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import CS tigervnc-1.13.1-10.el8

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This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2024-05-22 13:49:14 +00:00
parent 1f98227e4a
commit ae88ffbba8
17 changed files with 416 additions and 625 deletions
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2
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1 +1 @@
SOURCES/tigervnc-1.12.0.tar.gz SOURCES/tigervnc-1.13.1.tar.gz

2
.tigervnc.metadata
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@ -1 +1 @@
44db63993d8ad04f730b0b48e8aca32933bff15a SOURCES/tigervnc-1.12.0.tar.gz 6f7a23f14833f552c88523da1a5e102f3b8d35c2 SOURCES/tigervnc-1.13.1.tar.gz

199
SOURCES/tigervnc-add-new-keycodes-for-unknown-keysyms.patch
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@ -1,199 +0,0 @@
From ccbd491fa48f1c43daeb1a6c5ee91a1a8fa3db88 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Aug 2022 14:31:07 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x0vncserver: add new keysym in case we don't find a matching
keycode
We might often fail to find a matching X11 keycode when the client has
a different keyboard layout and end up with no key event. To avoid a
failure we add it as a new keysym/keycode pair so the next time a keysym
from the client that is unknown to the server is send, we will find a
match and proceed with key event. This is same behavior used in Xvnc or
x11vnc, although Xvnc has more advanced mapping from keysym to keycode.
---
unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx | 121 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h | 4 ++
2 files changed, 122 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
index f2046e43e..933998f05 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
@@ -31,6 +31,7 @@
#include <x0vncserver/XDesktop.h>
#include <X11/XKBlib.h>
+#include <X11/Xutil.h>
#ifdef HAVE_XTEST
#include <X11/extensions/XTest.h>
#endif
@@ -50,6 +51,7 @@ void vncSetGlueContext(Display *dpy, void *res);
#include <x0vncserver/Geometry.h>
#include <x0vncserver/XPixelBuffer.h>
+using namespace std;
using namespace rfb;
extern const unsigned short code_map_qnum_to_xorgevdev[];
@@ -264,6 +266,9 @@ void XDesktop::start(VNCServer* vs) {
void XDesktop::stop() {
running = false;
+ // Delete added keycodes
+ deleteAddedKeysyms(dpy);
+
#ifdef HAVE_XDAMAGE
if (haveDamage)
XDamageDestroy(dpy, damage);
@@ -383,6 +388,118 @@ KeyCode XDesktop::XkbKeysymToKeycode(Display* dpy, KeySym keysym) {
}
#endif
+KeyCode XDesktop::addKeysym(Display* dpy, KeySym keysym)
+{
+ int types[1];
+ unsigned int key;
+ XkbDescPtr xkb;
+ XkbMapChangesRec changes;
+ KeySym *syms;
+ KeySym upper, lower;
+
+ xkb = XkbGetMap(dpy, XkbAllComponentsMask, XkbUseCoreKbd);
+
+ if (!xkb)
+ return 0;
+
+ for (key = xkb->max_key_code; key >= xkb->min_key_code; key--) {
+ if (XkbKeyNumGroups(xkb, key) == 0)
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (key < xkb->min_key_code)
+ return 0;
+
+ memset(&changes, 0, sizeof(changes));
+
+ XConvertCase(keysym, &lower, &upper);
+
+ if (upper == lower)
+ types[XkbGroup1Index] = XkbOneLevelIndex;
+ else
+ types[XkbGroup1Index] = XkbAlphabeticIndex;
+
+ XkbChangeTypesOfKey(xkb, key, 1, XkbGroup1Mask, types, &changes);
+
+ syms = XkbKeySymsPtr(xkb,key);
+ if (upper == lower)
+ syms[0] = keysym;
+ else {
+ syms[0] = lower;
+ syms[1] = upper;
+ }
+
+ changes.changed |= XkbKeySymsMask;
+ changes.first_key_sym = key;
+ changes.num_key_syms = 1;
+
+ if (XkbChangeMap(dpy, xkb, &changes)) {
+ vlog.info("Added unknown keysym %s to keycode %d", XKeysymToString(keysym), key);
+ addedKeysyms[keysym] = key;
+ return key;
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
+void XDesktop::deleteAddedKeysyms(Display* dpy) {
+ XkbDescPtr xkb;
+ xkb = XkbGetMap(dpy, XkbAllComponentsMask, XkbUseCoreKbd);
+
+ if (!xkb)
+ return;
+
+ XkbMapChangesRec changes;
+ memset(&changes, 0, sizeof(changes));
+
+ KeyCode lowestKeyCode = xkb->max_key_code;
+ KeyCode highestKeyCode = xkb->min_key_code;
+ std::map<KeySym, KeyCode>::iterator it;
+ for (it = addedKeysyms.begin(); it != addedKeysyms.end(); it++) {
+ if (XkbKeyNumGroups(xkb, it->second) != 0) {
+ // Check if we are removing keysym we added ourself
+ if (XkbKeysymToKeycode(dpy, it->first) != it->second)
+ continue;
+
+ XkbChangeTypesOfKey(xkb, it->second, 0, XkbGroup1Mask, NULL, &changes);
+
+ if (it->second < lowestKeyCode)
+ lowestKeyCode = it->second;
+
+ if (it->second > highestKeyCode)
+ highestKeyCode = it->second;
+ }
+ }
+
+ changes.changed |= XkbKeySymsMask;
+ changes.first_key_sym = lowestKeyCode;
+ changes.num_key_syms = highestKeyCode - lowestKeyCode + 1;
+ XkbChangeMap(dpy, xkb, &changes);
+
+ addedKeysyms.clear();
+}
+
+KeyCode XDesktop::keysymToKeycode(Display* dpy, KeySym keysym) {
+ int keycode = 0;
+
+ // XKeysymToKeycode() doesn't respect state, so we have to use
+ // something slightly more complex
+ keycode = XkbKeysymToKeycode(dpy, keysym);
+
+ if (keycode != 0)
+ return keycode;
+
+ // TODO: try to further guess keycode with all possible mods as Xvnc does
+
+ keycode = addKeysym(dpy, keysym);
+
+ if (keycode == 0)
+ vlog.error("Failure adding new keysym 0x%lx", keysym);
+
+ return keycode;
+}
+
+
void XDesktop::keyEvent(rdr::U32 keysym, rdr::U32 xtcode, bool down) {
#ifdef HAVE_XTEST
int keycode = 0;
@@ -398,9 +515,7 @@ void XDesktop::keyEvent(rdr::U32 keysym, rdr::U32 xtcode, bool down) {
if (pressedKeys.find(keysym) != pressedKeys.end())
keycode = pressedKeys[keysym];
else {
- // XKeysymToKeycode() doesn't respect state, so we have to use
- // something slightly more complex
- keycode = XkbKeysymToKeycode(dpy, keysym);
+ keycode = keysymToKeycode(dpy, keysym);
}
}
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h
index 840d43316..6ebcd9f8a 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.h
@@ -55,6 +55,9 @@ class XDesktop : public rfb::SDesktop,
const char* userName);
virtual void pointerEvent(const rfb::Point& pos, int buttonMask);
KeyCode XkbKeysymToKeycode(Display* dpy, KeySym keysym);
+ KeyCode addKeysym(Display* dpy, KeySym keysym);
+ void deleteAddedKeysyms(Display* dpy);
+ KeyCode keysymToKeycode(Display* dpy, KeySym keysym);
virtual void keyEvent(rdr::U32 keysym, rdr::U32 xtcode, bool down);
virtual void clientCutText(const char* str);
virtual unsigned int setScreenLayout(int fb_width, int fb_height,
@@ -78,6 +81,7 @@ class XDesktop : public rfb::SDesktop,
bool haveXtest;
bool haveDamage;
int maxButtons;
+ std::map<KeySym, KeyCode> addedKeysyms;
std::map<KeySym, KeyCode> pressedKeys;
bool running;
#ifdef HAVE_XDAMAGE

13
SOURCES/tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c
index b3d0926d..d36a096f 100644
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/vncInput.c
@@ -167,7 +167,7 @@ void vncPointerMove(int x, int y)
void vncGetPointerPos(int *x, int *y)
{
- if (vncPointerDev != NULL) {
+ if (vncPointerDev != NULL && !IsFloating(vncPointerDev)) {
ScreenPtr ptrScreen;
miPointerGetPosition(vncPointerDev, &cursorPosX, &cursorPosY);

51
SOURCES/tigervnc-dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
diff --git a/po/CMakeLists.txt b/po/CMakeLists.txt
index 052cfb3..c84fb0e 100644
--- a/po/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/po/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -14,7 +14,6 @@ if (GETTEXT_XGETTEXT_EXECUTABLE)
${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.h
${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.cxx
${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.desktop.in.in
- ${PROJECT_SOURCE_DIR}/vncviewer/*.metainfo.xml.in
)
add_custom_target(translations_update
diff --git a/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt b/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt
index 15eac66..450b732 100644
--- a/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/vncviewer/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -100,34 +100,6 @@ if(UNIX)
add_custom_target(desktop ALL DEPENDS vncviewer.desktop)
install(FILES ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/vncviewer.desktop DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_FULL_DATADIR}/applications)
- if("${GETTEXT_VERSION_STRING}" VERSION_GREATER 0.19.6)
- add_custom_command(OUTPUT org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- COMMAND ${GETTEXT_MSGFMT_EXECUTABLE}
- --xml --template ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
- -d ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/po -o org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
- )
- elseif(INTLTOOL_MERGE_EXECUTABLE)
- add_custom_command(OUTPUT org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- COMMAND sed -e 's@<name>@<_name>@\;s@</name>@</_name>@'
- -e 's@<summary>@<_summary>@\;s@</summary>@</_summary>@'
- -e 's@<caption>@<_caption>@\;s@</caption>@</_caption>@'
- -e 's@<p>@<_p>@g\;s@</p>@</_p>@g'
- ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in > org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.intl
- COMMAND ${INTLTOOL_MERGE_EXECUTABLE}
- -x ${CMAKE_SOURCE_DIR}/po
- org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.intl org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
- )
- else()
- add_custom_command(OUTPUT org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- COMMAND cp ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml
- DEPENDS ${CMAKE_CURRENT_SOURCE_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml.in
- )
- endif()
- add_custom_target(appstream ALL DEPENDS org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml)
- install(FILES ${CMAKE_CURRENT_BINARY_DIR}/org.tigervnc.vncviewer.metainfo.xml DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_FULL_DATADIR}/metainfo)
-
foreach(res 16 22 24 32 48 64 128)
install(FILES ../media/icons/tigervnc_${res}.png DESTINATION ${CMAKE_INSTALL_FULL_DATADIR}/icons/hicolor/${res}x${res}/apps RENAME tigervnc.png)
endforeach()

117
SOURCES/tigervnc-fix-ghost-cursor-in-zaphod-mode.patch
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@ -1,117 +0,0 @@
From f783d5c8b567199178b6690f347e060a69d2aa36 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Aug 2022 13:15:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] x0vncserver: update/display cursor only on correct screen in
zaphod mode
We have to check whether we update cursor position/shape only in case
the cursor is on our display, otherwise in zaphod mode, ie. when having
two instances of x0vncserver on screens :0.0 and :0.1 we would be having
the cursor duplicated and actually not funcional (aka ghost cursor) as
it would be actually not present. We also additionally watch EnterNotify
and LeaveNotify events in order to show/hide cursor accordingly.
Change made with help from Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
---
unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx | 60 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----
1 file changed, 53 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
index f2046e43e..f07fd78bf 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
@@ -192,7 +192,8 @@ XDesktop::XDesktop(Display* dpy_, Geometry *geometry_)
RRScreenChangeNotifyMask | RRCrtcChangeNotifyMask);
/* Override TXWindow::init input mask */
XSelectInput(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy),
- PropertyChangeMask | StructureNotifyMask | ExposureMask);
+ PropertyChangeMask | StructureNotifyMask |
+ ExposureMask | EnterWindowMask | LeaveWindowMask);
} else {
#endif
vlog.info("RANDR extension not present");
@@ -217,11 +218,13 @@ void XDesktop::poll() {
Window root, child;
int x, y, wx, wy;
unsigned int mask;
- XQueryPointer(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy), &root, &child,
- &x, &y, &wx, &wy, &mask);
- x -= geometry->offsetLeft();
- y -= geometry->offsetTop();
- server->setCursorPos(rfb::Point(x, y), false);
+
+ if (XQueryPointer(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy), &root, &child,
+ &x, &y, &wx, &wy, &mask)) {
+ x -= geometry->offsetLeft();
+ y -= geometry->offsetTop();
+ server->setCursorPos(rfb::Point(x, y), false);
+ }
}
}
@@ -253,7 +256,14 @@ void XDesktop::start(VNCServer* vs) {
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_XFIXES
- setCursor();
+ Window root, child;
+ int x, y, wx, wy;
+ unsigned int mask;
+ // Check whether the cursor is initially on our screen
+ if (XQueryPointer(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy), &root, &child,
+ &x, &y, &wx, &wy, &mask))
+ setCursor();
+
#endif
server->setLEDState(ledState);
@@ -701,6 +711,15 @@ bool XDesktop::handleGlobalEvent(XEvent* ev) {
if (cev->subtype != XFixesDisplayCursorNotify)
return false;
+ Window root, child;
+ int x, y, wx, wy;
+ unsigned int mask;
+
+ // Check whether the cursor is initially on our screen
+ if (!XQueryPointer(dpy, DefaultRootWindow(dpy), &root, &child,
+ &x, &y, &wx, &wy, &mask))
+ return false;
+
return setCursor();
#endif
#ifdef HAVE_XRANDR
@@ -753,6 +772,33 @@ bool XDesktop::handleGlobalEvent(XEvent* ev) {
return true;
#endif
+#ifdef HAVE_XFIXES
+ } else if (ev->type == EnterNotify) {
+ XCrossingEvent* cev;
+
+ if (!running)
+ return true;
+
+ cev = (XCrossingEvent*)ev;
+
+ if (cev->window != cev->root)
+ return false;
+
+ return setCursor();
+ } else if (ev->type == LeaveNotify) {
+ XCrossingEvent* cev;
+
+ if (!running)
+ return true;
+
+ cev = (XCrossingEvent*)ev;
+
+ if (cev->window == cev->root)
+ return false;
+
+ server->setCursor(0, 0, Point(), NULL);
+ return true;
+#endif
}
return false;

34
SOURCES/tigervnc-fix-typo-in-mirror-monitor-detection.patch
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@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
From 2daf4126882f82b6e392dfbae87205dbdc559c3d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
Date: Thu, 23 Dec 2021 15:58:00 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Fix typo in mirror monitor detection
Bug introduced in fb561eb but still somehow passed manual testing.
Resulted in some stray reads off the end of the stack, which were
hopefully harmless.
---
vncviewer/MonitorIndicesParameter.cxx | 8 ++++----
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/vncviewer/MonitorIndicesParameter.cxx b/vncviewer/MonitorIndicesParameter.cxx
index 5130831cb..4ac74dd1a 100644
--- a/vncviewer/MonitorIndicesParameter.cxx
+++ b/vncviewer/MonitorIndicesParameter.cxx
@@ -211,13 +211,13 @@ std::vector<MonitorIndicesParameter::Monitor> MonitorIndicesParameter::fetchMoni
// Only keep a single entry for mirrored screens
match = false;
for (int j = 0; j < ((int) monitors.size()); j++) {
- if (monitors[i].x != monitor.x)
+ if (monitors[j].x != monitor.x)
continue;
- if (monitors[i].y != monitor.y)
+ if (monitors[j].y != monitor.y)
continue;
- if (monitors[i].w != monitor.w)
+ if (monitors[j].w != monitor.w)
continue;
- if (monitors[i].h != monitor.h)
+ if (monitors[j].h != monitor.h)
continue;
match = true;

25
SOURCES/tigervnc-root-user-selinux-context.patch
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@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
From faf81b4b238e24fe29eb53f885a25367e212dd7b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Feb 2022 10:45:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: use /root/.vnc in file context specification
Instead of HOME_ROOT/.vnc, /root/.vnc should be used
for user root's home to specify default file context
as HOME_ROOT actually means base for home dirs (usually /home).
---
unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.fc | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.fc b/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.fc
index 6aaf4b1f4..bc81f8f25 100644
--- a/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.fc
+++ b/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.fc
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@
#
HOME_DIR/\.vnc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:vnc_home_t,s0)
-HOME_ROOT/\.vnc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:vnc_home_t,s0)
+/root/\.vnc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:vnc_home_t,s0)
/usr/sbin/vncsession -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vnc_session_exec_t,s0)
/usr/libexec/vncsession-start -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vnc_session_exec_t,s0)

28
SOURCES/tigervnc-sanity-check-when-cleaning-up-keymap-changes.patch
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@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
From 774c6bcf33b5c9b94c1ff12895775e77c555decc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Pierre Ossman <ossman@cendio.se>
Date: Thu, 9 Feb 2023 11:30:37 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] Sanity check when cleaning up keymap changes
Make sure we don't send a bogus request to the X server in the (common)
case that we don't actually have anything to restore.
(cherry picked from commit 1e3484f2017f038dd5149cd50741feaf39a680e4)
---
unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx | 4 ++++
1 file changed, 4 insertions(+)
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
index d5c6b2db9..f9c810968 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/XDesktop.cxx
@@ -481,6 +481,10 @@ void XDesktop::deleteAddedKeysyms(Display* dpy) {
}
}
+ // Did we actually find something to remove?
+ if (highestKeyCode < lowestKeyCode)
+ return;
+
changes.changed |= XkbKeySymsMask;
changes.first_key_sym = lowestKeyCode;
changes.num_key_syms = highestKeyCode - lowestKeyCode + 1;

31
SOURCES/tigervnc-selinux-allow-vncsession-create-vnc-directory.patch
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@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
From 717d787de8f913070446444e37d552b51f05515e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Zdenek Pytela <zpytela@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 16 Jan 2023 12:35:40 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: Allow vncsession create ~/.vnc directory
Addresses the following AVC denial:
type=PROCTITLE msg=audit(01/12/2023 02:58:12.648:696) : proctitle=/usr/sbin/vncsession fedora :1
type=PATH msg=audit(01/12/2023 02:58:12.648:696) : item=1 name=/home/fedora/.vnc nametype=CREATE cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=PATH msg=audit(01/12/2023 02:58:12.648:696) : item=0 name=/home/fedora/ inode=262145 dev=fc:02 mode=dir,700 ouid=fedora ogid=fedora rdev=00:00 obj=unconfined_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t:s0 nametype=PARENT cap_fp=none cap_fi=none cap_fe=0 cap_fver=0 cap_frootid=0
type=CWD msg=audit(01/12/2023 02:58:12.648:696) : cwd=/home/fedora
type=SYSCALL msg=audit(01/12/2023 02:58:12.648:696) : arch=x86_64 syscall=mkdir success=no exit=EACCES(Permission denied) a0=0x7fff47d52540 a1=0755 a2=0x0 a3=0x0 items=2 ppid=2869 pid=2880 auid=fedora uid=fedora gid=fedora euid=fedora suid=fedora fsuid=fedora egid=fedora sgid=fedora fsgid=fedora tty=(none) ses=8 comm=vncsession exe=/usr/sbin/vncsession subj=system_u:system_r:vnc_session_t:s0 key=(null)
type=AVC msg=audit(01/12/2023 02:58:12.648:696) : avc: denied { create } for pid=2880 comm=vncsession name=.vnc scontext=system_u:system_r:vnc_session_t:s0 tcontext=system_u:object_r:vnc_home_t:s0 tclass=dir permissive=0
Resolves: rhbz#2143704
---
unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te b/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te
index fb966c14b..680be8ea1 100644
--- a/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te
+++ b/unix/vncserver/selinux/vncsession.te
@@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ allow vnc_session_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms;
allow vnc_session_t vnc_session_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms;
files_pid_filetrans(vnc_session_t, vnc_session_var_run_t, file)
+create_dirs_pattern(vnc_session_t, vnc_home_t, vnc_home_t)
manage_files_pattern(vnc_session_t, vnc_home_t, vnc_home_t)
manage_fifo_files_pattern(vnc_session_t, vnc_home_t, vnc_home_t)
manage_sock_files_pattern(vnc_session_t, vnc_home_t, vnc_home_t)

81
SOURCES/tigervnc-selinux-restore-context-in-case-of-different-policies.patch
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@ -1,81 +0,0 @@
From d2d52704624ce841f4a392fccd82079d87ff13b6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 11 Nov 2021 13:52:41 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] SELinux: restore SELinux context in case of different
policies
---
CMakeLists.txt | 13 +++++++++++++
unix/vncserver/CMakeLists.txt | 2 +-
unix/vncserver/vncsession.c | 16 ++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/CMakeLists.txt b/CMakeLists.txt
index 50247c7da..1708eb3d8 100644
--- a/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -268,6 +268,19 @@ if(UNIX AND NOT APPLE)
endif()
endif()
+# Check for SELinux library
+if(UNIX AND NOT APPLE)
+ check_include_files(selinux/selinux.h HAVE_SELINUX_H)
+ if(HAVE_SELINUX_H)
+ set(CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES -lselinux)
+ set(CMAKE_REQUIRED_LIBRARIES)
+ set(SELINUX_LIBS selinux)
+ add_definitions("-DHAVE_SELINUX")
+ else()
+ message(WARNING "Could not find SELinux development files")
+ endif()
+endif()
+
# Generate config.h and make sure the source finds it
configure_file(config.h.in config.h)
add_definitions(-DHAVE_CONFIG_H)
diff --git a/unix/vncserver/CMakeLists.txt b/unix/vncserver/CMakeLists.txt
index f65ccc7db..ae69dc098 100644
--- a/unix/vncserver/CMakeLists.txt
+++ b/unix/vncserver/CMakeLists.txt
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
add_executable(vncsession vncsession.c)
-target_link_libraries(vncsession ${PAM_LIBS})
+target_link_libraries(vncsession ${PAM_LIBS} ${SELINUX_LIBS})
configure_file(vncserver@.service.in vncserver@.service @ONLY)
configure_file(vncsession-start.in vncsession-start @ONLY)
diff --git a/unix/vncserver/vncsession.c b/unix/vncserver/vncsession.c
index 3573e5e9b..f6d2fd59e 100644
--- a/unix/vncserver/vncsession.c
+++ b/unix/vncserver/vncsession.c
@@ -37,6 +37,11 @@
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <sys/wait.h>
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
+#include <selinux/restorecon.h>
+#endif
+
extern char **environ;
// PAM service name
@@ -360,6 +365,17 @@ redir_stdio(const char *homedir, const char *display)
syslog(LOG_CRIT, "Failure creating \"%s\": %s", logfile, strerror(errno));
_exit(EX_OSERR);
}
+
+#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
+ int result;
+ if (selinux_file_context_verify(logfile, 0) == 0) {
+ result = selinux_restorecon(logfile, SELINUX_RESTORECON_RECURSE);
+
+ if (result < 0) {
+ syslog(LOG_WARNING, "Failure restoring SELinux context for \"%s\": %s", logfile, strerror(errno));
+ }
+ }
+#endif
}
hostlen = sysconf(_SC_HOST_NAME_MAX);

135
SOURCES/tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,135 @@
diff --git a/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx b/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx
index 6f65e87..3142ba3 100644
--- a/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx
+++ b/common/rfb/SSecurityPlain.cxx
@@ -27,6 +27,8 @@
#include <rdr/InStream.h>
#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__APPLE__)
#include <rfb/UnixPasswordValidator.h>
+#include <unistd.h>
+#include <pwd.h>
#endif
#ifdef WIN32
#include <rfb/WinPasswdValidator.h>
@@ -45,21 +47,22 @@ StringParameter PasswordValidator::plainUsers
bool PasswordValidator::validUser(const char* username)
{
- CharArray users(plainUsers.getValueStr()), user;
+ std::vector<std::string> users;
- while (users.buf) {
- strSplit(users.buf, ',', &user.buf, &users.buf);
-#ifdef WIN32
- if (0 == stricmp(user.buf, "*"))
- return true;
- if (0 == stricmp(user.buf, username))
- return true;
-#else
- if (!strcmp(user.buf, "*"))
- return true;
- if (!strcmp(user.buf, username))
- return true;
+ users = split(plainUsers, ',');
+
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < users.size(); i++) {
+ if (users[i] == "*")
+ return true;
+#if !defined(WIN32) && !defined(__APPLE__)
+ if (users[i] == "%u") {
+ struct passwd *pw = getpwnam(username);
+ if (pw && pw->pw_uid == getuid())
+ return true;
+ }
#endif
+ if (users[i] == username)
+ return true;
}
return false;
}
diff --git a/common/rfb/util.cxx b/common/rfb/util.cxx
index 649eb0b..cce73a0 100644
--- a/common/rfb/util.cxx
+++ b/common/rfb/util.cxx
@@ -99,6 +99,26 @@ namespace rfb {
return false;
}
+ std::vector<std::string> split(const char* src,
+ const char delimiter)
+ {
+ std::vector<std::string> out;
+ const char *start, *stop;
+
+ start = src;
+ do {
+ stop = strchr(start, delimiter);
+ if (stop == NULL) {
+ out.push_back(start);
+ } else {
+ out.push_back(std::string(start, stop-start));
+ start = stop + 1;
+ }
+ } while (stop != NULL);
+
+ return out;
+ }
+
bool strContains(const char* src, char c) {
int l=strlen(src);
for (int i=0; i<l; i++)
diff --git a/common/rfb/util.h b/common/rfb/util.h
index f0ac9ef..ed15c28 100644
--- a/common/rfb/util.h
+++ b/common/rfb/util.h
@@ -27,6 +27,9 @@
#include <limits.h>
#include <string.h>
+#include <string>
+#include <vector>
+
struct timeval;
#ifdef __GNUC__
@@ -76,6 +79,10 @@ namespace rfb {
// that part of the string. Obviously, setting both to 0 is not useful...
bool strSplit(const char* src, const char limiter, char** out1, char** out2, bool fromEnd=false);
+ // Splits a string with the specified delimiter
+ std::vector<std::string> split(const char* src,
+ const char delimiter);
+
// Returns true if src contains c
bool strContains(const char* src, char c);
diff --git a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
index c36ae34..78db730 100644
--- a/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
+++ b/unix/x0vncserver/x0vncserver.man
@@ -125,8 +125,8 @@ parameter instead.
.B \-PlainUsers \fIuser-list\fP
A comma separated list of user names that are allowed to authenticate via
any of the "Plain" security types (Plain, TLSPlain, etc.). Specify \fB*\fP
-to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Default is to
-deny all users.
+to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Specify \fB%u\fP
+to allow the user of the server process. Default is to deny all users.
.
.TP
.B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
index ea87dea..e9fb654 100644
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/Xvnc.man
@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ parameter instead.
.B \-PlainUsers \fIuser-list\fP
A comma separated list of user names that are allowed to authenticate via
any of the "Plain" security types (Plain, TLSPlain, etc.). Specify \fB*\fP
-to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Default is to
-deny all users.
+to allow any user to authenticate using this security type. Specify \fB%u\fP
+to allow the user of the server process. Default is to deny all users.
.
.TP
.B \-pam_service \fIname\fP, \-PAMService \fIname\fP

17
SOURCES/tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
diff --git a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
index f8141959..c5c36539 100644
--- a/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
+++ b/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c
@@ -366,8 +366,10 @@ ddxProcessArgument(int argc, char *argv[], int i)
if (strcmp(argv[i], "-inetd") == 0) {
int nullfd;
- dup2(0, 3);
- vncInetdSock = 3;
+ if ((vncInetdSock = dup(0)) == -1)
+ FatalError
+ ("Xvnc error: failed to allocate a new file descriptor for -inetd: %s\n", strerror(errno));
+
/* Avoid xserver >= 1.19's epoll-fd becoming fd 2 / stderr only to be
replaced by /dev/null by OsInit() because the pollfd is not

12
SOURCES/vncserver
View File

@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ if ($fontPath eq "") {
# Check command line options # Check command line options
&ParseOptions("-geometry",1,"-depth",1,"-pixelformat",1,"-name",1,"-kill",1, &ParseOptions("-geometry",1,"-depth",1,"-pixelformat",1,"-name",1,"-kill",1,
"-help",0,"-h",0,"--help",0,"-fp",1,"-list",0,"-fg",0,"-autokill",0,"-noxstartup",0,"-xstartup",1); "-help",0,"-h",0,"--help",0,"-fp",1,"-list",0,"-fg",0,"-autokill",0,"-noxstartup",0,"-xstartup",1,"-fallbacktofreeport",0);
&Usage() if ($opt{'-help'} || $opt{'-h'} || $opt{'--help'}); &Usage() if ($opt{'-help'} || $opt{'-h'} || $opt{'--help'});
@ -168,8 +168,13 @@ if ((@ARGV > 0) && ($ARGV[0] =~ /^:(\d+)$/)) {
$displayNumber = $1; $displayNumber = $1;
shift(@ARGV); shift(@ARGV);
if (!&CheckDisplayNumber($displayNumber)) { if (!&CheckDisplayNumber($displayNumber)) {
warn "A VNC server is already running as :$displayNumber\n"; if ($opt{'-fallbacktofreeport'}) {
$displayNumber = &GetDisplayNumber(); warn "A VNC server is already running as :$displayNumber\n";
$displayNumber = &GetDisplayNumber();
warn "Using port :$displayNumber as fallback\n";
} else {
die "A VNC server is already running as :$displayNumber\n";
}
} }
} elsif ((@ARGV > 0) && ($ARGV[0] !~ /^-/) && ($ARGV[0] !~ /^\+/)) { } elsif ((@ARGV > 0) && ($ARGV[0] !~ /^-/) && ($ARGV[0] !~ /^\+/)) {
&Usage(); &Usage();
@ -675,6 +680,7 @@ sub Usage
" [-autokill]\n". " [-autokill]\n".
" [-noxstartup]\n". " [-noxstartup]\n".
" [-xstartup <file>]\n". " [-xstartup <file>]\n".
" [-fallbacktofreeport]\n".
" <Xvnc-options>...\n\n". " <Xvnc-options>...\n\n".
" $prog -kill <X-display>\n\n". " $prog -kill <X-display>\n\n".
" $prog -list\n\n"); " $prog -list\n\n");

72
SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
From 337d8d48b618d4fc0168a7b978be4c3447650b04 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 5 Apr 2024 15:24:49 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] render: Avoid possible double-free in ProcRenderAddGlyphs()
ProcRenderAddGlyphs() adds the glyph to the glyphset using AddGlyph() and
then frees it using FreeGlyph() to decrease the reference count, after
AddGlyph() has increased it.
AddGlyph() however may chose to reuse an existing glyph if it's already
in the glyphSet, and free the glyph that was given, in which case the
caller function, ProcRenderAddGlyphs() will call FreeGlyph() on an
already freed glyph, as reported by ASan:
READ of size 4 thread T0
#0 in FreeGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:252
#1 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1174
#2 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546
#3 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271
#4 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34
#5 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
#6 in __libc_start_main_impl ../csu/libc-start.c:360
#7 (/usr/bin/Xwayland+0x44fe4)
Address is located 0 bytes inside of 64-byte region
freed by thread T0 here:
#0 in __interceptor_free libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:52
#1 in _dixFreeObjectWithPrivates xserver/dix/privates.c:538
#2 in AddGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:295
#3 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1173
#4 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546
#5 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271
#6 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34
#7 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
previously allocated by thread T0 here:
#0 in __interceptor_malloc libsanitizer/asan/asan_malloc_linux.cpp:69
#1 in AllocateGlyph xserver/render/glyph.c:355
#2 in ProcRenderAddGlyphs xserver/render/render.c:1085
#3 in Dispatch xserver/dix/dispatch.c:546
#4 in dix_main xserver/dix/main.c:271
#5 in main xserver/dix/stubmain.c:34
#6 in __libc_start_call_main ../sysdeps/nptl/libc_start_call_main.h:58
SUMMARY: AddressSanitizer: heap-use-after-free xserver/render/glyph.c:252 in FreeGlyph
To avoid that, make sure not to free the given glyph in AddGlyph().
v2: Simplify the test using the boolean returned from AddGlyph() (Michel)
v3: Simplify even more by not freeing the glyph in AddGlyph() (Peter)
Fixes: bdca6c3d1 - render: fix refcounting of glyphs during ProcRenderAddGlyphs
Closes: https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/issues/1659
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Part-of: <https://gitlab.freedesktop.org/xorg/xserver/-/merge_requests/1476>
---
render/glyph.c | 2 --
1 file changed, 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/render/glyph.c b/render/glyph.c
index 13991f8a1..5fa7f3b5b 100644
--- a/render/glyph.c
+++ b/render/glyph.c
@@ -291,8 +291,6 @@ AddGlyph(GlyphSetPtr glyphSet, GlyphPtr glyph, Glyph id)
gr = FindGlyphRef(&globalGlyphs[glyphSet->fdepth], signature,
TRUE, glyph->sha1);
if (gr->glyph && gr->glyph != DeletedGlyph && gr->glyph != glyph) {
- FreeGlyphPicture(glyph);
- dixFreeObjectWithPrivates(glyph, PRIVATE_GLYPH);
glyph = gr->glyph;
}
else if (gr->glyph != glyph) {
--
2.44.0

42
SOURCES/xorg-x11-server-composite-Fix-use-after-free-of-the-COW.patch
View File

@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
From 947bd1b3f4a23565bf10879ec41ba06ebe1e1c76 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 13 Mar 2023 11:08:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH xserver] composite: Fix use-after-free of the COW
ZDI-CAN-19866/CVE-2023-1393
If a client explicitly destroys the compositor overlay window (aka COW),
we would leave a dangling pointer to that window in the CompScreen
structure, which will trigger a use-after-free later.
Make sure to clear the CompScreen pointer to the COW when the latter gets
destroyed explicitly by the client.
This vulnerability was discovered by:
Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative
Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan <ofourdan@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Adam Jackson <ajax@redhat.com>
---
composite/compwindow.c | 5 +++++
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+)
diff --git a/composite/compwindow.c b/composite/compwindow.c
index 4e2494b86..b30da589e 100644
--- a/composite/compwindow.c
+++ b/composite/compwindow.c
@@ -620,6 +620,11 @@ compDestroyWindow(WindowPtr pWin)
ret = (*pScreen->DestroyWindow) (pWin);
cs->DestroyWindow = pScreen->DestroyWindow;
pScreen->DestroyWindow = compDestroyWindow;
+
+ /* Did we just destroy the overlay window? */
+ if (pWin == cs->pOverlayWin)
+ cs->pOverlayWin = NULL;
+
/* compCheckTree (pWin->drawable.pScreen); can't check -- tree isn't good*/
return ret;
}
--
2.40.0

180
SPECS/tigervnc.spec
View File

@ -4,8 +4,8 @@
%global modulename vncsession %global modulename vncsession
Name: tigervnc Name: tigervnc
Version: 1.12.0 Version: 1.13.1
Release: 15%{?dist} Release: 10%{?dist}
Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system
%global _hardened_build 1 %global _hardened_build 1
@ -21,50 +21,73 @@ Source3: 10-libvnc.conf
# Backwards compatibility # Backwards compatibility
Source5: vncserver Source5: vncserver
# Downstream patches
Patch1: tigervnc-use-gnome-as-default-session.patch Patch1: tigervnc-use-gnome-as-default-session.patch
Patch2: tigervnc-vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service.patch
Patch3: tigervnc-dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch
# Upstream patches # Upstream patches
Patch50: tigervnc-selinux-restore-context-in-case-of-different-policies.patch Patch50: tigervnc-support-username-alias-in-plainusers.patch
Patch51: tigervnc-fix-typo-in-mirror-monitor-detection.patch Patch51: tigervnc-use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd.patch
Patch52: tigervnc-root-user-selinux-context.patch
Patch53: tigervnc-vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service.patch # Upstreamable patches
# https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/pull/1513 Patch80: tigervnc-dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device.patch
Patch54: tigervnc-fix-ghost-cursor-in-zaphod-mode.patch
# https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/pull/1510
Patch55: tigervnc-add-new-keycodes-for-unknown-keysyms.patch
Patch56: tigervnc-sanity-check-when-cleaning-up-keymap-changes.patch
Patch57: tigervnc-selinux-allow-vncsession-create-vnc-directory.patch
# This is tigervnc-%%{version}/unix/xserver116.patch rebased on the latest xorg # This is tigervnc-%%{version}/unix/xserver116.patch rebased on the latest xorg
Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch
# 1326867 - [RHEL7.3] GLX applications in an Xvnc session fails to start # 1326867 - [RHEL7.3] GLX applications in an Xvnc session fails to start
Patch101: 0001-rpath-hack.patch Patch101: 0001-rpath-hack.patch
# CVE-2023-1393 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: X.Org Server Overlay Window Use-After-Free Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability # XServer patches
Patch110: xorg-x11-server-composite-Fix-use-after-free-of-the-COW.patch Patch200: xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup.patch
BuildRequires: make
BuildRequires: gcc-c++ BuildRequires: gcc-c++
BuildRequires: libX11-devel, automake, autoconf, libtool, gettext, gettext-autopoint BuildRequires: gettext
BuildRequires: libXext-devel, xorg-x11-server-source, libXi-devel BuildRequires: cmake
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-xtrans-devel, xorg-x11-util-macros, libXtst-devel
BuildRequires: libxkbfile-devel, openssl-devel, libpciaccess-devel BuildRequires: gnutls-devel
BuildRequires: mesa-libGL-devel, libXinerama-devel, xorg-x11-font-utils BuildRequires: desktop-file-utils
BuildRequires: freetype-devel, libXdmcp-devel, libxshmfence-devel BuildRequires: libappstream-glib
BuildRequires: libjpeg-turbo-devel, gnutls-devel, pam-devel BuildRequires: libjpeg-turbo-devel
BuildRequires: libdrm-devel, libXt-devel, pixman-devel BuildRequires: openssl-devel
BuildRequires: systemd, cmake, desktop-file-utils BuildRequires: pam-devel
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel, selinux-policy-devel BuildRequires: zlib-devel
BuildRequires: libXfixes-devel, libXdamage-devel, libXrandr-devel
%if 0%{?fedora} > 24 || 0%{?rhel} >= 7
BuildRequires: libXfont2-devel
%else
BuildRequires: libXfont-devel
%endif
# TigerVNC 1.4.x requires fltk 1.3.3 for keyboard handling support # TigerVNC 1.4.x requires fltk 1.3.3 for keyboard handling support
# See https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/issues/8, also bug #1208814 # See https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/issues/8, also bug #1208814
BuildRequires: fltk-devel >= 1.3.3 BuildRequires: fltk-devel >= 1.3.3
BuildRequires: libX11-devel
BuildRequires: libXext-devel
BuildRequires: libXi-devel
BuildRequires: libXrandr-devel
BuildRequires: libXrender-devel
BuildRequires: pixman-devel
# X11/graphics dependencies
BuildRequires: autoconf
BuildRequires: automake
BuildRequires: gettext-autopoint
BuildRequires: libXdamage-devel
BuildRequires: libXdmcp-devel
BuildRequires: libXfixes-devel
BuildRequires: libXfont2-devel
BuildRequires: libXinerama-devel
BuildRequires: libXt-devel
BuildRequires: libXtst-devel
BuildRequires: libdrm-devel
BuildRequires: libtool
BuildRequires: libxkbfile-devel
BuildRequires: libxshmfence-devel
BuildRequires: mesa-libGL-devel
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-font-utils
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-server-devel BuildRequires: xorg-x11-server-devel
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-server-source
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-util-macros
BuildRequires: xorg-x11-xtrans-devel
# SELinux
BuildRequires: libselinux-devel, selinux-policy-devel, systemd
Requires(post): coreutils Requires(post): coreutils
Requires(postun):coreutils Requires(postun):coreutils
@ -164,20 +187,19 @@ for all in `find . -type f -perm -001`; do
done done
%patch100 -p1 -b .xserver120-rebased %patch100 -p1 -b .xserver120-rebased
%patch101 -p1 -b .rpath %patch101 -p1 -b .rpath
%patch110 -p1 -b .composite-Fix-use-after-free-of-the-COW %patch200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2024-31083-followup
popd popd
%patch1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session %patch1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session
%patch2 -p1 -b .vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service
%patch3 -p1 -b .dont-install-appstream-metadata-file.patch
# Upstream patches # Upstream patches
%patch50 -p1 -b .selinux-restore-context-in-case-of-different-policies %patch50 -p1 -b .support-username-alias-in-plainusers
%patch51 -p1 -b .fix-typo-in-mirror-monitor-detection %patch51 -p1 -b .use-dup-to-get-available-fd-for-inetd
%patch52 -p1 -b .root-user-selinux-context
%patch53 -p1 -b .vncsession-restore-script-systemd-service # Upstreamable patches
%patch54 -p1 -b .fix-ghost-cursor-in-zaphod-mode %patch80 -p1 -b .dont-get-pointer-position-for-floating-device
%patch55 -p1 -b .add-new-keycodes-for-unknown-keysyms
%patch56 -p1 -b .sanity-check-when-cleaning-up-keymap-changes
%patch57 -p1 -b .selinux-allow-vncsession-create-vnc-directory
%build %build
%ifarch sparcv9 sparc64 s390 s390x %ifarch sparcv9 sparc64 s390 s390x
@ -243,7 +265,7 @@ install -m644 %{SOURCE2} %{buildroot}%{_unitdir}/xvnc.socket
mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/{16x16,24x24,48x48}/apps mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/{16x16,24x24,48x48}/apps
pushd media/icons pushd media/icons
for s in 16 24 48; do for s in 16 22 24 32 48 64 128; do
install -m644 tigervnc_$s.png %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/${s}x$s/apps/tigervnc.png install -m644 tigervnc_$s.png %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/icons/hicolor/${s}x$s/apps/tigervnc.png
done done
popd popd
@ -329,36 +351,68 @@ fi
%files selinux %files selinux
%{_datadir}/selinux/packages/%{selinuxtype}/%{modulename}.pp.* %{_datadir}/selinux/packages/%{selinuxtype}/%{modulename}.pp.*
%ghost %verify(not md5 size mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename} %ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename}
%changelog %changelog
*Mon Mar 27 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-15 * Mon Apr 15 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-10
- xorg-x11-server: X.Org Server Overlay Window Use-After-Free Local Privilege Escalation Vulnerability - Drop patches that are already part of xorg-x11-server
Resolves: bz#2180305 Resolves: RHEL-30755
Resolves: RHEL-30767
Resolves: RHEL-30761
* Tue Feb 21 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-14 * Thu Apr 04 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-9
- SELinux: allow vncsession create .vnc directory - Fix CVE-2024-31080 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overread/data leakage in ProcXIGetSelectedEvents
Resolves: bz#2164704 Resolves: RHEL-30755
- Fix CVE-2024-31083 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: User-after-free in ProcRenderAddGlyphs
Resolves: RHEL-30767
- Fix CVE-2024-31081 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overread/data leakage in ProcXIPassiveGrabDevice
Resolves: RHEL-30761
* Wed Feb 15 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-13 * Wed Feb 07 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-8
- Add sanity check when cleaning up keymap changes - Fix copy/paste error in the DeviceStateNotify
Resolves: bz#2169960 Resolves: RHEL-20530
* Mon Feb 06 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-12 * Mon Jan 22 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-7
- xorg-x11-server: DeepCopyPointerClasses use-after-free leads to privilege elevation - Fix CVE-2024-21886 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in DisableDevice
Resolves: bz#2167058 Resolves: RHEL-20388
- Fix CVE-2024-21885 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: heap buffer overflow in XISendDeviceHierarchyEvent
Resolves: RHEL-20382
- Fix CVE-2024-0229 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: reattaching to different master device may lead to out-of-bounds memory access
Resolves: RHEL-20530
- Fix CVE-2023-6816 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Heap buffer overflow in DeviceFocusEvent and ProcXIQueryPointer
Resolves: RHEL-21214
* Tue Dec 20 2022 Tomas Popela <tpopela@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-11 * Mon Jan 08 2024 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-6
- Rebuild for xorg-x11-server CVE-2022-46340 follow up fix - Use dup() to get available file descriptor when using -inetd option
Resolves: RHEL-21000
* Fri Dec 16 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-10 * Mon Dec 18 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-5
- Rebuild for xorg-x11-server CVEs - Fix CVE-2023-6377 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory reads/writes in XKB button actions
Resolves: CVE-2022-4283 (bz#2154233) Resolves: RHEL-18410
Resolves: CVE-2022-46340 (bz#2154220) - Fix CVE-2023-6478 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: out-of-bounds memory read in RRChangeOutputProperty and RRChangeProviderProperty
Resolves: CVE-2022-46341 (bz#2154223) Resolves: RHEL-18422
Resolves: CVE-2022-46342 (bz#2154225)
Resolves: CVE-2022-46343 (bz#2154227) * Wed Nov 01 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-4
Resolves: CVE-2022-46344 (bz#2154229) - Fix CVE-2023-5380 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Use-after-free bug in DestroyWindow
Resolves: RHEL-15236
- Fix CVE-2023-5367 tigervnc: xorg-x11-server: Out-of-bounds write in XIChangeDeviceProperty/RRChangeOutputProperty
Resolves: RHEL-15230
* Mon Oct 09 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-3
- Support username alias in PlainUsers
Resolves: RHEL-4258
* Tue Apr 11 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-2
- xorg-x11-server: X.Org Server Overlay Window Use-After-Free Local Privilege
Escalation Vulnerability
Resolves: bz#2180306
* Tue Mar 21 2023 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.13.1-1
- 1.13.1
Resolves: bz#2175748
- Restore "--fallbacktofreeport" option in the vncserver script
Resolves: bz#2174398
* Thu Dec 08 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-9 * Thu Dec 08 2022 Jan Grulich <jgrulich@redhat.com> - 1.12.0-9
- Bump build version to fix upgrade path - Bump build version to fix upgrade path