From 32b8c2adeff49699442bbb352b7ecd2b149828df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001 From: Jan Horak Date: Wed, 31 Aug 2011 09:53:58 +0200 Subject: [PATCH] Distrust a specific Certificate Authority --- thunderbird.spec | 7 +- xulrunner-diginotar.patch | 324 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++ 2 files changed, 330 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-) create mode 100644 xulrunner-diginotar.patch diff --git a/thunderbird.spec b/thunderbird.spec index 2f96112..5520874 100644 --- a/thunderbird.spec +++ b/thunderbird.spec @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ Summary: Mozilla Thunderbird mail/newsgroup client Name: thunderbird Version: 6.0 -Release: 1%{?dist} +Release: 2%{?dist} URL: http://www.mozilla.org/projects/thunderbird/ License: MPLv1.1 or GPLv2+ or LGPLv2+ Group: Applications/Internet @@ -60,6 +60,7 @@ Source100: find-external-requires # Mozilla (XULRunner) patches Patch0: thunderbird-version.patch Patch7: crashreporter-remove-static.patch +Patch8: xulrunner-diginotar.patch %if %{official_branding} # Required by Mozilla Corporation @@ -140,6 +141,7 @@ sed -e 's/__RPM_VERSION_INTERNAL__/%{version_internal}/' %{P:%%PATCH0} \ # Mozilla (XULRunner) patches cd mozilla %patch7 -p2 -b .static +%patch8 -p1 -b .diginotar cd .. %if %{official_branding} @@ -353,6 +355,9 @@ gtk-update-icon-cache %{_datadir}/icons/hicolor &>/dev/null || : #=============================================================================== %changelog +* Wed Aug 31 2011 Jan Horak - 6.0-2 +- Distrust a specific Certificate Authority + * Tue Aug 16 2011 Jan Horak - 6.0-1 - Update to 6.0 diff --git a/xulrunner-diginotar.patch b/xulrunner-diginotar.patch new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf2a4d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/xulrunner-diginotar.patch @@ -0,0 +1,324 @@ + +# HG changeset patch +# User Kai Engert +# Date 1314714745 14400 +# Node ID d172106979730bdd967073f2c1e6188e708ca911 +# Parent 078215b4d425df355ae87f0ec47d66261ad58c5a +Bug 682927 - Dis-trust DigiNotar root certificate, all parts together; r=bsmith + +diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp +--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp ++++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsIdentityChecking.cpp +@@ -118,28 +118,16 @@ static struct nsMyTrustedEVInfo myTruste + SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, + "5F:43:E5:B1:BF:F8:78:8C:AC:1C:C7:CA:4A:9A:C6:22:2B:CC:34:C6", + "MDsxGDAWBgNVBAoTD0N5YmVydHJ1c3QsIEluYzEfMB0GA1UEAxMWQ3liZXJ0cnVz" + "dCBHbG9iYWwgUm9vdA==", + "BAAAAAABD4WqLUg=", + nsnull + }, + { +- // E=info@diginotar.nl,CN=DigiNotar Root CA,O=DigiNotar,C=NL +- "2.16.528.1.1001.1.1.1.12.6.1.1.1", +- "DigiNotar EV OID", +- SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, +- "C0:60:ED:44:CB:D8:81:BD:0E:F8:6C:0B:A2:87:DD:CF:81:67:47:8C", +- "MF8xCzAJBgNVBAYTAk5MMRIwEAYDVQQKEwlEaWdpTm90YXIxGjAYBgNVBAMTEURp" +- "Z2lOb3RhciBSb290IENBMSAwHgYJKoZIhvcNAQkBFhFpbmZvQGRpZ2lub3Rhci5u" +- "bA==", +- "DHbanJEMTiye/hXQWJM8TA==", +- nsnull +- }, +- { + // CN=SwissSign Gold CA - G2,O=SwissSign AG,C=CH + "2.16.756.1.89.1.2.1.1", + "SwissSign EV OID", + SEC_OID_UNKNOWN, + "D8:C5:38:8A:B7:30:1B:1B:6E:D4:7A:E6:45:25:3A:6F:9F:1A:27:61", + "MEUxCzAJBgNVBAYTAkNIMRUwEwYDVQQKEwxTd2lzc1NpZ24gQUcxHzAdBgNVBAMT" + "FlN3aXNzU2lnbiBHb2xkIENBIC0gRzI=", + "ALtAHEP1Xk+w", + +diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp +--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp ++++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.cpp +@@ -1029,16 +1029,63 @@ static struct nsSerialBinaryBlacklistEnt + { 16, "\x3e\x75\xce\xd4\x6b\x69\x30\x21\x21\x88\x30\xae\x86\xa8\x2a\x71" }, + { 17, "\x00\xe9\x02\x8b\x95\x78\xe4\x15\xdc\x1a\x71\x0a\x2b\x88\x15\x44\x47" }, + { 17, "\x00\xd7\x55\x8f\xda\xf5\xf1\x10\x5b\xb2\x13\x28\x2b\x70\x77\x29\xa3" }, + { 16, "\x04\x7e\xcb\xe9\xfc\xa5\x5f\x7b\xd0\x9e\xae\x36\xe1\x0c\xae\x1e" }, + { 17, "\x00\xf5\xc8\x6a\xf3\x61\x62\xf1\x3a\x64\xf5\x4f\x6d\xc9\x58\x7c\x06" }, + { 0, 0 } // end marker + }; + ++// Bug 682927: Do not trust any DigiNotar-issued certificates. ++// We do this check after normal certificate validation because we do not ++// want to override a "revoked" OCSP response. ++PRErrorCode ++PSM_SSL_BlacklistDigiNotar(CERTCertificate * serverCert, ++ CERTCertList * serverCertChain) ++{ ++ PRBool isDigiNotarIssuedCert = PR_FALSE; ++ ++ for (CERTCertListNode *node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(serverCertChain); ++ !CERT_LIST_END(node, serverCertChain); ++ node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { ++ if (!node->cert->issuerName) ++ continue; ++ ++ if (strstr(node->cert->issuerName, "CN=DigiNotar")) { ++ isDigiNotarIssuedCert = PR_TRUE; ++ // Do not let the user override the error if the cert was ++ // chained from the "DigiNotar Root CA" cert and the cert was issued ++ // within the time window in which we think the mis-issuance(s) occurred. ++ if (strstr(node->cert->issuerName, "CN=DigiNotar Root CA")) { ++ PRTime cutoff = 0, notBefore = 0, notAfter = 0; ++ PRStatus status = PR_ParseTimeString("01-JUL-2011 00:00", PR_TRUE, &cutoff); ++ NS_ASSERTION(status == PR_SUCCESS, "PR_ParseTimeString failed"); ++ if (status != PR_SUCCESS || ++ CERT_GetCertTimes(serverCert, ¬Before, ¬After) != SECSuccess || ++ notBefore >= cutoff) { ++ return SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ // By request of the Dutch government ++ if (!strcmp(node->cert->issuerName, ++ "CN=Staat der Nederlanden Root CA,O=Staat der Nederlanden,C=NL") && ++ CERT_LIST_END(CERT_LIST_NEXT(node), serverCertChain)) { ++ return 0; ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (isDigiNotarIssuedCert) ++ return SEC_ERROR_UNTRUSTED_ISSUER; // user can override this ++ else ++ return 0; // No DigiNotor cert => carry on as normal ++} ++ ++ + SECStatus PR_CALLBACK AuthCertificateCallback(void* client_data, PRFileDesc* fd, + PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer) { + nsNSSShutDownPreventionLock locker; + + CERTCertificate *serverCert = SSL_PeerCertificate(fd); + CERTCertificateCleaner serverCertCleaner(serverCert); + + if (serverCert && +@@ -1074,40 +1121,54 @@ SECStatus PR_CALLBACK AuthCertificateCal + + if (server_cert_comparison_len == locked_cert_comparison_len && + !memcmp(server_cert_comparison_start, locked_cert_comparison_start, locked_cert_comparison_len)) { + PR_SetError(SEC_ERROR_REVOKED_CERTIFICATE, 0); + return SECFailure; + } + } + } +- ++ + SECStatus rv = PSM_SSL_PKIX_AuthCertificate(fd, serverCert, checksig, isServer); + + // We want to remember the CA certs in the temp db, so that the application can find the + // complete chain at any time it might need it. + // But we keep only those CA certs in the temp db, that we didn't already know. + + if (serverCert) { + nsNSSSocketInfo* infoObject = (nsNSSSocketInfo*) fd->higher->secret; + nsRefPtr status = infoObject->SSLStatus(); + nsRefPtr nsc; + + if (!status || !status->mServerCert) { + nsc = nsNSSCertificate::Create(serverCert); + } + +- if (SECSuccess == rv) { ++ CERTCertList *certList = nsnull; ++ if (rv == SECSuccess) { ++ certList = CERT_GetCertChainFromCert(serverCert, PR_Now(), certUsageSSLCA); ++ if (!certList) { ++ rv = SECFailure; ++ } else { ++ PRErrorCode blacklistErrorCode = PSM_SSL_BlacklistDigiNotar(serverCert, ++ certList); ++ if (blacklistErrorCode != 0) { ++ infoObject->SetCertIssuerBlacklisted(); ++ PORT_SetError(blacklistErrorCode); ++ rv = SECFailure; ++ } ++ } ++ } ++ ++ if (rv == SECSuccess) { + if (nsc) { + PRBool dummyIsEV; + nsc->GetIsExtendedValidation(&dummyIsEV); // the nsc object will cache the status + } + +- CERTCertList *certList = CERT_GetCertChainFromCert(serverCert, PR_Now(), certUsageSSLCA); +- + nsCOMPtr nssComponent; + + for (CERTCertListNode *node = CERT_LIST_HEAD(certList); + !CERT_LIST_END(node, certList); + node = CERT_LIST_NEXT(node)) { + + if (node->cert->slot) { + // This cert was found on a token, no need to remember it in the temp db. +@@ -1133,16 +1194,19 @@ SECStatus PR_CALLBACK AuthCertificateCal + PK11_ImportCert(slot, node->cert, CK_INVALID_HANDLE, + nickname, PR_FALSE); + PK11_FreeSlot(slot); + } + } + PR_FREEIF(nickname); + } + ++ } ++ ++ if (certList) { + CERT_DestroyCertList(certList); + } + + // The connection may get terminated, for example, if the server requires + // a client cert. Let's provide a minimal SSLStatus + // to the caller that contains at least the cert and its status. + if (!status) { + status = new nsSSLStatus(); +diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.h b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.h +--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.h ++++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSCallbacks.h +@@ -50,16 +50,19 @@ + + char* PR_CALLBACK + PK11PasswordPrompt(PK11SlotInfo *slot, PRBool retry, void* arg); + + void PR_CALLBACK HandshakeCallback(PRFileDesc *fd, void *client_data); + SECStatus PR_CALLBACK AuthCertificateCallback(void* client_data, PRFileDesc* fd, + PRBool checksig, PRBool isServer); + ++PRErrorCode PSM_SSL_BlacklistDigiNotar(CERTCertificate * serverCert, ++ CERTCertList * serverCertChain); ++ + SECStatus RegisterMyOCSPAIAInfoCallback(); + SECStatus UnregisterMyOCSPAIAInfoCallback(); + + class nsHTTPListener : public nsIStreamLoaderObserver + { + private: + // For XPCOM implementations that are not a base class for some other + // class, it is good practice to make the destructor non-virtual and +diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp +--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp ++++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.cpp +@@ -221,17 +221,18 @@ nsNSSSocketInfo::nsNSSSocketInfo() + mForSTARTTLS(PR_FALSE), + mHandshakePending(PR_TRUE), + mCanceled(PR_FALSE), + mHasCleartextPhase(PR_FALSE), + mHandshakeInProgress(PR_FALSE), + mAllowTLSIntoleranceTimeout(PR_TRUE), + mRememberClientAuthCertificate(PR_FALSE), + mHandshakeStartTime(0), +- mPort(0) ++ mPort(0), ++ mIsCertIssuerBlacklisted(PR_FALSE) + { + mThreadData = new nsSSLSocketThreadData; + } + + nsNSSSocketInfo::~nsNSSSocketInfo() + { + delete mThreadData; + +@@ -3437,16 +3438,20 @@ nsNSSBadCertHandler(void *arg, PRFileDes + cvout[0].value.pointer.log = verify_log; + cvout[1].type = cert_po_end; + + srv = CERT_PKIXVerifyCert(peerCert, certificateUsageSSLServer, + survivingParams->GetRawPointerForNSS(), + cvout, (void*)infoObject); + } + ++ if (infoObject->IsCertIssuerBlacklisted()) { ++ collected_errors |= nsICertOverrideService::ERROR_UNTRUSTED; ++ } ++ + // We ignore the result code of the cert verification. + // Either it is a failure, which is expected, and we'll process the + // verify log below. + // Or it is a success, then a domain mismatch is the only + // possible failure. + + CERTVerifyLogNode *i_node; + for (i_node = verify_log->head; i_node; i_node = i_node->next) +diff --git a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.h b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.h +--- a/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.h ++++ b/security/manager/ssl/src/nsNSSIOLayer.h +@@ -197,16 +197,22 @@ public: + + /* Set SSL Status values */ + nsresult SetSSLStatus(nsSSLStatus *aSSLStatus); + nsSSLStatus* SSLStatus() { return mSSLStatus; } + PRBool hasCertErrors(); + + PRStatus CloseSocketAndDestroy(); + ++ PRBool IsCertIssuerBlacklisted() const { ++ return mIsCertIssuerBlacklisted; ++ } ++ void SetCertIssuerBlacklisted() { ++ mIsCertIssuerBlacklisted = PR_TRUE; ++ } + protected: + nsCOMPtr mCallbacks; + PRFileDesc* mFd; + nsCOMPtr mCert; + nsCOMPtr mPreviousCert; // DocShellDependent + enum { + blocking_state_unknown, is_nonblocking_socket, is_blocking_socket + } mBlockingState; +@@ -224,16 +230,17 @@ protected: + PRPackedBool mCanceled; + PRPackedBool mHasCleartextPhase; + PRPackedBool mHandshakeInProgress; + PRPackedBool mAllowTLSIntoleranceTimeout; + PRPackedBool mRememberClientAuthCertificate; + PRIntervalTime mHandshakeStartTime; + PRInt32 mPort; + nsXPIDLCString mHostName; ++ PRErrorCode mIsCertIssuerBlacklisted; + + /* SSL Status */ + nsRefPtr mSSLStatus; + + nsresult ActivateSSL(); + + nsSSLSocketThreadData *mThreadData; + + +diff --git a/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/nssckbi.h b/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/nssckbi.h +--- a/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/nssckbi.h ++++ b/security/nss/lib/ckfw/builtins/nssckbi.h +@@ -72,18 +72,18 @@ + * ... + * - NSS 3.29 branch: 250-255 + * + * NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION_MINOR is a CK_BYTE. It's not clear + * whether we may use its full range (0-255) or only 0-99 because + * of the comment in the CK_VERSION type definition. + */ + #define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION_MAJOR 1 +-#define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION_MINOR 83 +-#define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION "1.83" ++#define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION_MINOR 85 ++#define NSS_BUILTINS_LIBRARY_VERSION "1.85" + + /* These version numbers detail the semantic changes to the ckfw engine. */ + #define NSS_BUILTINS_HARDWARE_VERSION_MAJOR 1 + #define NSS_BUILTINS_HARDWARE_VERSION_MINOR 0 + + /* These version numbers detail the semantic changes to ckbi itself + * (new PKCS #11 objects), etc. */ + #define NSS_BUILTINS_FIRMWARE_VERSION_MAJOR 1 +