systemd/0716-bootctl-split-out-setting-of-system-token-into-funct.patch
Jan Macku a83ff382a5 systemd-252-31
Resolves: RHEL-16952
2024-03-15 14:22:25 +01:00

172 lines
7.3 KiB
Diff

From 6fb21c25c859d950c1d9ab3b954573e87e87e64a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Date: Tue, 20 Dec 2022 18:03:06 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] bootctl: split out setting of system token into function of
its own
Let's break a huge function in two. No code change, just some
refactoring.
(cherry picked from commit 54978e3f3b5394d26f53f4753bb1c9e3e5811408)
Related: RHEL-16952
---
src/boot/bootctl.c | 132 +++++++++++++++++++++++----------------------
1 file changed, 69 insertions(+), 63 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/boot/bootctl.c b/src/boot/bootctl.c
index 3833e755b1..00e8eda992 100644
--- a/src/boot/bootctl.c
+++ b/src/boot/bootctl.c
@@ -1984,12 +1984,79 @@ static int verb_list(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
return show_boot_entries(&config, arg_json_format_flags);
}
+static int set_system_token(void) {
+ uint8_t buffer[RANDOM_EFI_SEED_SIZE];
+ size_t token_size;
+ int r;
+
+ if (!arg_touch_variables)
+ return 0;
+
+ if (arg_root) {
+ log_warning("Acting on %s, skipping EFI variable setup.",
+ arg_image ? "image" : "root directory");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ if (!is_efi_boot()) {
+ log_notice("Not booted with EFI, skipping EFI variable setup.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_WRITE_SYSTEM_TOKEN");
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r != -ENXIO)
+ log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_WRITE_SYSTEM_TOKEN, ignoring.");
+ } else if (r == 0) {
+ log_notice("Not writing system token, because $SYSTEMD_WRITE_SYSTEM_TOKEN is set to false.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ r = efi_get_variable(EFI_LOADER_VARIABLE(LoaderSystemToken), NULL, NULL, &token_size);
+ if (r == -ENODATA)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "LoaderSystemToken EFI variable is invalid (too short?), replacing.");
+ else if (r < 0) {
+ if (r != -ENOENT)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to test system token validity: %m");
+ } else {
+ if (token_size >= sizeof(buffer)) {
+ /* Let's avoid writes if we can, and initialize this only once. */
+ log_debug("System token already written, not updating.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ log_debug("Existing system token size (%zu) does not match our expectations (%zu), replacing.", token_size, sizeof(buffer));
+ }
+
+ r = crypto_random_bytes(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire random seed: %m");
+
+ /* Let's write this variable with an umask in effect, so that unprivileged users can't see the token
+ * and possibly get identification information or too much insight into the kernel's entropy pool
+ * state. */
+ RUN_WITH_UMASK(0077) {
+ r = efi_set_variable(EFI_LOADER_VARIABLE(LoaderSystemToken), buffer, sizeof(buffer));
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (!arg_graceful)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write 'LoaderSystemToken' EFI variable: %m");
+
+ if (r == -EINVAL)
+ log_notice_errno(r, "Unable to write 'LoaderSystemToken' EFI variable (firmware problem?), ignoring: %m");
+ else
+ log_notice_errno(r, "Unable to write 'LoaderSystemToken' EFI variable, ignoring: %m");
+ } else
+ log_info("Successfully initialized system token in EFI variable with %zu bytes.", sizeof(buffer));
+ }
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int install_random_seed(const char *esp) {
_cleanup_close_ int esp_fd = -EBADF, loader_dir_fd = -EBADF, fd = -EBADF;
_cleanup_free_ char *tmp = NULL;
uint8_t buffer[RANDOM_EFI_SEED_SIZE];
struct sha256_ctx hash_state;
- size_t token_size;
bool refreshed;
int r;
@@ -2066,68 +2133,7 @@ static int install_random_seed(const char *esp) {
log_info("Random seed file %s/loader/random-seed successfully %s (%zu bytes).", esp, refreshed ? "refreshed" : "written", sizeof(buffer));
- if (!arg_touch_variables)
- return 0;
-
- if (!is_efi_boot()) {
- log_notice("Not booted with EFI, skipping EFI variable setup.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- if (arg_root) {
- log_warning("Acting on %s, skipping EFI variable setup.",
- arg_image ? "image" : "root directory");
- return 0;
- }
-
- r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_WRITE_SYSTEM_TOKEN");
- if (r < 0) {
- if (r != -ENXIO)
- log_warning_errno(r, "Failed to parse $SYSTEMD_WRITE_SYSTEM_TOKEN, ignoring.");
- } else if (r == 0) {
- log_notice("Not writing system token, because $SYSTEMD_WRITE_SYSTEM_TOKEN is set to false.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- r = efi_get_variable(EFI_LOADER_VARIABLE(LoaderSystemToken), NULL, NULL, &token_size);
- if (r == -ENODATA)
- log_debug_errno(r, "LoaderSystemToken EFI variable is invalid (too short?), replacing.");
- else if (r < 0) {
- if (r != -ENOENT)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to test system token validity: %m");
- } else {
- if (token_size >= sizeof(buffer)) {
- /* Let's avoid writes if we can, and initialize this only once. */
- log_debug("System token already written, not updating.");
- return 0;
- }
-
- log_debug("Existing system token size (%zu) does not match our expectations (%zu), replacing.", token_size, sizeof(buffer));
- }
-
- r = crypto_random_bytes(buffer, sizeof(buffer));
- if (r < 0)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to acquire random seed: %m");
-
- /* Let's write this variable with an umask in effect, so that unprivileged users can't see the token
- * and possibly get identification information or too much insight into the kernel's entropy pool
- * state. */
- RUN_WITH_UMASK(0077) {
- r = efi_set_variable(EFI_LOADER_VARIABLE(LoaderSystemToken), buffer, sizeof(buffer));
- if (r < 0) {
- if (!arg_graceful)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write 'LoaderSystemToken' EFI variable: %m");
-
- if (r == -EINVAL)
- log_notice_errno(r, "Unable to write 'LoaderSystemToken' EFI variable (firmware problem?), ignoring: %m");
- else
- log_notice_errno(r, "Unable to write 'LoaderSystemToken' EFI variable, ignoring: %m");
- } else
- log_info("Successfully initialized system token in EFI variable with %zu bytes.", sizeof(buffer));
- }
-
- return 0;
-
+ return set_system_token();
fail:
if (tmp)
(void) unlinkat(loader_dir_fd, tmp, 0);