mask &= ~XSyncCAValueType;
/* sanity check in SyncInitTrigger */
- pAlarm->trigger.value_type = *values++;
+ trigger.value_type = *values++;
break;
case XSyncCAValue:
mask &= ~XSyncCAValue;
- pAlarm->trigger.wait_value = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
+ trigger.wait_value = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
values += 2;
break;
case XSyncCATestType:
mask &= ~XSyncCATestType;
/* sanity check in SyncInitTrigger */
- pAlarm->trigger.test_type = *values++;
+ trigger.test_type = *values++;
break;
case XSyncCADelta:
mask &= ~XSyncCADelta;
- pAlarm->delta = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
+ delta = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1];
values += 2;
break;
@@ -844,10 +850,8 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
client->errorValue = *values;
return BadValue;
}
- status = SyncEventSelectForAlarm(pAlarm, client,
- (Bool) (*values++));
- if (status != Success)
- return status;
+ select_events_value = (Bool) (*values++);
+ select_events_changed = TRUE;
break;
default:
@@ -856,25 +860,33 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask,
}
}
+ if (select_events_changed) {
+ status = SyncEventSelectForAlarm(pAlarm, client, select_events_value);
+ if (status != Success)
+ return status;
+ }
+
/* "If the test-type is PositiveComparison or PositiveTransition
* and delta is less than zero, or if the test-type is
* NegativeComparison or NegativeTransition and delta is
* greater than zero, a Match error is generated."
*/
if (origmask & (XSyncCADelta | XSyncCATestType)) {
- if ((((pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveComparison) ||
- (pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveTransition))
- && pAlarm->delta < 0)
+ if ((((trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveComparison) ||
+ (trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveTransition))
+ && delta < 0)
||
- (((pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeComparison) ||
- (pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeTransition))
- && pAlarm->delta > 0)
+ (((trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeComparison) ||
+ (trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeTransition))
+ && delta > 0)
) {
return BadMatch;
}
}
/* postpone this until now, when we're sure nothing else can go wrong */
+ pAlarm->delta = delta;
+ pAlarm->trigger = trigger;
if ((status = SyncInitTrigger(client, &pAlarm->trigger, counter, RTCounter,
origmask & XSyncCAAllTrigger)) != Success)
return status;
--
2.48.1

66
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601.patch
View File

@ -1,66 +0,0 @@
From 573a2265aacfeaddcc1bb001905a6f7d4fa15ee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 16:52:01 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] sync: Do not let sync objects uninitialized
When changing an alarm, the change mask values are evaluated one after
the other, changing the trigger values as requested and eventually,
SyncInitTrigger() is called.
SyncInitTrigger() will evaluate the XSyncCACounter first and may free
the existing sync object.
Other changes are then evaluated and may trigger an error and an early
return, not adding the new sync object.
This can be used to cause a use after free when the alarm eventually
triggers.
To avoid the issue, delete the existing sync object as late as possible
only once we are sure that no further error will cause an early exit.
CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
---
Xext/sync.c | 13 ++++++++-----
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c
index b6417b3b0..4267d3af6 100644
--- a/Xext/sync.c
+++ b/Xext/sync.c
@@ -330,11 +330,6 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
client->errorValue = syncObject;
return rc;
}
- if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */
- SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger);
- pTrigger->pSync = pSync;
- newSyncObject = TRUE;
- }
}
/* if system counter, ask it what the current value is */
@@ -402,6 +397,14 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject,
}
}
+ if (changes & XSyncCACounter) {
+ if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */
+ SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger);
+ pTrigger->pSync = pSync;
+ newSyncObject = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+
/* we wait until we're sure there are no errors before registering
* a new counter on a trigger
*/
--
2.48.1

87
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-49175.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,87 @@
From 53e0de91e307870b6790690bd74cf30ac501de50 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 28 Mar 2025 09:43:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] render: Avoid 0 or less animated cursors
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Animated cursors use a series of cursors that the client can set.
By default, the Xserver assumes at least one cursor is specified
while a client may actually pass no cursor at all.
That causes an out-of-bound read creating the animated cursor and a
crash of the Xserver:
| Invalid read of size 8
| at 0x5323F4: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
| by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Address 0x59aa010 is 0 bytes after a block of size 0 alloc'd
| at 0x48468D3: reallocarray (vg_replace_malloc.c:1803)
| by 0x52D3DA: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1802)
| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
|
| Invalid read of size 2
| at 0x5323F7: AnimCursorCreate (animcur.c:325)
| by 0x52D4C5: ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor (render.c:1817)
| by 0x52DC80: ProcRenderDispatch (render.c:1999)
| by 0x4A1E9D: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560)
| by 0x4B0169: dix_main (main.c:284)
| by 0x4287F5: main (stubmain.c:34)
| Address 0x8 is not stack'd, malloc'd or (recently) free'd
To avoid the issue, check the number of cursors specified and return a
BadValue error in both the proc handler (early) and the animated cursor
creation (as this is a public function) if there is 0 or less cursor.
CVE-2025-49175
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: José Expósito <jexposit@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9304e31035f97ddbfcc1d5f3c178da1d04a472ad)
---
render/animcur.c | 3 +++
render/render.c | 2 ++
2 files changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/render/animcur.c b/render/animcur.c
index ef27bda27..77942d846 100644
--- a/render/animcur.c
+++ b/render/animcur.c
@@ -304,6 +304,9 @@ AnimCursorCreate(CursorPtr *cursors, CARD32 *deltas, int ncursor,
int rc = BadAlloc, i;
AnimCurPtr ac;
+ if (ncursor <= 0)
+ return BadValue;
+
for (i = 0; i < screenInfo.numScreens; i++)
if (!GetAnimCurScreen(screenInfo.screens[i]))
return BadImplementation;
diff --git a/render/render.c b/render/render.c
index 5bc2a204b..a8c2da056 100644
--- a/render/render.c
+++ b/render/render.c
@@ -1795,6 +1795,8 @@ ProcRenderCreateAnimCursor(ClientPtr client)
ncursor =
(client->req_len -
(bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xRenderCreateAnimCursorReq)))) >> 1;
+ if (ncursor <= 0)
+ return BadValue;
cursors = xallocarray(ncursor, sizeof(CursorPtr) + sizeof(CARD32));
if (!cursors)
return BadAlloc;
--
2.49.0

88
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-49176-1.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
From 57248c57e971bb7cc0ccae6de4c49a49ff13b45c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Apr 2025 16:13:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver] os: Do not overflow the integer size with BigRequest
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The BigRequest extension allows request larger than the 16-bit length
limit.
It uses integers for the request length and checks for the size not to
exceed the maxBigRequestSize limit, but does so after translating the
length to integer by multiplying the given size in bytes by 4.
In doing so, it might overflow the integer size limit before actually
checking for the overflow, defeating the purpose of the test.
To avoid the issue, make sure to check that the request size does not
overflow the maxBigRequestSize limit prior to any conversion.
The caller Dispatch() function however expects the return value to be in
bytes, so we cannot just return the converted value in case of error, as
that would also overflow the integer size.
To preserve the existing API, we use a negative value for the X11 error
code BadLength as the function only return positive values, 0 or -1 and
update the caller Dispatch() function to take that case into account to
return the error code to the offending client.
CVE-2025-49176
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Michel Dänzer <mdaenzer@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b380b0a6c2022fbd3115552b1cd88251b5268daa)
---
dix/dispatch.c | 9 +++++----
os/io.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 9 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c
index 6f4e349e0..15e63e22a 100644
--- a/dix/dispatch.c
+++ b/dix/dispatch.c
@@ -518,9 +518,10 @@ Dispatch(void)
/* now, finally, deal with client requests */
result = ReadRequestFromClient(client);
- if (result <= 0) {
- if (result < 0)
- CloseDownClient(client);
+ if (result == 0)
+ break;
+ else if (result == -1) {
+ CloseDownClient(client);
break;
}
@@ -541,7 +542,7 @@ Dispatch(void)
client->index,
client->requestBuffer);
#endif
- if (result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
+ if (result < 0 || result > (maxBigRequestSize << 2))
result = BadLength;
else {
result = XaceHookDispatch(client, client->majorOp);
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
index 5b7fac349..5fc05821c 100644
--- a/os/io.c
+++ b/os/io.c
@@ -296,6 +296,10 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
}
client->req_len = needed;
+ if (needed > MAXINT >> 2) {
+ /* Check for potential integer overflow */
+ return -(BadLength);
+ }
needed <<= 2; /* needed is in bytes now */
}
if (gotnow < needed) {
--
2.49.0

32
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-49176-2.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
From 6794bf46b1c76c0a424940c97be3576dc2e7e9b1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Jun 2025 08:39:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] os: Check for integer overflow on BigRequest length
Check for another possible integer overflow once we get a complete xReq
with BigRequest.
Related to CVE-2025-49176
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Suggested-by: Peter Harris <pharris2@rocketsoftware.com>
---
os/io.c | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
index e7b76b9cea..167b40a720 100644
--- a/os/io.c
+++ b/os/io.c
@@ -394,6 +394,8 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
needed = get_big_req_len(request, client);
}
client->req_len = needed;
+ if (needed > MAXINT >> 2)
+ return -(BadLength);
needed <<= 2;
}
if (gotnow < needed) {
--
GitLab

46
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-49178.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From 90a13c564e7b9ba5c0d8d92acac80689cd051898 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 10:46:03 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver] os: Account for bytes to ignore when sharing input
buffer
When reading requests from the clients, the input buffer might be shared
and used between different clients.
If a given client sends a full request with non-zero bytes to ignore,
the bytes to ignore may still be non-zero even though the request is
full, in which case the buffer could be shared with another client who's
request will not be processed because of those bytes to ignore, leading
to a possible hang of the other client request.
To avoid the issue, make sure we have zero bytes to ignore left in the
input request when sharing the input buffer with another client.
CVE-2025-49178
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit b0c1cbf4f8e6baa372b1676d2f30512de8ab4ed3)
---
os/io.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/os/io.c b/os/io.c
index 5fc05821c..26f9161ef 100644
--- a/os/io.c
+++ b/os/io.c
@@ -442,7 +442,7 @@ ReadRequestFromClient(ClientPtr client)
*/
gotnow -= needed;
- if (!gotnow)
+ if (!gotnow && !oci->ignoreBytes)
AvailableInput = oc;
if (move_header) {
if (client->req_len < bytes_to_int32(sizeof(xBigReq) - sizeof(xReq))) {
--
2.49.0

62
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-49179.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
From 9a4f3012ba5752be1634455a3f0c7c125eabb328 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 28 Apr 2025 11:47:15 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver] record: Check for overflow in
RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients()
The RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients() checks for the request length,
but does not check for integer overflow.
A client might send a very large value for either the number of clients
or the number of protocol ranges that will cause an integer overflow in
the request length computation, defeating the check for request length.
To avoid the issue, explicitly check the number of clients against the
limit of clients (which is much lower than an maximum integer value) and
the number of protocol ranges (multiplied by the record length) do not
exceed the maximum integer value.
This way, we ensure that the final computation for the request length
will not overflow the maximum integer limit.
CVE-2025-49179
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit ea52403bf222f8bd6ee4c509bed5e34f0c789b00)
---
record/record.c | 8 ++++++++
1 file changed, 8 insertions(+)
diff --git a/record/record.c b/record/record.c
index e123867a7..018e53f81 100644
--- a/record/record.c
+++ b/record/record.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ and Jim Haggerty of Metheus.
#include "inputstr.h"
#include "eventconvert.h"
#include "scrnintstr.h"
+#include "opaque.h"
#include <stdio.h>
#include <assert.h>
@@ -1298,6 +1299,13 @@ RecordSanityCheckRegisterClients(RecordContextPtr pContext, ClientPtr client,
int i;
XID recordingClient;
+ /* LimitClients is 2048 at max, way less that MAXINT */
+ if (stuff->nClients > LimitClients)
+ return BadValue;
+
+ if (stuff->nRanges > (MAXINT - 4 * stuff->nClients) / SIZEOF(xRecordRange))
+ return BadValue;
+
if (((client->req_len << 2) - SIZEOF(xRecordRegisterClientsReq)) !=
4 * stuff->nClients + SIZEOF(xRecordRange) * stuff->nRanges)
return BadLength;
--
2.49.0

41
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-49180.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From 5e7a3a955853218536ba4a7e696360aab0064206 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 20 May 2025 15:18:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] randr: Check for overflow in
RRChangeProviderProperty()
A client might send a request causing an integer overflow when computing
the total size to allocate in RRChangeProviderProperty().
To avoid the issue, check that total length in bytes won't exceed the
maximum integer value.
CVE-2025-49180
This issue was discovered by Nils Emmerich <nemmerich@ernw.de> and
reported by Julian Suleder via ERNW Vulnerability Disclosure.
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer <peter.hutterer@who-t.net>
(cherry picked from commit 1b0bf563a3a76b06ddcd6fc4d8e72d81f6773699)
---
randr/rrproviderproperty.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
index 90c5a9a93..0aa35ad87 100644
--- a/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
+++ b/randr/rrproviderproperty.c
@@ -179,7 +179,8 @@ RRChangeProviderProperty(RRProviderPtr provider, Atom property, Atom type,
if (mode == PropModeReplace || len > 0) {
void *new_data = NULL, *old_data = NULL;
-
+ if (total_len > MAXINT / size_in_bytes)
+ return BadValue;
total_size = total_len * size_in_bytes;
new_value.data = (void *) malloc(total_size);
if (!new_value.data && total_size) {
--
2.49.0

159
SPECS/tigervnc.spec
View File

@ -5,7 +5,7 @@
Name: tigervnc
Version: 1.14.1
Release: 1%{?dist}.1
Release: 8%{?dist}
Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system
%global _hardened_build 1
@ -25,9 +25,14 @@ Source5: vncserver
Patch1: tigervnc-use-gnome-as-default-session.patch
# https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/pull/1425
Patch2: tigervnc-vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service.patch
# https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/pull/1792
Patch3: tigervnc-add-option-allowing-to-connect-only-user-owning-session.patch
# Upstream patches
Patch50: tigervnc-vncsession-move-existing-log-to-log-old-if-present.patch
Patch51: tigervnc-add-clipboard-support-to-x0vncserver.patch
Patch52: tigervnc-do-proper-toplevel-window-setup-for-selection-window.patch
Patch53: tigervnc-avoid-invalid-xfree-for-xclasshint.patch
# Upstreamable patches
Patch80: tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch
@ -38,20 +43,12 @@ Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch
Patch101: 0001-rpath-hack.patch
# XServer patches
Patch200: xorg-CVE-2024-9632.patch
Patch201: xorg-CVE-2025-26594.patch
Patch202: xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2.patch
Patch203: xorg-CVE-2025-26595.patch
Patch204: xorg-CVE-2025-26596.patch
Patch205: xorg-CVE-2025-26597.patch
Patch206: xorg-CVE-2025-26598.patch
Patch207: xorg-CVE-2025-26599.patch
Patch208: xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2.patch
Patch209: xorg-CVE-2025-26600.patch
Patch210: xorg-CVE-2025-26601.patch
Patch211: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2.patch
Patch212: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3.patch
Patch213: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4.patch
Patch200: xorg-CVE-2025-49175.patch
Patch201: xorg-CVE-2025-49176-1.patch
Patch202: xorg-CVE-2025-49176-2.patch
Patch203: xorg-CVE-2025-49178.patch
Patch204: xorg-CVE-2025-49179.patch
Patch205: xorg-CVE-2025-49180.patch
BuildRequires: make
BuildRequires: gcc-c++
@ -103,7 +100,11 @@ BuildRequires: xorg-x11-xtrans-devel
# SELinux
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel
BuildRequires: selinux-policy-devel
BuildRequires: systemd
# For RHEL-34880
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(dbus-1) >= 1.0
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libsystemd) >= 209
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(libudev) >= 143
Requires(post): coreutils
Requires(postun):coreutils
@ -206,28 +207,25 @@ done
# Xorg patches
%patch -P100 -p1 -b .xserver120-rebased
%patch -P101 -p1 -b .rpath
%patch -P200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-9632
%patch -P201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26594
%patch -P202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2
%patch -P203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26595
%patch -P204 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26596
%patch -P205 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26597
%patch -P206 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26598
%patch -P207 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26599
%patch -P208 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2
%patch -P209 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26600
%patch -P210 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601
%patch -P211 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2
%patch -P212 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3
%patch -P213 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4
# Xorg CVEs
%patch -P200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49175
%patch -P201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49176-1
%patch -P202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49176-2
%patch -P203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49178
%patch -P204 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49179
%patch -P205 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-49180
popd
# Tigervnc patches
%patch -P1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session
%patch -P2 -p1 -b .vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service
%patch -P3 -p1 -b .add-option-allowing-to-connect-only-user-owning-session
# Upstream patches
%patch -P50 -p1 -b .vncsession-move-existing-log-to-log-old-if-present
%patch -P51 -p1 -b .add-clipboard-support-to-x0vncserver
%patch -P52 -p1 -b .do-proper-toplevel-window-setup-for-selection-window
%patch -P53 -p1 -b .avoid-invalid-xfree-for-xclasshint
# Upstreamable patches
%patch -P80 -p1 -b .dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device
@ -269,7 +267,9 @@ autoreconf -fiv
--disable-config-udev \
--without-dtrace \
--disable-devel-docs \
--disable-selective-werror
--disable-selective-werror \
--enable-systemd-logind \
--enable-config-udev
make %{?_smp_mflags}
popd
@ -412,29 +412,84 @@ fi
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename}
%changelog
* Wed Feb 26 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-1.1
- Fix CVE-2025-26594 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free of the root cursor
Resolves: RHEL-79406
- Fix CVE-2025-26595 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText()
Resolves: RHEL-80018
- Fix CVE-2025-26596 xorg-x11-server Heap overflow in XkbWriteKeySyms()
Resolves: RHEL-79391
- Fix CVE-2025-26597 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey()
Resolves: RHEL-80029
- Fix CVE-2025-26598 xorg-x11-server Out-of-bounds write in CreatePointerBarrierClient()
Resolves: RHEL-79374
- Fix CVE-2025-26599 xorg-x11-server Use of uninitialized pointer in compRedirectWindow()
Resolves: RHEL-80043
- Fix CVE-2025-26600 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in PlayReleasedEvents()
Resolves: RHEL-80037
- Fix CVE-2025-26601 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in SyncInitTrigger()
Resolves: RHEL-79353
* Wed Jun 18 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-8
- Additional fix to CVE-2025-49176: xorg-x11-server: Integer Overflow in Big Requests Extension
Resolves: RHEL-97305
* Fri Nov 08 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-1
- 1.14.1
Resolves: RHEL-66600
* Tue Jun 17 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-7
- Fix CVE-2025-49175: xorg-x11-server: Out-of-Bounds Read in X Rendering Extension Animated Cursors
Resolves: RHEL-97287
- Fix CVE-2025-49176: xorg-x11-server: Integer Overflow in Big Requests Extension
Resolves: RHEL-97305
- Fix CVE-2025-49178: xorg-x11-server: Unprocessed Client Request Due to Bytes to Ignore
Resolves: RHEL-97380
- Fix CVE-2025-49179: xorg-x11-server: Integer overflow in X Record extension
Resolves: RHEL-97415
- Fix CVE-2025-49180: xorg-x11-server: Integer Overflow in X Resize, Rotate and Reflect (RandR) Extension
Resolves: RHEL-97430
* Wed May 28 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-6
- Fix broken authentication with x0vncserver
Resolves: RHEL-93726
* Wed Feb 26 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-5
- Fix CVE-2025-26594 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free of the root cursor
Resolves: RHEL-80015
- Fix CVE-2025-26595 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText()
Resolves: RHEL-80027
- Fix CVE-2025-26596 xorg-x11-server Heap overflow in XkbWriteKeySyms()
Resolves: RHEL-79395
- Fix CVE-2025-26597 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey()
Resolves: RHEL-80035
- Fix CVE-2025-26598 xorg-x11-server Out-of-bounds write in CreatePointerBarrierClient()
Resolves: RHEL-79378
- Fix CVE-2025-26599 xorg-x11-server Use of uninitialized pointer in compRedirectWindow()
Resolves: RHEL-80047
- Fix CVE-2025-26600 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in PlayReleasedEvents()
Resolves: RHEL-80041
- Fix CVE-2025-26601 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in SyncInitTrigger()
Resolves: RHEL-79358
* Tue Jan 21 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-4
- Fix crash in clipboard support in x0vncserver
Resolves: RHEL-74216
* Thu Jan 16 2025 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-3
- Add clipboard support to x0vncserver
Resolves: RHEL-74216
* Thu Oct 31 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-2
- Fix CVE-2024-9632: xorg-x11-server: heap-based buffer overflow privilege escalation vulnerability
Resolves: RHEL-62000
Resolves: RHEL-62001
* Wed Oct 23 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.1-1
- 1.14.1
Resolves: RHEL-45316
* Mon Oct 07 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-6
- Make "ApproveLoggedUserOnly" to ignore "closing" sessions
Resolves: RHEL-34880
* Fri Oct 04 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-5
- Fix "ApproveLoggedUserOnly" option not working in some setups
Resolves: RHEL-34880
* Fri Sep 27 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-4
- Add option "ApproveLoggedUserOnly" allowing to connect only the user
owning the running session
Resolves: RHEL-34880
* Wed Sep 04 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-3
- Move old log to log.old if present (fix patch)
Resolves: RHEL-54294
* Tue Aug 20 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.14.0-2
- 1.14.0
Resolves: RHEL-45316
- Move old log to log.old if present
Resolves: RHEL-54294
- Fix shared memory leak
Resolves: RHEL-55768
* Mon Aug 05 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-11
- vncsession: use /bin/sh if the user shell is not set