systemd/0327-man-document-the-new-RestrictSUIDSGID-setting.patch

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From 797ebaa8240aefc39de3d1713468b221c83ed3f5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Lennart Poettering <lennart@poettering.net>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2019 19:45:32 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] man: document the new RestrictSUIDSGID= setting
(cherry picked from commit 7445db6eb70e8d5989f481d0c5a08ace7047ae5b)
Related: #1687512
---
doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md | 1 +
man/systemd.exec.xml | 41 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------
2 files changed, 30 insertions(+), 12 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md b/doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md
index 0ea444b133..c2b5c0dcce 100644
--- a/doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md
+++ b/doc/TRANSIENT-SETTINGS.md
@@ -149,6 +149,7 @@ All execution-related settings are available for transient units.
✓ MemoryDenyWriteExecute=
✓ RestrictNamespaces=
✓ RestrictRealtime=
+✓ RestrictSUIDSGID=
✓ RestrictAddressFamilies=
✓ LockPersonality=
✓ LimitCPU=
diff --git a/man/systemd.exec.xml b/man/systemd.exec.xml
index 87fb8b34f4..45ed1864f8 100644
--- a/man/systemd.exec.xml
+++ b/man/systemd.exec.xml
@@ -348,18 +348,19 @@ CapabilityBoundingSet=~CAP_B CAP_C</programlisting>
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>NoNewPrivileges=</varname></term>
- <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, ensures that the service process and all its children can
- never gain new privileges through <function>execve()</function> (e.g. via setuid or setgid bits, or filesystem
- capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that a process and its children can never
- elevate privileges again. Defaults to false, but certain settings override this and ignore the value of this
- setting. This is the case when <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>,
- <varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>, <varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>,
- <varname>RestrictNamespaces=</varname>, <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>,
- <varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>, <varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>,
- <varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>, <varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname>, or
- <varname>LockPersonality=</varname> are specified. Note that even if this setting is overridden by them,
- <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of this setting. Also see
- <ulink url="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">No New Privileges
+ <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If true, ensures that the service process and all its
+ children can never gain new privileges through <function>execve()</function> (e.g. via setuid or
+ setgid bits, or filesystem capabilities). This is the simplest and most effective way to ensure that
+ a process and its children can never elevate privileges again. Defaults to false, but certain
+ settings override this and ignore the value of this setting. This is the case when
+ <varname>SystemCallFilter=</varname>, <varname>SystemCallArchitectures=</varname>,
+ <varname>RestrictAddressFamilies=</varname>, <varname>RestrictNamespaces=</varname>,
+ <varname>PrivateDevices=</varname>, <varname>ProtectKernelTunables=</varname>,
+ <varname>ProtectKernelModules=</varname>, <varname>MemoryDenyWriteExecute=</varname>,
+ <varname>RestrictRealtime=</varname>, <varname>RestrictSUIDSGID=</varname> or
+ <varname>LockPersonality=</varname> are specified. Note that even if this setting is overridden by
+ them, <command>systemctl show</command> shows the original value of this setting. Also see <ulink
+ url="https://www.kernel.org/doc/html/latest/userspace-api/no_new_privs.html">No New Privileges
Flag</ulink>. </para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
@@ -1274,6 +1275,22 @@ RestrictNamespaces=~cgroup net</programlisting>
that actually require them. Defaults to off.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><varname>RestrictSUIDSGID=</varname></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>Takes a boolean argument. If set, any attempts to set the set-user-ID (SUID) or
+ set-group-ID (SGID) bits on files or directories will be denied (for details on these bits see
+ <citerefentry
+ project='man-pages'><refentrytitle>inode</refentrytitle><manvolnum>7</manvolnum></citerefentry>). If
+ running in user mode, or in system mode, but without the <constant>CAP_SYS_ADMIN</constant>
+ capability (e.g. setting <varname>User=</varname>), <varname>NoNewPrivileges=yes</varname> is
+ implied. As the SUID/SGID bits are mechanisms to elevate privileges, and allows users to acquire the
+ identity of other users, it is recommended to restrict creation of SUID/SGID files to the few
+ programs that actually require them. Note that this restricts marking of any type of file system
+ object with these bits, including both regular files and directories (where the SGID is a different
+ meaning than for files, see documentation). Defaults to off.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><varname>RemoveIPC=</varname></term>