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- ad: gpo evalute host groups

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- DP: reduce log level in case a responder asks for unknown
 domain
- ipa: Add `BUILD_PASSKEY` conditional for passkey codepath
- LDAP: make groups_by_user_send/recv public
- Makefile: Respect `BUILD_PASSKEY` conditional
- pam: Conditionalize passkey code
- sdap: add set_non_posix parameter
- SSS_CLIENT: check if mem-cache fd was hijacked
- SSS_CLIENT: check if reponder socket was hijacked
- SSS_CLIENT: MC: in case mem-cache file validation fails
- sysdb: remove sysdb_computer.[ch]
This commit is contained in:
eabdullin 2024-02-21 14:21:27 +03:00
parent 3be8b07c4d
commit d0b0fe0ac8
12 changed files with 2586 additions and 4 deletions
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28
SOURCES/DP-reduce-log-level-in-case-a-responder-asks-for-unknown.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,28 @@
From 39cd0baa06742b349ed763aa40ea4de366e80f1a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Dec 2023 09:47:25 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] DP: reduce log level in case a responder asks for unknown
domain
Since 9358a74d3a56c738890353aaf6bc956bfe72df99 a domain might be
skipped by 'ad_enabled_domains' option
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
---
src/providers/data_provider/dp_request.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/data_provider/dp_request.c b/src/providers/data_provider/dp_request.c
index df2db26662..9c0fcf1f52 100644
--- a/src/providers/data_provider/dp_request.c
+++ b/src/providers/data_provider/dp_request.c
@@ -204,7 +204,8 @@ dp_req_new(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
if (domainname != NULL) {
dp_req->domain = find_domain_by_name(be_ctx->domain, domainname, true);
if (dp_req->domain == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Unknown domain: %s\n", domainname);
+ /* domain might be skipped by 'ad_enabled_domains' option */
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CONF_SETTINGS, "Unknown domain: %s\n", domainname);
return ERR_DOMAIN_NOT_FOUND;
}
}

69
SOURCES/LDAP-make-groups_by_user_send-recv-public.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
From 9b73614c49aeb3cfc3208dba5f472354086180b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 3 Nov 2023 18:43:13 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] LDAP: make groups_by_user_send/recv public
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/5708
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
---
src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h | 12 ++++++++++++
src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c | 18 +++++++++---------
2 files changed, 21 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
index 1b35cbd208..6df7b3df44 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
@@ -298,6 +298,18 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_get_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
bool no_members);
int groups_get_recv(struct tevent_req *req, int *dp_error_out, int *sdap_ret);
+struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
+ struct tevent_context *ev,
+ struct sdap_id_ctx *ctx,
+ struct sdap_domain *sdom,
+ struct sdap_id_conn_ctx *conn,
+ const char *filter_value,
+ int filter_type,
+ const char *extra_value,
+ bool noexist_delete);
+
+int groups_by_user_recv(struct tevent_req *req, int *dp_error_out, int *sdap_ret);
+
struct tevent_req *ldap_netgroup_get_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct tevent_context *ev,
struct sdap_id_ctx *ctx,
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
index a60aed0686..fb81a17937 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
@@ -1151,15 +1151,15 @@ static int groups_by_user_retry(struct tevent_req *req);
static void groups_by_user_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
static void groups_by_user_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
-static struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
- struct tevent_context *ev,
- struct sdap_id_ctx *ctx,
- struct sdap_domain *sdom,
- struct sdap_id_conn_ctx *conn,
- const char *filter_value,
- int filter_type,
- const char *extra_value,
- bool noexist_delete)
+struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
+ struct tevent_context *ev,
+ struct sdap_id_ctx *ctx,
+ struct sdap_domain *sdom,
+ struct sdap_id_conn_ctx *conn,
+ const char *filter_value,
+ int filter_type,
+ const char *extra_value,
+ bool noexist_delete)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
struct groups_by_user_state *state;

79
SOURCES/Makefile-Respect-BUILD_PASSKEY-conditional.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,79 @@
From a20dadc7ec9b21687356d1b0b0218db89f438c67 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2023 16:27:39 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] Makefile: Respect `BUILD_PASSKEY` conditional
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
---
Makefile.am | 11 ++++++++---
src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 5 +++++
2 files changed, 13 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index a3952ce78d..066f5d94ee 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -1315,7 +1315,9 @@ endif
if BUILD_SYSTEMTAP
libsss_util_la_LIBADD += stap_generated_probes.lo
endif
+if BUILD_PASSKEY
libsss_util_la_SOURCES += src/db/sysdb_passkey_user_verification.c
+endif # BUILD_PASSKEY
libsss_util_la_LDFLAGS = -avoid-version
pkglib_LTLIBRARIES += libsss_semanage.la
@@ -2616,7 +2618,6 @@ pam_srv_tests_SOURCES = \
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c \
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_p11.c \
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_gssapi.c \
- src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c \
src/responder/pam/pam_helpers.c \
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_dp.c \
src/responder/pam/pam_prompting_config.c \
@@ -2650,6 +2651,9 @@ pam_srv_tests_LDADD = \
libsss_iface.la \
libsss_sbus.la \
$(NULL)
+if BUILD_PASSKEY
+ pam_srv_tests_SOURCES += src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c
+endif # BUILD_PASSKEY
EXTRA_ssh_srv_tests_DEPENDENCIES = \
$(ldblib_LTLIBRARIES) \
@@ -4656,8 +4660,10 @@ krb5_child_SOURCES = \
src/sss_client/common.c \
src/krb5_plugin/common/utils.c \
src/krb5_plugin/idp/idp_utils.c \
- src/krb5_plugin/passkey/passkey_utils.c \
$(NULL)
+if BUILD_PASSKEY
+ krb5_child_SOURCES += src/krb5_plugin/passkey/passkey_utils.c
+endif # BUILD_PASSKEY
krb5_child_CFLAGS = \
$(AM_CFLAGS) \
$(POPT_CFLAGS) \
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
index a3d83b4c8c..7e43042bff 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
@@ -999,6 +999,10 @@ static krb5_error_code answer_passkey(krb5_context kctx,
struct krb5_req *kr,
krb5_responder_context rctx)
{
+#ifndef BUILD_PASSKEY
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "Passkey auth not possible, SSSD built without passkey support!\n");
+ return EINVAL;
+#else
enum sss_authtok_type type;
struct sss_passkey_message *msg;
struct sss_passkey_message *reply_msg = NULL;
@@ -1090,6 +1094,7 @@ done:
}
return kerr;
+#endif /* BUILD_PASSKEY */
}
static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_responder(krb5_context ctx,

44
SOURCES/SSS_CLIENT-MC-in-case-mem-cache-file-validation-fails.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,44 @@
From 958a5e25c447dc502e8f8fbecf3253e62f92b0b2 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 8 Dec 2023 19:02:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] SSS_CLIENT: MC: in case mem-cache file validation fails,
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
don't return anything but EINVAL, because `_nss_sss_*()` functions
can have a special handling for other error codes (for ERANGE in
particular).
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
---
src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c | 6 +++---
1 file changed, 3 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c
index e227c0bae3..37119fa8d3 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c
@@ -79,17 +79,17 @@ static errno_t sss_nss_mc_validate(struct sss_cli_mc_ctx *ctx)
}
if (fstat(ctx->fd, &fdstat) == -1) {
- return errno;
+ return EINVAL;
}
/* Memcache was removed. */
if (fdstat.st_nlink == 0) {
- return ENOENT;
+ return EINVAL;
}
/* Invalid size. */
if (fdstat.st_size != ctx->mmap_size) {
- return ERANGE;
+ return EINVAL;
}
return EOK;

83
SOURCES/SSS_CLIENT-check-if-mem-cache-fd-was-hijacked.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,83 @@
From a186224d6e1ce0c91507df58fec424209a307fe3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 14:52:51 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] SSS_CLIENT: check if mem-cache fd was hijacked
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Real life example would be:
https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/blob/effd854bfd19654fa67ff3d39514a91a246b8ae6/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c#L369
- TigerVNC unconditionally overwrites fd=3
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/6986
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0344c41aca0d6fcaa33e081ed77297607e48ced4)
---
src/sss_client/nss_mc.h | 6 ++++--
src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c | 10 ++++++++++
2 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc.h b/src/sss_client/nss_mc.h
index 9ab2736fa6..646861ba52 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc.h
+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc.h
@@ -53,6 +53,8 @@ struct sss_cli_mc_ctx {
pthread_mutex_t *mutex;
#endif
int fd;
+ ino_t fd_inode;
+ dev_t fd_device;
uint32_t seed; /* seed from the tables header */
@@ -69,9 +71,9 @@ struct sss_cli_mc_ctx {
};
#if HAVE_PTHREAD
-#define SSS_CLI_MC_CTX_INITIALIZER(mtx) {UNINITIALIZED, (mtx), -1, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0}
+#define SSS_CLI_MC_CTX_INITIALIZER(mtx) {UNINITIALIZED, (mtx), -1, 0, 0, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0}
#else
-#define SSS_CLI_MC_CTX_INITIALIZER {UNINITIALIZED, -1, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0}
+#define SSS_CLI_MC_CTX_INITIALIZER {UNINITIALIZED, -1, 0, 0, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, NULL, 0, 0}
#endif
errno_t sss_nss_mc_get_ctx(const char *name, struct sss_cli_mc_ctx *ctx);
diff --git a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c
index 37119fa8d3..17683ac0e5 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/nss_mc_common.c
@@ -87,6 +87,12 @@ static errno_t sss_nss_mc_validate(struct sss_cli_mc_ctx *ctx)
return EINVAL;
}
+ /* FD was hijacked */
+ if ((fdstat.st_dev != ctx->fd_device) || (fdstat.st_ino != ctx->fd_inode)) {
+ ctx->fd = -1; /* don't ruin app even if it's misbehaving */
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
/* Invalid size. */
if (fdstat.st_size != ctx->mmap_size) {
return EINVAL;
@@ -161,6 +167,8 @@ static void sss_nss_mc_destroy_ctx(struct sss_cli_mc_ctx *ctx)
close(ctx->fd);
}
ctx->fd = -1;
+ ctx->fd_inode = 0;
+ ctx->fd_device = 0;
ctx->seed = 0;
ctx->data_table = NULL;
@@ -202,6 +210,8 @@ static errno_t sss_nss_mc_init_ctx(const char *name,
ret = EIO;
goto done;
}
+ ctx->fd_inode = fdstat.st_ino;
+ ctx->fd_device = fdstat.st_dev;
if (fdstat.st_size < MC_HEADER_SIZE) {
ret = ENOMEM;

41
SOURCES/SSS_CLIENT-check-if-reponder-socket-was-hijacked.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
From abb146e1487598c0e4fa2cdc826b7388db46f9bc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 09:43:48 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] SSS_CLIENT: check if reponder socket was hijacked
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Real life example would be:
https://github.com/TigerVNC/tigervnc/blob/effd854bfd19654fa67ff3d39514a91a246b8ae6/unix/xserver/hw/vnc/xvnc.c#L369
- TigerVNC unconditionally overwrites fd=3
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2bcfb7f9238c27025e99e6445e9ba799e0bde7b8)
---
src/sss_client/common.c | 10 ++++++++++
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/sss_client/common.c b/src/sss_client/common.c
index 1075af9419..702d0597d1 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/common.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/common.c
@@ -746,6 +746,16 @@ static enum sss_status sss_cli_check_socket(int *errnop,
myself_ino = myself_sb.st_ino;
}
+ /* check if the socket has been hijacked */
+ if (sss_cli_sd != -1) {
+ ret = fstat(sss_cli_sd, &mypid_sb);
+ if ((ret != 0) || (!S_ISSOCK(mypid_sb.st_mode))
+ || (mypid_sb.st_dev != sss_cli_sb.st_dev)
+ || (mypid_sb.st_ino != sss_cli_sb.st_ino)) {
+ sss_cli_sd = -1; /* don't ruin app even if it's misbehaving */
+ }
+ }
+
/* check if the socket has been closed on the other side */
if (sss_cli_sd_get() != -1) {
struct pollfd pfd;

623
SOURCES/ad-gpo-evalute-host-groups.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,623 @@
From c02e09afe9610d872121708893db8a21fb201b12 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Nov 2023 18:17:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ad: gpo evalute host groups
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
With this patch the group-memberships of the client running SSSD are
included in the evaluation of the security filtering. Similar as in AD
the host object is more or less handled as a user object which allows
to skip some code dedicated to computers only.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/5708
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
---
src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c | 332 +++++++++++----------------------
src/tests/cmocka/test_ad_gpo.c | 25 ++-
2 files changed, 134 insertions(+), 223 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
index b119aa3776..1c731b222b 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
@@ -661,6 +661,8 @@ ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(const char *user_sid,
const char *host_sid,
const char **group_sids,
int group_size,
+ const char **host_group_sids,
+ int host_group_size,
struct dom_sid ace_dom_sid,
struct sss_idmap_ctx *idmap_ctx,
bool *_included)
@@ -718,6 +720,22 @@ ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(const char *user_sid,
}
}
+ for (i = 0; i < host_group_size; i++) {
+ err = sss_idmap_sid_to_smb_sid(idmap_ctx, host_group_sids[i], &group_dom_sid);
+ if (err != IDMAP_SUCCESS) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
+ "sss_idmap_sid_to_smb_sid() failed for group_sid '%s': %d\n",
+ group_sids[i], err);
+ return EFAULT;
+ }
+ included = ad_gpo_dom_sid_equal(&ace_dom_sid, group_dom_sid);
+ sss_idmap_free_smb_sid(idmap_ctx, group_dom_sid);
+ if (included) {
+ *_included = true;
+ return EOK;
+ }
+ }
+
*_included = false;
return EOK;
}
@@ -770,7 +788,9 @@ static enum ace_eval_agp_status ad_gpo_evaluate_ace(struct security_ace *ace,
const char *user_sid,
const char *host_sid,
const char **group_sids,
- int group_size)
+ int group_size,
+ const char **host_group_sids,
+ int host_group_size)
{
bool included = false;
int ret = 0;
@@ -782,9 +802,9 @@ static enum ace_eval_agp_status ad_gpo_evaluate_ace(struct security_ace *ace,
}
ret = ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(user_sid, host_sid, group_sids,
- group_size, ace->trustee, idmap_ctx,
- &included);
-
+ group_size, host_group_sids,
+ host_group_size, ace->trustee,
+ idmap_ctx, &included);
if (ret != EOK) {
return AD_GPO_ACE_DENIED;
}
@@ -844,6 +864,8 @@ static errno_t ad_gpo_simple_evaluate_ace(struct security_ace *ace,
const char *host_sid,
const char **group_sids,
int group_size,
+ const char **host_group_sids,
+ int host_group_size,
uint32_t *_gpo_access_granted_status,
uint32_t *_gpo_access_denied_status)
{
@@ -856,6 +878,7 @@ static errno_t ad_gpo_simple_evaluate_ace(struct security_ace *ace,
}
ret = ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(user_sid, host_sid, group_sids, group_size,
+ host_group_sids, host_group_size,
ace->trustee, idmap_ctx, &included);
if (ret != EOK || !included) {
@@ -895,6 +918,8 @@ static errno_t ad_gpo_evaluate_dacl(struct security_acl *dacl,
const char *host_sid,
const char **group_sids,
int group_size,
+ const char **host_group_sids,
+ int host_group_size,
bool *_dacl_access_allowed)
{
uint32_t num_aces = 0;
@@ -931,6 +956,7 @@ static errno_t ad_gpo_evaluate_dacl(struct security_acl *dacl,
ret = ad_gpo_simple_evaluate_ace(ace, idmap_ctx, user_sid, host_sid,
group_sids, group_size,
+ host_group_sids, host_group_size,
&access_granted_status,
&access_denied_status);
@@ -963,7 +989,8 @@ static errno_t ad_gpo_evaluate_dacl(struct security_acl *dacl,
}
ace_status = ad_gpo_evaluate_ace(ace, idmap_ctx, user_sid, host_sid,
- group_sids, group_size);
+ group_sids, group_size,
+ host_group_sids, host_group_size);
switch (ace_status) {
case AD_GPO_ACE_NEUTRAL:
@@ -1016,8 +1043,9 @@ static errno_t ad_gpo_evaluate_dacl(struct security_acl *dacl,
static errno_t
ad_gpo_filter_gpos_by_dacl(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *user,
- const char *host_sid,
+ const char *host_fqdn,
struct sss_domain_info *domain,
+ struct sss_domain_info *host_domain,
struct sss_idmap_ctx *idmap_ctx,
struct gp_gpo **candidate_gpos,
int num_candidate_gpos,
@@ -1033,6 +1061,9 @@ ad_gpo_filter_gpos_by_dacl(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
const char *user_sid = NULL;
const char **group_sids = NULL;
int group_size = 0;
+ const char *host_sid = NULL;
+ const char **host_group_sids = NULL;
+ int host_group_size = 0;
int gpo_dn_idx = 0;
bool access_allowed = false;
struct gp_gpo **dacl_filtered_gpos = NULL;
@@ -1052,6 +1083,15 @@ ad_gpo_filter_gpos_by_dacl(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
goto done;
}
+ ret = ad_gpo_get_sids(tmp_ctx, host_fqdn, host_domain, &host_sid,
+ &host_group_sids, &host_group_size);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ ret = ERR_NO_SIDS;
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "Unable to retrieve host SIDs: [%d](%s)\n", ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
dacl_filtered_gpos = talloc_array(tmp_ctx,
struct gp_gpo *,
num_candidate_gpos + 1);
@@ -1096,7 +1136,8 @@ ad_gpo_filter_gpos_by_dacl(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
if ((sd->type & SEC_DESC_DACL_PRESENT) && (dacl != NULL)) {
ret = ad_gpo_evaluate_dacl(dacl, idmap_ctx, user_sid, host_sid,
- group_sids, group_size, &access_allowed);
+ group_sids, group_size, host_group_sids,
+ host_group_size, &access_allowed);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
"Could not determine if GPO is applicable\n");
@@ -1773,6 +1814,8 @@ struct ad_gpo_access_state {
int timeout;
struct sss_domain_info *user_domain;
struct sss_domain_info *host_domain;
+ const char *host_sam_account_name;
+ char *host_fqdn;
const char *user;
int gpo_timeout_option;
const char *ad_hostname;
@@ -1793,7 +1836,6 @@ static void ad_gpo_process_gpo_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
static errno_t ad_gpo_cse_step(struct tevent_req *req);
static void ad_gpo_cse_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
-static void ad_gpo_get_host_sid_retrieval_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
struct tevent_req *
ad_gpo_access_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
@@ -1967,15 +2009,11 @@ ad_gpo_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
struct ad_gpo_access_state *state;
- char *filter;
- const char *sam_account_name;
- char *domain_dn;
int dp_error;
errno_t ret;
char *server_uri;
LDAPURLDesc *lud;
-
- const char *attrs[] = {AD_AT_DN, AD_AT_UAC, NULL};
+ struct sdap_domain *sdom;
req = tevent_req_callback_data(subreq, struct tevent_req);
state = tevent_req_data(req, struct ad_gpo_access_state);
@@ -2041,47 +2079,40 @@ ad_gpo_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
/* SDAP_SASL_AUTHID contains the name used for kinit and SASL bind which
* in the AD case is the NetBIOS name. */
- sam_account_name = dp_opt_get_string(state->opts->basic, SDAP_SASL_AUTHID);
- if (sam_account_name == NULL) {
+ state->host_sam_account_name = dp_opt_get_string(state->opts->basic,
+ SDAP_SASL_AUTHID);
+ if (state->host_sam_account_name == NULL) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "sam_account_name is %s\n", sam_account_name);
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "sam_account_name is %s\n",
+ state->host_sam_account_name);
- /* Convert the domain name into domain DN */
- ret = domain_to_basedn(state, state->ad_domain, &domain_dn);
- if (ret != EOK) {
+ state->host_fqdn = sss_create_internal_fqname(state, state->host_sam_account_name,
+ state->host_domain->name);
+ if (state->host_fqdn == NULL) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "Cannot convert domain name [%s] to base DN [%d]: %s\n",
- state->ad_domain, ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* SDAP_OC_USER objectclass covers both users and computers */
- filter = talloc_asprintf(state,
- "(&(objectclass=%s)(%s=%s))",
- state->opts->user_map[SDAP_OC_USER].name,
- AD_AT_SAMACCOUNTNAME,
- sam_account_name);
- if (filter == NULL) {
+ "Failed to create fully-qualified host name.\n");
ret = ENOMEM;
goto done;
}
- subreq = sdap_get_generic_send(state, state->ev, state->opts,
- sdap_id_op_handle(state->sdap_op),
- domain_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_SUBTREE,
- filter, attrs, NULL, 0,
- state->timeout,
- false);
-
- if (subreq == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "sdap_get_generic_send failed.\n");
+ /* AD handle computers the same as users */
+ sdom = sdap_domain_get(state->access_ctx->ad_id_ctx->sdap_id_ctx->opts,
+ state->host_domain);
+ if (sdom == NULL) {
ret = EIO;
goto done;
}
+ subreq = groups_by_user_send(state, state->ev,
+ state->access_ctx->ad_id_ctx->sdap_id_ctx,
+ sdom, state->conn,
+ state->host_fqdn,
+ BE_FILTER_NAME,
+ NULL,
+ true);
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, ad_gpo_target_dn_retrieval_done, req);
ret = EOK;
@@ -2100,22 +2131,20 @@ ad_gpo_target_dn_retrieval_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
struct ad_gpo_access_state *state;
int ret;
int dp_error;
- size_t reply_count;
- struct sysdb_attrs **reply;
+ int sdap_ret;
const char *target_dn = NULL;
uint32_t uac;
- const char *attrs[] = {AD_AT_SID, NULL};
- struct ldb_message *msg;
- static const char *host_attrs[] = { SYSDB_SID_STR, NULL };
+ static const char *host_attrs[] = { SYSDB_ORIG_DN, SYSDB_AD_USER_ACCOUNT_CONTROL, SYSDB_SID_STR, NULL };
+ struct ldb_result *res = NULL;
+ const char *tmp = NULL;
+ char *endptr;
req = tevent_req_callback_data(subreq, struct tevent_req);
state = tevent_req_data(req, struct ad_gpo_access_state);
- ret = sdap_get_generic_recv(subreq, state,
- &reply_count, &reply);
+ ret = groups_by_user_recv(subreq, &dp_error, &sdap_ret);
talloc_zfree(subreq);
if (ret != EOK) {
- ret = sdap_id_op_done(state->sdap_op, ret, &dp_error);
- if (ret == EAGAIN && dp_error == DP_ERR_OFFLINE) {
+ if (sdap_ret == EAGAIN && dp_error == DP_ERR_OFFLINE) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "Preparing for offline operation.\n");
ret = process_offline_gpos(state,
state->user,
@@ -2144,27 +2173,25 @@ ad_gpo_target_dn_retrieval_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
goto done;
}
- /* make sure there is only one non-NULL reply returned */
-
- if (reply_count < 1) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "No DN retrieved for policy target.\n");
- ret = ENOENT;
- goto done;
- } else if (reply_count > 1) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Multiple replies for policy target\n");
- ret = ERR_INTERNAL;
+ ret = sysdb_get_user_attr(state, state->host_domain,
+ state->host_fqdn,
+ host_attrs, &res);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to read host attributes.\n");
goto done;
- } else if (reply == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "reply_count is 1, but reply is NULL\n");
- ret = ERR_INTERNAL;
+ }
+ if (res->count != 1) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Unexpected number [%d] of results searching "
+ "for [%s], expected 1.\n", res->count,
+ state->host_sam_account_name);
+ ret = EINVAL;
goto done;
}
- /* reply[0] holds requested attributes of single reply */
- ret = sysdb_attrs_get_string(reply[0], AD_AT_DN, &target_dn);
- if (ret != EOK) {
+ target_dn = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(res->msgs[0], SYSDB_ORIG_DN, NULL);
+ if (target_dn == NULL) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "sysdb_attrs_get_string failed: [%d](%s)\n",
+ "ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string failed: [%d](%s)\n",
ret, sss_strerror(ret));
goto done;
}
@@ -2174,14 +2201,29 @@ ad_gpo_target_dn_retrieval_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
goto done;
}
- ret = sysdb_attrs_get_uint32_t(reply[0], AD_AT_UAC, &uac);
- if (ret != EOK) {
+ tmp = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(res->msgs[0], SYSDB_AD_USER_ACCOUNT_CONTROL,
+ NULL);
+ if (tmp == NULL) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "sysdb_attrs_get_uint32_t failed: [%d](%s)\n",
+ "ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string failed: [%d](%s)\n",
ret, sss_strerror(ret));
goto done;
}
+ uac = strtouint32(tmp, &endptr, 10);
+ if (errno != 0) {
+ ret = errno;
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to convert UAC [%s] into uint32_t.\n",
+ tmp);
+ goto done;
+ }
+ if (*endptr != '\0') {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "UAC [%s] is not a pure numerical value.\n",
+ tmp);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
/* we only support computer policy targets, not users */
if (!(uac & UAC_WORKSTATION_TRUST_ACCOUNT ||
uac & UAC_SERVER_TRUST_ACCOUNT)) {
@@ -2192,36 +2234,8 @@ ad_gpo_target_dn_retrieval_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
goto done;
}
- /* Check if computer exists in cache */
- ret = sysdb_get_computer(state, state->user_domain, state->ad_hostname,
- host_attrs, &msg);
- if (ret == ENOENT) {
- /* The computer is not in cache so query LDAP server */
- subreq = sdap_get_generic_send(state, state->ev, state->opts,
- sdap_id_op_handle(state->sdap_op),
- state->target_dn, LDAP_SCOPE_BASE,
- "(&)", attrs, NULL, 0,
- state->timeout,
- false);
-
- if (subreq == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "sdap_get_generic_send failed.\n");
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, ad_gpo_get_host_sid_retrieval_done, req);
- return;
- } else if (ret != EOK) {
- ret = sdap_id_op_done(state->sdap_op, ret, &dp_error);
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* The computer exists in the cache, there is no need to query LDAP.
- * Store the retrieved host sid from cache in the state to avoid querying
- * the cache again in ad_gpo_get_sids.
- */
- state->host_sid = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(msg, SYSDB_SID_STR, NULL);
+ state->host_sid = ldb_msg_find_attr_as_string(res->msgs[0], SYSDB_SID_STR,
+ NULL);
talloc_steal(state, state->host_sid);
subreq = ad_gpo_process_som_send(state,
@@ -2251,125 +2265,6 @@ ad_gpo_target_dn_retrieval_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
}
-enum ndr_err_code
-ndr_pull_dom_sid(struct ndr_pull *ndr,
- int ndr_flags,
- struct dom_sid *r);
-
-static void ad_gpo_get_host_sid_retrieval_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
-{
- struct tevent_req *req;
- struct ad_gpo_access_state *state;
- int ret;
- int dp_error;
- size_t reply_count;
- struct sysdb_attrs **reply;
- struct ldb_message_element *el = NULL;
- enum ndr_err_code ndr_err;
- struct dom_sid host_sid;
- char *sid_str;
-
- req = tevent_req_callback_data(subreq, struct tevent_req);
- state = tevent_req_data(req, struct ad_gpo_access_state);
-
- ret = sdap_get_generic_recv(subreq, state,
- &reply_count, &reply);
- talloc_zfree(subreq);
-
- if (ret != EOK) {
- ret = sdap_id_op_done(state->sdap_op, ret, &dp_error);
-
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "sdap_get_generic_recv failed: [%d](%s)\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- ret = ENOENT;
- tevent_req_error(req, ret);
- return;
- }
-
- if (reply_count == 0 || !reply) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "sdap_get_generic_recv failed to receive host sid\n");
- ret = EIO;
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* reply[0] holds the requested attribute */
- ret = sysdb_attrs_get_el(reply[0], AD_AT_SID, &el);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "sysdb_attrs_get_el failed: [%d](%s)\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
- if (el->num_values != 1) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "ad_gpo_get_host_sid_retrieval_done failed: sid not present\n");
- ret = EIO;
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* parse the dom_sid from the ldb blob */
- ndr_err = ndr_pull_struct_blob_all((DATA_BLOB*)&(el->values[0]),
- subreq, &host_sid,
- (ndr_pull_flags_fn_t)ndr_pull_dom_sid);
- if (!NDR_ERR_CODE_IS_SUCCESS(ndr_err)) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "ndr_pull_struct_blob_all failed: [%d]\n",
- ndr_err);
- ret = EIO;
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* Convert the dom_sid to a sid string */
- ret = sss_idmap_smb_sid_to_sid(state->opts->idmap_ctx->map,
- &host_sid, &sid_str);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "sss_idmap_smb_sid_to_sid failed: [%d](%s)\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
- state->host_sid = talloc_steal(state, sid_str);
-
- /* Put the sid string in the sysdb */
- ret = sysdb_set_computer(subreq, state->user_domain,
- state->ad_hostname, state->host_sid,
- state->user_domain->computer_timeout,
- time(NULL));
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "sysdb_set_computer failed: [%d](%s)\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
-
- subreq = ad_gpo_process_som_send(state,
- state->ev,
- state->conn,
- state->ldb_ctx,
- state->sdap_op,
- state->opts,
- state->access_ctx->ad_options,
- state->timeout,
- state->target_dn,
- state->ad_domain);
- if (subreq == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, ad_gpo_process_som_done, req);
-
- ret = EOK;
-
- done:
-
- if (ret != EOK) {
- tevent_req_error(req, ret);
- }
-}
-
static void
ad_gpo_process_som_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
{
@@ -2487,8 +2382,9 @@ ad_gpo_process_gpo_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
goto done;
}
- ret = ad_gpo_filter_gpos_by_dacl(state, state->user, state->host_sid,
+ ret = ad_gpo_filter_gpos_by_dacl(state, state->user, state->host_fqdn,
state->user_domain,
+ state->host_domain,
state->opts->idmap_ctx->map,
candidate_gpos, num_candidate_gpos,
&state->dacl_filtered_gpos,
diff --git a/src/tests/cmocka/test_ad_gpo.c b/src/tests/cmocka/test_ad_gpo.c
index 8660b05107..d49f6c54c2 100644
--- a/src/tests/cmocka/test_ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/tests/cmocka/test_ad_gpo.c
@@ -270,6 +270,8 @@ static void test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(const char *user_sid,
const char *host_sid,
const char **group_sids,
int group_size,
+ const char **host_group_sids,
+ int host_group_size,
struct dom_sid ace_dom_sid,
bool expected)
{
@@ -288,8 +290,9 @@ static void test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(const char *user_sid,
assert_int_equal(err, IDMAP_SUCCESS);
ret = ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(user_sid, host_sid, group_sids,
- group_size, ace_dom_sid, idmap_ctx,
- &includes_client_sid);
+ group_size, host_group_sids,
+ host_group_size, ace_dom_sid,
+ idmap_ctx, &includes_client_sid);
talloc_free(idmap_ctx);
assert_int_equal(ret, EOK);
@@ -312,8 +315,12 @@ void test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid_true(void **state)
const char *group_sids[] = {"S-1-5-21-2-3-4",
"S-1-5-21-2-3-5"};
+ int host_group_size = 0;
+ const char *host_group_sids[] = { NULL };
+
test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(user_sid, host_sid, group_sids,
- group_size, ace_dom_sid, true);
+ group_size, host_group_sids,
+ host_group_size, ace_dom_sid, true);
}
void test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid_false(void **state)
@@ -328,8 +335,12 @@ void test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid_false(void **state)
const char *group_sids[] = {"S-1-5-21-2-3-5",
"S-1-5-21-2-3-6"};
+ int host_group_size = 0;
+ const char *host_group_sids[] = { NULL };
+
test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(user_sid, host_sid, group_sids,
- group_size, ace_dom_sid, false);
+ group_size, host_group_sids,
+ host_group_size, ace_dom_sid, false);
}
void test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_host_sid_true(void **state)
@@ -343,8 +354,12 @@ void test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_host_sid_true(void **state)
int group_size = 0;
const char *group_sids[] = {};
+ int host_group_size = 0;
+ const char *host_group_sids[] = { NULL };
+
test_ad_gpo_ace_includes_client_sid(user_sid, host_sid, group_sids,
- group_size, ace_dom_sid, true);
+ group_size, host_group_sids,
+ host_group_size, ace_dom_sid, true);
}
uint8_t test_sid_data[] = {

57
SOURCES/ipa-Add-BUILD_PASSKEY-conditional-for-passkey-codepath.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,57 @@
From 7cf9a1ff0e876ea0970a3f0b3c389b87be834b4f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 15 Aug 2023 13:33:03 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] ipa: Add `BUILD_PASSKEY` conditional for passkey codepath
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
---
Makefile.am | 2 ++
src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains.c | 4 ++++
2 files changed, 6 insertions(+)
diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index 273ac1c523..c68461675f 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -4568,8 +4568,10 @@ if BUILD_SSH
libsss_ipa_la_SOURCES += src/providers/ipa/ipa_hostid.c
endif
+if BUILD_PASSKEY
libsss_ipa_la_SOURCES += \
src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains_passkey.c
+endif # BUILD_PASSKEY
libsss_ad_la_SOURCES = \
src/providers/ad/ad_opts.c \
diff --git a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains.c b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains.c
index 34cedc0362..e19343a77d 100644
--- a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains.c
+++ b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains.c
@@ -30,7 +30,9 @@
#include "providers/ipa/ipa_id.h"
#include "providers/ipa/ipa_opts.h"
#include "providers/ipa/ipa_config.h"
+#ifdef BUILD_PASSKEY
#include "providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains_passkey.h"
+#endif /* BUILD_PASSKEY */
#include <ctype.h>
@@ -2762,6 +2764,7 @@ static void ipa_subdomains_refresh_certmap_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
/* Not good, but let's try to continue with other server side options */
}
+#ifdef BUILD_PASSKEY
subreq = ipa_subdomains_passkey_send(state, state->ev, state->sd_ctx,
sdap_id_op_handle(state->sdap_op));
if (subreq == NULL) {
@@ -2792,6 +2795,7 @@ static void ipa_subdomains_refresh_passkey_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
DEBUG(SSSDBG_IMPORTANT_INFO, "Passkey feature is not configured "
"on IPA server");
}
+#endif /* BUILD_PASSKEY */
subreq = ipa_subdomains_master_send(state, state->ev, state->sd_ctx,
sdap_id_op_handle(state->sdap_op));

871
SOURCES/pam-Conditionalize-passkey-code.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,871 @@
From eadee9a2a8f0dfe4f22c460537d6c87c493fa622 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 14 Aug 2023 14:42:51 -0400
Subject: [PATCH] pam: Conditionalize passkey code
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
---
Makefile.am | 4 +-
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c | 364 +----------------------------
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c | 351 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.h | 8 +
4 files changed, 372 insertions(+), 355 deletions(-)
diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index 066f5d94ee..273ac1c523 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -1558,8 +1558,10 @@ sssd_pam_SOURCES = \
src/responder/pam/pam_prompting_config.c \
src/sss_client/pam_sss_prompt_config.c \
src/responder/pam/pam_helpers.c \
- src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c \
$(SSSD_RESPONDER_OBJ)
+if BUILD_PASSKEY
+ sssd_pam_SOURCES += src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c
+endif
sssd_pam_CFLAGS = \
$(AM_CFLAGS) \
$(GSSAPI_KRB5_CFLAGS) \
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
index 94cbf13e8d..eed283f4e9 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
@@ -50,12 +50,6 @@ struct pam_initgroup_enum_str {
const char *option;
};
-struct pam_passkey_table_data {
- hash_table_t *table;
- char *key;
- struct pk_child_user_data *data;
-};
-
struct pam_initgroup_enum_str pam_initgroup_enum_str[] = {
{ PAM_INITGR_NEVER, "never" },
{ PAM_INITGR_NO_SESSION, "no_session" },
@@ -105,10 +99,6 @@ static errno_t check_cert(TALLOC_CTX *mctx,
struct pam_auth_req *preq,
struct pam_data *pd);
-errno_t passkey_kerberos(struct pam_ctx *pctx,
- struct pam_data *pd,
- struct pam_auth_req *preq);
-
int pam_check_user_done(struct pam_auth_req *preq, int ret);
static errno_t pack_user_info_msg(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
@@ -871,228 +861,6 @@ done:
return ret;
}
-errno_t decode_pam_passkey_msg(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- uint8_t *buf,
- size_t len,
- struct pk_child_user_data **_data)
-{
-
- size_t p = 0;
- size_t pctr = 0;
- errno_t ret;
- size_t offset;
- struct pk_child_user_data *data = NULL;
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
-
- tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
- if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- data = talloc_zero(tmp_ctx, struct pk_child_user_data);
- if (data == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to talloc passkey data.\n");
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- data->user_verification = talloc_strdup(data, (char *) &buf[p]);
- if (data->user_verification == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to strdup passkey prompt.\n");
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- offset = strlen(data->user_verification) + 1;
- if (offset >= len) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "passkey prompt offset failure.\n");
- ret = EIO;
- goto done;
- }
-
- data->crypto_challenge = talloc_strdup(data, (char *) &buf[p + offset]);
- if (data->crypto_challenge == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to strdup passkey challenge.\n");
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- offset += strlen(data->crypto_challenge) + 1;
- if (offset >= len) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "passkey challenge offset failure.\n");
- ret = EIO;
- goto done;
- }
-
-
- data->domain = talloc_strdup(data, (char *) &buf[p] + offset);
- if (data->domain == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to strdup passkey domain.\n");
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- offset += strlen(data->domain) + 1;
- if (offset >= len) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "passkey domain offset failure.\n");
- ret = EIO;
- goto done;
- }
-
- SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32(&data->num_credentials, &buf[p + offset], &pctr);
- size_t list_sz = (size_t) data->num_credentials;
-
- offset += sizeof(uint32_t);
-
- data->key_handles = talloc_zero_array(data, const char *, list_sz);
-
- for (int i = 0; i < list_sz; i++) {
- data->key_handles[i] = talloc_strdup(data->key_handles, (char *) &buf[p + offset]);
- if (data->key_handles[i] == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to strdup passkey list.\n");
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- offset += strlen(data->key_handles[i]) + 1;
- }
-
- *_data = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, data);
-
- ret = EOK;
-done:
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
-
-errno_t save_passkey_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct pam_ctx *pctx,
- struct pk_child_user_data *data,
- struct pam_auth_req *preq)
-{
- char *pk_key;
- errno_t ret;
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
-
- tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
- if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- /* Passkey data (pk_table_data) is stolen onto client ctx, it will
- * be freed when the client closes, and the sss_ptr_hash interface
- * takes care of automatically removing it from the hash table then */
- pctx->pk_table_data = talloc_zero(tmp_ctx, struct pam_passkey_table_data);
- if (pctx->pk_table_data == NULL) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- if (pctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
- pctx->pk_table_data->table = sss_ptr_hash_create(pctx->pk_table_data,
- NULL, NULL);
- if (pctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- pk_key = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s", data->crypto_challenge);
- if (pk_key == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- pctx->pk_table_data->key = talloc_strdup(pctx->pk_table_data, pk_key);
- if (pctx->pk_table_data->key == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = sss_ptr_hash_add(pctx->pk_table_data->table, pk_key, data,
- struct pk_child_user_data);
- if (ret == EEXIST) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "pk_table key [%s] already exists\n",
- pk_key);
- goto done;
- } else if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Unable to add pk data to hash table "
- "[%d]: %s\n", ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
-
- talloc_steal(mem_ctx, pctx->pk_table_data);
- pctx->pk_table_data->data = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, data);
-
- ret = EOK;
-
-done:
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-errno_t pam_eval_passkey_response(struct pam_ctx *pctx,
- struct pam_data *pd,
- struct pam_auth_req *preq,
- bool *_pk_preauth_done)
-{
- struct response_data *pk_resp;
- struct pk_child_user_data *pk_data;
- errno_t ret;
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
-
- tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
- if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- pk_resp = pd->resp_list;
-
- while (pk_resp != NULL) {
- switch (pk_resp->type) {
- case SSS_PAM_PASSKEY_KRB_INFO:
- if (!pctx->passkey_auth) {
- /* Passkey auth is disabled. To avoid passkey prompts appearing,
- * don't send SSS_PAM_PASSKEY_KRB_INFO to the client and
- * add a dummy response to fallback to normal auth */
- pk_resp->do_not_send_to_client = true;
- ret = pam_add_response(pd, SSS_OTP, 0, NULL);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "pam_add_response failed.\n");
- goto done;
- }
- break;
- }
- ret = decode_pam_passkey_msg(tmp_ctx, pk_resp->data, pk_resp->len, &pk_data);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to decode passkey msg\n");
- ret = EIO;
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = save_passkey_data(preq->cctx, pctx, pk_data, preq);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to save passkey msg\n");
- ret = EIO;
- goto done;
- }
- break;
- /* Passkey non-kerberos preauth has already run */
- case SSS_PAM_PASSKEY_INFO:
- *_pk_preauth_done = true;
- default:
- break;
- }
- pk_resp = pk_resp->next;
- }
-
- ret = EOK;
-done:
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
-
- return ret;
-}
void pam_reply(struct pam_auth_req *preq)
{
@@ -1342,6 +1110,7 @@ void pam_reply(struct pam_auth_req *preq)
"using defaults.\n");
}
+#ifdef BUILD_PASSKEY
ret = pam_eval_passkey_response(pctx, pd, preq, &pk_preauth_done);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to eval passkey response\n");
@@ -1353,6 +1122,7 @@ void pam_reply(struct pam_auth_req *preq)
pam_check_user_done(preq, ret);
return;
}
+#endif /* BUILD_PASSKEY */
}
/*
@@ -1810,6 +1580,7 @@ static int pam_forwarder(struct cli_ctx *cctx, int pam_cmd)
* It is checked in pam_reply() to avoid an endless loop */
preq->passkey_data_exists = true;
+#ifdef BUILD_PASSKEY
if ((pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE)) {
if (may_do_passkey_auth(pctx, pd)) {
if (sss_authtok_get_type(pd->authtok) == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSKEY_KRB) {
@@ -1822,6 +1593,7 @@ static int pam_forwarder(struct cli_ctx *cctx, int pam_cmd)
}
}
}
+#endif /* BUILD_PASSKEY */
ret = pam_check_user_search(preq);
@@ -2220,6 +1992,7 @@ static void pam_forwarder_cb(struct tevent_req *req)
goto done;
}
+#ifdef BUILD_PASSKEY
/* This is set to false inside passkey_non_kerberos() if no passkey data is found.
* It is checked in pam_reply() to avoid an endless loop */
preq->passkey_data_exists = true;
@@ -2236,6 +2009,7 @@ static void pam_forwarder_cb(struct tevent_req *req)
}
}
}
+#endif /* BUILD_PASSKEY */
ret = pam_check_user_search(preq);
@@ -2557,127 +2331,6 @@ static bool pam_can_user_cache_auth(struct sss_domain_info *domain,
return result;
}
-void passkey_kerberos_cb(struct tevent_req *req)
-{
- struct pam_auth_req *preq = tevent_req_callback_data(req,
- struct pam_auth_req);
- errno_t ret = EOK;
- int child_status;
-
- ret = pam_passkey_auth_recv(req, &child_status);
- talloc_free(req);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "PAM passkey auth failed [%d]: %s\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
-
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "passkey child finished with status [%d]\n", child_status);
-
- pam_check_user_search(preq);
-
-done:
- pam_check_user_done(preq, ret);
-}
-
-errno_t passkey_kerberos(struct pam_ctx *pctx,
- struct pam_data *pd,
- struct pam_auth_req *preq)
-{
- errno_t ret;
- const char *prompt;
- const char *key;
- const char *pin;
- size_t pin_len;
- struct pk_child_user_data *data;
- struct tevent_req *req;
- int timeout;
- char *verify_opts;
- bool debug_libfido2;
- enum passkey_user_verification verification;
-
- ret = sss_authtok_get_passkey(preq, preq->pd->authtok,
- &prompt, &key, &pin, &pin_len);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "Failure to get passkey authtok\n");
- return EIO;
- }
-
- if (prompt == NULL || key == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "Passkey prompt and key are missing or invalid.\n");
- return EIO;
- }
-
- data = sss_ptr_hash_lookup(pctx->pk_table_data->table, key,
- struct pk_child_user_data);
- if (data == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "Failed to lookup passkey authtok\n");
- return EIO;
- }
-
- ret = confdb_get_int(pctx->rctx->cdb, CONFDB_PAM_CONF_ENTRY,
- CONFDB_PAM_PASSKEY_CHILD_TIMEOUT, PASSKEY_CHILD_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT,
- &timeout);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "Failed to read passkey_child_timeout from confdb: [%d]: %s\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = confdb_get_string(pctx->rctx->cdb, preq, CONFDB_MONITOR_CONF_ENTRY,
- CONFDB_MONITOR_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION, NULL,
- &verify_opts);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "Failed to read '"CONFDB_MONITOR_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION"' from confdb: [%d]: %s\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* Always use verification sent from passkey krb5 plugin */
- ret = read_passkey_conf_verification(preq, verify_opts, NULL);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE, "Unable to parse passkey verificaton options.\n");
- }
-
- if (strcasecmp(data->user_verification, "false") == 0) {
- verification = PAM_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION_OFF;
- } else {
- verification = PAM_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION_ON;
- }
-
- ret = confdb_get_bool(pctx->rctx->cdb, CONFDB_PAM_CONF_ENTRY,
- CONFDB_PAM_PASSKEY_DEBUG_LIBFIDO2, false,
- &debug_libfido2);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "Failed to read '"CONFDB_PAM_PASSKEY_DEBUG_LIBFIDO2"' from confdb: [%d]: %s\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
-
- req = pam_passkey_auth_send(preq->cctx, preq->cctx->ev, timeout, debug_libfido2,
- verification, pd, data, true);
- if (req == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "passkey auth send failed [%d]: [%s]\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
-
- tevent_req_set_callback(req, passkey_kerberos_cb, preq);
-
- ret = EAGAIN;
-
-done:
-
- return ret;
-
-}
-
static void pam_dom_forwarder(struct pam_auth_req *preq)
{
int ret;
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c
index eb62db03d7..57cba845ae 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.c
@@ -32,6 +32,12 @@ struct pam_passkey_verification_enum_str {
const char *option;
};
+struct pam_passkey_table_data {
+ hash_table_t *table;
+ char *key;
+ struct pk_child_user_data *data;
+};
+
struct pam_passkey_verification_enum_str pam_passkey_verification_enum_str[] = {
{ PAM_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION_ON, "on" },
{ PAM_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION_OFF, "off" },
@@ -85,6 +91,127 @@ struct passkey_get_mapping_state {
struct cache_req_result *result;
};
+void passkey_kerberos_cb(struct tevent_req *req)
+{
+ struct pam_auth_req *preq = tevent_req_callback_data(req,
+ struct pam_auth_req);
+ errno_t ret = EOK;
+ int child_status;
+
+ ret = pam_passkey_auth_recv(req, &child_status);
+ talloc_free(req);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "PAM passkey auth failed [%d]: %s\n",
+ ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "passkey child finished with status [%d]\n", child_status);
+
+ pam_check_user_search(preq);
+
+done:
+ pam_check_user_done(preq, ret);
+}
+
+errno_t passkey_kerberos(struct pam_ctx *pctx,
+ struct pam_data *pd,
+ struct pam_auth_req *preq)
+{
+ errno_t ret;
+ const char *prompt;
+ const char *key;
+ const char *pin;
+ size_t pin_len;
+ struct pk_child_user_data *data;
+ struct tevent_req *req;
+ int timeout;
+ char *verify_opts;
+ bool debug_libfido2;
+ enum passkey_user_verification verification;
+
+ ret = sss_authtok_get_passkey(preq, preq->pd->authtok,
+ &prompt, &key, &pin, &pin_len);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "Failure to get passkey authtok\n");
+ return EIO;
+ }
+
+ if (prompt == NULL || key == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "Passkey prompt and key are missing or invalid.\n");
+ return EIO;
+ }
+
+ data = sss_ptr_hash_lookup(pctx->pk_table_data->table, key,
+ struct pk_child_user_data);
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "Failed to lookup passkey authtok\n");
+ return EIO;
+ }
+
+ ret = confdb_get_int(pctx->rctx->cdb, CONFDB_PAM_CONF_ENTRY,
+ CONFDB_PAM_PASSKEY_CHILD_TIMEOUT, PASSKEY_CHILD_TIMEOUT_DEFAULT,
+ &timeout);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "Failed to read passkey_child_timeout from confdb: [%d]: %s\n",
+ ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = confdb_get_string(pctx->rctx->cdb, preq, CONFDB_MONITOR_CONF_ENTRY,
+ CONFDB_MONITOR_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION, NULL,
+ &verify_opts);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "Failed to read '"CONFDB_MONITOR_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION"' from confdb: [%d]: %s\n",
+ ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Always use verification sent from passkey krb5 plugin */
+ ret = read_passkey_conf_verification(preq, verify_opts, NULL);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE, "Unable to parse passkey verificaton options.\n");
+ }
+
+ if (strcasecmp(data->user_verification, "false") == 0) {
+ verification = PAM_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION_OFF;
+ } else {
+ verification = PAM_PASSKEY_VERIFICATION_ON;
+ }
+
+ ret = confdb_get_bool(pctx->rctx->cdb, CONFDB_PAM_CONF_ENTRY,
+ CONFDB_PAM_PASSKEY_DEBUG_LIBFIDO2, false,
+ &debug_libfido2);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "Failed to read '"CONFDB_PAM_PASSKEY_DEBUG_LIBFIDO2"' from confdb: [%d]: %s\n",
+ ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ req = pam_passkey_auth_send(preq->cctx, preq->cctx->ev, timeout, debug_libfido2,
+ verification, pd, data, true);
+ if (req == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "passkey auth send failed [%d]: [%s]\n",
+ ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tevent_req_set_callback(req, passkey_kerberos_cb, preq);
+
+ ret = EAGAIN;
+
+done:
+
+ return ret;
+
+}
+
errno_t passkey_non_kerberos(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct tevent_context *ev,
struct pam_ctx *pam_ctx,
@@ -994,6 +1121,229 @@ errno_t pam_passkey_auth_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
return EOK;
}
+errno_t decode_pam_passkey_msg(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ uint8_t *buf,
+ size_t len,
+ struct pk_child_user_data **_data)
+{
+
+ size_t p = 0;
+ size_t pctr = 0;
+ errno_t ret;
+ size_t offset;
+ struct pk_child_user_data *data = NULL;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ data = talloc_zero(tmp_ctx, struct pk_child_user_data);
+ if (data == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to talloc passkey data.\n");
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ data->user_verification = talloc_strdup(data, (char *) &buf[p]);
+ if (data->user_verification == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to strdup passkey prompt.\n");
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ offset = strlen(data->user_verification) + 1;
+ if (offset >= len) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "passkey prompt offset failure.\n");
+ ret = EIO;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ data->crypto_challenge = talloc_strdup(data, (char *) &buf[p + offset]);
+ if (data->crypto_challenge == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to strdup passkey challenge.\n");
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ offset += strlen(data->crypto_challenge) + 1;
+ if (offset >= len) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "passkey challenge offset failure.\n");
+ ret = EIO;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+
+ data->domain = talloc_strdup(data, (char *) &buf[p] + offset);
+ if (data->domain == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to strdup passkey domain.\n");
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ offset += strlen(data->domain) + 1;
+ if (offset >= len) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "passkey domain offset failure.\n");
+ ret = EIO;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ SAFEALIGN_COPY_UINT32(&data->num_credentials, &buf[p + offset], &pctr);
+ size_t list_sz = (size_t) data->num_credentials;
+
+ offset += sizeof(uint32_t);
+
+ data->key_handles = talloc_zero_array(data, const char *, list_sz);
+
+ for (int i = 0; i < list_sz; i++) {
+ data->key_handles[i] = talloc_strdup(data->key_handles, (char *) &buf[p + offset]);
+ if (data->key_handles[i] == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to strdup passkey list.\n");
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ offset += strlen(data->key_handles[i]) + 1;
+ }
+
+ *_data = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, data);
+
+ ret = EOK;
+done:
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
+
+errno_t save_passkey_data(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct pam_ctx *pctx,
+ struct pk_child_user_data *data,
+ struct pam_auth_req *preq)
+{
+ char *pk_key;
+ errno_t ret;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ /* Passkey data (pk_table_data) is stolen onto client ctx, it will
+ * be freed when the client closes, and the sss_ptr_hash interface
+ * takes care of automatically removing it from the hash table then */
+ pctx->pk_table_data = talloc_zero(tmp_ctx, struct pam_passkey_table_data);
+ if (pctx->pk_table_data == NULL) {
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (pctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
+ pctx->pk_table_data->table = sss_ptr_hash_create(pctx->pk_table_data,
+ NULL, NULL);
+ if (pctx->pk_table_data->table == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
+ pk_key = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%s", data->crypto_challenge);
+ if (pk_key == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ pctx->pk_table_data->key = talloc_strdup(pctx->pk_table_data, pk_key);
+ if (pctx->pk_table_data->key == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = sss_ptr_hash_add(pctx->pk_table_data->table, pk_key, data,
+ struct pk_child_user_data);
+ if (ret == EEXIST) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "pk_table key [%s] already exists\n",
+ pk_key);
+ goto done;
+ } else if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Unable to add pk data to hash table "
+ "[%d]: %s\n", ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ talloc_steal(mem_ctx, pctx->pk_table_data);
+ pctx->pk_table_data->data = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, data);
+
+ ret = EOK;
+
+done:
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
+errno_t pam_eval_passkey_response(struct pam_ctx *pctx,
+ struct pam_data *pd,
+ struct pam_auth_req *preq,
+ bool *_pk_preauth_done)
+{
+ struct response_data *pk_resp;
+ struct pk_child_user_data *pk_data;
+ errno_t ret;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ pk_resp = pd->resp_list;
+
+ while (pk_resp != NULL) {
+ switch (pk_resp->type) {
+ case SSS_PAM_PASSKEY_KRB_INFO:
+ if (!pctx->passkey_auth) {
+ /* Passkey auth is disabled. To avoid passkey prompts appearing,
+ * don't send SSS_PAM_PASSKEY_KRB_INFO to the client and
+ * add a dummy response to fallback to normal auth */
+ pk_resp->do_not_send_to_client = true;
+ ret = pam_add_response(pd, SSS_OTP, 0, NULL);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "pam_add_response failed.\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ break;
+ }
+ ret = decode_pam_passkey_msg(tmp_ctx, pk_resp->data, pk_resp->len, &pk_data);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to decode passkey msg\n");
+ ret = EIO;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = save_passkey_data(preq->cctx, pctx, pk_data, preq);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to save passkey msg\n");
+ ret = EIO;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ break;
+ /* Passkey non-kerberos preauth has already run */
+ case SSS_PAM_PASSKEY_INFO:
+ *_pk_preauth_done = true;
+ default:
+ break;
+ }
+ pk_resp = pk_resp->next;
+ }
+
+ ret = EOK;
+done:
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+
+ return ret;
+}
+
static void
pam_passkey_auth_done(int child_status,
struct tevent_signal *sige,
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.h b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.h
index 6b0d62071f..7c5a532e91 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.h
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_passkey.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#include <security/pam_appl.h>
#include "util/util.h"
+#include "util/sss_ptr_hash.h"
#include "responder/common/responder.h"
#include "responder/common/cache_req/cache_req.h"
#include "responder/pam/pamsrv.h"
@@ -40,6 +41,9 @@ errno_t passkey_non_kerberos(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct pam_ctx *pam_ctx,
struct pam_auth_req *preq,
struct pam_data *pd);
+errno_t passkey_kerberos(struct pam_ctx *pctx,
+ struct pam_data *pd,
+ struct pam_auth_req *preq);
struct pk_child_user_data {
/* Both Kerberos and non-kerberos */
@@ -69,6 +73,10 @@ struct tevent_req *pam_passkey_auth_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
bool kerberos_pa);
errno_t pam_passkey_auth_recv(struct tevent_req *req,
int *child_status);
+errno_t pam_eval_passkey_response(struct pam_ctx *pctx,
+ struct pam_data *pd,
+ struct pam_auth_req *preq,
+ bool *_pk_preauth_done);
bool may_do_passkey_auth(struct pam_ctx *pctx,
struct pam_data *pd);

347
SOURCES/sdap-add-set_non_posix-parameter.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,347 @@
From 5f63d9bfc71b271844db1ee122172630be1afed0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 9 Jan 2024 11:14:42 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] sdap: add set_non_posix parameter
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This patch adds a new parameter set_non_posix to the user and group
lookup calls. Currently the domain type is used to determine if the
search should be restricted to POSIX objects or not. The new option
allows to drop this restriction explicitly to look up non-POSIX objects.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/5708
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
---
src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c | 1 +
src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains_ext_groups.c | 2 +-
src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h | 6 ++-
src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c | 38 +++++++++++--------
src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h | 3 +-
src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c | 9 +++--
src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups_ad.c | 2 +-
src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_users.c | 9 +++--
src/providers/ldap/sdap_users.h | 3 +-
9 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 29 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
index f78f17f7b4..336d475d19 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
@@ -2111,6 +2111,7 @@ ad_gpo_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
state->host_fqdn,
BE_FILTER_NAME,
NULL,
+ true,
true);
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, ad_gpo_target_dn_retrieval_done, req);
diff --git a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains_ext_groups.c b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains_ext_groups.c
index b385c2f272..f4f84749a2 100644
--- a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains_ext_groups.c
+++ b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_subdomains_ext_groups.c
@@ -883,7 +883,7 @@ static void ipa_add_ad_memberships_get_next(struct tevent_req *req)
state->sdap_id_ctx->conn,
fq_name,
BE_FILTER_NAME,
- false, false);
+ false, false, false);
if (subreq == NULL) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "groups_get_send failed.\n");
ret = ENOMEM;
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
index 6df7b3df44..7159d63564 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
@@ -295,7 +295,8 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_get_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
const char *name,
int filter_type,
bool noexist_delete,
- bool no_members);
+ bool no_members,
+ bool set_non_posix);
int groups_get_recv(struct tevent_req *req, int *dp_error_out, int *sdap_ret);
struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
@@ -306,7 +307,8 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
- bool noexist_delete);
+ bool noexist_delete,
+ bool set_non_posix);
int groups_by_user_recv(struct tevent_req *req, int *dp_error_out, int *sdap_ret);
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
index fb81a17937..da54816bdf 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
@@ -165,7 +165,8 @@ struct tevent_req *users_get_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
- bool noexist_delete)
+ bool noexist_delete,
+ bool set_non_posix)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
struct users_get_state *state;
@@ -202,7 +203,7 @@ struct tevent_req *users_get_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
state->filter_value = filter_value;
state->filter_type = filter_type;
- if (state->domain->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION) {
+ if (state->domain->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION || set_non_posix) {
state->non_posix = true;
}
@@ -582,7 +583,8 @@ static void users_get_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
ret = sdap_fallback_local_user(state, state->shortname, uid, &usr_attrs);
if (ret == EOK) {
ret = sdap_save_user(state, state->ctx->opts, state->domain,
- usr_attrs[0], NULL, NULL, 0);
+ usr_attrs[0], NULL, NULL, 0,
+ state->non_posix);
}
}
}
@@ -665,7 +667,8 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_get_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
bool noexist_delete,
- bool no_members)
+ bool no_members,
+ bool set_non_posix)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
struct groups_get_state *state;
@@ -703,7 +706,7 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_get_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
state->filter_value = filter_value;
state->filter_type = filter_type;
- if (state->domain->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION) {
+ if (state->domain->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION || set_non_posix) {
state->non_posix = true;
}
@@ -991,7 +994,8 @@ static void groups_get_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
state->filter_value,
state->filter_type,
NULL,
- state->noexist_delete);
+ state->noexist_delete,
+ false);
if (subreq == NULL) {
tevent_req_error(req, ENOMEM);
return;
@@ -1159,7 +1163,8 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
- bool noexist_delete)
+ bool noexist_delete,
+ bool set_non_posix)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
struct groups_by_user_state *state;
@@ -1188,7 +1193,7 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
state->domain = sdom->dom;
state->sysdb = sdom->dom->sysdb;
- if (state->domain->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION) {
+ if (state->domain->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION || set_non_posix) {
state->non_posix = true;
}
@@ -1252,7 +1257,8 @@ static void groups_by_user_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
state->filter_value,
state->filter_type,
state->extra_value,
- state->attrs);
+ state->attrs,
+ state->non_posix);
if (!subreq) {
tevent_req_error(req, ENOMEM);
return;
@@ -1421,7 +1427,8 @@ sdap_handle_acct_req_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
ar->filter_value,
ar->filter_type,
ar->extra_value,
- noexist_delete);
+ noexist_delete,
+ false);
break;
case BE_REQ_GROUP: /* group */
@@ -1429,7 +1436,7 @@ sdap_handle_acct_req_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
sdom, conn,
ar->filter_value,
ar->filter_type,
- noexist_delete, false);
+ noexist_delete, false, false);
break;
case BE_REQ_INITGROUPS: /* init groups for user */
@@ -1446,7 +1453,7 @@ sdap_handle_acct_req_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
ar->filter_value,
ar->filter_type,
ar->extra_value,
- noexist_delete);
+ noexist_delete, false);
break;
case BE_REQ_SUBID_RANGES:
@@ -1545,7 +1552,8 @@ sdap_handle_acct_req_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
ar->filter_value,
ar->filter_type,
ar->extra_value,
- noexist_delete);
+ noexist_delete,
+ false);
break;
default: /*fail*/
@@ -1741,7 +1749,7 @@ static struct tevent_req *get_user_and_group_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
subreq = groups_get_send(req, state->ev, state->id_ctx,
state->sdom, state->conn,
state->filter_val, state->filter_type,
- state->noexist_delete, false);
+ state->noexist_delete, false, false);
if (subreq == NULL) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "groups_get_send failed.\n");
ret = ENOMEM;
@@ -1795,7 +1803,7 @@ static void get_user_and_group_groups_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
subreq = users_get_send(req, state->ev, state->id_ctx,
state->sdom, user_conn,
state->filter_val, state->filter_type, NULL,
- state->noexist_delete);
+ state->noexist_delete, false);
if (subreq == NULL) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "users_get_send failed.\n");
tevent_req_error(req, ENOMEM);
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h
index 02d84672e1..f9027a776d 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h
@@ -161,7 +161,8 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
const char *name,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
- const char **grp_attrs);
+ const char **grp_attrs,
+ bool set_non_posix);
int sdap_get_initgr_recv(struct tevent_req *req);
struct tevent_req *sdap_exop_modify_passwd_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c
index 4c8538e8a5..97be594a38 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c
@@ -2735,7 +2735,8 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
- const char **grp_attrs)
+ const char **grp_attrs,
+ bool set_non_posix)
{
struct tevent_req *req;
struct sdap_get_initgr_state *state;
@@ -2771,7 +2772,7 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
goto done;
}
- if (state->dom->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION) {
+ if (state->dom->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION || set_non_posix) {
state->non_posix = true;
}
@@ -3099,7 +3100,7 @@ static void sdap_get_initgr_user(struct tevent_req *subreq)
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_ALL, "Storing the user\n");
ret = sdap_save_user(state, state->opts, state->dom, state->orig_user,
- NULL, NULL, 0);
+ NULL, NULL, 0, state->non_posix);
if (ret) {
goto fail;
}
@@ -3435,7 +3436,7 @@ static void sdap_get_initgr_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
subreq = groups_get_send(req, state->ev, state->id_ctx,
state->id_ctx->opts->sdom, state->conn,
gid, BE_FILTER_IDNUM, false,
- false);
+ false, false);
if (!subreq) {
ret = ENOMEM;
goto done;
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups_ad.c b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups_ad.c
index bb18f35dc3..fb80c92429 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups_ad.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups_ad.c
@@ -346,7 +346,7 @@ static errno_t sdap_ad_resolve_sids_step(struct tevent_req *req)
subreq = groups_get_send(state, state->ev, state->id_ctx, sdap_domain,
state->conn, state->current_sid,
- BE_FILTER_SECID, false, true);
+ BE_FILTER_SECID, false, true, false);
if (subreq == NULL) {
return ENOMEM;
}
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_users.c b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_users.c
index 9dcb59e233..728295d9df 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_users.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_users.c
@@ -175,7 +175,8 @@ int sdap_save_user(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct sysdb_attrs *attrs,
struct sysdb_attrs *mapped_attrs,
char **_usn_value,
- time_t now)
+ time_t now,
+ bool set_non_posix)
{
struct ldb_message_element *el;
int ret;
@@ -352,7 +353,7 @@ int sdap_save_user(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
ret = sysdb_attrs_get_uint32_t(attrs,
opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_UID].sys_name,
&uid);
- if (ret == ENOENT && dom->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION) {
+ if (ret == ENOENT && (dom->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION || set_non_posix)) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_INTERNAL,
"Marking object as non-POSIX and setting ID=0!\n");
ret = sdap_set_non_posix_flag(user_attrs,
@@ -450,7 +451,7 @@ int sdap_save_user(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
ret = sysdb_attrs_get_uint32_t(attrs,
opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_GID].sys_name,
&gid);
- if (ret == ENOENT && dom->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION) {
+ if (ret == ENOENT && (dom->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION || set_non_posix)) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_INTERNAL,
"Marking object as non-POSIX and setting ID=0!\n");
ret = sdap_set_non_posix_flag(attrs,
@@ -696,7 +697,7 @@ int sdap_save_users(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
usn_value = NULL;
ret = sdap_save_user(tmpctx, opts, dom, users[i], mapped_attrs,
- &usn_value, now);
+ &usn_value, now, false);
/* Do not fail completely on errors.
* Just report the failure to save and go on */
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_users.h b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_users.h
index a6d088a6d7..74284cd0ac 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_users.h
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_users.h
@@ -36,6 +36,7 @@ int sdap_save_user(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct sysdb_attrs *attrs,
struct sysdb_attrs *mapped_attrs,
char **_usn_value,
- time_t now);
+ time_t now,
+ bool set_non_posix);
#endif /* _SDAP_USERS_H_ */

303
SOURCES/sysdb-remove-sysdb_computer.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,303 @@
From ff23e7e2879f94a907d05b615dbdb547aaa2e542 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 17 Nov 2023 19:09:05 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] sysdb: remove sysdb_computer.[ch]
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The related calls are not needed anymore.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/5708
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
---
Makefile.am | 2 -
src/db/sysdb_computer.c | 185 --------------------------------------
src/db/sysdb_computer.h | 51 -----------
src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c | 1 -
4 files changed, 239 deletions(-)
delete mode 100644 src/db/sysdb_computer.c
delete mode 100644 src/db/sysdb_computer.h
diff --git a/Makefile.am b/Makefile.am
index ead2bf7c0b..7ec14fc476 100644
--- a/Makefile.am
+++ b/Makefile.am
@@ -810,7 +810,6 @@ dist_noinst_HEADERS = \
src/db/sysdb_subid.h \
src/db/sysdb_domain_resolution_order.h \
src/db/sysdb_passkey_user_verification.h \
- src/db/sysdb_computer.h \
src/db/sysdb_iphosts.h \
src/db/sysdb_ipnetworks.h \
src/confdb/confdb.h \
@@ -1249,7 +1248,6 @@ libsss_util_la_SOURCES = \
src/db/sysdb_iphosts.c \
src/db/sysdb_ipnetworks.c \
src/util/sss_pam_data.c \
- src/db/sysdb_computer.c \
src/db/sysdb_subid.c \
src/util/util.c \
src/util/util_ext.c \
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_computer.c b/src/db/sysdb_computer.c
deleted file mode 100644
index 9fcaf5a7c3..0000000000
--- a/src/db/sysdb_computer.c
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
-/*
- SSSD
-
- Authors:
- Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.com>
- David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
-
- Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
-
- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
- (at your option) any later version.
-
- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
- GNU General Public License for more details.
-
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-*/
-
-#include <arpa/inet.h>
-
-#include "db/sysdb.h"
-#include "db/sysdb_private.h"
-#include "db/sysdb_computer.h"
-
-static errno_t
-sysdb_search_computer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct sss_domain_info *domain,
- const char *filter,
- const char **attrs,
- size_t *_num_hosts,
- struct ldb_message ***_hosts)
-{
- errno_t ret;
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
- struct ldb_message **results;
- size_t num_results;
-
- tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
- if (!tmp_ctx) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- ret = sysdb_search_custom(tmp_ctx, domain, filter,
- COMPUTERS_SUBDIR, attrs,
- &num_results, &results);
- if (ret != EOK && ret != ENOENT) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
- "Error looking up host [%d]: %s\n",
- ret, strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- } else if (ret == ENOENT) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "No such host\n");
- *_hosts = NULL;
- *_num_hosts = 0;
- goto done;
- }
-
- *_hosts = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, results);
- *_num_hosts = num_results;
- ret = EOK;
-
-done:
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-sysdb_get_computer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct sss_domain_info *domain,
- const char *computer_name,
- const char **attrs,
- struct ldb_message **_computer)
-{
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
- errno_t ret;
- const char *filter;
- struct ldb_message **hosts;
- size_t num_hosts;
-
- tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
- if (!tmp_ctx) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- filter = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, SYSDB_COMP_FILTER, computer_name);
- if (!filter) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = sysdb_search_computer(tmp_ctx, domain, filter, attrs,
- &num_hosts, &hosts);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- goto done;
- }
-
- if (num_hosts != 1) {
- ret = EINVAL;
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
- "Did not find a single host with name %s\n", computer_name);
- goto done;
- }
-
- *_computer = talloc_steal(mem_ctx, hosts[0]);
- ret = EOK;
-
-done:
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
-
- return ret;
-}
-
-int
-sysdb_set_computer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct sss_domain_info *domain,
- const char *computer_name,
- const char *sid_str,
- int cache_timeout,
- time_t now)
-{
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
- int ret;
- struct sysdb_attrs *attrs;
-
- tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
- if (!tmp_ctx) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- attrs = sysdb_new_attrs(tmp_ctx);
- if (!attrs) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = sysdb_attrs_add_string(attrs, SYSDB_SID_STR, sid_str);
- if (ret) goto done;
-
- ret = sysdb_attrs_add_string(attrs, SYSDB_OBJECTCLASS, SYSDB_COMPUTER_CLASS);
- if (ret) goto done;
-
- ret = sysdb_attrs_add_string(attrs, SYSDB_NAME, computer_name);
- if (ret) goto done;
-
- /* creation time */
- ret = sysdb_attrs_add_time_t(attrs, SYSDB_CREATE_TIME, now);
- if (ret) goto done;
-
- /* Set a cache expire time. There is a periodic task that cleans up
- * expired entries from the cache even when enumeration is disabled */
- ret = sysdb_attrs_add_time_t(attrs, SYSDB_CACHE_EXPIRE,
- cache_timeout ? (now + cache_timeout) : 0);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Could not set sysdb cache expire [%d]: %s\n",
- ret, strerror(ret));
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = sysdb_store_custom(domain, computer_name, COMPUTERS_SUBDIR, attrs);
- if (ret) goto done;
-
- /* FIXME As a future improvement we have to extend domain enumeration.
- * When 'enumerate = true' for a domain, sssd starts a periodic task
- * that brings all users and groups to the cache, cleaning up
- * stale objects after each run. If enumeration is disabled, the cleanup
- * task for expired entries is started instead.
- *
- * We have to extend the enumeration task to fetch 'computer'
- * objects as well (see ad_id_enumeration_send, the entry point of the
- * enumeration task for the id provider).
- */
-done:
- if (ret) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "Error: %d (%s)\n", ret, strerror(ret));
- }
- talloc_zfree(tmp_ctx);
-
- return ret;
-}
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_computer.h b/src/db/sysdb_computer.h
deleted file mode 100644
index 4be67fdf51..0000000000
--- a/src/db/sysdb_computer.h
+++ /dev/null
@@ -1,51 +0,0 @@
-/*
- SSSD
-
- Authors:
- Samuel Cabrero <scabrero@suse.com>
- David Mulder <dmulder@suse.com>
-
- Copyright (C) 2019 SUSE LINUX GmbH, Nuernberg, Germany.
-
- This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
- it under the terms of the GNU General Public License as published by
- the Free Software Foundation; either version 3 of the License, or
- (at your option) any later version.
-
- This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful,
- but WITHOUT ANY WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of
- MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the
- GNU General Public License for more details.
-
- You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
- along with this program. If not, see <http://www.gnu.org/licenses/>.
-*/
-
-#ifndef SYSDB_COMPUTERS_H_
-#define SYSDB_COMPUTERS_H_
-
-#include "db/sysdb.h"
-
-#define COMPUTERS_SUBDIR "computers"
-#define SYSDB_COMPUTER_CLASS "computer"
-#define SYSDB_COMPUTERS_CONTAINER "cn="COMPUTERS_SUBDIR
-#define SYSDB_TMPL_COMPUTER_BASE SYSDB_COMPUTERS_CONTAINER","SYSDB_DOM_BASE
-#define SYSDB_TMPL_COMPUTER SYSDB_NAME"=%s,"SYSDB_TMPL_COMPUTER_BASE
-#define SYSDB_COMP_FILTER "(&("SYSDB_NAME"=%s)("SYSDB_OBJECTCLASS"="SYSDB_COMPUTER_CLASS"))"
-
-int
-sysdb_get_computer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct sss_domain_info *domain,
- const char *computer_name,
- const char **attrs,
- struct ldb_message **computer);
-
-int
-sysdb_set_computer(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct sss_domain_info *domain,
- const char *computer_name,
- const char *sid_str,
- int cache_timeout,
- time_t now);
-
-#endif /* SYSDB_COMPUTERS_H_ */
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
index 1c731b222b..f78f17f7b4 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
@@ -53,7 +53,6 @@
#include "util/sss_chain_id.h"
#include <ndr.h>
#include <gen_ndr/security.h>
-#include <db/sysdb_computer.h>
/* == gpo-ldap constants =================================================== */

45
SPECS/sssd.spec
View File

@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
Name: sssd
Version: 2.9.1
Release: 4%{?dist}.alma.1
Release: 4%{?dist}.5.alma.1
Group: Applications/System
Summary: System Security Services Daemon
License: GPLv3+
@ -32,11 +32,34 @@ Patch0002: 0002-sbus-arm-watchdog-for-sbus_connect_init_send.patch
# Patches were taken from:
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/641e5f73d3bd5b3d32cafd551013d3bfd2a52732
Patch0005: mc-recover-from-invalid-memory-cache-size.patch
Patch0003: mc-recover-from-invalid-memory-cache-size.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/1e5dfc187c7659cca567d2f7d5592e72794ef13c
Patch0006: sss_iface-do-not-add-cli_id-to-chain-key.patch
Patch0004: sss_iface-do-not-add-cli_id-to-chain-key.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/88d8afbb115f18007dcc11f7ebac1b238c3ebd98
Patch0007: MC-a-couple-of-additions-to-recover-from-invalid-memory.patch
Patch0005: MC-a-couple-of-additions-to-recover-from-invalid-memory.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/39cd0baa06742b349ed763aa40ea4de366e80f1a
Patch0006: DP-reduce-log-level-in-case-a-responder-asks-for-unknown.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/958a5e25c447dc502e8f8fbecf3253e62f92b0b2
Patch0007: SSS_CLIENT-MC-in-case-mem-cache-file-validation-fails.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/a186224d6e1ce0c91507df58fec424209a307fe3
Patch0008: SSS_CLIENT-check-if-mem-cache-fd-was-hijacked.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/abb146e1487598c0e4fa2cdc826b7388db46f9bc
Patch0009: SSS_CLIENT-check-if-reponder-socket-was-hijacked.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/9b73614c49aeb3cfc3208dba5f472354086180b5
Patch00010: LDAP-make-groups_by_user_send-recv-public.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/c02e09afe9610d872121708893db8a21fb201b12
Patch00011: ad-gpo-evalute-host-groups.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/ff23e7e2879f94a907d05b615dbdb547aaa2e542
Patch00012: sysdb-remove-sysdb_computer.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/5f63d9bfc71b271844db1ee122172630be1afed0
Patch00013: sdap-add-set_non_posix-parameter.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/7cf9a1ff0e876ea0970a3f0b3c389b87be834b4f
Patch00014: ipa-Add-BUILD_PASSKEY-conditional-for-passkey-codepath.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/eadee9a2a8f0dfe4f22c460537d6c87c493fa622
Patch00015: pam-Conditionalize-passkey-code.patch
# https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/commit/a20dadc7ec9b21687356d1b0b0218db89f438c67
Patch00016: Makefile-Respect-BUILD_PASSKEY-conditional.patch
### Downstream Patches ###
@ -1220,6 +1243,20 @@ fi
%systemd_postun_with_restart sssd.service
%changelog
* Wed Feb 21 2024 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 2.9.1-4.5.alma.1
- ad: gpo evalute host groups
- DP: reduce log level in case a responder asks for unknown
domain
- ipa: Add `BUILD_PASSKEY` conditional for passkey codepath
- LDAP: make groups_by_user_send/recv public
- Makefile: Respect `BUILD_PASSKEY` conditional
- pam: Conditionalize passkey code
- sdap: add set_non_posix parameter
- SSS_CLIENT: check if mem-cache fd was hijacked
- SSS_CLIENT: check if reponder socket was hijacked
- SSS_CLIENT: MC: in case mem-cache file validation fails
- sysdb: remove sysdb_computer.[ch]
* Wed Nov 15 2023 Eduard Abdullin <eabdullin@almalinux.org> - 2.9.1-4.alma.1
- sss_iface: do not add cli_id to chain key
- mc: recover from invalid memory cache size