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import CS sssd-2.9.5-4.el9_5.1

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eabdullin 2024-11-12 10:52:48 +00:00
parent 5a0b01d98a
commit ca2c2f36f8
29 changed files with 1311 additions and 1900 deletions
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2
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1 +1 @@
SOURCES/sssd-2.9.4.tar.gz SOURCES/sssd-2.9.5.tar.gz

2
.sssd.metadata
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@ -1 +1 @@
574f6cec9ee12dd943e4305286845343ab7bb891 SOURCES/sssd-2.9.4.tar.gz f6704a9df1303e154ef8526f9f21e2b72879c046 SOURCES/sssd-2.9.5.tar.gz

34
SOURCES/0001-spec-change-passkey_child-owner.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
From ee8de7e404ba65062e0b373f2badc0475835bbde Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 11 Jun 2024 15:57:23 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] spec: change passkey_child owner
passkey_child owner was incorrectly set to $sssd_user:$sssd_user, when
it should be root:root. Correcting it.
Fixes: 30daa0ccdae5 ("spec: update to include passkey")
Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bb72b53d3a222f016d882853a619bd74c237edf9)
---
contrib/sssd.spec.in | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/contrib/sssd.spec.in b/contrib/sssd.spec.in
index 03171a872..3735d4f06 100644
--- a/contrib/sssd.spec.in
+++ b/contrib/sssd.spec.in
@@ -998,7 +998,7 @@ done
%if %{build_passkey}
%files passkey
-%attr(755,%{sssd_user},%{sssd_user}) %{_libexecdir}/%{servicename}/passkey_child
+%{_libexecdir}/%{servicename}/passkey_child
%{_libdir}/%{name}/modules/sssd_krb5_passkey_plugin.so
%{_datadir}/sssd/krb5-snippets/sssd_enable_passkey
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/krb5.conf.d/sssd_enable_passkey
--
2.44.0

144
SOURCES/0001-sssd-adding-mail-as-case-insensitive.patch
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@ -1,144 +0,0 @@
From dd0f63246aa75d5f53b44cbc185e88833e79976e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Andre Boscatto <andreboscatto@gmail.com>
Date: Wed, 7 Feb 2024 12:28:28 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] sssd: adding mail as case insensitive
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7173
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 945cebcf72ef53ea0368f19c09e710f7fff11b51)
---
src/db/sysdb_init.c | 7 ++++++
src/db/sysdb_private.h | 5 +++-
src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c | 56 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 67 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_init.c b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
index c2ea6c369..38a9cd64a 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_init.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
@@ -603,6 +603,13 @@ static errno_t sysdb_domain_cache_upgrade(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
}
}
+ if (strcmp(version, SYSDB_VERSION_0_23) == 0) {
+ ret = sysdb_upgrade_23(sysdb, &version);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = EOK;
done:
sysdb->ldb = save_ldb;
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_private.h b/src/db/sysdb_private.h
index 1f55007bc..63f7b5601 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_private.h
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_private.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#ifndef __INT_SYS_DB_H__
#define __INT_SYS_DB_H__
+#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_24 "0.24"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_23 "0.23"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_22 "0.22"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_21 "0.21"
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_2 "0.2"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_1 "0.1"
-#define SYSDB_VERSION SYSDB_VERSION_0_23
+#define SYSDB_VERSION SYSDB_VERSION_0_24
#define SYSDB_BASE_LDIF \
"dn: @ATTRIBUTES\n" \
@@ -60,6 +61,7 @@
"objectclass: CASE_INSENSITIVE\n" \
"ipHostNumber: CASE_INSENSITIVE\n" \
"ipNetworkNumber: CASE_INSENSITIVE\n" \
+ "mail: CASE_INSENSITIVE\n" \
"\n" \
"dn: @INDEXLIST\n" \
"@IDXATTR: cn\n" \
@@ -191,6 +193,7 @@ int sysdb_upgrade_19(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_upgrade_20(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_upgrade_21(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_upgrade_22(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
+int sysdb_upgrade_23(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_ts_upgrade_01(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
index 346a1cb0b..56083e6be 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
@@ -2718,6 +2718,62 @@ done:
return ret;
}
+int sysdb_upgrade_23(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver)
+{
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+ int ret;
+ struct ldb_message *msg;
+ struct upgrade_ctx *ctx;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+ if (!tmp_ctx) {
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ ret = commence_upgrade(sysdb, sysdb->ldb, SYSDB_VERSION_0_24, &ctx);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ /* Add new indexes */
+ msg = ldb_msg_new(tmp_ctx);
+ if (!msg) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ msg->dn = ldb_dn_new(tmp_ctx, sysdb->ldb, "@ATTRIBUTES");
+ if (!msg->dn) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* Case insensitive search for mail */
+ ret = ldb_msg_add_empty(msg, SYSDB_USER_EMAIL, LDB_FLAG_MOD_ADD, NULL);
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ ret = ldb_msg_add_string(msg, SYSDB_USER_EMAIL, "CASE_INSENSITIVE");
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = ldb_modify(sysdb->ldb, msg);
+ if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
+ ret = sysdb_error_to_errno(ret);
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ /* conversion done, update version number */
+ ret = update_version(ctx);
+
+done:
+ ret = finish_upgrade(ret, &ctx, ver);
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
+
int sysdb_ts_upgrade_01(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver)
{
struct upgrade_ctx *ctx;
--
2.41.0

154
SOURCES/0002-sdap-add-search_bases-option-to-groups_by_user_send.patch
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@ -1,154 +0,0 @@
From a7621a5b464af7a3c8409dcbde038b35fee2c895 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 13:47:53 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 2/3] sdap: add search_bases option to groups_by_user_send()
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
AD handles users and computer objects very similar and so does SSSD's
GPO code when lookup up the host's group-memberships. But users and
computers might be stored in different sub-tree of the AD LDAP tree and
if a dedicated user search base is given with the ldap_user_search_base
option in sssd.conf the host object might be in a different sub-tree. To
make sure the host can still be found this patch uses the base DN of
the LDAP tree when searching for hosts in the GPO code.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/5708
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 29a77c6e79020d7e8cb474b4d3b394d390eba196)
---
src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c | 10 ++++++++++
src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h | 1 +
src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c | 6 +++++-
src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h | 1 +
src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c | 4 +++-
5 files changed, 20 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
index 94959c36b..b0ee3e616 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
@@ -2091,6 +2091,7 @@ ad_gpo_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
char *server_uri;
LDAPURLDesc *lud;
struct sdap_domain *sdom;
+ struct sdap_search_base **search_bases;
req = tevent_req_callback_data(subreq, struct tevent_req);
state = tevent_req_data(req, struct ad_gpo_access_state);
@@ -2184,9 +2185,18 @@ ad_gpo_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
goto done;
}
+ ret = common_parse_search_base(state, sdom->basedn, state->ldb_ctx,
+ "AD_HOSTS", NULL, &search_bases);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "Failed to create dedicated search base for host lookups, "
+ "trying with user search base.");
+ }
+
subreq = groups_by_user_send(state, state->ev,
state->access_ctx->ad_id_ctx->sdap_id_ctx,
sdom, state->conn,
+ search_bases,
state->host_fqdn,
BE_FILTER_NAME,
NULL,
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
index 7159d6356..2c984ef50 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
@@ -304,6 +304,7 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct sdap_id_ctx *ctx,
struct sdap_domain *sdom,
struct sdap_id_conn_ctx *conn,
+ struct sdap_search_base **search_bases,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
index da54816bd..b3ea2333f 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
@@ -1139,6 +1139,7 @@ struct groups_by_user_state {
struct sdap_id_op *op;
struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb;
struct sss_domain_info *domain;
+ struct sdap_search_base **search_bases;
const char *filter_value;
int filter_type;
@@ -1160,6 +1161,7 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct sdap_id_ctx *ctx,
struct sdap_domain *sdom,
struct sdap_id_conn_ctx *conn,
+ struct sdap_search_base **search_bases,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
@@ -1192,6 +1194,7 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
state->extra_value = extra_value;
state->domain = sdom->dom;
state->sysdb = sdom->dom->sysdb;
+ state->search_bases = search_bases;
if (state->domain->type == DOM_TYPE_APPLICATION || set_non_posix) {
state->non_posix = true;
@@ -1254,6 +1257,7 @@ static void groups_by_user_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
sdap_id_op_handle(state->op),
state->ctx,
state->conn,
+ state->search_bases,
state->filter_value,
state->filter_type,
state->extra_value,
@@ -1449,7 +1453,7 @@ sdap_handle_acct_req_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
}
subreq = groups_by_user_send(state, be_ctx->ev, id_ctx,
- sdom, conn,
+ sdom, conn, NULL,
ar->filter_value,
ar->filter_type,
ar->extra_value,
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h
index 5458d21f1..89245f41f 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h
@@ -158,6 +158,7 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct sdap_handle *sh,
struct sdap_id_ctx *id_ctx,
struct sdap_id_conn_ctx *conn,
+ struct sdap_search_base **search_bases,
const char *name,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c
index 97be594a3..fb3d8fe24 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c
@@ -2732,6 +2732,7 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct sdap_handle *sh,
struct sdap_id_ctx *id_ctx,
struct sdap_id_conn_ctx *conn,
+ struct sdap_search_base **search_bases,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
@@ -2764,7 +2765,8 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
state->orig_user = NULL;
state->timeout = dp_opt_get_int(state->opts->basic, SDAP_SEARCH_TIMEOUT);
state->user_base_iter = 0;
- state->user_search_bases = sdom->user_search_bases;
+ state->user_search_bases = (search_bases == NULL) ? sdom->user_search_bases
+ : search_bases;
if (!state->user_search_bases) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
"Initgroups lookup request without a user search base\n");
--
2.41.0

58
SOURCES/0002-sysdb-do-not-fail-to-add-non-posix-user-to-MPG-domai.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From d234cf5d6e793daf2c96856887acb641c4dff407 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 14 Jun 2024 16:10:34 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] sysdb: do not fail to add non-posix user to MPG domain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
SSSD does not handle the root user (UID==0) and treats all accounts with
UID 0 as non-Posix accounts. The primary GID of those accounts is 0 as
well and as a result for those accounts in MPG domains the check for a
collisions of the primary GID should be skipped. The current code might
e.g. cause issues during GPO evaluation when adding a host account into
the cache which does not have any UID or GID set in AD and SSSD is
configured to read UID and GID from AD.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7451
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 986bb726202e69b05f861c14c3a220379baf9bd1)
---
src/db/sysdb_ops.c | 18 ++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 10 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_ops.c b/src/db/sysdb_ops.c
index 0f62e3b1a..76f4580aa 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_ops.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_ops.c
@@ -1914,15 +1914,17 @@ int sysdb_add_user(struct sss_domain_info *domain,
goto done;
}
- ret = sysdb_search_group_by_gid(tmp_ctx, domain, uid, NULL, &msg);
- if (ret != ENOENT) {
- if (ret == EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "Group with GID [%"SPRIgid"] already exists in an "
- "MPG domain\n", gid);
- ret = EEXIST;
+ if (uid != 0) { /* uid == 0 means non-POSIX object */
+ ret = sysdb_search_group_by_gid(tmp_ctx, domain, uid, NULL, &msg);
+ if (ret != ENOENT) {
+ if (ret == EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "Group with GID [%"SPRIgid"] already exists in an "
+ "MPG domain\n", uid);
+ ret = EEXIST;
+ }
+ goto done;
}
- goto done;
}
}
--
2.44.0

37
SOURCES/0003-ad-use-right-memory-context-in-GPO-code.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,37 @@
From 723a30b45ba4cbd9a4913fd37d68e392dcfc16ba Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 7 Jun 2024 18:04:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] ad: use right memory context in GPO code
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The original primary SID is allocated on a temporary context and must be
move to be longer living one to still be available when the SID is
evaluated later in the code.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7411
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b25e510ad60f6ce0b57063cce648c3aa48b21241)
---
src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
index b879b0a08..ed664ec83 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
@@ -711,7 +711,7 @@ ad_gpo_get_sids(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
}
group_sids[i++] = talloc_strdup(group_sids, AD_AUTHENTICATED_USERS_SID);
if (orig_gid_sid != NULL) {
- group_sids[i++] = orig_gid_sid;
+ group_sids[i++] = talloc_steal(group_sids, orig_gid_sid);
}
group_sids[i] = NULL;
--
2.44.0

194
SOURCES/0003-sdap-add-naming_context-as-new-member-of-struct-sdap.patch
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@ -1,194 +0,0 @@
From 6a8e60df84d5d2565bec36be19c2def25a6ece1f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 14:21:12 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 3/3] sdap: add naming_context as new member of struct
sdap_domain
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The naming_context could be a more reliable source than basedn for the
actual base DN because basedn is set very early from the domain name
given in sssd.conf. Although it is recommended to use the fully
qualified DNS domain name here it is not required. As a result basedn
might not reflect the actual based DN of the LDAP server. Also pure LDAP
server (i.e. not AD or FreeIPA) might use different schemes to set the
base DN which will not be based on the DNS domain of the LDAP server.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/5708
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit a153f13f296401247a862df2b99048bb1bbb8e2e)
---
src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c | 6 ++++--
src/providers/ldap/sdap.c | 36 +++++++++++++-----------------------
src/providers/ldap/sdap.h | 11 +++++++++++
3 files changed, 28 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
index b0ee3e616..3d1ad39c7 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
@@ -2185,8 +2185,10 @@ ad_gpo_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
goto done;
}
- ret = common_parse_search_base(state, sdom->basedn, state->ldb_ctx,
- "AD_HOSTS", NULL, &search_bases);
+ ret = common_parse_search_base(state,
+ sdom->naming_context == NULL ? sdom->basedn
+ : sdom->naming_context,
+ state->ldb_ctx, "AD_HOSTS", NULL, &search_bases);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
"Failed to create dedicated search base for host lookups, "
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap.c b/src/providers/ldap/sdap.c
index f5637c5fb..956eba93a 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap.c
@@ -1252,19 +1252,10 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
struct sdap_domain *sdom)
{
int ret;
- char *naming_context = NULL;
- if (!sdom->search_bases
- || !sdom->user_search_bases
- || !sdom->group_search_bases
- || !sdom->netgroup_search_bases
- || !sdom->host_search_bases
- || !sdom->sudo_search_bases
- || !sdom->iphost_search_bases
- || !sdom->ipnetwork_search_bases
- || !sdom->autofs_search_bases) {
- naming_context = get_naming_context(opts->basic, rootdse);
- if (naming_context == NULL) {
+ if (!sdom->naming_context) {
+ sdom->naming_context = get_naming_context(sdom, rootdse);
+ if (sdom->naming_context == NULL) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "get_naming_context failed.\n");
/* This has to be non-fatal, since some servers offer
@@ -1280,7 +1271,7 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
@@ -1288,7 +1279,7 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->user_search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_USER_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
@@ -1296,7 +1287,7 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->group_search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_GROUP_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
@@ -1304,7 +1295,7 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->netgroup_search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_NETGROUP_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
@@ -1312,7 +1303,7 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->host_search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_HOST_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
@@ -1320,7 +1311,7 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->sudo_search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_SUDO_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
@@ -1328,7 +1319,7 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->service_search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_SERVICE_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
@@ -1336,7 +1327,7 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->autofs_search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_AUTOFS_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
@@ -1344,7 +1335,7 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->iphost_search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_IPHOST_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
@@ -1352,14 +1343,13 @@ errno_t sdap_set_config_options_with_rootdse(struct sysdb_attrs *rootdse,
if (!sdom->ipnetwork_search_bases) {
ret = sdap_set_search_base(opts, sdom,
SDAP_IPNETWORK_SEARCH_BASE,
- naming_context);
+ sdom->naming_context);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
}
ret = EOK;
done:
- talloc_free(naming_context);
return ret;
}
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap.h b/src/providers/ldap/sdap.h
index 161bc5c26..103d50ed4 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap.h
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap.h
@@ -454,6 +454,17 @@ struct sdap_domain {
char *basedn;
+ /* The naming_context could be a more reliable source than basedn for the
+ * actual base DN because basedn is set very early from the domain name
+ * given in sssd.conf. Although it is recommended to use the fully
+ * qualified DNS domain name here it is not required. As a result basedn
+ * might not reflect the actual based DN of the LDAP server. Also pure
+ * LDAP server (i.e. not AD or FreeIPA) might use different schemes to set
+ * the base DN which will not be based on the DNS domain of the LDAP
+ * server. naming_context might be NULL even after connection to an LDAP
+ * server. */
+ char *naming_context;
+
struct sdap_search_base **search_bases;
struct sdap_search_base **user_search_bases;
struct sdap_search_base **group_search_bases;
--
2.41.0

208
SOURCES/0004-TS_CACHE-never-try-to-upgrade-timestamps-cache.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
From 09b23e78806d8930c3f1b9e411dc8cf464c18998 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 13:08:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] TS_CACHE: never try to upgrade timestamps cache
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
It's easier and more consistent to recreate it instead.
This is a natural extension of 3b67fc6488ac10ca13561d9032f59951f82203e6
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit fc2a26c306e51b66680aef85aa0d2c41d8049a7f)
---
src/db/sysdb_init.c | 103 +----------------------------------------
src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c | 45 ------------------
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 147 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_init.c b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
index 38a9cd64a..a1d02d49c 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_init.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
@@ -376,57 +376,6 @@ static errno_t sysdb_cache_create_empty(struct ldb_context *ldb,
return EOK;
}
-static errno_t sysdb_ts_cache_upgrade(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
- struct ldb_context *ldb,
- struct sss_domain_info *domain,
- const char *cur_version,
- const char **_new_version)
-{
- errno_t ret;
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
- const char *version;
- struct ldb_context *save_ldb;
-
- tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
- if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- /* The upgrade process depends on having ldb around, yet the upgrade
- * function shouldn't set the ldb pointer, only the connect function
- * should after it's successful. To avoid hard refactoring, save the
- * ldb pointer here and restore in the 'done' handler
- */
- save_ldb = sysdb->ldb;
- sysdb->ldb = ldb;
-
- version = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, cur_version);
- if (version == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CONF_SETTINGS,
- "Upgrading timstamp cache of DB [%s] from version: %s\n",
- domain->name, version);
-
- if (strcmp(version, SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_1) == 0) {
- ret = sysdb_ts_upgrade_01(sysdb, &version);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- ret = EOK;
-
-done:
- sysdb->ldb = save_ldb;
- *_new_version = version;
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
static errno_t sysdb_domain_cache_upgrade(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
struct sysdb_dom_upgrade_ctx *upgrade_ctx,
@@ -884,56 +833,6 @@ static int sysdb_timestamp_cache_connect(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
}
ret = sysdb_ts_cache_connect(tmp_ctx, sysdb, domain, &ldb, &version);
- switch (ret) {
- case ERR_SYSDB_VERSION_TOO_OLD:
- if (upgrade_ctx == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE,
- "DB version too old [%s], expected [%s] for domain %s!\n",
- version, SYSDB_VERSION, domain->name);
- break;
- }
-
- ret = sysdb_ts_cache_upgrade(tmp_ctx, sysdb, ldb, domain, version,
- &version);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
- "Could not upgrade the timestamp ldb file (%d) (%s)\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- break;
- }
-
- /* The version should now match SYSDB_VERSION.
- * If not, it means we didn't match any of the
- * known older versions. The DB might be
- * corrupt or generated by a newer version of
- * SSSD.
- */
- ret = sysdb_version_check(SYSDB_TS_VERSION, version);
- if (ret == EOK) {
- /* The cache has been upgraded.
- * We need to reopen the LDB to ensure that
- * any changes made above take effect.
- */
- ret = sysdb_ldb_reconnect(tmp_ctx,
- sysdb->ldb_ts_file,
- LDB_FLG_NOSYNC,
- &ldb);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
- "Could not reopen the timestamp ldb file (%d) (%s)\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- }
- }
- break;
- case ERR_SYSDB_VERSION_TOO_NEW:
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
- "DB version too new [%s], expected [%s] for domain %s!\n",
- version, SYSDB_TS_VERSION, domain->name);
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
"The timestamps cache could not be opened. "
@@ -953,7 +852,7 @@ static int sysdb_timestamp_cache_connect(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
ret = sysdb_ts_cache_connect(tmp_ctx, sysdb, domain, &ldb, &version);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
- "Could not delete the timestamp ldb file (%d) (%s)\n",
+ "sysdb_ts_cache_connect() failed after cache deletion [%d]: %s\n",
ret, sss_strerror(ret));
}
}
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
index 328bd2962..37c0007cb 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
@@ -2774,51 +2774,6 @@ done:
return ret;
}
-int sysdb_ts_upgrade_01(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver)
-{
- struct upgrade_ctx *ctx;
- errno_t ret;
- struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
-
- ret = commence_upgrade(sysdb, sysdb->ldb, SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_2, &ctx);
- if (ret) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* Remove @IDXONE from index */
- talloc_free(msg);
- msg = ldb_msg_new(ctx);
- if (msg == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- msg->dn = ldb_dn_new(msg, sysdb->ldb, "@INDEXLIST");
- if (msg->dn == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = ldb_msg_add_empty(msg, "@IDXONE", LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE, NULL);
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = ldb_modify(sysdb->ldb, msg);
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- ret = sysdb_error_to_errno(ret);
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* conversion done, update version number */
- ret = update_version(ctx);
-
-done:
- ret = finish_upgrade(ret, &ctx, ver);
- return ret;
-}
-
/*
* Example template for future upgrades.
* Copy and change version numbers as appropriate.
--
2.45.2

233
SOURCES/0004-pam-fix-SC-auth-with-multiple-certs-and-missing-logi.patch
View File

@ -1,233 +0,0 @@
From 50077c3255177fe1b01837fbe31a7f8fd47dee74 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 18 Jan 2024 13:08:17 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pam: fix SC auth with multiple certs and missing login name
While introducing the local_auth_policy option a quite specific use-case
was not covered correctly. If there are multiple matching certificates
on the Smartcard, 'local_auth_policy = only' is set and GDM's Smartcard
mode was used for login, i.e. there is no user name given and the user
has to be derived from the certificate used for login, authentication
failed. The main reason for the failure is that in this case the
Smartcard interaction and the user mapping has to be done first to
determine the user before local_auth_policy is evaluated. As a result
when checking if the authentication can be finished the request was in
an unexpected state because the indicator for local Smartcard
authentication was not enabled.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7109
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Scott Poore <spoore@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 44ec3e4638b0c6f7f45a3390a28c2e8745d52bc3)
---
src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h | 10 ++++
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c | 17 +++++--
src/tests/intg/Makefile.am | 2 +
src/tests/intg/test_pam_responder.py | 74 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
4 files changed, 96 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h
index 7013a8edd..618836189 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h
@@ -93,7 +93,17 @@ struct pam_auth_req {
struct ldb_message *user_obj;
struct cert_auth_info *cert_list;
struct cert_auth_info *current_cert;
+ /* Switched to 'true' if the backend indicates that it cannot handle
+ * Smartcard authentication, but Smartcard authentication is
+ * possible and local Smartcard authentication is allowed. */
bool cert_auth_local;
+ /* Switched to 'true' if authentication (not pre-authentication) was
+ * started without a login name and the name had to be lookup up with the
+ * certificate used for authentication. Since reading the certificate from
+ * the Smartcard already involves the PIN validation in this case there
+ * would be no need for an additional Smartcard interaction if only local
+ * Smartcard authentication is possible. */
+ bool initial_cert_auth_successful;
bool passkey_data_exists;
uint32_t client_id_num;
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
index c23ea7ba4..a7c181733 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
@@ -2200,8 +2200,8 @@ static void pam_forwarder_lookup_by_cert_done(struct tevent_req *req)
ret = ENOENT;
goto done;
}
-
- if (cert_count > 1) {
+ /* Multiple certificates are only expected during pre-auth */
+ if (cert_count > 1 && preq->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_PREAUTH) {
for (preq->current_cert = preq->cert_list;
preq->current_cert != NULL;
preq->current_cert = sss_cai_get_next(preq->current_cert)) {
@@ -2285,7 +2285,9 @@ static void pam_forwarder_lookup_by_cert_done(struct tevent_req *req)
}
/* If logon_name was not given during authentication add a
- * SSS_PAM_CERT_INFO message to send the name to the caller. */
+ * SSS_PAM_CERT_INFO message to send the name to the caller.
+ * Additionally initial_cert_auth_successful is set to
+ * indicate that the user is already authenticated. */
if (preq->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE
&& preq->pd->logon_name == NULL) {
ret = add_pam_cert_response(preq->pd,
@@ -2297,6 +2299,8 @@ static void pam_forwarder_lookup_by_cert_done(struct tevent_req *req)
preq->pd->pam_status = PAM_AUTHINFO_UNAVAIL;
goto done;
}
+
+ preq->initial_cert_auth_successful = true;
}
/* cert_user will be returned to the PAM client as user name, so
@@ -2851,12 +2855,15 @@ static void pam_dom_forwarder(struct pam_auth_req *preq)
if (found) {
if (local_policy != NULL && strcasecmp(local_policy, "only") == 0) {
talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_IMPORTANT_INFO, "Local auth only set, skipping online auth\n");
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_IMPORTANT_INFO,
+ "Local auth only set and matching certificate was found, "
+ "skipping online auth\n");
if (preq->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_PREAUTH) {
preq->pd->pam_status = PAM_SUCCESS;
} else if (preq->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE
&& IS_SC_AUTHTOK(preq->pd->authtok)
- && preq->cert_auth_local) {
+ && (preq->cert_auth_local
+ || preq->initial_cert_auth_successful)) {
preq->pd->pam_status = PAM_SUCCESS;
preq->callback = pam_reply;
}
diff --git a/src/tests/intg/Makefile.am b/src/tests/intg/Makefile.am
index 3866d3ca6..0cfd268dc 100644
--- a/src/tests/intg/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/tests/intg/Makefile.am
@@ -199,6 +199,7 @@ clean-local:
PAM_CERT_DB_PATH="$(abs_builddir)/../test_CA/SSSD_test_CA.pem"
SOFTHSM2_CONF="$(abs_builddir)/../test_CA/softhsm2_one.conf"
+SOFTHSM2_TWO_CONF="$(abs_builddir)/../test_CA/softhsm2_two.conf"
intgcheck-installed: config.py passwd group pam_sss_service pam_sss_alt_service pam_sss_sc_required pam_sss_try_sc pam_sss_allow_missing_name pam_sss_domains sss_netgroup_thread_test
pipepath="$(DESTDIR)$(pipepath)"; \
@@ -233,6 +234,7 @@ intgcheck-installed: config.py passwd group pam_sss_service pam_sss_alt_service
PAM_CERT_DB_PATH=$(PAM_CERT_DB_PATH) \
ABS_SRCDIR=$(abs_srcdir) \
SOFTHSM2_CONF=$(SOFTHSM2_CONF) \
+ SOFTHSM2_TWO_CONF=$(SOFTHSM2_TWO_CONF) \
KCM_RENEW=$(KCM_RENEW) \
FILES_PROVIDER=$(FILES_PROVIDER) \
DBUS_SOCK_DIR="$(DESTDIR)$(runstatedir)/dbus/" \
diff --git a/src/tests/intg/test_pam_responder.py b/src/tests/intg/test_pam_responder.py
index 1fc3937e6..0fbf8065e 100644
--- a/src/tests/intg/test_pam_responder.py
+++ b/src/tests/intg/test_pam_responder.py
@@ -168,7 +168,7 @@ def format_pam_cert_auth_conf(config, provider):
{provider.p}
[certmap/auth_only/user1]
- matchrule = <SUBJECT>.*CN=SSSD test cert 0001.*
+ matchrule = <SUBJECT>.*CN=SSSD test cert 000[12].*
""").format(**locals())
@@ -201,7 +201,7 @@ def format_pam_cert_auth_conf_name_format(config, provider):
{provider.p}
[certmap/auth_only/user1]
- matchrule = <SUBJECT>.*CN=SSSD test cert 0001.*
+ matchrule = <SUBJECT>.*CN=SSSD test cert 000[12].*
""").format(**locals())
@@ -380,6 +380,28 @@ def simple_pam_cert_auth_no_cert(request, passwd_ops_setup):
return None
+@pytest.fixture
+def simple_pam_cert_auth_two_certs(request, passwd_ops_setup):
+ """Setup SSSD with pam_cert_auth=True"""
+ config.PAM_CERT_DB_PATH = os.environ['PAM_CERT_DB_PATH']
+
+ old_softhsm2_conf = os.environ['SOFTHSM2_CONF']
+ softhsm2_two_conf = os.environ['SOFTHSM2_TWO_CONF']
+ os.environ['SOFTHSM2_CONF'] = softhsm2_two_conf
+
+ conf = format_pam_cert_auth_conf(config, provider_switch(request.param))
+ create_conf_fixture(request, conf)
+ create_sssd_fixture(request)
+
+ os.environ['SOFTHSM2_CONF'] = old_softhsm2_conf
+
+ passwd_ops_setup.useradd(**USER1)
+ passwd_ops_setup.useradd(**USER2)
+ sync_files_provider(USER2['name'])
+
+ return None
+
+
@pytest.fixture
def simple_pam_cert_auth_name_format(request, passwd_ops_setup):
"""Setup SSSD with pam_cert_auth=True and full_name_format"""
@@ -522,6 +544,54 @@ def test_sc_auth(simple_pam_cert_auth, env_for_sssctl):
assert err.find("pam_authenticate for user [user1]: Success") != -1
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('simple_pam_cert_auth_two_certs', provider_list(), indirect=True)
+def test_sc_auth_two(simple_pam_cert_auth_two_certs, env_for_sssctl):
+
+ sssctl = subprocess.Popen(["sssctl", "user-checks", "user1",
+ "--action=auth", "--service=pam_sss_service"],
+ universal_newlines=True,
+ env=env_for_sssctl, stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
+ stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
+
+ try:
+ out, err = sssctl.communicate(input="2\n123456")
+ except Exception:
+ sssctl.kill()
+ out, err = sssctl.communicate()
+
+ sssctl.stdin.close()
+ sssctl.stdout.close()
+
+ if sssctl.wait() != 0:
+ raise Exception("sssctl failed")
+
+ assert err.find("pam_authenticate for user [user1]: Success") != -1
+
+
+@pytest.mark.parametrize('simple_pam_cert_auth_two_certs', provider_list(), indirect=True)
+def test_sc_auth_two_missing_name(simple_pam_cert_auth_two_certs, env_for_sssctl):
+
+ sssctl = subprocess.Popen(["sssctl", "user-checks", "",
+ "--action=auth", "--service=pam_sss_allow_missing_name"],
+ universal_newlines=True,
+ env=env_for_sssctl, stdin=subprocess.PIPE,
+ stdout=subprocess.PIPE, stderr=subprocess.PIPE)
+
+ try:
+ out, err = sssctl.communicate(input="2\n123456")
+ except Exception:
+ sssctl.kill()
+ out, err = sssctl.communicate()
+
+ sssctl.stdin.close()
+ sssctl.stdout.close()
+
+ if sssctl.wait() != 0:
+ raise Exception("sssctl failed")
+
+ assert err.find("pam_authenticate for user [user1]: Success") != -1
+
+
@pytest.mark.parametrize('simple_pam_cert_auth', ['proxy_password'], indirect=True)
def test_sc_proxy_password_fallback(simple_pam_cert_auth, env_for_sssctl):
"""
--
2.41.0

147
SOURCES/0005-SYSDB-remove-index-on-dataExpireTimestamp.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
From 13e3d0390b9aaf72a855b857857c3cdd6eb6252a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 19:09:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] SYSDB: remove index on `dataExpireTimestamp`
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This index was only used in cleanup tasks that don't run often.
On the other hand, this index is huge and degrades performance of libldb
in general.
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f0d45464cee1d2a6a2719dbffe5bbf6189d0554a)
---
src/db/sysdb_init.c | 8 ++++++++
src/db/sysdb_private.h | 9 +++++----
src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_init.c b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
index a1d02d49c..68b9744dd 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_init.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
@@ -559,6 +559,13 @@ static errno_t sysdb_domain_cache_upgrade(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
}
}
+ if (strcmp(version, SYSDB_VERSION_0_24) == 0) {
+ ret = sysdb_upgrade_24(sysdb, &version);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = EOK;
done:
sysdb->ldb = save_ldb;
@@ -765,6 +772,7 @@ static int sysdb_domain_cache_connect(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
ret = sysdb_domain_cache_upgrade(tmp_ctx, sysdb, upgrade_ctx,
ldb, domain, version, &version);
if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "sysdb_domain_cache_upgrade() failed\n");
goto done;
}
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_private.h b/src/db/sysdb_private.h
index 63f7b5601..b814f97a5 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_private.h
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_private.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#ifndef __INT_SYS_DB_H__
#define __INT_SYS_DB_H__
+#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_25 "0.25"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_24 "0.24"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_23 "0.23"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_22 "0.22"
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_2 "0.2"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_1 "0.1"
-#define SYSDB_VERSION SYSDB_VERSION_0_24
+#define SYSDB_VERSION SYSDB_VERSION_0_25
#define SYSDB_BASE_LDIF \
"dn: @ATTRIBUTES\n" \
@@ -72,7 +73,6 @@
"@IDXATTR: uidNumber\n" \
"@IDXATTR: gidNumber\n" \
"@IDXATTR: lastUpdate\n" \
- "@IDXATTR: dataExpireTimestamp\n" \
"@IDXATTR: originalDN\n" \
"@IDXATTR: nameAlias\n" \
"@IDXATTR: servicePort\n" \
@@ -104,10 +104,11 @@
"\n"
/* The timestamp cache has its own versioning */
+#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_3 "0.3"
#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_2 "0.2"
#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_1 "0.1"
-#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_2
+#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_3
#define SYSDB_TS_BASE_LDIF \
"dn: @ATTRIBUTES\n" \
@@ -115,7 +116,6 @@
"\n" \
"dn: @INDEXLIST\n" \
"@IDXATTR: lastUpdate\n" \
- "@IDXATTR: dataExpireTimestamp\n" \
"\n" \
"dn: cn=sysdb\n" \
"cn: sysdb\n" \
@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ int sysdb_upgrade_20(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_upgrade_21(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_upgrade_22(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_upgrade_23(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
+int sysdb_upgrade_24(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_ts_upgrade_01(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
index 37c0007cb..b010488ca 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
@@ -2774,6 +2774,33 @@ done:
return ret;
}
+int sysdb_upgrade_24(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver)
+{
+ struct upgrade_ctx *ctx;
+ errno_t ret;
+
+ ret = commence_upgrade(sysdb, sysdb->ldb, SYSDB_VERSION_0_25, &ctx);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = sysdb_ldb_mod_index(sysdb, SYSDB_IDX_DELETE, sysdb->ldb, "dataExpireTimestamp");
+ if (ret == ENOENT) { /*nothing to delete */
+ ret = EOK;
+ }
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "sysdb_ldb_mod_index() failed [%d]: %s\n",
+ ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = update_version(ctx);
+
+done:
+ ret = finish_upgrade(ret, &ctx, ver);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Example template for future upgrades.
* Copy and change version numbers as appropriate.
--
2.45.2

50
SOURCES/0005-sss-client-handle-key-value-in-destructor.patch
View File

@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
From 8bf31924265baf81372fe42580dee4064a642375 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 23 Jan 2024 09:28:26 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] sss-client: handle key value in destructor
When the pthread key destructor is called the key value is already set
to NULL by the caller. As a result the data stored in the value can only
be accessed by the first argument passed to the destructor and not by
pthread_getspecific() as the previous code did.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7189
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit b439847bc88ad7b89f0596af822c0ffbf2a579df)
---
src/sss_client/common.c | 16 +++++++++++++++-
1 file changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/sss_client/common.c b/src/sss_client/common.c
index 702d0597d..32555edf3 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/common.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/common.c
@@ -93,8 +93,22 @@ void sss_cli_close_socket(void)
#ifdef HAVE_PTHREAD_EXT
static void sss_at_thread_exit(void *v)
{
- sss_cli_close_socket();
+ /* At this point the key value is already set to NULL and the only way to
+ * access the data from the value is via the argument passed to the
+ * destructor (sss_at_thread_exit). See e.g.
+ * https://www.man7.org/linux/man-pages/man3/pthread_key_create.3p.html
+ * for details. */
+
+ struct sss_socket_descriptor_t *descriptor = (struct sss_socket_descriptor_t *) v;
+
+ if (descriptor->sd != -1) {
+ close(descriptor->sd);
+ descriptor->sd = -1;
+ }
+
free(v);
+
+ /* Most probably redudant, but better safe than sorry. */
pthread_setspecific(sss_sd_key, NULL);
}
--
2.42.0

104
SOURCES/0006-krb5-Allow-fallback-between-responder-questions.patch
View File

@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
From 23849f751315ea218e125f35cd419cce55d27355 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 1 Feb 2024 14:22:09 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 6/7] krb5: Allow fallback between responder questions
Add support to try the next Preauth type when answering
krb5 questions. Fixes an issue when an IPA user has
both authtype passkey and authtype password set at
the same time.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7152
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit c9a333c5215b9ee6080038881a249c329141d0cf)
---
src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 37 +++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
1 file changed, 28 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
index d3e3d859a..26b0090b4 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
@@ -784,11 +784,14 @@ static krb5_error_code answer_pkinit(krb5_context ctx,
"krb5_responder_set_answer failed.\n");
}
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE, "Unexpected authentication token type [%s]\n",
+ sss_authtok_type_to_str(sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)));
+ kerr = EAGAIN;
goto done;
}
- kerr = EOK;
-
done:
krb5_responder_pkinit_challenge_free(ctx, rctx, chl);
@@ -914,9 +917,9 @@ static krb5_error_code answer_idp_oauth2(krb5_context kctx,
type = sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok);
if (type != SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_OAUTH2) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Unexpected authentication token type [%s]\n",
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE, "Unexpected authentication token type [%s]\n",
sss_authtok_type_to_str(type));
- kerr = EINVAL;
+ kerr = EAGAIN;
goto done;
}
@@ -1141,9 +1144,9 @@ static krb5_error_code answer_passkey(krb5_context kctx,
type = sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok);
if (type != SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSKEY_REPLY) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Unexpected authentication token type [%s]\n",
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE, "Unexpected authentication token type [%s]\n",
sss_authtok_type_to_str(type));
- kerr = EINVAL;
+ kerr = EAGAIN;
goto done;
}
@@ -1244,17 +1247,33 @@ static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_responder(krb5_context ctx,
return kerr;
}
+
+ kerr = EOK;
} else if (strcmp(question_list[c],
KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PKINIT) == 0
&& (sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)
== SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_SC_PIN
|| sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)
== SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_SC_KEYPAD)) {
- return answer_pkinit(ctx, kr, rctx);
+ kerr = answer_pkinit(ctx, kr, rctx);
} else if (strcmp(question_list[c], SSSD_IDP_OAUTH2_QUESTION) == 0) {
- return answer_idp_oauth2(ctx, kr, rctx);
+ kerr = answer_idp_oauth2(ctx, kr, rctx);
} else if (strcmp(question_list[c], SSSD_PASSKEY_QUESTION) == 0) {
- return answer_passkey(ctx, kr, rctx);
+ kerr = answer_passkey(ctx, kr, rctx);
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE, "Unknown question type [%s]\n", question_list[c]);
+ kerr = EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ /* Continue to the next question when the given authtype cannot be
+ * handled by the answer_* function. This allows fallback between auth
+ * types, such as passkey -> password. */
+ if (kerr == EAGAIN) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_ALL, "Auth type [%s] could not be handled by answer function, "
+ "continuing to next question.\n", question_list[c]);
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ return kerr;
}
}
}
--
2.42.0

115
SOURCES/0006-pam_sss-fix-passthrow-of-old-authtok-from-another-pa.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
From 39cbb8df402f59b4df2442eb291600773e7062cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Mikhalicin <pmikhalicin@rutoken.ru>
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 15:24:48 +0600
Subject: [PATCH 6/8] pam_sss: fix passthrow of old authtok from another pam
modules at PAM_PRELIM_CHECK
pam_sss ignored old authtoks passed from another pam modules
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7007
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/5418
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae6b9163be0a5a8846e8dbf2e0da2c29221781b9)
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
---
src/sss_client/pam_sss.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
index 41a528dda..5171e58ec 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
@@ -2728,42 +2728,57 @@ static int get_authtok_for_password_change(pam_handle_t *pamh,
exp_data = NULL;
}
- /* we query for the old password during PAM_PRELIM_CHECK to make
- * pam_sss work e.g. with pam_cracklib */
if (pam_flags & PAM_PRELIM_CHECK) {
- if ( (getuid() != 0 || exp_data ) && !(flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_FIRST_PASS)) {
- if (flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_2FA
- || (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
- && pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
- if (pi->password_prompting) {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
- _("Second Factor (optional): "));
- } else {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
- _("Second Factor: "));
- }
+ if (getuid() == 0 && !exp_data )
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_2FA
+ || (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
+ && pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
+ if (pi->password_prompting) {
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
+ _("Second Factor (optional): "));
} else {
- ret = prompt_password(pamh, pi, _("Current Password: "));
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
+ _("Second Factor: "));
}
- if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- D(("failed to get credentials from user"));
- return ret;
+ } else if ((flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_FIRST_PASS)
+ && check_authtok_data(pamh, pi) != 0) {
+ if (pi->pamstack_oldauthtok == NULL) {
+ pi->pam_authtok_type = SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_EMPTY;
+ pi->pam_authtok = NULL;
+ pi->pam_authtok_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ pi->pam_authtok = strdup(pi->pamstack_oldauthtok);
+ if (pi->pam_authtok == NULL) {
+ D(("strdup failed"));
+ return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ }
+ pi->pam_authtok_type = SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD;
+ pi->pam_authtok_size = strlen(pi->pam_authtok);
}
+ ret = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ ret = prompt_password(pamh, pi, _("Current Password: "));
+ }
+ if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ D(("failed to get credentials from user"));
+ return ret;
+ }
- ret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, pi->pam_authtok);
- if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- D(("Failed to set PAM_OLDAUTHTOK [%s], "
- "oldauthtok may not be available",
- pam_strerror(pamh,ret)));
- return ret;
- }
+ ret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, pi->pam_authtok);
+ if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ D(("Failed to set PAM_OLDAUTHTOK [%s], "
+ "oldauthtok may not be available",
+ pam_strerror(pamh,ret)));
+ return ret;
+ }
- if (pi->pam_authtok_type == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA) {
- ret = keep_authtok_data(pamh, pi);
- if (ret != 0) {
- D(("Failed to store authtok data to pam handle. Password "
- "change might fail."));
- }
+ if (pi->pam_authtok_type == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA) {
+ ret = keep_authtok_data(pamh, pi);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ D(("Failed to store authtok data to pam handle. Password "
+ "change might fail."));
}
}
--
2.45.2

206
SOURCES/0007-krb5-Add-fallback-password-change-support.patch
View File

@ -1,206 +0,0 @@
From 8d9ae754b50dffafef719ad3fa44e5dd1dde47b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Mar 2024 14:31:25 -0500
Subject: [PATCH 7/7] krb5: Add fallback password change support
handle password changes for IPA users with multiple auth types set
(passkey, password)
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6c1272edf174eb4bdf236dc1ffd4287b71a43392)
---
src/krb5_plugin/passkey/passkey_clpreauth.c | 5 ++
src/providers/ipa/ipa_auth.c | 13 +++++
src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.c | 12 +++++
src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.h | 3 ++
src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 5 ++
src/providers/krb5/krb5_child_handler.c | 53 +++++++++++++++++++++
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c | 10 ++++
7 files changed, 101 insertions(+)
diff --git a/src/krb5_plugin/passkey/passkey_clpreauth.c b/src/krb5_plugin/passkey/passkey_clpreauth.c
index d2dfe6fe1..35b6a3fed 100644
--- a/src/krb5_plugin/passkey/passkey_clpreauth.c
+++ b/src/krb5_plugin/passkey/passkey_clpreauth.c
@@ -279,6 +279,11 @@ sss_passkeycl_process(krb5_context context,
goto done;
}
+ if (prompter == NULL) {
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
/* Get FAST armor key. */
as_key = cb->fast_armor(context, rock);
if (as_key == NULL) {
diff --git a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_auth.c b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_auth.c
index 1d61a1052..e5e1bf30c 100644
--- a/src/providers/ipa/ipa_auth.c
+++ b/src/providers/ipa/ipa_auth.c
@@ -258,6 +258,19 @@ static void ipa_pam_auth_handler_krb5_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
if (dp_err != DP_ERR_OK) {
goto done;
}
+ if (state->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_CHAUTHTOK_PRELIM
+ && state->pd->pam_status == PAM_TRY_AGAIN) {
+ /* Reset this to fork a new krb5_child in handle_child_send() */
+ state->pd->child_pid = 0;
+ subreq = krb5_auth_queue_send(state, state->ev, state->be_ctx, state->pd,
+ state->auth_ctx->krb5_auth_ctx);
+ if (subreq == NULL) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, ipa_pam_auth_handler_retry_done, req);
+ return;
+ }
if (state->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE
&& state->pd->pam_status == PAM_CRED_ERR
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.c
index be34880b4..e34943b82 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.c
@@ -532,6 +532,18 @@ struct tevent_req *krb5_auth_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
ret = EOK;
goto done;
}
+
+ /* If krb5_child is still running from SSS_PAM_PREAUTH,
+ * terminate the waiting krb5_child and send the
+ * CHAUTHTOK_PRELIM request again */
+ if (pd->child_pid != 0) {
+ soft_terminate_krb5_child(state, pd, krb5_ctx);
+ state->pam_status = PAM_TRY_AGAIN;
+ state->dp_err = DP_ERR_OK;
+ ret = EOK;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
break;
case SSS_CMD_RENEW:
if (authtok_type != SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_CCFILE) {
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.h b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.h
index bbdbf61fc..783292bc0 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.h
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_auth.h
@@ -135,6 +135,9 @@ errno_t init_renew_tgt(struct krb5_ctx *krb5_ctx, struct be_ctx *be_ctx,
errno_t add_tgt_to_renew_table(struct krb5_ctx *krb5_ctx, const char *ccfile,
struct tgt_times *tgtt, struct pam_data *pd,
const char *upn);
+errno_t soft_terminate_krb5_child(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct pam_data *pd,
+ struct krb5_ctx *krb5_ctx);
/* krb5_access.c */
struct tevent_req *krb5_access_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
index 26b0090b4..b8acae7d7 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
@@ -1259,6 +1259,11 @@ static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_responder(krb5_context ctx,
} else if (strcmp(question_list[c], SSSD_IDP_OAUTH2_QUESTION) == 0) {
kerr = answer_idp_oauth2(ctx, kr, rctx);
} else if (strcmp(question_list[c], SSSD_PASSKEY_QUESTION) == 0) {
+ /* Skip answer_passkey for expired password changes, e.g. user with auth types
+ * passkey AND password set */
+ if (kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_CHAUTHTOK_PRELIM || kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_CHAUTHTOK) {
+ continue;
+ }
kerr = answer_passkey(ctx, kr, rctx);
} else {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE, "Unknown question type [%s]\n", question_list[c]);
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child_handler.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child_handler.c
index 54088e4d6..cab84b37d 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child_handler.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child_handler.c
@@ -1020,3 +1020,56 @@ parse_krb5_child_response(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx, uint8_t *buf, ssize_t len,
*_res = res;
return EOK;
}
+
+/* Closes the write end of waiting krb5_child */
+errno_t soft_terminate_krb5_child(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
+ struct pam_data *pd,
+ struct krb5_ctx *krb5_ctx)
+{
+ char *io_key;
+ struct child_io_fds *io;
+ TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
+ int ret;
+
+ tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
+ if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
+ return ENOMEM;
+ }
+
+ if (pd->child_pid == 0) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
+ "Expected waiting krb5_child.\n");
+ ret = EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ io_key = talloc_asprintf(tmp_ctx, "%d", pd->child_pid);
+ if (io_key == NULL) {
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ io = sss_ptr_hash_lookup(krb5_ctx->io_table, io_key,
+ struct child_io_fds);
+ if (io == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
+ "PTR hash lookup failed.\n");
+ ret = ENOMEM;
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ if (io->write_to_child_fd != -1) {
+ ret = close(io->write_to_child_fd);
+ io->write_to_child_fd = -1;
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ ret = errno;
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
+ "close failed [%d][%s].\n", ret, strerror(ret));
+ }
+ }
+
+ ret = EOK;
+done:
+ talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
+ return ret;
+}
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
index a7c181733..de408ced8 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
@@ -1418,6 +1418,15 @@ void pam_reply(struct pam_auth_req *preq)
goto done;
}
+#if BUILD_PASSKEY
+ if(pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE &&
+ pd->pam_status == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD &&
+ sss_authtok_get_type(pd->authtok) == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSKEY_REPLY) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "Passkey authentication reply, ignoring "
+ "new authtok required status\n");
+ pd->pam_status = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ }
+
/* Passkey auth user notification if no TGT is granted */
if (pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE &&
pd->pam_status == PAM_SUCCESS &&
@@ -1429,6 +1438,7 @@ void pam_reply(struct pam_auth_req *preq)
"User [%s] logged in with local passkey authentication, single "
"sign on ticket is not obtained.\n", pd->user);
}
+#endif /* BUILD_PASSKEY */
/* Account expiration warning is printed for sshd. If pam_verbosity
* is equal or above PAM_VERBOSITY_INFO then all services are informed
--
2.42.0

178
SOURCES/0007-krb5_child-do-not-try-passwords-with-OTP.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
From ef375cdd67b51d8fb63cae4d3cd40f3a5c2bc173 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2024 20:40:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] krb5_child: do not try passwords with OTP
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
During two-factor authentication (OTP) krb5_child should use use the
dedicated OTP auth types SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA and
SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE exclusively and should not try password or
other types.
The special handling needed of ssh under certain conditions are
documented in the code and the man page.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7456
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit af799964e5fa1264467b49988021c054586eff27)
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
---
src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml | 11 +++++++++
src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 11 +--------
src/sss_client/pam_sss.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml b/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml
index fb86a4e41..8ac1a4418 100644
--- a/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml
+++ b/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml
@@ -4559,6 +4559,17 @@ ldap_user_extra_attrs = phone:telephoneNumber
to log in either only with the password or with both factors
two-step prompting has to be used.
</para>
+ <para>
+ Some clients, such as SSH with
+ 'PasswordAuthentication yes', generate their own prompts
+ and do not use prompts provided by SSSD or other PAM
+ modules. Additionally, for SSH with
+ PasswordAuthentication, if two-factor authentication is
+ available, SSSD expects that the
+ credentials entered by the user at the SSH password prompt
+ will always be the two factors in a single string, even if
+ two-factor authentication is optional.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
index 494711de9..cb9a9ce73 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
@@ -536,15 +536,6 @@ static krb5_error_code tokeninfo_matches(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
size_t fa2_len;
switch (sss_authtok_get_type(auth_tok)) {
- case SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD:
- ret = sss_authtok_get_password(auth_tok, &pwd, &len);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "sss_authtok_get_password failed.\n");
- return ret;
- }
-
- return tokeninfo_matches_pwd(mem_ctx, ti, pwd, len, out_token, out_pin);
- break;
case SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE:
ret = sss_authtok_get_2fa_single(auth_tok, &pwd, &len);
if (ret != EOK) {
@@ -569,7 +560,7 @@ static krb5_error_code tokeninfo_matches(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
"Unsupported authtok type %d\n", sss_authtok_get_type(auth_tok));
}
- return EINVAL;
+ return EAGAIN;
}
static krb5_error_code answer_otp(krb5_context ctx,
diff --git a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
index 5171e58ec..d43bd0f55 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
@@ -1656,6 +1656,7 @@ static int prompt_password(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi,
}
static int prompt_2fa(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi,
+ bool second_factor_optional,
const char *prompt_fa1, const char *prompt_fa2)
{
int ret;
@@ -1706,13 +1707,30 @@ static int prompt_2fa(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi,
goto done;
}
- if (resp[1].resp == NULL || *(resp[1].resp) == '\0'
- || (pi->pam_service != NULL && strcmp(pi->pam_service, "sshd") == 0
- && strcmp(resp[0].resp, resp[1].resp) == 0)) {
+ if (resp[1].resp == NULL || *(resp[1].resp) == '\0') {
/* Missing second factor, assume first factor contains combined 2FA
- * credentials.
- * Special handling for SSH with password authentication. Combined
- * 2FA credentials are used but SSH puts them in both responses. */
+ * credentials if the second factor is not optional. If it is optional
+ * then it is assumed that the first factor contain the password. */
+ pi->pam_authtok = strndup(resp[0].resp, MAX_AUTHTOK_SIZE);
+ if (pi->pam_authtok == NULL) {
+ D(("strndup failed."));
+ ret = PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ pi->pam_authtok_size = strlen(pi->pam_authtok) + 1;
+ pi->pam_authtok_type = second_factor_optional
+ ? SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD
+ : SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE;
+ } else if (pi->pam_service != NULL && strcmp(pi->pam_service, "sshd") == 0
+ && strcmp(resp[0].resp, resp[1].resp) == 0) {
+ /* Special handling for SSH with password authentication (ssh's
+ * 'PasswordAuthentication' option. In this mode the ssh client
+ * directly prompts the user for a password and the prompts we are
+ * sending are ignored. Since we send two prompts ssh * will create two
+ * response as well with the same content. We assume that the combined
+ * 2FA credentials are used even if the second factor is optional
+ * because there is no indication about the intention of the user. As a
+ * result we prefer the more secure variant. */
pi->pam_authtok = strndup(resp[0].resp, MAX_AUTHTOK_SIZE);
if (pi->pam_authtok == NULL) {
@@ -1721,7 +1739,7 @@ static int prompt_2fa(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi,
goto done;
}
pi->pam_authtok_size = strlen(pi->pam_authtok) + 1;
- pi->pam_authtok_type = SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD;
+ pi->pam_authtok_type = SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE;
} else {
ret = sss_auth_pack_2fa_blob(resp[0].resp, 0, resp[1].resp, 0, NULL, 0,
@@ -2487,7 +2505,7 @@ static int prompt_by_config(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi)
ret = prompt_password(pamh, pi, pc_get_password_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
break;
case PC_TYPE_2FA:
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
pc_get_2fa_2nd_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
break;
case PC_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE:
@@ -2564,10 +2582,10 @@ static int get_authtok_for_authentication(pam_handle_t *pamh,
|| (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
&& pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
if (pi->password_prompting) {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor: "),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, true, _("First Factor: "),
_("Second Factor (optional): "));
} else {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor: "),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false, _("First Factor: "),
_("Second Factor: "));
}
} else if (pi->passkey_prompt_pin) {
@@ -2736,10 +2754,12 @@ static int get_authtok_for_password_change(pam_handle_t *pamh,
|| (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
&& pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
if (pi->password_prompting) {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, true,
+ _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
_("Second Factor (optional): "));
} else {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false,
+ _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
_("Second Factor: "));
}
} else if ((flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_FIRST_PASS)
--
2.45.2

30
SOURCES/0008-pam-fix-invalid-if-condition.patch
View File

@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
From bebb150720620aae97dcae5c11e0b9bea0119b5b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Pavel=20B=C5=99ezina?= <pbrezina@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 13 Mar 2024 13:27:02 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pam: fix invalid #if condition
ifdef should be used as anywhere else, otherwise we hit a build
error if sssd is being built without passkey.
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 603399a43d7bd0b8b6de3b512388b08abb9521ed)
---
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
index de408ced8..13ba13131 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
@@ -1418,7 +1418,7 @@ void pam_reply(struct pam_auth_req *preq)
goto done;
}
-#if BUILD_PASSKEY
+#ifdef BUILD_PASSKEY
if(pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE &&
pd->pam_status == PAM_NEW_AUTHTOK_REQD &&
sss_authtok_get_type(pd->authtok) == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSKEY_REPLY) {
--
2.42.0

45
SOURCES/0008-pam_sss-add-missing-optional-2nd-factor-handling.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From 7e76396a891b4c704f1db8c71a217f869bef0ec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2024 13:46:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] pam_sss: add missing optional 2nd factor handling
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This is a follow up to pull-request #7462 and adds the proper handling of
an optional second factor in case the prompting is configured.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7456
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 077d2993a1b306e7cfe61618cbd5d03c602572f8)
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
---
src/sss_client/pam_sss.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
index d43bd0f55..d1101e16c 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
@@ -2505,8 +2505,13 @@ static int prompt_by_config(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi)
ret = prompt_password(pamh, pi, pc_get_password_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
break;
case PC_TYPE_2FA:
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
- pc_get_2fa_2nd_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
+ if (pi->password_prompting) {
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, true, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
+ pc_get_2fa_2nd_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
+ } else {
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
+ pc_get_2fa_2nd_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
+ }
break;
case PC_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE:
ret = prompt_2fa_single(pamh, pi,
--
2.45.2

185
SOURCES/0009-krb5-add-OTP-to-krb5-response-selection.patch
View File

@ -1,185 +0,0 @@
From 5b9bc0a1a6116e6fb001c7dce7497854fcdd40c4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2024 09:18:45 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 09/12] krb5: add OTP to krb5 response selection
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Originally where there was only password and OTP authentication we
checked for password authentication and used OTP as a fallback. This was
continued as other (pre)-authentication types were added. But so far
only one authentication type was returned.
This changed recently to allow the user a better selection and as a
result OTP cannot be handled as a fallback anymore but has to be added
to the selection. In case there are no types (questions) available now
password is used as a fallback.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7152
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit bf6cb6dcdd94d9f47e4e74acd51e30f86b488943)
---
src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 107 ++++++++++++++++++++++----------
1 file changed, 75 insertions(+), 32 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
index b8acae7d7..116f2adda 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
@@ -1200,6 +1200,44 @@ done:
#endif /* BUILD_PASSKEY */
}
+static krb5_error_code answer_password(krb5_context kctx,
+ struct krb5_req *kr,
+ krb5_responder_context rctx)
+{
+ krb5_error_code kerr;
+ int ret;
+ const char *pwd;
+
+ kr->password_prompting = true;
+
+ if ((kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE
+ || kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_CHAUTHTOK_PRELIM
+ || kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_CHAUTHTOK)
+ && sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)
+ == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD) {
+ ret = sss_authtok_get_password(kr->pd->authtok, &pwd, NULL);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "sss_authtok_get_password failed.\n");
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ kerr = krb5_responder_set_answer(kctx, rctx,
+ KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PASSWORD,
+ pwd);
+ if (kerr != 0) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "krb5_responder_set_answer failed.\n");
+ }
+
+ return kerr;
+ }
+
+ /* For SSS_PAM_PREAUTH and the other remaining commands the caller should
+ * continue to iterate over the available authentication methods. */
+ return EAGAIN;
+}
+
static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_responder(krb5_context ctx,
void *data,
krb5_responder_context rctx)
@@ -1207,9 +1245,7 @@ static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_responder(krb5_context ctx,
struct krb5_req *kr = talloc_get_type(data, struct krb5_req);
const char * const *question_list;
size_t c;
- const char *pwd;
- int ret;
- krb5_error_code kerr;
+ krb5_error_code kerr = EINVAL;
if (kr == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
@@ -1221,34 +1257,18 @@ static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_responder(krb5_context ctx,
for (c = 0; question_list[c] != NULL; c++) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_ALL, "Got question [%s].\n", question_list[c]);
+ /* It is expected that the answer_*() functions only return EOK
+ * (success) if the authentication was successful, i.e. during
+ * SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE. In all other cases, e.g. during
+ * SSS_PAM_PREAUTH either EAGAIN should be returned to indicate
+ * that the other available authentication methods should be
+ * checked as well. Or some other error code to indicate a fatal
+ * error where no other methods should be tried.
+ * Especially if setting the answer failed neither EOK nor EAGAIN
+ * should be returned. */
if (strcmp(question_list[c],
KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PASSWORD) == 0) {
- kr->password_prompting = true;
-
- if ((kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE
- || kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_CHAUTHTOK_PRELIM
- || kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_CHAUTHTOK)
- && sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)
- == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD) {
- ret = sss_authtok_get_password(kr->pd->authtok, &pwd, NULL);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "sss_authtok_get_password failed.\n");
- return ret;
- }
-
- kerr = krb5_responder_set_answer(ctx, rctx,
- KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PASSWORD,
- pwd);
- if (kerr != 0) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "krb5_responder_set_answer failed.\n");
- }
-
- return kerr;
- }
-
- kerr = EOK;
+ kerr = answer_password(ctx, kr, rctx);
} else if (strcmp(question_list[c],
KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_PKINIT) == 0
&& (sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)
@@ -1265,6 +1285,8 @@ static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_responder(krb5_context ctx,
continue;
}
kerr = answer_passkey(ctx, kr, rctx);
+ } else if (strcmp(question_list[c], KRB5_RESPONDER_QUESTION_OTP) == 0) {
+ kerr = answer_otp(ctx, kr, rctx);
} else {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE, "Unknown question type [%s]\n", question_list[c]);
kerr = EINVAL;
@@ -1274,16 +1296,37 @@ static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_responder(krb5_context ctx,
* handled by the answer_* function. This allows fallback between auth
* types, such as passkey -> password. */
if (kerr == EAGAIN) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_ALL, "Auth type [%s] could not be handled by answer function, "
- "continuing to next question.\n", question_list[c]);
+ /* During pre-auth iterating over all authentication methods
+ * is expected and no message will be displayed. */
+ if (kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_ALL,
+ "Auth type [%s] could not be handled by answer "
+ "function, continuing to next question.\n",
+ question_list[c]);
+ }
continue;
} else {
return kerr;
}
}
+ } else {
+ kerr = answer_password(ctx, kr, rctx);
}
- return answer_otp(ctx, kr, rctx);
+ /* During SSS_PAM_PREAUTH 'EAGAIN' is expected because we will run
+ * through all offered authentication methods and all are expect to return
+ * 'EAGAIN' in the positive case to indicate that the other methods should
+ * be checked as well. If all methods are checked we are done and should
+ * return success.
+ * In the other steps, especially SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE, having 'EAGAIN' at
+ * this stage would mean that no method feels responsible for the provided
+ * credentials i.e. authentication failed and we should return an error.
+ */
+ if (kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_PREAUTH) {
+ return kerr == EAGAIN ? 0 : kerr;
+ } else {
+ return kerr;
+ }
}
#endif /* HAVE_KRB5_GET_INIT_CREDS_OPT_SET_RESPONDER */
--
2.42.0

58
SOURCES/0009-pam-only-set-SYSDB_LOCAL_SMARTCARD_AUTH-to-true-but-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,58 @@
From b4c496856d466ff00d06cd5177cb216110f5e3b3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Sep 2024 15:18:14 +0200
Subject: [PATCH] pam: only set SYSDB_LOCAL_SMARTCARD_AUTH to 'true' but never
to 'false'.
The krb5 backend will only returns that Smartcard authentication is
available if a Smartcard is present. That means if the user
authenticates with a different method and a Smartcard is not present at
this time 'sc_allow' will be 'false' and might overwrite a 'true' value
written during a previous authentication attempt where a Smartcard was
present. To avoid this we only write 'true' values. Since the default if
SYSDB_LOCAL_SMARTCARD_AUTH is missing is 'false' local Smartcard
authentication (offline) will still only be enabled if online Smartcard
authentication was detected.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7532
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 67ba42c48abb9270982836310488e35d9fc1d451)
---
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c | 19 ++++++++++++++++---
1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
index 1394147a0..941446d94 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
@@ -554,9 +554,22 @@ static errno_t set_local_auth_type(struct pam_auth_req *preq,
goto fail;
}
- ret = sysdb_attrs_add_bool(attrs, SYSDB_LOCAL_SMARTCARD_AUTH, sc_allow);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- goto fail;
+ if (sc_allow) {
+ /* Only set SYSDB_LOCAL_SMARTCARD_AUTH to 'true' but never to
+ * 'false'. The krb5 backend will only returns that Smartcard
+ * authentication is available if a Smartcard is present. That means
+ * if the user authenticates with a different method and a Smartcard
+ * is not present at this time 'sc_allow' will be 'false' and might
+ * overwrite a 'true' value written during a previous authentication
+ * attempt where a Smartcard was present. To avoid this we only write
+ * 'true' values. Since the default if SYSDB_LOCAL_SMARTCARD_AUTH is
+ * missing is 'false' local Smartcard authentication (offline) will
+ * still only be enabled if online Smartcard authentication was
+ * detected. */
+ ret = sysdb_attrs_add_bool(attrs, SYSDB_LOCAL_SMARTCARD_AUTH, sc_allow);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ goto fail;
+ }
}
ret = sysdb_attrs_add_bool(attrs, SYSDB_LOCAL_PASSKEY_AUTH, passkey_allow);
--
2.45.0

119
SOURCES/0010-krb5-make-sure-answer_pkinit-use-matching-debug-mess.patch
View File

@ -1,119 +0,0 @@
From c3725a13ef694c2c34813953153f33ebfbaf1c27 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 11:29:47 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 10/12] krb5: make sure answer_pkinit() use matching debug
messages
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7152
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 7c33f9d57cebfff80778f930ff0cc3144a7cc261)
---
src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 77 ++++++++++++++++++---------------
1 file changed, 42 insertions(+), 35 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
index 116f2adda..926109588 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
@@ -745,51 +745,58 @@ static krb5_error_code answer_pkinit(krb5_context ctx,
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_ALL, "Setting pkinit_prompting.\n");
kr->pkinit_prompting = true;
- if (kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE
- && (sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)
+ if (kr->pd->cmd == SSS_PAM_AUTHENTICATE) {
+ if ((sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)
== SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_SC_PIN
|| sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)
== SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_SC_KEYPAD)) {
- kerr = sss_authtok_get_sc(kr->pd->authtok, &pin, NULL,
- &token_name, NULL,
- &module_name, NULL,
- NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
- if (kerr != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "sss_authtok_get_sc failed.\n");
- goto done;
- }
+ kerr = sss_authtok_get_sc(kr->pd->authtok, &pin, NULL,
+ &token_name, NULL,
+ &module_name, NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, NULL);
+ if (kerr != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "sss_authtok_get_sc failed.\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
- for (c = 0; chl->identities[c] != NULL; c++) {
- if (chl->identities[c]->identity != NULL
- && pkinit_identity_matches(chl->identities[c]->identity,
- token_name, module_name)) {
- break;
+ for (c = 0; chl->identities[c] != NULL; c++) {
+ if (chl->identities[c]->identity != NULL
+ && pkinit_identity_matches(chl->identities[c]->identity,
+ token_name, module_name)) {
+ break;
+ }
}
- }
- if (chl->identities[c] == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
- "No matching identity for [%s][%s] found in pkinit challenge.\n",
- token_name, module_name);
- kerr = EINVAL;
- goto done;
- }
+ if (chl->identities[c] == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
+ "No matching identity for [%s][%s] found in pkinit "
+ "challenge.\n", token_name, module_name);
+ kerr = EINVAL;
+ goto done;
+ }
- kerr = krb5_responder_pkinit_set_answer(ctx, rctx,
- chl->identities[c]->identity,
- pin);
- if (kerr != 0) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
- "krb5_responder_set_answer failed.\n");
- }
+ kerr = krb5_responder_pkinit_set_answer(ctx, rctx,
+ chl->identities[c]->identity,
+ pin);
+ if (kerr != 0) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "krb5_responder_set_answer failed.\n");
+ }
- goto done;
+ goto done;
+ } else {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
+ "Unexpected authentication token type [%s]\n",
+ sss_authtok_type_to_str(sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)));
+ kerr = EAGAIN;
+ goto done;
+ }
} else {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE, "Unexpected authentication token type [%s]\n",
- sss_authtok_type_to_str(sss_authtok_get_type(kr->pd->authtok)));
+ /* We only expect SSS_PAM_PREAUTH here, but also for all other
+ * commands the graceful solution would be to let the caller
+ * check other authentication methods as well. */
kerr = EAGAIN;
- goto done;
}
done:
--
2.42.0

307
SOURCES/0010-sdap-allow-to-provide-user_map-when-looking-up-group.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,307 @@
From 321ca19ae09609ac4195f323b696bdcd7ee573e4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2024 14:27:19 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 10/11] sdap: allow to provide user_map when looking up group
memberships
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
To allow to lookup group memberships of other objects similar to user
objects but with different attribute mappings, e.g. host objects in AD,
a new option to provide an alternative attribute map is added.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7590
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 69f63f1fa64bd9cc7c2ee1f8e8d736727b13b3be)
---
src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c | 2 +-
src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h | 2 +
src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c | 9 ++++
src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h | 2 +
src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c | 51 ++++++++++++++--------
5 files changed, 48 insertions(+), 18 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
index ed664ec83..fa68d814f 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
@@ -2244,7 +2244,7 @@ ad_gpo_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
search_bases,
state->host_fqdn,
BE_FILTER_NAME,
- NULL,
+ NULL, NULL, 0,
true,
true);
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, ad_gpo_target_dn_retrieval_done, req);
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
index 2c984ef50..61a35553b 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_common.h
@@ -308,6 +308,8 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
+ struct sdap_attr_map *user_map,
+ size_t user_map_cnt,
bool noexist_delete,
bool set_non_posix);
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
index b3ea2333f..0596ad4cf 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/ldap_id.c
@@ -1144,6 +1144,8 @@ struct groups_by_user_state {
const char *filter_value;
int filter_type;
const char *extra_value;
+ struct sdap_attr_map *user_map;
+ size_t user_map_cnt;
const char **attrs;
bool non_posix;
@@ -1165,6 +1167,8 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
const char *filter_value,
int filter_type,
const char *extra_value,
+ struct sdap_attr_map *user_map,
+ size_t user_map_cnt,
bool noexist_delete,
bool set_non_posix)
{
@@ -1192,6 +1196,8 @@ struct tevent_req *groups_by_user_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
state->filter_value = filter_value;
state->filter_type = filter_type;
state->extra_value = extra_value;
+ state->user_map = user_map;
+ state->user_map_cnt = user_map_cnt;
state->domain = sdom->dom;
state->sysdb = sdom->dom->sysdb;
state->search_bases = search_bases;
@@ -1256,6 +1262,8 @@ static void groups_by_user_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
state->sdom,
sdap_id_op_handle(state->op),
state->ctx,
+ state->user_map,
+ state->user_map_cnt,
state->conn,
state->search_bases,
state->filter_value,
@@ -1457,6 +1465,7 @@ sdap_handle_acct_req_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
ar->filter_value,
ar->filter_type,
ar->extra_value,
+ NULL, 0,
noexist_delete, false);
break;
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h
index 89245f41f..a45e057d0 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async.h
@@ -157,6 +157,8 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct sdap_domain *sdom,
struct sdap_handle *sh,
struct sdap_id_ctx *id_ctx,
+ struct sdap_attr_map *user_map,
+ size_t user_map_cnt,
struct sdap_id_conn_ctx *conn,
struct sdap_search_base **search_bases,
const char *name,
diff --git a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c
index fb3d8fe24..8ce1f6cd4 100644
--- a/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c
+++ b/src/providers/ldap/sdap_async_initgroups.c
@@ -785,6 +785,8 @@ struct sdap_initgr_nested_state {
struct tevent_context *ev;
struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb;
struct sdap_options *opts;
+ struct sdap_attr_map *user_map;
+ size_t user_map_cnt;
struct sss_domain_info *dom;
struct sdap_handle *sh;
@@ -812,6 +814,8 @@ static void sdap_initgr_nested_store(struct tevent_req *req);
static struct tevent_req *sdap_initgr_nested_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct tevent_context *ev,
struct sdap_options *opts,
+ struct sdap_attr_map *user_map,
+ size_t user_map_cnt,
struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
struct sss_domain_info *dom,
struct sdap_handle *sh,
@@ -828,6 +832,8 @@ static struct tevent_req *sdap_initgr_nested_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
state->ev = ev;
state->opts = opts;
+ state->user_map = user_map;
+ state->user_map_cnt = user_map_cnt;
state->sysdb = sysdb;
state->dom = dom;
state->sh = sh;
@@ -968,7 +974,7 @@ static errno_t sdap_initgr_nested_deref_search(struct tevent_req *req)
subreq = sdap_deref_search_send(state, state->ev, state->opts,
state->sh, state->orig_dn,
- state->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_MEMBEROF].name,
+ state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_MEMBEROF].name,
sdap_attrs, num_maps, maps, timeout);
if (!subreq) {
ret = EIO;
@@ -2697,6 +2703,8 @@ struct sdap_get_initgr_state {
struct tevent_context *ev;
struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb;
struct sdap_options *opts;
+ struct sdap_attr_map *user_map;
+ size_t user_map_cnt;
struct sss_domain_info *dom;
struct sdap_domain *sdom;
struct sdap_handle *sh;
@@ -2731,6 +2739,8 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
struct sdap_domain *sdom,
struct sdap_handle *sh,
struct sdap_id_ctx *id_ctx,
+ struct sdap_attr_map *user_map,
+ size_t user_map_cnt,
struct sdap_id_conn_ctx *conn,
struct sdap_search_base **search_bases,
const char *filter_value,
@@ -2754,6 +2764,12 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
state->ev = ev;
state->opts = id_ctx->opts;
+ state->user_map = user_map;
+ state->user_map_cnt = user_map_cnt;
+ if (state->user_map == NULL) {
+ state->user_map = id_ctx->opts->user_map;
+ state->user_map_cnt = id_ctx->opts->user_map_cnt;
+ }
state->dom = sdom->dom;
state->sysdb = sdom->dom->sysdb;
state->sdom = sdom;
@@ -2785,7 +2801,7 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
switch (filter_type) {
case BE_FILTER_SECID:
- search_attr = state->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_OBJECTSID].name;
+ search_attr = state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_OBJECTSID].name;
ret = sss_filter_sanitize(state, state->filter_value, &clean_name);
if (ret != EOK) {
@@ -2794,7 +2810,7 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
}
break;
case BE_FILTER_UUID:
- search_attr = state->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_UUID].name;
+ search_attr = state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_UUID].name;
ret = sss_filter_sanitize(state, state->filter_value, &clean_name);
if (ret != EOK) {
@@ -2812,23 +2828,23 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
}
ep_filter = get_enterprise_principal_string_filter(state,
- state->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_PRINC].name,
+ state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_PRINC].name,
clean_name, state->opts->basic);
state->user_base_filter =
talloc_asprintf(state,
"(&(|(%s=%s)(%s=%s)%s)(objectclass=%s)",
- state->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_PRINC].name,
+ state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_PRINC].name,
clean_name,
- state->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_EMAIL].name,
+ state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_EMAIL].name,
clean_name,
ep_filter == NULL ? "" : ep_filter,
- state->opts->user_map[SDAP_OC_USER].name);
+ state->user_map[SDAP_OC_USER].name);
if (state->user_base_filter == NULL) {
talloc_zfree(req);
return NULL;
}
} else {
- search_attr = state->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_NAME].name;
+ search_attr = state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_NAME].name;
ret = sss_parse_internal_fqname(state, filter_value,
&state->shortname, NULL);
@@ -2860,7 +2876,7 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
state->user_base_filter =
talloc_asprintf(state, "(&(%s=%s)(objectclass=%s)",
search_attr, clean_name,
- state->opts->user_map[SDAP_OC_USER].name);
+ state->user_map[SDAP_OC_USER].name);
if (!state->user_base_filter) {
talloc_zfree(req);
return NULL;
@@ -2877,14 +2893,14 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
*/
state->user_base_filter = talloc_asprintf_append(state->user_base_filter,
"(%s=*))",
- id_ctx->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_OBJECTSID].name);
+ state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_OBJECTSID].name);
} else {
/* When not ID-mapping or looking up app users, make sure there
* is a non-NULL UID */
state->user_base_filter = talloc_asprintf_append(state->user_base_filter,
"(&(%s=*)(!(%s=0))))",
- id_ctx->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_UID].name,
- id_ctx->opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_UID].name);
+ state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_UID].name,
+ state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_UID].name);
}
if (!state->user_base_filter) {
talloc_zfree(req);
@@ -2892,8 +2908,8 @@ struct tevent_req *sdap_get_initgr_send(TALLOC_CTX *memctx,
}
ret = build_attrs_from_map(state,
- state->opts->user_map,
- state->opts->user_map_cnt,
+ state->user_map,
+ state->user_map_cnt,
NULL, &state->user_attrs, NULL);
if (ret) {
talloc_zfree(req);
@@ -2990,7 +3006,7 @@ static errno_t sdap_get_initgr_next_base(struct tevent_req *req)
state->user_search_bases[state->user_base_iter]->basedn,
state->user_search_bases[state->user_base_iter]->scope,
state->filter, state->user_attrs,
- state->opts->user_map, state->opts->user_map_cnt,
+ state->user_map, state->user_map_cnt,
state->timeout,
false);
if (!subreq) {
@@ -3179,6 +3195,7 @@ static void sdap_get_initgr_user(struct tevent_req *subreq)
case SDAP_SCHEMA_IPA_V1:
subreq = sdap_initgr_nested_send(state, state->ev, state->opts,
+ state->user_map, state->user_map_cnt,
state->sysdb, state->dom, state->sh,
state->orig_user, state->grp_attrs);
if (!subreq) {
@@ -3377,7 +3394,7 @@ static void sdap_get_initgr_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
*/
ret = sdap_attrs_get_sid_str(
tmp_ctx, opts->idmap_ctx, state->orig_user,
- opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_OBJECTSID].sys_name,
+ state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_OBJECTSID].sys_name,
&sid_str);
if (ret != EOK) goto done;
@@ -3392,7 +3409,7 @@ static void sdap_get_initgr_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
ret = sysdb_attrs_get_uint32_t(
state->orig_user,
- opts->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_PRIMARY_GROUP].sys_name,
+ state->user_map[SDAP_AT_USER_PRIMARY_GROUP].sys_name,
&primary_gid);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
--
2.45.0

77
SOURCES/0011-ad-use-default-user_map-when-looking-of-host-groups-.patch Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
From 2c233636c093708d5cdd7ddb69af9b0ecde633bd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 6 Sep 2024 14:37:05 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 11/11] ad: use default user_map when looking of host groups
for GPO
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Use the default AD user attribute map to lookup the group membership of
the AD host object. This should help to avoid issues if user attributes
are overwritten in the user attribute map.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7590
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 5f5077ac1158deff6fbb51722d37b9c5f8b05cf7)
---
src/providers/ad/ad_access.h | 1 +
src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c | 15 ++++++++++++++-
2 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_access.h b/src/providers/ad/ad_access.h
index 34d5597da..c54b53eed 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_access.h
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_access.h
@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@ struct ad_access_ctx {
} gpo_map_type;
hash_table_t *gpo_map_options_table;
enum gpo_map_type gpo_default_right;
+ struct sdap_attr_map *host_attr_map;
};
struct tevent_req *
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
index fa68d814f..6b154f71d 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
#include "providers/ad/ad_common.h"
#include "providers/ad/ad_domain_info.h"
#include "providers/ad/ad_gpo.h"
+#include "providers/ad/ad_opts.h"
#include "providers/ldap/sdap_access.h"
#include "providers/ldap/sdap_async.h"
#include "providers/ldap/sdap.h"
@@ -2238,13 +2239,25 @@ ad_gpo_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
"trying with user search base.");
}
+ if (state->access_ctx->host_attr_map == NULL) {
+ ret = sdap_copy_map(state->access_ctx,
+ ad_2008r2_user_map, SDAP_OPTS_USER,
+ &state->access_ctx->host_attr_map);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to copy user map.\n");
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
subreq = groups_by_user_send(state, state->ev,
state->access_ctx->ad_id_ctx->sdap_id_ctx,
sdom, state->conn,
search_bases,
state->host_fqdn,
BE_FILTER_NAME,
- NULL, NULL, 0,
+ NULL,
+ state->access_ctx->host_attr_map,
+ SDAP_OPTS_USER,
true,
true);
tevent_req_set_callback(subreq, ad_gpo_target_dn_retrieval_done, req);
--
2.45.0

67
SOURCES/0011-krb5-make-prompter-and-pre-auth-debug-message-less-i.patch
View File

@ -1,67 +0,0 @@
From 87b54bd8448760241e7071a585f95b3e2604355a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Mar 2024 12:35:00 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 11/12] krb5: make prompter and pre-auth debug message less
irritating
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7152
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit e26cc69341bcfd2bbc758eca30df296431c70a28)
---
src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 15 +++++++++++----
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
index 926109588..494711de9 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
@@ -1355,13 +1355,14 @@ static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_prompter(krb5_context context, void *data,
int ret;
size_t c;
struct krb5_req *kr = talloc_get_type(data, struct krb5_req);
+ const char *err_msg;
if (kr == NULL) {
return EINVAL;
}
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_ALL,
- "sss_krb5_prompter name [%s] banner [%s] num_prompts [%d] EINVAL.\n",
+ "sss_krb5_prompter name [%s] banner [%s] num_prompts [%d].\n",
name, banner, num_prompts);
if (num_prompts != 0) {
@@ -1370,7 +1371,12 @@ static krb5_error_code sss_krb5_prompter(krb5_context context, void *data,
prompts[c].prompt);
}
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_FUNC_DATA, "Prompter interface isn't used for password prompts by SSSD.\n");
+ err_msg = krb5_get_error_message(context, KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD);
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FUNC_DATA,
+ "Prompter interface isn't used for prompting by SSSD."
+ "Returning the expected error [%ld/%s].\n",
+ KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD, err_msg);
+ krb5_free_error_message(context, err_msg);
return KRB5_LIBOS_CANTREADPWD;
}
@@ -2839,8 +2845,9 @@ static errno_t tgt_req_child(struct krb5_req *kr)
* should now know which authentication methods are available to
* update the password. */
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC,
- "krb5_get_init_creds_password returned [%d] during pre-auth, "
- "ignored.\n", kerr);
+ "krb5_get_init_creds_password returned [%d] while collecting "
+ "available authentication types, errors are expected "
+ "and ignored.\n", kerr);
ret = pam_add_prompting(kr);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "pam_add_prompting failed.\n");
--
2.42.0

70
SOURCES/0012-pam_sss-prefer-Smartcard-authentication.patch
View File

@ -1,70 +0,0 @@
From d06b4a3eda612d1a54b6bdb3c3b779543bc23b0f Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 11:26:16 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 12/12] pam_sss: prefer Smartcard authentication
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The current behavior is that Smartcard authentication is preferred if
possible, i.e. if a Smartcard is present. Since the Smartcard (or
equivalent) must be inserted manually the assumption is that if the user
has inserted it they most probably want to use it for authentication.
With the latest patches pam_sss might receive multiple available
authentication methods. With this patch the checks for available
authentication types start Smartcard authentication to mimic the
existing behavior.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7152
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0d5e8f11714e8e6cc0ad28e03fecf0f5732528b3)
---
src/sss_client/pam_sss.c | 22 +++++++++++-----------
1 file changed, 11 insertions(+), 11 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
index a1c353604..41a528dda 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
@@ -2544,17 +2544,7 @@ static int get_authtok_for_authentication(pam_handle_t *pamh,
} else if (pi->pc != NULL) {
ret = prompt_by_config(pamh, pi);
} else {
- if (flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_2FA
- || (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
- && pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
- if (pi->password_prompting) {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor: "),
- _("Second Factor (optional): "));
- } else {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor: "),
- _("Second Factor: "));
- }
- } else if (pi->cert_list != NULL) {
+ if (pi->cert_list != NULL) {
if (pi->cert_list->next == NULL) {
/* Only one certificate */
pi->selected_cert = pi->cert_list;
@@ -2570,6 +2560,16 @@ static int get_authtok_for_authentication(pam_handle_t *pamh,
|| (pi->flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_REQUIRE_CERT_AUTH)) {
/* Use pin prompt as fallback for gdm-smartcard */
ret = prompt_sc_pin(pamh, pi);
+ } else if (flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_2FA
+ || (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
+ && pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
+ if (pi->password_prompting) {
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor: "),
+ _("Second Factor (optional): "));
+ } else {
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor: "),
+ _("Second Factor: "));
+ }
} else if (pi->passkey_prompt_pin) {
ret = prompt_passkey(pamh, pi,
_("Insert your passkey device, then press ENTER."),
--
2.42.0

57
SOURCES/0013-pam-fix-storing-auth-types-for-offline-auth.patch
View File

@ -1,57 +0,0 @@
From 163db8465e815984abac0ba9af097589045791da Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 22 Mar 2024 19:53:29 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] pam: fix storing auth types for offline auth
Before the recent patches which allow krb5_child to iterate over all
available authentication methods typically only one method was returned.
E.g. is Smartcard authentication (pkinit) was possible it was typically
the first method the in question list and the result of the
answer_pkinit() function was immediately returned. As a result only the
Smartcard authentication type was set and a missing password
authentication type while others were present might have been a
reasonable indicator for the online state.
With the recent patches, all available methods, including password
authentication if available, are return and a new indicator is needed.
---
src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h | 1 +
src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c | 3 ++-
2 files changed, 3 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h
index 618836189..2aa14ae02 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv.h
@@ -114,6 +114,7 @@ struct pam_resp_auth_type {
bool otp_auth;
bool cert_auth;
bool passkey_auth;
+ bool backend_returned_no_auth_type;
};
struct sss_cmd_table *get_pam_cmds(void);
diff --git a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
index 13ba13131..94895d48e 100644
--- a/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
+++ b/src/responder/pam/pamsrv_cmd.c
@@ -915,6 +915,7 @@ errno_t pam_get_auth_types(struct pam_data *pd,
/* If the backend cannot determine which authentication types are
* available the default would be to prompt for a password. */
types.password_auth = true;
+ types.backend_returned_no_auth_type = true;
}
DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_ALL, "Authentication types for user [%s] and service "
@@ -1002,7 +1003,7 @@ static errno_t pam_eval_local_auth_policy(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
}
/* Store the local auth types, in case we go offline */
- if (!auth_types.password_auth) {
+ if (!auth_types.backend_returned_no_auth_type) {
ret = set_local_auth_type(preq, sc_allow, passkey_allow);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE,
--
2.42.0

218
SOURCES/0014-ad-gpo-use-hash-to-store-intermediate-results.patch
View File

@ -1,218 +0,0 @@
From e1bfbc2493c4194988acc3b2413df3dde0735ae3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Wed, 8 Nov 2023 14:50:24 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] ad-gpo: use hash to store intermediate results
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Currently after the evaluation of a single GPO file the intermediate
results are stored in the cache and this cache entry is updated until
all applicable GPO files are evaluated. Finally the data in the cache is
used to make the decision of access is granted or rejected.
If there are two or more access-control request running in parallel one
request might overwrite the cache object with intermediate data while
another request reads the cached data for the access decision and as a
result will do this decision based on intermediate data.
To avoid this the intermediate results are not stored in the cache
anymore but in hash tables which are specific to the request. Only the
final result is written to the cache to have it available for offline
authentication.
Reviewed-by: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit d7db7971682da2dbf7642ac94940d6b0577ec35a)
---
src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c | 116 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----
1 file changed, 102 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
index 3d1ad39c7..b879b0a08 100644
--- a/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
+++ b/src/providers/ad/ad_gpo.c
@@ -1431,6 +1431,33 @@ ad_gpo_extract_policy_setting(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
return ret;
}
+static errno_t
+add_result_to_hash(hash_table_t *hash, const char *key, char *value)
+{
+ int hret;
+ hash_key_t k;
+ hash_value_t v;
+
+ if (hash == NULL || key == NULL || value == NULL) {
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ k.type = HASH_KEY_CONST_STRING;
+ k.c_str = key;
+
+ v.type = HASH_VALUE_PTR;
+ v.ptr = value;
+
+ hret = hash_enter(hash, &k, &v);
+ if (hret != HASH_SUCCESS) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to add [%s][%s] to hash: [%s].\n",
+ key, value, hash_error_string(hret));
+ return EIO;
+ }
+
+ return EOK;
+}
+
/*
* This function parses the cse-specific (GP_EXT_GUID_SECURITY) filename,
* and stores the allow_key and deny_key of all of the gpo_map_types present
@@ -1438,6 +1465,7 @@ ad_gpo_extract_policy_setting(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
*/
static errno_t
ad_gpo_store_policy_settings(struct sss_domain_info *domain,
+ hash_table_t *allow_maps, hash_table_t *deny_maps,
const char *filename)
{
struct ini_cfgfile *file_ctx = NULL;
@@ -1571,14 +1599,14 @@ ad_gpo_store_policy_settings(struct sss_domain_info *domain,
goto done;
} else if (ret != ENOENT) {
const char *value = allow_value ? allow_value : empty_val;
- ret = sysdb_gpo_store_gpo_result_setting(domain,
- allow_key,
- value);
+ ret = add_result_to_hash(allow_maps, allow_key,
+ talloc_strdup(allow_maps, value));
if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
- "sysdb_gpo_store_gpo_result_setting failed for key:"
- "'%s' value:'%s' [%d][%s]\n", allow_key, allow_value,
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Failed to add key: [%s] "
+ "value: [%s] to allow maps "
+ "[%d][%s].\n",
+ allow_key, value, ret,
+ sss_strerror(ret));
goto done;
}
}
@@ -1598,14 +1626,14 @@ ad_gpo_store_policy_settings(struct sss_domain_info *domain,
goto done;
} else if (ret != ENOENT) {
const char *value = deny_value ? deny_value : empty_val;
- ret = sysdb_gpo_store_gpo_result_setting(domain,
- deny_key,
- value);
+ ret = add_result_to_hash(deny_maps, deny_key,
+ talloc_strdup(deny_maps, value));
if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE,
- "sysdb_gpo_store_gpo_result_setting failed for key:"
- "'%s' value:'%s' [%d][%s]\n", deny_key, deny_value,
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_CRIT_FAILURE, "Failed to add key: [%s] "
+ "value: [%s] to deny maps "
+ "[%d][%s].\n",
+ deny_key, value, ret,
+ sss_strerror(ret));
goto done;
}
}
@@ -1902,6 +1930,8 @@ struct ad_gpo_access_state {
int num_cse_filtered_gpos;
int cse_gpo_index;
const char *ad_domain;
+ hash_table_t *allow_maps;
+ hash_table_t *deny_maps;
};
static void ad_gpo_connect_done(struct tevent_req *subreq);
@@ -2023,6 +2053,19 @@ ad_gpo_access_send(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
goto immediately;
}
+ ret = sss_hash_create(state, 0, &state->allow_maps);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, "Could not create allow maps "
+ "hash table [%d]: %s\n", ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto immediately;
+ }
+
+ ret = sss_hash_create(state, 0, &state->deny_maps);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE, "Could not create deny maps "
+ "hash table [%d]: %s\n", ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto immediately;
+ }
subreq = sdap_id_op_connect_send(state->sdap_op, state, &ret);
if (subreq == NULL) {
@@ -2713,6 +2756,43 @@ ad_gpo_cse_step(struct tevent_req *req)
return EAGAIN;
}
+static errno_t
+store_hash_maps_in_cache(struct sss_domain_info *domain,
+ hash_table_t *allow_maps, hash_table_t *deny_maps)
+{
+ int ret;
+ struct hash_iter_context_t *iter;
+ hash_entry_t *entry;
+ size_t c;
+ hash_table_t *hash_list[] = { allow_maps, deny_maps, NULL};
+
+
+ for (c = 0; hash_list[c] != NULL; c++) {
+ iter = new_hash_iter_context(hash_list[c]);
+ if (iter == NULL) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to create hash iterator.\n");
+ return EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ while ((entry = iter->next(iter)) != NULL) {
+ ret = sysdb_gpo_store_gpo_result_setting(domain,
+ entry->key.c_str,
+ entry->value.ptr);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ free(iter);
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
+ "sysdb_gpo_store_gpo_result_setting failed for key:"
+ "[%s] value:[%s] [%d][%s]\n", entry->key.c_str,
+ (char *) entry->value.ptr, ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ return ret;
+ }
+ }
+ talloc_free(iter);
+ }
+
+ return EOK;
+}
+
/*
* This cse-specific function (GP_EXT_GUID_SECURITY) increments the
* cse_gpo_index until the policy settings for all applicable GPOs have been
@@ -2754,6 +2834,7 @@ ad_gpo_cse_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
* (as part of the GPO Result object in the sysdb cache).
*/
ret = ad_gpo_store_policy_settings(state->host_domain,
+ state->allow_maps, state->deny_maps,
cse_filtered_gpo->policy_filename);
if (ret != EOK && ret != ENOENT) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE,
@@ -2767,6 +2848,13 @@ ad_gpo_cse_done(struct tevent_req *subreq)
if (ret == EOK) {
/* ret is EOK only after all GPO policy files have been downloaded */
+ ret = store_hash_maps_in_cache(state->host_domain,
+ state->allow_maps, state->deny_maps);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "Failed to store evaluated GPO maps "
+ "[%d][%s].\n", ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
ret = ad_gpo_perform_hbac_processing(state,
state->gpo_mode,
state->gpo_map_type,
--
2.44.0

49
SOURCES/0015-tests-Drop-extensions-from-openssl-command-if-there-.patch
View File

@ -1,49 +0,0 @@
From a453f9625b40a0a1fbcf055ffa196121f2b248b5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Date: Wed, 24 Jan 2024 23:03:04 +0100
Subject: [PATCH] tests: Drop -extensions from openssl command if there is no
-x509
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
The 'openssl req' ignores the '-extensions' option without '-x509'.
OpenSSL versions prior 3.2 simply ignored it. Starting with version 3.2
an error is generated:
| /usr/bin/openssl req -batch -config
| ../../../../../src/tests/test_CA/intermediate_CA/SSSD_test_intermediate_CA.config
| -new -nodes -key
| …/build/../src/tests/test_CA/intermediate_CA/SSSD_test_intermediate_CA_key.pem
-sha256 -extensions v3_ca -out SSSD_test_intermediate_CA_req.pem
| Error adding request extensions from section v3_ca
| 003163BAB27F0000:error:11000079:X509 V3 routines:v2i_AUTHORITY_KEYID:no issuer certificate:../crypto/x509/v3_akid.c:156:
| 003163BAB27F0000:error:11000080:X509 V3 routines:X509V3_EXT_nconf_int:error in extension:../crypto/x509/v3_conf.c:48:section=v3_ca, name=authorityKeyIdentifier, value=keyid:always,issuer:always
|
Remove the '-extensions' option.
Signed-off-by: Sebastian Andrzej Siewior <sebastian@breakpoint.cc>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 32b72c7c3303edb2bf55ae9a22e8db7855f3d7d1)
---
src/tests/test_CA/intermediate_CA/Makefile.am | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/tests/test_CA/intermediate_CA/Makefile.am b/src/tests/test_CA/intermediate_CA/Makefile.am
index b439f82cb..50fcddb8d 100644
--- a/src/tests/test_CA/intermediate_CA/Makefile.am
+++ b/src/tests/test_CA/intermediate_CA/Makefile.am
@@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ SSSD_test_CA.pem:
ln -s $(builddir)/../$@
SSSD_test_intermediate_CA_req.pem: $(openssl_intermediate_ca_key) $(openssl_intermediate_ca_config) SSSD_test_CA.pem
- $(OPENSSL) req -batch -config ${openssl_intermediate_ca_config} -new -nodes -key $< -sha256 -extensions v3_ca -out $@
+ $(OPENSSL) req -batch -config ${openssl_intermediate_ca_config} -new -nodes -key $< -sha256 -out $@
SSSD_test_intermediate_CA.pem: SSSD_test_intermediate_CA_req.pem $(openssl_root_ca_config) $(openssl_root_ca_key)
cd .. && $(OPENSSL) ca -config ${openssl_root_ca_config} -batch -notext -keyfile $(openssl_root_ca_key) -in $(abs_builddir)/$< -days 200 -extensions v3_intermediate_ca -out $(abs_builddir)/$@
--
2.44.0

63
SPECS/sssd.spec
View File

@ -26,29 +26,25 @@
%global samba_package_version %(rpm -q samba-devel --queryformat %{version}-%{release}) %global samba_package_version %(rpm -q samba-devel --queryformat %{version}-%{release})
Name: sssd Name: sssd
Version: 2.9.4 Version: 2.9.5
Release: 6%{?dist} Release: 4%{?dist}.1
Summary: System Security Services Daemon Summary: System Security Services Daemon
License: GPLv3+ License: GPLv3+
URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/ URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/
Source0: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/releases/download/%{version}/sssd-%{version}.tar.gz Source0: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/releases/download/%{version}/sssd-%{version}.tar.gz
### Patches ### ### Patches ###
Patch0001: 0001-sssd-adding-mail-as-case-insensitive.patch Patch0001: 0001-spec-change-passkey_child-owner.patch
Patch0002: 0002-sdap-add-search_bases-option-to-groups_by_user_send.patch Patch0002: 0002-sysdb-do-not-fail-to-add-non-posix-user-to-MPG-domai.patch
Patch0003: 0003-sdap-add-naming_context-as-new-member-of-struct-sdap.patch Patch0003: 0003-ad-use-right-memory-context-in-GPO-code.patch
Patch0004: 0004-pam-fix-SC-auth-with-multiple-certs-and-missing-logi.patch Patch0004: 0004-TS_CACHE-never-try-to-upgrade-timestamps-cache.patch
Patch0005: 0005-sss-client-handle-key-value-in-destructor.patch Patch0005: 0005-SYSDB-remove-index-on-dataExpireTimestamp.patch
Patch0006: 0006-krb5-Allow-fallback-between-responder-questions.patch Patch0006: 0006-pam_sss-fix-passthrow-of-old-authtok-from-another-pa.patch
Patch0007: 0007-krb5-Add-fallback-password-change-support.patch Patch0007: 0007-krb5_child-do-not-try-passwords-with-OTP.patch
Patch0008: 0008-pam-fix-invalid-if-condition.patch Patch0008: 0008-pam_sss-add-missing-optional-2nd-factor-handling.patch
Patch0009: 0009-krb5-add-OTP-to-krb5-response-selection.patch Patch0009: 0009-pam-only-set-SYSDB_LOCAL_SMARTCARD_AUTH-to-true-but-.patch
Patch0010: 0010-krb5-make-sure-answer_pkinit-use-matching-debug-mess.patch Patch0010: 0010-sdap-allow-to-provide-user_map-when-looking-up-group.patch
Patch0011: 0011-krb5-make-prompter-and-pre-auth-debug-message-less-i.patch Patch0011: 0011-ad-use-default-user_map-when-looking-of-host-groups-.patch
Patch0012: 0012-pam_sss-prefer-Smartcard-authentication.patch
Patch0013: 0013-pam-fix-storing-auth-types-for-offline-auth.patch
Patch0014: 0014-ad-gpo-use-hash-to-store-intermediate-results.patch
Patch0015: 0015-tests-Drop-extensions-from-openssl-command-if-there-.patch
### Dependencies ### ### Dependencies ###
@ -1004,7 +1000,7 @@ done
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/krb5.conf.d/sssd_enable_idp %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/krb5.conf.d/sssd_enable_idp
%files passkey %files passkey
%attr(755,%{sssd_user},%{sssd_user}) %{_libexecdir}/%{servicename}/passkey_child %{_libexecdir}/%{servicename}/passkey_child
%{_libdir}/%{name}/modules/sssd_krb5_passkey_plugin.so %{_libdir}/%{name}/modules/sssd_krb5_passkey_plugin.so
%{_datadir}/sssd/krb5-snippets/sssd_enable_passkey %{_datadir}/sssd/krb5-snippets/sssd_enable_passkey
%config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/krb5.conf.d/sssd_enable_passkey %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/krb5.conf.d/sssd_enable_passkey
@ -1098,6 +1094,37 @@ fi
%systemd_postun_with_restart sssd.service %systemd_postun_with_restart sssd.service
%changelog %changelog
* Tue Sep 24 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.5-4.1
- Resolves: RHEL-59876 - EL9/CentOS Stream 9 lost offline smart card authentication
- Resolves: RHEL-50912 - possible regression of rhbz#2196521
* Thu Jul 18 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.5-4
- Resolves: RHEL-49711 - SYSDB: remove index on dataExpireTimestamp
- Resolves: RHEL-49811 - 2FA is being enforced after upgrading 2.9.1->2.9.4
* Mon Jul 8 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.5-3
- Resolves: RHEL-40742 - passkey_child with wrong owner
* Mon Jun 24 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.5-2
- Resolves: RHEL-40742 - passkey_child with wrong owner
- Resolves: RHEL-41047 - sssd is skipping GPO evaluation with auto_private_groups
- Resolves: RHEL-40570 - GPO access the wrong memory location
* Thu May 16 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.5-1
- Resolves: RHEL-36586 - Rebase SSSD for RHEL 9.5
- Resolves: RHEL-27716 - SSSD fails to process AD groups with 'Global Scope' correctly causing incomplete group-membership on RHEL if cache is empty
- Resolves: RHEL-17659 - [RfE] SSSD Failover Enhancements
- Resolves: RHEL-35781 - Passkey errors when handling multiple altSecurityIdentities values
- Resolves: RHEL-30142 - sssd_pac is crashing
- Resolves: RHEL-22206 - Errors in krb5_child.log every time a user authenticates - Pre-authentication failed: No pkinit_anchors supplied
- Resolves: RHEL-32595 - Excessive "Domain not found' messages logged to sssd_nss & sssd_be in multidomain AD forest
- Resolves: RHEL-28666 - sssctl config-check is reporting false positive error msg
- Resolves: RHEL-29454 - NULL dereference in inotify handling
- Resolves: RHEL-1654 - Improve documentation for allowing e-mail address as username
* Mon Apr 29 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.4-7
- Relates: RHEL-33645 - Rebase Samba to the latest 4.20.x release
* Thu Apr 18 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.4-6 * Thu Apr 18 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.4-6
- Resolves: RHEL-27209 - Race condition during authorization leads to GPO policies functioning inconsistently [rhel-9.4.0] - Resolves: RHEL-27209 - Race condition during authorization leads to GPO policies functioning inconsistently [rhel-9.4.0]