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systemd/SOURCES/0577-tpm2-move-policy-calculation-out-of-tpm2_seal.patch

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From ddf00c82e41a9c10acb92473c7800089dde96d62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Date: Wed, 12 Jul 2023 17:35:54 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] tpm2: move policy calculation out of tpm2_seal()
Move the calculation of the sealed object policy hash out of the tpm2_seal()
function. Instead, callers of tpm2_seal() can directly call
tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy() and then provide the policy hash to
tpm2_seal().
(cherry picked from commit 9e4379945b74ee7920fe375be0bcb04d8ef53873)
Related: RHEL-16182
---
src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c | 88 ++++++++++++++++++------
src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h | 5 +-
src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c | 28 +++++---
src/partition/repart.c | 89 +++++++++++++++++-------
src/shared/creds-util.c | 51 ++++++++++++--
src/shared/tpm2-util.c | 104 +++++++----------------------
src/shared/tpm2-util.h | 6 +-
7 files changed, 228 insertions(+), 143 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
index a2f57ecff4..8a26ec692c 100644
--- a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
+++ b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
@@ -133,7 +133,8 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
const void *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size,
const char *device,
- uint32_t hash_pcr_mask,
+ Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values,
+ size_t n_hash_pcr_values,
const char *pubkey_path,
uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask,
const char *signature_path,
@@ -143,9 +144,8 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
_cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *v = NULL, *signature_json = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *base64_encoded = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *srk_buf = NULL;
- size_t secret_size, blob_size, hash_size, pubkey_size = 0, srk_buf_size = 0;
- _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *hash = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
- uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg;
+ size_t secret_size, blob_size, pubkey_size = 0, srk_buf_size = 0;
+ _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *pubkey = NULL;
const char *node;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) char *pin_str = NULL;
ssize_t base64_encoded_size;
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
assert(cd);
assert(volume_key);
assert(volume_key_size > 0);
- assert(TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(hash_pcr_mask));
+ assert(TPM2_PCR_VALUES_VALID(hash_pcr_values, n_hash_pcr_values));
assert(TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(pubkey_pcr_mask));
assert_se(node = crypt_get_device_name(cd));
@@ -209,23 +209,69 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
}
}
- r = tpm2_seal(device,
- hash_pcr_mask,
- pubkey, pubkey_size,
- pubkey_pcr_mask,
+ _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL;
+ r = tpm2_context_new(device, &tpm2_context);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ bool pcr_value_specified = false;
+ for (size_t i = 0; i < n_hash_pcr_values; i++)
+ if (hash_pcr_values[i].value.size > 0) {
+ pcr_value_specified = true;
+ break;
+ }
+
+ r = tpm2_pcr_read_missing_values(tpm2_context, hash_pcr_values, n_hash_pcr_values);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ uint16_t hash_pcr_bank = 0;
+ uint32_t hash_pcr_mask = 0;
+ if (n_hash_pcr_values > 0) {
+ size_t hash_count;
+ r = tpm2_pcr_values_hash_count(hash_pcr_values, n_hash_pcr_values, &hash_count);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Could not get hash count: %m");
+
+ if (hash_count > 1)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Multiple PCR banks selected.");
+
+ hash_pcr_bank = hash_pcr_values[0].hash;
+ r = tpm2_pcr_values_to_mask(hash_pcr_values, n_hash_pcr_values, hash_pcr_bank, &hash_pcr_mask);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Could not get hash mask: %m");
+ }
+
+ TPM2B_PUBLIC public;
+ if (pubkey) {
+ r = tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_pem(pubkey, pubkey_size, &public);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Could not convert public key to TPM2B_PUBLIC: %m");
+ }
+
+ TPM2B_DIGEST policy = TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(NULL, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ r = tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(
+ hash_pcr_values,
+ n_hash_pcr_values,
+ pubkey ? &public : NULL,
+ use_pin,
+ &policy);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_context,
+ &policy,
pin_str,
&secret, &secret_size,
&blob, &blob_size,
- &hash, &hash_size,
- &pcr_bank,
- &primary_alg,
+ /* ret_primary_alg= */ NULL,
&srk_buf,
&srk_buf_size);
if (r < 0)
return r;
/* Let's see if we already have this specific PCR policy hash enrolled, if so, exit early. */
- r = search_policy_hash(cd, hash, hash_size);
+ r = search_policy_hash(cd, policy.buffer, policy.size);
if (r == -ENOENT)
log_debug_errno(r, "PCR policy hash not yet enrolled, enrolling now.");
else if (r < 0)
@@ -235,22 +281,22 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
return r; /* return existing keyslot, so that wiping won't kill it */
}
- /* Quick verification that everything is in order, we are not in a hurry after all.*/
- if (!pubkey || signature_json) {
+ /* Quick verification that everything is in order, we are not in a hurry after all. */
+ if ((!pubkey || signature_json) && !pcr_value_specified) {
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *secret2 = NULL;
size_t secret2_size;
log_debug("Unsealing for verification...");
r = tpm2_unseal(device,
hash_pcr_mask,
- pcr_bank,
+ hash_pcr_bank,
pubkey, pubkey_size,
pubkey_pcr_mask,
signature_json,
pin_str,
- primary_alg,
+ /* primary_alg= */ 0,
blob, blob_size,
- hash, hash_size,
+ policy.buffer, policy.size,
srk_buf, srk_buf_size,
&secret2, &secret2_size);
if (r < 0)
@@ -282,12 +328,12 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
r = tpm2_make_luks2_json(
keyslot,
hash_pcr_mask,
- pcr_bank,
+ hash_pcr_bank,
pubkey, pubkey_size,
pubkey_pcr_mask,
- primary_alg,
+ /* primary_alg= */ 0,
blob, blob_size,
- hash, hash_size,
+ policy.buffer, policy.size,
use_pin ? binary_salt : NULL,
use_pin ? sizeof(binary_salt) : 0,
srk_buf, srk_buf_size,
diff --git a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h
index b6e0c2808e..d43a9a8ffe 100644
--- a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h
+++ b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h
@@ -5,11 +5,12 @@
#include "cryptsetup-util.h"
#include "log.h"
+#include "tpm2-util.h"
#if HAVE_TPM2
-int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, const char *pubkey_path, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin);
+int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcrs, size_t n_hash_pcrs, const char *pubkey_path, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin);
#else
-static inline int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, const char *pubkey_path, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin) {
+static inline int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcrs, size_t n_hash_pcrs, const char *pubkey_path, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin) {
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"TPM2 key enrollment not supported.");
}
diff --git a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c
index c84e10e567..aeef45eea6 100644
--- a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c
+++ b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c
@@ -27,17 +27,19 @@
#include "strv.h"
#include "terminal-util.h"
#include "tpm-pcr.h"
-#include "tpm2-util.h"
static EnrollType arg_enroll_type = _ENROLL_TYPE_INVALID;
static char *arg_unlock_keyfile = NULL;
static char *arg_pkcs11_token_uri = NULL;
static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL;
static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL;
-static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
+static Tpm2PCRValue *arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values = NULL;
+static size_t arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values = 0;
+static bool arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values_use_default = true;
static bool arg_tpm2_pin = false;
static char *arg_tpm2_public_key = NULL;
-static uint32_t arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
+static uint32_t arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = 0;
+static bool arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask_use_default = true;
static char *arg_tpm2_signature = NULL;
static char *arg_node = NULL;
static int *arg_wipe_slots = NULL;
@@ -57,6 +59,7 @@ STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_unlock_keyfile, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_pkcs11_token_uri, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_fido2_device, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_public_key, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_signature, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_node, freep);
@@ -335,7 +338,8 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
}
case ARG_TPM2_PCRS:
- r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(optarg, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask);
+ arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values_use_default = false;
+ r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_append(optarg, &arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, &arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -356,6 +360,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
break;
case ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY_PCRS:
+ arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask_use_default = false;
r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(optarg, &arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -443,10 +448,15 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX)
- arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT;
- if (arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX)
- arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = UINT32_C(1) << TPM_PCR_INDEX_KERNEL_IMAGE;
+ if (arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask_use_default && arg_tpm2_public_key)
+ arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = INDEX_TO_MASK(uint32_t, TPM_PCR_INDEX_KERNEL_IMAGE);
+
+ if (arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values_use_default && !GREEDY_REALLOC_APPEND(
+ arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values,
+ arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values,
+ &TPM2_PCR_VALUE_MAKE(TPM2_PCR_INDEX_DEFAULT, /* hash= */ 0, /* value= */ {}),
+ 1))
+ return log_oom();
return 1;
}
@@ -657,7 +667,7 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
break;
case ENROLL_TPM2:
- slot = enroll_tpm2(cd, vk, vks, arg_tpm2_device, arg_tpm2_pcr_mask, arg_tpm2_public_key, arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask, arg_tpm2_signature, arg_tpm2_pin);
+ slot = enroll_tpm2(cd, vk, vks, arg_tpm2_device, arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_public_key, arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask, arg_tpm2_signature, arg_tpm2_pin);
break;
case _ENROLL_TYPE_INVALID:
diff --git a/src/partition/repart.c b/src/partition/repart.c
index a2c5e214f6..611bd541b0 100644
--- a/src/partition/repart.c
+++ b/src/partition/repart.c
@@ -121,9 +121,12 @@ static size_t arg_key_size = 0;
static EVP_PKEY *arg_private_key = NULL;
static X509 *arg_certificate = NULL;
static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL;
-static uint32_t arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
+static Tpm2PCRValue *arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values = NULL;
+static size_t arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values = 0;
+static bool arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values_use_default = true;
static char *arg_tpm2_public_key = NULL;
-static uint32_t arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = UINT32_MAX;
+static uint32_t arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = 0;
+static bool arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask_use_default = true;
static bool arg_split = false;
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_root, freep);
@@ -133,6 +136,7 @@ STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_key, erase_and_freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_private_key, EVP_PKEY_freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_certificate, X509_freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_device, freep);
+STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, freep);
STATIC_DESTRUCTOR_REGISTER(arg_tpm2_public_key, freep);
typedef struct Partition Partition;
@@ -3020,10 +3024,9 @@ static int partition_encrypt(
_cleanup_(json_variant_unrefp) JsonVariant *v = NULL;
_cleanup_(erase_and_freep) void *secret = NULL;
_cleanup_free_ void *pubkey = NULL;
- _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *hash = NULL, *srk_buf = NULL;
- size_t secret_size, blob_size, hash_size, pubkey_size = 0, srk_buf_size = 0;
+ _cleanup_free_ void *blob = NULL, *srk_buf = NULL;
+ size_t secret_size, blob_size, pubkey_size = 0, srk_buf_size = 0;
ssize_t base64_encoded_size;
- uint16_t pcr_bank, primary_alg;
int keyslot;
if (arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask != 0) {
@@ -3037,18 +3040,51 @@ static int partition_encrypt(
}
}
- r = tpm2_seal(arg_tpm2_device,
- arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
- pubkey, pubkey_size,
- arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask,
+ _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL;
+ r = tpm2_context_new(arg_tpm2_device, &tpm2_context);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ TPM2B_PUBLIC public;
+ if (pubkey) {
+ r = tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_pem(pubkey, pubkey_size, &public);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Could not convert public key to TPM2B_PUBLIC: %m");
+ }
+
+ r = tpm2_pcr_read_missing_values(tpm2_context, arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ uint16_t hash_pcr_bank = 0;
+ uint32_t hash_pcr_mask = 0;
+ if (arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values > 0) {
+ size_t hash_count;
+ r = tpm2_pcr_values_hash_count(arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values, &hash_count);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Could not get hash count: %m");
+
+ if (hash_count > 1)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL), "Multiple PCR banks selected.");
+
+ hash_pcr_bank = arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values[0].hash;
+ r = tpm2_pcr_values_to_mask(arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values, hash_pcr_bank, &hash_pcr_mask);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Could not get hash mask: %m");
+ }
+
+ TPM2B_DIGEST policy = TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(NULL, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ r = tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values, &public, /* use_pin= */ false, &policy);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_context,
+ &policy,
/* pin= */ NULL,
&secret, &secret_size,
&blob, &blob_size,
- &hash, &hash_size,
- &pcr_bank,
- &primary_alg,
- &srk_buf,
- &srk_buf_size);
+ /* ret_primary_alg= */ NULL,
+ &srk_buf, &srk_buf_size);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to seal to TPM2: %m");
@@ -3072,13 +3108,13 @@ static int partition_encrypt(
r = tpm2_make_luks2_json(
keyslot,
- arg_tpm2_pcr_mask,
- pcr_bank,
+ hash_pcr_mask,
+ hash_pcr_bank,
pubkey, pubkey_size,
arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask,
- primary_alg,
+ /* primary_alg= */ 0,
blob, blob_size,
- hash, hash_size,
+ policy.buffer, policy.size,
NULL, 0, /* no salt because tpm2_seal has no pin */
srk_buf, srk_buf_size,
0,
@@ -5276,7 +5312,8 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
}
case ARG_TPM2_PCRS:
- r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(optarg, &arg_tpm2_pcr_mask);
+ arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values_use_default = false;
+ r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_append(optarg, &arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, &arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -5290,6 +5327,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
break;
case ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY_PCRS:
+ arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask_use_default = false;
r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_to_mask(optarg, &arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -5359,10 +5397,15 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"A path to a loopback file must be specified when --split is used.");
- if (arg_tpm2_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX)
- arg_tpm2_pcr_mask = TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT;
- if (arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask == UINT32_MAX)
- arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = UINT32_C(1) << TPM_PCR_INDEX_KERNEL_IMAGE;
+ if (arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask_use_default && arg_tpm2_public_key)
+ arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask = INDEX_TO_MASK(uint32_t, TPM_PCR_INDEX_KERNEL_IMAGE);
+
+ if (arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values_use_default && !GREEDY_REALLOC_APPEND(
+ arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values,
+ arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values,
+ &TPM2_PCR_VALUE_MAKE(TPM2_PCR_INDEX_DEFAULT, /* hash= */ 0, /* value= */ {}),
+ 1))
+ return log_oom();
if (arg_pretty < 0 && isatty(STDOUT_FILENO))
arg_pretty = true;
diff --git a/src/shared/creds-util.c b/src/shared/creds-util.c
index 902275215a..ae7919631b 100644
--- a/src/shared/creds-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/creds-util.c
@@ -648,18 +648,49 @@ int encrypt_credential_and_warn(
if (!pubkey)
tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask = 0;
- r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_device,
- tpm2_hash_pcr_mask,
- pubkey, pubkey_size,
- tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask,
+ _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *tpm2_context = NULL;
+ r = tpm2_context_new(tpm2_device, &tpm2_context);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = tpm2_get_best_pcr_bank(tpm2_context, tpm2_hash_pcr_mask | tpm2_pubkey_pcr_mask, &tpm2_pcr_bank);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ TPML_PCR_SELECTION tpm2_hash_pcr_selection;
+ tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_from_mask(tpm2_hash_pcr_mask, tpm2_pcr_bank, &tpm2_hash_pcr_selection);
+
+ _cleanup_free_ Tpm2PCRValue *tpm2_hash_pcr_values = NULL;
+ size_t tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values;
+ r = tpm2_pcr_read(tpm2_context, &tpm2_hash_pcr_selection, &tpm2_hash_pcr_values, &tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ TPM2B_PUBLIC public;
+ if (pubkey) {
+ r = tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_pem(pubkey, pubkey_size, &public);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Could not convert public key to TPM2B_PUBLIC: %m");
+ }
+
+ TPM2B_DIGEST tpm2_policy = TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(NULL, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+ r = tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(
+ tpm2_hash_pcr_values,
+ tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values,
+ pubkey ? &public : NULL,
+ /* use_pin= */ false,
+ &tpm2_policy);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_context,
+ &tpm2_policy,
/* pin= */ NULL,
&tpm2_key, &tpm2_key_size,
&tpm2_blob, &tpm2_blob_size,
- &tpm2_policy_hash, &tpm2_policy_hash_size,
- &tpm2_pcr_bank,
&tpm2_primary_alg,
/* ret_srk_buf= */ NULL,
- /* ret_srk_buf_size= */ 0);
+ /* ret_srk_buf_size= */ NULL);
if (r < 0) {
if (sd_id128_equal(with_key, _CRED_AUTO_INITRD))
log_warning("Firmware reported a TPM2 being present and used, but we didn't manage to talk to it. Credential will be refused if SecureBoot is enabled.");
@@ -669,6 +700,12 @@ int encrypt_credential_and_warn(
log_notice_errno(r, "TPM2 sealing didn't work, continuing without TPM2: %m");
}
+ tpm2_policy_hash_size = tpm2_policy.size;
+ tpm2_policy_hash = malloc(tpm2_policy_hash_size);
+ if (!tpm2_policy_hash)
+ return log_oom();
+ memcpy(tpm2_policy_hash, tpm2_policy.buffer, tpm2_policy_hash_size);
+
assert(tpm2_blob_size <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX);
assert(tpm2_policy_hash_size <= CREDENTIAL_FIELD_SIZE_MAX);
}
diff --git a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
index b73457843d..e4565e4034 100644
--- a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
@@ -3365,7 +3365,7 @@ static int tpm2_policy_authorize(
}
/* Extend 'digest' with the calculated policy hash. */
-static int tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(
+int tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(
const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values,
size_t n_pcr_values,
const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public,
@@ -3662,38 +3662,25 @@ int tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_pem(const void *pem, size_t pem_size, TPM2B_PUBLIC *r
#endif
}
-int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
- uint32_t hash_pcr_mask,
- const void *pubkey,
- const size_t pubkey_size,
- uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask,
+int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c,
+ const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy,
const char *pin,
void **ret_secret,
size_t *ret_secret_size,
void **ret_blob,
size_t *ret_blob_size,
- void **ret_pcr_hash,
- size_t *ret_pcr_hash_size,
- uint16_t *ret_pcr_bank,
uint16_t *ret_primary_alg,
void **ret_srk_buf,
size_t *ret_srk_buf_size) {
+ uint16_t primary_alg = 0;
TSS2_RC rc;
int r;
- assert(pubkey || pubkey_size == 0);
-
assert(ret_secret);
assert(ret_secret_size);
assert(ret_blob);
assert(ret_blob_size);
- assert(ret_pcr_hash);
- assert(ret_pcr_hash_size);
- assert(ret_pcr_bank);
-
- assert(TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(hash_pcr_mask));
- assert(TPM2_PCR_MASK_VALID(pubkey_pcr_mask));
/* So here's what we do here: we connect to the TPM2 chip. It persistently contains a "seed" key that
* is randomized when the TPM2 is first initialized or reset and remains stable across boots. We
@@ -3713,53 +3700,6 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
usec_t start = now(CLOCK_MONOTONIC);
- _cleanup_(tpm2_context_unrefp) Tpm2Context *c = NULL;
- r = tpm2_context_new(device, &c);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
- TPMI_ALG_HASH pcr_bank = 0;
- if (hash_pcr_mask | pubkey_pcr_mask) {
- /* Some TPM2 devices only can do SHA1. Prefer SHA256 but allow SHA1. */
- r = tpm2_get_best_pcr_bank(c, hash_pcr_mask|pubkey_pcr_mask, &pcr_bank);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- }
-
- _cleanup_free_ Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values = NULL;
- size_t n_hash_pcr_values;
- if (hash_pcr_mask) {
- /* For now, we just read the current values from the system; we need to be able to specify
- * expected values, eventually. */
- TPML_PCR_SELECTION hash_pcr_selection;
- tpm2_tpml_pcr_selection_from_mask(hash_pcr_mask, pcr_bank, &hash_pcr_selection);
-
- r = tpm2_pcr_read(c, &hash_pcr_selection, &hash_pcr_values, &n_hash_pcr_values);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
- }
-
- TPM2B_PUBLIC pubkey_tpm2b;
- if (pubkey) {
- r = tpm2_tpm2b_public_from_pem(pubkey, pubkey_size, &pubkey_tpm2b);
- if (r < 0)
- return log_error_errno(r, "Could not create TPMT_PUBLIC: %m");
- }
-
- TPM2B_DIGEST policy_digest;
- r = tpm2_digest_init(TPM2_ALG_SHA256, &policy_digest);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
- r = tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(
- hash_pcr_values,
- n_hash_pcr_values,
- pubkey ? &pubkey_tpm2b : NULL,
- !!pin,
- &policy_digest);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
/* We use a keyed hash object (i.e. HMAC) to store the secret key we want to use for unlocking the
* LUKS2 volume with. We don't ever use for HMAC/keyed hash operations however, we just use it
* because it's a key type that is universally supported and suitable for symmetric binary blobs. */
@@ -3769,7 +3709,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
.objectAttributes = TPMA_OBJECT_FIXEDTPM | TPMA_OBJECT_FIXEDPARENT,
.parameters.keyedHashDetail.scheme.scheme = TPM2_ALG_NULL,
.unique.keyedHash.size = SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE,
- .authPolicy = policy_digest,
+ .authPolicy = policy ? *policy : TPM2B_DIGEST_MAKE(NULL, TPM2_SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE),
};
TPMS_SENSITIVE_CREATE hmac_sensitive = {
@@ -3794,21 +3734,33 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to generate secret key: %m");
- _cleanup_(Esys_Freep) TPM2B_PUBLIC *primary_public = NULL;
_cleanup_(tpm2_handle_freep) Tpm2Handle *primary_handle = NULL;
if (ret_srk_buf) {
- r = tpm2_get_or_create_srk(c, NULL, &primary_public, NULL, NULL, &primary_handle);
+ _cleanup_(Esys_Freep) TPM2B_PUBLIC *primary_public = NULL;
+ r = tpm2_get_or_create_srk(
+ c,
+ /* session= */ NULL,
+ &primary_public,
+ /* ret_name= */ NULL,
+ /* ret_qname= */ NULL,
+ &primary_handle);
if (r < 0)
return r;
+
+ primary_alg = primary_public->publicArea.type;
} else {
/* TODO: force all callers to provide ret_srk_buf, so we can stop sealing with the legacy templates. */
+ primary_alg = TPM2_ALG_ECC;
+
TPM2B_PUBLIC template = { .size = sizeof(TPMT_PUBLIC), };
- r = tpm2_get_legacy_template(TPM2_ALG_ECC, &template.publicArea);
+ r = tpm2_get_legacy_template(primary_alg, &template.publicArea);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not get legacy ECC template: %m");
if (!tpm2_supports_tpmt_public(c, &template.publicArea)) {
- r = tpm2_get_legacy_template(TPM2_ALG_RSA, &template.publicArea);
+ primary_alg = TPM2_ALG_RSA;
+
+ r = tpm2_get_legacy_template(primary_alg, &template.publicArea);
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not get legacy RSA template: %m");
@@ -3822,7 +3774,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
/* session= */ NULL,
&template,
/* sensitive= */ NULL,
- &primary_public,
+ /* ret_public= */ NULL,
&primary_handle);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -3863,11 +3815,6 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
"Failed to marshal public key: %s", sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
- _cleanup_free_ void *hash = NULL;
- hash = memdup(policy_digest.buffer, policy_digest.size);
- if (!hash)
- return log_oom();
-
/* serialize the key for storage in the LUKS header. A deserialized ESYS_TR provides both
* the raw TPM handle as well as the object name. The object name is used to verify that
* the key we use later is the key we expect to establish the session with.
@@ -3903,10 +3850,9 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
*ret_secret_size = hmac_sensitive.data.size;
*ret_blob = TAKE_PTR(blob);
*ret_blob_size = blob_size;
- *ret_pcr_hash = TAKE_PTR(hash);
- *ret_pcr_hash_size = policy_digest.size;
- *ret_pcr_bank = pcr_bank;
- *ret_primary_alg = primary_public->publicArea.type;
+
+ if (ret_primary_alg)
+ *ret_primary_alg = primary_alg;
return 0;
}
diff --git a/src/shared/tpm2-util.h b/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
index 0938fe35eb..2e03eb85ab 100644
--- a/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
+++ b/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
@@ -154,8 +154,9 @@ int tpm2_calculate_name(const TPMT_PUBLIC *public, TPM2B_NAME *ret_name);
int tpm2_calculate_policy_auth_value(TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
int tpm2_calculate_policy_authorize(const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy_ref, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
int tpm2_calculate_policy_pcr(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
+int tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_values, const TPM2B_PUBLIC *public, bool use_pin, TPM2B_DIGEST *digest);
-int tpm2_seal(const char *device, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, const void *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *pin, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, void **ret_pcr_hash, size_t *ret_pcr_hash_size, uint16_t *ret_pcr_bank, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, void **ret_srk_buf, size_t *ret_srk_buf_size);
+int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy, const char *pin, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, void **ret_srk_buf, size_t *ret_srk_buf_size);
int tpm2_unseal(const char *device, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, const void *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, JsonVariant *signature, const char *pin, uint16_t primary_alg, const void *blob, size_t blob_size, const void *policy_hash, size_t policy_hash_size, const void *srk_buf, size_t srk_buf_size, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size);
#if HAVE_OPENSSL
@@ -240,7 +241,8 @@ int tpm2_make_luks2_json(int keyslot, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank,
int tpm2_parse_luks2_json(JsonVariant *v, int *ret_keyslot, uint32_t *ret_hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t *ret_pcr_bank, void **ret_pubkey, size_t *ret_pubkey_size, uint32_t *ret_pubkey_pcr_mask, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, void **ret_policy_hash, size_t *ret_policy_hash_size, void **ret_salt, size_t *ret_salt_size, void **ret_srk_buf, size_t *ret_srk_buf_size, TPM2Flags *ret_flags);
/* Default to PCR 7 only */
-#define TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT (UINT32_C(1) << 7)
+#define TPM2_PCR_INDEX_DEFAULT (7)
+#define TPM2_PCR_MASK_DEFAULT INDEX_TO_MASK(uint32_t, TPM2_PCR_INDEX_DEFAULT)
/* We want the helpers below to work also if TPM2 libs are not available, hence define these four defines if
* they are missing. */
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