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43 changed files with 2155 additions and 4170 deletions

3
.gitignore vendored
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@ -1 +1,2 @@
SOURCES/squid-4.15.tar.xz
SOURCES/pgp.asc
SOURCES/squid-5.5.tar.xz

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@ -1 +1,2 @@
60bda34ba39657e2d870c8c1d2acece8a69c3075 SOURCES/squid-4.15.tar.xz
8e3de63f3bef0c9c4edbcfe000c567119f687143 SOURCES/pgp.asc
42302bd9b8feff851a41420334cb8eaeab2806ab SOURCES/squid-5.5.tar.xz

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@ -5,12 +5,17 @@ fi
SQUID_CONF=${SQUID_CONF:-"/etc/squid/squid.conf"}
CACHE_SWAP=`sed -e 's/#.*//g' $SQUID_CONF | \
grep cache_dir | awk '{ print $3 }'`
CACHE_SWAP=`awk '/^[[:blank:]]*cache_dir/ { print $3 }' "$SQUID_CONF"`
init_cache_dirs=0
for adir in $CACHE_SWAP; do
if [ ! -d $adir/00 ]; then
echo -n "init_cache_dir $adir... "
squid -N -z -F -f $SQUID_CONF >> /var/log/squid/squid.out 2>&1
init_cache_dirs=1
fi
done
if [ $init_cache_dirs -ne 0 ]; then
echo ""
squid --foreground -z -f "$SQUID_CONF" >> /var/log/squid/squid.out 2>&1
fi

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@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
diff --git a/contrib/url-normalizer.pl b/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
index 90ac6a4..8dbed90 100755
index 4cb0480..4b89910 100755
--- a/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
+++ b/contrib/url-normalizer.pl
@@ -1,4 +1,4 @@
-#!/usr/local/bin/perl -Tw
+#!/usr/bin/perl -Tw
#
# * Copyright (C) 1996-2021 The Squid Software Foundation and contributors
# * Copyright (C) 1996-2022 The Squid Software Foundation and contributors
# *

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@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
diff --git a/QUICKSTART b/QUICKSTART
index e5299b4..a243437 100644
--- a/QUICKSTART
+++ b/QUICKSTART
@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ After you retrieved, compiled and installed the Squid software (see
diff -up squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART.location squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART
--- squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART.location 2009-06-26 12:35:27.000000000 +0200
+++ squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART 2009-07-17 14:03:10.000000000 +0200
@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ After you retrieved, compiled and instal
INSTALL in the same directory), you have to configure the squid.conf
file. This is the list of the values you *need* to change, because no
sensible defaults could be defined. Do not touch the other variables
@ -15,7 +14,7 @@ index e5299b4..a243437 100644
==============================================================================
@@ -80,12 +79,12 @@ After editing squid.conf to your liking, run Squid from the command
@@ -82,12 +81,12 @@ After editing squid.conf to your liking,
line TWICE:
To create any disk cache_dir configured:

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@ -0,0 +1,95 @@
------------------------------------------------------------
revno: 14311
revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
------------------------------------------------------------
revno: 14311
revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
branch nick: trunk
timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
message:
Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
------------------------------------------------------------
# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
# 6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
#
# Begin patch
=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
--- compat/os/linux.h 2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
+++ compat/os/linux.h 2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
#endif
/*
+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
+ *
+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
+ * aways present in Linux.
+ *
+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
+ * to workaround it.
+ */
+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
* sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
*
* HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc
fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
branch nick: trunk
timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
message:
Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
------------------------------------------------------------
# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
# 6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
#
# Begin patch
=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
--- compat/os/linux.h 2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
+++ compat/os/linux.h 2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
#endif
/*
+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
+ *
+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
+ * aways present in Linux.
+ *
+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
+ * to workaround it.
+ */
+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
* sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
*
* HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc

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@ -1,8 +1,7 @@
diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
index 26ef576..30d5509 100644
--- a/src/cf.data.pre
+++ b/src/cf.data.pre
@@ -5006,7 +5006,7 @@ DOC_END
diff -up squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre.config squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre
--- squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre.config 2016-06-09 22:32:57.000000000 +0200
+++ squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre 2016-07-11 21:08:35.090976840 +0200
@@ -4658,7 +4658,7 @@ DOC_END
NAME: logfile_rotate
TYPE: int
@ -11,7 +10,7 @@ index 26ef576..30d5509 100644
LOC: Config.Log.rotateNumber
DOC_START
Specifies the default number of logfile rotations to make when you
@@ -6857,11 +6857,11 @@ COMMENT_END
@@ -6444,11 +6444,11 @@ COMMENT_END
NAME: cache_mgr
TYPE: string

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@ -1,143 +0,0 @@
From 771908d313ee9c255adfb5e4fdba4d6797c18409 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 13:50:38 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Bug 4928: Cannot convert non-IPv4 to IPv4 (#379)
... when reaching client_ip_max_connections
The client_ip_max_connections limit is checked before the TCP dst-IP is located for the newly received TCP connection. This leaves Squid unable to fetch the NFMARK or similar
details later on (they do not exist for [::]).
Move client_ip_max_connections test later in the TCP accept process to ensure dst-IP is known when the error is produced.
---
src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc b/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc
index d4b576d..936aa30 100644
--- a/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc
+++ b/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc
@@ -282,7 +282,16 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::acceptOne()
ConnectionPointer newConnDetails = new Connection();
const Comm::Flag flag = oldAccept(newConnDetails);
- if (flag == Comm::COMM_ERROR) {
+ /* Check for errors */
+ if (!newConnDetails->isOpen()) {
+
+ if (flag == Comm::NOMESSAGE) {
+ /* register interest again */
+ debugs(5, 5, HERE << "try later: " << conn << " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
+ SetSelect(conn->fd, COMM_SELECT_READ, doAccept, this, 0);
+ return;
+ }
+
// A non-recoverable error; notify the caller */
debugs(5, 5, HERE << "non-recoverable error:" << status() << " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
if (intendedForUserConnections())
@@ -292,16 +301,12 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::acceptOne()
return;
}
- if (flag == Comm::NOMESSAGE) {
- /* register interest again */
- debugs(5, 5, "try later: " << conn << " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
- } else {
- debugs(5, 5, "Listener: " << conn <<
- " accepted new connection " << newConnDetails <<
- " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
- notify(flag, newConnDetails);
- }
+ newConnDetails->nfmark = Ip::Qos::getNfmarkFromConnection(newConnDetails, Ip::Qos::dirAccepted);
+ debugs(5, 5, HERE << "Listener: " << conn <<
+ " accepted new connection " << newConnDetails <<
+ " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
+ notify(flag, newConnDetails);
SetSelect(conn->fd, COMM_SELECT_READ, doAccept, this, 0);
}
@@ -341,8 +346,8 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::notify(const Comm::Flag flag, const Comm::ConnectionPointer &
*
* \retval Comm::OK success. details parameter filled.
* \retval Comm::NOMESSAGE attempted accept() but nothing useful came in.
- * Or this client has too many connections already.
* \retval Comm::COMM_ERROR an outright failure occurred.
+ * Or this client has too many connections already.
*/
Comm::Flag
Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
@@ -383,6 +388,15 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
details->remote = *gai;
+ if ( Config.client_ip_max_connections >= 0) {
+ if (clientdbEstablished(details->remote, 0) > Config.client_ip_max_connections) {
+ debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: " << details->remote << " attempting more than " << Config.client_ip_max_connections << " connections.");
+ Ip::Address::FreeAddr(gai);
+ PROF_stop(comm_accept);
+ return Comm::COMM_ERROR;
+ }
+ }
+
// lookup the local-end details of this new connection
Ip::Address::InitAddr(gai);
details->local.setEmpty();
@@ -396,6 +410,23 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
details->local = *gai;
Ip::Address::FreeAddr(gai);
+ /* fdstat update */
+ fdd_table[sock].close_file = NULL;
+ fdd_table[sock].close_line = 0;
+
+ fde *F = &fd_table[sock];
+ details->remote.toStr(F->ipaddr,MAX_IPSTRLEN);
+ F->remote_port = details->remote.port();
+ F->local_addr = details->local;
+ F->sock_family = details->local.isIPv6()?AF_INET6:AF_INET;
+
+ // set socket flags
+ commSetCloseOnExec(sock);
+ commSetNonBlocking(sock);
+
+ /* IFF the socket is (tproxy) transparent, pass the flag down to allow spoofing */
+ F->flags.transparent = fd_table[conn->fd].flags.transparent; // XXX: can we remove this line yet?
+
// Perform NAT or TPROXY operations to retrieve the real client/dest IP addresses
if (conn->flags&(COMM_TRANSPARENT|COMM_INTERCEPTION) && !Ip::Interceptor.Lookup(details, conn)) {
debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: NAT/TPROXY lookup failed to locate original IPs on " << details);
@@ -414,33 +445,6 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
}
#endif
- details->nfmark = Ip::Qos::getNfmarkFromConnection(details, Ip::Qos::dirAccepted);
-
- if (Config.client_ip_max_connections >= 0) {
- if (clientdbEstablished(details->remote, 0) > Config.client_ip_max_connections) {
- debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: " << details->remote << " attempting more than " << Config.client_ip_max_connections << " connections.");
- PROF_stop(comm_accept);
- return Comm::NOMESSAGE;
- }
- }
-
- /* fdstat update */
- fdd_table[sock].close_file = NULL;
- fdd_table[sock].close_line = 0;
-
- fde *F = &fd_table[sock];
- details->remote.toStr(F->ipaddr,MAX_IPSTRLEN);
- F->remote_port = details->remote.port();
- F->local_addr = details->local;
- F->sock_family = details->local.isIPv6()?AF_INET6:AF_INET;
-
- // set socket flags
- commSetCloseOnExec(sock);
- commSetNonBlocking(sock);
-
- /* IFF the socket is (tproxy) transparent, pass the flag down to allow spoofing */
- F->flags.transparent = fd_table[conn->fd].flags.transparent; // XXX: can we remove this line yet?
-
PROF_stop(comm_accept);
return Comm::OK;
}

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@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/compat/os/linux.h b/compat/os/linux.h
index 0ff05c6..d51389b 100644
--- a/compat/os/linux.h
+++ b/compat/os/linux.h
@@ -44,6 +44,36 @@
#include <netinet/in.h>
#endif
+/*
+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
+ *
+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
+ * aways present in Linux.
+ *
+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
+ * to workaround it.
+ */
+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
+ *
+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
+ * aways present in Linux.
+ *
+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
+ * to workaround it.
+ */
+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#endif
+
/*
* sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
*

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@ -1,178 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/src/acl/RegexData.cc b/src/acl/RegexData.cc
index 01a4c12..b5c1679 100644
--- a/src/acl/RegexData.cc
+++ b/src/acl/RegexData.cc
@@ -22,6 +22,7 @@
#include "ConfigParser.h"
#include "Debug.h"
#include "sbuf/List.h"
+#include "sbuf/Algorithms.h"
ACLRegexData::~ACLRegexData()
{
@@ -129,6 +130,18 @@ compileRE(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const char * RE, int flags)
return true;
}
+static bool
+compileRE(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const SBufList &RE, int flags)
+{
+ if (RE.empty())
+ return curlist.empty(); // XXX: old code did this. It looks wrong.
+ SBuf regexp;
+ static const SBuf openparen("("), closeparen(")"), separator(")|(");
+ JoinContainerIntoSBuf(regexp, RE.begin(), RE.end(), separator, openparen,
+ closeparen);
+ return compileRE(curlist, regexp.c_str(), flags);
+}
+
/** Compose and compile one large RE from a set of (small) REs.
* The ultimate goal is to have only one RE per ACL so that match() is
* called only once per ACL.
@@ -137,16 +150,11 @@ static int
compileOptimisedREs(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const SBufList &sl)
{
std::list<RegexPattern> newlist;
- int numREs = 0;
+ SBufList accumulatedRE;
+ int numREs = 0, reSize = 0;
int flags = REG_EXTENDED | REG_NOSUB;
- int largeREindex = 0;
- char largeRE[BUFSIZ];
- *largeRE = 0;
for (const SBuf & configurationLineWord : sl) {
- int RElen;
- RElen = configurationLineWord.length();
-
static const SBuf minus_i("-i");
static const SBuf plus_i("+i");
if (configurationLineWord == minus_i) {
@@ -155,10 +163,11 @@ compileOptimisedREs(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const SBufList &sl)
debugs(28, 2, "optimisation of -i ... -i" );
} else {
debugs(28, 2, "-i" );
- if (!compileRE(newlist, largeRE, flags))
+ if (!compileRE(newlist, accumulatedRE, flags))
return 0;
flags |= REG_ICASE;
- largeRE[largeREindex=0] = '\0';
+ accumulatedRE.clear();
+ reSize = 0;
}
} else if (configurationLineWord == plus_i) {
if ((flags & REG_ICASE) == 0) {
@@ -166,37 +175,34 @@ compileOptimisedREs(std::list<RegexPattern> &curlist, const SBufList &sl)
debugs(28, 2, "optimisation of +i ... +i");
} else {
debugs(28, 2, "+i");
- if (!compileRE(newlist, largeRE, flags))
+ if (!compileRE(newlist, accumulatedRE, flags))
return 0;
flags &= ~REG_ICASE;
- largeRE[largeREindex=0] = '\0';
+ accumulatedRE.clear();
+ reSize = 0;
}
- } else if (RElen + largeREindex + 3 < BUFSIZ-1) {
+ } else if (reSize < 1024) {
debugs(28, 2, "adding RE '" << configurationLineWord << "'");
- if (largeREindex > 0) {
- largeRE[largeREindex] = '|';
- ++largeREindex;
- }
- largeRE[largeREindex] = '(';
- ++largeREindex;
- configurationLineWord.copy(largeRE+largeREindex, BUFSIZ-largeREindex);
- largeREindex += configurationLineWord.length();
- largeRE[largeREindex] = ')';
- ++largeREindex;
- largeRE[largeREindex] = '\0';
+ accumulatedRE.push_back(configurationLineWord);
++numREs;
+ reSize += configurationLineWord.length();
} else {
debugs(28, 2, "buffer full, generating new optimised RE..." );
- if (!compileRE(newlist, largeRE, flags))
+ accumulatedRE.push_back(configurationLineWord);
+ if (!compileRE(newlist, accumulatedRE, flags))
return 0;
- largeRE[largeREindex=0] = '\0';
+ accumulatedRE.clear();
+ reSize = 0;
continue; /* do the loop again to add the RE to largeRE */
}
}
- if (!compileRE(newlist, largeRE, flags))
+ if (!compileRE(newlist, accumulatedRE, flags))
return 0;
+ accumulatedRE.clear();
+ reSize = 0;
+
/* all was successful, so put the new list at the tail */
curlist.splice(curlist.end(), newlist);
diff --git a/src/sbuf/Algorithms.h b/src/sbuf/Algorithms.h
index 21ee889..338e9c0 100644
--- a/src/sbuf/Algorithms.h
+++ b/src/sbuf/Algorithms.h
@@ -81,6 +81,57 @@ SBufContainerJoin(const Container &items, const SBuf& separator)
return rv;
}
+/** Join container of SBufs and append to supplied target
+ *
+ * append to the target SBuf all elements in the [begin,end) range from
+ * an iterable container, prefixed by prefix, separated by separator and
+ * followed by suffix. Prefix and suffix are added also in case of empty
+ * iterable
+ *
+ * \return the modified dest
+ */
+template <class ContainerIterator>
+SBuf&
+JoinContainerIntoSBuf(SBuf &dest, const ContainerIterator &begin,
+ const ContainerIterator &end, const SBuf& separator,
+ const SBuf& prefix = SBuf(), const SBuf& suffix = SBuf())
+{
+ if (begin == end) {
+ dest.append(prefix).append(suffix);
+ return dest;
+ }
+
+ // optimization: pre-calculate needed storage
+ const SBuf::size_type totalContainerSize =
+ std::accumulate(begin, end, 0, SBufAddLength(separator)) +
+ dest.length() + prefix.length() + suffix.length();
+ SBufReservationRequirements req;
+ req.minSpace = totalContainerSize;
+ dest.reserve(req);
+
+ auto i = begin;
+ dest.append(prefix);
+ dest.append(*i);
+ ++i;
+ for (; i != end; ++i)
+ dest.append(separator).append(*i);
+ dest.append(suffix);
+ return dest;
+}
+
+
+/// convenience wrapper of JoinContainerIntoSBuf with no caller-supplied SBuf
+template <class ContainerIterator>
+SBuf
+JoinContainerToSBuf(const ContainerIterator &begin,
+ const ContainerIterator &end, const SBuf& separator,
+ const SBuf& prefix = SBuf(), const SBuf& suffix = SBuf())
+{
+ SBuf rv;
+ return JoinContainerIntoSBuf(rv, begin, end, separator, prefix, suffix);
+}
+
+
namespace std {
/// default hash functor to support std::unordered_map<SBuf,*>
template <>

View File

@ -1,424 +0,0 @@
commit b003a0da7865caa25b5d1e70c79329b32409b02a (HEAD -> refs/heads/v4, refs/remotes/origin/v4)
Author: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: 2021-09-24 21:53:11 +0000
WCCP: Validate packets better (#899)
Update WCCP to support exception based error handling for
parsing and processing we are moving Squid to for protocol
handling.
Update the main WCCPv2 parsing checks to throw meaningful
exceptions when detected.
diff --git a/src/wccp2.cc b/src/wccp2.cc
index ee592449c..6ef469e91 100644
--- a/src/wccp2.cc
+++ b/src/wccp2.cc
@@ -1108,6 +1108,59 @@ wccp2ConnectionClose(void)
* Functions for handling the requests.
*/
+/// Checks that the given area section ends inside the given (whole) area.
+/// \param error the message to throw when the section does not fit
+static void
+CheckSectionLength(const void *sectionStart, const size_t sectionLength, const void *wholeStart, const size_t wholeSize, const char *error)
+{
+ assert(sectionStart);
+ assert(wholeStart);
+
+ const auto wholeEnd = static_cast<const char*>(wholeStart) + wholeSize;
+ assert(sectionStart >= wholeStart && "we never go backwards");
+ assert(sectionStart <= wholeEnd && "we never go beyond our whole (but zero-sized fields are OK)");
+ static_assert(sizeof(wccp2_i_see_you_t) <= PTRDIFF_MAX, "paranoid: no UB when subtracting in-whole pointers");
+ // subtraction safe due to the three assertions above
+ const auto remainderDiff = wholeEnd - static_cast<const char*>(sectionStart);
+
+ // casting safe due to the assertions above (and size_t definition)
+ assert(remainderDiff >= 0);
+ const auto remainderSize = static_cast<size_t>(remainderDiff);
+
+ if (sectionLength <= remainderSize)
+ return;
+
+ throw TextException(error, Here());
+}
+
+/// Checks that the area contains at least dataLength bytes after the header.
+/// The size of the field header itself is not included in dataLength.
+/// \returns the total field size -- the field header and field data combined
+template<class FieldHeader>
+static size_t
+CheckFieldDataLength(const FieldHeader *header, const size_t dataLength, const void *areaStart, const size_t areaSize, const char *error)
+{
+ assert(header);
+ const auto dataStart = reinterpret_cast<const char*>(header) + sizeof(header);
+ CheckSectionLength(dataStart, dataLength, areaStart, areaSize, error);
+ return sizeof(header) + dataLength; // no overflow after CheckSectionLength()
+}
+
+/// Positions the given field at a given start within a given packet area.
+/// The Field type determines the correct field size (used for bounds checking).
+/// \param field the field pointer the function should set
+/// \param areaStart the start of a packet (sub)structure containing the field
+/// \param areaSize the size of the packet (sub)structure starting at areaStart
+/// \param fieldStart the start of a field within the given area
+/// \param error the message to throw when the field does not fit the area
+template<class Field>
+static void
+SetField(Field *&field, const void *fieldStart, const void *areaStart, const size_t areaSize, const char *error)
+{
+ CheckSectionLength(fieldStart, sizeof(Field), areaStart, areaSize, error);
+ field = static_cast<Field*>(const_cast<void*>(fieldStart));
+}
+
/*
* Accept the UDP packet
*/
@@ -1124,8 +1177,6 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
/* These structs form the parts of the packet */
- struct wccp2_item_header_t *header = NULL;
-
struct wccp2_security_none_t *security_info = NULL;
struct wccp2_service_info_t *service_info = NULL;
@@ -1141,14 +1192,13 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
struct wccp2_cache_identity_info_t *cache_identity = NULL;
struct wccp2_capability_info_header_t *router_capability_header = NULL;
+ char *router_capability_data_start = nullptr;
struct wccp2_capability_element_t *router_capability_element;
struct sockaddr_in from;
struct in_addr cache_address;
- int len, found;
- short int data_length, offset;
uint32_t tmp;
char *ptr;
int num_caches;
@@ -1161,20 +1211,18 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
Ip::Address from_tmp;
from_tmp.setIPv4();
- len = comm_udp_recvfrom(sock,
- &wccp2_i_see_you,
- WCCP_RESPONSE_SIZE,
- 0,
- from_tmp);
+ const auto lenOrError = comm_udp_recvfrom(sock, &wccp2_i_see_you, WCCP_RESPONSE_SIZE, 0, from_tmp);
- if (len < 0)
+ if (lenOrError < 0)
return;
+ const auto len = static_cast<size_t>(lenOrError);
- if (ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.version) != WCCP2_VERSION)
- return;
-
- if (ntohl(wccp2_i_see_you.type) != WCCP2_I_SEE_YOU)
- return;
+ try {
+ // TODO: Remove wccp2_i_see_you.data and use a buffer to read messages.
+ const auto message_header_size = sizeof(wccp2_i_see_you) - sizeof(wccp2_i_see_you.data);
+ Must2(len >= message_header_size, "incomplete WCCP message header");
+ Must2(ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.version) == WCCP2_VERSION, "WCCP version unsupported");
+ Must2(ntohl(wccp2_i_see_you.type) == WCCP2_I_SEE_YOU, "WCCP packet type unsupported");
/* FIXME INET6 : drop conversion boundary */
from_tmp.getSockAddr(from);
@@ -1182,73 +1230,60 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
debugs(80, 3, "Incoming WCCPv2 I_SEE_YOU length " << ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.length) << ".");
/* Record the total data length */
- data_length = ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.length);
+ const auto data_length = ntohs(wccp2_i_see_you.length);
+ Must2(data_length <= len - message_header_size,
+ "malformed packet claiming it's bigger than received data");
- offset = 0;
-
- if (data_length > len) {
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: Malformed WCCPv2 packet claiming it's bigger than received data");
- return;
- }
+ size_t offset = 0;
/* Go through the data structure */
- while (data_length > offset) {
+ while (offset + sizeof(struct wccp2_item_header_t) <= data_length) {
char *data = wccp2_i_see_you.data;
- header = (struct wccp2_item_header_t *) &data[offset];
+ const auto itemHeader = reinterpret_cast<const wccp2_item_header_t*>(&data[offset]);
+ const auto itemSize = CheckFieldDataLength(itemHeader, ntohs(itemHeader->length),
+ data, data_length, "truncated record");
+ // XXX: Check "The specified length must be a multiple of 4 octets"
+ // requirement to avoid unaligned memory reads after the first item.
- switch (ntohs(header->type)) {
+ switch (ntohs(itemHeader->type)) {
case WCCP2_SECURITY_INFO:
-
- if (security_info != NULL) {
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate security definition");
- return;
- }
-
- security_info = (struct wccp2_security_none_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
+ Must2(!security_info, "duplicate security definition");
+ SetField(security_info, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
+ "security definition truncated");
break;
case WCCP2_SERVICE_INFO:
-
- if (service_info != NULL) {
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate service_info definition");
- return;
- }
-
- service_info = (struct wccp2_service_info_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
+ Must2(!service_info, "duplicate service_info definition");
+ SetField(service_info, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
+ "service_info definition truncated");
break;
case WCCP2_ROUTER_ID_INFO:
-
- if (router_identity_info != NULL) {
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate router_identity_info definition");
- return;
- }
-
- router_identity_info = (struct router_identity_info_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
+ Must2(!router_identity_info, "duplicate router_identity_info definition");
+ SetField(router_identity_info, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
+ "router_identity_info definition truncated");
break;
case WCCP2_RTR_VIEW_INFO:
-
- if (router_view_header != NULL) {
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate router_view definition");
- return;
- }
-
- router_view_header = (struct router_view_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
+ Must2(!router_view_header, "duplicate router_view definition");
+ SetField(router_view_header, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
+ "router_view definition truncated");
break;
- case WCCP2_CAPABILITY_INFO:
-
- if (router_capability_header != NULL) {
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Duplicate router_capability definition");
- return;
- }
+ case WCCP2_CAPABILITY_INFO: {
+ Must2(!router_capability_header, "duplicate router_capability definition");
+ SetField(router_capability_header, itemHeader, itemHeader, itemSize,
+ "router_capability definition truncated");
- router_capability_header = (struct wccp2_capability_info_header_t *) &wccp2_i_see_you.data[offset];
+ CheckFieldDataLength(router_capability_header, ntohs(router_capability_header->capability_info_length),
+ itemHeader, itemSize, "capability info truncated");
+ router_capability_data_start = reinterpret_cast<char*>(router_capability_header) +
+ sizeof(*router_capability_header);
break;
+ }
/* Nothing to do for the types below */
@@ -1257,22 +1292,17 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
break;
default:
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Unknown record type in WCCPv2 Packet (" << ntohs(header->type) << ").");
+ debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Unknown record type in WCCPv2 Packet (" << ntohs(itemHeader->type) << ").");
}
- offset += sizeof(struct wccp2_item_header_t);
- offset += ntohs(header->length);
-
- if (offset > data_length) {
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Error: WCCPv2 packet tried to tell us there is data beyond the end of the packet");
- return;
- }
+ offset += itemSize;
+ assert(offset <= data_length && "CheckFieldDataLength(itemHeader...) established that");
}
- if ((security_info == NULL) || (service_info == NULL) || (router_identity_info == NULL) || (router_view_header == NULL)) {
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Incomplete WCCPv2 Packet");
- return;
- }
+ Must2(security_info, "packet missing security definition");
+ Must2(service_info, "packet missing service_info definition");
+ Must2(router_identity_info, "packet missing router_identity_info definition");
+ Must2(router_view_header, "packet missing router_view definition");
debugs(80, 5, "Complete packet received");
@@ -1308,10 +1338,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
break;
}
- if (router_list_ptr->next == NULL) {
- debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WCCPv2 Packet received from unknown router");
- return;
- }
+ Must2(router_list_ptr->next, "packet received from unknown router");
/* Set the router id */
router_list_ptr->info->router_address = router_identity_info->router_id_element.router_address;
@@ -1331,11 +1358,20 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
}
} else {
- char *end = ((char *) router_capability_header) + sizeof(*router_capability_header) + ntohs(router_capability_header->capability_info_length) - sizeof(struct wccp2_capability_info_header_t);
-
- router_capability_element = (struct wccp2_capability_element_t *) (((char *) router_capability_header) + sizeof(*router_capability_header));
-
- while ((char *) router_capability_element <= end) {
+ const auto router_capability_data_length = ntohs(router_capability_header->capability_info_length);
+ assert(router_capability_data_start);
+ const auto router_capability_data_end = router_capability_data_start +
+ router_capability_data_length;
+ for (auto router_capability_data_current = router_capability_data_start;
+ router_capability_data_current < router_capability_data_end;) {
+
+ SetField(router_capability_element, router_capability_data_current,
+ router_capability_data_start, router_capability_data_length,
+ "capability element header truncated");
+ const auto elementSize = CheckFieldDataLength(
+ router_capability_element, ntohs(router_capability_element->capability_length),
+ router_capability_data_start, router_capability_data_length,
+ "capability element truncated");
switch (ntohs(router_capability_element->capability_type)) {
@@ -1377,7 +1413,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "Unknown capability type in WCCPv2 Packet (" << ntohs(router_capability_element->capability_type) << ").");
}
- router_capability_element = (struct wccp2_capability_element_t *) (((char *) router_capability_element) + sizeof(struct wccp2_item_header_t) + ntohs(router_capability_element->capability_length));
+ router_capability_data_current += elementSize;
}
}
@@ -1396,23 +1432,34 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
num_caches = 0;
/* Check to see if we're the master cache and update the cache list */
- found = 0;
+ bool found = false;
service_list_ptr->lowest_ip = 1;
cache_list_ptr = &router_list_ptr->cache_list_head;
/* to find the list of caches, we start at the end of the router view header */
ptr = (char *) (router_view_header) + sizeof(struct router_view_t);
+ const auto router_view_size = sizeof(struct router_view_t) +
+ ntohs(router_view_header->header.length);
/* Then we read the number of routers */
- memcpy(&tmp, ptr, sizeof(tmp));
+ const uint32_t *routerCountRaw = nullptr;
+ SetField(routerCountRaw, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
+ "malformed packet (truncated router view info w/o number of routers)");
/* skip the number plus all the ip's */
-
- ptr += sizeof(tmp) + (ntohl(tmp) * sizeof(struct in_addr));
+ ptr += sizeof(*routerCountRaw);
+ const auto ipCount = ntohl(*routerCountRaw);
+ const auto ipsSize = ipCount * sizeof(struct in_addr); // we check for unsigned overflow below
+ Must2(ipsSize / sizeof(struct in_addr) != ipCount, "huge IP address count");
+ CheckSectionLength(ptr, ipsSize, router_view_header, router_view_size, "invalid IP address count");
+ ptr += ipsSize;
/* Then read the number of caches */
- memcpy(&tmp, ptr, sizeof(tmp));
+ const uint32_t *cacheCountRaw = nullptr;
+ SetField(cacheCountRaw, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
+ "malformed packet (truncated router view info w/o cache count)");
+ memcpy(&tmp, cacheCountRaw, sizeof(tmp)); // TODO: Replace tmp with cacheCount
ptr += sizeof(tmp);
if (ntohl(tmp) != 0) {
@@ -1426,7 +1473,8 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
case WCCP2_ASSIGNMENT_METHOD_HASH:
- cache_identity = (struct wccp2_cache_identity_info_t *) ptr;
+ SetField(cache_identity, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
+ "malformed packet (truncated router view info cache w/o assignment hash)");
ptr += sizeof(struct wccp2_cache_identity_info_t);
@@ -1437,13 +1485,15 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
case WCCP2_ASSIGNMENT_METHOD_MASK:
- cache_mask_info = (struct cache_mask_info_t *) ptr;
+ SetField(cache_mask_info, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
+ "malformed packet (truncated router view info cache w/o assignment mask)");
/* The mask assignment has an undocumented variable length entry here */
if (ntohl(cache_mask_info->num1) == 3) {
- cache_mask_identity = (struct wccp2_cache_mask_identity_info_t *) ptr;
+ SetField(cache_mask_identity, ptr, router_view_header, router_view_size,
+ "malformed packet (truncated router view info cache w/o assignment mask identity)");
ptr += sizeof(struct wccp2_cache_mask_identity_info_t);
@@ -1474,10 +1524,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
debugs (80, 5, "checking cache list: (" << std::hex << cache_address.s_addr << ":" << router_list_ptr->local_ip.s_addr << ")");
/* Check to see if it's the master, or us */
-
- if (cache_address.s_addr == router_list_ptr->local_ip.s_addr) {
- found = 1;
- }
+ found = found || (cache_address.s_addr == router_list_ptr->local_ip.s_addr);
if (cache_address.s_addr < router_list_ptr->local_ip.s_addr) {
service_list_ptr->lowest_ip = 0;
@@ -1494,7 +1541,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
cache_list_ptr->next = NULL;
service_list_ptr->lowest_ip = 1;
- found = 1;
+ found = true;
num_caches = 1;
}
@@ -1502,7 +1549,7 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
router_list_ptr->num_caches = htonl(num_caches);
- if ((found == 1) && (service_list_ptr->lowest_ip == 1)) {
+ if (found && (service_list_ptr->lowest_ip == 1)) {
if (ntohl(router_view_header->change_number) != router_list_ptr->member_change) {
debugs(80, 4, "Change detected - queueing up new assignment");
router_list_ptr->member_change = ntohl(router_view_header->change_number);
@@ -1515,6 +1562,10 @@ wccp2HandleUdp(int sock, void *)
eventDelete(wccp2AssignBuckets, NULL);
debugs(80, 5, "I am not the lowest ip cache - not assigning buckets");
}
+
+ } catch (...) {
+ debugs(80, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: Ignoring WCCPv2 message: " << CurrentException);
+ }
}
static void

File diff suppressed because it is too large Load Diff

View File

@ -1,32 +0,0 @@
diff --git a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
index da9867f..e992638 100644
--- a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
+++ b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
@@ -1084,16 +1084,17 @@ Ftp::Gateway::checkAuth(const HttpHeader * req_hdr)
void
Ftp::Gateway::checkUrlpath()
{
- static SBuf str_type_eq("type=");
- auto t = request->url.path().rfind(';');
-
- if (t != SBuf::npos) {
- auto filenameEnd = t-1;
- if (request->url.path().substr(++t).cmp(str_type_eq, str_type_eq.length()) == 0) {
- t += str_type_eq.length();
- typecode = (char)xtoupper(request->url.path()[t]);
- request->url.path(request->url.path().substr(0,filenameEnd));
- }
+ // If typecode was specified, extract it and leave just the filename in
+ // url.path. Tolerate trailing garbage or missing typecode value. Roughly:
+ // [filename] ;type=[typecode char] [trailing garbage]
+ static const SBuf middle(";type=");
+ const auto typeSpecStart = request->url.path().find(middle);
+ if (typeSpecStart != SBuf::npos) {
+ const auto fullPath = request->url.path();
+ const auto typecodePos = typeSpecStart + middle.length();
+ typecode = (typecodePos < fullPath.length()) ?
+ static_cast<char>(xtoupper(fullPath[typecodePos])) : '\0';
+ request->url.path(fullPath.substr(0, typeSpecStart));
}
int l = request->url.path().length();

View File

@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
From 8d0ee420a4d91ac7fd97316338f1e28b4b060cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 19:26:27 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Ignore whitespace chars after chunk-size
Previously (before #1498 change), squid was accepting TE-chunked replies
with whitespaces after chunk-size and missing chunk-ext data. After
It turned out that replies with such whitespace chars are pretty
common and other webservers which can act as forward proxies (e.g.
nginx, httpd...) are accepting them.
This change will allow to proxy chunked responses from origin server,
which had whitespaces inbetween chunk-size and CRLF.
---
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 1 +
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
index 9cce10fdc91..04753395e16 100644
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
// Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
try {
+ tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
buf_ = tok.remaining();
From 9c8d35f899035fa06021ab3fe6919f892c2f0c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:06:31 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Added new argument to Http::One::ParseBws()
Depending on new wsp_only argument in ParseBws() it will be decided
which set of whitespaces characters will be parsed. If wsp_only is set
to true, only SP and HTAB chars will be parsed.
Also optimized number of ParseBws calls.
---
src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
src/http/one/Parser.h | 3 ++-
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 13 +++++++++----
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h | 2 +-
4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
index b1908316a0b..01d7e3bc0e8 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
void
-Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
{
- const auto count = tok.skipAll(Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
+ const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
if (tok.atEnd())
throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
index d9a0ac8c273..08200371cd6 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
@@ -163,8 +163,9 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
};
/// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
/// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
-void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
/// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
int ErrorLevel();
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
index 04753395e16..41e1e5ddaea 100644
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
@@ -125,8 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
// Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
try {
- tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
- parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
+ // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
+ // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
+ if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
+ ParseBws(tok, true);
+
tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
buf_ = tok.remaining();
parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
@@ -140,20 +143,22 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
-void
+bool
Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
{
+ bool foundChunkExt = false;
do {
auto tok = callerTok;
ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
if (!tok.skip(';'))
- return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
+ return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
callerTok = tok;
+ foundChunkExt = true;
} while (true);
}
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
index 02eacd1bb89..8c5d4bb4cba 100644
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
private:
bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
- void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
+ bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
From 81e67f97f9c386bdd0bb4a5e182395c46adb70ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:44:33 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Fix typo in Parser.h
---
src/http/one/Parser.h | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
index 08200371cd6..3ef4c5f7752 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
};
/// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
-/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
/// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
From a0d4fe1794e605f8299a5c118c758a807453f016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 22:39:42 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Bug 5449 is a regression of Bug 4492!
Both bugs deal with "chunk-size SP+ CRLF" use cases. Bug 4492 had _two_
spaces after chunk-size, which answers one of the PR review questions:
Should we skip just one space? No, we should not.
The lines moved around in many commits, but I believe this regression
was introduced in commit 951013d0 because that commit stopped consuming
partially parsed chunk-ext sequences. That consumption was wrong, but it
had a positive side effect -- fixing Bug 4492...
---
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 10 +++++-----
1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
index 41e1e5ddaea..aa4a840fdcf 100644
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
// Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
try {
- // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
- // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
- if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
- ParseBws(tok, true);
+ // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
+ ParseBws(tok, true);
+
+ parseChunkExtensions(tok);
tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
buf_ = tok.remaining();
@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
do {
auto tok = callerTok;
- ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
+ ParseBws(tok);
if (!tok.skip(';'))
return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
From f837f5ff61301a17008f16ce1fb793c2abf19786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:06:42 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fixup: Fewer conditionals/ifs and more explicit spelling
... to draw code reader attention when something unusual is going on.
---
src/http/one/Parser.cc | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
src/http/one/Parser.h | 10 ++++++++--
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 14 ++++++--------
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h | 2 +-
4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
index 01d7e3bc0e8..d3937e5e96b 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
@@ -271,11 +271,12 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
return Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser < 0 ? DBG_IMPORTANT : 5;
}
-// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
-void
-Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
+/// common part of ParseBws() and ParseStrctBws()
+namespace Http::One {
+static void
+ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
{
- const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
+ const auto count = tok.skipAll(bwsChars);
if (tok.atEnd())
throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
@@ -290,4 +291,17 @@ Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
// success: no more BWS characters expected
}
+} // namespace Http::One
+
+void
+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
+{
+ ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
+}
+
+void
+Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
+{
+ ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
+}
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
index 3ef4c5f7752..49e399de546 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
@@ -163,9 +163,15 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
};
/// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
-/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
/// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
-void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
+/// \sa WhitespaceCharacters() for the definition of BWS characters
+/// \sa ParseStrictBws() that avoids WhitespaceCharacters() uncertainties
+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
+
+/// Like ParseBws() but only skips CharacterSet::WSP characters. This variation
+/// must be used if the next element may start with CR or any other character
+/// from RelaxedDelimiterCharacters().
+void ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
/// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
int ErrorLevel();
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
index aa4a840fdcf..859471b8c77 100644
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
// Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
try {
- // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
- ParseBws(tok, true);
-
- parseChunkExtensions(tok);
+ // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size.
+ // No ParseBws() here because it may consume CR required further below.
+ ParseStrictBws(tok);
+ parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
buf_ = tok.remaining();
parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
@@ -143,22 +143,20 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
-bool
+void
Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
{
- bool foundChunkExt = false;
do {
auto tok = callerTok;
ParseBws(tok);
if (!tok.skip(';'))
- return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
+ return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
callerTok = tok;
- foundChunkExt = true;
} while (true);
}
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
index 8c5d4bb4cba..02eacd1bb89 100644
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
private:
bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
- bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
+ void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
From f79936a234e722adb2dd08f31cf6019d81ee712c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:31:08 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fixup: Deadly typo
---
src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
index d3937e5e96b..7403a9163a2 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
@@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
void
Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
{
- ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
+ ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
}
void
Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
{
- ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
+ ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
}

View File

@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
File: squid-4.15.tar.xz
Date: Mon 10 May 2021 10:50:22 UTC
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MD5 : a593de9dc888dfeca4f1f7db2cd7d3b9
SHA1: 60bda34ba39657e2d870c8c1d2acece8a69c3075
Key : CD6DBF8EF3B17D3E <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
B068 84ED B779 C89B 044E 64E3 CD6D BF8E F3B1 7D3E
keyring = http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
keyserver = pool.sks-keyservers.net
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View File

@ -0,0 +1,68 @@
From fc01451000eaa5592cd5afbd6aee14e53f7dd2c3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amos Jeffries <amosjeffries@squid-cache.org>
Date: Sun, 18 Oct 2020 20:23:10 +1300
Subject: [PATCH] Update translations integration
* Add credits for es-mx translation moderator
* Use es-mx for default of all Spanish (Central America) texts
* Update translation related .am files
---
doc/manuals/language.am | 2 +-
errors/TRANSLATORS | 1 +
errors/aliases | 3 ++-
errors/language.am | 3 ++-
errors/template.am | 2 +-
5 files changed, 7 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
diff --git a/doc/manuals/language.am b/doc/manuals/language.am
index 7670c88380c..f03c4cf71b4 100644
--- a/doc/manuals/language.am
+++ b/doc/manuals/language.am
@@ -18,4 +18,4 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
oc.lang \
pt.lang \
ro.lang \
- ru.lang
+ ru.lang
diff --git a/errors/aliases b/errors/aliases
index 36f17f4b80f..cf0116f297d 100644
--- a/errors/aliases
+++ b/errors/aliases
@@ -14,7 +14,8 @@ da da-dk
de de-at de-ch de-de de-li de-lu
el el-gr
en en-au en-bz en-ca en-cn en-gb en-ie en-in en-jm en-nz en-ph en-sg en-tt en-uk en-us en-za en-zw
-es es-ar es-bo es-cl es-co es-cr es-do es-ec es-es es-gt es-hn es-mx es-ni es-pa es-pe es-pr es-py es-sv es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl
+es es-ar es-bo es-cl es-cu es-co es-do es-ec es-es es-pe es-pr es-py es-us es-uy es-ve es-xl spq
+es-mx es-bz es-cr es-gt es-hn es-ni es-pa es-sv
et et-ee
fa fa-fa fa-ir
fi fi-fi
diff --git a/errors/language.am b/errors/language.am
index 12b1b2b3b43..029e8c1eb2f 100644
--- a/errors/language.am
+++ b/errors/language.am
@@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
de.lang \
el.lang \
en.lang \
+ es-mx.lang \
es.lang \
et.lang \
fa.lang \
@@ -51,4 +52,4 @@ TRANSLATE_LANGUAGES = \
uz.lang \
vi.lang \
zh-hans.lang \
- zh-hant.lang
+ zh-hant.lang
diff --git a/errors/template.am b/errors/template.am
index 6c12781e6f4..715c65aa22b 100644
--- a/errors/template.am
+++ b/errors/template.am
@@ -48,4 +48,4 @@ ERROR_TEMPLATES = \
templates/ERR_UNSUP_REQ \
templates/ERR_URN_RESOLVE \
templates/ERR_WRITE_ERROR \
- templates/ERR_ZERO_SIZE_OBJECT
+ templates/ERR_ZERO_SIZE_OBJECT

View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
index b665bcf..d287e55 100644
index 747ed35..f2b7126 100644
--- a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
+++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
@@ -778,7 +778,8 @@ Ftp::Client::connectDataChannel()
@@ -795,7 +795,8 @@ Ftp::Client::connectDataChannel()
bool
Ftp::Client::openListenSocket()
{
@ -13,10 +13,10 @@ index b665bcf..d287e55 100644
/// creates a data channel Comm close callback
diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.h b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
index a76a5a0..218d696 100644
index eb5ea1b..e92c007 100644
--- a/src/clients/FtpClient.h
+++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ public:
@@ -137,7 +137,7 @@ public:
bool sendPort();
bool sendPassive();
void connectDataChannel();
@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ index a76a5a0..218d696 100644
CtrlChannel ctrl; ///< FTP control channel state
diff --git a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
index 05db817..2989cd2 100644
--- a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
+++ b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
@@ -87,6 +87,13 @@ struct GatewayFlags {
@@ -86,6 +86,13 @@ struct GatewayFlags {
class Gateway;
typedef void (StateMethod)(Ftp::Gateway *);
@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
/// FTP Gateway: An FTP client that takes an HTTP request with an ftp:// URI,
/// converts it into one or more FTP commands, and then
/// converts one or more FTP responses into the final HTTP response.
@@ -137,7 +144,11 @@ public:
@@ -136,7 +143,11 @@ public:
/// create a data channel acceptor and start listening.
void listenForDataChannel(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn);
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
int checkAuth(const HttpHeader * req_hdr);
void checkUrlpath();
void buildTitleUrl();
@@ -1787,6 +1798,7 @@ ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback)
@@ -1786,6 +1797,7 @@ ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback)
}
ftpState->listenForDataChannel(temp);
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
}
static void
@@ -1822,13 +1834,19 @@ ftpSendPORT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
@@ -1821,13 +1833,19 @@ ftpSendPORT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
// pull out the internal IP address bytes to send in PORT command...
// source them from the listen_conn->local
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_PORT;
@@ -1881,14 +1899,27 @@ ftpSendEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
@@ -1880,14 +1898,27 @@ ftpSendEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
return;
}
@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_EPRT;
@@ -1907,7 +1938,7 @@ ftpReadEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
@@ -1906,7 +1937,7 @@ ftpReadEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
ftpSendPORT(ftpState);
return;
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,185 @@
diff --git a/src/ssl/support.cc b/src/ssl/support.cc
index 3ad135d..73912ce 100644
--- a/src/ssl/support.cc
+++ b/src/ssl/support.cc
@@ -557,7 +557,11 @@ Ssl::VerifyCallbackParameters::At(Security::Connection &sconn)
}
// "dup" function for SSL_get_ex_new_index("cert_err_check")
-#if SQUID_USE_CONST_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_DUP
+#if OPENSSL_VERSION_MAJOR >= 3
+static int
+ssl_dupAclChecklist(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, void **,
+ int, long, void *)
+#elif SQUID_USE_CONST_CRYPTO_EX_DATA_DUP
static int
ssl_dupAclChecklist(CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, const CRYPTO_EX_DATA *, void *,
int, long, void *)
diff --git a/src/security/PeerOptions.cc b/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
index cf1d4ba..4346ba5 100644
--- a/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
+++ b/src/security/PeerOptions.cc
@@ -297,130 +297,130 @@ static struct ssl_option {
} ssl_options[] = {
-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
{
"NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_REUSE_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
{
"SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG", SSL_OP_SSLREF2_REUSE_CERT_TYPE_BUG
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
+#ifdef SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
{
"MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER", SSL_OP_MICROSOFT_BIG_SSLV3_BUFFER
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
{
"SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG", SSL_OP_SSLEAY_080_CLIENT_DH_BUG
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
{
"TLS_D5_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_D5_BUG
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
{
"TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_BLOCK_PADDING_BUG
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
+#ifdef SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
{
"TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG", SSL_OP_TLS_ROLLBACK_BUG
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_ALL
+#ifdef SSL_OP_ALL
{
"ALL", (long)SSL_OP_ALL
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
{
"SINGLE_DH_USE", SSL_OP_SINGLE_DH_USE
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
+#ifdef SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
{
"EPHEMERAL_RSA", SSL_OP_EPHEMERAL_RSA
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
+#ifdef SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
{
"PKCS1_CHECK_1", SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_1
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
+#ifdef SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
{
"PKCS1_CHECK_2", SSL_OP_PKCS1_CHECK_2
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
{
"NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_CA_DN_BUG
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
{
"NON_EXPORT_FIRST", SSL_OP_NON_EXPORT_FIRST
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
+#ifdef SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
{
"CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE", SSL_OP_CIPHER_SERVER_PREFERENCE
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
{
"NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG", SSL_OP_NETSCAPE_DEMO_CIPHER_CHANGE_BUG
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
{
"NO_SSLv3", SSL_OP_NO_SSLv3
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
{
"NO_TLSv1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1
},
#else
{ "NO_TLSv1", 0 },
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
{
"NO_TLSv1_1", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_1
},
#else
{ "NO_TLSv1_1", 0 },
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
{
"NO_TLSv1_2", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_2
},
#else
{ "NO_TLSv1_2", 0 },
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
{
"NO_TLSv1_3", SSL_OP_NO_TLSv1_3
},
#else
{ "NO_TLSv1_3", 0 },
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
{
"No_Compression", SSL_OP_NO_COMPRESSION
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
{
"NO_TICKET", SSL_OP_NO_TICKET
},
#endif
-#if SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
+#ifdef SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
{
"SINGLE_ECDH_USE", SSL_OP_SINGLE_ECDH_USE
},
@@ -512,7 +512,7 @@ Security::PeerOptions::parseOptions()
}
-#if SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
+#ifdef SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2
// compliance with RFC 6176: Prohibiting Secure Sockets Layer (SSL) Version 2.0
op = op | SSL_OP_NO_SSLv2;
#endif

View File

@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
diff --git a/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc b/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
index 0564380..fcd60b9 100644
--- a/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
+++ b/src/tests/testStoreHashIndex.cc
@@ -102,6 +102,8 @@ void commonInit()
if (inited)
return;
+ inited = true;
+
Mem::Init();
Config.Store.avgObjectSize = 1024;
@@ -109,6 +111,10 @@ void commonInit()
Config.Store.objectsPerBucket = 20;
Config.Store.maxObjectSize = 2048;
+
+ Config.memShared.defaultTo(false);
+
+ Config.store_dir_select_algorithm = xstrdup("round-robin");
}
/* TODO make this a cbdata class */

View File

@ -1,17 +1,8 @@
From 780c4ea1b4c9d2fb41f6962aa6ed73ae57f74b2b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joshua Rogers <MegaManSec@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Mon, 18 Apr 2022 13:42:36 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Improve handling of Gopher responses (#1022)
---
src/gopher.cc | 45 ++++++++++++++++++++-------------------------
1 file changed, 20 insertions(+), 25 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/gopher.cc b/src/gopher.cc
index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
index 576a3f7..2645b6b 100644
--- a/src/gopher.cc
+++ b/src/gopher.cc
@@ -371,7 +371,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
@@ -364,7 +364,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
char *lpos = NULL;
char *tline = NULL;
LOCAL_ARRAY(char, line, TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
@ -19,7 +10,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
char *name = NULL;
char *selector = NULL;
char *host = NULL;
@@ -381,7 +380,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
@@ -374,7 +373,6 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
char gtype;
StoreEntry *entry = NULL;
@ -27,7 +18,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
memset(line, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
entry = gopherState->entry;
@@ -416,7 +414,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
@@ -409,7 +407,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
return;
}
@ -36,7 +27,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
if (!gopherState->HTML_header_added) {
if (gopherState->conversion == GopherStateData::HTML_CSO_RESULT)
@@ -583,34 +581,34 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
@@ -577,34 +575,34 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
break;
}
@ -85,7 +76,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
} else {
memset(line, '\0', TEMP_BUF_SIZE);
continue;
@@ -643,13 +641,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
@@ -637,13 +635,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
break;
if (gopherState->cso_recno != recno) {
@ -101,7 +92,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
break;
} else {
int code;
@@ -677,8 +674,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
@@ -671,8 +668,7 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
case 502: { /* Too Many Matches */
/* Print the message the server returns */
@ -111,7 +102,7 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
break;
}
@@ -694,13 +690,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
@@ -688,13 +684,12 @@ gopherToHTML(GopherStateData * gopherState, char *inbuf, int len)
} /* while loop */
@ -126,4 +117,4 @@ index 169b0e18299..6187da18bcd 100644
- outbuf.clean();
return;
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,178 @@
From 05f6af2f4c85cc99323cfff6149c3d74af661b6d Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Fri, 13 Oct 2023 08:44:16 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] RFC 9112: Improve HTTP chunked encoding compliance (#1498)
---
src/http/one/Parser.cc | 8 +-------
src/http/one/Parser.h | 4 +---
src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 23 ++++++++++++++++++-----
src/parser/Tokenizer.cc | 12 ++++++++++++
src/parser/Tokenizer.h | 7 +++++++
5 files changed, 39 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
index c78ddd7f0..291ae39f0 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
@@ -65,16 +65,10 @@ Http::One::Parser::DelimiterCharacters()
void
Http::One::Parser::skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &tok) const
{
- if (tok.skip(Http1::CrLf()))
- return;
-
if (Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser && tok.skipOne(CharacterSet::LF))
return;
- if (tok.atEnd() || (tok.remaining().length() == 1 && tok.remaining().at(0) == '\r'))
- throw InsufficientInput();
-
- throw TexcHere("garbage instead of CRLF line terminator");
+ tok.skipRequired("line-terminating CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
}
/// all characters except the LF line terminator
diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
index f83c01a9a..aab895583 100644
--- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
@@ -124,9 +124,7 @@ protected:
* detect and skip the CRLF or (if tolerant) LF line terminator
* consume from the tokenizer.
*
- * \throws exception on bad or InsuffientInput.
- * \retval true only if line terminator found.
- * \retval false incomplete or missing line terminator, need more data.
+ * \throws exception on bad or InsufficientInput
*/
void skipLineTerminator(Tokenizer &) const;
diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
index 1434100b6..8bdb65abb 100644
--- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
@@ -91,6 +91,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok)
{
Must(theChunkSize <= 0); // Should(), really
+ static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixLower("0x");
+ static const SBuf bannedHexPrefixUpper("0X");
+ if (tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixLower) || tok.skip(bannedHexPrefixUpper))
+ throw TextException("chunk starts with 0x", Here());
+
int64_t size = -1;
if (tok.int64(size, 16, false) && !tok.atEnd()) {
if (size < 0)
@@ -121,7 +126,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
// bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
try {
parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
- skipLineTerminator(tok);
+ tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
buf_ = tok.remaining();
parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
return true;
@@ -132,12 +137,14 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
// other exceptions bubble up to kill message parsing
}
-/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 7230 section 4.1.1 and its Errata #4667):
+/// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
void
-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
+Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
{
do {
+ auto tok = callerTok;
+
ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
if (!tok.skip(';'))
@@ -145,6 +152,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &tok)
parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
+ callerTok = tok;
} while (true);
}
@@ -158,11 +166,14 @@ Http::One::ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(Tokenizer &tok, const SBuf &extName
/// Parses a single chunk-ext list element:
/// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
void
-Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
+Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &callerTok)
{
+ auto tok = callerTok;
+
ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: ICAP servers send SP before chunk-ext-name
const auto extName = tok.prefix("chunk-ext-name", CharacterSet::TCHAR);
+ callerTok = tok; // in case we determine that this is a valueless chunk-ext
ParseBws(tok);
@@ -176,6 +187,8 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &tok)
customExtensionValueParser->parse(tok, extName);
else
ChunkExtensionValueParser::Ignore(tok, extName);
+
+ callerTok = tok;
}
bool
@@ -209,7 +222,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok)
Must(theLeftBodySize == 0); // Should(), really
try {
- skipLineTerminator(tok);
+ tok.skipRequired("chunk CRLF", Http1::CrLf());
buf_ = tok.remaining(); // parse checkpoint
theChunkSize = 0; // done with the current chunk
parsingStage_ = Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK_SZ;
diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
index edaffd8d3..15df793b8 100644
--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
+++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.cc
@@ -147,6 +147,18 @@ Parser::Tokenizer::skipAll(const CharacterSet &tokenChars)
return success(prefixLen);
}
+void
+Parser::Tokenizer::skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip)
+{
+ if (skip(tokenToSkip) || tokenToSkip.isEmpty())
+ return;
+
+ if (tokenToSkip.startsWith(buf_))
+ throw InsufficientInput();
+
+ throw TextException(ToSBuf("cannot skip ", description), Here());
+}
+
bool
Parser::Tokenizer::skipOne(const CharacterSet &chars)
{
diff --git a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
index 7bae1ccbb..3cfa7dd6c 100644
--- a/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
+++ b/src/parser/Tokenizer.h
@@ -115,6 +115,13 @@ public:
*/
SBuf::size_type skipAll(const CharacterSet &discardables);
+ /** skips a given character sequence (string);
+ * does nothing if the sequence is empty
+ *
+ * \throws exception on mismatching prefix or InsufficientInput
+ */
+ void skipRequired(const char *description, const SBuf &tokenToSkip);
+
/** Removes a single trailing character from the set.
*
* \return whether a character was removed
--
2.25.1

View File

@ -1,8 +1,26 @@
From 052cf082b0faaef4eaaa4e94119d7a1437aac4a3 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: squidadm <squidadm@users.noreply.github.com>
Date: Wed, 18 Oct 2023 04:50:56 +1300
Subject: [PATCH] Fix stack buffer overflow when parsing Digest Authorization
(#1517)
The bug was discovered and detailed by Joshua Rogers at
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/digest-overflow.html
where it was filed as "Stack Buffer Overflow in Digest Authentication".
---------
Co-authored-by: Alex Bason <nonsleepr@gmail.com>
Co-authored-by: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
---
src/auth/digest/Config.cc | 10 +++++++---
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 3 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
index 6a9736f..0a883fa 100644
index d42831a55..be9f3c433 100644
--- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
+++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
@@ -847,11 +847,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const char *aRequestRealm)
@@ -844,11 +844,15 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const HttpRequest *request,
break;
case DIGEST_NC:
@ -21,3 +39,5 @@ index 6a9736f..0a883fa 100644
break;
case DIGEST_CNONCE:
--
2.25.1

View File

@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
From c67bf049871a49e9871efe50b230a7f37b7039f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Thu, 25 May 2023 02:10:28 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Fix userinfo percent-encoding (#1367)
%X expects an unsigned int, and that is what we were giving it. However,
to get to the correct unsigned int value from a (signed) char, one has
to cast to an unsigned char (or equivalent) first.
Broken since inception in commit 7b75100.
Also adjusted similar (commented out) ext_edirectory_userip_acl code.
---
src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc | 2 +-
src/anyp/Uri.cc | 2 +-
2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
index dbc20ae54..9028d1562 100644
--- a/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
+++ b/src/acl/external/eDirectory_userip/ext_edirectory_userip_acl.cc
@@ -1612,7 +1612,7 @@ MainSafe(int argc, char **argv)
/* BINARY DEBUGGING *
local_printfx("while() -> bufa[%" PRIuSIZE "]: %s", k, bufa);
for (i = 0; i < k; ++i)
- local_printfx("%02X", bufa[i]);
+ local_printfx("%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(bufa[i])));
local_printfx("\n");
* BINARY DEBUGGING */
/* Check for CRLF */
diff --git a/src/anyp/Uri.cc b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
index a6a5d5d9e..3d19188e9 100644
--- a/src/anyp/Uri.cc
+++ b/src/anyp/Uri.cc
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ AnyP::Uri::Encode(const SBuf &buf, const CharacterSet &ignore)
while (!tk.atEnd()) {
// TODO: Add Tokenizer::parseOne(void).
const auto ch = tk.remaining()[0];
- output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(ch)); // TODO: Optimize using a table
+ output.appendf("%%%02X", static_cast<unsigned int>(static_cast<unsigned char>(ch))); // TODO: Optimize using a table
(void)tk.skip(ch);
if (tk.prefix(goodSection, ignore))
--
2.25.1

View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
diff --git a/src/ClientRequestContext.h b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
index fe2edf6..47aa935 100644
index 55a7a43..94a8700 100644
--- a/src/ClientRequestContext.h
+++ b/src/ClientRequestContext.h
@@ -81,6 +81,10 @@ public:
@@ -80,6 +80,10 @@ public:
#endif
ErrorState *error; ///< saved error page for centralized/delayed processing
bool readNextRequest; ///< whether Squid should read after error handling
@ -14,10 +14,10 @@ index fe2edf6..47aa935 100644
#endif /* SQUID_CLIENTREQUESTCONTEXT_H */
diff --git a/src/client_side_request.cc b/src/client_side_request.cc
index 1c6ff62..b758f6f 100644
index f44849e..c7c09d4 100644
--- a/src/client_side_request.cc
+++ b/src/client_side_request.cc
@@ -78,6 +78,11 @@
@@ -80,6 +80,11 @@
static const char *const crlf = "\r\n";
#if FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR
@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ index 1c6ff62..b758f6f 100644
+#define SQUID_X_FORWARDED_FOR_HOP_MAX 64
+#endif
+
static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data);
static void clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data);
#endif /* FOLLOW_X_FORWARDED_FOR */
@@ -485,8 +490,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(allow_t answer, void *data)
@@ -485,8 +490,16 @@ clientFollowXForwardedForCheck(Acl::Answer answer, void *data)
/* override the default src_addr tested if we have to go deeper than one level into XFF */
Filled(calloutContext->acl_checklist)->src_addr = request->indirect_client_addr;
}

View File

@ -0,0 +1,30 @@
commit 8fcff9c09824b18628f010d26a04247f6a6cbcb8
Author: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Sun Nov 12 09:33:20 2023 +0000
Do not update StoreEntry expiration after errorAppendEntry() (#1580)
errorAppendEntry() is responsible for setting entry expiration times,
which it does by calling StoreEntry::storeErrorResponse() that calls
StoreEntry::negativeCache().
This change was triggered by a vulnerability report by Joshua Rogers at
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/cache-uaf.html where
it was filed as "Use-After-Free in Cache Manager Errors". The reported
"use after free" vulnerability was unknowingly addressed by 2022 commit
1fa761a that removed excessively long "reentrant" store_client calls
responsible for the disappearance of the properly locked StoreEntry in
this (and probably other) contexts.
diff --git a/src/cache_manager.cc b/src/cache_manager.cc
index 61c7f65be..65bf22dd0 100644
--- a/src/cache_manager.cc
+++ b/src/cache_manager.cc
@@ -326,7 +326,6 @@ CacheManager::start(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &client, HttpRequest *request,
err->url = xstrdup(entry->url());
err->detailError(new ExceptionErrorDetail(Here().id()));
errorAppendEntry(entry, err);
- entry->expires = squid_curtime;
return;
}

View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
index b006300..023e411 100644
index 98e3969..8b55bf3 100644
--- a/src/http.cc
+++ b/src/http.cc
@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
@@ -54,6 +54,7 @@
#include "rfc1738.h"
#include "SquidConfig.h"
#include "SquidTime.h"
@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
#include "StatCounters.h"
#include "Store.h"
#include "StrList.h"
@@ -1150,18 +1151,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
@@ -1235,18 +1236,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
* Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
*/
@ -18,13 +18,13 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
- CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
- rd.conn = io.conn;
- rd.size = entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, inBuf.spaceSize()));
+ size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
+ if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission) || !moreDataPermission)) {
+ const auto moreDataPermission = canBufferMoreReplyBytes();
+ if (!moreDataPermission) {
+ abortTransaction("ready to read required data, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
+ return;
+ }
+
+ const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission);
+ const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission.value());
+ // TODO: Move this logic inside maybeMakeSpaceAvailable():
+ const auto readSizeWanted = readSizeMax ? entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, readSizeMax)) : 0;
@ -42,23 +42,24 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
case Comm::INPROGRESS:
if (inBuf.isEmpty())
@@ -1520,8 +1529,11 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
@@ -1617,8 +1626,10 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
if (!Comm::IsConnOpen(serverConnection) || fd_table[serverConnection->fd].closing())
return;
- if (!maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(false))
+ size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
+ if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission)) || !moreDataPermission) {
+ if (!canBufferMoreReplyBytes()) {
+ abortTransaction("more response bytes required, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
return;
+ }
// XXX: get rid of the do_next_read flag
// check for the proper reasons preventing read(2)
@@ -1539,40 +1551,79 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
@@ -1636,40 +1647,78 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
Comm::Read(serverConnection, call);
}
-bool
-HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
+/// Desired inBuf capacity based on various capacity preferences/limits:
+/// * a smaller buffer may not hold enough for look-ahead header/body parsers;
+/// * a smaller buffer may result in inefficient tiny network reads;
@ -66,7 +67,17 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
+/// * a bigger buffer may exceed SBuf storage capabilities (SBuf::maxSize);
+size_t
+HttpStateData::calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const
+{
{
- // how much we are allowed to buffer
- const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
-
- if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
- // when buffer is at or over limit already
- debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
- debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
- // Process next response from buffer
- processReply();
- return false;
+ if (!flags.headers_parsed)
+ return Config.maxReplyHeaderSize;
+
@ -77,7 +88,7 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
+ //
+ // TODO: Cannot reuse throwing NaturalCast() here. Consider removing
+ // .value() dereference in NaturalCast() or add/use NaturalCastOrMax().
+ const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).second ? NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).first : SBuf::maxSize;
+ const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).value_or(SBuf::maxSize);
+
+ // TODO: Honor TeChunkedParser look-ahead and trailer parsing requirements
+ // (when explicit configurationPreferences are set too low).
@ -90,39 +101,27 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
+/// \retval std::nullopt means that no more virgin response bytes can be read
+/// \retval 0 means that more virgin response bytes may be read later
+/// \retval >0 is the number of bytes that can be read now (subject to other constraints)
bool
-HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
+HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const
{
- // how much we are allowed to buffer
- const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
-
- if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
- // when buffer is at or over limit already
- debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
- debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
- // Process next response from buffer
- processReply();
- return false;
+std::optional<size_t>
+HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes() const
+{
+#if USE_ADAPTATION
+ // If we do not check this now, we may say the final "no" prematurely below
+ // because inBuf.length() will decrease as adaptation drains buffered bytes.
+ if (responseBodyBuffer) {
+ debugs(11, 3, "yes, but waiting for adaptation to drain read buffer");
+ *maxReadSize = 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
+ return true;
+ return 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
+ }
+#endif
+
+ const auto maxCapacity = calcReadBufferCapacityLimit();
+ if (inBuf.length() >= maxCapacity) {
+ debugs(11, 3, "no, due to a full buffer: " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize() << "; limit: " << maxCapacity);
+ return false; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
+ return std::nullopt; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
}
+ *maxReadSize = (maxCapacity - inBuf.length()); // positive
+ debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << *maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
+ return true; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
+ const auto maxReadSize = maxCapacity - inBuf.length(); // positive
+ debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
+ return maxReadSize; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
+}
+
+/// prepare read buffer for reading
@ -159,7 +158,7 @@ index b006300..023e411 100644
/// called after writing the very last request byte (body, last-chunk, etc)
diff --git a/src/http.h b/src/http.h
index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
index e70cd7e..f7ed40d 100644
--- a/src/http.h
+++ b/src/http.h
@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
@ -170,8 +169,8 @@ index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
+
class FwdState;
class HttpHeader;
@@ -107,16 +109,9 @@ private:
class String;
@@ -112,16 +114,9 @@ private:
void abortTransaction(const char *reason) { abortAll(reason); } // abnormal termination
@ -186,7 +185,7 @@ index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
- */
- bool maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool grow);
+ size_t calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const;
+ bool canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const;
+ std::optional<size_t> canBufferMoreReplyBytes() const;
+ size_t maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(size_t maxReadSize);
// consuming request body

View File

@ -1,10 +1,10 @@
diff --git a/src/SquidString.h b/src/SquidString.h
index a791885..b9aef38 100644
index e36cd27..ea613ad 100644
--- a/src/SquidString.h
+++ b/src/SquidString.h
@@ -114,7 +114,16 @@ private:
@@ -140,7 +140,16 @@ private:
size_type len_; /* current length */
size_type len_ = 0; /* current length */
- static const size_type SizeMax_ = 65535; ///< 64K limit protects some fixed-size buffers
+ /// An earlier 64KB limit was meant to protect some fixed-size buffers, but
@ -21,10 +21,10 @@ index a791885..b9aef38 100644
static bool SafeAdd(size_type &base, size_type extra) { if (extra <= SizeMax_ && base <= SizeMax_ - extra) { base += extra; return true; } return false; }
diff --git a/src/cache_cf.cc b/src/cache_cf.cc
index a9c1b7e..46f07bb 100644
index cb746dc..c4ade96 100644
--- a/src/cache_cf.cc
+++ b/src/cache_cf.cc
@@ -935,6 +935,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
@@ -950,6 +950,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
(uint32_t)Config.maxRequestBufferSize, (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestHeaderSize);
}
@ -44,10 +44,10 @@ index a9c1b7e..46f07bb 100644
* Disable client side request pipelining if client_persistent_connections OFF.
* Waste of resources queueing any pipelined requests when the first will close the connection.
diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
index 67a66b0..61a66f1 100644
--- a/src/cf.data.pre
+++ b/src/cf.data.pre
@@ -6196,11 +6196,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
@@ -6489,11 +6489,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
DEFAULT: 64 KB
LOC: Config.maxRequestHeaderSize
DOC_START
@ -67,7 +67,7 @@ index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
DOC_END
NAME: reply_header_max_size
@@ -6209,11 +6212,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
@@ -6502,11 +6505,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
DEFAULT: 64 KB
LOC: Config.maxReplyHeaderSize
DOC_START
@ -88,10 +88,10 @@ index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
NAME: request_body_max_size
diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
index 877172d..b006300 100644
index 7c9ae70..98e3969 100644
--- a/src/http.cc
+++ b/src/http.cc
@@ -1820,8 +1820,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
@@ -1926,8 +1926,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
String strFwd = hdr_in->getList(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR);

View File

@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
diff --git a/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc b/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc
index b379856..5d87279 100644
--- a/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc
+++ b/lib/libTrie/TrieNode.cc
@@ -32,7 +32,7 @@ TrieNode::add(char const *aString, size_t theLength, void *privatedata, TrieChar
/* We trust that privatedata and existant keys have already been checked */
if (theLength) {
- int index = transform ? (*transform)(*aString): *aString;
+ const unsigned char index = transform ? (*transform)(*aString): *aString;
if (!internal[index])
internal[index] = new TrieNode;

View File

@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
diff --git a/src/client_side.cc b/src/client_side.cc
index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
index 4eb6976..63f1b66 100644
--- a/src/client_side.cc
+++ b/src/client_side.cc
@@ -906,7 +906,7 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
@@ -957,7 +957,7 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
* We are done with the response, and we are either still receiving request
* body (early response!) or have already stopped receiving anything.
*
@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
* (XXX: but then we will call readNextRequest() which may succeed and
* execute a smuggled request as we are not done with the current request).
*
@@ -926,28 +926,12 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
@@ -977,28 +977,12 @@ ConnStateData::kick()
* Attempt to parse a request from the request buffer.
* If we've been fed a pipelined request it may already
* be in our read buffer.
@ -42,8 +42,8 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
/** \par
* At this point we either have a parsed request (which we've
@@ -2058,16 +2042,11 @@ ConnStateData::receivedFirstByte()
commSetConnTimeout(clientConnection, Config.Timeout.request, timeoutCall);
@@ -1935,16 +1919,11 @@ ConnStateData::receivedFirstByte()
resetReadTimeout(Config.Timeout.request);
}
-/**
@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
debugs(33, 5, HERE << clientConnection << ": attempting to parse");
// Loop while we have read bytes that are not needed for producing the body
@@ -2116,8 +2095,6 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
@@ -1989,8 +1968,6 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
processParsedRequest(context);
@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
if (context->mayUseConnection()) {
debugs(33, 3, HERE << "Not parsing new requests, as this request may need the connection");
break;
@@ -2130,8 +2107,19 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
@@ -2003,8 +1980,19 @@ ConnStateData::clientParseRequests()
}
}
@ -94,21 +94,16 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
}
void
@@ -2148,23 +2136,7 @@ ConnStateData::afterClientRead()
@@ -2021,18 +2009,7 @@ ConnStateData::afterClientRead()
if (pipeline.empty())
fd_note(clientConnection->fd, "Reading next request");
- if (!clientParseRequests()) {
- if (!isOpen())
- return;
- /*
- * If the client here is half closed and we failed
- * to parse a request, close the connection.
- * The above check with connFinishedWithConn() only
- * succeeds _if_ the buffer is empty which it won't
- * be if we have an incomplete request.
- * XXX: This duplicates ConnStateData::kick
- */
- // We may get here if the client half-closed after sending a partial
- // request. See doClientRead() and shouldCloseOnEof().
- // XXX: This partially duplicates ConnStateData::kick().
- if (pipeline.empty() && commIsHalfClosed(clientConnection->fd)) {
- debugs(33, 5, clientConnection << ": half-closed connection, no completed request parsed, connection closing.");
- clientConnection->close();
@ -119,7 +114,7 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
if (!isOpen())
return;
@@ -3945,7 +3917,7 @@ ConnStateData::notePinnedConnectionBecameIdle(PinnedIdleContext pic)
@@ -3789,7 +3766,7 @@ ConnStateData::notePinnedConnectionBecameIdle(PinnedIdleContext pic)
startPinnedConnectionMonitoring();
if (pipeline.empty())
@ -129,10 +124,10 @@ index f57f3f7..ab393e4 100644
/// Forward future client requests using the given server connection.
diff --git a/src/client_side.h b/src/client_side.h
index 9fe8463..dfb4d8e 100644
index 2793673..7c8d86b 100644
--- a/src/client_side.h
+++ b/src/client_side.h
@@ -85,7 +85,6 @@ public:
@@ -93,7 +93,6 @@ public:
virtual void doneWithControlMsg();
/// Traffic parsing
@ -140,16 +135,16 @@ index 9fe8463..dfb4d8e 100644
void readNextRequest();
/// try to make progress on a transaction or read more I/O
@@ -373,6 +372,7 @@ private:
virtual bool connFinishedWithConn(int size);
virtual void checkLogging();
@@ -422,6 +421,7 @@ private:
void checkLogging();
+ void parseRequests();
void clientAfterReadingRequests();
bool concurrentRequestQueueFilled() const;
diff --git a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
index d7efb0f..655ed83 100644
index acf61c4..b1d82bf 100644
--- a/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
+++ b/src/tests/stub_client_side.cc
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@

View File

@ -1,14 +1,14 @@
commit c08948c8b831a2ba73c676b48aa11ba1b58cc542
commit c54122584d175cf1d292b239a5b70f2d1aa77c3a
Author: Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com>
Date: Thu Dec 8 11:03:08 2022 +0100
Date: Mon Dec 5 15:03:07 2022 +0100
Backport adding IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT flag to outgoing connections
diff --git a/src/comm.cc b/src/comm.cc
index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
index b4818f3..b18d175 100644
--- a/src/comm.cc
+++ b/src/comm.cc
@@ -58,6 +58,7 @@
@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
*/
static IOCB commHalfClosedReader;
@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
static void comm_init_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn, const char *note, struct addrinfo *AI);
static int comm_apply_flags(int new_socket, Ip::Address &addr, int flags, struct addrinfo *AI);
@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ static EVH commHalfClosedCheck;
@@ -76,6 +77,7 @@ static EVH commHalfClosedCheck;
static void commPlanHalfClosedCheck();
static Comm::Flag commBind(int s, struct addrinfo &);
@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
static void commSetReuseAddr(int);
static void commSetNoLinger(int);
#ifdef TCP_NODELAY
@@ -201,6 +203,22 @@ comm_local_port(int fd)
@@ -202,6 +204,22 @@ comm_local_port(int fd)
return F->local_addr.port();
}
@ -47,18 +47,18 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
static Comm::Flag
commBind(int s, struct addrinfo &inaddr)
{
@@ -227,6 +245,10 @@ comm_open(int sock_type,
@@ -228,6 +246,10 @@ comm_open(int sock_type,
int flags,
const char *note)
{
+ // assume zero-port callers do not need to know the assigned port right away
+ // assume zero-port callers do not need to know the assigned port right away
+ if (sock_type == SOCK_STREAM && addr.port() == 0 && ((flags & COMM_DOBIND) || !addr.isAnyAddr()))
+ flags |= COMM_DOBIND_PORT_LATER;
+
return comm_openex(sock_type, proto, addr, flags, note);
}
@@ -328,7 +350,7 @@ comm_set_transparent(int fd)
@@ -329,7 +351,7 @@ comm_set_transparent(int fd)
* Create a socket. Default is blocking, stream (TCP) socket. IO_TYPE
* is OR of flags specified in defines.h:COMM_*
*/
@ -67,10 +67,10 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
comm_openex(int sock_type,
int proto,
Ip::Address &addr,
@@ -476,6 +498,9 @@ comm_apply_flags(int new_socket,
if ( addr.isNoAddr() )
debugs(5,0,"CRITICAL: Squid is attempting to bind() port " << addr << "!!");
@@ -488,6 +510,9 @@ comm_apply_flags(int new_socket,
}
}
#endif
+ if ((flags & COMM_DOBIND_PORT_LATER))
+ commSetBindAddressNoPort(new_socket);
+
@ -78,7 +78,7 @@ index 0d5f34d..6811b54 100644
comm_close(new_socket);
return -1;
diff --git a/src/comm.h b/src/comm.h
index c963e1c..9ff201d 100644
index 5a1a7c2..a9f33db 100644
--- a/src/comm.h
+++ b/src/comm.h
@@ -43,7 +43,6 @@ void comm_import_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &, const char *note, struc
@ -98,10 +98,10 @@ index c963e1c..9ff201d 100644
int comm_udp_sendto(int sock, const Ip::Address &to, const void *buf, int buflen);
diff --git a/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc b/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc
index 25a30e4..2082214 100644
index 19c1237..79fa2ed 100644
--- a/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc
+++ b/src/comm/ConnOpener.cc
@@ -263,7 +263,7 @@ Comm::ConnOpener::createFd()
@@ -285,7 +285,7 @@ Comm::ConnOpener::createFd()
if (callback_ == NULL || callback_->canceled())
return false;
@ -111,20 +111,20 @@ index 25a30e4..2082214 100644
sendAnswer(Comm::ERR_CONNECT, 0, "Comm::ConnOpener::createFd");
return false;
diff --git a/src/comm/Connection.h b/src/comm/Connection.h
index 4f2f23a..1e32c22 100644
index 40c2249..2641f4e 100644
--- a/src/comm/Connection.h
+++ b/src/comm/Connection.h
@@ -47,6 +47,8 @@ namespace Comm
#define COMM_DOBIND 0x08 // requires a bind()
#define COMM_TRANSPARENT 0x10 // arrived via TPROXY
#define COMM_INTERCEPTION 0x20 // arrived via NAT
@@ -52,6 +52,8 @@ namespace Comm
#define COMM_REUSEPORT 0x40 //< needs SO_REUSEPORT
/// not registered with Comm and not owned by any connection-closing code
#define COMM_ORPHANED 0x40
+/// Internal Comm optimization: Keep the source port unassigned until connect(2)
+#define COMM_DOBIND_PORT_LATER 0x100
/**
* Store data about the physical and logical attributes of a connection.
diff --git a/src/ipc.cc b/src/ipc.cc
index e1d48fc..e92a27f 100644
index 45cab52..42e11e6 100644
--- a/src/ipc.cc
+++ b/src/ipc.cc
@@ -95,12 +95,12 @@ ipcCreate(int type, const char *prog, const char *const args[], const char *name
@ -143,10 +143,10 @@ index e1d48fc..e92a27f 100644
local_addr,
0, /* blocking */
diff --git a/src/tests/stub_comm.cc b/src/tests/stub_comm.cc
index 58f85e4..5381ab2 100644
index a1d33d6..bf4bea6 100644
--- a/src/tests/stub_comm.cc
+++ b/src/tests/stub_comm.cc
@@ -46,7 +46,6 @@ int comm_open_uds(int sock_type, int proto, struct sockaddr_un* addr, int flags)
@@ -48,7 +48,6 @@ int comm_open_uds(int sock_type, int proto, struct sockaddr_un* addr, int flags)
void comm_import_opened(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &, const char *note, struct addrinfo *AI) STUB
int comm_open_listener(int sock_type, int proto, Ip::Address &addr, int flags, const char *note) STUB_RETVAL(-1)
void comm_open_listener(int sock_type, int proto, Comm::ConnectionPointer &conn, const char *note) STUB

View File

@ -0,0 +1,113 @@
From a0a9e6dc69d0c7b9ba237702b4c5020abc7ad1f8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
Date: Sat, 4 Nov 2023 00:30:42 +0000
Subject: [PATCH] Bug 5154: Do not open IPv6 sockets when IPv6 is disabled
(#1567)
... but allow basic IPv6 manipulations like getSockAddr().
Address.cc:663 getAddrInfo() assertion failed: false
Squids receives IPv6 addresses from traffic, configuration, or
hard-coded constants even when ./configured with --disable-ipv6 or when
IPv6 support was automatically disabled at startup after failing IPv6
tests. To handle IPv6 correctly, such Squids must support basic IPv6
operations like recognizing an IPv6 address in a request-target or
reporting an unsolicited IPv6 DNS record. At least for now, such Squids
must also correctly parse configuration-related IPv6 addresses.
All those activities rely on various low-level operations like filling
addrinfo structure with IP address information. Since 2012 commit
c5fbbc7, Ip::Address::getAddrInfo() was failing for IPv6 addresses when
Ip::EnableIpv6 was falsy. That change correctly recognized[^1] the need
for such Squids to handle IPv6, but to support basic operations, we need
to reject IPv6 addresses at a higher level and without asserting.
That high-level rejection work is ongoing, but initial attempts have
exposed difficult problems that will take time to address. For now, we
just avoid the assertion while protecting IPv6-disabled Squid from
listening on or opening connections to IPv6 addresses. Since Squid
already expects (and usually correctly handles) socket opening failures,
disabling those operations is better than failing in low-level IP
manipulation code.
The overall IPv6 posture of IPv6-disabled Squids that lack http_access
or other rules to deny IPv6 requests will change: This fix exposes more
of IPv6-disabled Squid code to IPv6 addresses. It is possible that such
exposure will make some IPv6 resources inside Squid (e.g., a previously
cached HTTP response) accessible to external requests. Squids will not
open or accept IPv6 connections but may forward requests with raw IPv6
targets to IPv4 cache_peers. Whether these and similar behavior changes
are going to be permanent is open for debate, but even if they are
temporary, they are arguably better than the corresponding assertions.
These changes do not effect IPv6-enabled Squids.
The assertion in IPv6-disabled Squid was reported by Joshua Rogers at
https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/ipv6-assert.html where
it was filed as "Assertion on IPv6 Host Requests with --disable-ipv6".
[^1]: https://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=3593#c1
---
src/comm.cc | 6 ++++++
src/ip/Address.cc | 2 +-
src/ip/Intercept.cc | 8 ++++++++
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/src/comm.cc b/src/comm.cc
index 4659955b011..271ba04d4da 100644
--- a/src/comm.cc
+++ b/src/comm.cc
@@ -344,6 +344,12 @@ comm_openex(int sock_type,
/* Create socket for accepting new connections. */
++ statCounter.syscalls.sock.sockets;
+ if (!Ip::EnableIpv6 && addr.isIPv6()) {
+ debugs(50, 2, "refusing to open an IPv6 socket when IPv6 support is disabled: " << addr);
+ errno = ENOTSUP;
+ return -1;
+ }
+
/* Setup the socket addrinfo details for use */
addr.getAddrInfo(AI);
AI->ai_socktype = sock_type;
diff --git a/src/ip/Address.cc b/src/ip/Address.cc
index b6f810bfc25..ae6db37da5e 100644
--- a/src/ip/Address.cc
+++ b/src/ip/Address.cc
@@ -623,7 +623,7 @@ Ip::Address::getAddrInfo(struct addrinfo *&dst, int force) const
&& dst->ai_protocol == 0)
dst->ai_protocol = IPPROTO_UDP;
- if (force == AF_INET6 || (force == AF_UNSPEC && Ip::EnableIpv6 && isIPv6()) ) {
+ if (force == AF_INET6 || (force == AF_UNSPEC && isIPv6()) ) {
dst->ai_addr = (struct sockaddr*)new sockaddr_in6;
memset(dst->ai_addr,0,sizeof(struct sockaddr_in6));
diff --git a/src/ip/Intercept.cc b/src/ip/Intercept.cc
index 1a5e2d15af1..a8522efaac0 100644
--- a/src/ip/Intercept.cc
+++ b/src/ip/Intercept.cc
@@ -15,6 +15,7 @@
#include "comm/Connection.h"
#include "fde.h"
#include "ip/Intercept.h"
+#include "ip/tools.h"
#include "src/tools.h"
#include <cerrno>
@@ -430,6 +431,13 @@ Ip::Intercept::ProbeForTproxy(Ip::Address &test)
debugs(3, 3, "Detect TPROXY support on port " << test);
+ if (!Ip::EnableIpv6 && test.isIPv6() && !test.setIPv4()) {
+ debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "Cannot use TPROXY for " << test << " because IPv6 support is disabled");
+ if (doneSuid)
+ leave_suid();
+ return false;
+ }
+
int tos = 1;
int tmp_sock = -1;

View File

@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
File: squid-5.5.tar.xz
Date: Wed 13 Apr 2022 08:45:42 UTC
Size: 2565732
MD5 : 83ccc2d86ca0966e3555a3b78f5afd14
SHA1: 42302bd9b8feff851a41420334cb8eaeab2806ab
Key : CD6DBF8EF3B17D3E <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
B068 84ED B779 C89B 044E 64E3 CD6D BF8E F3B1 7D3E
keyring = http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
keyserver = pool.sks-keyservers.net
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----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=9xr/
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----

View File

@ -2,6 +2,7 @@
weekly
rotate 5
compress
delaycompress
notifempty
missingok
nocreate
@ -10,7 +11,5 @@
# Asks squid to reopen its logs. (logfile_rotate 0 is set in squid.conf)
# errors redirected to make it silent if squid is not running
/usr/sbin/squid -k rotate 2>/dev/null
# Wait a little to allow Squid to catch up before the logs is compressed
sleep 1
endscript
}

View File

@ -2,6 +2,6 @@
case "$2" in
up|down|vpn-up|vpn-down)
/bin/systemctl -q reload squid.service || :
/usr/bin/systemctl -q reload squid.service || :
;;
esac

View File

@ -1,9 +1,5 @@
# default squid options
SQUID_OPTS=""
# Time to wait for Squid to shut down when asked. Should not be necessary
# most of the time.
SQUID_SHUTDOWN_TIMEOUT=100
# default squid conf file
SQUID_CONF="/etc/squid/squid.conf"

2
SOURCES/squid.sysusers Normal file
View File

@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
g squid 23 -
u squid 23 "Squid proxy user" /var/spool/squid /sbin/nologin

View File

@ -1,85 +1,93 @@
%define __perl_requires %{SOURCE98}
Name: squid
Version: 4.15
Release: 10%{?dist}.1
Version: 5.5
Release: 14%{?dist}
Summary: The Squid proxy caching server
Epoch: 7
# See CREDITS for breakdown of non GPLv2+ code
License: GPLv2+ and (LGPLv2+ and MIT and BSD and Public Domain)
URL: http://www.squid-cache.org
Source0: http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v4/squid-%{version}.tar.xz
Source1: http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v4/squid-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
Source2: squid.logrotate
Source3: squid.sysconfig
Source4: squid.pam
Source5: squid.nm
Source6: squid.service
Source7: cache_swap.sh
Source0: http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v5/squid-%{version}.tar.xz
Source1: http://www.squid-cache.org/Versions/v5/squid-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
Source2: http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
Source3: squid.logrotate
Source4: squid.sysconfig
Source5: squid.pam
Source6: squid.nm
Source7: squid.service
Source8: cache_swap.sh
Source9: squid.sysusers
Source98: perl-requires-squid.sh
# Upstream patches
# Backported patches
Patch101: squid-4.15-ip-bind-address-no-port.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2072988
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2151188
Patch101: squid-5.5-ip-bind-address-no-port.patch
# Local patches
# Applying upstream patches first makes it less likely that local patches
# will break upstream ones.
Patch201: squid-4.11-config.patch
Patch202: squid-4.11-location.patch
Patch203: squid-4.11-perlpath.patch
Patch204: squid-4.11-include-guards.patch
Patch205: squid-4.11-large-acl.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=980511
Patch206: squid-4.11-active-ftp.patch
Patch208: squid-4.11-convert-ipv4.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2006121
Patch209: squid-4.15-ftp-filename-extraction.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2076717
Patch210: squid-4.15-halfclosed.patch
Patch201: squid-4.0.11-config.patch
Patch202: squid-3.1.0.9-location.patch
Patch203: squid-3.0.STABLE1-perlpath.patch
Patch204: squid-3.5.9-include-guards.patch
# revert this upstream patch - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1936422
# workaround for #1934919
Patch205: squid-5.0.5-symlink-lang-err.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1953505
Patch206: squid-5.0.6-openssl3.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1969322
Patch207: squid-5.0.6-active-ftp.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1988122
Patch208: squid-5.1-test-store-cppsuite.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2231827
Patch209: squid-5.5-halfclosed.patch
# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-30352
Patch210: squid-5.5-ipv6-crash.patch
# Security fixes
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1941506
Patch300: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-28116.patch
# Security patches
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2100721
Patch301: squid-4.15-CVE-2021-46784.patch
Patch501: squid-5.5-CVE-2021-46784.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2129771
Patch302: squid-4.15-CVE-2022-41318.patch
Patch502: squid-5.5-CVE-2022-41318.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245910
# +backported: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/417da4006cf5c97d44e74431b816fc58fec9e270
Patch303: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
Patch503: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46846.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245916
Patch304: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46847.patch
# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-14792
Patch305: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-5824.patch
Patch504: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46847.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2245919
Patch505: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46848.patch
# https://issues.redhat.com/browse/RHEL-14802
Patch506: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-5824.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2248521
Patch306: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46728.patch
Patch507: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46728.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2247567
Patch307: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46724.patch
Patch508: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-46724.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252926
Patch308: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch
Patch509: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-49285.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252923
Patch309: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch
Patch510: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-49286.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2254663
Patch310: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch
Patch511: squid-5.5-CVE-2023-50269.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264309
Patch311: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch
Patch512: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-25617.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2268366
Patch312: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch
# Regression caused by squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
# Upstream PR: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/pull/1914
Patch313: squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch
Patch513: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-25111.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2294353
Patch514: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-37894.patch
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2260051
Patch515: squid-5.5-CVE-2024-23638.patch
# cache_swap.sh
Requires: bash gawk
# for httpd conf file - cachemgr script alias
Requires: httpd-filesystem
Requires: bash >= 2.0
Requires(pre): shadow-utils
Requires(post): systemd
Requires(preun): systemd
Requires(postun): systemd
# squid_ldap_auth and other LDAP helpers require OpenLDAP
BuildRequires: make
BuildRequires: openldap-devel
# squid_pam_auth requires PAM development libs
BuildRequires: pam-devel
@ -87,8 +95,8 @@ BuildRequires: pam-devel
BuildRequires: openssl-devel
# squid_kerb_aut requires Kerberos development libs
BuildRequires: krb5-devel
# time_quota requires DB
BuildRequires: libdb-devel
# time_quota requires TrivialDB
BuildRequires: libtdb-devel
# ESI support requires Expat & libxml2
BuildRequires: expat-devel libxml2-devel
# TPROXY requires libcap, and also increases security somewhat
@ -101,10 +109,20 @@ BuildRequires: libtool libtool-ltdl-devel
BuildRequires: perl-generators
# For test suite
BuildRequires: pkgconfig(cppunit)
BuildRequires: autoconf
# For verifying downloded src tarball
BuildRequires: gnupg2
# for _tmpfilesdir and _unitdir macro
# see https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/Systemd/#_packaging
BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
# systemd notify
BuildRequires: systemd-devel
%{?systemd_requires}
%{?sysusers_requires_compat}
# Old NetworkManager expects the dispatcher scripts in a different place
Conflicts: NetworkManager < 1.20
%description
Squid is a high-performance proxy caching server for Web clients,
supporting FTP, gopher, and HTTP data objects. Unlike traditional
@ -118,6 +136,7 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
(ftpget), and some management and client tools.
%prep
%{gpgverify} --keyring='%{SOURCE2}' --signature='%{SOURCE1}' --data='%{SOURCE0}'
%setup -q
# Upstream patches
@ -129,36 +148,36 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
%patch201 -p1 -b .config
%patch202 -p1 -b .location
%patch203 -p1 -b .perlpath
%patch204 -p1 -b .include-guards
%patch205 -p1 -b .large_acl
%patch206 -p1 -b .active-ftp
%patch208 -p1 -b .convert-ipv4
%patch209 -p1 -b .ftp-fn-extraction
%patch210 -p1 -b .halfclosed
%patch204 -p0 -b .include-guards
%patch205 -p1 -R -b .symlink-lang-err
%patch206 -p1 -b .openssl3
%patch207 -p1 -b .active-ftp
%patch208 -p1 -b .test-store-cpp
%patch209 -p1 -b .halfclosed
%patch210 -p1 -b .ipv6-crash
%patch501 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46784
%patch502 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-41318
%patch503 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46846
%patch504 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46847
%patch505 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46848
%patch506 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-5824
%patch507 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46728
%patch508 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46724
%patch509 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49285
%patch510 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49286
%patch511 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
%patch512 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25617
%patch513 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
%patch514 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-37894
%patch515 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-23638
# Security patches
%patch300 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-28116
%patch301 -p1 -b .CVE-2021-46784
%patch302 -p1 -b .CVE-2022-41318
%patch303 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46846
%patch304 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46847
%patch305 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-5824
%patch306 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46728
%patch307 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46724
%patch308 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49285
%patch309 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49286
%patch310 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
%patch311 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25617
%patch312 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
%patch313 -p1 -b .ignore-wsp-chunk-sz
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1679526
# Patch in the vendor documentation and used different location for documentation
sed -i 's|@SYSCONFDIR@/squid.conf.documented|%{_pkgdocdir}/squid.conf.documented|' src/squid.8.in
%build
# cppunit-config patch changes configure.ac
autoconf
# NIS helper has been removed because of the following bug
# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1531540
@ -167,7 +186,7 @@ autoconf
--datadir=%{_datadir}/squid \
--sysconfdir=%{_sysconfdir}/squid \
--with-logdir='%{_localstatedir}/log/squid' \
--with-pidfile='%{_localstatedir}/run/squid.pid' \
--with-pidfile='/run/squid.pid' \
--disable-dependency-tracking \
--enable-eui \
--enable-follow-x-forwarded-for \
@ -204,13 +223,19 @@ autoconf
--with-pthreads \
--disable-arch-native \
--disable-security-cert-validators \
--disable-strict-error-checking \
--with-swapdir=%{_localstatedir}/spool/squid
# workaround to build squid v5
mkdir -p src/icmp/tests
mkdir -p tools/squidclient/tests
mkdir -p tools/tests
%make_build
%check
make check
%install
%make_install
@ -233,22 +258,20 @@ mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/httpd/conf.d/
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_prefix}/lib/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_unitdir}
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/squid
install -m 644 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d/squid
install -m 644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/squid
install -m 644 %{SOURCE4} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/squid
install -m 644 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_unitdir}
install -m 755 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/squid
install -m 644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/logrotate.d/squid
install -m 644 %{SOURCE4} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/sysconfig/squid
install -m 644 %{SOURCE5} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/pam.d/squid
install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_unitdir}
install -m 755 %{SOURCE8} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_libexecdir}/squid
install -m 644 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/httpd/conf.d/squid.conf
install -m 644 %{SOURCE5} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/20-squid
install -m 755 %{SOURCE6} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_prefix}/lib/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/20-squid
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/log/squid
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/spool/squid
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_localstatedir}/run/squid
mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/run/squid
chmod 644 contrib/url-normalizer.pl contrib/user-agents.pl
iconv -f ISO88591 -t UTF8 ChangeLog -o ChangeLog.tmp
mv -f ChangeLog.tmp ChangeLog
# install /usr/lib/tmpfiles.d/squid.conf
mkdir -p ${RPM_BUILD_ROOT}%{_tmpfilesdir}
@ -266,11 +289,12 @@ mv $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/squid/mib.txt $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/usr/share/snmp/mibs/S
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/squid/squid.conf.documented
# remove unpackaged files from the buildroot
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/{RunAccel,RunCache}
rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp
# sysusers.d
install -p -D -m 0644 %{SOURCE9} %{buildroot}%{_sysusersdir}/squid.conf
%files
%defattr(-,root,root,-)
%license COPYING
%doc CONTRIBUTORS README ChangeLog QUICKSTART src/squid.conf.documented
%doc contrib/url-normalizer.pl contrib/user-agents.pl
@ -282,7 +306,7 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp
%attr(755,root,root) %dir %{_libdir}/squid
%attr(770,squid,root) %dir %{_localstatedir}/log/squid
%attr(750,squid,squid) %dir %{_localstatedir}/spool/squid
%attr(755,squid,squid) %dir %{_localstatedir}/run/squid
%attr(755,squid,squid) %dir /run/squid
%config(noreplace) %attr(644,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/httpd/conf.d/squid.conf
%config(noreplace) %attr(640,root,squid) %{_sysconfdir}/squid/squid.conf
@ -300,7 +324,7 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp
%dir %{_datadir}/squid
%attr(-,root,root) %{_datadir}/squid/errors
%attr(755,root,root) %{_sysconfdir}/NetworkManager/dispatcher.d/20-squid
%{_prefix}/lib/NetworkManager
%{_datadir}/squid/icons
%{_sbindir}/squid
%{_bindir}/squidclient
@ -310,15 +334,10 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/squid.httpd.tmp
%{_libdir}/squid/*
%{_datadir}/snmp/mibs/SQUID-MIB.txt
%{_tmpfilesdir}/squid.conf
%{_sysusersdir}/squid.conf
%pre
if ! getent group squid >/dev/null 2>&1; then
/usr/sbin/groupadd -g 23 squid
fi
if ! getent passwd squid >/dev/null 2>&1 ; then
/usr/sbin/useradd -g 23 -u 23 -d /var/spool/squid -r -s /sbin/nologin squid >/dev/null 2>&1 || exit 1
fi
%sysusers_create_compat %{SOURCE9}
for i in /var/log/squid /var/spool/squid ; do
if [ -d $i ] ; then
@ -331,6 +350,18 @@ done
exit 0
%pretrans -p <lua>
-- temporarilly commented until https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1936422 is resolved
--
-- previously /usr/share/squid/errors/es-mx was symlink, now it is directory since squid v5
-- see https://docs.fedoraproject.org/en-US/packaging-guidelines/Directory_Replacement/
-- Define the path to the symlink being replaced below.
--
-- path = "/usr/share/squid/errors/es-mx"
-- st = posix.stat(path)
-- if st and st.type == "link" then
-- os.remove(path)
-- end
-- Due to a bug #447156
paths = {"/usr/share/squid/errors/zh-cn", "/usr/share/squid/errors/zh-tw"}
for key,path in ipairs(paths)
@ -367,173 +398,240 @@ fi
%changelog
* Mon Oct 14 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.1
- Resolves: RHEL-56024 - (Regression) Transfer-encoding:chunked data is not sent
to the client in its complementary
* Mon Jul 01 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-14
- Resolves: RHEL-45057 - squid: Out-of-bounds write error may lead to Denial of
Service (CVE-2024-37894)
- Resolves: RHEL-22594 - squid: vulnerable to a Denial of Service attack against
Cache Manager error responses (CVE-2024-23638)
* Tue Mar 19 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10
- Resolves: RHEL-28529 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Chunked
* Thu May 09 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-13
- Resolves: RHEL-30352 - squid v5 crashes with SIGABRT when ipv6 is disabled
at kernel level but it is asked to connect to an ipv6 address by a client
* Tue Mar 19 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-12
- Resolves: RHEL-28530 - squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Chunked
Decoding (CVE-2024-25111)
- Resolves: RHEL-26088 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP header
- Resolves: RHEL-26092 - squid: denial of service in HTTP header
parser (CVE-2024-25617)
* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-9
- Resolves: RHEL-19552 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP request
* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-10
- Resolves: RHEL-19556 - squid: denial of service in HTTP request
parsing (CVE-2023-50269)
* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-8
- Resolves: RHEL-18351 - squid:4/squid: Buffer over-read in the HTTP Message
processing feature (CVE-2023-49285)
- Resolves: RHEL-18342 - squid:4/squid: Incorrect Check of Function Return
Value In Helper Process management (CVE-2023-49286)
- Resolves: RHEL-18230 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in SSL Certificate
validation (CVE-2023-46724)
- Resolves: RHEL-15911 - squid:4/squid: NULL pointer dereference in the gopher
protocol code (CVE-2023-46728)
- Resolves: RHEL-18251 - squid crashes in assertion when a parent peer exists
- Resolves: RHEL-14794 - squid: squid multiple issues in HTTP response caching
(CVE-2023-5824)
- Resolves: RHEL-14803 - squid: squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Digest
Authentication (CVE-2023-46847)
- Resolves: RHEL-14777 - squid: squid: Request/Response smuggling in HTTP/1.1
and ICAP (CVE-2023-46846)
* Thu Feb 01 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-9
- Resolves: RHEL-18354 - squid: Buffer over-read in the HTTP Message processing
feature (CVE-2023-49285)
- Resolves: RHEL-18345 - squid: Incorrect Check of Function Return Value In
Helper Process management (CVE-2023-49286)
- Resolves: RHEL-18146 - squid crashes in assertion when a parent peer exists
- Resolves: RHEL-18231 - squid: Denial of Service in SSL Certificate validation
(CVE-2023-46724)
- Resolves: RHEL-15912 - squid: NULL pointer dereference in the gopher protocol
code (CVE-2023-46728)
* Wed Aug 16 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7
- Resolves: #2076717 - Crash with half_closed_client on
* Tue Dec 05 2023 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-8
- Resolves: RHEL-14802 - squid: multiple issues in HTTP response caching
* Thu Dec 08 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 4.15-6
- Resolves: #2072988 - [RFE] Add the "IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT"
* Sun Nov 12 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-7
- Resolves: RHEL-14820 - squid: squid: denial of Servicein FTP
- Resolves: RHEL-14809 - squid: squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Digest
Authentication
- Resolves: RHEL-14781 - squid: squid: Request/Response smuggling in HTTP/1.1
and ICAP
* Wed Aug 16 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-6
- Resolves: #2231827 - Crash with half_closed_client on
* Tue Dec 06 2022 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-5
- Resolves: #2151188 - [RFE] Add the "IP_BIND_ADDRESS_NO_PORT"
flag to sockets created for outgoing connections in the squid source code.
* Wed Sep 28 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-5
- Resolves: #2130260 - CVE-2022-41318 squid:4/squid: buffer-over-read in SSPI and SMB
* Mon Nov 07 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-4
- Resolves: #2095468 - [RFE] squid use systemd-sysusers
* Mon Nov 07 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-3
- Resolves: #2130253 - CVE-2022-41318 squid: buffer-over-read in SSPI and SMB
authentication
* Tue Jun 28 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-4
- Resolves: #2100783 - CVE-2021-46784 squid:4/squid: DoS when processing gopher
server responses
* Mon Jul 11 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-2
- Resolves: #2100785 - CVE-2021-46784 squid: DoS when processing gopher server
responses
* Wed Feb 09 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-3
- Resolves: #1941506 - CVE-2021-28116 squid:4/squid: out-of-bounds read in WCCP
protocol data may lead to information disclosure
* Tue May 31 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.5-1
- new version 5.5
- Resolves: #2075727 - The memory usage of the squid process keeps increasing
* Tue Jan 25 2022 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-2
- Resolves: #2006121 - SQUID shortens FTP Link wrong that contains a semi-colon
and as a result is not able to download zip file.CODE 404 TO CLIENT)
* Thu Oct 07 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.2-1
- new version 5.2
- Resolves: #1934560 - squid: out-of-bounds read in WCCP protocol
- Resolves: #2011637 - Rebase squid to 5.2
* Fri Jun 18 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-1
- new version 4.15
- Resolves: #1964384 - squid:4 rebase to 4.15
* Wed Sep 15 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.1-3
- Resolves: #1988122 - Enable LTO build of squid for RHEL 9
* Wed Mar 31 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-5
- Resolves: #1944261 - CVE-2020-25097 squid:4/squid: improper input validation
may allow a trusted client to perform HTTP Request Smuggling
* Tue Aug 10 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 7:5.1-2
- Rebuilt for IMA sigs, glibc 2.34, aarch64 flags
Related: rhbz#1991688
* Mon Oct 26 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-4
- Resolves: #1890606 - Fix for CVE 2019-13345 breaks authentication in
cachemgr.cgi
* Thu Aug 05 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.1-1
- new version 5.1
- Resolves: #1990517 - Rebase squid to 5.1
- Resolves: #1985231 - squid: FTBFS because of OpenSSL 3.0 preprocessor macro
changes
* Wed Aug 26 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-3
- Resolves: #1871705 - CVE-2020-24606 squid: Improper Input Validation could
result in a DoS
- Resolves: #1871702 - CVE-2020-15811 squid: HTTP Request Splitting could result
in cache poisoning
- Resolves: #1871700 - CVE-2020-15810 squid: HTTP Request Smuggling could result
in cache poisoning
* Wed Jun 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.6-4
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA for openssl 3.0
Related: rhbz#1971065
* Thu Jul 02 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-2
- Resolves: #1853130 - CVE-2020-15049 squid:4/squid: request smuggling and
poisoning attack against the HTTP cache
- Resolves: #1853136 - CVE-2020-14058 squid:4/squid: DoS in TLS handshake
* Tue Jun 08 2021 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.6-3
- Resolves: #1969322 - squid doesn't work with active ftp
* Mon May 17 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.6-2
- Resolves: #1953505 - squid: Port to OpenSSL 3.0
* Mon May 17 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.6-1
- new version 5.0.6
- Resolves: #1961253 - Rebase squid to 5.0.6
* Fri Apr 23 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:5.0.5-2
- new version 5.0.5
- Resolves: #1952896 - Rebase squid to >= 5.0.5
- Resolves: #1940412 - Remove libdb dependency from squid
* Fri Apr 16 2021 Mohan Boddu <mboddu@redhat.com> - 7:4.14-2
- Rebuilt for RHEL 9 BETA on Apr 15th 2021. Related: rhbz#1947937
* Wed Mar 31 2021 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.14-1
- new version 4.14
- Resolves: #1939927 - CVE-2020-25097 squid: improper input validation may allow
a trusted client to perform HTTP Request Smuggling
* Wed Jan 27 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.13-3
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
* Sat Oct 17 2020 Jeff Law <law@redhat.com> - 7:4.13-2
- Fix missing #includes for gcc-11
* Tue Aug 25 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.13-1
- new version 4.13
* Fri Aug 07 2020 Jeff law <law@redhat.com> - 7:4.12-4
- Disable LTO
* Sat Aug 01 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.12-3
- Second attempt - Rebuilt for
https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
* Wed Jul 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.12-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
* Mon Jun 15 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.12-1
- new version 4.12
* Thu May 07 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-1
- new version 4.11
- libsystemd integration
- Resolves: #1829467 - squid:4 rebase
- Resolves: #1828378 - CVE-2019-12521 squid:4/squid: off-by-one error in
addStackElement allows for a heap buffer overflow and a crash
- Resolves: #1828377 - CVE-2019-12520 squid:4/squid: improper input validation
in request allows for proxy manipulation
- Resolves: #1828375 - CVE-2019-12524 squid:4/squid: improper access restriction
in url_regex may lead to security bypass
- Resolves: #1820664 - CVE-2019-18860 squid: mishandles HTML in the host
parameter to cachemgr.cgi which could result in squid behaving in unsecure way
- Resolves: #1802514 - CVE-2020-8449 squid:4/squid: Improper input validation
issues in HTTP Request processing
- Resolves: #1802513 - CVE-2020-8450 squid:4/squid: Buffer overflow in a Squid
acting as reverse-proxy
- Resolves: #1802512 - CVE-2019-12528 squid:4/squid: Information Disclosure
issue in FTP Gateway
- Resolves: #1771288 - CVE-2019-18678 squid:4/squid: HTTP Request Splitting
issue in HTTP message processing
- Resolves: #1771283 - CVE-2019-18679 squid:4/squid: Information Disclosure
issue in HTTP Digest Authentication
- Resolves: #1771280 - CVE-2019-18677 squid:4/squid: Cross-Site Request Forgery
issue in HTTP Request processing
- Resolves: #1771275 - CVE-2019-12523 squid:4/squid: Improper input validation
in URI processor
- Resolves: #1771272 - CVE-2019-18676 squid:4/squid: Buffer overflow in URI
processor
- Resolves: #1771264 - CVE-2019-12526 squid:4/squid: Heap overflow issue in URN
processing
- Resolves: #1738581 - CVE-2019-12529 squid: OOB read in Proxy-Authorization
header causes DoS
* Tue Apr 28 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-9
- Resolves: #1738583 - CVE-2019-12525 squid:4/squid: parsing of header
Proxy-Authentication leads to memory corruption
- Resolves: #1828369 - CVE-2020-11945 squid: improper access restriction upon
- Resolves: #1827564 - CVE-2020-11945 squid: improper access restriction upon
Digest Authentication nonce replay could lead to remote code execution
- Resolves: #1828370 - CVE-2019-12519 squid: improper check for new member in
ESIExpression::Evaluate allows for stack buffer overflow
* Fri Aug 23 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-8
- Resolves: # 1738485 - CVE-2019-12527 squid:4/squid: heap-based buffer overflow
in HttpHeader::getAuth
* Thu Mar 26 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.10-4
- Resolves: #1817208 - More cache_swap.sh optimizations
* Wed Jul 31 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-7
- Resolves: #1729436 - CVE-2019-13345 squid: XSS via user_name or auth parameter
in cachemgr.cgi
* Wed Mar 25 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.10-3
- Resolves: #1786485 - squid.service: use ${SQUID_CONF} rather than $SQUID_CONF
- Resolves: #1798535 - CVE-2019-12528 squid: Information Disclosure issue in
FTP Gateway
- Resolves: #1798554 - CVE-2020-8450 squid: Buffer overflow in a Squid acting
as reverse-proxy
- Resolves: #1798541 - CVE-2020-8449 squid: Improper input validation issues
in HTTP Request processing
* Fri Jun 21 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-6
- Resolves: #1679526 - Missing detailed configuration file
- Resolves: #1703117 - RHEL 7 to 8 fails with squid installed because dirs
changed to symlinks
- Resolves: #1691741 - Squid cache_peer DNS lookup failed when not all lower
case
- Resolves: #1683527 - "Reloading" message on a fresh reboot after enabling
squid
* Tue Jan 28 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.10-1
- new version 4.10
* Tue Dec 11 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-4
- Resolves: #1612524 - Man page scan results for squid
* Tue Dec 17 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.9-3
- Resolves: #1784383 - Add BuildRequires: systemd-rpm-macros
- Resolves: #1783757 - Build with ./configure --with-pidfile=/run/squid.pid
- Resolves: #1783768 - Optimize cache_swap.sh cache_dir search
* Tue Dec 11 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-3
- Resolves: #1642384 - squid doesn't work with active ftp
* Mon Nov 11 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.9-2
- new version 4.9
- verify src taball signature by default in prep section
* Tue Dec 11 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-2
- Resolves: #1657847 - Unable to start Squid in Selinux Enforcing mode
* Tue Oct 08 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.8-6
- Resolves: #1741342 - Do not call autoconf at build time
* Tue Oct 08 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.8-5
- Resolves: #1716950 - Drop "sleep 1" from logrotate fragment
* Thu Aug 22 2019 Lubomir Rintel <lkundrak@v3.sk> - 7:4.8-4
- Move the NetworkManager dispatcher script out of /etc
* Mon Aug 05 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.8-3
- Resolves: #1737030 - depend on httpd-filesystem
* Sat Jul 27 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.8-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
* Wed Jul 10 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.8-1
- new version 4.8
- Resolves: #1727745 - squid: CVe-2019-13345 squid: XSS via user_name or auth
parameter in cachemgr.cgi
* Tue Jul 02 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.7-6
- fix filepath to squid.conf.documented in squid's manpage
- fix path to systemctl in nm script
* Wed May 22 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.7-5
- Related: #1709299 - Use upstream squid.service
* Fri May 17 2019 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.7-1
- new version 4.7
* Fri May 17 2019 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.6-3
- Resolves: #1709299 - Use upstream squid.service
* Mon Apr 29 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.6-2
- Resolves: #1599074 - squid: 3 coredumps every day
* Wed Apr 24 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.6-1
- new version 4.6
- disabled strict checking due to gcc warnings
* Sun Feb 03 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.4-3
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
* Mon Jan 14 2019 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.4-2
- Rebuilt for libcrypt.so.2 (#1666033)
* Mon Dec 10 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-1
- Resolves: #1656871 - squid rebase to 4.4
- Resolves: #1645148 - CVE-2018-19131 squid: Cross-Site Scripting when
generating HTTPS response messages about TLS errors
- Resolves: #1645156 - CVE-2018-19132 squid: Memory leak in SNMP query
rejection code
- new version 4.4
* Mon Aug 06 2018 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.2-1
* Sun Oct 14 2018 Peter Robinson <pbrobinson@fedoraproject.org> 7:4.2-3
- Drop obsolete legacy sys-v remanents
* Mon Aug 20 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.2-2
- Resolves: #1618790 - SELinux 'dac_override' denial for cache_swap.sh
* Mon Aug 06 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.2-1
- new version 4.2
- enable back strict error checking
* Wed Aug 01 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.1-1
- new version 4.1
* Mon Jun 04 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.23-5
- Resolves: #1585617 - Build against libdb only instead of libdb4
- disabled strict checking for now (squid can not be built with GCC8)
* Sat Jul 14 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.0.25-2
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
* Mon Apr 16 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.23-4
- Resolves: #1566055 - module squid cannot be installed due to missing
perl(Crypt::OpenSSL::X509)
* Thu Jun 28 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.25-1
- new version 4.0.25
* Mon Jun 04 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.24-2
- removed obsolete BuildRequires (libdb4-devel)
* Thu Mar 08 2018 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.0.24-1
- new version 4.0.24
- disabled strict checking (removed -Werror)
* Fri Feb 09 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 7:4.0.23-3
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_28_Mass_Rebuild