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0007-core-allow-omitting-second-part-of-LoadCredentials-a.patch
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0007-core-allow-omitting-second-part-of-LoadCredentials-a.patch
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From 5aa097c851aebc056871485c35e65d8badc8f69f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
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From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
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Date: Thu, 11 Mar 2021 10:02:46 +0100
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Subject: [PATCH] core: allow omitting second part of LoadCredentials= argument
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This allows "LoadCredentials=foo" to be used as shortcut for
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"LoadCredentials=foo:foo", i.e. it's a very short way to inherit a
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credential under its original name from the service manager into a
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service.
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(cherry picked from commit 8a29862e32fc7981fe16fc8dd79ad6863a8dc486)
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Resolves: #1949568
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---
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man/systemd.exec.xml | 30 ++++++++++++++++--------------
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src/core/load-fragment.c | 25 +++++++++++++++++--------
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2 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
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diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
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index 5bb9af3e7d..6ae630f615 100644
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--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
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+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
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@@ -2821,7 +2821,7 @@ StandardInputData=SWNrIHNpdHplIGRhIHVuJyBlc3NlIEtsb3BzLAp1ZmYgZWVtYWwga2xvcHAncy
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<variablelist class='unit-directives'>
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<varlistentry>
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- <term><varname>LoadCredential=</varname><replaceable>ID</replaceable>:<replaceable>PATH</replaceable></term>
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+ <term><varname>LoadCredential=</varname><replaceable>ID</replaceable><optional>:<replaceable>PATH</replaceable></optional></term>
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<listitem><para>Pass a credential to the unit. Credentials are limited-size binary or textual objects
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that may be passed to unit processes. They are primarily used for passing cryptographic keys (both
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@@ -2834,19 +2834,21 @@ StandardInputData=SWNrIHNpdHplIGRhIHVuJyBlc3NlIEtsb3BzLAp1ZmYgZWVtYWwga2xvcHAncy
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environment variable to the unit's processes.</para>
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<para>The <varname>LoadCredential=</varname> setting takes a textual ID to use as name for a
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- credential plus a file system path. The ID must be a short ASCII string suitable as filename in the
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- filesystem, and may be chosen freely by the user. If the specified path is absolute it is opened as
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- regular file and the credential data is read from it. If the absolute path refers to an
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- <constant>AF_UNIX</constant> stream socket in the file system a connection is made to it (only once
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- at unit start-up) and the credential data read from the connection, providing an easy IPC integration
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- point for dynamically providing credentials from other services. If the specified path is not
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- absolute and itself qualifies as valid credential identifier it is understood to refer to a
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- credential that the service manager itself received via the <varname>$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY</varname>
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- environment variable, which may be used to propagate credentials from an invoking environment (e.g. a
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- container manager that invoked the service manager) into a service. The contents of the file/socket
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- may be arbitrary binary or textual data, including newline characters and <constant>NUL</constant>
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- bytes. This option may be used multiple times, each time defining an additional credential to pass to
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- the unit.</para>
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+ credential plus a file system path, separated by a colon. The ID must be a short ASCII string
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+ suitable as filename in the filesystem, and may be chosen freely by the user. If the specified path
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+ is absolute it is opened as regular file and the credential data is read from it. If the absolute
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+ path refers to an <constant>AF_UNIX</constant> stream socket in the file system a connection is made
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+ to it (only once at unit start-up) and the credential data read from the connection, providing an
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+ easy IPC integration point for dynamically providing credentials from other services. If the
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+ specified path is not absolute and itself qualifies as valid credential identifier it is understood
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+ to refer to a credential that the service manager itself received via the
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+ <varname>$CREDENTIALS_DIRECTORY</varname> environment variable, which may be used to propagate
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+ credentials from an invoking environment (e.g. a container manager that invoked the service manager)
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+ into a service. The contents of the file/socket may be arbitrary binary or textual data, including
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+ newline characters and <constant>NUL</constant> bytes. If the file system path is omitted it is
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+ chosen identical to the credential name, i.e. this is a terse way do declare credentials to inherit
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+ from the service manager into a service. This option may be used multiple times, each time defining
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+ an additional credential to pass to the unit.</para>
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<para>The credential files/IPC sockets must be accessible to the service manager, but don't have to
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be directly accessible to the unit's processes: the credential data is read and copied into separate,
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diff --git a/src/core/load-fragment.c b/src/core/load-fragment.c
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index c6fc4fe083..6a998bb801 100644
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--- a/src/core/load-fragment.c
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+++ b/src/core/load-fragment.c
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@@ -4606,14 +4606,23 @@ int config_parse_load_credential(
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log_syntax(unit, LOG_WARNING, filename, line, 0, "Credential name \"%s\" not valid, ignoring.", k);
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return 0;
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}
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- r = unit_full_printf(u, p, &q);
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- if (r < 0) {
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- log_syntax(unit, LOG_WARNING, filename, line, r, "Failed to resolve unit specifiers in \"%s\", ignoring: %m", p);
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- return 0;
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- }
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- if (path_is_absolute(q) ? !path_is_normalized(q) : !credential_name_valid(q)) {
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- log_syntax(unit, LOG_WARNING, filename, line, r, "Credential source \"%s\" not valid, ignoring.", q);
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- return 0;
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+
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+ if (isempty(p)) {
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+ /* If only one field field is specified take it as shortcut for inheriting a credential named
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+ * the same way from our parent */
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+ q = strdup(k);
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+ if (!q)
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+ return log_oom();
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+ } else {
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+ r = unit_full_printf(u, p, &q);
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+ if (r < 0) {
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+ log_syntax(unit, LOG_WARNING, filename, line, r, "Failed to resolve unit specifiers in \"%s\", ignoring: %m", p);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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+ if (path_is_absolute(q) ? !path_is_normalized(q) : !credential_name_valid(q)) {
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+ log_syntax(unit, LOG_WARNING, filename, line, r, "Credential source \"%s\" not valid, ignoring.", q);
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+ return 0;
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+ }
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}
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r = strv_consume_pair(&context->load_credentials, TAKE_PTR(k), TAKE_PTR(q));
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@ -21,7 +21,7 @@
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Name: systemd
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Url: https://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd
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Version: 248
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Release: 6%{?dist}
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Release: 7%{?dist}
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# For a breakdown of the licensing, see README
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License: LGPLv2+ and MIT and GPLv2+
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Summary: System and Service Manager
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@ -83,6 +83,7 @@ Patch0003: 0003-logind-set-RemoveIPC-to-false-by-default.patch
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Patch0004: 0004-Revert-rfkill-fix-the-format-string-to-prevent-compi.patch
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Patch0005: 0005-Revert-rfkill-don-t-compare-values-of-different-sign.patch
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Patch0006: 0006-rfkill-add-some-casts-to-silence-Werror-sign-compare.patch
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Patch0007: 0007-core-allow-omitting-second-part-of-LoadCredentials-a.patch
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# Downstream-only patches (9000–9999)
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# https://github.com/systemd/systemd/pull/17050
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@ -851,6 +852,9 @@ getent passwd systemd-oom &>/dev/null || useradd -r -l -g systemd-oom -d / -s /s
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%files standalone-sysusers -f .file-list-standalone-sysusers
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%changelog
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* Thu Jun 17 2021 systemd maintenance team <systemd-maint@redhat.com> - 248-7
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- core: allow omitting second part of LoadCredentials= argument (#1949568)
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* Tue Jun 15 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com>
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- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
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