.gitignore

@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-SOURCES/squid-4.15.tar.xz
+SOURCES/pgp.asc
+SOURCES/squid-5.5.tar.xz

.squid.metadata

@@ -1 +1,2 @@
-60bda34ba39657e2d870c8c1d2acece8a69c3075 SOURCES/squid-4.15.tar.xz
+8e3de63f3bef0c9c4edbcfe000c567119f687143 SOURCES/pgp.asc
+42302bd9b8feff851a41420334cb8eaeab2806ab SOURCES/squid-5.5.tar.xz

SOURCES/cache_swap.sh

@@ -5,12 +5,17 @@ fi
 
 SQUID_CONF=${SQUID_CONF:-"/etc/squid/squid.conf"}
 
-CACHE_SWAP=`sed -e 's/#.*//g' $SQUID_CONF | \
-	grep cache_dir | awk '{ print $3 }'`
+CACHE_SWAP=`awk '/^[[:blank:]]*cache_dir/ { print $3 }' "$SQUID_CONF"`
 
+init_cache_dirs=0
 for adir in $CACHE_SWAP; do
 	if [ ! -d $adir/00 ]; then
 		echo -n "init_cache_dir $adir... "
-		squid -N -z -F -f $SQUID_CONF >> /var/log/squid/squid.out 2>&1
+		init_cache_dirs=1
 	fi
 done
+
+if [ $init_cache_dirs -ne 0 ]; then
+	echo ""
+	squid --foreground -z -f "$SQUID_CONF" >> /var/log/squid/squid.out 2>&1
+fi

SOURCES/squid-3.0.STABLE1-perlpath.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 diff --git a/contrib/url-normalizer.pl b/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
-index 90ac6a4..8dbed90 100755
+index 4cb0480..4b89910 100755
 --- a/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
 +++ b/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
 @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
 -#!/usr/local/bin/perl -Tw
 +#!/usr/bin/perl -Tw
  #
- # * Copyright (C) 1996-2021 The Squid Software Foundation and contributors
+ # * Copyright (C) 1996-2022 The Squid Software Foundation and contributors
  # *

SOURCES/squid-3.1.0.9-location.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/QUICKSTART b/QUICKSTART
-index e5299b4..a243437 100644
---- a/QUICKSTART
-+++ b/QUICKSTART
-@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ After you retrieved, compiled and installed the Squid software (see
+diff -up squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART.location squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART
+--- squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART.location	2009-06-26 12:35:27.000000000 +0200
++++ squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART	2009-07-17 14:03:10.000000000 +0200
+@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ After you retrieved, compiled and instal
  INSTALL in the same directory), you have to configure the squid.conf
  file. This is the list of the values you *need* to change, because no
  sensible defaults could be defined. Do not touch the other variables
@@ -15,7 +14,7 @@ index e5299b4..a243437 100644
  
  ==============================================================================
  
-@@ -80,12 +79,12 @@ After editing squid.conf to your liking, run Squid from the command
+@@ -82,12 +81,12 @@ After editing squid.conf to your liking,
  line TWICE:
  
  To create any disk cache_dir configured:

SOURCES/squid-3.5.9-include-guards.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
+------------------------------------------------------------
+revno: 14311
+revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
+parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
+------------------------------------------------------------
+revno: 14311
+revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
+parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
+fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
+author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
+committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
+branch nick: trunk
+timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
+message:
+  Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
+------------------------------------------------------------
+# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
+# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
+# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
+# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
+# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
+# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
+# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
+#   6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
+# 
+# Begin patch
+=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
+--- compat/os/linux.h	2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
++++ compat/os/linux.h	2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
+@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
++ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
++ *
++ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
++ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
++ * aways present in Linux.
++ *
++ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
++ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
++ * to workaround it.
++ */
++#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#endif
++
++/*
+  * sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
+  *
+  * HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc
+fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
+author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
+committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
+branch nick: trunk
+timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
+message:
+  Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
+------------------------------------------------------------
+# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
+# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
+# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
+# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
+# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
+# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
+# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
+#   6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
+# 
+# Begin patch
+=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
+--- compat/os/linux.h	2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
++++ compat/os/linux.h	2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
+@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
+ #endif
+ 
+ /*
++ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
++ *
++ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
++ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
++ * aways present in Linux.
++ *
++ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
++ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
++ * to workaround it.
++ */
++#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
++#include <netinet/in.h>
++#endif
++
++/*
+  * sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
+  *
+  * HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc
+

SOURCES/squid-4.0.11-config.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
-diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
-index 26ef576..30d5509 100644
---- a/src/cf.data.pre
-+++ b/src/cf.data.pre
-@@ -5006,7 +5006,7 @@ DOC_END
+diff -up squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre.config squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre
+--- squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre.config	2016-06-09 22:32:57.000000000 +0200
++++ squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre	2016-07-11 21:08:35.090976840 +0200
+@@ -4658,7 +4658,7 @@ DOC_END
  
  NAME: logfile_rotate
  TYPE: int
@@ -11,7 +10,7 @@ index 26ef576..30d5509 100644
  LOC: Config.Log.rotateNumber
  DOC_START
  	Specifies the default number of logfile rotations to make when you
-@@ -6857,11 +6857,11 @@ COMMENT_END
+@@ -6444,11 +6444,11 @@ COMMENT_END
  
  NAME: cache_mgr
  TYPE: string

SOURCES/squid-4.11-convert-ipv4.patch

@@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
-From 771908d313ee9c255adfb5e4fdba4d6797c18409 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 13:50:38 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Bug 4928: Cannot convert non-IPv4 to IPv4 (#379)
-
-... when reaching client_ip_max_connections
-
-The client_ip_max_connections limit is checked before the TCP dst-IP is located for the newly received TCP connection. This leaves Squid unable to fetch the NFMARK or similar
-details later on (they do not exist for [::]).
-
-Move client_ip_max_connections test later in the TCP accept process to ensure dst-IP is known when the error is produced.
----
- src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
- 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc b/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc
-index d4b576d..936aa30 100644
---- a/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc
-+++ b/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc
-@@ -282,7 +282,16 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::acceptOne()
-     ConnectionPointer newConnDetails = new Connection();
-     const Comm::Flag flag = oldAccept(newConnDetails);
- 
--    if (flag == Comm::COMM_ERROR) {
-+    /* Check for errors */
-+    if (!newConnDetails->isOpen()) {
-+
-+        if (flag == Comm::NOMESSAGE) {
-+            /* register interest again */
-+            debugs(5, 5, HERE << "try later: " << conn << " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
-+            SetSelect(conn->fd, COMM_SELECT_READ, doAccept, this, 0);
-+            return;
-+        }
-+
-         // A non-recoverable error; notify the caller */
-         debugs(5, 5, HERE << "non-recoverable error:" << status() << " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
-         if (intendedForUserConnections())
-@@ -292,16 +301,12 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::acceptOne()
-         return;
-     }
- 
--    if (flag == Comm::NOMESSAGE) {
--        /* register interest again */
--        debugs(5, 5, "try later: " << conn << " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
--    } else {
--        debugs(5, 5, "Listener: " << conn <<
--               " accepted new connection " << newConnDetails <<
--               " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
--        notify(flag, newConnDetails);
--    }
-+    newConnDetails->nfmark = Ip::Qos::getNfmarkFromConnection(newConnDetails, Ip::Qos::dirAccepted);
- 
-+    debugs(5, 5, HERE << "Listener: " << conn <<
-+           " accepted new connection " << newConnDetails <<
-+           " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
-+    notify(flag, newConnDetails);
-     SetSelect(conn->fd, COMM_SELECT_READ, doAccept, this, 0);
- }
- 
-@@ -341,8 +346,8 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::notify(const Comm::Flag flag, const Comm::ConnectionPointer &
-  *
-  * \retval Comm::OK          success. details parameter filled.
-  * \retval Comm::NOMESSAGE   attempted accept() but nothing useful came in.
-- *                           Or this client has too many connections already.
-  * \retval Comm::COMM_ERROR  an outright failure occurred.
-+ *                           Or this client has too many connections already.
-  */
- Comm::Flag
- Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
-@@ -383,6 +388,15 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
- 
-     details->remote = *gai;
- 
-+    if ( Config.client_ip_max_connections >= 0) {
-+        if (clientdbEstablished(details->remote, 0) > Config.client_ip_max_connections) {
-+            debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: " << details->remote << " attempting more than " << Config.client_ip_max_connections << " connections.");
-+            Ip::Address::FreeAddr(gai);
-+            PROF_stop(comm_accept);
-+            return Comm::COMM_ERROR;
-+        }
-+    }
-+
-     // lookup the local-end details of this new connection
-     Ip::Address::InitAddr(gai);
-     details->local.setEmpty();
-@@ -396,6 +410,23 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
-     details->local = *gai;
-     Ip::Address::FreeAddr(gai);
- 
-+    /* fdstat update */
-+    fdd_table[sock].close_file = NULL;
-+    fdd_table[sock].close_line = 0;
-+
-+    fde *F = &fd_table[sock];
-+    details->remote.toStr(F->ipaddr,MAX_IPSTRLEN);
-+    F->remote_port = details->remote.port();
-+    F->local_addr = details->local;
-+    F->sock_family = details->local.isIPv6()?AF_INET6:AF_INET;
-+
-+    // set socket flags
-+    commSetCloseOnExec(sock);
-+    commSetNonBlocking(sock);
-+
-+    /* IFF the socket is (tproxy) transparent, pass the flag down to allow spoofing */
-+    F->flags.transparent = fd_table[conn->fd].flags.transparent; // XXX: can we remove this line yet?
-+
-     // Perform NAT or TPROXY operations to retrieve the real client/dest IP addresses
-     if (conn->flags&(COMM_TRANSPARENT|COMM_INTERCEPTION) && !Ip::Interceptor.Lookup(details, conn)) {
-         debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: NAT/TPROXY lookup failed to locate original IPs on " << details);
-@@ -414,33 +445,6 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
-     }
- #endif
- 
--    details->nfmark = Ip::Qos::getNfmarkFromConnection(details, Ip::Qos::dirAccepted);
--
--    if (Config.client_ip_max_connections >= 0) {
--        if (clientdbEstablished(details->remote, 0) > Config.client_ip_max_connections) {
--            debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: " << details->remote << " attempting more than " << Config.client_ip_max_connections << " connections.");
--            PROF_stop(comm_accept);
--            return Comm::NOMESSAGE;
--        }
--    }
--
--    /* fdstat update */
--    fdd_table[sock].close_file = NULL;
--    fdd_table[sock].close_line = 0;
--
--    fde *F = &fd_table[sock];
--    details->remote.toStr(F->ipaddr,MAX_IPSTRLEN);
--    F->remote_port = details->remote.port();
--    F->local_addr = details->local;
--    F->sock_family = details->local.isIPv6()?AF_INET6:AF_INET;
--
--    // set socket flags
--    commSetCloseOnExec(sock);
--    commSetNonBlocking(sock);
--
--    /* IFF the socket is (tproxy) transparent, pass the flag down to allow spoofing */
--    F->flags.transparent = fd_table[conn->fd].flags.transparent; // XXX: can we remove this line yet?
--
-     PROF_stop(comm_accept);
-     return Comm::OK;
- }

SOURCES/squid-4.11-include-guards.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/compat/os/linux.h b/compat/os/linux.h
-index 0ff05c6..d51389b 100644
---- a/compat/os/linux.h
-+++ b/compat/os/linux.h
-@@ -44,6 +44,36 @@
- #include <netinet/in.h>
- #endif
- 
-+/*
-+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
-+ *
-+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
-+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
-+ * aways present in Linux.
-+ *
-+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
-+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
-+ * to workaround it.
-+ */
-+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
-+#include <netinet/in.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
-+ *
-+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
-+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
-+ * aways present in Linux.
-+ *
-+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
-+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
-+ * to workaround it.
-+ */
-+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
-+#include <netinet/in.h>
-+#endif
-+
- /*
-  * sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
-  *

SOURCES/squid-4.11-large-acl.patch

@@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/acl/RegexData.cc b/src/acl/RegexData.cc
-index 01a4c12..b5c1679 100644
---- a/src/acl/RegexData.cc
-+++ b/src/acl/RegexData.cc
-@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
- #include "ConfigParser.h"
- #include "Debug.h"
- #include "sbuf/List.h"
-+#include "sbuf/Algorithms.h"
- 
- ACLRegexData::~ACLRegexData()
- {
-@@ -129,6 +130,18 @@ compileRE(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const char * RE, int flags)
-     return true;
- }
- 
-+static bool
-+compileRE(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const SBufList &RE, int flags)
-+{
-+	if (RE.empty())
-+		return curlist.empty(); // XXX: old code did this. It looks wrong.
-+	SBuf regexp;
-+	static const SBuf openparen("("), closeparen(")"), separator(")|(");
-+	JoinContainerIntoSBuf(regexp, RE.begin(), RE.end(), separator, openparen,
-+			closeparen);
-+	return compileRE(curlist, regexp.c_str(), flags);
-+}
-+
- /** Compose and compile one large RE from a set of (small) REs.
-  * The ultimate goal is to have only one RE per ACL so that match() is
-  * called only once per ACL.
-@@ -137,16 +150,11 @@ static int
- compileOptimisedREs(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const SBufList &sl)
- {
-     std::list<RegexPattern> newlist;
--    int numREs = 0;
-+    SBufList accumulatedRE;
-+    int numREs = 0, reSize = 0;
-     int flags = REG_EXTENDED | REG_NOSUB;
--    int largeREindex = 0;
--    char largeRE[BUFSIZ];
--    *largeRE = 0;
- 
-     for (const SBuf & configurationLineWord : sl) {
--        int RElen;
--        RElen = configurationLineWord.length();
--
-         static const SBuf minus_i("-i");
-         static const SBuf plus_i("+i");
-         if (configurationLineWord == minus_i) {
-@@ -155,10 +163,11 @@ compileOptimisedREs(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const SBufList &sl)
-                 debugs(28, 2, "optimisation of -i ... -i" );
-             } else {
-                 debugs(28, 2, "-i" );
--                if (!compileRE(newlist, largeRE, flags))
-+                if (!compileRE(newlist, accumulatedRE, flags))
-                     return 0;
-                 flags |= REG_ICASE;
--                largeRE[largeREindex=0] = '\0';
-+                accumulatedRE.clear();
-+                reSize = 0;
-             }
-         } else if (configurationLineWord == plus_i) {
-             if ((flags & REG_ICASE) == 0) {
-@@ -166,37 +175,34 @@ compileOptimisedREs(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const SBufList &sl)
-                 debugs(28, 2, "optimisation of +i ... +i");
-             } else {
-                 debugs(28, 2, "+i");
--                if (!compileRE(newlist, largeRE, flags))
-+                if (!compileRE(newlist, accumulatedRE, flags))
-                     return 0;
-                 flags &= ~REG_ICASE;
--                largeRE[largeREindex=0] = '\0';
-+                accumulatedRE.clear();
-+                reSize = 0;
-             }
--        } else if (RElen + largeREindex + 3 < BUFSIZ-1) {
-+        } else if (reSize < 1024) {
-             debugs(28, 2, "adding RE '" << configurationLineWord << "'");
--            if (largeREindex > 0) {
--                largeRE[largeREindex] = '|';
--                ++largeREindex;
--            }
--            largeRE[largeREindex] = '(';
--            ++largeREindex;
--            configurationLineWord.copy(largeRE+largeREindex, BUFSIZ-largeREindex);
--            largeREindex += configurationLineWord.length();
--            largeRE[largeREindex] = ')';
--            ++largeREindex;
--            largeRE[largeREindex] = '\0';
-+            accumulatedRE.push_back(configurationLineWord);
-             ++numREs;
-+            reSize += configurationLineWord.length();
-         } else {
-             debugs(28, 2, "buffer full, generating new optimised RE..." );
--            if (!compileRE(newlist, largeRE, flags))
-+            accumulatedRE.push_back(configurationLineWord);
-+            if (!compileRE(newlist, accumulatedRE, flags))
-                 return 0;
--            largeRE[largeREindex=0] = '\0';
-+            accumulatedRE.clear();
-+            reSize = 0;
-             continue;    /* do the loop again to add the RE to largeRE */
-         }
-     }
- 
--    if (!compileRE(newlist, largeRE, flags))
-+    if (!compileRE(newlist, accumulatedRE, flags))
-         return 0;
- 
-+    accumulatedRE.clear();
-+    reSize = 0;
-+
-     /* all was successful, so put the new list at the tail */
-     curlist.splice(curlist.end(), newlist);
- 
-diff --git a/src/sbuf/Algorithms.h b/src/sbuf/Algorithms.h
-index 21ee889..338e9c0 100644
---- a/src/sbuf/Algorithms.h
-+++ b/src/sbuf/Algorithms.h
-@@ -81,6 +81,57 @@ SBufContainerJoin(const Container &items, const SBuf& separator)
-     return rv;
- }
- 
-+/** Join container of SBufs and append to supplied target
-+ *
-+ * append to the target SBuf all elements in the [begin,end) range from
-+ * an iterable container, prefixed by prefix, separated by separator and
-+ * followed by suffix. Prefix and suffix are added also in case of empty
-+ * iterable
-+ *
-+ * \return the modified dest
-+ */
-+template <class ContainerIterator>
-+SBuf&
-+JoinContainerIntoSBuf(SBuf &dest, const ContainerIterator &begin,
-+                      const ContainerIterator &end, const SBuf& separator,
-+                      const SBuf& prefix = SBuf(), const SBuf& suffix = SBuf())
-+{
-+    if (begin == end) {
-+        dest.append(prefix).append(suffix);
-+        return dest;
-+    }
-+
-+    // optimization: pre-calculate needed storage
-+    const SBuf::size_type totalContainerSize =
-+        std::accumulate(begin, end, 0, SBufAddLength(separator)) +
-+        dest.length() + prefix.length() + suffix.length();
-+    SBufReservationRequirements req;
-+    req.minSpace = totalContainerSize;
-+    dest.reserve(req);
-+
-+    auto i = begin;
-+    dest.append(prefix);
-+    dest.append(*i);
-+    ++i;
-+    for (; i != end; ++i)
-+        dest.append(separator).append(*i);
-+    dest.append(suffix);
-+    return dest;
-+}
-+
-+
-+/// convenience wrapper of JoinContainerIntoSBuf with no caller-supplied SBuf
-+template <class ContainerIterator>
-+SBuf
-+JoinContainerToSBuf(const ContainerIterator &begin,
-+                    const ContainerIterator &end, const SBuf& separator,
-+                    const SBuf& prefix = SBuf(), const SBuf& suffix = SBuf())
-+{
-+    SBuf rv;
-+    return JoinContainerIntoSBuf(rv, begin, end, separator, prefix, suffix);
-+}
-+
-+
- namespace std {
- /// default hash functor to support std::unordered_map<SBuf,*>
- template <>

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2021-28116.patch

@@ -1,424 +0,0 @@
-commit b003a0da7865caa25b5d1e70c79329b32409b02a (HEAD -> refs/heads/v4, refs/remotes/origin/v4)
-Author: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date:   2021-09-24 21:53:11 +0000
-
-    WCCP: Validate packets better (#899)
-    
-    Update WCCP to support exception based error handling for
-    parsing and processing we are moving Squid to for protocol
-    handling.
-    
-    Update the main WCCPv2 parsing checks to throw meaningful
-    exceptions when detected.
-
-diff --git a/src/wccp2.cc b/src/wccp2.cc
-index ee592449c..6ef469e91 100644
---- a/src/wccp2.cc
-+++ b/src/wccp2.cc
-@@ -1108,6 +1108,59 @@ wccp2ConnectionClose(void)
-  * Functions for handling the requests.
-  */
- 
-+/// Checks that the given area section ends inside the given (whole) area.
-+/// \param error the message to throw when the section does not fit
-+static void
-+CheckSectionLength(const void *sectionStart, const size_t sectionLength, const void *wholeStart, const size_t wholeSize, const char *error)
-+{
-+    assert(sectionStart);
-+    assert(wholeStart);
-+
-+    const auto wholeEnd = static_cast<const char*>(wholeStart) + wholeSize;
-+    assert(sectionStart >= wholeStart && "we never go backwards");
-+    assert(sectionStart <= wholeEnd && "we never go beyond our whole (but zero-sized fields are OK)");
-+    static_assert(sizeof(wccp2_i_see_you_t) <= PTRDIFF_MAX, "paranoid: no UB when subtracting in-whole pointers");
-+    // subtraction safe due to the three assertions above
-+    const auto remainderDiff = wholeEnd - static_cast<const char*>(sectionStart);
-+
-+    // casting safe due to the assertions above (and size_t definition)
-+    assert(remainderDiff >= 0);
-+    const auto remainderSize = static_cast<size_t>(remainderDiff);
-+
-+    if (sectionLength <= remainderSize)
-+        return;
-+
-+    throw TextException(error, Here());
-+}
-+
-+/// Checks that the area contains at least dataLength bytes after the header.
-+/// The size of the field header itself is not included in dataLength.
-+/// \returns the total field size -- the field header and field data combined
-+template<class FieldHeader>
-+static size_t
-+CheckFieldDataLength(const FieldHeader *header, const size_t dataLength, const void *areaStart, const size_t areaSize, const char *error)
-+{
-+    assert(header);
-+    const auto dataStart = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(header) + sizeof(header);
-+    CheckSectionLength(dataStart, dataLength, areaStart, areaSize, error);
-+    return sizeof(header) + dataLength; // no overflow after CheckSectionLength()
-+}
-+
-+/// Positions the given field at a given start within a given packet area.
-+/// The Field type determines the correct field size (used for bounds checking).
-+/// \param field the field pointer the function should set
-+/// \param areaStart the start of a packet (sub)structure containing the field
-+/// \param areaSize the size of the packet (sub)structure starting at areaStart
-+/// \param fieldStart the start of a field within the given area
-+/// \param error the message to throw when the field does not fit the area
-+template<class Field>
-+static void
-+SetField(Field *&field, const void *fieldStart, const void *areaStart, const size_t areaSize, const char *error)
-+{
-+    CheckSectionLength(fieldStart, sizeof(Field), areaStart, areaSize, error);
-+    field = static_cast<Field*>(const_cast<void*>(fieldStart));
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * Accept the UDP packet
-  */
-@@ -1124,8 +1177,6 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
- 
-     /* These structs form the parts of the packet */
- 
--    struct wccp2_item_header_t *header = NULL;
--
-     struct wccp2_security_none_t *security_info = NULL;
- 
-     struct wccp2_service_info_t *service_info = NULL;
-@@ -1141,14 +1192,13 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-     struct wccp2_cache_identity_info_t *cache_identity = NULL;
- 
-     struct wccp2_capability_info_header_t *router_capability_header = NULL;
-+    char *router_capability_data_start = nullptr;
- 
-     struct wccp2_capability_element_t *router_capability_element;
- 
-     struct sockaddr_in from;
- 
-     struct in_addr cache_address;
--    int len, found;
--    short int data_length, offset;
-     uint32_t tmp;
-     char *ptr;
-     int num_caches;
-@@ -1161,20 +1211,18 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-     Ip::Address from_tmp;
-     from_tmp.setIPv4();
- 
--    len = comm_udp_recvfrom(sock,
--                            &wccp2_i_see_you,
--                            WCCP_RESPONSE_SIZE,
--                            0,
--                            from_tmp);
-+    const auto lenOrError = comm_udp_recvfrom(sock, &wccp2_i_see_you, WCCP_RESPONSE_SIZE, 0, from_tmp);
- 
--    if (len < 0)
-+    if (lenOrError < 0)
-         return;
-+    const auto len = static_cast<size_t>(lenOrError);
- 
--    if (ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.version) != WCCP2_VERSION)
--        return;
--
--    if (ntohl(wccp2_i_see_you.type) != WCCP2_I_SEE_YOU)
--        return;
-+    try {
-+        // TODO: Remove wccp2_i_see_you.data and use a buffer to read messages.
-+        const auto message_header_size = sizeof(wccp2_i_see_you) - sizeof(wccp2_i_see_you.data);
-+        Must2(len >= message_header_size, "incomplete WCCP message header");
-+        Must2(ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.version) == WCCP2_VERSION, "WCCP version unsupported");
-+        Must2(ntohl(wccp2_i_see_you.type) == WCCP2_I_SEE_YOU, "WCCP packet type unsupported");
- 
-     /* FIXME INET6 : drop conversion boundary */
-     from_tmp.getSockAddr(from);
-@@ -1182,73 +1230,60 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-     debugs(80, 3, "Incoming WCCPv2 I_SEE_YOU length " << ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.length) << ".");
- 
-     /* Record the total data length */
--    data_length = ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.length);
-+    const auto data_length = ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.length);
-+    Must2(data_length <= len - message_header_size,
-+          "malformed packet claiming it's bigger than received data");
- 
--    offset = 0;
--
--    if (data_length > len) {
--        debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: Malformed WCCPv2 packet claiming it's bigger than received data");
--        return;
--    }
-+    size_t offset = 0;
- 
-     /* Go through the data structure */
--    while (data_length > offset) {
-+    while (offset + sizeof(struct wccp2_item_header_t) <= data_length) {
- 
-         char *data = wccp2_i_see_you.data;
- 
--        header = (struct wccp2_item_header_t *) &data[offset];
-+        const auto itemHeader = reinterpret_cast<const wccp2_item_header_t*>(&data[offset]);
-+        const auto itemSize = CheckFieldDataLength(itemHeader, ntohs(itemHeader->length),
-+                              data, data_length, "truncated record");
-+        // XXX: Check "The specified length must be a multiple of 4 octets"
-+        // requirement to avoid unaligned memory reads after the first item.
- 
--        switch (ntohs(header->type)) {
-+        switch (ntohs(itemHeader->type)) {
- 
-         case WCCP2_SECURITY_INFO:
--
--            if (security_info != NULL) {
--                debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate security definition");
--                return;
--            }
--
--            security_info = (struct wccp2_security_none_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
-+            Must2(!security_info, "duplicate security definition");
-+            SetField(security_info, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
-+                     "security definition truncated");
-             break;
- 
-         case WCCP2_SERVICE_INFO:
--
--            if (service_info != NULL) {
--                debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate service_info definition");
--                return;
--            }
--
--            service_info = (struct wccp2_service_info_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
-+            Must2(!service_info, "duplicate service_info definition");
-+            SetField(service_info, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
-+                     "service_info definition truncated");
-             break;
- 
-         case WCCP2_ROUTER_ID_INFO:
--
--            if (router_identity_info != NULL) {
--                debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate router_identity_info definition");
--                return;
--            }
--
--            router_identity_info = (struct router_identity_info_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
-+            Must2(!router_identity_info, "duplicate router_identity_info definition");
-+            SetField(router_identity_info, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
-+                     "router_identity_info definition truncated");
-             break;
- 
-         case WCCP2_RTR_VIEW_INFO:
--
--            if (router_view_header != NULL) {
--                debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate router_view definition");
--                return;
--            }
--
--            router_view_header = (struct router_view_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
-+            Must2(!router_view_header, "duplicate router_view definition");
-+            SetField(router_view_header, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
-+                     "router_view definition truncated");
-             break;
- 
--        case WCCP2_CAPABILITY_INFO:
--
--            if (router_capability_header != NULL) {
--                debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate router_capability definition");
--                return;
--            }
-+        case WCCP2_CAPABILITY_INFO: {
-+            Must2(!router_capability_header, "duplicate router_capability definition");
-+            SetField(router_capability_header, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
-+                     "router_capability definition truncated");
- 
--            router_capability_header = (struct wccp2_capability_info_header_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
-+            CheckFieldDataLength(router_capability_header, ntohs(router_capability_header->capability_info_length),
-+                                 itemHeader, itemSize, "capability info truncated");
-+            router_capability_data_start = reinterpret_cast<char*>(router_capability_header) +
-+                                           sizeof(*router_capability_header);
-             break;
-+        }
- 
-         /* Nothing to do for the types below */
- 
-@@ -1257,22 +1292,17 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-             break;
- 
-         default:
--            debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Unknown record type in WCCPv2 Packet (" << ntohs(header->type) << ").");
-+            debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Unknown record type in WCCPv2 Packet (" << ntohs(itemHeader->type) << ").");
-         }
- 
--        offset += sizeof(struct wccp2_item_header_t);
--        offset += ntohs(header->length);
--
--        if (offset > data_length) {
--            debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Error: WCCPv2 packet tried to tell us there is data beyond the end of the packet");
--            return;
--        }
-+        offset += itemSize;
-+        assert(offset <= data_length && "CheckFieldDataLength(itemHeader...) established that");
-     }
- 
--    if ((security_info == NULL) || (service_info == NULL) || (router_identity_info == NULL) || (router_view_header == NULL)) {
--        debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Incomplete WCCPv2 Packet");
--        return;
--    }
-+    Must2(security_info, "packet missing security definition");
-+    Must2(service_info, "packet missing service_info definition");
-+    Must2(router_identity_info, "packet missing router_identity_info definition");
-+    Must2(router_view_header, "packet missing router_view definition");
- 
-     debugs(80, 5, "Complete packet received");
- 
-@@ -1308,10 +1338,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-             break;
-     }
- 
--    if (router_list_ptr->next == NULL) {
--        debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WCCPv2 Packet received from unknown router");
--        return;
--    }
-+    Must2(router_list_ptr->next, "packet received from unknown router");
- 
-     /* Set the router id */
-     router_list_ptr->info->router_address = router_identity_info->router_id_element.router_address;
-@@ -1331,11 +1358,20 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-         }
-     } else {
- 
--        char *end = ((char *) router_capability_header) + sizeof(*router_capability_header) + ntohs(router_capability_header->capability_info_length) - sizeof(struct wccp2_capability_info_header_t);
--
--        router_capability_element = (struct wccp2_capability_element_t *) (((char *) router_capability_header) + sizeof(*router_capability_header));
--
--        while ((char *) router_capability_element <= end) {
-+        const auto router_capability_data_length = ntohs(router_capability_header->capability_info_length);
-+        assert(router_capability_data_start);
-+        const auto router_capability_data_end = router_capability_data_start +
-+                                                router_capability_data_length;
-+        for (auto router_capability_data_current = router_capability_data_start;
-+                router_capability_data_current < router_capability_data_end;) {
-+
-+            SetField(router_capability_element, router_capability_data_current,
-+                     router_capability_data_start, router_capability_data_length,
-+                     "capability element header truncated");
-+            const auto elementSize = CheckFieldDataLength(
-+                                         router_capability_element, ntohs(router_capability_element->capability_length),
-+                                         router_capability_data_start, router_capability_data_length,
-+                                         "capability element truncated");
- 
-             switch (ntohs(router_capability_element->capability_type)) {
- 
-@@ -1377,7 +1413,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-                 debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Unknown capability type in WCCPv2 Packet (" << ntohs(router_capability_element->capability_type) << ").");
-             }
- 
--            router_capability_element = (struct wccp2_capability_element_t *) (((char *) router_capability_element) + sizeof(struct wccp2_item_header_t) + ntohs(router_capability_element->capability_length));
-+            router_capability_data_current += elementSize;
-         }
-     }
- 
-@@ -1396,23 +1432,34 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-     num_caches = 0;
- 
-     /* Check to see if we're the master cache and update the cache list */
--    found = 0;
-+    bool found = false;
-     service_list_ptr->lowest_ip = 1;
-     cache_list_ptr = &router_list_ptr->cache_list_head;
- 
-     /* to find the list of caches, we start at the end of the router view header */
- 
-     ptr = (char *) (router_view_header) + sizeof(struct router_view_t);
-+    const auto router_view_size = sizeof(struct router_view_t) +
-+                                  ntohs(router_view_header->header.length);
- 
-     /* Then we read the number of routers */
--    memcpy(&tmp, ptr, sizeof(tmp));
-+    const uint32_t *routerCountRaw = nullptr;
-+    SetField(routerCountRaw, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
-+             "malformed packet (truncated router view info w/o number of routers)");
- 
-     /* skip the number plus all the ip's */
--
--    ptr += sizeof(tmp) + (ntohl(tmp) * sizeof(struct in_addr));
-+    ptr += sizeof(*routerCountRaw);
-+    const auto ipCount = ntohl(*routerCountRaw);
-+    const auto ipsSize = ipCount * sizeof(struct in_addr); // we check for unsigned overflow below
-+    Must2(ipsSize / sizeof(struct in_addr) != ipCount, "huge IP address count");
-+    CheckSectionLength(ptr, ipsSize, router_view_header, router_view_size, "invalid IP address count");
-+    ptr += ipsSize;
- 
-     /* Then read the number of caches */
--    memcpy(&tmp, ptr, sizeof(tmp));
-+    const uint32_t *cacheCountRaw = nullptr;
-+    SetField(cacheCountRaw, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
-+             "malformed packet (truncated router view info w/o cache count)");
-+    memcpy(&tmp, cacheCountRaw, sizeof(tmp)); // TODO: Replace tmp with cacheCount
-     ptr += sizeof(tmp);
- 
-     if (ntohl(tmp) != 0) {
-@@ -1426,7 +1473,8 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
- 
-             case WCCP2_ASSIGNMENT_METHOD_HASH:
- 
--                cache_identity = (struct wccp2_cache_identity_info_t *) ptr;
-+                SetField(cache_identity, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
-+                         "malformed packet (truncated router view info cache w/o assignment hash)");
- 
-                 ptr += sizeof(struct wccp2_cache_identity_info_t);
- 
-@@ -1437,13 +1485,15 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
- 
-             case WCCP2_ASSIGNMENT_METHOD_MASK:
- 
--                cache_mask_info = (struct cache_mask_info_t *) ptr;
-+                SetField(cache_mask_info, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
-+                         "malformed packet (truncated router view info cache w/o assignment mask)");
- 
-                 /* The mask assignment has an undocumented variable length entry here */
- 
-                 if (ntohl(cache_mask_info->num1) == 3) {
- 
--                    cache_mask_identity = (struct wccp2_cache_mask_identity_info_t *) ptr;
-+                    SetField(cache_mask_identity, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
-+                             "malformed packet (truncated router view info cache w/o assignment mask identity)");
- 
-                     ptr += sizeof(struct wccp2_cache_mask_identity_info_t);
- 
-@@ -1474,10 +1524,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-             debugs (80, 5,  "checking cache list: (" << std::hex << cache_address.s_addr << ":" <<  router_list_ptr->local_ip.s_addr << ")");
- 
-             /* Check to see if it's the master, or us */
--
--            if (cache_address.s_addr == router_list_ptr->local_ip.s_addr) {
--                found = 1;
--            }
-+            found = found || (cache_address.s_addr == router_list_ptr->local_ip.s_addr);
- 
-             if (cache_address.s_addr < router_list_ptr->local_ip.s_addr) {
-                 service_list_ptr->lowest_ip = 0;
-@@ -1494,7 +1541,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-         cache_list_ptr->next = NULL;
- 
-         service_list_ptr->lowest_ip = 1;
--        found = 1;
-+        found = true;
-         num_caches = 1;
-     }
- 
-@@ -1502,7 +1549,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
- 
-     router_list_ptr->num_caches = htonl(num_caches);
- 
--    if ((found == 1) && (service_list_ptr->lowest_ip == 1)) {
-+    if (found && (service_list_ptr->lowest_ip == 1)) {
-         if (ntohl(router_view_header->change_number) != router_list_ptr->member_change) {
-             debugs(80, 4, "Change detected - queueing up new assignment");
-             router_list_ptr->member_change = ntohl(router_view_header->change_number);
-@@ -1515,6 +1562,10 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
-         eventDelete(wccp2AssignBuckets, NULL);
-         debugs(80, 5, "I am not the lowest ip cache - not assigning buckets");
-     }
-+
-+    } catch (...) {
-+        debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: Ignoring WCCPv2 message: " << CurrentException);
-+    }
- }
- 
- static void

SOURCES/squid-4.15-ftp-filename-extraction.patch

@@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
-index da9867f..e992638 100644
---- a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
-+++ b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
-@@ -1084,16 +1084,17 @@ Ftp::Gateway::checkAuth(const HttpHeader * req_hdr)
- void
- Ftp::Gateway::checkUrlpath()
- {
--    static SBuf str_type_eq("type=");
--    auto t = request->url.path().rfind(';');
--
--    if (t != SBuf::npos) {
--        auto filenameEnd = t-1;
--        if (request->url.path().substr(++t).cmp(str_type_eq, str_type_eq.length()) == 0) {
--            t += str_type_eq.length();
--            typecode = (char)xtoupper(request->url.path()[t]);
--            request->url.path(request->url.path().substr(0,filenameEnd));
--        }
-+    // If typecode was specified, extract it and leave just the filename in
-+    // url.path. Tolerate trailing garbage or missing typecode value. Roughly:
-+    // [filename] ;type=[typecode char] [trailing garbage]
-+    static const SBuf middle(";type=");
-+    const auto typeSpecStart = request->url.path().find(middle);
-+    if (typeSpecStart != SBuf::npos) {
-+        const auto fullPath = request->url.path();
-+        const auto typecodePos = typeSpecStart + middle.length();
-+        typecode = (typecodePos < fullPath.length()) ?
-+            static_cast<char>(xtoupper(fullPath[typecodePos])) : '\0';
-+        request->url.path(fullPath.substr(0, typeSpecStart));
-     }
- 
-     int l = request->url.path().length();

SOURCES/squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch

@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
-From 8d0ee420a4d91ac7fd97316338f1e28b4b060cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 19:26:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Ignore whitespace chars after chunk-size
-
-Previously (before #1498 change), squid was accepting TE-chunked replies
-with whitespaces after chunk-size and missing chunk-ext data. After
-
-It turned out that replies with such whitespace chars are pretty
-common and other webservers which can act as forward proxies (e.g.
-nginx, httpd...) are accepting them.
-
-This change will allow to proxy chunked responses from origin server,
-which had whitespaces inbetween chunk-size and CRLF.
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 9cce10fdc91..04753395e16 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
-+        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
-         parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-
-From 9c8d35f899035fa06021ab3fe6919f892c2f0c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:06:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Added new argument to Http::One::ParseBws()
-
-Depending on new wsp_only argument in ParseBws() it will be decided
-which set of whitespaces characters will be parsed. If wsp_only is set
-to true, only SP and HTAB chars will be parsed.
-
-Also optimized number of ParseBws calls.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          |  4 ++--
- src/http/one/Parser.h           |  3 ++-
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 13 +++++++++----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index b1908316a0b..01d7e3bc0e8 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
- 
- // BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
- void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index d9a0ac8c273..08200371cd6 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,8 +163,9 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 04753395e16..41e1e5ddaea 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,8 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-+        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
-+        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
-+        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
-+            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -140,20 +143,22 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--void
-+bool
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
-+    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
-+        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 02eacd1bb89..8c5d4bb4cba 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From 81e67f97f9c386bdd0bb4a5e182395c46adb70ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:44:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Fix typo in Parser.h
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.h | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 08200371cd6..3ef4c5f7752 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
- void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
-
-From a0d4fe1794e605f8299a5c118c758a807453f016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 22:39:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Bug 5449 is a regression of Bug 4492!
-
-Both bugs deal with "chunk-size SP+ CRLF" use cases. Bug 4492 had _two_
-spaces after chunk-size, which answers one of the PR review questions:
-Should we skip just one space? No, we should not.
-
-The lines moved around in many commits, but I believe this regression
-was introduced in commit 951013d0 because that commit stopped consuming
-partially parsed chunk-ext sequences. That consumption was wrong, but it
-had a positive side effect -- fixing Bug 4492...
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 10 +++++-----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 41e1e5ddaea..aa4a840fdcf 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
--        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
--        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
--            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
- 
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
--        ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
-             return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-
-From f837f5ff61301a17008f16ce1fb793c2abf19786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:06:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fixup: Fewer conditionals/ifs and more explicit spelling
-
-... to draw code reader attention when something unusual is going on.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
- src/http/one/Parser.h           | 10 ++++++++--
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 14 ++++++--------
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index 01d7e3bc0e8..d3937e5e96b 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -271,11 +271,12 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
-     return Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser < 0 ? DBG_IMPORTANT : 5;
- }
- 
--// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
--void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
-+/// common part of ParseBws() and ParseStrctBws()
-+namespace Http::One {
-+static void
-+ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(bwsChars);
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-@@ -290,4 +291,17 @@ Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- 
-     // success: no more BWS characters expected
- }
-+} // namespace Http::One
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+}
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 3ef4c5f7752..49e399de546 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,9 +163,15 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
-+/// \sa WhitespaceCharacters() for the definition of BWS characters
-+/// \sa ParseStrictBws() that avoids WhitespaceCharacters() uncertainties
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+
-+/// Like ParseBws() but only skips CharacterSet::WSP characters. This variation
-+/// must be used if the next element may start with CR or any other character
-+/// from RelaxedDelimiterCharacters().
-+void ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index aa4a840fdcf..859471b8c77 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
--        ParseBws(tok, true);
--
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size.
-+        // No ParseBws() here because it may consume CR required further below.
-+        ParseStrictBws(tok);
- 
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -143,22 +143,20 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--bool
-+void
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
--    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
--        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 8c5d4bb4cba..02eacd1bb89 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From f79936a234e722adb2dd08f31cf6019d81ee712c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:31:08 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fixup: Deadly typo
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index d3937e5e96b..7403a9163a2 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- void
- Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- }
- 
- void
- Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
- }
- 
-

SOURCES/squid-4.15.tar.xz.asc

@@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-File: squid-4.15.tar.xz
-Date: Mon 10 May 2021 10:50:22 UTC
-Size: 2454176
-MD5 : a593de9dc888dfeca4f1f7db2cd7d3b9
-SHA1: 60bda34ba39657e2d870c8c1d2acece8a69c3075
-Key : CD6DBF8EF3B17D3E <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
-            B068 84ED B779 C89B 044E  64E3 CD6D BF8E F3B1 7D3E
-      keyring = http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
-      keyserver = pool.sks-keyservers.net
------BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-
-iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEsGiE7bd5yJsETmTjzW2/jvOxfT4FAmCZD/UACgkQzW2/jvOx
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-96NbJ0cycW215Q34L+Y0tWuxEbIU01vIc3AA7rQd0LKy+fQU0OtBuhk5Vf4bKilW
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-RDXN4SuClsNe4UQ4oNoGIES9XtaYlOzPR1PlbqPUrdp1cDnhgLJ+1fkAixlMqCml
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-=1Re1
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SOURCES/squid-5.0.5-symlink-lang-err.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
+From fc01451000eaa5592cd5afbd6aee14e53f7dd2c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Amos Jeffries <amosjeffries@squid-cache.org>
+Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2020 20:23:10 +1300
+Subject: [PATCH] Update translations integration
+
+* Add credits for es-mx translation moderator
+* Use es-mx for default of all Spanish (Central America) texts
+* Update translation related .am files
+---
+ doc/manuals/language.am | 2 +-
+ errors/TRANSLATORS      | 1 +
+ errors/aliases          | 3 ++-
+ errors/language.am      | 3 ++-
+ errors/template.am      | 2 +-
+ 5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/doc/manuals/language.am b/doc/manuals/language.am
+index 7670c88380c..f03c4cf71b4 100644
+--- a/doc/manuals/language.am
++++ b/doc/manuals/language.am
+@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
+     oc.lang \
+     pt.lang \
+     ro.lang \
+-    ru.lang 
++    ru.lang
+diff --git a/errors/aliases b/errors/aliases
+index 36f17f4b80f..cf0116f297d 100644
+--- a/errors/aliases
++++ b/errors/aliases
+@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ da	da-dk
+ de	de-at de-ch de-de de-li de-lu
+ el	el-gr
+ en	en-au en-bz en-ca en-cn en-gb en-ie en-in en-jm en-nz en-ph en-sg en-tt en-uk en-us en-za en-zw
+-es	es-ar es-bo es-cl es-co es-cr es-do es-ec es-es es-gt es-hn es-mx es-ni es-pa es-pe es-pr es-py es-sv es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl
++es	es-ar es-bo es-cl es-cu es-co es-do es-ec es-es es-pe es-pr es-py es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl spq
++es-mx	es-bz es-cr es-gt es-hn es-ni es-pa es-sv
+ et	et-ee
+ fa	fa-fa fa-ir
+ fi	fi-fi
+diff --git a/errors/language.am b/errors/language.am
+index 12b1b2b3b43..029e8c1eb2f 100644
+--- a/errors/language.am
++++ b/errors/language.am
+@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
+     de.lang \
+     el.lang \
+     en.lang \
++    es-mx.lang \
+     es.lang \
+     et.lang \
+     fa.lang \
+@@ -51,4 +52,4 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
+     uz.lang \
+     vi.lang \
+     zh-hans.lang \
+-    zh-hant.lang 
++    zh-hant.lang
+diff --git a/errors/template.am b/errors/template.am
+index 6c12781e6f4..715c65aa22b 100644
+--- a/errors/template.am
++++ b/errors/template.am
+@@ -48,4 +48,4 @@ ERROR_TEMPLATES = \
+     templates/ERR_UNSUP_REQ \
+     templates/ERR_URN_RESOLVE \
+     templates/ERR_WRITE_ERROR \
+-    templates/ERR_ZERO_SIZE_OBJECT 
++    templates/ERR_ZERO_SIZE_OBJECT

SOURCES/squid-5.0.6-active-ftp.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
-index b665bcf..d287e55 100644
+index 747ed35..f2b7126 100644
 --- a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
 +++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
-@@ -778,7 +778,8 @@ Ftp::Client::connectDataChannel()
+@@ -795,7 +795,8 @@ Ftp::Client::connectDataChannel()
  bool
  Ftp::Client::openListenSocket()
  {
@@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ index b665bcf..d287e55 100644
  
  /// creates a data channel Comm close callback
 diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.h b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
-index a76a5a0..218d696 100644
+index eb5ea1b..e92c007 100644
 --- a/src/clients/FtpClient.h
 +++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
-@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ public:
+@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ public:
      bool sendPort();
      bool sendPassive();
      void connectDataChannel();
@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ index a76a5a0..218d696 100644
  
      CtrlChannel ctrl; ///< FTP control channel state
 diff --git a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
-index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
+index 05db817..2989cd2 100644
 --- a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
 +++ b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
-@@ -87,6 +87,13 @@ struct GatewayFlags {
+@@ -86,6 +86,13 @@ struct GatewayFlags {
  class Gateway;
  typedef void (StateMethod)(Ftp::Gateway *);
  
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
  /// FTP Gateway: An FTP client that takes an HTTP request with an ftp:// URI,
  /// converts it into one or more FTP commands, and then
  /// converts one or more FTP responses into the final HTTP response.
-@@ -137,7 +144,11 @@ public:
+@@ -136,7 +143,11 @@ public:
  
      /// create a data channel acceptor and start listening.
      void listenForDataChannel(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn);
@@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
      int checkAuth(const HttpHeader * req_hdr);
      void checkUrlpath();
      void buildTitleUrl();
-@@ -1787,6 +1798,7 @@ ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback)
+@@ -1786,6 +1797,7 @@ ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback)
      }
  
      ftpState->listenForDataChannel(temp);
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
  }
  
  static void
-@@ -1822,13 +1834,19 @@ ftpSendPORT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
+@@ -1821,13 +1833,19 @@ ftpSendPORT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
      // pull out the internal IP address bytes to send in PORT command...
      // source them from the listen_conn->local
  
@@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
      ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
      ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_PORT;
  
-@@ -1881,14 +1899,27 @@ ftpSendEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
+@@ -1880,14 +1898,27 @@ ftpSendEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
          return;
      }
  
@@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
  
      ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
      ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_EPRT;
-@@ -1907,7 +1938,7 @@ ftpReadEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
+@@ -1906,7 +1937,7 @@ ftpReadEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
          ftpSendPORT(ftpState);
          return;
      }

SOURCES/squid-5.0.6-openssl3.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
+diff --git a/src/ssl/support.cc b/src/ssl/support.cc
+index 3ad135d..73912ce 100644
+--- a/src/ssl/support.cc
++++ b/src/ssl/support.cc
+@@ -557,7 +557,11 @@ Ssl::VerifyCallbackParameters::At(Security::Connection &sconn)
+ }
+ 
+ // "dup" function for SSL_get_ex_new_index("cert_err_check")
+-#if SQUID_USE_CONST_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_DUP
++#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
++static int
++ssl_dupAclChecklist(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, void **,
++                    int, long, void *)
++#elif SQUID_USE_CONST_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_DUP
+ static int
+ ssl_dupAclChecklist(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, void *,
+                     int, long, void *)
+diff --git a/src/security/PeerOptions.cc b/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
+index cf1d4ba..4346ba5 100644
+--- a/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
++++ b/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
+@@ -297,130 +297,130 @@ static struct ssl_option {
+ 
+ } ssl_options[] = {
+ 
+-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+     {
+         "NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
+     {
+         "SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
++#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+     {
+         "MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
+     {
+         "SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
+     {
+         "TLS_D5_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
+     {
+         "TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
+     {
+         "TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_ALL
++#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
+     {
+         "ALL", (long)SSL_OP_ALL
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
++#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+     {
+         "SINGLE_DH_USE", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
++#ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+     {
+         "EPHEMERAL_RSA", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
++#ifdef SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
+     {
+         "PKCS1_CHECK_1", SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
++#ifdef SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
+     {
+         "PKCS1_CHECK_2", SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
+     {
+         "NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
+     {
+         "NON_EXPORT_FIRST", SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
++#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+     {
+         "CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+     {
+         "NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+     {
+         "NO_SSLv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+     {
+         "NO_TLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+     },
+ #else
+     { "NO_TLSv1", 0 },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+     {
+         "NO_TLSv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+     },
+ #else
+     { "NO_TLSv1_1", 0 },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+     {
+         "NO_TLSv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+     },
+ #else
+     { "NO_TLSv1_2", 0 },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
+     {
+         "NO_TLSv1_3", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
+     },
+ #else
+     { "NO_TLSv1_3", 0 },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+     {
+         "No_Compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+     {
+         "NO_TICKET", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+     },
+ #endif
+-#if SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
++#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
+     {
+         "SINGLE_ECDH_USE", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
+     },
+@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ Security::PeerOptions::parseOptions()
+ 
+     }
+ 
+-#if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
++#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
+     // compliance with RFC 6176: Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0
+     op = op | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
+ #endif

SOURCES/squid-5.1-test-store-cppsuite.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+diff --git a/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc b/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
+index 0564380..fcd60b9 100644
+--- a/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
++++ b/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
+@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ void commonInit()
+     if (inited)
+         return;
+ 
++    inited = true;
++
+     Mem::Init();
+ 
+     Config.Store.avgObjectSize = 1024;
+@@ -109,6 +111,10 @@ void commonInit()
+     Config.Store.objectsPerBucket = 20;
+ 
+     Config.Store.maxObjectSize = 2048;
++
++    Config.memShared.defaultTo(false);
++
++    Config.store_dir_select_algorithm = xstrdup("round-robin");
+ }
+ 
+ /* TODO make this a cbdata class */

SOURCES/squid-5.5-CVE-2021-46784.patch

@@ -1,17 +1,8 @@
-From 780c4ea1b4c9d2fb41f6962aa6ed73ae57f74b2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 13:42:36 +0000
-Subject: [PATCH] Improve handling of Gopher responses (#1022)
-
----
- src/gopher.cc | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
- 1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
-
 diff --git a/src/gopher.cc b/src/gopher.cc
-index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
+index 576a3f7..2645b6b 100644
 --- a/src/gopher.cc
 +++ b/src/gopher.cc
-@@ -371,7 +371,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+@@ -364,7 +364,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
      char *lpos = NULL;
      char *tline = NULL;
      LOCAL_ARRAY(char, line, TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
@@ -19,7 +10,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
      char *name = NULL;
      char *selector = NULL;
      char *host = NULL;
-@@ -381,7 +380,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+@@ -374,7 +373,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
      char gtype;
      StoreEntry *entry = NULL;
  
@@ -27,7 +18,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
      memset(line, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
  
      entry = gopherState->entry;
-@@ -416,7 +414,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+@@ -409,7 +407,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
          return;
      }
  
@@ -36,7 +27,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
  
      if (!gopherState->HTML_header_added) {
          if (gopherState->conversion == GopherStateData::HTML_CSO_RESULT)
-@@ -583,34 +581,34 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+@@ -577,34 +575,34 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
                          break;
                      }
  
@@ -85,7 +76,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
                  } else {
                      memset(line, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
                      continue;
-@@ -643,13 +641,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+@@ -637,13 +635,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
                      break;
  
                  if (gopherState->cso_recno != recno) {
@@ -101,7 +92,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
                  break;
              } else {
                  int code;
-@@ -677,8 +674,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+@@ -671,8 +668,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
  
                  case 502: { /* Too Many Matches */
                      /* Print the message the server returns */
@@ -111,7 +102,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
                      break;
                  }
  
-@@ -694,13 +690,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
+@@ -688,13 +684,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
  
      }               /* while loop */
  
@@ -126,4 +117,4 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
 -    outbuf.clean();
      return;
  }
- 
+ 

SOURCES/squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46846.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
+From 05f6af2f4c85cc99323cfff6149c3d74af661b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2023 08:44:16 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] RFC 9112: Improve HTTP chunked encoding compliance (#1498)
+
+---
+ src/http/one/Parser.cc          |  8 +-------
+ src/http/one/Parser.h           |  4 +---
+ src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
+ src/parser/Tokenizer.cc         | 12 ++++++++++++
+ src/parser/Tokenizer.h          |  7 +++++++
+ 5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+index c78ddd7f0..291ae39f0 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
++++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+@@ -65,16 +65,10 @@ Http::One::Parser::DelimiterCharacters()
+ void
+ Http::One::Parser::skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &tok) const
+ {
+-    if (tok.skip(Http1::CrLf()))
+-        return;
+-
+     if (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser && tok.skipOne(CharacterSet::LF))
+         return;
+ 
+-    if (tok.atEnd() || (tok.remaining().length() == 1 && tok.remaining().at(0) == '\r'))
+-        throw InsufficientInput();
+-
+-    throw TexcHere("garbage instead of CRLF line terminator");
++    tok.skipRequired("line-terminating CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
+ }
+ 
+ /// all characters except the LF line terminator
+diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
+index f83c01a9a..aab895583 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
++++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
+@@ -124,9 +124,7 @@ protected:
+      * detect and skip the CRLF or (if tolerant) LF line terminator
+      * consume from the tokenizer.
+      *
+-     * \throws exception on bad or InsuffientInput.
+-     * \retval true only if line terminator found.
+-     * \retval false incomplete or missing line terminator, need more data.
++     * \throws exception on bad or InsufficientInput
+      */
+     void skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &) const;
+ 
+diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+index 1434100b6..8bdb65abb 100644
+--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
++++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok)
+ {
+     Must(theChunkSize <= 0); // Should(), really
+ 
++    static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixLower("0x");
++    static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixUpper("0X");
++    if (tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixLower) || tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixUpper))
++        throw TextException("chunk starts with 0x", Here());
++
+     int64_t size = -1;
+     if (tok.int64(size, 16, false) && !tok.atEnd()) {
+         if (size < 0)
+@@ -121,7 +126,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
+     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
+     try {
+         parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
+-        skipLineTerminator(tok);
++        tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
+         buf_ = tok.remaining();
+         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
+         return true;
+@@ -132,12 +137,14 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
+     // other exceptions bubble up to kill message parsing
+ }
+ 
+-/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 7230 section 4.1.1 and its Errata #4667):
++/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
+ /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
+ void
+-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
++Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
+ {
+     do {
++        auto tok = callerTok;
++
+         ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
+ 
+         if (!tok.skip(';'))
+@@ -145,6 +152,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
+ 
+         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
+         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
++        callerTok = tok;
+     } while (true);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -158,11 +166,14 @@ Http::One::ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(Tokenizer &tok, const SBuf &extName
+ /// Parses a single chunk-ext list element:
+ /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
+ void
+-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
++Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &callerTok)
+ {
++    auto tok = callerTok;
++
+     ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: ICAP servers send SP before chunk-ext-name
+ 
+     const auto extName = tok.prefix("chunk-ext-name", CharacterSet::TCHAR);
++    callerTok = tok; // in case we determine that this is a valueless chunk-ext
+ 
+     ParseBws(tok);
+ 
+@@ -176,6 +187,8 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
+         customExtensionValueParser->parse(tok, extName);
+     else
+         ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(tok, extName);
++
++    callerTok = tok;
+ }
+ 
+ bool
+@@ -209,7 +222,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok)
+     Must(theLeftBodySize == 0); // Should(), really
+ 
+     try {
+-        skipLineTerminator(tok);
++        tok.skipRequired("chunk CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
+         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // parse checkpoint
+         theChunkSize = 0; // done with the current chunk
+         parsingStage_ = Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK_SZ;
+diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
+index edaffd8d3..15df793b8 100644
+--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
++++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
+@@ -147,6 +147,18 @@ Parser::Tokenizer::skipAll(const CharacterSet &tokenChars)
+     return success(prefixLen);
+ }
+ 
++void
++Parser::Tokenizer::skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip)
++{
++    if (skip(tokenToSkip) || tokenToSkip.isEmpty())
++        return;
++
++    if (tokenToSkip.startsWith(buf_))
++        throw InsufficientInput();
++
++    throw TextException(ToSBuf("cannot skip ", description), Here());
++}
++
+ bool
+ Parser::Tokenizer::skipOne(const CharacterSet &chars)
+ {
+diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
+index 7bae1ccbb..3cfa7dd6c 100644
+--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
++++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
+@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ public:
+      */
+     SBuf::size_type skipAll(const CharacterSet &discardables);
+ 
++    /** skips a given character sequence (string);
++     * does nothing if the sequence is empty
++     *
++     * \throws exception on mismatching prefix or InsufficientInput
++     */
++    void skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip);
++
+     /** Removes a single trailing character from the set.
+      *
+      * \return whether a character was removed
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

SOURCES/squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46847.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,26 @@
+From 052cf082b0faaef4eaaa4e94119d7a1437aac4a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: squidadm <squidadm@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 04:50:56 +1300
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix stack buffer overflow when parsing Digest Authorization
+ (#1517)
+
+The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
+https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/digest-overflow.html
+where it was filed as "Stack Buffer Overflow in Digest Authentication".
+
+---------
+
+Co-authored-by: Alex Bason <nonsleepr@gmail.com>
+Co-authored-by: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
+---
+ src/auth/digest/Config.cc | 10 +++++++---
+ 1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
+
 diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-index 6a9736f..0a883fa 100644
+index d42831a55..be9f3c433 100644
 --- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
 +++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-@@ -847,11 +847,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const char *aRequestRealm)
+@@ -844,11 +844,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const HttpRequest *request,
              break;
  
          case DIGEST_NC:
@@ -21,3 +39,5 @@ index 6a9736f..0a883fa 100644
              break;
  
          case DIGEST_CNONCE:
+-- 
+2.25.1

SOURCES/squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46848.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
+From c67bf049871a49e9871efe50b230a7f37b7039f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
+Date: Thu, 25 May 2023 02:10:28 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Fix userinfo percent-encoding (#1367)
+
+%X expects an unsigned int, and that is what we were giving it. However,
+to get to the correct unsigned int value from a (signed) char, one has
+to cast to an unsigned char (or equivalent) first.
+
+Broken since inception in commit 7b75100.
+
+Also adjusted similar (commented out) ext_edirectory_userip_acl code.
+---
+ src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc | 2 +-
+ src/anyp/Uri.cc                                                 | 2 +-
+ 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
+index dbc20ae54..9028d1562 100644
+--- a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
++++ b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
+@@ -1612,7 +1612,7 @@ MainSafe(int argc, char **argv)
+         /* BINARY DEBUGGING *
+                     local_printfx("while() -> bufa[%" PRIuSIZE "]: %s", k, bufa);
+                     for (i = 0; i < k; ++i)
+-                      local_printfx("%02X", bufa[i]);
++                      local_printfx("%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(bufa[i])));
+                     local_printfx("\n");
+         * BINARY DEBUGGING */
+         /* Check for CRLF */
+diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
+index a6a5d5d9e..3d19188e9 100644
+--- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
++++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ AnyP::Uri::Encode(const SBuf &buf, const CharacterSet &ignore)
+     while (!tk.atEnd()) {
+         // TODO: Add Tokenizer::parseOne(void).
+         const auto ch = tk.remaining()[0];
+-        output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(ch)); // TODO: Optimize using a table
++        output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(ch))); // TODO: Optimize using a table
+         (void)tk.skip(ch);
+ 
+         if (tk.prefix(goodSection, ignore))
+-- 
+2.25.1
+

SOURCES/squid-5.5-CVE-2023-50269.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 diff --git a/src/ClientRequestContext.h b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
-index fe2edf6..47aa935 100644
+index 55a7a43..94a8700 100644
 --- a/src/ClientRequestContext.h
 +++ b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
-@@ -81,6 +81,10 @@ public:
+@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ public:
  #endif
      ErrorState *error; ///< saved error page for centralized/delayed processing
      bool readNextRequest; ///< whether Squid should read after error handling
@@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ index fe2edf6..47aa935 100644
  
  #endif /* SQUID_CLIENTREQUESTCONTEXT_H */
 diff --git a/src/client_side_request.cc b/src/client_side_request.cc
-index 1c6ff62..b758f6f 100644
+index f44849e..c7c09d4 100644
 --- a/src/client_side_request.cc
 +++ b/src/client_side_request.cc
-@@ -78,6 +78,11 @@
+@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@
  static const char *const crlf = "\r\n";
  
  #if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
@@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ index 1c6ff62..b758f6f 100644
 +#define SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX 64
 +#endif
 +
- static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data);
+ static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data);
  #endif /* FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR */
  
-@@ -485,8 +490,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data)
+@@ -485,8 +490,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data)
                  /* override the default src_addr tested if we have to go deeper than one level into XFF */
                  Filled(calloutContext->acl_checklist)->src_addr = request->indirect_client_addr;
              }

SOURCES/squid-5.5-CVE-2024-23638.patch

@@ -16,14 +16,13 @@ Date:   Sun Nov 12 09:33:20 2023 +0000
     responsible for the disappearance of the properly locked StoreEntry in
     this (and probably other) contexts.
 
-
 diff --git a/src/cache_manager.cc b/src/cache_manager.cc
-index 8055ece..fdcc9cf 100644
+index 61c7f65be..65bf22dd0 100644
 --- a/src/cache_manager.cc
 +++ b/src/cache_manager.cc
-@@ -323,7 +323,6 @@ CacheManager::Start(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &client, HttpRequest * request
-         const auto err = new ErrorState(ERR_INVALID_URL, Http::scNotFound, request);
+@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ CacheManager::start(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &client, HttpRequest *request,
          err->url = xstrdup(entry->url());
+         err->detailError(new ExceptionErrorDetail(Here().id()));
          errorAppendEntry(entry, err);
 -        entry->expires = squid_curtime;
          return;

SOURCES/squid-5.5-CVE-2024-25111.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index b006300..023e411 100644
+index 98e3969..8b55bf3 100644
 --- a/src/http.cc
 +++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
+@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
  #include "rfc1738.h"
  #include "SquidConfig.h"
  #include "SquidTime.h"
@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
  #include "StatCounters.h"
  #include "Store.h"
  #include "StrList.h"
-@@ -1150,18 +1151,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
+@@ -1235,18 +1236,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
       * Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
       */
  
@@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
 -    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
 -    rd.conn = io.conn;
 -    rd.size = entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, inBuf.spaceSize()));
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission) || !moreDataPermission)) {
++    const auto moreDataPermission = canBufferMoreReplyBytes();
++    if (!moreDataPermission) {
 +        abortTransaction("ready to read required data, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
 +        return;
 +    }
 +
-+    const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission);
++    const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission.value());
 +    // TODO: Move this logic inside maybeMakeSpaceAvailable():
 +    const auto readSizeWanted = readSizeMax ? entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, readSizeMax)) : 0;
  
@@ -42,23 +42,24 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
      switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
      case Comm::INPROGRESS:
          if (inBuf.isEmpty())
-@@ -1520,8 +1529,11 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
+@@ -1617,8 +1626,10 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
      if (!Comm::IsConnOpen(serverConnection) || fd_table[serverConnection->fd].closing())
          return;
  
 -    if (!maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(false))
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission)) || !moreDataPermission) {
++    if (!canBufferMoreReplyBytes()) {
 +        abortTransaction("more response bytes required, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
          return;
 +    }
  
      // XXX: get rid of the do_next_read flag
      // check for the proper reasons preventing read(2)
-@@ -1539,40 +1551,79 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
+@@ -1636,40 +1647,78 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
      Comm::Read(serverConnection, call);
  }
  
+-bool
+-HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
 +/// Desired inBuf capacity based on various capacity preferences/limits:
 +/// * a smaller buffer may not hold enough for look-ahead header/body parsers;
 +/// * a smaller buffer may result in inefficient tiny network reads;
@@ -66,7 +67,17 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
 +/// * a bigger buffer may exceed SBuf storage capabilities (SBuf::maxSize);
 +size_t
 +HttpStateData::calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const
-+{
+ {
+-    // how much we are allowed to buffer
+-    const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
+-
+-    if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
+-        // when buffer is at or over limit already
+-        debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
+-        debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
+-        // Process next response from buffer
+-        processReply();
+-        return false;
 +    if (!flags.headers_parsed)
 +        return Config.maxReplyHeaderSize;
 +
@@ -77,7 +88,7 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
 +    //
 +    // TODO: Cannot reuse throwing NaturalCast() here. Consider removing
 +    // .value() dereference in NaturalCast() or add/use NaturalCastOrMax().
-+    const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).second ? NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).first : SBuf::maxSize;
++    const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).value_or(SBuf::maxSize);
 +
 +    // TODO: Honor TeChunkedParser look-ahead and trailer parsing requirements
 +    // (when explicit configurationPreferences are set too low).
@@ -90,39 +101,27 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
 +/// \retval std::nullopt means that no more virgin response bytes can be read
 +/// \retval 0 means that more virgin response bytes may be read later
 +/// \retval >0 is the number of bytes that can be read now (subject to other constraints)
- bool
--HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
-+HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const
- {
--    // how much we are allowed to buffer
--    const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
--
--    if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
--        // when buffer is at or over limit already
--        debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
--        debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
--        // Process next response from buffer
--        processReply();
--        return false;
++std::optional<size_t>
++HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes() const
++{
 +#if USE_ADAPTATION
 +    // If we do not check this now, we may say the final "no" prematurely below
 +    // because inBuf.length() will decrease as adaptation drains buffered bytes.
 +    if (responseBodyBuffer) {
 +        debugs(11, 3, "yes, but waiting for adaptation to drain read buffer");
-+        *maxReadSize = 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
-+        return true;
++        return 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
 +    }
 +#endif
 +
 +    const auto maxCapacity = calcReadBufferCapacityLimit();
 +    if (inBuf.length() >= maxCapacity) {
 +        debugs(11, 3, "no, due to a full buffer: " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize() << "; limit: " << maxCapacity);
-+        return false; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
++        return std::nullopt; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
      }
  
-+    *maxReadSize = (maxCapacity - inBuf.length()); // positive
-+    debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << *maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
-+    return true; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
++    const auto maxReadSize = maxCapacity - inBuf.length(); // positive
++    debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
++    return maxReadSize; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
 +}
 +
 +/// prepare read buffer for reading
@@ -159,7 +158,7 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
  
  /// called after writing the very last request byte (body, last-chunk, etc)
 diff --git a/src/http.h b/src/http.h
-index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
+index e70cd7e..f7ed40d 100644
 --- a/src/http.h
 +++ b/src/http.h
 @@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
@@ -170,8 +169,8 @@ index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
 +
  class FwdState;
  class HttpHeader;
- 
-@@ -107,16 +109,9 @@ private:
+ class String;
+@@ -112,16 +114,9 @@ private:
  
      void abortTransaction(const char *reason) { abortAll(reason); } // abnormal termination
  
@@ -186,7 +185,7 @@ index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
 -     */
 -    bool maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool grow);
 +    size_t calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const;
-+    bool canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const;
++    std::optional<size_t> canBufferMoreReplyBytes() const;
 +    size_t maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(size_t maxReadSize);
  
      // consuming request body

SOURCES/squid-5.5-CVE-2024-25617.patch

@@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
 diff --git a/src/SquidString.h b/src/SquidString.h
-index a791885..b9aef38 100644
+index e36cd27..ea613ad 100644
 --- a/src/SquidString.h
 +++ b/src/SquidString.h
-@@ -114,7 +114,16 @@ private:
+@@ -140,7 +140,16 @@ private:
  
-     size_type len_;  /* current length  */
+     size_type len_ = 0;  /* current length  */
  
 -    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 65535; ///< 64K limit protects some fixed-size buffers
 +    /// An earlier 64KB limit was meant to protect some fixed-size buffers, but
@@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ index a791885..b9aef38 100644
      static bool SafeAdd(size_type &base, size_type extra) { if (extra <= SizeMax_ && base <= SizeMax_ - extra) { base += extra; return true; } return false; }
  
 diff --git a/src/cache_cf.cc b/src/cache_cf.cc
-index a9c1b7e..46f07bb 100644
+index cb746dc..c4ade96 100644
 --- a/src/cache_cf.cc
 +++ b/src/cache_cf.cc
-@@ -935,6 +935,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
+@@ -950,6 +950,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
                 (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestBufferSize, (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestHeaderSize);
      }
  
@@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ index a9c1b7e..46f07bb 100644
       * Disable client side request pipelining if client_persistent_connections OFF.
       * Waste of resources queueing any pipelined requests when the first will close the connection.
 diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
-index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
+index 67a66b0..61a66f1 100644
 --- a/src/cf.data.pre
 +++ b/src/cf.data.pre
-@@ -6196,11 +6196,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
+@@ -6489,11 +6489,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
  DEFAULT: 64 KB
  LOC: Config.maxRequestHeaderSize
  DOC_START
@@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
  DOC_END
  
  NAME: reply_header_max_size
-@@ -6209,11 +6212,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
+@@ -6502,11 +6505,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
  DEFAULT: 64 KB
  LOC: Config.maxReplyHeaderSize
  DOC_START
@@ -88,10 +88,10 @@ index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
  
  NAME: request_body_max_size
 diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index 877172d..b006300 100644
+index 7c9ae70..98e3969 100644
 --- a/src/http.cc
 +++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -1820,8 +1820,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
+@@ -1926,8 +1926,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
  
          String strFwd = hdr_in->getList(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR);
  

SOURCES/squid-5.5-CVE-2024-37894.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+diff --git a/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc b/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc
+index b379856..5d87279 100644
+--- a/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc
++++ b/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc
+@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ TrieNode::add(char const *aString, size_t theLength, void *privatedata, TrieChar
+     /* We trust that privatedata and existant keys have already been checked */
+ 
+     if (theLength) {
+-        int index = transform ? (*transform)(*aString): *aString;
++        const unsigned char index = transform ? (*transform)(*aString): *aString;
+ 
+         if (!internal[index])
+             internal[index] = new TrieNode;

SOURCES/squid-5.5-halfclosed.patch

@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 diff --git a/src/client_side.cc b/src/client_side.cc
-index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
+index 4eb6976..63f1b66 100644
 --- a/src/client_side.cc
 +++ b/src/client_side.cc
-@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
+@@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
       * We are done with the response, and we are either still receiving request
       * body (early response!) or have already stopped receiving anything.
       *
@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
       * (XXX: but then we will call readNextRequest() which may succeed and
       * execute a smuggled request as we are not done with the current request).
       *
-@@ -926,28 +926,12 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
+@@ -977,28 +977,12 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
       * Attempt to parse a request from the request buffer.
       * If we've been fed a pipelined request it may already
       * be in our read buffer.
@@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
  
      /** \par
       * At this point we either have a parsed request (which we've
-@@ -2058,16 +2042,11 @@ ConnStateData::receivedFirstByte()
-     commSetConnTimeout(clientConnection, Config.Timeout.request, timeoutCall);
+@@ -1935,16 +1919,11 @@ ConnStateData::receivedFirstByte()
+     resetReadTimeout(Config.Timeout.request);
  }
  
 -/**
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
      debugs(33, 5, HERE << clientConnection << ": attempting to parse");
  
      // Loop while we have read bytes that are not needed for producing the body
-@@ -2116,8 +2095,6 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
+@@ -1989,8 +1968,6 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
  
              processParsedRequest(context);
  
@@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
              if (context->mayUseConnection()) {
                  debugs(33, 3, HERE << "Not parsing new requests, as this request may need the connection");
                  break;
-@@ -2130,8 +2107,19 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
+@@ -2003,8 +1980,19 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
          }
      }
  
@@ -94,21 +94,16 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
  }
  
  void
-@@ -2148,23 +2136,7 @@ ConnStateData::afterClientRead()
+@@ -2021,18 +2009,7 @@ ConnStateData::afterClientRead()
      if (pipeline.empty())
          fd_note(clientConnection->fd, "Reading next request");
  
 -    if (!clientParseRequests()) {
 -        if (!isOpen())
 -            return;
--        /*
--         * If the client here is half closed and we failed
--         * to parse a request, close the connection.
--         * The above check with connFinishedWithConn() only
--         * succeeds _if_ the buffer is empty which it won't
--         * be if we have an incomplete request.
--         * XXX: This duplicates ConnStateData::kick
--         */
+-        // We may get here if the client half-closed after sending a partial
+-        // request. See doClientRead() and shouldCloseOnEof().
+-        // XXX: This partially duplicates ConnStateData::kick().
 -        if (pipeline.empty() && commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd)) {
 -            debugs(33, 5, clientConnection << ": half-closed connection, no completed request parsed, connection closing.");
 -            clientConnection->close();
@@ -119,7 +114,7 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
  
      if (!isOpen())
          return;
-@@ -3945,7 +3917,7 @@ ConnStateData::notePinnedConnectionBecameIdle(PinnedIdleContext pic)
+@@ -3789,7 +3766,7 @@ ConnStateData::notePinnedConnectionBecameIdle(PinnedIdleContext pic)
      startPinnedConnectionMonitoring();
  
      if (pipeline.empty())
@@ -129,10 +124,10 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
  
  /// Forward future client requests using the given server connection.
 diff --git a/src/client_side.h b/src/client_side.h
-index 9fe8463..dfb4d8e 100644
+index 2793673..7c8d86b 100644
 --- a/src/client_side.h
 +++ b/src/client_side.h
-@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ public:
+@@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ public:
      virtual void doneWithControlMsg();
  
      /// Traffic parsing
@@ -140,16 +135,16 @@ index 9fe8463..dfb4d8e 100644
      void readNextRequest();
  
      /// try to make progress on a transaction or read more I/O
-@@ -373,6 +372,7 @@ private:
-     virtual bool connFinishedWithConn(int size);
-     virtual void checkLogging();
+@@ -422,6 +421,7 @@ private:
+ 
+     void checkLogging();
  
 +    void parseRequests();
      void clientAfterReadingRequests();
      bool concurrentRequestQueueFilled() const;
  
 diff --git a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
-index d7efb0f..655ed83 100644
+index acf61c4..b1d82bf 100644
 --- a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
 +++ b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
 @@ -14,7 +14,7 @@

SOURCES/squid-5.5-ip-bind-address-no-port.patch

@@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
-commit c08948c8b831a2ba73c676b48aa11ba1b58cc542
+commit c54122584d175cf1d292b239a5b70f2d1aa77c3a
 Author: Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com>
-Date:   Thu Dec 8 11:03:08 2022 +0100
+Date:   Mon Dec 5 15:03:07 2022 +0100
 
     Backport adding IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT flag to outgoing connections
 
 diff --git a/src/comm.cc b/src/comm.cc
-index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
+index b4818f3..b18d175 100644
 --- a/src/comm.cc
 +++ b/src/comm.cc
-@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
   */
  
  static IOCB commHalfClosedReader;
@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
  static void comm_init_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn, const char *note, struct addrinfo *AI);
  static int comm_apply_flags(int new_socket, Ip::Address &addr, int flags, struct addrinfo *AI);
  
-@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ static EVH commHalfClosedCheck;
+@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ static EVH commHalfClosedCheck;
  static void commPlanHalfClosedCheck();
  
  static Comm::Flag commBind(int s, struct addrinfo &);
@@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
  static void commSetReuseAddr(int);
  static void commSetNoLinger(int);
  #ifdef TCP_NODELAY
-@@ -201,6 +203,22 @@ comm_local_port(int fd)
+@@ -202,6 +204,22 @@ comm_local_port(int fd)
      return F->local_addr.port();
  }
  
@@ -47,18 +47,18 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
  static Comm::Flag
  commBind(int s, struct addrinfo &inaddr)
  {
-@@ -227,6 +245,10 @@ comm_open(int sock_type,
+@@ -228,6 +246,10 @@ comm_open(int sock_type,
            int flags,
            const char *note)
  {
-+    // assume zero-port callers do not need to know the assigned port right away
++        // assume zero-port callers do not need to know the assigned port right away
 +    if (sock_type == SOCK_STREAM && addr.port() == 0 && ((flags & COMM_DOBIND) || !addr.isAnyAddr()))
 +        flags |= COMM_DOBIND_PORT_LATER;
 +
      return comm_openex(sock_type, proto, addr, flags, note);
  }
  
-@@ -328,7 +350,7 @@ comm_set_transparent(int fd)
+@@ -329,7 +351,7 @@ comm_set_transparent(int fd)
   * Create a socket. Default is blocking, stream (TCP) socket.  IO_TYPE
   * is OR of flags specified in defines.h:COMM_*
   */
@@ -67,10 +67,10 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
  comm_openex(int sock_type,
              int proto,
              Ip::Address &addr,
-@@ -476,6 +498,9 @@ comm_apply_flags(int new_socket,
-         if ( addr.isNoAddr() )
-             debugs(5,0,"CRITICAL: Squid is attempting to bind() port " << addr << "!!");
- 
+@@ -488,6 +510,9 @@ comm_apply_flags(int new_socket,
+             }
+         }
+ #endif
 +        if ((flags & COMM_DOBIND_PORT_LATER))
 +            commSetBindAddressNoPort(new_socket);
 +
@@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
              comm_close(new_socket);
              return -1;
 diff --git a/src/comm.h b/src/comm.h
-index c963e1c..9ff201d 100644
+index 5a1a7c2..a9f33db 100644
 --- a/src/comm.h
 +++ b/src/comm.h
 @@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ void comm_import_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &, const char *note, struc
@@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ index c963e1c..9ff201d 100644
  
  int comm_udp_sendto(int sock, const Ip::Address &to, const void *buf, int buflen);
 diff --git a/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc b/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc
-index 25a30e4..2082214 100644
+index 19c1237..79fa2ed 100644
 --- a/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc
 +++ b/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc
-@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ Comm::ConnOpener::createFd()
+@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ Comm::ConnOpener::createFd()
      if (callback_ == NULL || callback_->canceled())
          return false;
  
@@ -111,20 +111,20 @@ index 25a30e4..2082214 100644
          sendAnswer(Comm::ERR_CONNECT, 0, "Comm::ConnOpener::createFd");
          return false;
 diff --git a/src/comm/Connection.h b/src/comm/Connection.h
-index 4f2f23a..1e32c22 100644
+index 40c2249..2641f4e 100644
 --- a/src/comm/Connection.h
 +++ b/src/comm/Connection.h
-@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ namespace Comm
- #define COMM_DOBIND             0x08  // requires a bind()
- #define COMM_TRANSPARENT        0x10  // arrived via TPROXY
- #define COMM_INTERCEPTION       0x20  // arrived via NAT
+@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ namespace Comm
+ #define COMM_REUSEPORT          0x40 //< needs SO_REUSEPORT
+ /// not registered with Comm and not owned by any connection-closing code
+ #define COMM_ORPHANED           0x40
 +/// Internal Comm optimization: Keep the source port unassigned until connect(2)
 +#define COMM_DOBIND_PORT_LATER 0x100
  
  /**
   * Store data about the physical and logical attributes of a connection.
 diff --git a/src/ipc.cc b/src/ipc.cc
-index e1d48fc..e92a27f 100644
+index 45cab52..42e11e6 100644
 --- a/src/ipc.cc
 +++ b/src/ipc.cc
 @@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
@@ -143,10 +143,10 @@ index e1d48fc..e92a27f 100644
                                  local_addr,
                                  0,          /* blocking */
 diff --git a/src/tests/stub_comm.cc b/src/tests/stub_comm.cc
-index 58f85e4..5381ab2 100644
+index a1d33d6..bf4bea6 100644
 --- a/src/tests/stub_comm.cc
 +++ b/src/tests/stub_comm.cc
-@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ int comm_open_uds(int sock_type, int proto, struct sockaddr_un* addr, int flags)
+@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ int comm_open_uds(int sock_type, int proto, struct sockaddr_un* addr, int flags)
  void comm_import_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &, const char *note, struct addrinfo *AI) STUB
  int comm_open_listener(int sock_type, int proto, Ip::Address &addr, int flags, const char *note) STUB_RETVAL(-1)
  void comm_open_listener(int sock_type, int proto, Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn, const char *note) STUB

SOURCES/squid-5.5-ipv6-crash.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
+From a0a9e6dc69d0c7b9ba237702b4c5020abc7ad1f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
+Date: Sat, 4 Nov 2023 00:30:42 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 5154: Do not open IPv6 sockets when IPv6 is disabled
+ (#1567)
+
+... but allow basic IPv6 manipulations like getSockAddr().
+
+    Address.cc:663 getAddrInfo() assertion failed: false
+
+Squids receives IPv6 addresses from traffic, configuration, or
+hard-coded constants even when ./configured with --disable-ipv6 or when
+IPv6 support was automatically disabled at startup after failing IPv6
+tests. To handle IPv6 correctly, such Squids must support basic IPv6
+operations like recognizing an IPv6 address in a request-target or
+reporting an unsolicited IPv6 DNS record. At least for now, such Squids
+must also correctly parse configuration-related IPv6 addresses.
+
+All those activities rely on various low-level operations like filling
+addrinfo structure with IP address information. Since 2012 commit
+c5fbbc7, Ip::Address::getAddrInfo() was failing for IPv6 addresses when
+Ip::EnableIpv6 was falsy. That change correctly recognized[^1] the need
+for such Squids to handle IPv6, but to support basic operations, we need
+to reject IPv6 addresses at a higher level and without asserting.
+
+That high-level rejection work is ongoing, but initial attempts have
+exposed difficult problems that will take time to address. For now, we
+just avoid the assertion while protecting IPv6-disabled Squid from
+listening on or opening connections to IPv6 addresses. Since Squid
+already expects (and usually correctly handles) socket opening failures,
+disabling those operations is better than failing in low-level IP
+manipulation code.
+
+The overall IPv6 posture of IPv6-disabled Squids that lack http_access
+or other rules to deny IPv6 requests will change: This fix exposes more
+of IPv6-disabled Squid code to IPv6 addresses. It is possible that such
+exposure will make some IPv6 resources inside Squid (e.g., a previously
+cached HTTP response) accessible to external requests. Squids will not
+open or accept IPv6 connections but may forward requests with raw IPv6
+targets to IPv4 cache_peers. Whether these and similar behavior changes
+are going to be permanent is open for debate, but even if they are
+temporary, they are arguably better than the corresponding assertions.
+
+These changes do not effect IPv6-enabled Squids.
+
+The assertion in IPv6-disabled Squid was reported by Joshua Rogers at
+https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/ipv6-assert.html where
+it was filed as "Assertion on IPv6 Host Requests with --disable-ipv6".
+
+[^1]: https://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3593#c1
+---
+ src/comm.cc         | 6 ++++++
+ src/ip/Address.cc   | 2 +-
+ src/ip/Intercept.cc | 8 ++++++++
+ 3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/comm.cc b/src/comm.cc
+index 4659955b011..271ba04d4da 100644
+--- a/src/comm.cc
++++ b/src/comm.cc
+@@ -344,6 +344,12 @@ comm_openex(int sock_type,
+     /* Create socket for accepting new connections. */
+     ++ statCounter.syscalls.sock.sockets;
+ 
++    if (!Ip::EnableIpv6 && addr.isIPv6()) {
++        debugs(50, 2, "refusing to open an IPv6 socket when IPv6 support is disabled: " << addr);
++        errno = ENOTSUP;
++        return -1;
++    }
++
+     /* Setup the socket addrinfo details for use */
+     addr.getAddrInfo(AI);
+     AI->ai_socktype = sock_type;
+diff --git a/src/ip/Address.cc b/src/ip/Address.cc
+index b6f810bfc25..ae6db37da5e 100644
+--- a/src/ip/Address.cc
++++ b/src/ip/Address.cc
+@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ Ip::Address::getAddrInfo(struct addrinfo *&dst, int force) const
+             && dst->ai_protocol == 0)
+         dst->ai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
+ 
+-    if (force == AF_INET6 || (force == AF_UNSPEC && Ip::EnableIpv6 && isIPv6()) ) {
++    if (force == AF_INET6 || (force == AF_UNSPEC && isIPv6()) ) {
+         dst->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr*)new sockaddr_in6;
+ 
+         memset(dst->ai_addr,0,sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
+diff --git a/src/ip/Intercept.cc b/src/ip/Intercept.cc
+index 1a5e2d15af1..a8522efaac0 100644
+--- a/src/ip/Intercept.cc
++++ b/src/ip/Intercept.cc
+@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
+ #include "comm/Connection.h"
+ #include "fde.h"
+ #include "ip/Intercept.h"
++#include "ip/tools.h"
+ #include "src/tools.h"
+ 
+ #include <cerrno>
+@@ -430,6 +431,13 @@ Ip::Intercept::ProbeForTproxy(Ip::Address &test)
+ 
+     debugs(3, 3, "Detect TPROXY support on port " << test);
+ 
++    if (!Ip::EnableIpv6 && test.isIPv6() && !test.setIPv4()) {
++        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "Cannot use TPROXY for " << test << " because IPv6 support is disabled");
++        if (doneSuid)
++            leave_suid();
++        return false;
++    }
++
+     int tos = 1;
+     int tmp_sock = -1;
+ 
+

SOURCES/squid-5.5.tar.xz.asc

@@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+File: squid-5.5.tar.xz
+Date: Wed 13 Apr 2022 08:45:42 UTC
+Size: 2565732
+MD5 : 83ccc2d86ca0966e3555a3b78f5afd14
+SHA1: 42302bd9b8feff851a41420334cb8eaeab2806ab
+Key : CD6DBF8EF3B17D3E <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
+            B068 84ED B779 C89B 044E  64E3 CD6D BF8E F3B1 7D3E
+      keyring = http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
+      keyserver = pool.sks-keyservers.net
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+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+=9xr/
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

SOURCES/squid.logrotate

@@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
     weekly
     rotate 5
     compress
+    delaycompress
     notifempty
     missingok
     nocreate
@@ -10,7 +11,5 @@
       # Asks squid to reopen its logs. (logfile_rotate 0 is set in squid.conf)
       # errors redirected to make it silent if squid is not running
       /usr/sbin/squid -k rotate 2>/dev/null
-      # Wait a little to allow Squid to catch up before the logs is compressed
-      sleep 1
     endscript
 }

SOURCES/squid.nm

@@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
 
 case "$2" in
         up|down|vpn-up|vpn-down)
-                /bin/systemctl -q reload squid.service || :
+                /usr/bin/systemctl -q reload squid.service || :
                 ;;
 esac

SOURCES/squid.sysconfig

@@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
 # default squid options
 SQUID_OPTS=""
 
-# Time to wait for Squid to shut down when asked. Should not be necessary
-# most of the time.
-SQUID_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT=100
-
 # default squid conf file
 SQUID_CONF="/etc/squid/squid.conf"

SOURCES/squid.sysusers

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+g squid 23 -
+u squid 23 "Squid proxy user" /var/spool/squid /sbin/nologin

SPECS/squid.spec

@@ -1,86 +1,93 @@
 %define __perl_requires %{SOURCE98}
 
 Name:     squid
-Version:  4.15
-Release:  10%{?dist}.3
+Version:  5.5
+Release:  14%{?dist}
 Summary:  The Squid proxy caching server
 Epoch:    7
 # See CREDITS for breakdown of non GPLv2+ code
 License:  GPLv2+ and (LGPLv2+ and MIT and BSD and Public Domain)
 URL:      http://www.squid-cache.org
-Source0:  http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v4/squid-%{version}.tar.xz
-Source1:  http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v4/squid-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
-Source2:  squid.logrotate
-Source3:  squid.sysconfig
-Source4:  squid.pam
-Source5:  squid.nm
-Source6:  squid.service
-Source7:  cache_swap.sh
+
+Source0:  http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v5/squid-%{version}.tar.xz
+Source1:  http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v5/squid-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
+Source2:  http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
+Source3:  squid.logrotate
+Source4:  squid.sysconfig
+Source5:  squid.pam
+Source6:  squid.nm
+Source7:  squid.service
+Source8:  cache_swap.sh
+Source9:  squid.sysusers
 
 Source98: perl-requires-squid.sh
 
 # Upstream patches
 
 # Backported patches
-Patch101: squid-4.15-ip-bind-address-no-port.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2072988
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2151188
+Patch101: squid-5.5-ip-bind-address-no-port.patch
 
 # Local patches
 # Applying upstream patches first makes it less likely that local patches
 # will break upstream ones.
-Patch201: squid-4.11-config.patch
-Patch202: squid-4.11-location.patch
-Patch203: squid-4.11-perlpath.patch
-Patch204: squid-4.11-include-guards.patch
-Patch205: squid-4.11-large-acl.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=980511
-Patch206: squid-4.11-active-ftp.patch
-Patch208: squid-4.11-convert-ipv4.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2006121
-Patch209: squid-4.15-ftp-filename-extraction.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2076717
-Patch210: squid-4.15-halfclosed.patch
+Patch201: squid-4.0.11-config.patch
+Patch202: squid-3.1.0.9-location.patch
+Patch203: squid-3.0.STABLE1-perlpath.patch
+Patch204: squid-3.5.9-include-guards.patch
+# revert this upstream patch - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1936422
+# workaround for #1934919
+Patch205: squid-5.0.5-symlink-lang-err.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1953505
+Patch206: squid-5.0.6-openssl3.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1969322
+Patch207: squid-5.0.6-active-ftp.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1988122
+Patch208: squid-5.1-test-store-cppsuite.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2231827
+Patch209: squid-5.5-halfclosed.patch
+# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-30352
+Patch210: squid-5.5-ipv6-crash.patch
 
-# Security fixes
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1941506
-Patch300: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-28116.patch
+# Security patches
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2100721
-Patch301: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-46784.patch
+Patch501: squid-5.5-CVE-2021-46784.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2129771
-Patch302: squid-4.15-CVE-2022-41318.patch
+Patch502: squid-5.5-CVE-2022-41318.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245910
-# +backported: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/417da4006cf5c97d44e74431b816fc58fec9e270
-Patch303: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
+Patch503: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46846.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245916
-Patch304: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46847.patch
-# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-14792
-Patch305: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-5824.patch
+Patch504: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46847.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245919
+Patch505: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46848.patch
+# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-14802
+Patch506: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-5824.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2248521
-Patch306: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46728.patch
+Patch507: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46728.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2247567
-Patch307: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46724.patch
+Patch508: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46724.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252926
-Patch308: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch
+Patch509: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-49285.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252923
-Patch309: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch
+Patch510: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-49286.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2254663
-Patch310: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch
+Patch511: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-50269.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264309
-Patch311: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch
+Patch512: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-25617.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2268366
-Patch312: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch
-# Regression caused by squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
-# Upstream PR: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/pull/1914
-Patch313: squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch
+Patch513: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-25111.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2294353
+Patch514: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-37894.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2260051
-Patch314: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-23638.patch
+Patch515: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-23638.patch
+
+# cache_swap.sh
+Requires: bash gawk
+# for httpd conf file - cachemgr script alias
+Requires: httpd-filesystem
 
-Requires: bash >= 2.0
-Requires(pre): shadow-utils
-Requires(post): systemd
-Requires(preun): systemd
-Requires(postun): systemd
 # squid_ldap_auth and other LDAP helpers require OpenLDAP
+BuildRequires: make
 BuildRequires: openldap-devel
 # squid_pam_auth requires PAM development libs
 BuildRequires: pam-devel
@@ -88,8 +95,10 @@ BuildRequires: pam-devel
 BuildRequires: openssl-devel
 # squid_kerb_aut requires Kerberos development libs
 BuildRequires: krb5-devel
-# time_quota requires DB
-BuildRequires: libdb-devel
+# time_quota requires TrivialDB
+BuildRequires: libtdb-devel
+# ESI support requires Expat & libxml2
+BuildRequires: expat-devel libxml2-devel
 # TPROXY requires libcap, and also increases security somewhat
 BuildRequires: libcap-devel
 # eCAP support
@@ -100,10 +109,20 @@ BuildRequires: libtool libtool-ltdl-devel
 BuildRequires: perl-generators
 # For test suite
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(cppunit)
-BuildRequires: autoconf
+# For verifying downloded src tarball
+BuildRequires: gnupg2
+# for _tmpfilesdir and _unitdir macro
+# see https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/Systemd/#_packaging
+BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
 # systemd notify
 BuildRequires: systemd-devel
 
+%{?systemd_requires}
+%{?sysusers_requires_compat}
+
+# Old NetworkManager expects the dispatcher scripts in a different place
+Conflicts: NetworkManager < 1.20
+
 %description
 Squid is a high-performance proxy caching server for Web clients,
 supporting FTP, gopher, and HTTP data objects. Unlike traditional
@@ -117,6 +136,7 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 (ftpget), and some management and client tools.
 
 %prep
+%{gpgverify} --keyring='%{SOURCE2}' --signature='%{SOURCE1}' --data='%{SOURCE0}'
 %setup -q
 
 # Upstream patches
@@ -128,37 +148,36 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 %patch201 -p1 -b .config
 %patch202 -p1 -b .location
 %patch203 -p1 -b .perlpath
-%patch204 -p1 -b .include-guards
-%patch205 -p1 -b .large_acl
-%patch206 -p1 -b .active-ftp
-%patch208 -p1 -b .convert-ipv4
-%patch209 -p1 -b .ftp-fn-extraction
-%patch210 -p1 -b .halfclosed
+%patch204 -p0 -b .include-guards
+%patch205 -p1 -R -b .symlink-lang-err
+%patch206 -p1 -b .openssl3
+%patch207 -p1 -b .active-ftp
+%patch208 -p1 -b .test-store-cpp
+%patch209 -p1 -b .halfclosed
+%patch210 -p1 -b .ipv6-crash
+
+%patch501 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46784
+%patch502 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-41318
+%patch503 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46846
+%patch504 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46847
+%patch505 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46848
+%patch506 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-5824
+%patch507 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46728
+%patch508 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46724
+%patch509 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49285
+%patch510 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49286
+%patch511 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
+%patch512 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25617
+%patch513 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
+%patch514 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-37894
+%patch515 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-23638
 
-# Security patches
-%patch300 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-28116
-%patch301 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46784
-%patch302 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-41318
-%patch303 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46846
-%patch304 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46847
-%patch305 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-5824
-%patch306 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46728
-%patch307 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46724
-%patch308 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49285
-%patch309 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49286
-%patch310 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
-%patch311 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25617
-%patch312 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
-%patch313 -p1 -b .ignore-wsp-chunk-sz
-%patch314 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-23638
 
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1679526
 # Patch in the vendor documentation and used different location for documentation
 sed -i 's|@SYSCONFDIR@/squid.conf.documented|%{_pkgdocdir}/squid.conf.documented|' src/squid.8.in
 
 %build
-# cppunit-config patch changes configure.ac
-autoconf
 
 # NIS helper has been removed because of the following bug
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1531540
@@ -167,7 +186,7 @@ autoconf
    --datadir=%{_datadir}/squid \
    --sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/squid \
    --with-logdir='%{_localstatedir}/log/squid' \
-   --with-pidfile='%{_localstatedir}/run/squid.pid' \
+   --with-pidfile='/run/squid.pid' \
    --disable-dependency-tracking \
    --enable-eui \
    --enable-follow-x-forwarded-for \
@@ -195,7 +214,7 @@ autoconf
    --enable-storeio="aufs,diskd,ufs,rock" \
    --enable-diskio \
    --enable-wccpv2 \
-   --disable-esi \
+   --enable-esi \
    --enable-ecap \
    --with-aio \
    --with-default-user="squid" \
@@ -204,13 +223,19 @@ autoconf
    --with-pthreads \
    --disable-arch-native \
    --disable-security-cert-validators \
+   --disable-strict-error-checking \
    --with-swapdir=%{_localstatedir}/spool/squid
 
+# workaround to build squid v5
+mkdir -p src/icmp/tests
+mkdir -p tools/squidclient/tests
+mkdir -p tools/tests
+
 %make_build
 
 %check
 make check
-	
+
 %install
 %make_install
 
@@ -233,22 +258,20 @@ mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/httpd/conf.d/
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d
+mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_prefix}/lib/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_unitdir}
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/squid
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d/squid
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/squid
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE4} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/squid
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_unitdir}
-install -m 755 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/squid
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d/squid
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE4} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/squid
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE5} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/squid
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_unitdir}
+install -m 755 %{SOURCE8} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/squid
 install -m 644 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/httpd/conf.d/squid.conf
-install -m 644 %{SOURCE5} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/20-squid
+install -m 755 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_prefix}/lib/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/20-squid
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/log/squid
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/spool/squid
-mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/run/squid
+mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/run/squid
 chmod 644 contrib/url-normalizer.pl contrib/user-agents.pl
-iconv -f ISO88591 -t UTF8 ChangeLog -o ChangeLog.tmp
-mv -f ChangeLog.tmp ChangeLog
 
 # install /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/squid.conf
 mkdir -p ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{_tmpfilesdir}
@@ -266,11 +289,12 @@ mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/squid/mib.txt $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/snmp/mibs/S
 rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/squid/squid.conf.documented
 
 # remove unpackaged files from the buildroot
-rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/{RunAccel,RunCache}
 rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp
 
+# sysusers.d
+install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/squid.conf
+
 %files
-%defattr(-,root,root,-)
 %license COPYING 
 %doc CONTRIBUTORS README ChangeLog QUICKSTART src/squid.conf.documented
 %doc contrib/url-normalizer.pl contrib/user-agents.pl
@@ -282,7 +306,7 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp
 %attr(755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/squid
 %attr(770,squid,root) %dir %{_localstatedir}/log/squid
 %attr(750,squid,squid) %dir %{_localstatedir}/spool/squid
-%attr(755,squid,squid) %dir %{_localstatedir}/run/squid
+%attr(755,squid,squid) %dir /run/squid
 
 %config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/httpd/conf.d/squid.conf
 %config(noreplace) %attr(640,root,squid) %{_sysconfdir}/squid/squid.conf
@@ -300,7 +324,7 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp
 
 %dir %{_datadir}/squid
 %attr(-,root,root) %{_datadir}/squid/errors
-%attr(755,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/20-squid
+%{_prefix}/lib/NetworkManager
 %{_datadir}/squid/icons
 %{_sbindir}/squid
 %{_bindir}/squidclient
@@ -310,15 +334,10 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp
 %{_libdir}/squid/*
 %{_datadir}/snmp/mibs/SQUID-MIB.txt
 %{_tmpfilesdir}/squid.conf
+%{_sysusersdir}/squid.conf
 
 %pre
-if ! getent group squid >/dev/null 2>&1; then
-  /usr/sbin/groupadd -g 23 squid
-fi
-
-if ! getent passwd squid >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
-  /usr/sbin/useradd -g 23 -u 23 -d /var/spool/squid -r -s /sbin/nologin squid >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1 
-fi
+%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE9}
 
 for i in /var/log/squid /var/spool/squid ; do
         if [ -d $i ] ; then
@@ -331,6 +350,18 @@ done
 exit 0
 
 %pretrans -p <lua>
+-- temporarilly commented until https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1936422 is resolved
+--
+-- previously /usr/share/squid/errors/es-mx was symlink, now it is directory since squid v5
+-- see https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/Directory_Replacement/
+-- Define the path to the symlink being replaced below.
+--
+-- path = "/usr/share/squid/errors/es-mx"
+-- st = posix.stat(path)
+-- if st and st.type == "link" then
+--   os.remove(path)
+-- end
+
 -- Due to a bug #447156
 paths = {"/usr/share/squid/errors/zh-cn", "/usr/share/squid/errors/zh-tw"}
 for key,path in ipairs(paths)
@@ -367,182 +398,240 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Nov 13 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.3
-- Resolves: RHEL-22593 - CVE-2024-23638 squid:4/squid: vulnerable to
-  a Denial of Service attack against Cache Manager error responses
+* Mon Jul 01 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-14
+- Resolves: RHEL-45057 - squid: Out-of-bounds write error may lead to Denial of 
+  Service (CVE-2024-37894)
+- Resolves: RHEL-22594 - squid: vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack against
+  Cache Manager error responses (CVE-2024-23638)
 
-* Thu Nov 07 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.2
-- Disable ESI support
-- Resolves: RHEL-65075 - CVE-2024-45802 squid:4/squid: Denial of Service
-  processing ESI response content
+* Thu May 09 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-13
+- Resolves: RHEL-30352 - squid v5 crashes with SIGABRT when ipv6 is disabled
+  at kernel level but it is asked to connect to an ipv6 address by a client
 
-* Mon Oct 14 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.1
-- Resolves: RHEL-56024 - (Regression) Transfer-encoding:chunked data is not sent
-  to the client in its complementary
-
-* Tue Mar 19 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10
-- Resolves: RHEL-28529 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Chunked
+* Tue Mar 19 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-12
+- Resolves: RHEL-28530 - squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Chunked
   Decoding (CVE-2024-25111)
-- Resolves: RHEL-26088 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP header
+- Resolves: RHEL-26092 - squid: denial of service in HTTP header
   parser (CVE-2024-25617)
 
-* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-9
-- Resolves: RHEL-19552 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP request 
+* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-10
+- Resolves: RHEL-19556 - squid: denial of service in HTTP request
   parsing (CVE-2023-50269)
 
-* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-8
-- Resolves: RHEL-18351 - squid:4/squid: Buffer over-read in the HTTP Message
-  processing feature (CVE-2023-49285)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18342 - squid:4/squid: Incorrect Check of Function Return
-  Value In Helper Process management (CVE-2023-49286)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18230 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in SSL Certificate
-  validation (CVE-2023-46724)
-- Resolves: RHEL-15911 - squid:4/squid: NULL pointer dereference in the gopher
-  protocol code (CVE-2023-46728)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18251 - squid crashes in assertion when a parent peer exists
-- Resolves: RHEL-14794 - squid: squid multiple issues in HTTP response caching
-  (CVE-2023-5824)
-- Resolves: RHEL-14803 - squid: squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Digest
-  Authentication (CVE-2023-46847)
-- Resolves: RHEL-14777 - squid: squid: Request/Response smuggling in HTTP/1.1
-  and ICAP (CVE-2023-46846)
+* Thu Feb 01 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-9
+- Resolves: RHEL-18354 - squid: Buffer over-read in the HTTP Message processing
+  feature (CVE-2023-49285)
+- Resolves: RHEL-18345 - squid: Incorrect Check of Function Return Value In
+  Helper Process management (CVE-2023-49286)
+- Resolves: RHEL-18146 - squid crashes in assertion when a parent peer exists
+- Resolves: RHEL-18231 - squid: Denial of Service in SSL Certificate validation
+  (CVE-2023-46724)
+- Resolves: RHEL-15912 - squid: NULL pointer dereference in the gopher protocol
+  code (CVE-2023-46728)
 
-* Wed Aug 16 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7
-- Resolves: #2076717 - Crash with half_closed_client on
+* Tue Dec 05 2023 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-8
+- Resolves: RHEL-14802 - squid: multiple issues in HTTP response caching
 
-* Thu Dec 08 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 4.15-6
-- Resolves: #2072988 - [RFE] Add the "IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT"
+* Sun Nov 12 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-7
+- Resolves: RHEL-14820 - squid: squid: denial of Servicein FTP
+- Resolves: RHEL-14809 - squid: squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Digest
+  Authentication
+- Resolves: RHEL-14781 - squid: squid: Request/Response smuggling in HTTP/1.1
+  and ICAP
+
+* Wed Aug 16 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-6
+- Resolves: #2231827 - Crash with half_closed_client on
+
+* Tue Dec 06 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-5
+- Resolves: #2151188 - [RFE] Add the "IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT"
   flag to sockets created for outgoing connections in the squid source code.
 
-* Wed Sep 28 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-5
-- Resolves: #2130260 - CVE-2022-41318 squid:4/squid: buffer-over-read in SSPI and SMB
+* Mon Nov 07 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-4
+- Resolves: #2095468 - [RFE] squid use systemd-sysusers
+
+* Mon Nov 07 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-3
+- Resolves: #2130253 - CVE-2022-41318 squid: buffer-over-read in SSPI and SMB
   authentication
 
-* Tue Jun 28 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-4
-- Resolves: #2100783 - CVE-2021-46784 squid:4/squid: DoS when processing gopher
-  server responses
+* Mon Jul 11 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-2
+- Resolves: #2100785 - CVE-2021-46784 squid: DoS when processing gopher server
+  responses
 
-* Wed Feb 09 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-3
-- Resolves: #1941506 - CVE-2021-28116 squid:4/squid: out-of-bounds read in WCCP
-  protocol data may lead to information disclosure
+* Tue May 31 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-1
+- new version 5.5
+- Resolves: #2075727 - The memory usage of the squid process keeps increasing
 
-* Tue Jan 25 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-2
-- Resolves: #2006121 - SQUID shortens FTP Link wrong that contains a semi-colon
-  and as a result is not able to download zip file.CODE 404 TO CLIENT)
+* Thu Oct 07 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.2-1
+- new version 5.2
+- Resolves: #1934560 - squid: out-of-bounds read in WCCP protocol
+- Resolves: #2011637 - Rebase squid to 5.2
 
-* Fri Jun 18 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-1
-- new version 4.15
-- Resolves: #1964384 - squid:4 rebase to 4.15
+* Wed Sep 15 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.1-3
+- Resolves: #1988122 - Enable LTO build of squid for RHEL 9
 
-* Wed Mar 31 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-5
-- Resolves: #1944261 - CVE-2020-25097 squid:4/squid: improper input validation
-  may allow a trusted client to perform HTTP Request Smuggling
+* Tue Aug 10 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 7:5.1-2
+- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
+  Related: rhbz#1991688
 
-* Mon Oct 26 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-4
-- Resolves: #1890606 - Fix for CVE 2019-13345 breaks authentication in
-  cachemgr.cgi
+* Thu Aug 05 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.1-1
+- new version 5.1
+- Resolves: #1990517 - Rebase squid to 5.1
+- Resolves: #1985231 - squid: FTBFS because of OpenSSL 3.0 preprocessor macro
+  changes
 
-* Wed Aug 26 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-3
-- Resolves: #1871705 - CVE-2020-24606 squid: Improper Input Validation could
-  result in a DoS
-- Resolves: #1871702 - CVE-2020-15811 squid: HTTP Request Splitting could result
-  in cache poisoning
-- Resolves: #1871700 - CVE-2020-15810 squid: HTTP Request Smuggling could result
-  in cache poisoning
+* Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.6-4
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
+  Related: rhbz#1971065
 
-* Thu Jul 02 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-2
-- Resolves: #1853130 - CVE-2020-15049 squid:4/squid: request smuggling and
-  poisoning attack against the HTTP cache
-- Resolves: #1853136 - CVE-2020-14058 squid:4/squid: DoS in TLS handshake
+* Tue Jun 08 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.6-3
+- Resolves: #1969322 - squid doesn't work with active ftp
+
+* Mon May 17 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.6-2
+- Resolves: #1953505 - squid: Port to OpenSSL 3.0
+
+* Mon May 17 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.6-1
+- new version 5.0.6
+- Resolves: #1961253 - Rebase squid to 5.0.6
+
+* Fri Apr 23 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.5-2
+- new version 5.0.5
+- Resolves: #1952896 - Rebase squid to >= 5.0.5
+- Resolves: #1940412 - Remove libdb dependency from squid
+
+* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 7:4.14-2
+- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
+
+* Wed Mar 31 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.14-1
+- new version 4.14
+- Resolves: #1939927 - CVE-2020-25097 squid: improper input validation may allow
+  a trusted client to perform HTTP Request Smuggling
+
+* Wed Jan 27 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.13-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Sat Oct 17 2020 Jeff Law <law@redhat.com> - 7:4.13-2
+- Fix missing #includes for gcc-11
+
+* Tue Aug 25 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.13-1
+- new version 4.13
+
+* Fri Aug 07 2020 Jeff law <law@redhat.com> - 7:4.12-4
+- Disable LTO
+
+* Sat Aug 01 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.12-3
+- Second attempt - Rebuilt for
+  https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jul 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.12-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jun 15 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.12-1
+- new version 4.12
 
 * Thu May 07 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-1
 - new version 4.11
 - libsystemd integration
-- Resolves: #1829467 - squid:4 rebase
-- Resolves: #1828378 - CVE-2019-12521 squid:4/squid: off-by-one error in
-  addStackElement allows for a heap buffer overflow and a crash
-- Resolves: #1828377 - CVE-2019-12520 squid:4/squid: improper input validation
-  in request allows for proxy manipulation
-- Resolves: #1828375 - CVE-2019-12524 squid:4/squid: improper access restriction
-  in url_regex may lead to security bypass
-- Resolves: #1820664 - CVE-2019-18860 squid: mishandles HTML in the host
-  parameter to cachemgr.cgi which could result in squid behaving in unsecure way
-- Resolves: #1802514 - CVE-2020-8449 squid:4/squid: Improper input validation
-  issues in HTTP Request processing
-- Resolves: #1802513 - CVE-2020-8450 squid:4/squid: Buffer overflow in a Squid
-  acting as reverse-proxy
-- Resolves: #1802512 - CVE-2019-12528 squid:4/squid: Information Disclosure
-  issue in FTP Gateway
-- Resolves: #1771288 - CVE-2019-18678 squid:4/squid: HTTP Request Splitting
-  issue in HTTP message processing
-- Resolves: #1771283 - CVE-2019-18679 squid:4/squid: Information Disclosure
-  issue in HTTP Digest Authentication
-- Resolves: #1771280 - CVE-2019-18677 squid:4/squid: Cross-Site Request Forgery
-  issue in HTTP Request processing
-- Resolves: #1771275 - CVE-2019-12523 squid:4/squid: Improper input validation
-  in URI processor
-- Resolves: #1771272 - CVE-2019-18676 squid:4/squid: Buffer overflow in URI
-  processor
-- Resolves: #1771264 - CVE-2019-12526 squid:4/squid: Heap overflow issue in URN
-  processing
-- Resolves: #1738581 - CVE-2019-12529 squid: OOB read in Proxy-Authorization
-  header causes DoS
-
-* Tue Apr 28 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-9
-- Resolves: #1738583 - CVE-2019-12525 squid:4/squid: parsing of header
-  Proxy-Authentication leads to memory corruption
-- Resolves: #1828369 - CVE-2020-11945 squid: improper access restriction upon
+- Resolves: #1827564 - CVE-2020-11945 squid: improper access restriction upon
   Digest Authentication nonce replay could lead to remote code execution
-- Resolves: #1828370 - CVE-2019-12519 squid: improper check for new member in
-  ESIExpression::Evaluate allows for stack buffer overflow
 
-* Fri Aug 23 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-8
-- Resolves: # 1738485 - CVE-2019-12527 squid:4/squid: heap-based buffer overflow
-  in HttpHeader::getAuth
+* Thu Mar 26 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.10-4
+- Resolves: #1817208 - More cache_swap.sh optimizations
 
-* Wed Jul 31 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-7
-- Resolves: #1729436 - CVE-2019-13345 squid: XSS via user_name or auth parameter
-  in cachemgr.cgi
+* Wed Mar 25 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.10-3
+- Resolves: #1786485 - squid.service: use ${SQUID_CONF} rather than $SQUID_CONF
+- Resolves: #1798535 - CVE-2019-12528 squid: Information Disclosure issue in
+  FTP Gateway
+- Resolves: #1798554 - CVE-2020-8450 squid: Buffer overflow in a Squid acting
+  as reverse-proxy
+- Resolves: #1798541 - CVE-2020-8449 squid: Improper input validation issues 
+  in HTTP Request processing
 
-* Fri Jun 21 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-6
-- Resolves: #1679526 - Missing detailed configuration file
-- Resolves: #1703117 - RHEL 7 to 8 fails with squid installed because dirs
-  changed to symlinks
-- Resolves: #1691741 - Squid cache_peer DNS lookup failed when not all lower
-  case
-- Resolves: #1683527 - "Reloading" message on a fresh reboot after enabling
-  squid
+* Tue Jan 28 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.10-1
+- new version 4.10
 
-* Tue Dec 11 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-4
-- Resolves: #1612524 - Man page scan results for squid 
+* Tue Dec 17 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.9-3
+- Resolves: #1784383 - Add BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
+- Resolves: #1783757 - Build with ./configure --with-pidfile=/run/squid.pid
+- Resolves: #1783768 - Optimize cache_swap.sh cache_dir search
 
-* Tue Dec 11 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-3
-- Resolves: #1642384 - squid doesn't work with active ftp
+* Mon Nov 11 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.9-2
+- new version 4.9
+- verify src taball signature by default in prep section
 
-* Tue Dec 11 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-2
-- Resolves: #1657847 - Unable to start Squid in Selinux Enforcing mode
+* Tue Oct 08 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.8-6
+- Resolves: #1741342 - Do not call autoconf at build time
+
+* Tue Oct 08 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.8-5
+- Resolves: #1716950 - Drop "sleep 1" from logrotate fragment
+
+* Thu Aug 22 2019 Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> - 7:4.8-4
+- Move the NetworkManager dispatcher script out of /etc
+
+* Mon Aug 05 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.8-3
+- Resolves: #1737030 - depend on httpd-filesystem
+
+* Sat Jul 27 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.8-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jul 10 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.8-1
+- new version 4.8
+- Resolves: #1727745 - squid: CVe-2019-13345 squid: XSS via user_name or auth
+  parameter in cachemgr.cgi
+
+* Tue Jul 02 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.7-6
+- fix filepath to squid.conf.documented in squid's manpage
+- fix path to systemctl in nm script
+
+* Wed May 22 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.7-5
+- Related: #1709299 - Use upstream squid.service
+
+* Fri May 17 2019 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.7-1
+- new version 4.7
+
+* Fri May 17 2019 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.6-3
+- Resolves: #1709299 - Use upstream squid.service
+
+* Mon Apr 29 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.6-2
+- Resolves: #1599074 - squid: 3 coredumps every day
+
+* Wed Apr 24 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.6-1
+- new version 4.6
+- disabled strict checking due to gcc warnings
+
+* Sun Feb 03 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.4-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jan 14 2019 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.4-2
+- Rebuilt for libcrypt.so.2 (#1666033)
 
 * Mon Dec 10 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-1
-- Resolves: #1656871 - squid rebase to 4.4
-- Resolves: #1645148 - CVE-2018-19131 squid: Cross-Site Scripting when
-  generating HTTPS response messages about TLS errors
-- Resolves: #1645156 - CVE-2018-19132 squid: Memory leak in SNMP query
-  rejection code
+- new version 4.4
 
-* Mon Aug 06 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.2-1
+* Sun Oct 14 2018 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 7:4.2-3
+- Drop obsolete legacy sys-v remanents
+
+* Mon Aug 20 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.2-2
+- Resolves: #1618790 - SELinux 'dac_override' denial for cache_swap.sh
+
+* Mon Aug 06 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.2-1
 - new version 4.2
 - enable back strict error checking
 
 * Wed Aug 01 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.1-1
 - new version 4.1
 
-* Mon Jun 04 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.23-5
-- Resolves: #1585617 - Build against libdb only instead of libdb4
-- disabled strict checking for now (squid can not be built with GCC8)
+* Sat Jul 14 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.0.25-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
 
-* Mon Apr 16 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.23-4
-- Resolves: #1566055 - module squid cannot be installed due to missing
-  perl(Crypt::OpenSSL::X509)
+* Thu Jun 28 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.25-1
+- new version 4.0.25
+
+* Mon Jun 04 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.24-2
+- removed obsolete BuildRequires (libdb4-devel)
+
+* Thu Mar 08 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.24-1
+- new version 4.0.24
+- disabled strict checking (removed -Werror)
 
 * Fri Feb 09 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.0.23-3
 - Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild