.gitignore

@@ -1 +1,2 @@
 SOURCES/squid-4.15.tar.xz
+/squid-4.15.tar.xz

.squid.metadata

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-60bda34ba39657e2d870c8c1d2acece8a69c3075 SOURCES/squid-4.15.tar.xz

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46724.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
-index 20b9bf1..81ebb18 100644
---- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
-+++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
-@@ -173,6 +173,10 @@ urlInitialize(void)
-     assert(0 == matchDomainName("*.foo.com", ".foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
-     assert(0 != matchDomainName("*.foo.com", "foo.com", mdnHonorWildcards));
- 
-+    assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", ""));
-+    assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnHonorWildcards));
-+    assert(0 != matchDomainName("foo.com", "", mdnRejectSubsubDomains));
-+
-     /* more cases? */
- }
- 
-@@ -756,6 +760,8 @@ matchDomainName(const char *h, const char *d, MatchDomainNameFlags flags)
-         return -1;
- 
-     dl = strlen(d);
-+    if (dl == 0)
-+        return 1;
- 
-     /*
-      * Start at the ends of the two strings and work towards the

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46847.patch

@@ -1,23 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-index 6a9736f..0a883fa 100644
---- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-+++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-@@ -847,11 +847,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const char *aRequestRealm)
-             break;
- 
-         case DIGEST_NC:
--            if (value.size() != 8) {
-+            if (value.size() == 8) {
-+                // for historical reasons, the nc value MUST be exactly 8 bytes
-+                static_assert(sizeof(digest_request->nc) == 8 + 1, "bad nc buffer size");
-+                xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
-+                debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
-+            } else {
-                 debugs(29, 9, "Invalid nc '" << value << "' in '" << temp << "'");
-+                digest_request->nc[0] = 0;
-             }
--            xstrncpy(digest_request->nc, value.rawBuf(), value.size() + 1);
--            debugs(29, 9, "Found noncecount '" << digest_request->nc << "'");
-             break;
- 
-         case DIGEST_CNONCE:

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch

@@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-commit 77b3fb4df0f126784d5fd4967c28ed40eb8d521b
-Author: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date:   Wed Oct 25 19:41:45 2023 +0000
-
-    RFC 1123: Fix date parsing (#1538)
-    
-    The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
-    https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/datetime-overflow.html
-    where it was filed as "1-Byte Buffer OverRead in RFC 1123 date/time
-    Handling".
-
-diff --git a/lib/rfc1123.c b/lib/rfc1123.c
-index e5bf9a4d7..cb484cc00 100644
---- a/lib/rfc1123.c
-+++ b/lib/rfc1123.c
-@@ -50,7 +50,13 @@ make_month(const char *s)
-     char month[3];
- 
-     month[0] = xtoupper(*s);
-+    if (!month[0])
-+        return -1; // protects *(s + 1) below
-+
-     month[1] = xtolower(*(s + 1));
-+    if (!month[1])
-+        return -1; // protects *(s + 2) below
-+
-     month[2] = xtolower(*(s + 2));
- 
-     for (i = 0; i < 12; i++)
-

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch

@@ -1,62 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/ipc.cc b/src/ipc.cc
-index 42e11e6..a68e623 100644
---- a/src/ipc.cc
-+++ b/src/ipc.cc
-@@ -19,6 +19,11 @@
- #include "SquidConfig.h"
- #include "SquidIpc.h"
- #include "tools.h"
-+#include <cstdlib>
-+
-+#if HAVE_UNISTD_H
-+#include <unistd.h>
-+#endif
- 
- static const char *hello_string = "hi there\n";
- #ifndef HELLO_BUF_SZ
-@@ -365,6 +370,22 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
-     }
- 
-     PutEnvironment();
-+
-+    // A dup(2) wrapper that reports and exits the process on errors. The
-+    // exiting logic is only suitable for this child process context.
-+    const auto dupOrExit = [prog,name](const int oldFd) {
-+        const auto newFd = dup(oldFd);
-+        if (newFd < 0) {
-+            const auto savedErrno = errno;
-+            debugs(54, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Helper process initialization failure: " << name <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "helper (CHILD) PID: " << getpid() <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "helper program name: " << prog <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "dup(2) system call error for FD " << oldFd << ": " << xstrerr(savedErrno));
-+            _exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+        }
-+        return newFd;
-+    };
-+
-     /*
-      * This double-dup stuff avoids problems when one of
-      *  crfd, cwfd, or debug_log are in the rage 0-2.
-@@ -372,17 +393,16 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
- 
-     do {
-         /* First make sure 0-2 is occupied by something. Gets cleaned up later */
--        x = dup(crfd);
--        assert(x > -1);
--    } while (x < 3 && x > -1);
-+        x = dupOrExit(crfd);
-+    } while (x < 3);
- 
-     close(x);
- 
--    t1 = dup(crfd);
-+    t1 = dupOrExit(crfd);
- 
--    t2 = dup(cwfd);
-+    t2 = dupOrExit(cwfd);
- 
--    t3 = dup(fileno(debug_log));
-+    t3 = dupOrExit(fileno(debug_log));
- 
-     assert(t1 > 2 && t2 > 2 && t3 > 2);
- 

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch

@@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/ClientRequestContext.h b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
-index fe2edf6..47aa935 100644
---- a/src/ClientRequestContext.h
-+++ b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
-@@ -81,6 +81,10 @@ public:
- #endif
-     ErrorState *error; ///< saved error page for centralized/delayed processing
-     bool readNextRequest; ///< whether Squid should read after error handling
-+
-+#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
-+    size_t currentXffHopNumber = 0; ///< number of X-Forwarded-For header values processed so far
-+#endif
- };
- 
- #endif /* SQUID_CLIENTREQUESTCONTEXT_H */
-diff --git a/src/client_side_request.cc b/src/client_side_request.cc
-index 1c6ff62..b758f6f 100644
---- a/src/client_side_request.cc
-+++ b/src/client_side_request.cc
-@@ -78,6 +78,11 @@
- static const char *const crlf = "\r\n";
- 
- #if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
-+
-+#if !defined(SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX)
-+#define SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX 64
-+#endif
-+
- static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data);
- #endif /* FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR */
- 
-@@ -485,8 +490,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data)
-                 /* override the default src_addr tested if we have to go deeper than one level into XFF */
-                 Filled(calloutContext->acl_checklist)->src_addr = request->indirect_client_addr;
-             }
--            calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
--            return;
-+            if (++calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber < SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX) {
-+                calloutContext->acl_checklist->nonBlockingCheck(clientFollowXForwardedForCheck, data);
-+                return;
-+            }
-+            const auto headerName = Http::HeaderLookupTable.lookup(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR).name;
-+            debugs(28, DBG_CRITICAL, "ERROR: Ignoring trailing " << headerName << " addresses" <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "addresses allowed by follow_x_forwarded_for: " << calloutContext->currentXffHopNumber <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "last/accepted address: " << request->indirect_client_addr <<
-+                   Debug::Extra << "ignored trailing addresses: " << request->x_forwarded_for_iterator);
-+            // fall through to resume clientAccessCheck() processing
-         }
-     }
- 

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch

@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index b006300..023e411 100644
---- a/src/http.cc
-+++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
- #include "rfc1738.h"
- #include "SquidConfig.h"
- #include "SquidTime.h"
-+#include "SquidMath.h"
- #include "StatCounters.h"
- #include "Store.h"
- #include "StrList.h"
-@@ -1150,18 +1151,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
-      * Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
-      */
- 
--    Must(maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(true));
--    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
--    rd.conn = io.conn;
--    rd.size = entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, inBuf.spaceSize()));
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission) || !moreDataPermission)) {
-+        abortTransaction("ready to read required data, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-+    const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission);
-+    // TODO: Move this logic inside maybeMakeSpaceAvailable():
-+    const auto readSizeWanted = readSizeMax ? entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, readSizeMax)) : 0;
- 
--    if (rd.size <= 0) {
-+    if (readSizeWanted <= 0) {
-         assert(entry->mem_obj);
-         AsyncCall::Pointer nilCall;
-         entry->mem_obj->delayRead(DeferredRead(readDelayed, this, CommRead(io.conn, NULL, 0, nilCall)));
-         return;
-     }
- 
-+    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
-+    rd.conn = io.conn;
-+    rd.size = readSizeWanted;
-     switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
-     case Comm::INPROGRESS:
-         if (inBuf.isEmpty())
-@@ -1520,8 +1529,11 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
-     if (!Comm::IsConnOpen(serverConnection) || fd_table[serverConnection->fd].closing())
-         return;
- 
--    if (!maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(false))
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission)) || !moreDataPermission) {
-+        abortTransaction("more response bytes required, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
-         return;
-+    }
- 
-     // XXX: get rid of the do_next_read flag
-     // check for the proper reasons preventing read(2)
-@@ -1539,40 +1551,79 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
-     Comm::Read(serverConnection, call);
- }
- 
-+/// Desired inBuf capacity based on various capacity preferences/limits:
-+/// * a smaller buffer may not hold enough for look-ahead header/body parsers;
-+/// * a smaller buffer may result in inefficient tiny network reads;
-+/// * a bigger buffer may waste memory;
-+/// * a bigger buffer may exceed SBuf storage capabilities (SBuf::maxSize);
-+size_t
-+HttpStateData::calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const
-+{
-+    if (!flags.headers_parsed)
-+        return Config.maxReplyHeaderSize;
-+
-+    // XXX: Our inBuf is not used to maintain the read-ahead gap, and using
-+    // Config.readAheadGap like this creates huge read buffers for large
-+    // read_ahead_gap values. TODO: Switch to using tcp_recv_bufsize as the
-+    // primary read buffer capacity factor.
-+    //
-+    // TODO: Cannot reuse throwing NaturalCast() here. Consider removing
-+    // .value() dereference in NaturalCast() or add/use NaturalCastOrMax().
-+    const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).second ? NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).first : SBuf::maxSize;
-+
-+    // TODO: Honor TeChunkedParser look-ahead and trailer parsing requirements
-+    // (when explicit configurationPreferences are set too low).
-+
-+    return std::min<size_t>(configurationPreferences, SBuf::maxSize);
-+}
-+
-+/// The maximum number of virgin reply bytes we may buffer before we violate
-+/// the currently configured response buffering limits.
-+/// \retval std::nullopt means that no more virgin response bytes can be read
-+/// \retval 0 means that more virgin response bytes may be read later
-+/// \retval >0 is the number of bytes that can be read now (subject to other constraints)
- bool
--HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
-+HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const
- {
--    // how much we are allowed to buffer
--    const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
--
--    if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
--        // when buffer is at or over limit already
--        debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
--        debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
--        // Process next response from buffer
--        processReply();
--        return false;
-+#if USE_ADAPTATION
-+    // If we do not check this now, we may say the final "no" prematurely below
-+    // because inBuf.length() will decrease as adaptation drains buffered bytes.
-+    if (responseBodyBuffer) {
-+        debugs(11, 3, "yes, but waiting for adaptation to drain read buffer");
-+        *maxReadSize = 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
-+        return true;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-+    const auto maxCapacity = calcReadBufferCapacityLimit();
-+    if (inBuf.length() >= maxCapacity) {
-+        debugs(11, 3, "no, due to a full buffer: " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize() << "; limit: " << maxCapacity);
-+        return false; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
-     }
- 
-+    *maxReadSize = (maxCapacity - inBuf.length()); // positive
-+    debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << *maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
-+    return true; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
-+}
-+
-+/// prepare read buffer for reading
-+/// \return the maximum number of bytes the caller should attempt to read
-+/// \retval 0 means that the caller should delay reading
-+size_t
-+HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(const size_t maxReadSize)
-+{
-     // how much we want to read
--    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), (limitBuffer - inBuf.length()));
-+    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), maxReadSize);
- 
--    if (!read_size) {
-+    if (read_size < 2) {
-         debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << read_size << " into buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
--        return false;
-+        return 0;
-     }
- 
--    // just report whether we could grow or not, do not actually do it
--    if (doGrow)
--        return (read_size >= 2);
--
-     // we may need to grow the buffer
-     inBuf.reserveSpace(read_size);
--    debugs(11, 8, (!flags.do_next_read ? "will not" : "may") <<
--           " read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buf(" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() <<
--           ") from " << serverConnection);
--
--    return (inBuf.spaceSize() >= 2); // only read if there is 1+ bytes of space available
-+    debugs(11, 7, "may read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
-+    return read_size;
- }
- 
- /// called after writing the very last request byte (body, last-chunk, etc)
-diff --git a/src/http.h b/src/http.h
-index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
---- a/src/http.h
-+++ b/src/http.h
-@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
- #include "http/StateFlags.h"
- #include "sbuf/SBuf.h"
- 
-+#include <optional>
-+
- class FwdState;
- class HttpHeader;
- 
-@@ -107,16 +109,9 @@ private:
- 
-     void abortTransaction(const char *reason) { abortAll(reason); } // abnormal termination
- 
--    /**
--     * determine if read buffer can have space made available
--     * for a read.
--     *
--     * \param grow  whether to actually expand the buffer
--     *
--     * \return whether the buffer can be grown to provide space
--     *         regardless of whether the grow actually happened.
--     */
--    bool maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool grow);
-+    size_t calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const;
-+    bool canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const;
-+    size_t maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(size_t maxReadSize);
- 
-     // consuming request body
-     virtual void handleMoreRequestBodyAvailable();

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/SquidString.h b/src/SquidString.h
-index a791885..b9aef38 100644
---- a/src/SquidString.h
-+++ b/src/SquidString.h
-@@ -114,7 +114,16 @@ private:
- 
-     size_type len_;  /* current length  */
- 
--    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 65535; ///< 64K limit protects some fixed-size buffers
-+    /// An earlier 64KB limit was meant to protect some fixed-size buffers, but
-+    /// (a) we do not know where those buffers are (or whether they still exist)
-+    /// (b) too many String users unknowingly exceeded that limit and asserted.
-+    /// We are now using a larger limit to reduce the number of (b) cases,
-+    /// especially cases where "compact" lists of items grow 50% in size when we
-+    /// convert them to canonical form. The new limit is selected to withstand
-+    /// concatenation and ~50% expansion of two HTTP headers limited by default
-+    /// request_header_max_size and reply_header_max_size settings.
-+    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 3*64*1024 - 1;
-+
-     /// returns true after increasing the first argument by extra if the sum does not exceed SizeMax_
-     static bool SafeAdd(size_type &base, size_type extra) { if (extra <= SizeMax_ && base <= SizeMax_ - extra) { base += extra; return true; } return false; }
- 
-diff --git a/src/cache_cf.cc b/src/cache_cf.cc
-index a9c1b7e..46f07bb 100644
---- a/src/cache_cf.cc
-+++ b/src/cache_cf.cc
-@@ -935,6 +935,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
-                (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestBufferSize, (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestHeaderSize);
-     }
- 
-+    // Warn about the dangers of exceeding String limits when manipulating HTTP
-+    // headers. Technically, we do not concatenate _requests_, so we could relax
-+    // their check, but we keep the two checks the same for simplicity sake.
-+    const auto safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax = (String::SizeMaxXXX()+1)/3;
-+    // TODO: static_assert(safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax >= 64*1024); // no WARNINGs for default settings
-+    if (Config.maxRequestHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
-+        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing request_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
-+               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxRequestHeaderSize << " bytes");
-+    if (Config.maxReplyHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
-+        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing reply_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
-+               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxReplyHeaderSize << " bytes");
-+
-     /*
-      * Disable client side request pipelining if client_persistent_connections OFF.
-      * Waste of resources queueing any pipelined requests when the first will close the connection.
-diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
-index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
---- a/src/cf.data.pre
-+++ b/src/cf.data.pre
-@@ -6196,11 +6196,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
- DEFAULT: 64 KB
- LOC: Config.maxRequestHeaderSize
- DOC_START
--	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a request.
--	Request headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
--	Placing a limit on the request header size will catch certain
--	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
--	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
-+	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP request
-+	(including request-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
-+	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
-+	limit also applies to received FTP commands.
-+
-+	This limit has no direct affect on Squid memory consumption.
-+
-+	Squid does not check this limit when sending requests.
- DOC_END
- 
- NAME: reply_header_max_size
-@@ -6209,11 +6212,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
- DEFAULT: 64 KB
- LOC: Config.maxReplyHeaderSize
- DOC_START
--	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a reply.
--	Reply headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
--	Placing a limit on the reply header size will catch certain
--	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
--	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
-+	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP response
-+	(including status-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
-+	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
-+	limit also applies to FTP command responses.
-+
-+	Squid also checks this limit when loading hit responses from disk cache.
-+
-+	Squid does not check this limit when sending responses.
- DOC_END
- 
- NAME: request_body_max_size
-diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index 877172d..b006300 100644
---- a/src/http.cc
-+++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -1820,8 +1820,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
- 
-         String strFwd = hdr_in->getList(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR);
- 
--        // if we cannot double strFwd size, then it grew past 50% of the limit
--        if (!strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
-+        // Detect unreasonably long header values. And paranoidly check String
-+        // limits: a String ought to accommodate two reasonable-length values.
-+        if (strFwd.size() > 32*1024 || !strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
-             // There is probably a forwarding loop with Via detection disabled.
-             // If we do nothing, String will assert on overflow soon.
-             // TODO: Terminate all transactions with huge XFF?

SOURCES/squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch

@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
-From 8d0ee420a4d91ac7fd97316338f1e28b4b060cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 19:26:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Ignore whitespace chars after chunk-size
-
-Previously (before #1498 change), squid was accepting TE-chunked replies
-with whitespaces after chunk-size and missing chunk-ext data. After
-
-It turned out that replies with such whitespace chars are pretty
-common and other webservers which can act as forward proxies (e.g.
-nginx, httpd...) are accepting them.
-
-This change will allow to proxy chunked responses from origin server,
-which had whitespaces inbetween chunk-size and CRLF.
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 9cce10fdc91..04753395e16 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
-+        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
-         parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-
-From 9c8d35f899035fa06021ab3fe6919f892c2f0c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:06:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Added new argument to Http::One::ParseBws()
-
-Depending on new wsp_only argument in ParseBws() it will be decided
-which set of whitespaces characters will be parsed. If wsp_only is set
-to true, only SP and HTAB chars will be parsed.
-
-Also optimized number of ParseBws calls.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          |  4 ++--
- src/http/one/Parser.h           |  3 ++-
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 13 +++++++++----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index b1908316a0b..01d7e3bc0e8 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
- 
- // BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
- void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index d9a0ac8c273..08200371cd6 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,8 +163,9 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 04753395e16..41e1e5ddaea 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,8 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-+        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
-+        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
-+        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
-+            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -140,20 +143,22 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--void
-+bool
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
-+    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
-+        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 02eacd1bb89..8c5d4bb4cba 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From 81e67f97f9c386bdd0bb4a5e182395c46adb70ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:44:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Fix typo in Parser.h
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.h | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 08200371cd6..3ef4c5f7752 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
- void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
-
-From a0d4fe1794e605f8299a5c118c758a807453f016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 22:39:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Bug 5449 is a regression of Bug 4492!
-
-Both bugs deal with "chunk-size SP+ CRLF" use cases. Bug 4492 had _two_
-spaces after chunk-size, which answers one of the PR review questions:
-Should we skip just one space? No, we should not.
-
-The lines moved around in many commits, but I believe this regression
-was introduced in commit 951013d0 because that commit stopped consuming
-partially parsed chunk-ext sequences. That consumption was wrong, but it
-had a positive side effect -- fixing Bug 4492...
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 10 +++++-----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 41e1e5ddaea..aa4a840fdcf 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
--        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
--        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
--            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
- 
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
--        ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
-             return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-
-From f837f5ff61301a17008f16ce1fb793c2abf19786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:06:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fixup: Fewer conditionals/ifs and more explicit spelling
-
-... to draw code reader attention when something unusual is going on.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
- src/http/one/Parser.h           | 10 ++++++++--
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 14 ++++++--------
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index 01d7e3bc0e8..d3937e5e96b 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -271,11 +271,12 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
-     return Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser < 0 ? DBG_IMPORTANT : 5;
- }
- 
--// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
--void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
-+/// common part of ParseBws() and ParseStrctBws()
-+namespace Http::One {
-+static void
-+ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(bwsChars);
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-@@ -290,4 +291,17 @@ Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- 
-     // success: no more BWS characters expected
- }
-+} // namespace Http::One
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+}
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 3ef4c5f7752..49e399de546 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,9 +163,15 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
-+/// \sa WhitespaceCharacters() for the definition of BWS characters
-+/// \sa ParseStrictBws() that avoids WhitespaceCharacters() uncertainties
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+
-+/// Like ParseBws() but only skips CharacterSet::WSP characters. This variation
-+/// must be used if the next element may start with CR or any other character
-+/// from RelaxedDelimiterCharacters().
-+void ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index aa4a840fdcf..859471b8c77 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
--        ParseBws(tok, true);
--
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size.
-+        // No ParseBws() here because it may consume CR required further below.
-+        ParseStrictBws(tok);
- 
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -143,22 +143,20 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--bool
-+void
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
--    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
--        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 8c5d4bb4cba..02eacd1bb89 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From f79936a234e722adb2dd08f31cf6019d81ee712c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:31:08 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fixup: Deadly typo
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index d3937e5e96b..7403a9163a2 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- void
- Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- }
- 
- void
- Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
- }
- 
-

gating.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+--- !Policy
+product_versions:
+  - rhel-9
+decision_context: osci_compose_gate
+rules:
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.tier1.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.tier2.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.tier3.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.acceptance-tier.functional}

sources

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+SHA512 (squid-4.15.tar.xz) = 8f0ce6e30dd9173927e8133618211ffb865fb5dde4c63c2fb465e2efccda4a6efb33f2c0846870c9b915340aff5f59461a60171882bcc0c890336b846fe60bd1

squid-3.0.STABLE1-perlpath.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+diff --git a/contrib/url-normalizer.pl b/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
+index 4cb0480..4b89910 100755
+--- a/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
++++ b/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
+@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
+-#!/usr/local/bin/perl -Tw
++#!/usr/bin/perl -Tw
+ #
+ # * Copyright (C) 1996-2022 The Squid Software Foundation and contributors
+ # *

squid-3.1.0.9-location.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,32 @@
+diff -up squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART.location squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART
+--- squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART.location	2009-06-26 12:35:27.000000000 +0200
++++ squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART	2009-07-17 14:03:10.000000000 +0200
+@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ After you retrieved, compiled and instal
+ INSTALL in the same directory), you have to configure the squid.conf
+ file. This is the list of the values you *need* to change, because no
+ sensible defaults could be defined. Do not touch the other variables
+-for now.  We assume you have installed Squid in the default location:
+-/usr/local/squid
++for now.
+ 
+-Uncomment and edit the following lines in /usr/local/squid/etc/squid.conf:
++Uncomment and edit the following lines in /etc/squid/squid.conf:
+ 
+ ==============================================================================
+ 
+@@ -82,12 +81,12 @@ After editing squid.conf to your liking,
+ line TWICE:
+ 
+ To create any disk cache_dir configured:
+-    % /usr/local/squid/sbin/squid -z
++    % /usr/sbin/squid -z
+ 
+ To start squid:
+-    % /usr/local/squid/sbin/squid 
++    % /usr/sbin/squid 
+ 
+-Check in the cache.log (/usr/local/squid/var/logs/cache.log) that
++Check in the cache.log (/var/log/squid/cache.log) that
+ everything is all right.
+ 
+ Once Squid created all its files (it can take several minutes on some

squid-3.5.9-include-guards.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+------------------------------------------------------------
+revno: 14311
+revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
+parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
+------------------------------------------------------------
+revno: 14311
+revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
+parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
+fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
+author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
+committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
+branch nick: trunk
+timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
+message:
+  Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
+------------------------------------------------------------
+# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
+# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
+# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
+# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
+# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
+# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
+# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
+#   6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
+# 
+# Begin patch
+=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
+--- compat/os/linux.h	2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
++++ compat/os/linux.h	2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
+@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
++ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
++ *
++ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
++ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
++ * aways present in Linux.
++ *
++ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
++ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
++ * to workaround it.
++ */
++#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#endif
++
++/*
+  * sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
+  *
+  * HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc
+fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
+author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
+committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
+branch nick: trunk
+timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
+message:
+  Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
+------------------------------------------------------------
+# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
+# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
+# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
+# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
+# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
+# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
+# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
+#   6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
+# 
+# Begin patch
+=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
+--- compat/os/linux.h	2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
++++ compat/os/linux.h	2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
+@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
++ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
++ *
++ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
++ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
++ * aways present in Linux.
++ *
++ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
++ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
++ * to workaround it.
++ */
++#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#endif
++
++/*
+  * sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
+  *
+  * HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc
+

squid-4.0.11-config.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,26 @@
+diff -up squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre.config squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre
+--- squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre.config	2016-06-09 22:32:57.000000000 +0200
++++ squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre	2016-07-11 21:08:35.090976840 +0200
+@@ -4658,7 +4658,7 @@ DOC_END
+ 
+ NAME: logfile_rotate
+ TYPE: int
+-DEFAULT: 10
++DEFAULT: 0
+ LOC: Config.Log.rotateNumber
+ DOC_START
+ 	Specifies the default number of logfile rotations to make when you
+@@ -6444,11 +6444,11 @@ COMMENT_END
+ 
+ NAME: cache_mgr
+ TYPE: string
+-DEFAULT: webmaster
++DEFAULT: root
+ LOC: Config.adminEmail
+ DOC_START
+ 	Email-address of local cache manager who will receive
+-	mail if the cache dies.  The default is "webmaster".
++	mail if the cache dies.  The default is "root".
+ DOC_END
+ 
+ NAME: mail_from

squid-5.0.5-symlink-lang-err.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From fc01451000eaa5592cd5afbd6aee14e53f7dd2c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Amos Jeffries <amosjeffries@squid-cache.org>
+Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2020 20:23:10 +1300
+Subject: [PATCH] Update translations integration
+
+* Add credits for es-mx translation moderator
+* Use es-mx for default of all Spanish (Central America) texts
+* Update translation related .am files
+---
+ doc/manuals/language.am | 2 +-
+ errors/TRANSLATORS      | 1 +
+ errors/aliases          | 3 ++-
+ errors/language.am      | 3 ++-
+ errors/template.am      | 2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/manuals/language.am b/doc/manuals/language.am
+index 7670c88380c..f03c4cf71b4 100644
+--- a/doc/manuals/language.am
++++ b/doc/manuals/language.am
+@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
+     oc.lang \
+     pt.lang \
+     ro.lang \
+-    ru.lang 
++    ru.lang
+diff --git a/errors/aliases b/errors/aliases
+index 36f17f4b80f..cf0116f297d 100644
+--- a/errors/aliases
++++ b/errors/aliases
+@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ da	da-dk
+ de	de-at de-ch de-de de-li de-lu
+ el	el-gr
+ en	en-au en-bz en-ca en-cn en-gb en-ie en-in en-jm en-nz en-ph en-sg en-tt en-uk en-us en-za en-zw
+-es	es-ar es-bo es-cl es-co es-cr es-do es-ec es-es es-gt es-hn es-mx es-ni es-pa es-pe es-pr es-py es-sv es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl
++es	es-ar es-bo es-cl es-cu es-co es-do es-ec es-es es-pe es-pr es-py es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl spq
++es-mx	es-bz es-cr es-gt es-hn es-ni es-pa es-sv
+ et	et-ee
+ fa	fa-fa fa-ir
+ fi	fi-fi
+diff --git a/errors/language.am b/errors/language.am
+index 12b1b2b3b43..029e8c1eb2f 100644
+--- a/errors/language.am
++++ b/errors/language.am
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
+     de.lang \
+     el.lang \
+     en.lang \
++    es-mx.lang \
+     es.lang \
+     et.lang \
+     fa.lang \
+@@ -51,4 +52,4 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
+     uz.lang \
+     vi.lang \
+     zh-hans.lang \
+-    zh-hant.lang 
++    zh-hant.lang
+diff --git a/errors/template.am b/errors/template.am
+index 6c12781e6f4..715c65aa22b 100644
+--- a/errors/template.am
++++ b/errors/template.am
+@@ -48,4 +48,4 @@ ERROR_TEMPLATES = \
+     templates/ERR_UNSUP_REQ \
+     templates/ERR_URN_RESOLVE \
+     templates/ERR_WRITE_ERROR \
+-    templates/ERR_ZERO_SIZE_OBJECT 
++    templates/ERR_ZERO_SIZE_OBJECT

squid-5.0.6-active-ftp.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,127 @@
+diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
+index 747ed35..f2b7126 100644
+--- a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
++++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
+@@ -795,7 +795,8 @@ Ftp::Client::connectDataChannel()
+ bool
+ Ftp::Client::openListenSocket()
+ {
+-    return false;
++    debugs(9, 3, HERE);
++	  return false;
+ }
+ 
+ /// creates a data channel Comm close callback
+diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.h b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
+index eb5ea1b..e92c007 100644
+--- a/src/clients/FtpClient.h
++++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
+@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ public:
+     bool sendPort();
+     bool sendPassive();
+     void connectDataChannel();
+-    bool openListenSocket();
++    virtual bool openListenSocket();
+     void switchTimeoutToDataChannel();
+ 
+     CtrlChannel ctrl; ///< FTP control channel state
+diff --git a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
+index 05db817..2989cd2 100644
+--- a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
++++ b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
+@@ -86,6 +86,13 @@ struct GatewayFlags {
+ class Gateway;
+ typedef void (StateMethod)(Ftp::Gateway *);
+ 
++} // namespace FTP
++
++static void ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback);
++
++namespace Ftp
++{
++
+ /// FTP Gateway: An FTP client that takes an HTTP request with an ftp:// URI,
+ /// converts it into one or more FTP commands, and then
+ /// converts one or more FTP responses into the final HTTP response.
+@@ -136,7 +143,11 @@ public:
+ 
+     /// create a data channel acceptor and start listening.
+     void listenForDataChannel(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn);
+-
++    virtual bool openListenSocket() {
++    		debugs(9, 3, HERE);
++				ftpOpenListenSocket(this, 0);
++        return Comm::IsConnOpen(data.conn);
++		}
+     int checkAuth(const HttpHeader * req_hdr);
+     void checkUrlpath();
+     void buildTitleUrl();
+@@ -1786,6 +1797,7 @@ ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback)
+     }
+ 
+     ftpState->listenForDataChannel(temp);
++    ftpState->data.listenConn = temp;
+ }
+ 
+ static void
+@@ -1821,13 +1833,19 @@ ftpSendPORT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
+     // pull out the internal IP address bytes to send in PORT command...
+     // source them from the listen_conn->local
+ 
++    struct sockaddr_in addr;
++    socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(addr);
++    getsockname(ftpState->data.listenConn->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, &addrlen);
++    unsigned char port_high = ntohs(addr.sin_port) >> 8;
++    unsigned char port_low  = ntohs(addr.sin_port) & 0xff;
++
+     struct addrinfo *AI = NULL;
+     ftpState->data.listenConn->local.getAddrInfo(AI, AF_INET);
+     unsigned char *addrptr = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in*)AI->ai_addr)->sin_addr;
+-    unsigned char *portptr = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in*)AI->ai_addr)->sin_port;
++    // unsigned char *portptr = (unsigned char *) &((struct sockaddr_in*)AI->ai_addr)->sin_port;
+     snprintf(cbuf, CTRL_BUFLEN, "PORT %d,%d,%d,%d,%d,%d\r\n",
+              addrptr[0], addrptr[1], addrptr[2], addrptr[3],
+-             portptr[0], portptr[1]);
++             port_high, port_low);
+     ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
+     ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_PORT;
+ 
+@@ -1880,14 +1898,27 @@ ftpSendEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
+         return;
+     }
+ 
++
++    unsigned int port;
++    struct sockaddr_storage addr;
++    socklen_t addrlen = sizeof(addr);
++    getsockname(ftpState->data.listenConn->fd, (struct sockaddr *) &addr, &addrlen);
++    if (addr.ss_family == AF_INET) {
++        struct sockaddr_in *addr4 = (struct sockaddr_in*) &addr;
++        port = ntohs( addr4->sin_port );
++    } else {
++        struct sockaddr_in6 *addr6 = (struct sockaddr_in6 *) &addr;
++        port = ntohs( addr6->sin6_port );
++    }
++
+     char buf[MAX_IPSTRLEN];
+ 
+     /* RFC 2428 defines EPRT as IPv6 equivalent to IPv4 PORT command. */
+     /* Which can be used by EITHER protocol. */
+-    snprintf(cbuf, CTRL_BUFLEN, "EPRT |%d|%s|%d|\r\n",
++    snprintf(cbuf, CTRL_BUFLEN, "EPRT |%d|%s|%u|\r\n",
+              ( ftpState->data.listenConn->local.isIPv6() ? 2 : 1 ),
+              ftpState->data.listenConn->local.toStr(buf,MAX_IPSTRLEN),
+-             ftpState->data.listenConn->local.port() );
++             port);
+ 
+     ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
+     ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_EPRT;
+@@ -1906,7 +1937,7 @@ ftpReadEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
+         ftpSendPORT(ftpState);
+         return;
+     }
+-
++    ftpState->ctrl.message = NULL;
+     ftpRestOrList(ftpState);
+ }
+ 

squid-5.0.6-openssl3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+diff --git a/src/ssl/support.cc b/src/ssl/support.cc
+index 3ad135d..73912ce 100644
+--- a/src/ssl/support.cc
++++ b/src/ssl/support.cc
+@@ -557,7 +557,11 @@ Ssl::VerifyCallbackParameters::At(Security::Connection &sconn)
+ }
+ 
+ // "dup" function for SSL_get_ex_new_index("cert_err_check")
+-#if SQUID_USE_CONST_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_DUP
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
++static int
++ssl_dupAclChecklist(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, void **,
++                    int, long, void *)
++#elif SQUID_USE_CONST_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_DUP
+ static int
+ ssl_dupAclChecklist(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, void *,
+                     int, long, void *)
+diff --git a/src/security/PeerOptions.cc b/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
+index cf1d4ba..4346ba5 100644
+--- a/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
++++ b/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
+@@ -297,130 +297,130 @@ static struct ssl_option {
+ 
+ } ssl_options[] = {
+ 
+-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+     {
+         "NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
+     {
+         "SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
++#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+     {
+         "MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
+     {
+         "SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
+     {
+         "TLS_D5_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
+     {
+         "TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
+     {
+         "TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_ALL
++#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
+     {
+         "ALL", (long)SSL_OP_ALL
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
++#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+     {
+         "SINGLE_DH_USE", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
++#ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+     {
+         "EPHEMERAL_RSA", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
++#ifdef SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
+     {
+         "PKCS1_CHECK_1", SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
++#ifdef SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
+     {
+         "PKCS1_CHECK_2", SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
+     {
+         "NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
+     {
+         "NON_EXPORT_FIRST", SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
++#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+     {
+         "CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+     {
+         "NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+     {
+         "NO_SSLv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+     {
+         "NO_TLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+     },
+ #else
+     { "NO_TLSv1", 0 },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+     {
+         "NO_TLSv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+     },
+ #else
+     { "NO_TLSv1_1", 0 },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+     {
+         "NO_TLSv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+     },
+ #else
+     { "NO_TLSv1_2", 0 },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
+     {
+         "NO_TLSv1_3", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
+     },
+ #else
+     { "NO_TLSv1_3", 0 },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+     {
+         "No_Compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+     {
+         "NO_TICKET", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
++#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
+     {
+         "SINGLE_ECDH_USE", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
+     },
+@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ Security::PeerOptions::parseOptions()
+ 
+     }
+ 
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
+     // compliance with RFC 6176: Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0
+     op = op | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ #endif

squid-5.1-test-store-cppsuite.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff --git a/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc b/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
+index 0564380..fcd60b9 100644
+--- a/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
++++ b/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
+@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ void commonInit()
+     if (inited)
+         return;
+ 
++    inited = true;
++
+     Mem::Init();
+ 
+     Config.Store.avgObjectSize = 1024;
+@@ -109,6 +111,10 @@ void commonInit()
+     Config.Store.objectsPerBucket = 20;
+ 
+     Config.Store.maxObjectSize = 2048;
++
++    Config.memShared.defaultTo(false);
++
++    Config.store_dir_select_algorithm = xstrdup("round-robin");
+ }
+ 
+ /* TODO make this a cbdata class */

squid-5.5-CVE-2021-46784.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,120 @@
+diff --git a/src/gopher.cc b/src/gopher.cc
+index 576a3f7..2645b6b 100644
+--- a/src/gopher.cc
++++ b/src/gopher.cc
+@@ -364,7 +364,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+     char *lpos = NULL;
+     char *tline = NULL;
+     LOCAL_ARRAY(char, line, TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
+-    LOCAL_ARRAY(char, tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
+     char *name = NULL;
+     char *selector = NULL;
+     char *host = NULL;
+@@ -374,7 +373,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+     char gtype;
+     StoreEntry *entry = NULL;
+ 
+-    memset(tmpbuf, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
+     memset(line, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
+ 
+     entry = gopherState->entry;
+@@ -409,7 +407,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    String outbuf;
++    SBuf outbuf;
+ 
+     if (!gopherState->HTML_header_added) {
+         if (gopherState->conversion == GopherStateData::HTML_CSO_RESULT)
+@@ -577,34 +575,34 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+                         break;
+                     }
+ 
+-                    memset(tmpbuf, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
+-
+                     if ((gtype == GOPHER_TELNET) || (gtype == GOPHER_3270)) {
+                         if (strlen(escaped_selector) != 0)
+-                            snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"telnet://%s@%s%s%s/\">%s</A>\n",
+-                                     icon_url, escaped_selector, rfc1738_escape_part(host),
+-                                     *port ? ":" : "", port, html_quote(name));
++                            outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"telnet://%s@%s%s%s/\">%s</A>\n",
++                                           icon_url, escaped_selector, rfc1738_escape_part(host),
++                                           *port ? ":" : "", port, html_quote(name));
+                         else
+-                            snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"telnet://%s%s%s/\">%s</A>\n",
+-                                     icon_url, rfc1738_escape_part(host), *port ? ":" : "",
+-                                     port, html_quote(name));
++                            outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"telnet://%s%s%s/\">%s</A>\n",
++                                           icon_url, rfc1738_escape_part(host), *port ? ":" : "",
++                                           port, html_quote(name));
+ 
+                     } else if (gtype == GOPHER_INFO) {
+-                        snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "\t%s\n", html_quote(name));
++                        outbuf.appendf("\t%s\n", html_quote(name));
+                     } else {
+                         if (strncmp(selector, "GET /", 5) == 0) {
+                             /* WWW link */
+-                            snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"http://%s/%s\">%s</A>\n",
+-                                     icon_url, host, rfc1738_escape_unescaped(selector + 5), html_quote(name));
++                            outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"http://%s/%s\">%s</A>\n",
++                                           icon_url, host, rfc1738_escape_unescaped(selector + 5), html_quote(name));
++                        } else if (gtype == GOPHER_WWW) {
++                            outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"gopher://%s/%c%s\">%s</A>\n",
++                                           icon_url, rfc1738_escape_unescaped(selector), html_quote(name));
+                         } else {
+                             /* Standard link */
+-                            snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"gopher://%s/%c%s\">%s</A>\n",
+-                                     icon_url, host, gtype, escaped_selector, html_quote(name));
++                            outbuf.appendf("<IMG border=\"0\" SRC=\"%s\"> <A HREF=\"gopher://%s/%c%s\">%s</A>\n",
++                                           icon_url, host, gtype, escaped_selector, html_quote(name));
+                         }
+                     }
+ 
+                     safe_free(escaped_selector);
+-                    outbuf.append(tmpbuf);
+                 } else {
+                     memset(line, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
+                     continue;
+@@ -637,13 +635,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+                     break;
+ 
+                 if (gopherState->cso_recno != recno) {
+-                    snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "</PRE><HR noshade size=\"1px\"><H2>Record# %d<br><i>%s</i></H2>\n<PRE>", recno, html_quote(result));
++                    outbuf.appendf("</PRE><HR noshade size=\"1px\"><H2>Record# %d<br><i>%s</i></H2>\n<PRE>", recno, html_quote(result));
+                     gopherState->cso_recno = recno;
+                 } else {
+-                    snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "%s\n", html_quote(result));
++                    outbuf.appendf("%s\n", html_quote(result));
+                 }
+ 
+-                outbuf.append(tmpbuf);
+                 break;
+             } else {
+                 int code;
+@@ -671,8 +668,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+ 
+                 case 502: { /* Too Many Matches */
+                     /* Print the message the server returns */
+-                    snprintf(tmpbuf, TEMP_BUF_SIZE, "</PRE><HR noshade size=\"1px\"><H2>%s</H2>\n<PRE>", html_quote(result));
+-                    outbuf.append(tmpbuf);
++                    outbuf.appendf("</PRE><HR noshade size=\"1px\"><H2>%s</H2>\n<PRE>", html_quote(result));
+                     break;
+                 }
+ 
+@@ -688,13 +684,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+ 
+     }               /* while loop */
+ 
+-    if (outbuf.size() > 0) {
+-        entry->append(outbuf.rawBuf(), outbuf.size());
++    if (outbuf.length() > 0) {
++        entry->append(outbuf.rawContent(), outbuf.length());
+         /* now let start sending stuff to client */
+         entry->flush();
+     }
+ 
+-    outbuf.clean();
+     return;
+ }
+ 

squid.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:     squid
 Version:  4.15
-Release:  10%{?dist}.1
+Release:  7%{?dist}
 Summary:  The Squid proxy caching server
 Epoch:    7
 # See CREDITS for breakdown of non GPLv2+ code
@@ -48,31 +48,6 @@ Patch300: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-28116.patch
 Patch301: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-46784.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2129771
 Patch302: squid-4.15-CVE-2022-41318.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245910
-# +backported: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/417da4006cf5c97d44e74431b816fc58fec9e270
-Patch303: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245916
-Patch304: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46847.patch
-# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-14792
-Patch305: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-5824.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2248521
-Patch306: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46728.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2247567
-Patch307: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46724.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252926
-Patch308: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252923
-Patch309: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2254663
-Patch310: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264309
-Patch311: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2268366
-Patch312: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch
-# Regression caused by squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
-# Upstream PR: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/pull/1914
-Patch313: squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch
-
 
 Requires: bash >= 2.0
 Requires(pre): shadow-utils
@@ -140,17 +115,6 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 %patch300 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-28116
 %patch301 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46784
 %patch302 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-41318
-%patch303 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46846
-%patch304 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46847
-%patch305 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-5824
-%patch306 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46728
-%patch307 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46724
-%patch308 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49285
-%patch309 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49286
-%patch310 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
-%patch311 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25617
-%patch312 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
-%patch313 -p1 -b .ignore-wsp-chunk-sz
 
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1679526
 # Patch in the vendor documentation and used different location for documentation
@@ -367,37 +331,6 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
-* Mon Oct 14 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.1
-- Resolves: RHEL-56024 - (Regression) Transfer-encoding:chunked data is not sent
-  to the client in its complementary
-
-* Tue Mar 19 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10
-- Resolves: RHEL-28529 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Chunked
-  Decoding (CVE-2024-25111)
-- Resolves: RHEL-26088 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP header
-  parser (CVE-2024-25617)
-
-* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-9
-- Resolves: RHEL-19552 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP request 
-  parsing (CVE-2023-50269)
-
-* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-8
-- Resolves: RHEL-18351 - squid:4/squid: Buffer over-read in the HTTP Message
-  processing feature (CVE-2023-49285)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18342 - squid:4/squid: Incorrect Check of Function Return
-  Value In Helper Process management (CVE-2023-49286)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18230 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in SSL Certificate
-  validation (CVE-2023-46724)
-- Resolves: RHEL-15911 - squid:4/squid: NULL pointer dereference in the gopher
-  protocol code (CVE-2023-46728)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18251 - squid crashes in assertion when a parent peer exists
-- Resolves: RHEL-14794 - squid: squid multiple issues in HTTP response caching
-  (CVE-2023-5824)
-- Resolves: RHEL-14803 - squid: squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Digest
-  Authentication (CVE-2023-46847)
-- Resolves: RHEL-14777 - squid: squid: Request/Response smuggling in HTTP/1.1
-  and ICAP (CVE-2023-46846)
-
 * Wed Aug 16 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7
 - Resolves: #2076717 - Crash with half_closed_client on