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From 461ba7436d539258744d03400490ef100095e093 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: "Jason A. Donenfeld" <Jason@zx2c4.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Nov 2022 15:22:35 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] random-seed: refresh EFI boot seed when writing a new seed
Since this runs at shutdown to write a new seed, we should also keep the
bootloader's seed maximally fresh by doing the same. So we follow the
same pattern - hash some new random bytes with the old seed to make a
new seed. We let this fail without warning, because it's just an
opportunistic thing. If the user happens to have set up the random seed
with bootctl, and the RNG is initialized, then things should be fine. If
not, we create a new seed if systemd-boot is in use. And if not, then we
just don't do anything.
(cherry picked from commit f913c784ad4c93894fd6cb2590738113dff5a694)
Related: RHEL-16952
---
src/random-seed/random-seed.c | 123 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 112 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/random-seed/random-seed.c b/src/random-seed/random-seed.c
index b548f92bbe..54ec3aa7d5 100644
--- a/src/random-seed/random-seed.c
+++ b/src/random-seed/random-seed.c
@@ -15,7 +15,11 @@
#include "sd-id128.h"
#include "alloc-util.h"
+#include "build.h"
+#include "chase-symlinks.h"
+#include "efi-loader.h"
#include "fd-util.h"
+#include "find-esp.h"
#include "fs-util.h"
#include "io-util.h"
#include "log.h"
@@ -25,6 +29,7 @@
#include "mkdir.h"
#include "parse-argument.h"
#include "parse-util.h"
+#include "path-util.h"
#include "pretty-print.h"
#include "random-util.h"
#include "string-table.h"
@@ -185,7 +190,7 @@ static int load_seed_file(
if (ret_hash_state) {
struct sha256_ctx *hash_state;
- hash_state = malloc(sizeof(struct sha256_ctx));
+ hash_state = new(struct sha256_ctx, 1);
if (!hash_state)
return log_oom();
@@ -311,6 +316,101 @@ static int save_seed_file(
return 0;
}
+static int refresh_boot_seed(void) {
+ uint8_t buffer[RANDOM_EFI_SEED_SIZE];
+ struct sha256_ctx hash_state;
+ _cleanup_free_ void *seed_file_bytes = NULL;
+ _cleanup_free_ char *esp_path = NULL;
+ _cleanup_close_ int seed_fd = -1;
+ size_t len;
+ ssize_t r;
+
+ assert_cc(RANDOM_EFI_SEED_SIZE == SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE);
+
+ r = find_esp_and_warn(NULL, NULL, /* unprivileged_mode= */ false, &esp_path,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (r == -ENOKEY) {
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Couldn't find any ESP, so not updating ESP random seed.");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return r; /* find_esp_and_warn() already logged */
+ }
+
+ seed_fd = chase_symlinks_and_open("/loader/random-seed", esp_path,
+ CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT|CHASE_PROHIBIT_SYMLINKS,
+ O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, NULL);
+ if (seed_fd == -ENOENT) {
+ uint64_t features;
+
+ r = efi_loader_get_features(&features);
+ if (r == 0 && FLAGS_SET(features, EFI_LOADER_FEATURE_RANDOM_SEED)) {
+ int dir_fd = chase_symlinks_and_open("/loader", esp_path,
+ CHASE_PREFIX_ROOT|CHASE_PROHIBIT_SYMLINKS,
+ O_DIRECTORY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, NULL);
+ if (dir_fd >= 0) {
+ seed_fd = openat(dir_fd, "random-seed", O_CREAT|O_EXCL|O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY, 0600);
+ close(dir_fd);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ if (seed_fd < 0) {
+ log_debug_errno(seed_fd, "Failed to open EFI seed path: %m");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ r = random_seed_size(seed_fd, &len);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to determine EFI seed path length: %m");
+ seed_file_bytes = malloc(len);
+ if (!seed_file_bytes)
+ return log_oom();
+ r = loop_read(seed_fd, seed_file_bytes, len, false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to read EFI seed file: %m");
+
+ /* Hash the old seed in so that we never regress in entropy. */
+ sha256_init_ctx(&hash_state);
+ sha256_process_bytes(&r, sizeof(r), &hash_state);
+ sha256_process_bytes(seed_file_bytes, r, &hash_state);
+
+ /* We're doing this opportunistically, so if the seeding dance before didn't manage to initialize the
+ * RNG, there's no point in doing it here. Secondly, getrandom(GRND_NONBLOCK) has been around longer
+ * than EFI seeding anyway, so there's no point in having non-getrandom() fallbacks here. So if this
+ * fails, just return early to cut our losses. */
+ r = getrandom(buffer, sizeof(buffer), GRND_NONBLOCK);
+ if (r < 0) {
+ if (errno == EAGAIN) {
+ log_debug_errno(errno, "Random pool not initialized yet, so skipping EFI seed update");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ if (errno == ENOSYS) {
+ log_debug_errno(errno, "getrandom() not available, so skipping EFI seed update");
+ return 0;
+ }
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to generate random bytes for EFI seed: %m");
+ }
+ assert(r == sizeof(buffer));
+
+ /* Hash the new seed into the state containing the old one to generate our final seed. */
+ sha256_process_bytes(&r, sizeof(r), &hash_state);
+ sha256_process_bytes(buffer, r, &hash_state);
+ sha256_finish_ctx(&hash_state, buffer);
+
+ if (lseek(seed_fd, 0, SEEK_SET) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to seek to beginning of EFI seed file: %m");
+ r = loop_write(seed_fd, buffer, sizeof(buffer), false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to write new EFI seed file: %m");
+ if (ftruncate(seed_fd, sizeof(buffer)) < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to truncate EFI seed file: %m");
+ r = fsync_full(seed_fd);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to fsync EFI seed file: %m");
+
+ log_debug("Updated random seed in ESP");
+ return 0;
+}
+
static int help(int argc, char *argv[], void *userdata) {
_cleanup_free_ char *link = NULL;
int r;
@@ -402,15 +502,15 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (r < 0)
return log_error_errno(r, "Failed to create directory " RANDOM_SEED_DIR ": %m");
+ random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
+ if (random_fd < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open /dev/urandom: %m");
+
/* When we load the seed we read it and write it to the device and then immediately update the saved
* seed with new data, to make sure the next boot gets seeded differently. */
switch (arg_action) {
case ACTION_LOAD:
- random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDWR|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
- if (random_fd < 0)
- return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open /dev/urandom: %m");
-
/* First, let's write the machine ID into /dev/urandom, not crediting entropy. See
* load_machine_id() for an explanation why. */
load_machine_id(random_fd);
@@ -428,8 +528,10 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
log_full_errno(level, open_rw_error, "Failed to open " RANDOM_SEED " for writing: %m");
log_full_errno(level, errno, "Failed to open " RANDOM_SEED " for reading: %m");
+ r = -errno;
- return missing ? 0 : -errno;
+ (void) refresh_boot_seed();
+ return missing ? 0 : r;
}
} else
write_seed_file = true;
@@ -439,10 +541,7 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
break;
case ACTION_SAVE:
- random_fd = open("/dev/urandom", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY);
- if (random_fd < 0)
- return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open /dev/urandom: %m");
-
+ (void) refresh_boot_seed();
seed_fd = open(RANDOM_SEED, O_WRONLY|O_CLOEXEC|O_NOCTTY|O_CREAT, 0600);
if (seed_fd < 0)
return log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to open " RANDOM_SEED ": %m");
@@ -460,9 +559,11 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
- if (read_seed_file)
+ if (read_seed_file) {
r = load_seed_file(seed_fd, random_fd, seed_size,
write_seed_file ? &hash_state : NULL);
+ (void) refresh_boot_seed();
+ }
if (r >= 0 && write_seed_file)
r = save_seed_file(seed_fd, random_fd, seed_size, synchronous, hash_state);
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