rpms/systemd
7
0
Fork 0
Code Issues Pull Requests Releases Activity
a9
systemd/SOURCES/0626-cryptenroll-allow-specifying-handle-index-of-key-to-.patch

277 lines
15 KiB
Diff
Raw Permalink Normal View History

import CS systemd-252-32.el9_3
2024-04-30 11:42:21 +00:00
From b76a221b28bb19f8e0bd80e20aeac7b56e2281ee Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Dan Streetman <ddstreet@ieee.org>
Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 15:49:16 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] cryptenroll: allow specifying handle index of key to use for
sealing
This defaults to the SRK index.
(cherry picked from commit 382bfd90c316dfdd39066e42ead12e47522738fe)
Related: RHEL-16182
---
man/systemd-cryptenroll.xml | 20 ++++++++++++
src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c | 2 ++
src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h | 4 +--
src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c | 14 ++++++++-
src/partition/repart.c | 1 +
src/shared/creds-util.c | 1 +
src/shared/tpm2-util.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++-------
src/shared/tpm2-util.h | 2 +-
8 files changed, 79 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/man/systemd-cryptenroll.xml b/man/systemd-cryptenroll.xml
index 28e315bd1c..979e57d126 100644
--- a/man/systemd-cryptenroll.xml
+++ b/man/systemd-cryptenroll.xml
@@ -375,6 +375,26 @@
enrollment to.</para></listitem>
</varlistentry>
+ <varlistentry>
+ <term><option>--tpm2-seal-key-handle=</option><replaceable>HANDLE</replaceable></term>
+
+ <listitem><para>Configures which parent key to use for sealing, using the TPM handle (index) of the
+ key. This is used to "seal" (encrypt) a secret and must be used later to "unseal" (decrypt) the
+ secret. Expects a hexadecimal 32bit integer, optionally prefixed with
+ <literal>0x</literal>. Allowable values are any handle index in the persistent
+ (<literal>0x81000000</literal>-<literal>0x81ffffff</literal>) or transient
+ (<literal>0x80000000</literal>-<literal>0x80ffffff</literal>) ranges. Since transient handles are
+ lost after a TPM reset, and may be flushed during TPM context switching, they should not be used
+ except for very specific use cases, e.g. testing.</para>
+
+ <para>The default is the Storage Root Key (SRK) handle index <literal>0x81000001</literal>. A value
+ of 0 will use the default. For the SRK handle, a new key will be created and stored in the TPM if one
+ does not already exist; for any other handle, the key must already exist in the TPM at the specified
+ handle index.</para>
+
+ <para>This should not be changed unless you know what you are doing.</para></listitem>
+ </varlistentry>
+
<varlistentry>
<term><option>--tpm2-pcrs=</option><arg rep="repeat">PCR</arg></term>
diff --git a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
index 0155f1a6ef..98c45f42f6 100644
--- a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
+++ b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.c
@@ -133,6 +133,7 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
const void *volume_key,
size_t volume_key_size,
const char *device,
+ uint32_t seal_key_handle,
Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcr_values,
size_t n_hash_pcr_values,
const char *pubkey_path,
@@ -255,6 +256,7 @@ int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd,
return r;
r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_context,
+ seal_key_handle,
&policy,
pin_str,
&secret, &secret_size,
diff --git a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h
index d43a9a8ffe..8a57bdda01 100644
--- a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h
+++ b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll-tpm2.h
@@ -8,9 +8,9 @@
#include "tpm2-util.h"
#if HAVE_TPM2
-int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcrs, size_t n_hash_pcrs, const char *pubkey_path, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin);
+int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcrs, size_t n_hash_pcrs, const char *pubkey_path, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin);
#else
-static inline int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcrs, size_t n_hash_pcrs, const char *pubkey_path, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin) {
+static inline int enroll_tpm2(struct crypt_device *cd, const void *volume_key, size_t volume_key_size, const char *device, uint32_t seal_key_handle, Tpm2PCRValue *hash_pcrs, size_t n_hash_pcrs, const char *pubkey_path, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, const char *signature_path, bool use_pin) {
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EOPNOTSUPP),
"TPM2 key enrollment not supported.");
}
diff --git a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c
index aeef45eea6..5ace7a9787 100644
--- a/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c
+++ b/src/cryptenroll/cryptenroll.c
@@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ static char *arg_unlock_keyfile = NULL;
static char *arg_pkcs11_token_uri = NULL;
static char *arg_fido2_device = NULL;
static char *arg_tpm2_device = NULL;
+static uint32_t arg_tpm2_seal_key_handle = 0;
static Tpm2PCRValue *arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values = NULL;
static size_t arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values = 0;
static bool arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values_use_default = true;
@@ -121,6 +122,8 @@ static int help(void) {
" Whether to require user verification to unlock the volume\n"
" --tpm2-device=PATH\n"
" Enroll a TPM2 device\n"
+ " --tpm2-seal-key-handle=HANDLE\n"
+ " Specify handle of key to use for sealing\n"
" --tpm2-pcrs=PCR1+PCR2+PCR3+…\n"
" Specify TPM2 PCRs to seal against\n"
" --tpm2-public-key=PATH\n"
@@ -153,6 +156,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
ARG_PKCS11_TOKEN_URI,
ARG_FIDO2_DEVICE,
ARG_TPM2_DEVICE,
+ ARG_TPM2_SEAL_KEY_HANDLE,
ARG_TPM2_PCRS,
ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY,
ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY_PCRS,
@@ -178,6 +182,7 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
{ "fido2-with-user-presence", required_argument, NULL, ARG_FIDO2_WITH_UP },
{ "fido2-with-user-verification", required_argument, NULL, ARG_FIDO2_WITH_UV },
{ "tpm2-device", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_DEVICE },
+ { "tpm2-seal-key-handle", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_SEAL_KEY_HANDLE },
{ "tpm2-pcrs", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_PCRS },
{ "tpm2-public-key", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY },
{ "tpm2-public-key-pcrs", required_argument, NULL, ARG_TPM2_PUBLIC_KEY_PCRS },
@@ -337,6 +342,13 @@ static int parse_argv(int argc, char *argv[]) {
break;
}
+ case ARG_TPM2_SEAL_KEY_HANDLE:
+ r = safe_atou32_full(optarg, 16, &arg_tpm2_seal_key_handle);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return log_error_errno(r, "Could not parse TPM2 seal key handle index '%s': %m", optarg);
+
+ break;
+
case ARG_TPM2_PCRS:
arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values_use_default = false;
r = tpm2_parse_pcr_argument_append(optarg, &arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, &arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values);
@@ -667,7 +679,7 @@ static int run(int argc, char *argv[]) {
break;
case ENROLL_TPM2:
- slot = enroll_tpm2(cd, vk, vks, arg_tpm2_device, arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_public_key, arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask, arg_tpm2_signature, arg_tpm2_pin);
+ slot = enroll_tpm2(cd, vk, vks, arg_tpm2_device, arg_tpm2_seal_key_handle, arg_tpm2_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_n_hash_pcr_values, arg_tpm2_public_key, arg_tpm2_public_key_pcr_mask, arg_tpm2_signature, arg_tpm2_pin);
break;
case _ENROLL_TYPE_INVALID:
diff --git a/src/partition/repart.c b/src/partition/repart.c
index 481680768a..2b3b384743 100644
--- a/src/partition/repart.c
+++ b/src/partition/repart.c
@@ -3079,6 +3079,7 @@ static int partition_encrypt(
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not calculate sealing policy digest: %m");
r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_context,
+ /* seal_key_handle= */ 0,
&policy,
/* pin= */ NULL,
&secret, &secret_size,
diff --git a/src/shared/creds-util.c b/src/shared/creds-util.c
index e269f1283c..27548a0eec 100644
--- a/src/shared/creds-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/creds-util.c
@@ -684,6 +684,7 @@ int encrypt_credential_and_warn(
return log_error_errno(r, "Could not calculate sealing policy digest: %m");
r = tpm2_seal(tpm2_context,
+ /* seal_key_handle= */ 0,
&tpm2_policy,
/* pin= */ NULL,
&tpm2_key, &tpm2_key_size,
diff --git a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
index 6e6cbe076f..b7f55ad7d3 100644
--- a/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
+++ b/src/shared/tpm2-util.c
@@ -780,20 +780,23 @@ int tpm2_index_to_handle(
assert(c);
- /* Let's restrict this, at least for now, to allow only some handle types. */
+ /* Only allow persistent, transient, or NV index handle types. */
switch (TPM2_HANDLE_TYPE(index)) {
case TPM2_HT_PERSISTENT:
case TPM2_HT_NV_INDEX:
case TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT:
break;
case TPM2_HT_PCR:
+ /* PCR handles are referenced by their actual index number and do not need a Tpm2Handle */
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Invalid handle 0x%08" PRIx32 " (in PCR range).", index);
case TPM2_HT_HMAC_SESSION:
case TPM2_HT_POLICY_SESSION:
+ /* Session indexes are only used internally by tpm2-tss (or lower code) */
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Invalid handle 0x%08" PRIx32 " (in session range).", index);
- case TPM2_HT_PERMANENT: /* Permanent handles are defined, e.g. ESYS_TR_RH_OWNER. */
+ case TPM2_HT_PERMANENT:
+ /* Permanent handles are defined, e.g. ESYS_TR_RH_OWNER. */
return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
"Invalid handle 0x%08" PRIx32 " (in permanent range).", index);
default:
@@ -3872,6 +3875,7 @@ static int tpm2_deserialize(
}
int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c,
+ uint32_t seal_key_handle,
const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy,
const char *pin,
void **ret_secret,
@@ -3945,18 +3949,42 @@ int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c,
_cleanup_(tpm2_handle_freep) Tpm2Handle *primary_handle = NULL;
if (ret_srk_buf) {
_cleanup_(Esys_Freep) TPM2B_PUBLIC *primary_public = NULL;
- r = tpm2_get_or_create_srk(
- c,
- /* session= */ NULL,
- &primary_public,
- /* ret_name= */ NULL,
- /* ret_qname= */ NULL,
- &primary_handle);
- if (r < 0)
- return r;
+
+ if (IN_SET(seal_key_handle, 0, TPM2_SRK_HANDLE)) {
+ r = tpm2_get_or_create_srk(
+ c,
+ /* session= */ NULL,
+ &primary_public,
+ /* ret_name= */ NULL,
+ /* ret_qname= */ NULL,
+ &primary_handle);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ } else if (IN_SET(TPM2_HANDLE_TYPE(seal_key_handle), TPM2_HT_TRANSIENT, TPM2_HT_PERSISTENT)) {
+ r = tpm2_index_to_handle(
+ c,
+ seal_key_handle,
+ /* session= */ NULL,
+ &primary_public,
+ /* ret_name= */ NULL,
+ /* ret_qname= */ NULL,
+ &primary_handle);
+ if (r < 0)
+ return r;
+ if (r == 0)
+ /* We do NOT automatically create anything other than the SRK */
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(ENOENT),
+ "No handle found at index 0x%" PRIx32, seal_key_handle);
+ } else
+ return log_debug_errno(SYNTHETIC_ERRNO(EINVAL),
+ "Seal key handle 0x%" PRIx32 " is neither transient nor persistent.",
+ seal_key_handle);
primary_alg = primary_public->publicArea.type;
} else {
+ if (seal_key_handle != 0)
+ log_debug("Using primary alg sealing, but seal key handle also provided; ignoring seal key handle.");
+
/* TODO: force all callers to provide ret_srk_buf, so we can stop sealing with the legacy templates. */
primary_alg = TPM2_ALG_ECC;
diff --git a/src/shared/tpm2-util.h b/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
index 15ca677c1c..8d60d43c51 100644
--- a/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
+++ b/src/shared/tpm2-util.h
@@ -174,7 +174,7 @@ int tpm2_calculate_sealing_policy(const Tpm2PCRValue *pcr_values, size_t n_pcr_v
int tpm2_get_or_create_srk(Tpm2Context *c, const Tpm2Handle *session, TPM2B_PUBLIC **ret_public, TPM2B_NAME **ret_name, TPM2B_NAME **ret_qname, Tpm2Handle **ret_handle);
-int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy, const char *pin, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, void **ret_srk_buf, size_t *ret_srk_buf_size);
+int tpm2_seal(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t seal_key_handle, const TPM2B_DIGEST *policy, const char *pin, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size, void **ret_blob, size_t *ret_blob_size, uint16_t *ret_primary_alg, void **ret_srk_buf, size_t *ret_srk_buf_size);
int tpm2_unseal(Tpm2Context *c, uint32_t hash_pcr_mask, uint16_t pcr_bank, const void *pubkey, size_t pubkey_size, uint32_t pubkey_pcr_mask, JsonVariant *signature, const char *pin, uint16_t primary_alg, const void *blob, size_t blob_size, const void *policy_hash, size_t policy_hash_size, const void *srk_buf, size_t srk_buf_size, void **ret_secret, size_t *ret_secret_size);
#if HAVE_OPENSSL
Reference in New Issue Copy Permalink