eceb26ad96
Resolves: #2138081,#2141979,#2151993,#2155517,#2160477
384 lines
15 KiB
Diff
384 lines
15 KiB
Diff
From e86a03c4f201745a683cfe1549a202d5ae636b07 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
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Date: Mon, 28 Nov 2022 12:12:55 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] coredump: do not allow user to access coredumps with changed
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uid/gid/capabilities
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When the user starts a program which elevates its permissions via setuid,
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setgid, or capabilities set on the file, it may access additional information
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which would then be visible in the coredump. We shouldn't make the the coredump
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visible to the user in such cases.
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Reported-by: Matthias Gerstner <mgerstner@suse.de>
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This reads the /proc/<pid>/auxv file and attaches it to the process metadata as
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PROC_AUXV. Before the coredump is submitted, it is parsed and if either
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at_secure was set (which the kernel will do for processes that are setuid,
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setgid, or setcap), or if the effective uid/gid don't match uid/gid, the file
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is not made accessible to the user. If we can't access this data, we assume the
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file should not be made accessible either. In principle we could also access
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the auxv data from a note in the core file, but that is much more complex and
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it seems better to use the stand-alone file that is provided by the kernel.
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Attaching auxv is both convient for this patch (because this way it's passed
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between the stages along with other fields), but I think it makes sense to save
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it in general.
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We use the information early in the core file to figure out if the program was
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32-bit or 64-bit and its endianness. This way we don't need heuristics to guess
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whether the format of the auxv structure. This test might reject some cases on
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fringe architecutes. But the impact would be limited: we just won't grant the
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user permissions to view the coredump file. If people report that we're missing
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some cases, we can always enhance this to support more architectures.
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I tested auxv parsing on amd64, 32-bit program on amd64, arm64, arm32, and
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ppc64el, but not the whole coredump handling.
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(cherry picked from commit 3e4d0f6cf99f8677edd6a237382a65bfe758de03)
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Resolves: #2155517
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---
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src/basic/io-util.h | 9 ++
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src/coredump/coredump.c | 196 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
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2 files changed, 192 insertions(+), 13 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/src/basic/io-util.h b/src/basic/io-util.h
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index 39728e06bc..3afb134266 100644
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--- a/src/basic/io-util.h
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+++ b/src/basic/io-util.h
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@@ -91,7 +91,16 @@ struct iovec_wrapper *iovw_new(void);
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struct iovec_wrapper *iovw_free(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw);
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struct iovec_wrapper *iovw_free_free(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw);
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void iovw_free_contents(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, bool free_vectors);
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+
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int iovw_put(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void *data, size_t len);
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+static inline int iovw_consume(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, void *data, size_t len) {
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+ /* Move data into iovw or free on error */
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+ int r = iovw_put(iovw, data, len);
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+ if (r < 0)
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+ free(data);
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+ return r;
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+}
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+
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int iovw_put_string_field(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, const char *field, const char *value);
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int iovw_put_string_field_free(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, const char *field, char *value);
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void iovw_rebase(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, char *old, char *new);
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diff --git a/src/coredump/coredump.c b/src/coredump/coredump.c
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index 7a181bdeeb..ea3d8c415a 100644
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--- a/src/coredump/coredump.c
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+++ b/src/coredump/coredump.c
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@@ -4,6 +4,7 @@
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <sys/prctl.h>
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#include <sys/statvfs.h>
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+#include <sys/auxv.h>
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#include <sys/xattr.h>
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#include <unistd.h>
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@@ -106,6 +107,7 @@ enum {
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META_EXE = _META_MANDATORY_MAX,
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META_UNIT,
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+ META_PROC_AUXV,
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_META_MAX
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};
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@@ -120,10 +122,12 @@ static const char * const meta_field_names[_META_MAX] = {
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[META_COMM] = "COREDUMP_COMM=",
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[META_EXE] = "COREDUMP_EXE=",
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[META_UNIT] = "COREDUMP_UNIT=",
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+ [META_PROC_AUXV] = "COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV=",
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};
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typedef struct Context {
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const char *meta[_META_MAX];
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+ size_t meta_size[_META_MAX];
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pid_t pid;
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bool is_pid1;
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bool is_journald;
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@@ -185,13 +189,16 @@ static uint64_t storage_size_max(void) {
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return 0;
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}
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-static int fix_acl(int fd, uid_t uid) {
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+static int fix_acl(int fd, uid_t uid, bool allow_user) {
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+ assert(fd >= 0);
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+ assert(uid_is_valid(uid));
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#if HAVE_ACL
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int r;
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- assert(fd >= 0);
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- assert(uid_is_valid(uid));
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+ /* We don't allow users to read coredumps if the uid or capabilities were changed. */
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+ if (!allow_user)
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+ return 0;
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if (uid_is_system(uid) || uid_is_dynamic(uid) || uid == UID_NOBODY)
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return 0;
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@@ -251,7 +258,8 @@ static int fix_permissions(
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const char *filename,
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const char *target,
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const Context *context,
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- uid_t uid) {
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+ uid_t uid,
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+ bool allow_user) {
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int r;
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@@ -261,7 +269,7 @@ static int fix_permissions(
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/* Ignore errors on these */
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(void) fchmod(fd, 0640);
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- (void) fix_acl(fd, uid);
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+ (void) fix_acl(fd, uid, allow_user);
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(void) fix_xattr(fd, context);
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r = fsync_full(fd);
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@@ -331,6 +339,153 @@ static int make_filename(const Context *context, char **ret) {
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return 0;
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}
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+static int parse_auxv64(
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+ const uint64_t *auxv,
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+ size_t size_bytes,
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+ int *at_secure,
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+ uid_t *uid,
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+ uid_t *euid,
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+ gid_t *gid,
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+ gid_t *egid) {
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+
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+ assert(auxv || size_bytes == 0);
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+
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+ if (size_bytes % (2 * sizeof(uint64_t)) != 0)
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+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Incomplete auxv structure (%zu bytes).", size_bytes);
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+
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+ size_t words = size_bytes / sizeof(uint64_t);
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+
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+ /* Note that we set output variables even on error. */
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+
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+ for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < words; i += 2)
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+ switch (auxv[i]) {
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+ case AT_SECURE:
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+ *at_secure = auxv[i + 1] != 0;
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+ break;
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+ case AT_UID:
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+ *uid = auxv[i + 1];
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+ break;
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+ case AT_EUID:
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+ *euid = auxv[i + 1];
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+ break;
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+ case AT_GID:
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+ *gid = auxv[i + 1];
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+ break;
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+ case AT_EGID:
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+ *egid = auxv[i + 1];
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+ break;
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+ case AT_NULL:
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+ if (auxv[i + 1] != 0)
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+ goto error;
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+ error:
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+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENODATA),
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+ "AT_NULL terminator not found, cannot parse auxv structure.");
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+}
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+
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+static int parse_auxv32(
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+ const uint32_t *auxv,
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+ size_t size_bytes,
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+ int *at_secure,
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+ uid_t *uid,
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+ uid_t *euid,
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+ gid_t *gid,
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+ gid_t *egid) {
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+
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+ assert(auxv || size_bytes == 0);
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+
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+ size_t words = size_bytes / sizeof(uint32_t);
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+
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+ if (size_bytes % (2 * sizeof(uint32_t)) != 0)
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+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EIO), "Incomplete auxv structure (%zu bytes).", size_bytes);
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+
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+ /* Note that we set output variables even on error. */
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+
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+ for (size_t i = 0; i + 1 < words; i += 2)
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+ switch (auxv[i]) {
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+ case AT_SECURE:
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+ *at_secure = auxv[i + 1] != 0;
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+ break;
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+ case AT_UID:
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+ *uid = auxv[i + 1];
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+ break;
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+ case AT_EUID:
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+ *euid = auxv[i + 1];
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+ break;
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+ case AT_GID:
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+ *gid = auxv[i + 1];
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+ break;
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+ case AT_EGID:
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+ *egid = auxv[i + 1];
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+ break;
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+ case AT_NULL:
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+ if (auxv[i + 1] != 0)
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+ goto error;
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+ error:
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+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENODATA),
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+ "AT_NULL terminator not found, cannot parse auxv structure.");
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+}
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+
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+static int grant_user_access(int core_fd, const Context *context) {
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+ int at_secure = -1;
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+ uid_t uid = UID_INVALID, euid = UID_INVALID;
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+ uid_t gid = GID_INVALID, egid = GID_INVALID;
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+ int r;
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+
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+ assert(core_fd >= 0);
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+ assert(context);
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+
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+ if (!context->meta[META_PROC_AUXV])
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+ return log_warning_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENODATA), "No auxv data, not adjusting permissions.");
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+
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+ uint8_t elf[EI_NIDENT];
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+ errno = 0;
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+ if (pread(core_fd, &elf, sizeof(elf), 0) != sizeof(elf))
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+ return log_warning_errno(errno_or_else(EIO),
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+ "Failed to pread from coredump fd: %s", STRERROR_OR_EOF(errno));
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+
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+ if (elf[EI_MAG0] != ELFMAG0 ||
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+ elf[EI_MAG1] != ELFMAG1 ||
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+ elf[EI_MAG2] != ELFMAG2 ||
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+ elf[EI_MAG3] != ELFMAG3 ||
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+ elf[EI_VERSION] != EV_CURRENT)
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+ return log_info_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN),
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+ "Core file does not have ELF header, not adjusting permissions.");
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+ if (!IN_SET(elf[EI_CLASS], ELFCLASS32, ELFCLASS64) ||
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+ !IN_SET(elf[EI_DATA], ELFDATA2LSB, ELFDATA2MSB))
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+ return log_info_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN),
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+ "Core file has strange ELF class, not adjusting permissions.");
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+
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+ if ((elf[EI_DATA] == ELFDATA2LSB) != (__BYTE_ORDER == __LITTLE_ENDIAN))
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+ return log_info_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EUCLEAN),
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+ "Core file has non-native endianness, not adjusting permissions.");
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+
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+ if (elf[EI_CLASS] == ELFCLASS64)
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+ r = parse_auxv64((const uint64_t*) context->meta[META_PROC_AUXV],
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+ context->meta_size[META_PROC_AUXV],
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+ &at_secure, &uid, &euid, &gid, &egid);
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+ else
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+ r = parse_auxv32((const uint32_t*) context->meta[META_PROC_AUXV],
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+ context->meta_size[META_PROC_AUXV],
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+ &at_secure, &uid, &euid, &gid, &egid);
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+ if (r < 0)
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+ return r;
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+
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+ /* We allow access if we got all the data and at_secure is not set and
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+ * the uid/gid matches euid/egid. */
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+ bool ret =
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+ at_secure == 0 &&
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+ uid != UID_INVALID && euid != UID_INVALID && uid == euid &&
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+ gid != GID_INVALID && egid != GID_INVALID && gid == egid;
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+ log_debug("Will %s access (uid="UID_FMT " euid="UID_FMT " gid="GID_FMT " egid="GID_FMT " at_secure=%s)",
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+ ret ? "permit" : "restrict",
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+ uid, euid, gid, egid, yes_no(at_secure));
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+ return ret;
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+}
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+
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static int save_external_coredump(
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const Context *context,
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int input_fd,
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@@ -453,6 +608,8 @@ static int save_external_coredump(
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context->meta[META_ARGV_PID], context->meta[META_COMM]);
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truncated = r == 1;
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+ bool allow_user = grant_user_access(fd, context) > 0;
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+
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#if HAVE_COMPRESSION
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if (arg_compress) {
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_cleanup_(unlink_and_freep) char *tmp_compressed = NULL;
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@@ -490,7 +647,7 @@ static int save_external_coredump(
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uncompressed_size += partial_uncompressed_size;
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}
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- r = fix_permissions(fd_compressed, tmp_compressed, fn_compressed, context, uid);
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+ r = fix_permissions(fd_compressed, tmp_compressed, fn_compressed, context, uid, allow_user);
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if (r < 0)
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return r;
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@@ -517,7 +674,7 @@ static int save_external_coredump(
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"SIZE_LIMIT=%"PRIu64, max_size,
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"MESSAGE_ID=" SD_MESSAGE_TRUNCATED_CORE_STR);
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- r = fix_permissions(fd, tmp, fn, context, uid);
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+ r = fix_permissions(fd, tmp, fn, context, uid, allow_user);
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if (r < 0)
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return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to fix permissions and finalize coredump %s into %s: %m", coredump_tmpfile_name(tmp), fn);
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@@ -765,7 +922,7 @@ static int change_uid_gid(const Context *context) {
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}
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static int submit_coredump(
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- Context *context,
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+ const Context *context,
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struct iovec_wrapper *iovw,
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int input_fd) {
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@@ -944,16 +1101,15 @@ static int save_context(Context *context, const struct iovec_wrapper *iovw) {
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struct iovec *iovec = iovw->iovec + n;
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for (size_t i = 0; i < ELEMENTSOF(meta_field_names); i++) {
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- char *p;
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-
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/* Note that these strings are NUL terminated, because we made sure that a
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* trailing NUL byte is in the buffer, though not included in the iov_len
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* count (see process_socket() and gather_pid_metadata_*()) */
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assert(((char*) iovec->iov_base)[iovec->iov_len] == 0);
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- p = startswith(iovec->iov_base, meta_field_names[i]);
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+ const char *p = startswith(iovec->iov_base, meta_field_names[i]);
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if (p) {
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context->meta[i] = p;
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+ context->meta_size[i] = iovec->iov_len - strlen(meta_field_names[i]);
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break;
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}
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}
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@@ -1190,6 +1346,7 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, Context *context) {
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uid_t owner_uid;
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pid_t pid;
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char *t;
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+ size_t size;
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const char *p;
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int r;
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@@ -1254,13 +1411,26 @@ static int gather_pid_metadata(struct iovec_wrapper *iovw, Context *context) {
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(void) iovw_put_string_field_free(iovw, "COREDUMP_PROC_LIMITS=", t);
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p = procfs_file_alloca(pid, "cgroup");
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- if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, NULL) >=0)
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+ if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, NULL) >= 0)
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(void) iovw_put_string_field_free(iovw, "COREDUMP_PROC_CGROUP=", t);
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p = procfs_file_alloca(pid, "mountinfo");
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- if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, NULL) >=0)
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+ if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, NULL) >= 0)
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(void) iovw_put_string_field_free(iovw, "COREDUMP_PROC_MOUNTINFO=", t);
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+ /* We attach /proc/auxv here. ELF coredumps also contain a note for this (NT_AUXV), see elf(5). */
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+ p = procfs_file_alloca(pid, "auxv");
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+ if (read_full_virtual_file(p, &t, &size) >= 0) {
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+ char *buf = malloc(strlen("COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV=") + size + 1);
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+ if (buf) {
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+ /* Add a dummy terminator to make save_context() happy. */
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+ *((uint8_t*) mempcpy(stpcpy(buf, "COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV="), t, size)) = '\0';
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+ (void) iovw_consume(iovw, buf, size + strlen("COREDUMP_PROC_AUXV="));
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+ }
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+
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+ free(t);
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+ }
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+
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if (get_process_cwd(pid, &t) >= 0)
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(void) iovw_put_string_field_free(iovw, "COREDUMP_CWD=", t);
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