systemd/0521-tpm2-add-tpm2_set_auth...

121 lines
4.6 KiB
Diff

From 50375de7b310d361a71521c6abf8e4251027dd3b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Date: Tue, 6 Dec 2022 13:16:43 -0500
Subject: [PATCH] tpm2: add tpm2_set_auth()
This provides a function to perform the SetAuth TPM function, which provides
the authValue for a key.
(cherry picked from commit 409a65f82901ace5799da0f22f10056105e062fa)
Related: RHEL-16182
---
src/shared/tpm2-util.c | 65 ++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
1 file changed, 38 insertions(+), 27 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
index f1950189d5..ac8569878c 100644
--- a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
@@ -1446,6 +1446,31 @@ int tpm2_digest_many_digests(
return tpm2_digest_many(alg, digest, iovecs, n_data, extend);
}
+static int tpm2_set_auth(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *handle, const char *pin) {
+ TPM2B_AUTH auth = {};
+ TSS2_RC rc;
+ int r;
+
+ assert(c);
+ assert(handle);
+
+ if (!pin)
+ return 0;
+
+ CLEANUP_ERASE(auth);
+
+ r = tpm2_digest_buffer(TPM2_ALG_SHA256, &auth, pin, strlen(pin), /* extend= */ false);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
+ rc = sym_Esys_TR_SetAuth(c->esys_context, handle->esys_handle, &auth);
+ if (rc != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS)
+ return log_error_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
+ "Failed to load PIN in TPM: %s", sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
+
+ return 0;
+}
+
static bool tpm2_is_encryption_session(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session) {
TPMA_SESSION flags = 0;
TSS2_RC rc;
@@ -1464,7 +1489,6 @@ static int tpm2_make_encryption_session(
Tpm2Context *c,
const Tpm2Handle *primary,
const Tpm2Handle *bind_key,
- const char *pin,
Tpm2Handle **ret_session) {
static const TPMT_SYM_DEF symmetric = {
@@ -1480,30 +1504,6 @@ static int tpm2_make_encryption_session(
assert(c);
assert(ret_session);
- /*
- * if a pin is set for the seal object, use it to bind the session
- * key to that object. This prevents active bus interposers from
- * faking a TPM and seeing the unsealed value. An active interposer
- * could fake a TPM, satisfying the encrypted session, and just
- * forward everything to the *real* TPM.
- */
- if (pin) {
- TPM2B_AUTH auth = {};
-
- CLEANUP_ERASE(auth);
-
- r = tpm2_digest_buffer(TPM2_ALG_SHA256, &auth, pin, strlen(pin), /* extend= */ false);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
-
- rc = sym_Esys_TR_SetAuth(c->esys_context, bind_key->esys_handle, &auth);
- if (rc != TSS2_RC_SUCCESS)
- return log_error_errno(
- SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOTRECOVERABLE),
- "Failed to load PIN in TPM: %s",
- sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
- }
-
log_debug("Starting HMAC encryption session.");
/* Start a salted, unbound HMAC session with a well-known key (e.g. primary key) as tpmKey, which
@@ -2111,7 +2111,7 @@ int tpm2_seal(const char *device,
/* we cannot use the bind key before its created */
_cleanup_tpm2_handle_ Tpm2Handle *encryption_session = NULL;
- r = tpm2_make_encryption_session(c, primary, &TPM2_HANDLE_NONE, NULL, &encryption_session);
+ r = tpm2_make_encryption_session(c, primary, &TPM2_HANDLE_NONE, &encryption_session);
if (r < 0)
return r;
@@ -2408,8 +2408,19 @@ int tpm2_unseal(const char *device,
sym_Tss2_RC_Decode(rc));
}
+ /*
+ * if a pin is set for the seal object, use it to bind the session
+ * key to that object. This prevents active bus interposers from
+ * faking a TPM and seeing the unsealed value. An active interposer
+ * could fake a TPM, satisfying the encrypted session, and just
+ * forward everything to the *real* TPM.
+ */
+ r = tpm2_set_auth(c, hmac_key, pin);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+
_cleanup_tpm2_handle_ Tpm2Handle *encryption_session = NULL;
- r = tpm2_make_encryption_session(c, primary, hmac_key, pin, &encryption_session);
+ r = tpm2_make_encryption_session(c, primary, hmac_key, &encryption_session);
if (r < 0)
return r;