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Add patches to fix build on arm64

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This commit is contained in:
Zbigniew Jędrzejewski-Szmek 2019-04-03 16:45:51 +02:00
parent 2379dd06da
commit 5fb495cb03
3 changed files with 323 additions and 0 deletions
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38
0010-test-seccomp-fix-compilation-on-arm64.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,38 @@
From dff6c6295b1cb09d6da8ab054e66059e43247ab1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 12:36:03 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 10/11] test-seccomp: fix compilation on arm64
It has no open().
---
src/test/test-seccomp.c | 8 +++++++-
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/test/test-seccomp.c b/src/test/test-seccomp.c
index 8efbecbeff..9b7307cf39 100644
--- a/src/test/test-seccomp.c
+++ b/src/test/test-seccomp.c
@@ -7,6 +7,7 @@
#include <sys/mman.h>
#include <sys/personality.h>
#include <sys/shm.h>
+#include <sys/syscall.h>
#include <sys/types.h>
#include <unistd.h>
@@ -763,9 +764,14 @@ static void test_lock_personality(void) {
static int real_open(const char *path, int flags, mode_t mode) {
/* glibc internally calls openat() when open() is requested. Let's hence define our own wrapper for
- * testing purposes that calls the real syscall. */
+ * testing purposes that calls the real syscall, on architectures where SYS_open is defined. On
+ * other architectures, let's just fall back to the glibc call. */
+#ifdef SYS_open
return (int) syscall(SYS_open, path, flags, mode);
+#else
+ return open(path, flags, mode);
+#endif
}
static void test_restrict_suid_sgid(void) {

283
0011-seccomp-rework-how-the-S-UG-ID-filter-is-installed.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,283 @@
From da4dc9a6748797e804b6bc92ad513d509abf581c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Zbigniew=20J=C4=99drzejewski-Szmek?= <zbyszek@in.waw.pl>
Date: Wed, 3 Apr 2019 13:11:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 11/11] seccomp: rework how the S[UG]ID filter is installed
If we know that a syscall is undefined on the given architecture, don't
even try to add it.
Try to install the filter even if some syscalls fail. Also use a helper
function to make the whole a bit less magic.
This allows the S[UG]ID test to pass on arm64.
---
src/shared/seccomp-util.c | 244 +++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
1 file changed, 138 insertions(+), 106 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
index 7a179998bd..65d800c914 100644
--- a/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/seccomp-util.c
@@ -1803,9 +1803,139 @@ int seccomp_protect_hostname(void) {
return 0;
}
+static int seccomp_restrict_sxid(scmp_filter_ctx seccomp, mode_t m) {
+ /* Checks the mode_t parameter of the following system calls:
+ *
+ * → chmod() + fchmod() + fchmodat()
+ * → open() + creat() + openat()
+ * → mkdir() + mkdirat()
+ * → mknod() + mknodat()
+ *
+ * Returns error if *everything* failed, and 0 otherwise.
+ */
+ int r = 0;
+ bool any = false;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(chmod),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for chmod: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(fchmod),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for fchmod: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(fchmodat),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for fchmodat: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(mkdir),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mkdir: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(mkdirat),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mkdirat: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(mknod),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mknod: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(mknodat),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for mknodat: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+
+#if SCMP_SYS(open) > 0
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(open),
+ 2,
+ SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_CREAT, O_CREAT),
+ SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for open: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+#endif
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(openat),
+ 2,
+ SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_CREAT, O_CREAT),
+ SCMP_A3(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for openat: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+
+ r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
+ seccomp,
+ SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
+ SCMP_SYS(creat),
+ 1,
+ SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add filter for creat: %m");
+ else
+ any = true;
+
+ return any ? 0 : r;
+}
+
int seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(void) {
uint32_t arch;
- int r;
+ int r, k;
SECCOMP_FOREACH_LOCAL_ARCH(arch) {
_cleanup_(seccomp_releasep) scmp_filter_ctx seccomp = NULL;
@@ -1814,114 +1944,16 @@ int seccomp_restrict_suid_sgid(void) {
if (r < 0)
return r;
- /* Checks the mode_t parameter of the following system calls:
- *
- * → chmod() + fchmod() + fchmodat()
- * → open() + creat() + openat()
- * → mkdir() + mkdirat()
- * → mknod() + mknodat()
- */
+ r = seccomp_restrict_sxid(seccomp, S_ISUID);
+ if (r < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add suid rule for architecture %s, ignoring: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
- for (unsigned bit = 0; bit < 2; bit ++) {
- /* Block S_ISUID in the first iteration, S_ISGID in the second */
- mode_t m = bit == 0 ? S_ISUID : S_ISGID;
+ k = seccomp_restrict_sxid(seccomp, S_ISGID);
+ if (k < 0)
+ log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add sgid rule for architecture %s, ignoring: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(chmod),
- 1,
- SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
-
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(fchmod),
- 1,
- SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
-
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(fchmodat),
- 1,
- SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
-
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(mkdir),
- 1,
- SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
-
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(mkdirat),
- 1,
- SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
-
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(mknod),
- 1,
- SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
-
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(mknodat),
- 1,
- SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
-
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(open),
- 2,
- SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_CREAT, O_CREAT),
- SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
-
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(openat),
- 2,
- SCMP_A2(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, O_CREAT, O_CREAT),
- SCMP_A3(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
-
- r = seccomp_rule_add_exact(
- seccomp,
- SCMP_ACT_ERRNO(EPERM),
- SCMP_SYS(creat),
- 1,
- SCMP_A1(SCMP_CMP_MASKED_EQ, m, m));
- if (r < 0)
- break;
- }
- if (r < 0) {
- log_debug_errno(r, "Failed to add suid/sgid rule for architecture %s, skipping: %m", seccomp_arch_to_string(arch));
+ if (r < 0 && k < 0)
continue;
- }
r = seccomp_load(seccomp);
if (IN_SET(r, -EPERM, -EACCES))

2
systemd.spec
View File

@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ GIT_DIR=../../src/systemd/.git git diffab -M v233..master@{2017-06-15} -- hwdb/[
%endif %endif
Patch0002: 0002-Revert-units-set-NoNewPrivileges-for-all-long-runnin.patch Patch0002: 0002-Revert-units-set-NoNewPrivileges-for-all-long-runnin.patch
Patch0010: 0010-test-seccomp-fix-compilation-on-arm64.patch
Patch0011: 0011-seccomp-rework-how-the-S-UG-ID-filter-is-installed.patch
Patch0998: 0998-resolved-create-etc-resolv.conf-symlink-at-runtime.patch Patch0998: 0998-resolved-create-etc-resolv.conf-symlink-at-runtime.patch