import systemd-239-74.el8_8.2

SOURCES/0905-pager-set-LESSSECURE-whenver-we-invoke-a-pager.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From e0488facf5b6e1faa292460548cfe0d7c542918d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
+Date: Mon, 31 Aug 2020 19:37:13 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] pager: set $LESSSECURE whenver we invoke a pager
+
+Some extra safety when invoked via "sudo". With this we address a
+genuine design flaw of sudo, and we shouldn't need to deal with this.
+But it's still a good idea to disable this surface given how exotic it
+is.
+
+Prompted by #5666
+
+(cherry picked from commit 612ebf6c913dd0e4197c44909cb3157f5c51a2f0)
+
+Related: #2175623
+---
+ man/less-variables.xml |  8 ++++++++
+ man/systemctl.xml      |  1 +
+ man/systemd.xml        |  2 ++
+ src/basic/pager.c      | 23 +++++++++++++++++++++--
+ 4 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/less-variables.xml b/man/less-variables.xml
+index a3faa38997..9dad4247da 100644
+--- a/man/less-variables.xml
++++ b/man/less-variables.xml
+@@ -36,5 +36,13 @@
+       the invoking terminal is determined to be UTF-8 compatible).</para></listitem>
+     </varlistentry>
+ 
++    <varlistentry id='lesssecure'>
++      <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE</varname></term>
++
++      <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. Overrides the <varname>$LESSSECURE</varname> environment
++      variable when invoking the pager, which controls the "secure" mode of less (which disables commands
++      such as <literal>|</literal> which allow to easily shell out to external command lines). By default
++      less secure mode is enabled, with this setting it may be disabled.</para></listitem>
++    </varlistentry>
+     </variablelist>
+ </refsect1>
+diff --git a/man/systemctl.xml b/man/systemctl.xml
+index a71e6c7c4f..abc386e6fb 100644
+--- a/man/systemctl.xml
++++ b/man/systemctl.xml
+@@ -2010,6 +2010,7 @@ Jan 12 10:46:45 example.com bluetoothd[8900]: gatt-time-server: Input/output err
+     <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="pager"/>
+     <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="less"/>
+     <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesscharset"/>
++    <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesssecure"/>
+   </refsect1>
+ 
+   <refsect1>
+diff --git a/man/systemd.xml b/man/systemd.xml
+index 17ab59beb5..66ae4d841d 100644
+--- a/man/systemd.xml
++++ b/man/systemd.xml
+@@ -862,6 +862,8 @@
+         </listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+ 
++      <xi:include href="less-variables.xml" xpointer="lesssecure"/>
++
+       <varlistentry>
+         <term><varname>$LISTEN_PID</varname></term>
+         <term><varname>$LISTEN_FDS</varname></term>
+diff --git a/src/basic/pager.c b/src/basic/pager.c
+index f241261119..4efb01c483 100644
+--- a/src/basic/pager.c
++++ b/src/basic/pager.c
+@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
+ #include "copy.h"
++#include "env-util.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+ #include "locale-util.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+@@ -94,8 +95,7 @@ int pager_open(bool no_pager, bool jump_to_end) {
+                 if (setenv("LESS", less_opts, 1) < 0)
+                         _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ 
+-                /* Initialize a good charset for less. This is
+-                 * particularly important if we output UTF-8
++                /* Initialize a good charset for less. This is particularly important if we output UTF-8
+                  * characters. */
+                 less_charset = getenv("SYSTEMD_LESSCHARSET");
+                 if (!less_charset && is_locale_utf8())
+@@ -104,6 +104,25 @@ int pager_open(bool no_pager, bool jump_to_end) {
+                     setenv("LESSCHARSET", less_charset, 1) < 0)
+                         _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ 
++                /* People might invoke us from sudo, don't needlessly allow less to be a way to shell out
++                 * privileged stuff. */
++                r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE");
++                if (r == 0) { /* Remove env var if off */
++                        if (unsetenv("LESSSECURE") < 0) {
++                                log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to uset environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
++                                _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++                        }
++                } else {
++                        /* Set env var otherwise */
++                        if (r < 0)
++                                log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse $SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE, ignoring: %m");
++
++                        if (setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1) < 0) {
++                                log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
++                                _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
++                        }
++                }
++
+                 if (pager) {
+                         execlp(pager, pager, NULL);
+                         execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", pager, NULL);

SOURCES/0906-test-login-always-test-sd_pid_get_owner_uid-moderniz.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,264 @@
+From cd2d72208df18c0894d2e6eea0656603e326f9cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Mon, 12 Oct 2020 18:57:32 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] test-login: always test sd_pid_get_owner_uid(), modernize
+
+A long time some function only worked when in a session, and the test
+didn't execute them when sd_pid_get_session() failed. Let's always call
+them to increase coverage.
+
+While at it, let's test for ==0 not >=0 where we don't expect the function
+to return anything except 0 or error.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 1b5b507cd2d1d7a2b053151abb548475ad9c5c3b)
+
+Related: #2175623
+---
+ src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c | 132 ++++++++++++++-------------
+ 1 file changed, 71 insertions(+), 61 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c
+index ccb1905a46..60ef889ec0 100644
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c
+@@ -8,20 +8,22 @@
+ #include "sd-login.h"
+ 
+ #include "alloc-util.h"
++#include "errno-list.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+ #include "format-util.h"
+ #include "log.h"
+ #include "string-util.h"
+ #include "strv.h"
+-#include "util.h"
++#include "time-util.h"
++#include "user-util.h"
+ 
+ static char* format_uids(char **buf, uid_t* uids, int count) {
+-        int pos = 0, k, inc;
++        int pos = 0, inc;
+         size_t size = (DECIMAL_STR_MAX(uid_t) + 1) * count + 1;
+ 
+         assert_se(*buf = malloc(size));
+ 
+-        for (k = 0; k < count; k++) {
++        for (int k = 0; k < count; k++) {
+                 sprintf(*buf + pos, "%s"UID_FMT"%n", k > 0 ? " " : "", uids[k], &inc);
+                 pos += inc;
+         }
+@@ -32,6 +34,10 @@ static char* format_uids(char **buf, uid_t* uids, int count) {
+         return *buf;
+ }
+ 
++static const char *e(int r) {
++        return r == 0 ? "OK" : errno_to_name(r);
++}
++
+ static void test_login(void) {
+         _cleanup_close_pair_ int pair[2] = { -1, -1 };
+         _cleanup_free_ char *pp = NULL, *qq = NULL,
+@@ -41,65 +47,71 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+                 *seat = NULL, *session = NULL,
+                 *unit = NULL, *user_unit = NULL, *slice = NULL;
+         int r;
+-        uid_t u, u2;
+-        char *t, **seats, **sessions;
++        uid_t u, u2 = UID_INVALID;
++        char *t, **seats = NULL, **sessions = NULL;
+ 
+         r = sd_pid_get_unit(0, &unit);
+-        assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
+-        log_info("sd_pid_get_unit(0, …) → \"%s\"", strna(unit));
++        log_info("sd_pid_get_unit(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(unit));
++        assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+ 
+         r = sd_pid_get_user_unit(0, &user_unit);
+-        assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
+-        log_info("sd_pid_get_user_unit(0, …) → \"%s\"", strna(user_unit));
++        log_info("sd_pid_get_user_unit(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(user_unit));
++        assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+ 
+         r = sd_pid_get_slice(0, &slice);
+-        assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
+-        log_info("sd_pid_get_slice(0, …) → \"%s\"", strna(slice));
++        log_info("sd_pid_get_slice(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(slice));
++        assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
++
++        r = sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, &u2);
++        log_info("sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, …) → %s / "UID_FMT, e(r), u2);
++        assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+ 
+         r = sd_pid_get_session(0, &session);
+-        if (r < 0) {
+-                log_warning_errno(r, "sd_pid_get_session(0, …): %m");
+-                if (r == -ENODATA)
+-                        log_info("Seems we are not running in a session, skipping some tests.");
+-        } else {
+-                log_info("sd_pid_get_session(0, …) → \"%s\"", session);
+-
+-                assert_se(sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, &u2) == 0);
+-                log_info("sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, …) → "UID_FMT, u2);
+-
+-                assert_se(sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, &cgroup) == 0);
+-                log_info("sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, …) → \"%s\"", cgroup);
+-
+-                r = sd_uid_get_display(u2, &display_session);
+-                assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
+-                log_info("sd_uid_get_display("UID_FMT", …) → \"%s\"",
+-                         u2, strnull(display_session));
+-
+-                assert_se(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == 0);
+-                sd_peer_get_session(pair[0], &pp);
+-                sd_peer_get_session(pair[1], &qq);
+-                assert_se(streq_ptr(pp, qq));
+-
+-                r = sd_uid_get_sessions(u2, false, &sessions);
++        log_info("sd_pid_get_session(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(session));
++
++        r = sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, &cgroup);
++        log_info("sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(cgroup));
++        assert_se(r == 0);
++
++        r = sd_uid_get_display(u2, &display_session);
++        log_info("sd_uid_get_display("UID_FMT", …) → %s / \"%s\"", u2, e(r), strnull(display_session));
++        if (u2 == UID_INVALID)
++                assert_se(r == -EINVAL);
++        else
++                assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
++
++        assert_se(socketpair(AF_UNIX, SOCK_STREAM, 0, pair) == 0);
++        sd_peer_get_session(pair[0], &pp);
++        sd_peer_get_session(pair[1], &qq);
++        assert_se(streq_ptr(pp, qq));
++
++        r = sd_uid_get_sessions(u2, false, &sessions);
++        assert_se(t = strv_join(sessions, " "));
++        log_info("sd_uid_get_sessions("UID_FMT", …) → %s \"%s\"", u2, e(r), t);
++        if (u2 == UID_INVALID)
++                assert_se(r == -EINVAL);
++        else {
+                 assert_se(r >= 0);
+                 assert_se(r == (int) strv_length(sessions));
+-                assert_se(t = strv_join(sessions, " "));
+-                strv_free(sessions);
+-                log_info("sd_uid_get_sessions("UID_FMT", …) → [%i] \"%s\"", u2, r, t);
+-                free(t);
++        }
++        sessions = strv_free(sessions);
++        free(t);
+ 
+-                assert_se(r == sd_uid_get_sessions(u2, false, NULL));
++        assert_se(r == sd_uid_get_sessions(u2, false, NULL));
+ 
+-                r = sd_uid_get_seats(u2, false, &seats);
++        r = sd_uid_get_seats(u2, false, &seats);
++        assert_se(t = strv_join(seats, " "));
++        log_info("sd_uid_get_seats("UID_FMT", …) → %s \"%s\"", u2, e(r), t);
++        if (u2 == UID_INVALID)
++                assert_se(r == -EINVAL);
++        else {
+                 assert_se(r >= 0);
+                 assert_se(r == (int) strv_length(seats));
+-                assert_se(t = strv_join(seats, " "));
+-                strv_free(seats);
+-                log_info("sd_uid_get_seats("UID_FMT", …) → [%i] \"%s\"", u2, r, t);
+-                free(t);
+-
+-                assert_se(r == sd_uid_get_seats(u2, false, NULL));
+         }
++        seats = strv_free(seats);
++        free(t);
++
++        assert_se(r == sd_uid_get_seats(u2, false, NULL));
+ 
+         if (session) {
+                 r = sd_session_is_active(session);
+@@ -111,7 +123,7 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+                 log_info("sd_session_is_remote(\"%s\") → %s", session, yes_no(r));
+ 
+                 r = sd_session_get_state(session, &state);
+-                assert_se(r >= 0);
++                assert_se(r == 0);
+                 log_info("sd_session_get_state(\"%s\") → \"%s\"", session, state);
+ 
+                 assert_se(sd_session_get_uid(session, &u) >= 0);
+@@ -125,16 +137,16 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+                 log_info("sd_session_get_class(\"%s\") → \"%s\"", session, class);
+ 
+                 r = sd_session_get_display(session, &display);
+-                assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
++                assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+                 log_info("sd_session_get_display(\"%s\") → \"%s\"", session, strna(display));
+ 
+                 r = sd_session_get_remote_user(session, &remote_user);
+-                assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
++                assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+                 log_info("sd_session_get_remote_user(\"%s\") → \"%s\"",
+                          session, strna(remote_user));
+ 
+                 r = sd_session_get_remote_host(session, &remote_host);
+-                assert_se(r >= 0 || r == -ENODATA);
++                assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+                 log_info("sd_session_get_remote_host(\"%s\") → \"%s\"",
+                          session, strna(remote_host));
+ 
+@@ -160,7 +172,7 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+                         assert_se(r == -ENODATA);
+                 }
+ 
+-                assert_se(sd_uid_get_state(u, &state2) >= 0);
++                assert_se(sd_uid_get_state(u, &state2) == 0);
+                 log_info("sd_uid_get_state("UID_FMT", …) → %s", u, state2);
+         }
+ 
+@@ -172,11 +184,11 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+                 assert_se(sd_uid_is_on_seat(u, 0, seat) > 0);
+ 
+                 r = sd_seat_get_active(seat, &session2, &u2);
+-                assert_se(r >= 0);
++                assert_se(r == 0);
+                 log_info("sd_seat_get_active(\"%s\", …) → \"%s\", "UID_FMT, seat, session2, u2);
+ 
+                 r = sd_uid_is_on_seat(u, 1, seat);
+-                assert_se(r >= 0);
++                assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, 1));
+                 assert_se(!!r == streq(session, session2));
+ 
+                 r = sd_seat_get_sessions(seat, &sessions, &uids, &n);
+@@ -184,8 +196,8 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+                 assert_se(r == (int) strv_length(sessions));
+                 assert_se(t = strv_join(sessions, " "));
+                 strv_free(sessions);
+-                log_info("sd_seat_get_sessions(\"%s\", …) → %i, \"%s\", [%i] {%s}",
+-                         seat, r, t, n, format_uids(&buf, uids, n));
++                log_info("sd_seat_get_sessions(\"%s\", …) → %s, \"%s\", [%u] {%s}",
++                         seat, e(r), t, n, format_uids(&buf, uids, n));
+                 free(t);
+ 
+                 assert_se(sd_seat_get_sessions(seat, NULL, NULL, NULL) == r);
+@@ -203,7 +215,7 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+ 
+         r = sd_seat_get_active(NULL, &t, NULL);
+         assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENODATA));
+-        log_info("sd_seat_get_active(NULL, …) (active session on current seat) → %s", strnull(t));
++        log_info("sd_seat_get_active(NULL, …) (active session on current seat) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(t));
+         free(t);
+ 
+         r = sd_get_sessions(&sessions);
+@@ -243,13 +255,11 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+ 
+ static void test_monitor(void) {
+         sd_login_monitor *m = NULL;
+-        unsigned n;
+         int r;
+ 
+-        r = sd_login_monitor_new("session", &m);
+-        assert_se(r >= 0);
++        assert_se(sd_login_monitor_new("session", &m) == 0);
+ 
+-        for (n = 0; n < 5; n++) {
++        for (unsigned n = 0; n < 5; n++) {
+                 struct pollfd pollfd = {};
+                 usec_t timeout, nw;
+ 

SOURCES/0907-pager-make-pager-secure-when-under-euid-is-changed-o.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,198 @@
+From 9c8a6018ed4a4da6efb1fc6958e70f9324bb5b1e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
+Date: Wed, 7 Oct 2020 11:15:05 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] pager: make pager secure when under euid is changed or
+ explicitly requested
+
+The variable is renamed to SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE (because it's not just about
+less now), and we automatically enable secure mode in certain cases, but not
+otherwise.
+
+This approach is more nuanced, but should provide a better experience for
+users:
+
+- Previusly we would set LESSSECURE=1 and trust the pager to make use of
+  it. But this has an effect only on less. We need to not start pagers which
+  are insecure when in secure mode. In particular more is like that and is a
+  very popular pager.
+
+- We don't enable secure mode always, which means that those other pagers can
+  reasonably used.
+
+- We do the right thing by default, but the user has ultimate control by
+  setting SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE.
+
+Fixes #5666.
+
+v2:
+- also check $PKEXEC_UID
+
+v3:
+- use 'sd_pid_get_owner_uid() != geteuid()' as the condition
+
+(cherry picked from commit 0a42426d797406b4b01a0d9c13bb759c2629d108)
+
+Resolves: #2175623
+---
+ man/less-variables.xml | 28 ++++++++++++++---
+ meson.build            |  3 +-
+ src/basic/pager.c      | 69 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------------
+ 3 files changed, 69 insertions(+), 31 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/man/less-variables.xml b/man/less-variables.xml
+index 9dad4247da..5f3a53c8dd 100644
+--- a/man/less-variables.xml
++++ b/man/less-variables.xml
+@@ -37,12 +37,30 @@
+     </varlistentry>
+ 
+     <varlistentry id='lesssecure'>
+-      <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE</varname></term>
++      <term><varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname></term>
+ 
+-      <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. Overrides the <varname>$LESSSECURE</varname> environment
+-      variable when invoking the pager, which controls the "secure" mode of less (which disables commands
+-      such as <literal>|</literal> which allow to easily shell out to external command lines). By default
+-      less secure mode is enabled, with this setting it may be disabled.</para></listitem>
++      <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. When true, the "secure" mode of the pager is enabled; if
++      false, disabled. If <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname> is not set at all, secure mode is enabled
++      if the effective UID is not the same as the owner of the login session, see <citerefentry
++      project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>geteuid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum></citerefentry> and
++      <citerefentry><refentrytitle>sd_pid_get_owner_uid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>3</manvolnum></citerefentry>.
++      In secure mode, <option>LESSSECURE=1</option> will be set when invoking the pager, and the pager shall
++      disable commands that open or create new files or start new subprocesses. When
++      <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname> is not set at all, pagers which are not known to implement
++      secure mode will not be used. (Currently only
++      <citerefentry><refentrytitle>less</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry> implements
++      secure mode.)</para>
++
++      <para>Note: when commands are invoked with elevated privileges, for example under <citerefentry
++      project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>sudo</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum></citerefentry> or
++      <citerefentry
++      project='die-net'><refentrytitle>pkexec</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry>, care
++      must be taken to ensure that unintended interactive features are not enabled. "Secure" mode for the
++      pager may be enabled automatically as describe above. Setting <varname>SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE=0</varname>
++      or not removing it from the inherited environment allows the user to invoke arbitrary commands. Note
++      that if the <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGER</varname> or <varname>$PAGER</varname> variables are to be
++      honoured, <varname>$SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE</varname> must be set too. It might be reasonable to completly
++      disable the pager using <option>--no-pager</option> instead.</para></listitem>
+     </varlistentry>
+     </variablelist>
+ </refsect1>
+diff --git a/meson.build b/meson.build
+index 673800a1a7..d986dd24ac 100644
+--- a/meson.build
++++ b/meson.build
+@@ -1467,7 +1467,8 @@ test_dlopen = executable(
+         'test-dlopen',
+         test_dlopen_c,
+         include_directories : includes,
+-        link_with : [libbasic],
++        link_with : [libsystemd_static,
++                     libbasic],
+         dependencies : [libdl])
+ 
+ foreach tuple : [['myhostname', 'ENABLE_NSS_MYHOSTNAME'],
+diff --git a/src/basic/pager.c b/src/basic/pager.c
+index 4efb01c483..c7e101235d 100644
+--- a/src/basic/pager.c
++++ b/src/basic/pager.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,8 @@
+ #include <sys/prctl.h>
+ #include <unistd.h>
+ 
++#include "sd-login.h"
++
+ #include "copy.h"
+ #include "env-util.h"
+ #include "fd-util.h"
+@@ -79,7 +81,7 @@ int pager_open(bool no_pager, bool jump_to_end) {
+         if (r < 0)
+                 return r;
+         if (r == 0) {
+-                const char* less_opts, *less_charset;
++                const char* less_opts, *less_charset, *exe;
+ 
+                 /* In the child start the pager */
+ 
+@@ -105,39 +107,56 @@ int pager_open(bool no_pager, bool jump_to_end) {
+                         _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ 
+                 /* People might invoke us from sudo, don't needlessly allow less to be a way to shell out
+-                 * privileged stuff. */
+-                r = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE");
+-                if (r == 0) { /* Remove env var if off */
+-                        if (unsetenv("LESSSECURE") < 0) {
+-                                log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to uset environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
+-                                _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+-                        }
+-                } else {
+-                        /* Set env var otherwise */
++                 * privileged stuff. If the user set $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE, trust their configuration of the
++                 * pager. If they didn't, use secure mode when under euid is changed. If $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE
++                 * wasn't explicitly set, and we autodetect the need for secure mode, only use the pager we
++                 * know to be good. */
++                int use_secure_mode = getenv_bool("SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE");
++                bool trust_pager = use_secure_mode >= 0;
++                if (use_secure_mode == -ENXIO) {
++                        uid_t uid;
++
++                        r = sd_pid_get_owner_uid(0, &uid);
+                         if (r < 0)
+-                                log_warning_errno(r, "Unable to parse $SYSTEMD_LESSSECURE, ignoring: %m");
++                                log_debug_errno(r, "sd_pid_get_owner_uid() failed, enabling pager secure mode: %m");
++
++                        use_secure_mode = r < 0 || uid != geteuid();
++
++                } else if (use_secure_mode < 0) {
++                        log_warning_errno(use_secure_mode, "Unable to parse $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE, assuming true: %m");
++                        use_secure_mode = true;
++                }
+ 
+-                        if (setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1) < 0) {
+-                                log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to set environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
+-                                _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+-                        }
++                /* We generally always set variables used by less, even if we end up using a different pager.
++                 * They shouldn't hurt in any case, and ideally other pagers would look at them too. */
++                if (use_secure_mode)
++                        r = setenv("LESSSECURE", "1", 1);
++                else
++                        r = unsetenv("LESSSECURE");
++                if (r < 0) {
++                        log_error_errno(errno, "Failed to adjust environment variable LESSSECURE: %m");
++                        _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+                 }
+ 
+-                if (pager) {
++                if (trust_pager && pager) { /* The pager config might be set globally, and we cannot
++                                                  * know if the user adjusted it to be appropriate for the
++                                                  * secure mode. Thus, start the pager specified through
++                                                  * envvars only when $SYSTEMD_PAGERSECURE was explicitly set
++                                                  * as well. */
+                         execlp(pager, pager, NULL);
+                         execl("/bin/sh", "sh", "-c", pager, NULL);
+                 }
+ 
+-                /* Debian's alternatives command for pagers is
+-                 * called 'pager'. Note that we do not call
+-                 * sensible-pagers here, since that is just a
+-                 * shell script that implements a logic that
+-                 * is similar to this one anyway, but is
+-                 * Debian-specific. */
+-                execlp("pager", "pager", NULL);
++                /* Debian's alternatives command for pagers is called 'pager'. Note that we do not call
++                 * sensible-pagers here, since that is just a shell script that implements a logic that is
++                 * similar to this one anyway, but is Debian-specific. */
++                FOREACH_STRING(exe, "pager", "less", "more") {
++                        /* Only less implements secure mode right now. */
++                        if (use_secure_mode && !streq(exe, "less"))
++                                continue;
+ 
+-                execlp("less", "less", NULL);
+-                execlp("more", "more", NULL);
++                        execlp(exe, exe, NULL);
++                }
+ 
+                 pager_fallback();
+                 /* not reached */

SOURCES/0908-test-ignore-ENOMEDIUM-error-from-sd_pid_get_cgroup.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
+From 1d8931bb5d65e9f77b470835786a97f814bd93ea Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@canonical.com>
+Date: Fri, 23 Oct 2020 15:50:28 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH] test: ignore ENOMEDIUM error from sd_pid_get_cgroup()
+
+Ubuntu builds on the Launchpad infrastructure run inside a chroot that does
+not have the sysfs cgroup dirs mounted, so this call will return ENOMEDIUM
+from cg_unified_cached() during the build-time testing, for example when
+building the package in a Launchpad PPA.
+
+(cherry picked from commit 352ab9d74049b4ac694fdba1a6e67339f12ded93)
+
+Related: #2175623
+---
+ src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c b/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c
+index 60ef889ec0..d24a04ccc8 100644
+--- a/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c
++++ b/src/libsystemd/sd-login/test-login.c
+@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ static void test_login(void) {
+ 
+         r = sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, &cgroup);
+         log_info("sd_pid_get_cgroup(0, …) → %s / \"%s\"", e(r), strnull(cgroup));
+-        assert_se(r == 0);
++        assert_se(IN_SET(r, 0, -ENOMEDIUM));
+ 
+         r = sd_uid_get_display(u2, &display_session);
+         log_info("sd_uid_get_display("UID_FMT", …) → %s / \"%s\"", u2, e(r), strnull(display_session));

SOURCES/0909-pstore-fix-crash-and-forward-dummy-arguments-instead.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 5bb3dd9c96b55a4a9da23ed96b5a2681d82dc500 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Michal Sekletar <msekleta@redhat.com>
+Date: Wed, 26 Apr 2023 20:07:10 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] pstore: fix crash and forward dummy arguments instead of NULL
+
+[msekleta: in our version of systemd "const char path*" argument of
+path_join() can't be NULL. Here we don't really want any subdirs paths
+passed into move_file(), but we can't just pass NULL pointers because
+they will be forwarded to path_join(). Hence, let's just pass "/"
+instead.]
+
+rhel-only
+
+Related: #2190153
+---
+ src/pstore/pstore.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/pstore/pstore.c b/src/pstore/pstore.c
+index 9f61e8f7f8..5335c9f92d 100644
+--- a/src/pstore/pstore.c
++++ b/src/pstore/pstore.c
+@@ -366,7 +366,7 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
+ 
+         /* Move left over files out of pstore */
+         for (size_t n = 0; n < list.n_entries; n++)
+-                (void) move_file(&list.entries[n], NULL, NULL);
++                (void) move_file(&list.entries[n], "/", "/");
+ 
+         return 0;
+ }

SOURCES/0910-ci-workflow-for-gathering-metadata-for-source-git-au.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,51 @@
+From d78272e6c2dddcbca891cb5d561f23ff766486a8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Macku <jamacku@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2023 15:13:08 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ci: workflow for gathering metadata for source-git automation
+
+Workflow gathers metadata like pull request numbers and information about commits.
+This metadata is used for commit validation and other actions.
+This workflow also triggers for rest of the source-git automation workflows.
+
+rhel-only
+
+Related: #2190153
+---
+ .github/workflows/gather-metadata.yml | 28 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 28 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 .github/workflows/gather-metadata.yml
+
+diff --git a/.github/workflows/gather-metadata.yml b/.github/workflows/gather-metadata.yml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..f432f41811
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/.github/workflows/gather-metadata.yml
+@@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
++name: Gather Pull Request Metadata
++on:
++  pull_request:
++    types: [ opened, reopened, synchronize ]
++    branches:
++      - main
++      - rhel-8.*.0
++
++permissions:
++  contents: read
++
++jobs:
++  gather-metadata:
++    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
++
++    steps:
++      - name: Repository checkout
++        uses: actions/checkout@v3
++
++      - id: Metadata
++        name: Gather Pull Request Metadata
++        uses: redhat-plumbers-in-action/gather-pull-request-metadata@v1
++
++      - name: Upload artifact with gathered metadata
++        uses: actions/upload-artifact@v3
++        with:
++          name: pr-metadata
++          path: ${{ steps.Metadata.outputs.metadata-file }}

SOURCES/0911-ci-first-part-of-the-source-git-automation-commit-li.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,103 @@
+From e08bdd25344ed475f48d22a1c303421e19489427 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Macku <jamacku@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 24 Apr 2023 15:15:00 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] ci: first part of the source-git automation - commit linter
+
+Add a GitHub Workflow that is triggered on `workflow_run` events.
+It uses metadata provided by `redhat-plumbers-in-action/gather-pull-request-metadata`
+GitHub Action to get the PR number and the commit metadata.
+The commit metadata is then used to check if the commit message contains
+all required information (tracker and upstream reference). GitHub Action
+responsible for commit verification `redhat-plumbers-in-action/advanced-commit-linter`
+is configured via the `advanced-commit-linter.yml` file.
+
+rhel-only
+
+Related: #2190153
+---
+ .github/advanced-commit-linter.yml          | 23 +++++++++++
+ .github/workflows/source-git-automation.yml | 45 +++++++++++++++++++++
+ 2 files changed, 68 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 .github/advanced-commit-linter.yml
+ create mode 100644 .github/workflows/source-git-automation.yml
+
+diff --git a/.github/advanced-commit-linter.yml b/.github/advanced-commit-linter.yml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..491836abbb
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/.github/advanced-commit-linter.yml
+@@ -0,0 +1,23 @@
++policy:
++  cherry-pick:
++    upstream:
++      - github: systemd/systemd
++      - github: systemd/systemd-stable
++    exception:
++      note:
++        - rhel-only
++  tracker:
++    - keyword:
++        - 'Resolves: #?'
++        - 'Related: #?'
++        - 'Reverts: #?'
++      issue-format:
++        - '\d+$'
++      url: 'https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id='
++    - keyword:
++        - 'Resolves: '
++        - 'Related: '
++        - 'Reverts: '
++      issue-format:
++        - 'RHEL-\d+$'
++      url: 'https://issues.redhat.com/browse/'
+diff --git a/.github/workflows/source-git-automation.yml b/.github/workflows/source-git-automation.yml
+new file mode 100644
+index 0000000000..140f21b116
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/.github/workflows/source-git-automation.yml
+@@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
++name: Source git Automation
++on:
++  workflow_run:
++    workflows: [ Gather Pull Request Metadata ]
++    types:
++      - completed
++
++permissions:
++  contents: read
++
++jobs:
++  download-metadata:
++    if: >
++      github.event.workflow_run.event == 'pull_request' &&
++      github.event.workflow_run.conclusion == 'success'
++    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
++
++    outputs:
++      pr-metadata: ${{ steps.Artifact.outputs.pr-metadata-json }}
++
++    steps:
++      - id: Artifact
++        name: Download Artifact
++        uses: redhat-plumbers-in-action/download-artifact@v1
++        with:
++          name: pr-metadata
++
++  commit-linter:
++    needs: [ download-metadata ]
++    runs-on: ubuntu-latest
++
++    outputs:
++      validated-pr-metadata: ${{ steps.commit-linter.outputs.validated-pr-metadata }}
++
++    permissions:
++      statuses: write
++      pull-requests: write
++
++    steps:
++      - id: commit-linter
++        name: Lint Commits
++        uses: redhat-plumbers-in-action/advanced-commit-linter@v1
++        with:
++          pr-metadata: ${{ needs.download-metadata.outputs.pr-metadata }}
++          token: ${{ secrets.GITHUB_TOKEN }}

SPECS/systemd.spec

@@ -13,7 +13,7 @@
 Name:           systemd
 Url:            http://www.freedesktop.org/wiki/Software/systemd
 Version:        239
-Release:        74%{?dist}
+Release:        74%{?dist}.2
 # For a breakdown of the licensing, see README
 License:        LGPLv2+ and MIT and GPLv2+
 Summary:        System and Service Manager
@@ -954,6 +954,13 @@ Patch0901: 0901-man-document-the-new-_LINE_BREAK-type.patch
 Patch0902: 0902-journald-server-always-create-state-file-in-signal-h.patch
 Patch0903: 0903-journald-server-move-relinquish-code-into-function.patch
 Patch0904: 0904-journald-server-always-touch-state-file-in-signal-ha.patch
+Patch0905: 0905-pager-set-LESSSECURE-whenver-we-invoke-a-pager.patch
+Patch0906: 0906-test-login-always-test-sd_pid_get_owner_uid-moderniz.patch
+Patch0907: 0907-pager-make-pager-secure-when-under-euid-is-changed-o.patch
+Patch0908: 0908-test-ignore-ENOMEDIUM-error-from-sd_pid_get_cgroup.patch
+Patch0909: 0909-pstore-fix-crash-and-forward-dummy-arguments-instead.patch
+Patch0910: 0910-ci-workflow-for-gathering-metadata-for-source-git-au.patch
+Patch0911: 0911-ci-first-part-of-the-source-git-automation-commit-li.patch
 
 %ifarch %{ix86} x86_64 aarch64
 %global have_gnu_efi 1
@@ -1584,6 +1591,17 @@ fi
 %files tests -f .file-list-tests
 
 %changelog
+* Thu May 18 2023 systemd maintenance team <systemd-maint@redhat.com> - 239-74.2
+- pstore: fix crash and forward dummy arguments instead of NULL (#2190153)
+- ci: workflow for gathering metadata for source-git automation (#2190153)
+- ci: first part of the source-git automation - commit linter (#2190153)
+
+* Tue Apr 18 2023 systemd maintenance team <systemd-maint@redhat.com> - 239-74.1
+- pager: set $LESSSECURE whenver we invoke a pager (#2175623)
+- test-login: always test sd_pid_get_owner_uid(), modernize (#2175623)
+- pager: make pager secure when under euid is changed or explicitly requested (#2175623)
+- test: ignore ENOMEDIUM error from sd_pid_get_cgroup() (#2175623)
+
 * Tue Mar 14 2023 systemd maintenance team <systemd-maint@redhat.com> - 239-74
 - journald-server: always create state file in signal handler (#2174645)
 - journald-server: move relinquish code into function (#2174645)