diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c1be3c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +From ded614e74e7175927dd2bc5ef69accaf2de29939 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Peter Hutterer +Date: Wed, 4 Dec 2024 15:49:43 +1000 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] dix: keep a ref to the rootCursor + +CreateCursor returns a cursor with refcount 1 - that refcount is used by +the resource system, any caller needs to call RefCursor to get their own +reference. That happens correctly for normal cursors but for our +rootCursor we keep a variable to the cursor despite not having a ref for +ourselves. + +Fix this by reffing/unreffing the rootCursor to ensure our pointer is +valid. + +Related to CVE-2025-26594, ZDI-CAN-25544 + +Reviewed-by: Olivier Fourdan +--- + dix/main.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/dix/main.c b/dix/main.c +index aa7b020b2..0c57ba605 100644 +--- a/dix/main.c ++++ b/dix/main.c +@@ -235,6 +235,8 @@ dix_main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[]) + defaultCursorFont); + } + ++ rootCursor = RefCursor(rootCursor); ++ + #ifdef PANORAMIX + /* + * Consolidate window and colourmap information for each screen +@@ -275,6 +277,8 @@ dix_main(int argc, char *argv[], char *envp[]) + + Dispatch(); + ++ UnrefCursor(rootCursor); ++ + UndisplayDevices(); + DisableAllDevices(); + +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26594.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26594.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..46bbc62 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26594.patch @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +From efca605c45ff51b57f136222b966ce1d610ebc33 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 11:27:05 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] Cursor: Refuse to free the root cursor +MIME-Version: 1.0 +Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8 +Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit + +If a cursor reference count drops to 0, the cursor is freed. + +The root cursor however is referenced with a specific global variable, +and when the root cursor is freed, the global variable may still point +to freed memory. + +Make sure to prevent the rootCursor from being explicitly freed by a +client. + +CVE-2025-26594, ZDI-CAN-25544 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +v2: Explicitly forbid XFreeCursor() on the root cursor (Peter Hutterer +) +v3: Return BadCursor instead of BadValue (Michel Dänzer +) + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Suggested-by: Peter Hutterer +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + dix/dispatch.c | 4 ++++ + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/dix/dispatch.c b/dix/dispatch.c +index 5f7cfe02d..d1241fa96 100644 +--- a/dix/dispatch.c ++++ b/dix/dispatch.c +@@ -3039,6 +3039,10 @@ ProcFreeCursor(ClientPtr client) + rc = dixLookupResourceByType((void **) &pCursor, stuff->id, RT_CURSOR, + client, DixDestroyAccess); + if (rc == Success) { ++ if (pCursor == rootCursor) { ++ client->errorValue = stuff->id; ++ return BadCursor; ++ } + FreeResource(stuff->id, RT_NONE); + return Success; + } +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26595.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26595.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31ef84f --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26595.patch @@ -0,0 +1,60 @@ +From 98602942c143075ab7464f917e0fc5d31ce28c3f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Wed, 27 Nov 2024 14:41:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText() + +The code in XkbVModMaskText() allocates a fixed sized buffer on the +stack and copies the virtual mod name. + +There's actually two issues in the code that can lead to a buffer +overflow. + +First, the bound check mixes pointers and integers using misplaced +parenthesis, defeating the bound check. + +But even though, if the check fails, the data is still copied, so the +stack overflow will occur regardless. + +Change the logic to skip the copy entirely if the bound check fails. + +CVE-2025-26595, ZDI-CAN-25545 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + xkb/xkbtext.c | 16 ++++++++-------- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkbtext.c b/xkb/xkbtext.c +index 018466420..93262528b 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkbtext.c ++++ b/xkb/xkbtext.c +@@ -173,14 +173,14 @@ XkbVModMaskText(XkbDescPtr xkb, + len = strlen(tmp) + 1 + (str == buf ? 0 : 1); + if (format == XkbCFile) + len += 4; +- if ((str - (buf + len)) <= VMOD_BUFFER_SIZE) { +- if (str != buf) { +- if (format == XkbCFile) +- *str++ = '|'; +- else +- *str++ = '+'; +- len--; +- } ++ if ((str - buf) + len > VMOD_BUFFER_SIZE) ++ continue; /* Skip */ ++ if (str != buf) { ++ if (format == XkbCFile) ++ *str++ = '|'; ++ else ++ *str++ = '+'; ++ len--; + } + if (format == XkbCFile) + sprintf(str, "%sMask", tmp); +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26596.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26596.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a7e76d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26596.patch @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +From b41f6fce201e77a174550935330e2f7772d4adf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 11:49:34 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix computation of XkbSizeKeySyms + +The computation of the length in XkbSizeKeySyms() differs from what is +actually written in XkbWriteKeySyms(), leading to a heap overflow. + +Fix the calculation in XkbSizeKeySyms() to match what kbWriteKeySyms() +does. + +CVE-2025-26596, ZDI-CAN-25543 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + xkb/xkb.c | 8 ++++---- + 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/xkb/xkb.c b/xkb/xkb.c +index 85659382d..744dba63d 100644 +--- a/xkb/xkb.c ++++ b/xkb/xkb.c +@@ -1095,10 +1095,10 @@ XkbSizeKeySyms(XkbDescPtr xkb, xkbGetMapReply * rep) + len = rep->nKeySyms * SIZEOF(xkbSymMapWireDesc); + symMap = &xkb->map->key_sym_map[rep->firstKeySym]; + for (i = nSyms = 0; i < rep->nKeySyms; i++, symMap++) { +- if (symMap->offset != 0) { +- nSymsThisKey = XkbNumGroups(symMap->group_info) * symMap->width; +- nSyms += nSymsThisKey; +- } ++ nSymsThisKey = XkbNumGroups(symMap->group_info) * symMap->width; ++ if (nSymsThisKey == 0) ++ continue; ++ nSyms += nSymsThisKey; + } + len += nSyms * 4; + rep->totalSyms = nSyms; +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26597.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26597.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..30f677b --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26597.patch @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +From c5114475db18f29d639537d60e135bdfc11a5d3a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Thu, 28 Nov 2024 14:09:04 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] xkb: Fix buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey() + +If XkbChangeTypesOfKey() is called with nGroups == 0, it will resize the +key syms to 0 but leave the key actions unchanged. + +If later, the same function is called with a non-zero value for nGroups, +this will cause a buffer overflow because the key actions are of the wrong +size. + +To avoid the issue, make sure to resize both the key syms and key actions +when nGroups is 0. + +CVE-2025-26597, ZDI-CAN-25683 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + xkb/XKBMisc.c | 1 + + 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+) + +diff --git a/xkb/XKBMisc.c b/xkb/XKBMisc.c +index abbfed90e..fd180fad2 100644 +--- a/xkb/XKBMisc.c ++++ b/xkb/XKBMisc.c +@@ -553,6 +553,7 @@ XkbChangeTypesOfKey(XkbDescPtr xkb, + i = XkbSetNumGroups(i, 0); + xkb->map->key_sym_map[key].group_info = i; + XkbResizeKeySyms(xkb, key, 0); ++ XkbResizeKeyActions(xkb, key, 0); + return Success; + } + +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26598.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26598.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2a0d88c --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26598.patch @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +From 0f5ea9d269ac6225bcb302a1ec0f58878114da9f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 11:25:11 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] Xi: Fix barrier device search + +The function GetBarrierDevice() would search for the pointer device +based on its device id and return the matching value, or supposedly NULL +if no match was found. + +Unfortunately, as written, it would return the last element of the list +if no matching device id was found which can lead to out of bounds +memory access. + +Fix the search function to return NULL if not matching device is found, +and adjust the callers to handle the case where the device cannot be +found. + +CVE-2025-26598, ZDI-CAN-25740 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + Xi/xibarriers.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++---- + 1 file changed, 23 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xi/xibarriers.c b/Xi/xibarriers.c +index 80c4b5981..28bc0a24f 100644 +--- a/Xi/xibarriers.c ++++ b/Xi/xibarriers.c +@@ -131,14 +131,15 @@ static void FreePointerBarrierClient(struct PointerBarrierClient *c) + + static struct PointerBarrierDevice *GetBarrierDevice(struct PointerBarrierClient *c, int deviceid) + { +- struct PointerBarrierDevice *pbd = NULL; ++ struct PointerBarrierDevice *p, *pbd = NULL; + +- xorg_list_for_each_entry(pbd, &c->per_device, entry) { +- if (pbd->deviceid == deviceid) ++ xorg_list_for_each_entry(p, &c->per_device, entry) { ++ if (p->deviceid == deviceid) { ++ pbd = p; + break; ++ } + } + +- BUG_WARN(!pbd); + return pbd; + } + +@@ -339,6 +340,9 @@ barrier_find_nearest(BarrierScreenPtr cs, DeviceIntPtr dev, + double distance; + + pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, dev->id); ++ if (!pbd) ++ continue; ++ + if (pbd->seen) + continue; + +@@ -447,6 +451,9 @@ input_constrain_cursor(DeviceIntPtr dev, ScreenPtr screen, + nearest = &c->barrier; + + pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, master->id); ++ if (!pbd) ++ continue; ++ + new_sequence = !pbd->hit; + + pbd->seen = TRUE; +@@ -487,6 +494,9 @@ input_constrain_cursor(DeviceIntPtr dev, ScreenPtr screen, + int flags = 0; + + pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, master->id); ++ if (!pbd) ++ continue; ++ + pbd->seen = FALSE; + if (!pbd->hit) + continue; +@@ -681,6 +691,9 @@ BarrierFreeBarrier(void *data, XID id) + continue; + + pbd = GetBarrierDevice(c, dev->id); ++ if (!pbd) ++ continue; ++ + if (!pbd->hit) + continue; + +@@ -740,6 +753,8 @@ static void remove_master_func(void *res, XID id, void *devid) + barrier = container_of(b, struct PointerBarrierClient, barrier); + + pbd = GetBarrierDevice(barrier, *deviceid); ++ if (!pbd) ++ return; + + if (pbd->hit) { + BarrierEvent ev = { +@@ -904,6 +919,10 @@ ProcXIBarrierReleasePointer(ClientPtr client) + barrier = container_of(b, struct PointerBarrierClient, barrier); + + pbd = GetBarrierDevice(barrier, dev->id); ++ if (!pbd) { ++ client->errorValue = dev->id; ++ return BadDevice; ++ } + + if (pbd->barrier_event_id == event_id) + pbd->release_event_id = event_id; +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c87667 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +From f5ce639ff9d3af05e79efce6c51e084352d28ed1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Mon, 13 Jan 2025 16:09:43 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/2] composite: initialize border clip even when + pixmap alloc fails + +If it fails to allocate the pixmap, the function compAllocPixmap() would +return early and leave the borderClip region uninitialized, which may +lead to the use of uninitialized value as reported by valgrind: + + Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s) + at 0x4F9B33: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:317) + by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476) + by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679) + by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693) + by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922) + by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560) + by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282) + by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34) + Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation + at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446) + by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171) + by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592) + by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925) + by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768) + by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560) + by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282) + by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34) + + Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s) + at 0x48EEDBC: pixman_region_translate (pixman-region.c:2233) + by 0x4F9255: RegionTranslate (regionstr.h:312) + by 0x4F9B7E: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:319) + by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476) + by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679) + by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693) + by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922) + by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560) + by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282) + by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34) + Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation + at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446) + by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171) + by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592) + by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925) + by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768) + by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560) + by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282) + by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34) + + Conditional jump or move depends on uninitialised value(s) + at 0x48EEE33: UnknownInlinedFun (pixman-region.c:2241) + by 0x48EEE33: pixman_region_translate (pixman-region.c:2225) + by 0x4F9255: RegionTranslate (regionstr.h:312) + by 0x4F9B7E: compClipNotify (compwindow.c:319) + by 0x484FC9: miComputeClips (mivaltree.c:476) + by 0x48559A: miValidateTree (mivaltree.c:679) + by 0x4F0685: MapWindow (window.c:2693) + by 0x4A344A: ProcMapWindow (dispatch.c:922) + by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560) + by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282) + by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34) + Uninitialised value was created by a heap allocation + at 0x4841866: malloc (vg_replace_malloc.c:446) + by 0x4F47BC: compRedirectWindow (compalloc.c:171) + by 0x4FA8AD: compCreateWindow (compwindow.c:592) + by 0x4EBB89: CreateWindow (window.c:925) + by 0x4A2E6E: ProcCreateWindow (dispatch.c:768) + by 0x4A25B5: Dispatch (dispatch.c:560) + by 0x4B082A: dix_main (main.c:282) + by 0x429233: main (stubmain.c:34) + +Fix compAllocPixmap() to initialize the border clip even if the creation +of the backing pixmap has failed, to avoid depending later on +uninitialized border clip values. + +Related to CVE-2025-26599, ZDI-CAN-25851 + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Acked-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + composite/compalloc.c | 11 ++++++++--- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/composite/compalloc.c b/composite/compalloc.c +index ecb1b6147..d1342799b 100644 +--- a/composite/compalloc.c ++++ b/composite/compalloc.c +@@ -605,9 +605,12 @@ compAllocPixmap(WindowPtr pWin) + int h = pWin->drawable.height + (bw << 1); + PixmapPtr pPixmap = compNewPixmap(pWin, x, y, w, h); + CompWindowPtr cw = GetCompWindow(pWin); ++ Bool status; + +- if (!pPixmap) +- return FALSE; ++ if (!pPixmap) { ++ status = FALSE; ++ goto out; ++ } + if (cw->update == CompositeRedirectAutomatic) + pWin->redirectDraw = RedirectDrawAutomatic; + else +@@ -621,14 +624,16 @@ compAllocPixmap(WindowPtr pWin) + DamageRegister(&pWin->drawable, cw->damage); + cw->damageRegistered = TRUE; + } ++ status = TRUE; + ++out: + /* Make sure our borderClip is up to date */ + RegionUninit(&cw->borderClip); + RegionCopy(&cw->borderClip, &pWin->borderClip); + cw->borderClipX = pWin->drawable.x; + cw->borderClipY = pWin->drawable.y; + +- return TRUE; ++ return status; + } + + void +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26599.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26599.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9030374 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26599.patch @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +From 10a24e364ac15983051d0bb90817c88bbe107036 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Tue, 17 Dec 2024 15:19:45 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/2] composite: Handle failure to redirect in + compRedirectWindow() + +The function compCheckRedirect() may fail if it cannot allocate the +backing pixmap. + +In that case, compRedirectWindow() will return a BadAlloc error. + +However that failure code path will shortcut the validation of the +window tree marked just before, which leaves the validate data partly +initialized. + +That causes a use of uninitialized pointer later. + +The fix is to not shortcut the call to compHandleMarkedWindows() even in +the case of compCheckRedirect() returning an error. + +CVE-2025-26599, ZDI-CAN-25851 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Acked-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + composite/compalloc.c | 5 +++-- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/composite/compalloc.c b/composite/compalloc.c +index e52c009bd..ecb1b6147 100644 +--- a/composite/compalloc.c ++++ b/composite/compalloc.c +@@ -138,6 +138,7 @@ compRedirectWindow(ClientPtr pClient, WindowPtr pWin, int update) + CompScreenPtr cs = GetCompScreen(pWin->drawable.pScreen); + WindowPtr pLayerWin; + Bool anyMarked = FALSE; ++ int status = Success; + + if (pWin == cs->pOverlayWin) { + return Success; +@@ -216,13 +217,13 @@ compRedirectWindow(ClientPtr pClient, WindowPtr pWin, int update) + + if (!compCheckRedirect(pWin)) { + FreeResource(ccw->id, RT_NONE); +- return BadAlloc; ++ status = BadAlloc; + } + + if (anyMarked) + compHandleMarkedWindows(pWin, pLayerWin); + +- return Success; ++ return status; + } + + void +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26600.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26600.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6abc3e --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26600.patch @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +From 70ad5d36ae80f6e5a436eabfee642c2c013e51cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Mon, 16 Dec 2024 16:18:04 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver] dix: Dequeue pending events on frozen device on + removal + +When a device is removed while still frozen, the events queued for that +device remain while the device itself is freed. + +As a result, replaying the events will cause a use after free. + +To avoid the issue, make sure to dequeue and free any pending events on +a frozen device when removed. + +CVE-2025-26600, ZDI-CAN-25871 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + dix/devices.c | 18 ++++++++++++++++++ + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+) + +diff --git a/dix/devices.c b/dix/devices.c +index 969819534..740390207 100644 +--- a/dix/devices.c ++++ b/dix/devices.c +@@ -966,6 +966,23 @@ FreeAllDeviceClasses(ClassesPtr classes) + + } + ++static void ++FreePendingFrozenDeviceEvents(DeviceIntPtr dev) ++{ ++ QdEventPtr qe, tmp; ++ ++ if (!dev->deviceGrab.sync.frozen) ++ return; ++ ++ /* Dequeue any frozen pending events */ ++ xorg_list_for_each_entry_safe(qe, tmp, &syncEvents.pending, next) { ++ if (qe->device == dev) { ++ xorg_list_del(&qe->next); ++ free(qe); ++ } ++ } ++} ++ + /** + * Close down a device and free all resources. + * Once closed down, the driver will probably not expect you that you'll ever +@@ -1030,6 +1047,7 @@ CloseDevice(DeviceIntPtr dev) + free(dev->last.touches[j].valuators); + free(dev->last.touches); + dev->config_info = NULL; ++ FreePendingFrozenDeviceEvents(dev); + dixFreePrivates(dev->devPrivates, PRIVATE_DEVICE); + free(dev); + } +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8468238 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2.patch @@ -0,0 +1,80 @@ +From 7dc3f11abb51cad8a59ecbff5278c8c8a318df41 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 16:54:30 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 2/4] sync: Check values before applying changes + +In SyncInitTrigger(), we would set the CheckTrigger function before +validating the counter value. + +As a result, if the counter value overflowed, we would leave the +function SyncInitTrigger() with the CheckTrigger applied but without +updating the trigger object. + +To avoid that issue, move the portion of code checking for the trigger +check value before updating the CheckTrigger function. + +Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870 + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + Xext/sync.c | 36 ++++++++++++++++++------------------ + 1 file changed, 18 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c +index 4267d3af6..4eab5a6ac 100644 +--- a/Xext/sync.c ++++ b/Xext/sync.c +@@ -351,6 +351,24 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject, + } + } + ++ if (changes & (XSyncCAValueType | XSyncCAValue)) { ++ if (pTrigger->value_type == XSyncAbsolute) ++ pTrigger->test_value = pTrigger->wait_value; ++ else { /* relative */ ++ Bool overflow; ++ ++ if (pCounter == NULL) ++ return BadMatch; ++ ++ overflow = checked_int64_add(&pTrigger->test_value, ++ pCounter->value, pTrigger->wait_value); ++ if (overflow) { ++ client->errorValue = pTrigger->wait_value >> 32; ++ return BadValue; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ + if (changes & XSyncCATestType) { + + if (pSync && SYNC_FENCE == pSync->type) { +@@ -379,24 +397,6 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject, + } + } + +- if (changes & (XSyncCAValueType | XSyncCAValue)) { +- if (pTrigger->value_type == XSyncAbsolute) +- pTrigger->test_value = pTrigger->wait_value; +- else { /* relative */ +- Bool overflow; +- +- if (pCounter == NULL) +- return BadMatch; +- +- overflow = checked_int64_add(&pTrigger->test_value, +- pCounter->value, pTrigger->wait_value); +- if (overflow) { +- client->errorValue = pTrigger->wait_value >> 32; +- return BadValue; +- } +- } +- } +- + if (changes & XSyncCACounter) { + if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */ + SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger); +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f6a1f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3.patch @@ -0,0 +1,47 @@ +From 4ccaa5134482b6be9c9a7f0b66cd221ef325d082 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:06:07 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 3/4] sync: Do not fail SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject() + +We do not want to return a failure at the very last step in +SyncInitTrigger() after having all changes applied. + +SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject() must not fail on memory allocation, if the +allocation of the SyncTriggerList fails, trigger a FatalError() instead. + +Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870 + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + Xext/sync.c | 7 +++---- + 1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c +index 4eab5a6ac..c36de1a2e 100644 +--- a/Xext/sync.c ++++ b/Xext/sync.c +@@ -200,8 +200,8 @@ SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(SyncTrigger * pTrigger) + return Success; + } + +- if (!(pCur = malloc(sizeof(SyncTriggerList)))) +- return BadAlloc; ++ /* Failure is not an option, it's succeed or burst! */ ++ pCur = XNFalloc(sizeof(SyncTriggerList)); + + pCur->pTrigger = pTrigger; + pCur->next = pTrigger->pSync->pTriglist; +@@ -409,8 +409,7 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject, + * a new counter on a trigger + */ + if (newSyncObject) { +- if ((rc = SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(pTrigger)) != Success) +- return rc; ++ SyncAddTriggerToSyncObject(pTrigger); + } + else if (pCounter && IsSystemCounter(pCounter)) { + SyncComputeBracketValues(pCounter); +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a558e0a --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4.patch @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +From f0984082067f79b45383fa1eb889c6a901667331 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 17:10:31 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 4/4] sync: Apply changes last in + SyncChangeAlarmAttributes() + +SyncChangeAlarmAttributes() would apply the various changes while +checking for errors. + +If one of the changes triggers an error, the changes for the trigger, +counter or delta value would remain, possibly leading to inconsistent +changes. + +Postpone the actual changes until we're sure nothing else can go wrong. + +Related to CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870 + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + Xext/sync.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------- + 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c +index c36de1a2e..e282e6657 100644 +--- a/Xext/sync.c ++++ b/Xext/sync.c +@@ -800,8 +800,14 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask, + int status; + XSyncCounter counter; + Mask origmask = mask; ++ SyncTrigger trigger; ++ Bool select_events_changed = FALSE; ++ Bool select_events_value; ++ int64_t delta; + +- counter = pAlarm->trigger.pSync ? pAlarm->trigger.pSync->id : None; ++ trigger = pAlarm->trigger; ++ delta = pAlarm->delta; ++ counter = trigger.pSync ? trigger.pSync->id : None; + + while (mask) { + int index2 = lowbit(mask); +@@ -817,24 +823,24 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask, + case XSyncCAValueType: + mask &= ~XSyncCAValueType; + /* sanity check in SyncInitTrigger */ +- pAlarm->trigger.value_type = *values++; ++ trigger.value_type = *values++; + break; + + case XSyncCAValue: + mask &= ~XSyncCAValue; +- pAlarm->trigger.wait_value = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1]; ++ trigger.wait_value = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1]; + values += 2; + break; + + case XSyncCATestType: + mask &= ~XSyncCATestType; + /* sanity check in SyncInitTrigger */ +- pAlarm->trigger.test_type = *values++; ++ trigger.test_type = *values++; + break; + + case XSyncCADelta: + mask &= ~XSyncCADelta; +- pAlarm->delta = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1]; ++ delta = ((int64_t)values[0] << 32) | values[1]; + values += 2; + break; + +@@ -844,10 +850,8 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask, + client->errorValue = *values; + return BadValue; + } +- status = SyncEventSelectForAlarm(pAlarm, client, +- (Bool) (*values++)); +- if (status != Success) +- return status; ++ select_events_value = (Bool) (*values++); ++ select_events_changed = TRUE; + break; + + default: +@@ -856,25 +860,33 @@ SyncChangeAlarmAttributes(ClientPtr client, SyncAlarm * pAlarm, Mask mask, + } + } + ++ if (select_events_changed) { ++ status = SyncEventSelectForAlarm(pAlarm, client, select_events_value); ++ if (status != Success) ++ return status; ++ } ++ + /* "If the test-type is PositiveComparison or PositiveTransition + * and delta is less than zero, or if the test-type is + * NegativeComparison or NegativeTransition and delta is + * greater than zero, a Match error is generated." + */ + if (origmask & (XSyncCADelta | XSyncCATestType)) { +- if ((((pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveComparison) || +- (pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveTransition)) +- && pAlarm->delta < 0) ++ if ((((trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveComparison) || ++ (trigger.test_type == XSyncPositiveTransition)) ++ && delta < 0) + || +- (((pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeComparison) || +- (pAlarm->trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeTransition)) +- && pAlarm->delta > 0) ++ (((trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeComparison) || ++ (trigger.test_type == XSyncNegativeTransition)) ++ && delta > 0) + ) { + return BadMatch; + } + } + + /* postpone this until now, when we're sure nothing else can go wrong */ ++ pAlarm->delta = delta; ++ pAlarm->trigger = trigger; + if ((status = SyncInitTrigger(client, &pAlarm->trigger, counter, RTCounter, + origmask & XSyncCAAllTrigger)) != Success) + return status; +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601.patch b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..debbd17 --- /dev/null +++ b/SOURCES/xorg-CVE-2025-26601.patch @@ -0,0 +1,66 @@ +From 573a2265aacfeaddcc1bb001905a6f7d4fa15ee6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 +From: Olivier Fourdan +Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2025 16:52:01 +0100 +Subject: [PATCH xserver 1/4] sync: Do not let sync objects uninitialized + +When changing an alarm, the change mask values are evaluated one after +the other, changing the trigger values as requested and eventually, +SyncInitTrigger() is called. + +SyncInitTrigger() will evaluate the XSyncCACounter first and may free +the existing sync object. + +Other changes are then evaluated and may trigger an error and an early +return, not adding the new sync object. + +This can be used to cause a use after free when the alarm eventually +triggers. + +To avoid the issue, delete the existing sync object as late as possible +only once we are sure that no further error will cause an early exit. + +CVE-2025-26601, ZDI-CAN-25870 + +This vulnerability was discovered by: +Jan-Niklas Sohn working with Trend Micro Zero Day Initiative + +Signed-off-by: Olivier Fourdan +Reviewed-by: Peter Hutterer +--- + Xext/sync.c | 13 ++++++++----- + 1 file changed, 8 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-) + +diff --git a/Xext/sync.c b/Xext/sync.c +index b6417b3b0..4267d3af6 100644 +--- a/Xext/sync.c ++++ b/Xext/sync.c +@@ -330,11 +330,6 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject, + client->errorValue = syncObject; + return rc; + } +- if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */ +- SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger); +- pTrigger->pSync = pSync; +- newSyncObject = TRUE; +- } + } + + /* if system counter, ask it what the current value is */ +@@ -402,6 +397,14 @@ SyncInitTrigger(ClientPtr client, SyncTrigger * pTrigger, XID syncObject, + } + } + ++ if (changes & XSyncCACounter) { ++ if (pSync != pTrigger->pSync) { /* new counter for trigger */ ++ SyncDeleteTriggerFromSyncObject(pTrigger); ++ pTrigger->pSync = pSync; ++ newSyncObject = TRUE; ++ } ++ } ++ + /* we wait until we're sure there are no errors before registering + * a new counter on a trigger + */ +-- +2.48.1 + diff --git a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec index 9175503..cdbdb91 100644 --- a/SPECS/tigervnc.spec +++ b/SPECS/tigervnc.spec @@ -5,7 +5,7 @@ Name: tigervnc Version: 1.13.1 -Release: 14%{?dist} +Release: 15%{?dist} Summary: A TigerVNC remote display system %global _hardened_build 1 @@ -41,6 +41,19 @@ Patch100: tigervnc-xserver120.patch Patch101: 0001-rpath-hack.patch # XServer patches +Patch200: xorg-CVE-2025-26594.patch +Patch201: xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2.patch +Patch202: xorg-CVE-2025-26595.patch +Patch203: xorg-CVE-2025-26596.patch +Patch204: xorg-CVE-2025-26597.patch +Patch205: xorg-CVE-2025-26598.patch +Patch206: xorg-CVE-2025-26599.patch +Patch207: xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2.patch +Patch208: xorg-CVE-2025-26600.patch +Patch209: xorg-CVE-2025-26601.patch +Patch210: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2.patch +Patch211: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3.patch +Patch212: xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4.patch BuildRequires: make BuildRequires: gcc-c++ @@ -188,6 +201,19 @@ for all in `find . -type f -perm -001`; do done %patch -P100 -p1 -b .xserver120-rebased %patch -P101 -p1 -b .rpath +%patch -P200 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26594 +%patch -P201 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26594-2 +%patch -P202 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26595 +%patch -P203 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26596 +%patch -P204 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26597 +%patch -P205 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26598 +%patch -P206 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26599 +%patch -P207 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26599-2 +%patch -P208 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26600 +%patch -P209 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601 +%patch -P210 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-2 +%patch -P211 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-3 +%patch -P212 -p1 -b .xorg-CVE-2025-26601-4 popd %patch -P1 -p1 -b .use-gnome-as-default-session @@ -356,7 +382,26 @@ fi %ghost %verify(not md5 size mode mtime) %{_sharedstatedir}/selinux/%{selinuxtype}/active/modules/200/%{modulename} %changelog -* Thu Oct 31 2024 Jan Grulich + +* Wed Feb 26 2025 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-15 +- Fix CVE-2025-26594 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free of the root cursor + Resolves: RHEL-79397 +- Fix CVE-2025-26595 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbVModMaskText() + Resolves: RHEL-79401 +- Fix CVE-2025-26596 xorg-x11-server Heap overflow in XkbWriteKeySyms() + Resolves: RHEL-79386 +- Fix CVE-2025-26597 xorg-x11-server Buffer overflow in XkbChangeTypesOfKey() + Resolves: RHEL-79380 +- Fix CVE-2025-26598 xorg-x11-server Out-of-bounds write in CreatePointerBarrierClient() + Resolves: RHEL-79369 +- Fix CVE-2025-26599 xorg-x11-server Use of uninitialized pointer in compRedirectWindow() + Resolves: RHEL-79364 +- Fix CVE-2025-26600 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in PlayReleasedEvents() + Resolves: RHEL-79360 +- Fix CVE-2025-26601 xorg-x11-server Use-after-free in SyncInitTrigger() + Resolves: RHEL-79348 + +* Thu Oct 31 2024 Jan Grulich - 1.13.1-14 - Fix CVE-2024-9632: xorg-x11-server: heap-based buffer overflow privilege escalation vulnerability Resolves: RHEL-61999