upgrade

.cvsignore

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
 sudo-1.6.8p12-sudoers
-sudo-1.6.9p12.tar.gz
+sudo-1.6.9p13.tar.gz

sources

@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
-3dad7cdd28925f9bdf387510961f8e9f  sudo-1.6.8p12-sudoers
+573c851f2a204f1cdbbdb657015fc6ef  sudo-1.6.8p12-sudoers
-a5795c292e5c64dd9f7bcba8c1c712c9  sudo-1.6.9p12.tar.gz
+7e9d3e7780c632469ffe88fcc4a6b1ca  sudo-1.6.9p13.tar.gz

sudo-1.6.8p12-sudoers

@@ -56,12 +56,11 @@ Cmnd_Alias DRIVERS = /sbin/modprobe
 Defaults    requiretty
 
 Defaults    env_reset
-Defaults    env_keep = "COLORS DISPLAY HOSTNAME HISTSIZE INPUTRC KDEDIR \
+Defaults    env_keep =  "COLORS DISPLAY HOSTNAME HISTSIZE INPUTRC KDEDIR LS_COLORS"
-                        LS_COLORS MAIL PS1 PS2 QTDIR USERNAME \
+Defaults    env_keep += "MAIL PS1 PS2 QTDIR USERNAME LANG LC_ADDRESS LC_CTYPE"
-                        LANG LC_ADDRESS LC_CTYPE LC_COLLATE LC_IDENTIFICATION \
+Defaults    env_keep += "LC_COLLATE LC_IDENTIFICATION LC_MEASUREMENT LC_MESSAGES"
-                        LC_MEASUREMENT LC_MESSAGES LC_MONETARY LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC \
+Defaults    env_keep += "LC_MONETARY LC_NAME LC_NUMERIC LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE"
-                        LC_PAPER LC_TELEPHONE LC_TIME LC_ALL LANGUAGE LINGUAS \
+Defaults    env_keep += "LC_TIME LC_ALL LANGUAGE LINGUAS _XKB_CHARSET XAUTHORITY"
-                        _XKB_CHARSET XAUTHORITY"
 
 ## Next comes the main part: which users can run what software on 
 ## which machines (the sudoers file can be shared between multiple

sudo-1.6.9p12-selinux.patch

@@ -1,672 +0,0 @@
-diff -up /dev/null sudo-1.6.9p12/sesh.c
---- /dev/null	2008-02-05 17:16:01.642928004 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/sesh.c	2008-02-06 13:06:50.000000000 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#include <limits.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <sys/wait.h>
-+#include <errno.h>
-+
-+main (int argc, char **argv) {
-+  char buf[PATH_MAX];
-+  pid_t pid;
-+  if ( argc < 2 ) {
-+    fprintf(stderr,"%s: Requires at least one argument\n", argv[0]);
-+    exit(-1);
-+  }
-+
-+  if ((pid = fork()) < 0) {
-+    snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s: Couldn't fork",argv[0]);
-+    perror(buf);
-+    exit(-1);
-+  } else if (pid > 0) {
-+    /* Parent */
-+    int status;
-+    int ret;
-+
-+    do {
-+      if ((ret = waitpid(pid, &status, 0)) < 0 && errno == EINTR)
-+        continue;
-+      else if (ret < 0) {
-+        perror("waitpid failed");
-+        exit(1);
-+      }
-+    } while (0);
-+
-+    if (WIFEXITED(status))
-+      exit(WEXITSTATUS(status));
-+    else
-+      exit(1);
-+  } else {
-+    /* Child */
-+    execv(argv[1], &argv[1]);
-+
-+    snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s: Error execing %s", argv[0], argv[1]);
-+    perror(buf);
-+    exit(-1);
-+  }
-+}
-diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in.selinux sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in
---- sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in.selinux	2008-02-06 12:45:07.000000000 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in	2008-02-06 13:06:50.000000000 +0100
-@@ -102,7 +102,7 @@ dnl
- dnl Initial values for Makefile variables listed above
- dnl May be overridden by environment variables..
- dnl
--PROGS="sudo visudo"
-+PROGS="sudo visudo sesh"
- : ${MANTYPE='man'}
- : ${mansrcdir='.'}
- : ${SUDOERS_MODE='0440'}
-diff -up /dev/null sudo-1.6.9p12/selinux.c
---- /dev/null	2008-02-05 17:16:01.642928004 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/selinux.c	2008-02-06 13:06:50.000000000 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,425 @@
-+/*
-+ * Copyright (c) 2008 Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Borrowed heavily from newrole source code
-+ * Authors:
-+ *      Anthony Colatrella
-+ *	Tim Fraser
-+ *	Steve Grubb <sgrubb@redhat.com>
-+ *	Darrel Goeddel <DGoeddel@trustedcs.com>
-+ *	Michael Thompson <mcthomps@us.ibm.com>
-+ *	Dan Walsh <dwalsh@redhat.com>
-+ *
-+ * Permission to use, copy, modify, and distribute this software for any
-+ * purpose with or without fee is hereby granted, provided that the above
-+ * copyright notice and this permission notice appear in all copies.
-+ *
-+ * THE SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED "AS IS" AND THE AUTHOR DISCLAIMS ALL WARRANTIES
-+ * WITH REGARD TO THIS SOFTWARE INCLUDING ALL IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF
-+ * MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE AUTHOR BE LIABLE FOR
-+ * ANY SPECIAL, DIRECT, INDIRECT, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES OR ANY DAMAGES
-+ * WHATSOEVER RESULTING FROM LOSS OF USE, DATA OR PROFITS, WHETHER IN AN
-+ * ACTION OF CONTRACT, NEGLIGENCE OR OTHER TORTIOUS ACTION, ARISING OUT OF
-+ * OR IN CONNECTION WITH THE USE OR PERFORMANCE OF THIS SOFTWARE.
-+ *
-+ */
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+#include <config.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#ifdef STDC_HEADERS
-+# include <stdlib.h>
-+# include <stddef.h>
-+#else
-+# ifdef HAVE_STDLIB_H
-+#  include <stdlib.h>
-+# endif
-+#endif /* STDC_HEADERS */
-+#ifdef HAVE_STRING_H
-+# if defined(HAVE_MEMORY_H) && !defined(STDC_HEADERS)
-+#  include <memory.h>
-+# endif
-+# include <string.h>
-+#else
-+# ifdef HAVE_STRINGS_H
-+#  include <strings.h>
-+# endif
-+#endif /* HAVE_STRING_H */
-+#ifdef HAVE_UNISTD_H
-+# include <unistd.h>
-+#endif /* HAVE_UNISTD_H */
-+#include <errno.h>
-+#include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <signal.h>
-+
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+#include <libaudit.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#include "sudo.h"
-+
-+#include <sys/wait.h>
-+
-+#ifdef USE_AUDIT
-+#include <libaudit.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+#include <selinux/flask.h>             /* for SECCLASS_CHR_FILE */
-+#include <selinux/selinux.h>           /* for is_selinux_enabled() */
-+#include <selinux/context.h>           /* for context-mangling functions */
-+#include <selinux/get_default_type.h>
-+#include <selinux/get_context_list.h>
-+
-+/**
-+ * This function attempts to revert the relabeling done to the tty.
-+ * fd   - referencing the opened ttyn
-+ * ttyn - name of tty to restore
-+ * tty_context     - original context of the tty
-+ * new_tty_context - context tty was relabeled to
-+ *
-+ * Returns zero on success, non-zero otherwise
-+ */
-+static int restore_tty_label(int fd, const char *ttyn,
-+			     security_context_t tty_context,
-+			     security_context_t new_tty_context)
-+{
-+	int rc = 0;
-+	security_context_t chk_tty_context = NULL;
-+
-+	if (!ttyn)
-+		goto skip_relabel;
-+
-+	if (!new_tty_context)
-+		goto skip_relabel;
-+
-+	/* Verify that the tty still has the context set by newrole. */
-+	if ((rc = fgetfilecon(fd, &chk_tty_context)) < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not fgetfilecon %s.\n", ttyn);
-+		goto skip_relabel;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((rc = strcmp(chk_tty_context, new_tty_context))) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s changed labels.\n", ttyn);
-+		goto skip_relabel;
-+	}
-+
-+	if ((rc = fsetfilecon(fd, tty_context)) < 0)
-+		fprintf(stderr,
-+			"Warning! Could not restore context for %s\n", ttyn);
-+      skip_relabel:
-+	freecon(chk_tty_context);
-+	return rc;
-+}
-+
-+/**
-+ * This function attempts to relabel the tty. If this function fails, then
-+ * the fd is closed, the contexts are free'd and -1 is returned. On success,
-+ * a valid fd is returned and tty_context and new_tty_context are set.
-+ *
-+ * This function will not fail if it can not relabel the tty when selinux is
-+ * in permissive mode.
-+ */
-+static int relabel_tty(const char *ttyn, security_context_t new_context,
-+		       security_context_t * tty_context,
-+		       security_context_t * new_tty_context)
-+{
-+	int fd;
-+	int enforcing = security_getenforce();
-+	security_context_t tty_con = NULL;
-+	security_context_t new_tty_con = NULL;
-+
-+	if (!ttyn)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (enforcing < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Could not determine enforcing mode.\n");
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Re-open TTY descriptor */
-+	fd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK);
-+	if (fd < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error!  Could not open %s.\n", ttyn);
-+		return fd;
-+	}
-+	fcntl(fd, F_SETFL, fcntl(fd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
-+
-+	if (fgetfilecon(fd, &tty_con) < 0) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s!  Could not get current context "
-+				  "for %s, not relabeling tty.\n",
-+			enforcing ? "Error" : "Warning", ttyn);
-+		if (enforcing)
-+			goto close_fd;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (tty_con &&
-+	    (security_compute_relabel(new_context, tty_con,
-+				      SECCLASS_CHR_FILE, &new_tty_con) < 0)) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "%s!  Could not get new context for %s, "
-+				  "not relabeling tty.\n",
-+			enforcing ? "Error" : "Warning", ttyn);
-+		if (enforcing)
-+			goto close_fd;
-+	}
-+
-+	if (new_tty_con)
-+		if (fsetfilecon(fd, new_tty_con) < 0) {
-+			fprintf(stderr,
-+				"%s!  Could not set new context for %s\n",
-+				enforcing ? "Error" : "Warning", ttyn);
-+			freecon(new_tty_con);
-+			new_tty_con = NULL;
-+			if (enforcing)
-+				goto close_fd;
-+		}
-+
-+	*tty_context = tty_con;
-+	*new_tty_context = new_tty_con;
-+	return fd;
-+
-+      close_fd:
-+	freecon(tty_con);
-+	close(fd);
-+	return -1;
-+}
-+
-+security_context_t get_exec_context(security_context_t old_context, char *role_s, char *type_s) {
-+
-+  /* our target security ID ("sid") */
-+  security_context_t new_context=NULL; 
-+
-+  /* manipulatable form of context_s */
-+  context_t context;                 
-+  
-+  if( !role_s ) {
-+    fprintf(stderr,"You must specify a role.\n");
-+    return NULL;
-+  }
-+	  
-+  
-+  /*
-+   * Get the SID and context of the caller, and extract
-+   * the username from the context.  Don't rely on the Linux
-+   * uid information - it isn't trustworthy.
-+   */
-+  
-+  /* 
-+   * Create a context structure so that we extract and modify 
-+   * components easily. 
-+   */
-+  context=context_new(old_context);
-+  
-+  /*
-+   *
-+   * Step 3:  Construct a new SID based on our old SID and the
-+   *          arguments specified on the command line.
-+   *
-+   */
-+  
-+  /* The first step in constructing a new SID for the new shell we  *
-+   * plan to exec is to take our old context in `context' as a   *
-+   * starting point, and modify it according to the options the user *
-+   * specified on the command line.                                  */
-+
-+  /* If the user specified a new role on the command line (if `role_s'   *
-+   * is set), then replace the old role in `context' with this new role. */
-+  if( !type_s ) {
-+    if( get_default_type(role_s,&type_s) )
-+      {
-+        fprintf(stderr,"Couldn't get default type.\n");
-+	goto err;
-+      }
-+    }
-+    
-+  if( context_role_set(context,role_s)) {
-+    fprintf(stderr,"failed to set new role %s\n",role_s);
-+    goto err;
-+  }
-+    
-+  /* If the user specified a new type on the command line (if `type_s'   *
-+   * is set), then replace the old type in `context' with this new type. */
-+  if( type_s ) {
-+    if( context_type_set(context,type_s)) {
-+      fprintf(stderr,"failed to set new type %s\n",type_s);
-+      goto err;
-+    }
-+  } /* if user specified new type */
-+    
-+  /* The second step in creating the new SID is to convert our modified *
-+   * `context' structure back to a context string and then to a SID.    */
-+    
-+  /* Make `context_s' point to a string version of the new `context'.  */
-+  if( !(new_context=strdup(context_str(context)))) {
-+    fprintf(stderr,"failed to convert new context to string\n" );
-+    goto err;
-+  }
-+
-+  if (security_check_context(new_context) < 0) {
-+    fprintf(stderr, "%s is not a valid context\n", new_context);
-+    goto err;
-+  }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG
-+  printf("Your new context is %s\n",new_context);
-+#endif
-+
-+  context_free(context);
-+  return new_context;
-+
-+ err:
-+  context_free(context);
-+  freecon(new_context);
-+  return NULL;
-+
-+}
-+
-+void selinux_exec(char *role_s, char *type_s, char *safe_cmd, int NewArgc, char **NewArgv, char **environ){ 
-+  pid_t childPid = 0;
-+  int ttyfd = -1;
-+  /* our original securiy ID ("old_context") */
-+  security_context_t old_context=NULL;	
-+
-+  /* security context to change to while running command*/
-+  security_context_t new_tty_context=NULL; 
-+  /* current security context of tty */
-+  security_context_t tty_context=NULL;  
-+
-+  char *ttyn = NULL;	/* tty path */
-+  
-+  /* our target security ID ("sid") */
-+  security_context_t new_context=NULL;
-+  /* Put the caller's SID into `old_context'. */
-+  if (getprevcon(&old_context)) {
-+    fprintf(stderr,"failed to get old_context.\n");
-+    exit(-1);
-+  }
-+  
-+#ifdef DEBUG
-+  printf( "Your old context was %s\n", old_context );
-+#endif
-+  new_context=get_exec_context(old_context, role_s,type_s);
-+  if (! new_context) {
-+	  fprintf(stderr, "Could not set exec context to %s.\n", new_context);
-+	  exit(-1);
-+  }
-+  
-+  ttyn = ttyname(STDIN_FILENO);
-+  if (!ttyn || *ttyn == '\0') {
-+	  fprintf(stderr,
-+		  "Warning!  Could not retrieve tty information.\n");
-+  }
-+  
-+  ttyfd = relabel_tty(ttyn, new_context, &tty_context, &new_tty_context);
-+  if (ttyfd < 0) {
-+	  fprintf(stderr, "Could not setup tty context for %s.\n", new_context);
-+	  exit(-1);
-+  }
-+
-+#ifdef DEBUG
-+  printf("Your old tty context is %s\n",tty_context);
-+  printf("Your new tty context is %s\n",new_tty_context);
-+#endif
-+
-+
-+  childPid = fork();
-+  if (childPid < 0) {
-+	  /* fork failed, no child to worry about */
-+	  int errsv = errno;
-+	  fprintf(stderr, "newrole: failure forking: %s",
-+		  strerror(errsv));
-+	  if (restore_tty_label(ttyfd, ttyn, tty_context, new_tty_context))
-+		  fprintf(stderr, "Unable to restore tty label...\n");
-+	  if (close(ttyfd))
-+		  fprintf(stderr, "Failed to close tty properly\n");
-+	  goto err;
-+  } else if (childPid) {
-+	  /* PARENT
-+	   * It doesn't make senes to exit early on errors at this point,
-+	   * since we are doing cleanup which needs to be done.
-+	   * We can exit with a bad rc though
-+	   */
-+	  pid_t pid;
-+	  int exit_code = 0;
-+	  int status;
-+	  
-+	  do {
-+		  pid = wait(&status);
-+	  } while (pid < 0 && errno == EINTR);
-+	  
-+	  /* Preserve child exit status, unless there is another error. */
-+	  if (WIFEXITED(status))
-+		  exit_code = WEXITSTATUS(status);
-+	  
-+	  if (restore_tty_label(ttyfd, ttyn, tty_context, new_tty_context)) {
-+		  fprintf(stderr, "Unable to restore tty label...\n");
-+		  exit_code = -1;
-+	  }
-+	  freecon(tty_context);
-+	  freecon(new_tty_context);
-+	  if (close(ttyfd)) {
-+		  fprintf(stderr, "Failed to close tty properly\n");
-+		  exit_code = -1;
-+	  }
-+	  exit(exit_code);
-+  }
-+  /* CHILD */
-+  /* Close the tty and reopen descriptors 0 through 2 */
-+  if (ttyn) {
-+    if (close(ttyfd) || close(0) || close(1) || close(2)) {
-+	    fprintf(stderr, "Could not close descriptors.\n");
-+	    goto err;
-+    }
-+    ttyfd = open(ttyn, O_RDONLY | O_NONBLOCK);
-+    if (ttyfd != 0)
-+	    goto err;
-+    fcntl(ttyfd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ttyfd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
-+    ttyfd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK);
-+    if (ttyfd != 1)
-+	    goto err;
-+    fcntl(ttyfd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ttyfd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
-+    ttyfd = open(ttyn, O_RDWR | O_NONBLOCK);
-+    if (ttyfd != 2)
-+	    goto err;
-+    fcntl(ttyfd, F_SETFL, fcntl(ttyfd, F_GETFL, 0) & ~O_NONBLOCK);
-+  }
-+  if (setexeccon(new_context)) {
-+	  fprintf(stderr, "Could not set exec context to %s.\n",
-+		  new_context);
-+	  goto err;
-+  }
-+
-+#ifdef USE_AUDIT
-+  if (send_audit_message(1, old_context, new_context, ttyn)) 
-+    goto err;
-+#endif
-+
-+  {
-+    /* 
-+       SELinux will only not transition properly with the following
-+       code.  Basically if the user chooses to use a different security
-+       context.  We need to start the selinux shell, before executing 
-+       the command.  This way the process transition will happen 
-+       correctly. For example if they user wants to run rpm from 
-+       sysadm_r.  Sudo will exec the /usr/sbin/sesh followed by the 
-+       specified command.*/
-+     char **dst, **src = NewArgv+1;
-+     NewArgv = (char **) emalloc2((++NewArgc + 1), sizeof(char *));
-+     NewArgv[0] = estrdup("/usr/sbin/sesh");
-+     NewArgv[1] = safe_cmd;
-+     safe_cmd = estrdup("/usr/sbin/sesh");
-+     /* copy the args from Argv */
-+     for (dst = NewArgv + 2; (*dst = *src) != NULL; ++src, ++dst)
-+	     ;
-+  }
-+  freecon(old_context);
-+  freecon(new_context);
-+
-+  execve(safe_cmd, NewArgv, environ);	/* run the command */
-+  
-+  perror("failed to exec shell\n");
-+ err:
-+  freecon(old_context);
-+  freecon(new_context);
-+  exit(-1);
-+}
-+#endif /* WITH_SELINUX */
-diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in.selinux sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in
---- sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in.selinux	2008-02-06 12:45:07.000000000 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in	2008-02-06 13:08:50.000000000 +0100
-@@ -43,7 +43,8 @@ INSTALL = $(SHELL) $(srcdir)/install-sh 
- # Libraries
- LIBS = @LIBS@
- NET_LIBS = @NET_LIBS@
--SUDO_LIBS = @SUDO_LIBS@ @AFS_LIBS@ @GETGROUPS_LIB@ $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS)
-+SELINUX_LIBS = -lselinux
-+SUDO_LIBS = @SUDO_LIBS@ @AFS_LIBS@ @GETGROUPS_LIB@ $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS) $(SELINUX_LIBS)
- 
- # C preprocessor flags
- CPPFLAGS = -I. -I$(srcdir) @CPPFLAGS@
-@@ -91,7 +92,7 @@ sudoers_gid = @SUDOERS_GID@
- sudoers_mode = @SUDOERS_MODE@
- 
- # Pass in paths and uid/gid + OS dependent defined
--DEFS = @OSDEFS@ -D_PATH_SUDOERS=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers\" -D_PATH_SUDOERS_TMP=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers.tmp\" -DSUDOERS_UID=$(sudoers_uid) -DSUDOERS_GID=$(sudoers_gid) -DSUDOERS_MODE=$(sudoers_mode)
-+DEFS = @OSDEFS@ -D_PATH_SUDOERS=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers\" -D_PATH_SUDOERS_TMP=\"$(sudoersdir)/sudoers.tmp\" -DSUDOERS_UID=$(sudoers_uid) -DSUDOERS_GID=$(sudoers_gid) -DSUDOERS_MODE=$(sudoers_mode) -DWITH_SELINUX
- 
- #### End of system configuration section. ####
- 
-@@ -105,7 +106,7 @@ SRCS = alloc.c alloca.c check.c closefro
-        logging.c memrchr.c mkstemp.c parse.c parse.lex parse.yacc set_perms.c \
-        sigaction.c snprintf.c strcasecmp.c strerror.c strlcat.c strlcpy.c \
-        sudo.c sudo_noexec.c sudo.tab.c sudo_edit.c testsudoers.c tgetpass.c \
--       utimes.c visudo.c zero_bytes.c $(AUTH_SRCS)
-+       utimes.c visudo.c zero_bytes.c $(AUTH_SRCS) selinux.c sesh.c
- 
- AUTH_SRCS = auth/afs.c auth/aix_auth.c auth/bsdauth.c auth/dce.c auth/fwtk.c \
- 	    auth/kerb4.c auth/kerb5.c auth/pam.c auth/passwd.c auth/rfc1938.c \
-@@ -124,11 +125,13 @@ AUDIT_OBJS = audit_help.o 
- PARSEOBJS = sudo.tab.o lex.yy.o alloc.o defaults.o
- 
- SUDOBJS = check.o env.o getspwuid.o gettime.o goodpath.o fileops.o find_path.o \
--	  interfaces.o logging.o parse.o set_perms.o sudo.o sudo_edit.o \
-+	  interfaces.o logging.o parse.o set_perms.o sudo.o selinux.o sudo_edit.o \
- 	  tgetpass.o zero_bytes.o @SUDO_OBJS@ $(AUTH_OBJS) $(PARSEOBJS) $(AUDIT_OBJS)
- 
- VISUDOBJS = visudo.o fileops.o gettime.o goodpath.o find_path.o $(PARSEOBJS)
- 
-+SESH_OBJS = sesh.o
-+
- TESTOBJS = interfaces.o testsudoers.o $(PARSEOBJS)
- 
- LIBOBJS = @LIBOBJS@ @ALLOCA@
-@@ -149,7 +152,7 @@ DISTFILES = $(SRCS) $(HDRS) BUGS CHANGES
- BINFILES= BUGS CHANGES HISTORY LICENSE README TROUBLESHOOTING \
- 	  UPGRADE install-sh mkinstalldirs sample.syslog.conf sample.sudoers \
- 	  sudo sudo.cat sudo.man sudo.pod sudoers sudoers.cat sudoers.man \
--	  sudoers.pod visudo visudo.cat visudo.man visudo.pod
-+	  sudoers.pod visudo visudo.cat visudo.man visudo.pod sesh
- 
- BINSPECIAL= INSTALL.binary Makefile.binary libtool
- 
-@@ -181,6 +184,9 @@ sudo: $(SUDOBJS) $(LIBOBJS)
- visudo: $(VISUDOBJS) $(LIBOBJS)
- 	$(CC) -o $@ $(VISUDOBJS) $(LIBOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS)
- 
-+sesh: $(SESH_OBJS) 
-+	$(CC) -o $@ $(SESH_OBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS)
-+
- testsudoers: $(TESTOBJS) $(LIBOBJS)
- 	$(CC) -o $@ $(TESTOBJS) $(LIBOBJS) $(LDFLAGS) $(LIBS) $(NET_LIBS)
- 
-@@ -222,6 +228,7 @@ logging.o: logging.c $(SUDODEP)
- set_perms.o: set_perms.c $(SUDODEP)
- tgetpass.o: tgetpass.c $(SUDODEP)
- visudo.o: visudo.c $(SUDODEP) version.h
-+sesh.o: sesh.c 
- sudo.o: sudo.c $(SUDODEP) interfaces.h version.h
- interfaces.o: interfaces.c $(SUDODEP) interfaces.h
- testsudoers.o: testsudoers.c $(SUDODEP) parse.h interfaces.h
-@@ -320,6 +327,7 @@ install-binaries: $(PROGS)
- 	ln $(DESTDIR)$(sudodir)/sudo $(DESTDIR)$(sudodir)/sudoedit
- 
- 	$(INSTALL) -O $(install_uid) -G $(install_gid) -M 0111 -s visudo $(DESTDIR)$(visudodir)/visudo
-+	$(INSTALL) -O $(install_uid) -G $(install_gid) -M 0111 -s sesh $(DESTDIR)$(visudodir)/sesh
- 
- install-noexec: sudo_noexec.la
- 	$(LIBTOOL) --mode=install $(INSTALL) sudo_noexec.la $(DESTDIR)$(noexecdir)
-diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.selinux sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
---- sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.selinux	2008-02-06 12:45:07.000000000 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c	2008-02-06 13:06:50.000000000 +0100
-@@ -101,6 +101,14 @@
- #include <libaudit.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-+static char *role_s = NULL;                  /* role spec'd by user in argv[] */
-+static char *type_s = NULL;                  /* type spec'd by user in argv[] */
-+extern void selinux_exec(char *role_s, char *type_s, char *safe_cmnd, int NewArgc, char **NewArgv, char **environ);
-+
-+#endif
-+
- #include "sudo.h"
- #include "interfaces.h"
- #include "version.h"
-@@ -487,6 +495,12 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
- 	if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
- 	    exit(0);
- 	else {
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	    if( is_selinux_enabled() >0 && role_s) {
-+		    selinux_exec(role_s, type_s, safe_cmnd, NewArgc, NewArgv, environ);	/* run the command */
-+		    exit(-1);
-+	    } 
-+#endif
- 	    execve(safe_cmnd, NewArgv, environ);
- 	}
- #else
-@@ -817,6 +831,30 @@ parse_args(argc, argv)
- 		    NewArgv++;
- 		    break;
- #endif
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	    case 'r':
-+		/* Must have an associated SELinux role. */
-+		if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
-+		    usage(1);
-+
-+		role_s = NewArgv[1];
-+
-+		/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
-+		NewArgc--;
-+		NewArgv++;
-+		break;
-+	    case 't':
-+		/* Must have an associated SELinux type. */
-+		if (NewArgv[1] == NULL)
-+		    usage(1);
-+
-+		type_s = NewArgv[1];
-+
-+		/* Shift Argv over and adjust Argc. */
-+		NewArgc--;
-+		NewArgv++;
-+		break;
-+#endif
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
- 		case 'c':
- 		    /* Must have an associated login class. */
-@@ -1318,6 +1356,9 @@ usage(exit_val)
- #ifdef HAVE_BSD_AUTH_H
- 	" [-a auth_type]",
- #endif
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	" [-r role] [-t type] ",
-+#endif
- #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
- 	" [-c class|-]",
- #endif
-diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.man.in.selinux sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.man.in
---- sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.man.in.selinux	2008-01-14 13:22:57.000000000 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.man.in	2008-02-06 13:06:50.000000000 +0100
-@@ -159,6 +159,7 @@ sudo, sudoedit \- execute a command as a
- .PP
- \&\fBsudo\fR [\fB\-bEHPS\fR] [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR]
- [\fB\-c\fR\ \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR] [\fB\-p\fR\ \fIprompt\fR] [\fB\-u\fR\ \fIusername\fR|\fI#uid\fR]
-+[\fB\-r\fR \fIrole\fR ] [\fB\-t\fR \fItype\fR ]
- [\fB\s-1VAR\s0\fR=\fIvalue\fR] {\fB\-i\fR\ |\ \fB\-s\fR\ |\ \fIcommand\fR}
- .PP
- \&\fBsudoedit\fR [\fB\-S\fR] [\fB\-a\fR\ \fIauth_type\fR] [\fB\-c\fR\ \fIclass\fR|\fI\-\fR]
-@@ -323,6 +324,16 @@ preserve the invoking user's group vecto
- \&\fBsudo\fR will initialize the group vector to the list of groups the
- target user is in.  The real and effective group IDs, however, are
- still set to match the target user.
-+.IP "\-r" 4
-+.IX Item "-r"
-+The \fB\-r\fR (\fRrole\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to have the role specified by
-+\fIROLE\fR.
-+.IP "\-t" 4
-+.IX Item "-t" 
-+The \fB\-t\fR (\fRtype\fR) option causes the new (SELinux) security context to have the have the type (domain)
-+specified by
-+\fITYPE\fR.
-+If no type is specified, the default type is derived from the specified role.
- .IP "\-p" 4
- .IX Item "-p"
- The \fB\-p\fR (\fIprompt\fR) option allows you to override the default

sudo-1.6.9p13-audit.patch

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
-diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/set_perms.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/set_perms.c
+diff -up sudo-1.6.9p13/set_perms.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p13/set_perms.c
---- sudo-1.6.9p12/set_perms.c.audit	2007-11-28 00:41:23.000000000 +0100
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13/set_perms.c.audit	2007-11-28 00:41:23.000000000 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/set_perms.c	2008-02-05 14:09:29.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/set_perms.c	2008-02-21 14:03:02.000000000 +0100
 @@ -53,6 +53,10 @@
  #ifdef HAVE_LOGIN_CAP_H
  # include <login_cap.h>
@@ -66,11 +66,11 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/set_perms.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/set_perms.c
  
  	case PERM_SUDOERS:
  				/* assume euid == ROOT_UID, ruid == user */
-diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
+diff -up sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.c
---- sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit	2008-02-05 13:57:21.000000000 +0100
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.c.audit	2008-02-21 14:03:02.000000000 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c	2008-02-05 13:57:21.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.c	2008-02-21 14:03:02.000000000 +0100
-@@ -97,6 +97,10 @@
+@@ -100,6 +100,10 @@
- # include <sys/task.h>
+ # include <selinux/selinux.h>
  #endif
  
 +#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
@@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
  #include "sudo.h"
  #include "interfaces.h"
  #include "version.h"
-@@ -292,6 +296,10 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
+@@ -295,6 +299,10 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
      if (safe_cmnd == NULL)
  	safe_cmnd = estrdup(user_cmnd);
  
@@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
      /*
       * Look up the timestamp dir owner if one is specified.
       */
-@@ -302,9 +310,13 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
+@@ -305,9 +313,13 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
  	    pw = getpwuid(atoi(def_timestampowner + 1));
  	else
  	    pw = getpwnam(def_timestampowner);
@@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
  	timestamp_uid = pw->pw_uid;
      }
  
-@@ -314,15 +326,22 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
+@@ -317,15 +329,22 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
  	exit(0);
      }
  
@@ -130,7 +130,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
  	exit(1);
      }
  
-@@ -336,8 +355,12 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
+@@ -339,8 +358,12 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
  
      /* Bail if a tty is required and we don't have one.  */
      if (def_requiretty) {
@@ -144,7 +144,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
  	else
  	    (void) close(fd);
      }
-@@ -370,17 +393,27 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
+@@ -373,17 +396,27 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
  	/* Finally tell the user if the command did not exist. */
  	if (cmnd_status == NOT_FOUND_DOT) {
  	    warnx("ignoring `%s' found in '.'\nUse `sudo ./%s' if this is the `%s' you wish to run.", user_cmnd, user_cmnd, user_cmnd);
@@ -173,7 +173,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
  	    else
  		validate_env_vars(sudo_user.env_vars);
  	}
-@@ -439,11 +472,23 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
+@@ -442,6 +475,17 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
  	(void) sigaction(SIGTSTP, &saved_sa_tstp, NULL);
  	(void) sigaction(SIGCHLD, &saved_sa_chld, NULL);
  
@@ -191,14 +191,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
  #ifndef PROFILING
  	if (ISSET(sudo_mode, MODE_BACKGROUND) && fork() > 0)
  	    exit(0);
--	else
+@@ -465,6 +509,9 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
-+	else {
- 	    execve(safe_cmnd, NewArgv, environ);
-+	}
- #else
- 	exit(0);
- #endif /* PROFILING */
-@@ -456,6 +501,9 @@ main(argc, argv, envp)
  	    NewArgv[1] = safe_cmnd;
  	    execve(_PATH_BSHELL, NewArgv, environ);
  	}
@@ -208,10 +201,10 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.c
  	warn("unable to execute %s", safe_cmnd);
  	exit(127);
      } else if (ISSET(validated, FLAG_NO_USER) || (validated & FLAG_NO_HOST)) {
-diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in
+diff -up sudo-1.6.9p13/configure.in.audit sudo-1.6.9p13/configure.in
---- sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in.audit	2008-02-05 13:57:21.000000000 +0100
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13/configure.in.audit	2008-02-21 14:03:02.000000000 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in	2008-02-05 13:57:21.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/configure.in	2008-02-21 14:03:02.000000000 +0100
-@@ -154,6 +154,10 @@ dnl
+@@ -166,6 +166,10 @@ dnl
  dnl Options for --with
  dnl
  
@@ -222,7 +215,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in
  AC_ARG_WITH(CC, [  --with-CC               C compiler to use],
  [case $with_CC in
      yes)	AC_MSG_ERROR(["must give --with-CC an argument."])
-@@ -1588,6 +1592,25 @@ dnl
+@@ -1614,6 +1618,25 @@ dnl
  : ${mansectsu='8'}
  : ${mansectform='5'}
  
@@ -248,10 +241,10 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/configure.in
  dnl
  dnl Add in any libpaths or libraries specified via configure
  dnl
-diff -up /dev/null sudo-1.6.9p12/audit_help.c
+diff -up /dev/null sudo-1.6.9p13/audit_help.c
---- /dev/null	2008-02-05 11:01:55.583821645 +0100
+--- /dev/null	2008-02-05 17:16:01.642928004 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/audit_help.c	2008-02-05 13:57:21.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/audit_help.c	2008-02-21 14:20:56.000000000 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,88 @@
+@@ -0,0 +1,124 @@
 +/*
 + *  Audit helper functions used throughout sudo
 + *
@@ -295,6 +288,10 @@ diff -up /dev/null sudo-1.6.9p12/audit_help.c
 +#include <unistd.h>
 +#include <sys/types.h>
 +
++#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
++#include <selinux/selinux.h>
++#endif
++
 +int audit_fd;
 +
 +void audit_help_open (void)
@@ -336,14 +333,46 @@ diff -up /dev/null sudo-1.6.9p12/audit_help.c
 +	}
 +}
 +
++#ifdef HAVE_SELINUX
++int send_audit_message(int success, security_context_t old_context,
++                       security_context_t new_context, const char *ttyn)
++{
++        char *msg = NULL;
++        int rc;
++
++        if (audit_fd < 0)
++                return -1;
++
++        if (asprintf(&msg, "newrole: old-context=%s new-context=%s",
++                     old_context ? old_context : "?",
++                     new_context ? new_context : "?") < 0) {
++                fprintf(stderr, "Error allocating memory.\n");
++                rc = -1;
++                goto out;
++        }
++
++        rc = audit_log_user_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_ROLE_CHANGE,
++                                    msg, NULL, NULL, ttyn, success);
++        if (rc <= 0) {
++                fprintf(stderr, "Error sending audit message.\n");
++                rc = -1;
++                goto out;
++        }
++        rc = 0;
++
++        out:
++         free(msg);
++         return rc;
++}
++#endif
 +
 +#endif                         /* WITH_AUDIT */
 +
 +
-diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in
+diff -up sudo-1.6.9p13/Makefile.in.audit sudo-1.6.9p13/Makefile.in
---- sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in.audit	2008-01-14 13:22:57.000000000 +0100
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13/Makefile.in.audit	2008-02-19 19:13:10.000000000 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in	2008-02-05 13:57:21.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/Makefile.in	2008-02-21 14:03:02.000000000 +0100
-@@ -119,11 +119,13 @@ HDRS = compat.h def_data.h defaults.h in
+@@ -120,11 +120,13 @@ HDRS = compat.h def_data.h defaults.h in
  
  AUTH_OBJS = sudo_auth.o @AUTH_OBJS@
  
@@ -358,7 +387,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in
  
  VISUDOBJS = visudo.o fileops.o gettime.o goodpath.o find_path.o $(PARSEOBJS)
  
-@@ -274,6 +276,9 @@ securid5.o: $(authdir)/securid5.c $(AUTH
+@@ -276,6 +278,9 @@ securid5.o: $(authdir)/securid5.c $(AUTH
  sia.o: $(authdir)/sia.c $(AUTHDEP)
  	$(CC) -c $(CPPFLAGS) $(CFLAGS) $(DEFS) $(OPTIONS) $(authdir)/sia.c
  
@@ -367,10 +396,10 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/Makefile.in
 +
  sudo.man.in: $(srcdir)/sudo.pod
  	@rm -f $(srcdir)/$@
- 	( cd $(srcdir); mansectsu=`echo @MANSECTSU@|tr A-Z a-z`; mansectform=`echo @MANSECTFORM@|tr A-Z a-z`; sed -n -e 1d -e '/^=pod/q' -e 's/^/.\\" /p' sudo.pod > $@; pod2man --quotes=none --date="`date '+%B %e, %Y'`" --section=$$mansectsu --release=$(VERSION) --center="MAINTENANCE COMMANDS" sudo.pod | sed -e "s/(5)/($$mansectform)/" -e "s/(8)/($$mansectsu)/" >> $@ )
+ 	( cd $(srcdir); mansectsu=`echo @MANSECTSU@|tr A-Z a-z`; mansectform=`echo @MANSECTFORM@|tr A-Z a-z`; sed -n -e '/^=pod/q' -e 's/^/.\\" /p' sudo.pod > $@; pod2man --quotes=none --date="`date '+%B %e, %Y'`" --section=$$mansectsu --release=$(VERSION) --center="MAINTENANCE COMMANDS" sudo.pod | sed -e "s/(5)/($$mansectform)/" -e "s/(8)/($$mansectsu)/" | perl -p sudo.man.pl >> $@ )
-diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.h.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.h
+diff -up sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.h.audit sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.h
---- sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.h.audit	2008-02-05 13:57:21.000000000 +0100
+--- sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.h.audit	2008-02-21 14:03:02.000000000 +0100
-+++ sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.h	2008-02-05 13:57:21.000000000 +0100
++++ sudo-1.6.9p13/sudo.h	2008-02-21 14:03:02.000000000 +0100
 @@ -23,6 +23,8 @@
  #ifndef _SUDO_SUDO_H
  #define _SUDO_SUDO_H
@@ -380,7 +409,7 @@ diff -up sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.h.audit sudo-1.6.9p12/sudo.h
  #include <pathnames.h>
  #include <limits.h>
  #include "compat.h"
-@@ -278,4 +280,10 @@ extern int sudo_mode;
+@@ -287,4 +289,10 @@ extern int sudo_mode;
  extern int errno;
  #endif
  

sudo.spec

@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
 Summary: Allows restricted root access for specified users
 Name: sudo
-Version: 1.6.9p12
+Version: 1.6.9p13
 Release: 1%{?dist}
 License: BSD
 Group: Applications/System
@@ -26,8 +26,7 @@ Patch2: sudo-1.6.9p4-login.patch
 # the rest, see changelog
 Patch3: sudo-1.6.9p4-getgrouplist.patch
 Patch4: sudo-1.6.9p12-noPam.patch
-Patch5: sudo-1.6.9p4-audit.patch
+Patch5: sudo-1.6.9p13-audit.patch
-Patch6: sudo-1.6.9p12-selinux.patch
 
 %description
 Sudo (superuser do) allows a system administrator to give certain
@@ -47,7 +46,6 @@ on many different machines.
 %patch3 -p1 -b .getgrouplist
 %patch4 -p1 -b .noPam
 %patch5 -p1 -b .audit
-%patch6 -p1 -b .selinux
 
 autoreconf
 
@@ -72,7 +70,8 @@ export CFLAGS="$RPM_OPT_FLAGS $F_PIE" LDFLAGS="-pie"
         --with-env-editor \
         --with-ignore-dot \
         --with-tty-tickets \
-        --with-ldap
+        --with-ldap \
+	--with-selinux
 #	--without-kerb5 \
 #	--without-kerb4
 make
@@ -118,7 +117,7 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 %attr(4111,root,root) %{_bindir}/sudo
 %attr(4111,root,root) %{_bindir}/sudoedit
 %attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/visudo
-%attr(0755,root,root) %{_sbindir}/sesh
+%attr(0755,root,root) %{_libexecdir}/sesh
 %{_libexecdir}/sudo_noexec.*
 %{_mandir}/man5/sudoers.5*
 %{_mandir}/man8/sudo.8*
@@ -130,6 +129,9 @@ rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
 /bin/chmod 0440 /etc/sudoers || :
 
 %changelog
+* Thu Feb 21 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 1.6.9p13-1
+- upgrade to the latest upstream release
+
 * Wed Feb 06 2008 Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> 1.6.9p12-1
 - upgrade to the latest upstream release
 - add selinux support