From 8d11c92de8644e5f090018933bad25be0f2adebb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Luca Boccassi <bluca@debian.org>
Date: Wed, 8 Feb 2023 00:25:00 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] core: imply DeviceAllow=/dev/tpmrm0 with
 LoadCredentialEncrypted

If the device access policy is restricted, add implicitly access to the TPM
if at least one encrypted credential needs to be loaded.

Fixes https://github.com/systemd/systemd/issues/26042

(cherry picked from commit 398dc7d39b9a877e71529f0e0b139329e4c6992e)

Related: RHEL-16182
---
 man/systemd.exec.xml       |  8 +++++++-
 src/core/unit.c            | 10 ++++++++++
 test/units/testsuite-70.sh |  6 ++++++
 3 files changed, 23 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)

diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
index 29666b102b..4927764b9b 100644
--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
@@ -3113,7 +3113,13 @@ StandardInputData=V2XigLJyZSBubyBzdHJhbmdlcnMgdG8gbG92ZQpZb3Uga25vdyB0aGUgcnVsZX
         authenticated credentials improves security as credentials are not stored in plaintext and only
         authenticated and decrypted into plaintext the moment a service requiring them is started. Moreover,
         credentials may be bound to the local hardware and installations, so that they cannot easily be
-        analyzed offline, or be generated externally.</para>
+        analyzed offline, or be generated externally. When <varname>DevicePolicy=</varname> is set to
+        <literal>closed</literal> or <literal>strict</literal>, or set to <literal>auto</literal> and
+        <varname>DeviceAllow=</varname> is set, or <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname> is set, then this
+        setting adds <filename>/dev/tpmrm0</filename> with <constant>rw</constant> mode to
+        <varname>DeviceAllow=</varname>. See
+        <citerefentry><refentrytitle>systemd.resource-control</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum></citerefentry>
+        for the details about <varname>DevicePolicy=</varname> or <varname>DeviceAllow=</varname>.</para>
 
         <para>The credential files/IPC sockets must be accessible to the service manager, but don't have to
         be directly accessible to the unit's processes: the credential data is read and copied into separate,
diff --git a/src/core/unit.c b/src/core/unit.c
index c9a42ee3d7..f109d16eb3 100644
--- a/src/core/unit.c
+++ b/src/core/unit.c
@@ -4191,6 +4191,16 @@ int unit_patch_contexts(Unit *u) {
                                 if (r < 0)
                                         return r;
                         }
+
+                        /* If there are encrypted credentials we might need to access the TPM. */
+                        ExecLoadCredential *cred;
+                        HASHMAP_FOREACH(cred, ec->load_credentials)
+                                if (cred->encrypted) {
+                                        r = cgroup_add_device_allow(cc, "/dev/tpmrm0", "rw");
+                                        if (r < 0)
+                                                return r;
+                                        break;
+                                }
                 }
         }
 
diff --git a/test/units/testsuite-70.sh b/test/units/testsuite-70.sh
index 3b4d66b686..2c405bccbb 100755
--- a/test/units/testsuite-70.sh
+++ b/test/units/testsuite-70.sh
@@ -185,6 +185,12 @@ else
     echo "/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-pcrphase or PCR sysfs files not found, skipping PCR extension test case"
 fi
 
+# Ensure that sandboxing doesn't stop creds from being accessible
+echo "test" > /tmp/testdata
+systemd-creds encrypt /tmp/testdata /tmp/testdata.encrypted --with-key=tpm2
+systemd-run -p PrivateDevices=yes -p LoadCredentialEncrypted=testdata.encrypted:/tmp/testdata.encrypted --pipe --wait systemd-creds cat testdata.encrypted | cmp - /tmp/testdata
+rm /tmp/testdata
+
 echo OK >/testok
 
 exit 0