Resolves: RHEL-49711 - SYSDB: remove index on dataExpireTimestamp

Resolves: RHEL-49811 - 2FA is being enforced after upgrading 2.9.1->2.9.4
This commit is contained in:
Alexey Tikhonov 2024-07-19 15:38:11 +02:00
parent 510ddf8166
commit 9fd0c37b6b
6 changed files with 703 additions and 1 deletions

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@ -0,0 +1,208 @@
From 09b23e78806d8930c3f1b9e411dc8cf464c18998 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Date: Tue, 16 Jul 2024 13:08:02 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 4/5] TS_CACHE: never try to upgrade timestamps cache
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
It's easier and more consistent to recreate it instead.
This is a natural extension of 3b67fc6488ac10ca13561d9032f59951f82203e6
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit fc2a26c306e51b66680aef85aa0d2c41d8049a7f)
---
src/db/sysdb_init.c | 103 +----------------------------------------
src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c | 45 ------------------
2 files changed, 1 insertion(+), 147 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_init.c b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
index 38a9cd64a..a1d02d49c 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_init.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
@@ -376,57 +376,6 @@ static errno_t sysdb_cache_create_empty(struct ldb_context *ldb,
return EOK;
}
-static errno_t sysdb_ts_cache_upgrade(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
- struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
- struct ldb_context *ldb,
- struct sss_domain_info *domain,
- const char *cur_version,
- const char **_new_version)
-{
- errno_t ret;
- TALLOC_CTX *tmp_ctx;
- const char *version;
- struct ldb_context *save_ldb;
-
- tmp_ctx = talloc_new(NULL);
- if (tmp_ctx == NULL) {
- return ENOMEM;
- }
-
- /* The upgrade process depends on having ldb around, yet the upgrade
- * function shouldn't set the ldb pointer, only the connect function
- * should after it's successful. To avoid hard refactoring, save the
- * ldb pointer here and restore in the 'done' handler
- */
- save_ldb = sysdb->ldb;
- sysdb->ldb = ldb;
-
- version = talloc_strdup(tmp_ctx, cur_version);
- if (version == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_CONF_SETTINGS,
- "Upgrading timstamp cache of DB [%s] from version: %s\n",
- domain->name, version);
-
- if (strcmp(version, SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_1) == 0) {
- ret = sysdb_ts_upgrade_01(sysdb, &version);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- goto done;
- }
- }
-
- ret = EOK;
-
-done:
- sysdb->ldb = save_ldb;
- *_new_version = version;
- talloc_free(tmp_ctx);
- return ret;
-}
-
static errno_t sysdb_domain_cache_upgrade(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
struct sysdb_dom_upgrade_ctx *upgrade_ctx,
@@ -884,56 +833,6 @@ static int sysdb_timestamp_cache_connect(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
}
ret = sysdb_ts_cache_connect(tmp_ctx, sysdb, domain, &ldb, &version);
- switch (ret) {
- case ERR_SYSDB_VERSION_TOO_OLD:
- if (upgrade_ctx == NULL) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_FATAL_FAILURE,
- "DB version too old [%s], expected [%s] for domain %s!\n",
- version, SYSDB_VERSION, domain->name);
- break;
- }
-
- ret = sysdb_ts_cache_upgrade(tmp_ctx, sysdb, ldb, domain, version,
- &version);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
- "Could not upgrade the timestamp ldb file (%d) (%s)\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- break;
- }
-
- /* The version should now match SYSDB_VERSION.
- * If not, it means we didn't match any of the
- * known older versions. The DB might be
- * corrupt or generated by a newer version of
- * SSSD.
- */
- ret = sysdb_version_check(SYSDB_TS_VERSION, version);
- if (ret == EOK) {
- /* The cache has been upgraded.
- * We need to reopen the LDB to ensure that
- * any changes made above take effect.
- */
- ret = sysdb_ldb_reconnect(tmp_ctx,
- sysdb->ldb_ts_file,
- LDB_FLG_NOSYNC,
- &ldb);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
- "Could not reopen the timestamp ldb file (%d) (%s)\n",
- ret, sss_strerror(ret));
- }
- }
- break;
- case ERR_SYSDB_VERSION_TOO_NEW:
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
- "DB version too new [%s], expected [%s] for domain %s!\n",
- version, SYSDB_TS_VERSION, domain->name);
- break;
- default:
- break;
- }
-
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
"The timestamps cache could not be opened. "
@@ -953,7 +852,7 @@ static int sysdb_timestamp_cache_connect(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
ret = sysdb_ts_cache_connect(tmp_ctx, sysdb, domain, &ldb, &version);
if (ret != EOK) {
DEBUG(SSSDBG_MINOR_FAILURE,
- "Could not delete the timestamp ldb file (%d) (%s)\n",
+ "sysdb_ts_cache_connect() failed after cache deletion [%d]: %s\n",
ret, sss_strerror(ret));
}
}
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
index 328bd2962..37c0007cb 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
@@ -2774,51 +2774,6 @@ done:
return ret;
}
-int sysdb_ts_upgrade_01(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver)
-{
- struct upgrade_ctx *ctx;
- errno_t ret;
- struct ldb_message *msg = NULL;
-
- ret = commence_upgrade(sysdb, sysdb->ldb, SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_2, &ctx);
- if (ret) {
- return ret;
- }
-
- /* Remove @IDXONE from index */
- talloc_free(msg);
- msg = ldb_msg_new(ctx);
- if (msg == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- msg->dn = ldb_dn_new(msg, sysdb->ldb, "@INDEXLIST");
- if (msg->dn == NULL) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = ldb_msg_add_empty(msg, "@IDXONE", LDB_FLAG_MOD_DELETE, NULL);
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- ret = ENOMEM;
- goto done;
- }
-
- ret = ldb_modify(sysdb->ldb, msg);
- if (ret != LDB_SUCCESS) {
- ret = sysdb_error_to_errno(ret);
- goto done;
- }
-
- /* conversion done, update version number */
- ret = update_version(ctx);
-
-done:
- ret = finish_upgrade(ret, &ctx, ver);
- return ret;
-}
-
/*
* Example template for future upgrades.
* Copy and change version numbers as appropriate.
--
2.45.2

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@ -0,0 +1,147 @@
From 13e3d0390b9aaf72a855b857857c3cdd6eb6252a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jun 2024 19:09:29 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 5/5] SYSDB: remove index on `dataExpireTimestamp`
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This index was only used in cleanup tasks that don't run often.
On the other hand, this index is huge and degrades performance of libldb
in general.
Reviewed-by: Alejandro López <allopez@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit f0d45464cee1d2a6a2719dbffe5bbf6189d0554a)
---
src/db/sysdb_init.c | 8 ++++++++
src/db/sysdb_private.h | 9 +++++----
src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c | 27 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
3 files changed, 40 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_init.c b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
index a1d02d49c..68b9744dd 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_init.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_init.c
@@ -559,6 +559,13 @@ static errno_t sysdb_domain_cache_upgrade(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
}
}
+ if (strcmp(version, SYSDB_VERSION_0_24) == 0) {
+ ret = sysdb_upgrade_24(sysdb, &version);
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ goto done;
+ }
+ }
+
ret = EOK;
done:
sysdb->ldb = save_ldb;
@@ -765,6 +772,7 @@ static int sysdb_domain_cache_connect(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb,
ret = sysdb_domain_cache_upgrade(tmp_ctx, sysdb, upgrade_ctx,
ldb, domain, version, &version);
if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "sysdb_domain_cache_upgrade() failed\n");
goto done;
}
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_private.h b/src/db/sysdb_private.h
index 63f7b5601..b814f97a5 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_private.h
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_private.h
@@ -23,6 +23,7 @@
#ifndef __INT_SYS_DB_H__
#define __INT_SYS_DB_H__
+#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_25 "0.25"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_24 "0.24"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_23 "0.23"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_22 "0.22"
@@ -48,7 +49,7 @@
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_2 "0.2"
#define SYSDB_VERSION_0_1 "0.1"
-#define SYSDB_VERSION SYSDB_VERSION_0_24
+#define SYSDB_VERSION SYSDB_VERSION_0_25
#define SYSDB_BASE_LDIF \
"dn: @ATTRIBUTES\n" \
@@ -72,7 +73,6 @@
"@IDXATTR: uidNumber\n" \
"@IDXATTR: gidNumber\n" \
"@IDXATTR: lastUpdate\n" \
- "@IDXATTR: dataExpireTimestamp\n" \
"@IDXATTR: originalDN\n" \
"@IDXATTR: nameAlias\n" \
"@IDXATTR: servicePort\n" \
@@ -104,10 +104,11 @@
"\n"
/* The timestamp cache has its own versioning */
+#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_3 "0.3"
#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_2 "0.2"
#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_1 "0.1"
-#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_2
+#define SYSDB_TS_VERSION SYSDB_TS_VERSION_0_3
#define SYSDB_TS_BASE_LDIF \
"dn: @ATTRIBUTES\n" \
@@ -115,7 +116,6 @@
"\n" \
"dn: @INDEXLIST\n" \
"@IDXATTR: lastUpdate\n" \
- "@IDXATTR: dataExpireTimestamp\n" \
"\n" \
"dn: cn=sysdb\n" \
"cn: sysdb\n" \
@@ -194,6 +194,7 @@ int sysdb_upgrade_20(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_upgrade_21(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_upgrade_22(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_upgrade_23(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
+int sysdb_upgrade_24(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
int sysdb_ts_upgrade_01(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver);
diff --git a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
index 37c0007cb..b010488ca 100644
--- a/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
+++ b/src/db/sysdb_upgrade.c
@@ -2774,6 +2774,33 @@ done:
return ret;
}
+int sysdb_upgrade_24(struct sysdb_ctx *sysdb, const char **ver)
+{
+ struct upgrade_ctx *ctx;
+ errno_t ret;
+
+ ret = commence_upgrade(sysdb, sysdb->ldb, SYSDB_VERSION_0_25, &ctx);
+ if (ret) {
+ return ret;
+ }
+
+ ret = sysdb_ldb_mod_index(sysdb, SYSDB_IDX_DELETE, sysdb->ldb, "dataExpireTimestamp");
+ if (ret == ENOENT) { /*nothing to delete */
+ ret = EOK;
+ }
+ if (ret != EOK) {
+ DEBUG(SSSDBG_TRACE_FUNC, "sysdb_ldb_mod_index() failed [%d]: %s\n",
+ ret, sss_strerror(ret));
+ goto done;
+ }
+
+ ret = update_version(ctx);
+
+done:
+ ret = finish_upgrade(ret, &ctx, ver);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Example template for future upgrades.
* Copy and change version numbers as appropriate.
--
2.45.2

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@ -0,0 +1,115 @@
From 39cbb8df402f59b4df2442eb291600773e7062cc Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Petr Mikhalicin <pmikhalicin@rutoken.ru>
Date: Fri, 10 Nov 2023 15:24:48 +0600
Subject: [PATCH 6/8] pam_sss: fix passthrow of old authtok from another pam
modules at PAM_PRELIM_CHECK
pam_sss ignored old authtoks passed from another pam modules
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7007
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/5418
Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae6b9163be0a5a8846e8dbf2e0da2c29221781b9)
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
---
src/sss_client/pam_sss.c | 75 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----------------
1 file changed, 45 insertions(+), 30 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
index 41a528dda..5171e58ec 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
@@ -2728,42 +2728,57 @@ static int get_authtok_for_password_change(pam_handle_t *pamh,
exp_data = NULL;
}
- /* we query for the old password during PAM_PRELIM_CHECK to make
- * pam_sss work e.g. with pam_cracklib */
if (pam_flags & PAM_PRELIM_CHECK) {
- if ( (getuid() != 0 || exp_data ) && !(flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_FIRST_PASS)) {
- if (flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_2FA
- || (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
- && pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
- if (pi->password_prompting) {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
- _("Second Factor (optional): "));
- } else {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
- _("Second Factor: "));
- }
+ if (getuid() == 0 && !exp_data )
+ return PAM_SUCCESS;
+
+ if (flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_2FA
+ || (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
+ && pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
+ if (pi->password_prompting) {
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
+ _("Second Factor (optional): "));
} else {
- ret = prompt_password(pamh, pi, _("Current Password: "));
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
+ _("Second Factor: "));
}
- if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- D(("failed to get credentials from user"));
- return ret;
+ } else if ((flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_FIRST_PASS)
+ && check_authtok_data(pamh, pi) != 0) {
+ if (pi->pamstack_oldauthtok == NULL) {
+ pi->pam_authtok_type = SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_EMPTY;
+ pi->pam_authtok = NULL;
+ pi->pam_authtok_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ pi->pam_authtok = strdup(pi->pamstack_oldauthtok);
+ if (pi->pam_authtok == NULL) {
+ D(("strdup failed"));
+ return PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ }
+ pi->pam_authtok_type = SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD;
+ pi->pam_authtok_size = strlen(pi->pam_authtok);
}
+ ret = PAM_SUCCESS;
+ } else {
+ ret = prompt_password(pamh, pi, _("Current Password: "));
+ }
+ if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ D(("failed to get credentials from user"));
+ return ret;
+ }
- ret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, pi->pam_authtok);
- if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
- D(("Failed to set PAM_OLDAUTHTOK [%s], "
- "oldauthtok may not be available",
- pam_strerror(pamh,ret)));
- return ret;
- }
+ ret = pam_set_item(pamh, PAM_OLDAUTHTOK, pi->pam_authtok);
+ if (ret != PAM_SUCCESS) {
+ D(("Failed to set PAM_OLDAUTHTOK [%s], "
+ "oldauthtok may not be available",
+ pam_strerror(pamh,ret)));
+ return ret;
+ }
- if (pi->pam_authtok_type == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA) {
- ret = keep_authtok_data(pamh, pi);
- if (ret != 0) {
- D(("Failed to store authtok data to pam handle. Password "
- "change might fail."));
- }
+ if (pi->pam_authtok_type == SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA) {
+ ret = keep_authtok_data(pamh, pi);
+ if (ret != 0) {
+ D(("Failed to store authtok data to pam handle. Password "
+ "change might fail."));
}
}
--
2.45.2

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@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
From ef375cdd67b51d8fb63cae4d3cd40f3a5c2bc173 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Mon, 1 Jul 2024 20:40:30 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 7/8] krb5_child: do not try passwords with OTP
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
During two-factor authentication (OTP) krb5_child should use use the
dedicated OTP auth types SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA and
SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE exclusively and should not try password or
other types.
The special handling needed of ssh under certain conditions are
documented in the code and the man page.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7456
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit af799964e5fa1264467b49988021c054586eff27)
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
---
src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml | 11 +++++++++
src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c | 11 +--------
src/sss_client/pam_sss.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
3 files changed, 44 insertions(+), 22 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml b/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml
index fb86a4e41..8ac1a4418 100644
--- a/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml
+++ b/src/man/sssd.conf.5.xml
@@ -4559,6 +4559,17 @@ ldap_user_extra_attrs = phone:telephoneNumber
to log in either only with the password or with both factors
two-step prompting has to be used.
</para>
+ <para>
+ Some clients, such as SSH with
+ 'PasswordAuthentication yes', generate their own prompts
+ and do not use prompts provided by SSSD or other PAM
+ modules. Additionally, for SSH with
+ PasswordAuthentication, if two-factor authentication is
+ available, SSSD expects that the
+ credentials entered by the user at the SSH password prompt
+ will always be the two factors in a single string, even if
+ two-factor authentication is optional.
+ </para>
</listitem>
</varlistentry>
</variablelist>
diff --git a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
index 494711de9..cb9a9ce73 100644
--- a/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
+++ b/src/providers/krb5/krb5_child.c
@@ -536,15 +536,6 @@ static krb5_error_code tokeninfo_matches(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
size_t fa2_len;
switch (sss_authtok_get_type(auth_tok)) {
- case SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD:
- ret = sss_authtok_get_password(auth_tok, &pwd, &len);
- if (ret != EOK) {
- DEBUG(SSSDBG_OP_FAILURE, "sss_authtok_get_password failed.\n");
- return ret;
- }
-
- return tokeninfo_matches_pwd(mem_ctx, ti, pwd, len, out_token, out_pin);
- break;
case SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE:
ret = sss_authtok_get_2fa_single(auth_tok, &pwd, &len);
if (ret != EOK) {
@@ -569,7 +560,7 @@ static krb5_error_code tokeninfo_matches(TALLOC_CTX *mem_ctx,
"Unsupported authtok type %d\n", sss_authtok_get_type(auth_tok));
}
- return EINVAL;
+ return EAGAIN;
}
static krb5_error_code answer_otp(krb5_context ctx,
diff --git a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
index 5171e58ec..d43bd0f55 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
@@ -1656,6 +1656,7 @@ static int prompt_password(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi,
}
static int prompt_2fa(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi,
+ bool second_factor_optional,
const char *prompt_fa1, const char *prompt_fa2)
{
int ret;
@@ -1706,13 +1707,30 @@ static int prompt_2fa(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi,
goto done;
}
- if (resp[1].resp == NULL || *(resp[1].resp) == '\0'
- || (pi->pam_service != NULL && strcmp(pi->pam_service, "sshd") == 0
- && strcmp(resp[0].resp, resp[1].resp) == 0)) {
+ if (resp[1].resp == NULL || *(resp[1].resp) == '\0') {
/* Missing second factor, assume first factor contains combined 2FA
- * credentials.
- * Special handling for SSH with password authentication. Combined
- * 2FA credentials are used but SSH puts them in both responses. */
+ * credentials if the second factor is not optional. If it is optional
+ * then it is assumed that the first factor contain the password. */
+ pi->pam_authtok = strndup(resp[0].resp, MAX_AUTHTOK_SIZE);
+ if (pi->pam_authtok == NULL) {
+ D(("strndup failed."));
+ ret = PAM_BUF_ERR;
+ goto done;
+ }
+ pi->pam_authtok_size = strlen(pi->pam_authtok) + 1;
+ pi->pam_authtok_type = second_factor_optional
+ ? SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD
+ : SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE;
+ } else if (pi->pam_service != NULL && strcmp(pi->pam_service, "sshd") == 0
+ && strcmp(resp[0].resp, resp[1].resp) == 0) {
+ /* Special handling for SSH with password authentication (ssh's
+ * 'PasswordAuthentication' option. In this mode the ssh client
+ * directly prompts the user for a password and the prompts we are
+ * sending are ignored. Since we send two prompts ssh * will create two
+ * response as well with the same content. We assume that the combined
+ * 2FA credentials are used even if the second factor is optional
+ * because there is no indication about the intention of the user. As a
+ * result we prefer the more secure variant. */
pi->pam_authtok = strndup(resp[0].resp, MAX_AUTHTOK_SIZE);
if (pi->pam_authtok == NULL) {
@@ -1721,7 +1739,7 @@ static int prompt_2fa(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi,
goto done;
}
pi->pam_authtok_size = strlen(pi->pam_authtok) + 1;
- pi->pam_authtok_type = SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_PASSWORD;
+ pi->pam_authtok_type = SSS_AUTHTOK_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE;
} else {
ret = sss_auth_pack_2fa_blob(resp[0].resp, 0, resp[1].resp, 0, NULL, 0,
@@ -2487,7 +2505,7 @@ static int prompt_by_config(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi)
ret = prompt_password(pamh, pi, pc_get_password_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
break;
case PC_TYPE_2FA:
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
pc_get_2fa_2nd_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
break;
case PC_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE:
@@ -2564,10 +2582,10 @@ static int get_authtok_for_authentication(pam_handle_t *pamh,
|| (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
&& pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
if (pi->password_prompting) {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor: "),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, true, _("First Factor: "),
_("Second Factor (optional): "));
} else {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor: "),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false, _("First Factor: "),
_("Second Factor: "));
}
} else if (pi->passkey_prompt_pin) {
@@ -2736,10 +2754,12 @@ static int get_authtok_for_password_change(pam_handle_t *pamh,
|| (pi->otp_vendor != NULL && pi->otp_token_id != NULL
&& pi->otp_challenge != NULL)) {
if (pi->password_prompting) {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, true,
+ _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
_("Second Factor (optional): "));
} else {
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false,
+ _("First Factor (Current Password): "),
_("Second Factor: "));
}
} else if ((flags & PAM_CLI_FLAGS_USE_FIRST_PASS)
--
2.45.2

View File

@ -0,0 +1,45 @@
From 7e76396a891b4c704f1db8c71a217f869bef0ec3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 12 Jul 2024 13:46:00 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 8/8] pam_sss: add missing optional 2nd factor handling
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
This is a follow up to pull-request #7462 and adds the proper handling of
an optional second factor in case the prompting is configured.
Resolves: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/issues/7456
Reviewed-by: Justin Stephenson <jstephen@redhat.com>
Reviewed-by: Tomáš Halman <thalman@redhat.com>
(cherry picked from commit 077d2993a1b306e7cfe61618cbd5d03c602572f8)
Reviewed-by: Sumit Bose <sbose@redhat.com>
---
src/sss_client/pam_sss.c | 9 +++++++--
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
index d43bd0f55..d1101e16c 100644
--- a/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
+++ b/src/sss_client/pam_sss.c
@@ -2505,8 +2505,13 @@ static int prompt_by_config(pam_handle_t *pamh, struct pam_items *pi)
ret = prompt_password(pamh, pi, pc_get_password_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
break;
case PC_TYPE_2FA:
- ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
- pc_get_2fa_2nd_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
+ if (pi->password_prompting) {
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, true, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
+ pc_get_2fa_2nd_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
+ } else {
+ ret = prompt_2fa(pamh, pi, false, pc_get_2fa_1st_prompt(pi->pc[c]),
+ pc_get_2fa_2nd_prompt(pi->pc[c]));
+ }
break;
case PC_TYPE_2FA_SINGLE:
ret = prompt_2fa_single(pamh, pi,
--
2.45.2

View File

@ -27,7 +27,7 @@
Name: sssd
Version: 2.9.5
Release: 3%{?dist}
Release: 4%{?dist}
Summary: System Security Services Daemon
License: GPLv3+
URL: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/
@ -37,6 +37,11 @@ Source0: https://github.com/SSSD/sssd/releases/download/%{version}/sssd-%{versio
Patch0001: 0001-spec-change-passkey_child-owner.patch
Patch0002: 0002-sysdb-do-not-fail-to-add-non-posix-user-to-MPG-domai.patch
Patch0003: 0003-ad-use-right-memory-context-in-GPO-code.patch
Patch0004: 0004-TS_CACHE-never-try-to-upgrade-timestamps-cache.patch
Patch0005: 0005-SYSDB-remove-index-on-dataExpireTimestamp.patch
Patch0006: 0006-pam_sss-fix-passthrow-of-old-authtok-from-another-pa.patch
Patch0007: 0007-krb5_child-do-not-try-passwords-with-OTP.patch
Patch0008: 0008-pam_sss-add-missing-optional-2nd-factor-handling.patch
### Dependencies ###
@ -1086,6 +1091,10 @@ fi
%systemd_postun_with_restart sssd.service
%changelog
* Thu Jul 18 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.5-4
- Resolves: RHEL-49711 - SYSDB: remove index on dataExpireTimestamp
- Resolves: RHEL-49811 - 2FA is being enforced after upgrading 2.9.1->2.9.4
* Mon Jul 8 2024 Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com> - 2.9.5-3
- Resolves: RHEL-40742 - passkey_child with wrong owner