SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-23638.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-commit 8fcff9c09824b18628f010d26a04247f6a6cbcb8
-Author: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date:   Sun Nov 12 09:33:20 2023 +0000
-
-    Do not update StoreEntry expiration after errorAppendEntry() (#1580)
-    
-    errorAppendEntry() is responsible for setting entry expiration times,
-    which it does by calling StoreEntry::storeErrorResponse() that calls
-    StoreEntry::negativeCache().
-    
-    This change was triggered by a vulnerability report by Joshua Rogers at
-    https://megamansec.github.io/Squid-Security-Audit/cache-uaf.html where
-    it was filed as "Use-After-Free in Cache Manager Errors". The reported
-    "use after free" vulnerability was unknowingly addressed by 2022 commit
-    1fa761a that removed excessively long "reentrant" store_client calls
-    responsible for the disappearance of the properly locked StoreEntry in
-    this (and probably other) contexts.
-
-
-diff --git a/src/cache_manager.cc b/src/cache_manager.cc
-index 8055ece..fdcc9cf 100644
---- a/src/cache_manager.cc
-+++ b/src/cache_manager.cc
-@@ -323,7 +323,6 @@ CacheManager::Start(const Comm::ConnectionPointer &client, HttpRequest * request
-         const auto err = new ErrorState(ERR_INVALID_URL, Http::scNotFound, request);
-         err->url = xstrdup(entry->url());
-         errorAppendEntry(entry, err);
--        entry->expires = squid_curtime;
-         return;
-     }
- 

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch

@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index b006300..023e411 100644
---- a/src/http.cc
-+++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
- #include "rfc1738.h"
- #include "SquidConfig.h"
- #include "SquidTime.h"
-+#include "SquidMath.h"
- #include "StatCounters.h"
- #include "Store.h"
- #include "StrList.h"
-@@ -1150,18 +1151,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
-      * Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
-      */
- 
--    Must(maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(true));
--    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
--    rd.conn = io.conn;
--    rd.size = entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, inBuf.spaceSize()));
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission) || !moreDataPermission)) {
-+        abortTransaction("ready to read required data, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-+    const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission);
-+    // TODO: Move this logic inside maybeMakeSpaceAvailable():
-+    const auto readSizeWanted = readSizeMax ? entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, readSizeMax)) : 0;
- 
--    if (rd.size <= 0) {
-+    if (readSizeWanted <= 0) {
-         assert(entry->mem_obj);
-         AsyncCall::Pointer nilCall;
-         entry->mem_obj->delayRead(DeferredRead(readDelayed, this, CommRead(io.conn, NULL, 0, nilCall)));
-         return;
-     }
- 
-+    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
-+    rd.conn = io.conn;
-+    rd.size = readSizeWanted;
-     switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
-     case Comm::INPROGRESS:
-         if (inBuf.isEmpty())
-@@ -1520,8 +1529,11 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
-     if (!Comm::IsConnOpen(serverConnection) || fd_table[serverConnection->fd].closing())
-         return;
- 
--    if (!maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(false))
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission)) || !moreDataPermission) {
-+        abortTransaction("more response bytes required, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
-         return;
-+    }
- 
-     // XXX: get rid of the do_next_read flag
-     // check for the proper reasons preventing read(2)
-@@ -1539,40 +1551,79 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
-     Comm::Read(serverConnection, call);
- }
- 
-+/// Desired inBuf capacity based on various capacity preferences/limits:
-+/// * a smaller buffer may not hold enough for look-ahead header/body parsers;
-+/// * a smaller buffer may result in inefficient tiny network reads;
-+/// * a bigger buffer may waste memory;
-+/// * a bigger buffer may exceed SBuf storage capabilities (SBuf::maxSize);
-+size_t
-+HttpStateData::calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const
-+{
-+    if (!flags.headers_parsed)
-+        return Config.maxReplyHeaderSize;
-+
-+    // XXX: Our inBuf is not used to maintain the read-ahead gap, and using
-+    // Config.readAheadGap like this creates huge read buffers for large
-+    // read_ahead_gap values. TODO: Switch to using tcp_recv_bufsize as the
-+    // primary read buffer capacity factor.
-+    //
-+    // TODO: Cannot reuse throwing NaturalCast() here. Consider removing
-+    // .value() dereference in NaturalCast() or add/use NaturalCastOrMax().
-+    const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).second ? NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).first : SBuf::maxSize;
-+
-+    // TODO: Honor TeChunkedParser look-ahead and trailer parsing requirements
-+    // (when explicit configurationPreferences are set too low).
-+
-+    return std::min<size_t>(configurationPreferences, SBuf::maxSize);
-+}
-+
-+/// The maximum number of virgin reply bytes we may buffer before we violate
-+/// the currently configured response buffering limits.
-+/// \retval std::nullopt means that no more virgin response bytes can be read
-+/// \retval 0 means that more virgin response bytes may be read later
-+/// \retval >0 is the number of bytes that can be read now (subject to other constraints)
- bool
--HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
-+HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const
- {
--    // how much we are allowed to buffer
--    const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
--
--    if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
--        // when buffer is at or over limit already
--        debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
--        debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
--        // Process next response from buffer
--        processReply();
--        return false;
-+#if USE_ADAPTATION
-+    // If we do not check this now, we may say the final "no" prematurely below
-+    // because inBuf.length() will decrease as adaptation drains buffered bytes.
-+    if (responseBodyBuffer) {
-+        debugs(11, 3, "yes, but waiting for adaptation to drain read buffer");
-+        *maxReadSize = 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
-+        return true;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-+    const auto maxCapacity = calcReadBufferCapacityLimit();
-+    if (inBuf.length() >= maxCapacity) {
-+        debugs(11, 3, "no, due to a full buffer: " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize() << "; limit: " << maxCapacity);
-+        return false; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
-     }
- 
-+    *maxReadSize = (maxCapacity - inBuf.length()); // positive
-+    debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << *maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
-+    return true; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
-+}
-+
-+/// prepare read buffer for reading
-+/// \return the maximum number of bytes the caller should attempt to read
-+/// \retval 0 means that the caller should delay reading
-+size_t
-+HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(const size_t maxReadSize)
-+{
-     // how much we want to read
--    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), (limitBuffer - inBuf.length()));
-+    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), maxReadSize);
- 
--    if (!read_size) {
-+    if (read_size < 2) {
-         debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << read_size << " into buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
--        return false;
-+        return 0;
-     }
- 
--    // just report whether we could grow or not, do not actually do it
--    if (doGrow)
--        return (read_size >= 2);
--
-     // we may need to grow the buffer
-     inBuf.reserveSpace(read_size);
--    debugs(11, 8, (!flags.do_next_read ? "will not" : "may") <<
--           " read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buf(" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() <<
--           ") from " << serverConnection);
--
--    return (inBuf.spaceSize() >= 2); // only read if there is 1+ bytes of space available
-+    debugs(11, 7, "may read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
-+    return read_size;
- }
- 
- /// called after writing the very last request byte (body, last-chunk, etc)
-diff --git a/src/http.h b/src/http.h
-index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
---- a/src/http.h
-+++ b/src/http.h
-@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
- #include "http/StateFlags.h"
- #include "sbuf/SBuf.h"
- 
-+#include <optional>
-+
- class FwdState;
- class HttpHeader;
- 
-@@ -107,16 +109,9 @@ private:
- 
-     void abortTransaction(const char *reason) { abortAll(reason); } // abnormal termination
- 
--    /**
--     * determine if read buffer can have space made available
--     * for a read.
--     *
--     * \param grow  whether to actually expand the buffer
--     *
--     * \return whether the buffer can be grown to provide space
--     *         regardless of whether the grow actually happened.
--     */
--    bool maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool grow);
-+    size_t calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const;
-+    bool canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const;
-+    size_t maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(size_t maxReadSize);
- 
-     // consuming request body
-     virtual void handleMoreRequestBodyAvailable();

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/SquidString.h b/src/SquidString.h
-index a791885..b9aef38 100644
---- a/src/SquidString.h
-+++ b/src/SquidString.h
-@@ -114,7 +114,16 @@ private:
- 
-     size_type len_;  /* current length  */
- 
--    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 65535; ///< 64K limit protects some fixed-size buffers
-+    /// An earlier 64KB limit was meant to protect some fixed-size buffers, but
-+    /// (a) we do not know where those buffers are (or whether they still exist)
-+    /// (b) too many String users unknowingly exceeded that limit and asserted.
-+    /// We are now using a larger limit to reduce the number of (b) cases,
-+    /// especially cases where "compact" lists of items grow 50% in size when we
-+    /// convert them to canonical form. The new limit is selected to withstand
-+    /// concatenation and ~50% expansion of two HTTP headers limited by default
-+    /// request_header_max_size and reply_header_max_size settings.
-+    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 3*64*1024 - 1;
-+
-     /// returns true after increasing the first argument by extra if the sum does not exceed SizeMax_
-     static bool SafeAdd(size_type &base, size_type extra) { if (extra <= SizeMax_ && base <= SizeMax_ - extra) { base += extra; return true; } return false; }
- 
-diff --git a/src/cache_cf.cc b/src/cache_cf.cc
-index a9c1b7e..46f07bb 100644
---- a/src/cache_cf.cc
-+++ b/src/cache_cf.cc
-@@ -935,6 +935,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
-                (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestBufferSize, (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestHeaderSize);
-     }
- 
-+    // Warn about the dangers of exceeding String limits when manipulating HTTP
-+    // headers. Technically, we do not concatenate _requests_, so we could relax
-+    // their check, but we keep the two checks the same for simplicity sake.
-+    const auto safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax = (String::SizeMaxXXX()+1)/3;
-+    // TODO: static_assert(safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax >= 64*1024); // no WARNINGs for default settings
-+    if (Config.maxRequestHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
-+        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing request_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
-+               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxRequestHeaderSize << " bytes");
-+    if (Config.maxReplyHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
-+        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing reply_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
-+               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxReplyHeaderSize << " bytes");
-+
-     /*
-      * Disable client side request pipelining if client_persistent_connections OFF.
-      * Waste of resources queueing any pipelined requests when the first will close the connection.
-diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
-index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
---- a/src/cf.data.pre
-+++ b/src/cf.data.pre
-@@ -6196,11 +6196,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
- DEFAULT: 64 KB
- LOC: Config.maxRequestHeaderSize
- DOC_START
--	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a request.
--	Request headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
--	Placing a limit on the request header size will catch certain
--	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
--	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
-+	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP request
-+	(including request-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
-+	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
-+	limit also applies to received FTP commands.
-+
-+	This limit has no direct affect on Squid memory consumption.
-+
-+	Squid does not check this limit when sending requests.
- DOC_END
- 
- NAME: reply_header_max_size
-@@ -6209,11 +6212,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
- DEFAULT: 64 KB
- LOC: Config.maxReplyHeaderSize
- DOC_START
--	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a reply.
--	Reply headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
--	Placing a limit on the reply header size will catch certain
--	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
--	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
-+	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP response
-+	(including status-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
-+	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
-+	limit also applies to FTP command responses.
-+
-+	Squid also checks this limit when loading hit responses from disk cache.
-+
-+	Squid does not check this limit when sending responses.
- DOC_END
- 
- NAME: request_body_max_size
-diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index 877172d..b006300 100644
---- a/src/http.cc
-+++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -1820,8 +1820,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
- 
-         String strFwd = hdr_in->getList(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR);
- 
--        // if we cannot double strFwd size, then it grew past 50% of the limit
--        if (!strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
-+        // Detect unreasonably long header values. And paranoidly check String
-+        // limits: a String ought to accommodate two reasonable-length values.
-+        if (strFwd.size() > 32*1024 || !strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
-             // There is probably a forwarding loop with Via detection disabled.
-             // If we do nothing, String will assert on overflow soon.
-             // TODO: Terminate all transactions with huge XFF?

SOURCES/squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch

@@ -1,367 +0,0 @@
-From 8d0ee420a4d91ac7fd97316338f1e28b4b060cbf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 19:26:27 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 1/6] Ignore whitespace chars after chunk-size
-
-Previously (before #1498 change), squid was accepting TE-chunked replies
-with whitespaces after chunk-size and missing chunk-ext data. After
-
-It turned out that replies with such whitespace chars are pretty
-common and other webservers which can act as forward proxies (e.g.
-nginx, httpd...) are accepting them.
-
-This change will allow to proxy chunked responses from origin server,
-which had whitespaces inbetween chunk-size and CRLF.
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 1 +
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 9cce10fdc91..04753395e16 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,6 +125,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
-+        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
-         parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-
-From 9c8d35f899035fa06021ab3fe6919f892c2f0c6b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:06:31 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/6] Added new argument to Http::One::ParseBws()
-
-Depending on new wsp_only argument in ParseBws() it will be decided
-which set of whitespaces characters will be parsed. If wsp_only is set
-to true, only SP and HTAB chars will be parsed.
-
-Also optimized number of ParseBws calls.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          |  4 ++--
- src/http/one/Parser.h           |  3 ++-
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 13 +++++++++----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 14 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index b1908316a0b..01d7e3bc0e8 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -273,9 +273,9 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
- 
- // BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
- void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index d9a0ac8c273..08200371cd6 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,8 +163,9 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 04753395e16..41e1e5ddaea 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,8 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        tok.skipAll(CharacterSet::WSP); // Some servers send SP/TAB after chunk-size
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-+        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
-+        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
-+        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
-+            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -140,20 +143,22 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--void
-+bool
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
-+    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
-+        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 02eacd1bb89..8c5d4bb4cba 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From 81e67f97f9c386bdd0bb4a5e182395c46adb70ad Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: =?UTF-8?q?Lubo=C5=A1=20Uhliarik?= <luhliari@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 11 Oct 2024 02:44:33 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 3/6] Fix typo in Parser.h
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.h | 2 +-
- 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 08200371cd6..3ef4c5f7752 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,7 +163,7 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimeter chars
-+/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
- void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
- 
-
-From a0d4fe1794e605f8299a5c118c758a807453f016 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 22:39:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Bug 5449 is a regression of Bug 4492!
-
-Both bugs deal with "chunk-size SP+ CRLF" use cases. Bug 4492 had _two_
-spaces after chunk-size, which answers one of the PR review questions:
-Should we skip just one space? No, we should not.
-
-The lines moved around in many commits, but I believe this regression
-was introduced in commit 951013d0 because that commit stopped consuming
-partially parsed chunk-ext sequences. That consumption was wrong, but it
-had a positive side effect -- fixing Bug 4492...
----
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 10 +++++-----
- 1 file changed, 5 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index 41e1e5ddaea..aa4a840fdcf 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,10 +125,10 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // A possibly empty chunk-ext list. If no chunk-ext has been found,
--        // try to skip trailing BWS, because some servers send "chunk-size BWS CRLF".
--        if (!parseChunkExtensions(tok))
--            ParseBws(tok, true);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok, true);
-+
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
- 
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-@@ -150,7 +150,7 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
--        ParseBws(tok); // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
-+        ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
-             return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-
-From f837f5ff61301a17008f16ce1fb793c2abf19786 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:06:42 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 5/6] fixup: Fewer conditionals/ifs and more explicit spelling
-
-... to draw code reader attention when something unusual is going on.
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc          | 22 ++++++++++++++++++----
- src/http/one/Parser.h           | 10 ++++++++--
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc | 14 ++++++--------
- src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h  |  2 +-
- 4 files changed, 33 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index 01d7e3bc0e8..d3937e5e96b 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -271,11 +271,12 @@ Http::One::ErrorLevel()
-     return Config.onoff.relaxed_header_parser < 0 ? DBG_IMPORTANT : 5;
- }
- 
--// BWS = *( SP / HTAB ) ; WhitespaceCharacters() may relax this RFC 7230 rule
--void
--Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
-+/// common part of ParseBws() and ParseStrctBws()
-+namespace Http::One {
-+static void
-+ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- {
--    const auto count = tok.skipAll(wsp_only ? CharacterSet::WSP : Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    const auto count = tok.skipAll(bwsChars);
- 
-     if (tok.atEnd())
-         throw InsufficientInput(); // even if count is positive
-@@ -290,4 +291,17 @@ Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const bool wsp_only)
- 
-     // success: no more BWS characters expected
- }
-+} // namespace Http::One
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+}
-+
-+void
-+Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
-+{
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+}
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.h b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-index 3ef4c5f7752..49e399de546 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.h
-@@ -163,9 +163,15 @@ class Parser : public RefCountable
- };
- 
- /// skips and, if needed, warns about RFC 7230 BWS ("bad" whitespace)
--/// \param wsp_only force skipping of whitespaces only, don't consider skipping relaxed delimiter chars
- /// \throws InsufficientInput when the end of BWS cannot be confirmed
--void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &, const bool wsp_only = false);
-+/// \sa WhitespaceCharacters() for the definition of BWS characters
-+/// \sa ParseStrictBws() that avoids WhitespaceCharacters() uncertainties
-+void ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
-+
-+/// Like ParseBws() but only skips CharacterSet::WSP characters. This variation
-+/// must be used if the next element may start with CR or any other character
-+/// from RelaxedDelimiterCharacters().
-+void ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &);
- 
- /// the right debugs() level for logging HTTP violation messages
- int ErrorLevel();
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-index aa4a840fdcf..859471b8c77 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.cc
-@@ -125,11 +125,11 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
-     // Code becomes much simpler when incremental parsing functions throw on
-     // bad or insufficient input, like in the code below. TODO: Expand up.
-     try {
--        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size
--        ParseBws(tok, true);
--
--        parseChunkExtensions(tok);
-+        // Bug 4492: IBM_HTTP_Server sends SP after chunk-size.
-+        // No ParseBws() here because it may consume CR required further below.
-+        ParseStrictBws(tok);
- 
-+        parseChunkExtensions(tok); // a possibly empty chunk-ext list
-         tok.skipRequired("CRLF after [chunk-ext]", Http1::CrLf());
-         buf_ = tok.remaining();
-         parsingStage_ = theChunkSize ? Http1::HTTP_PARSE_CHUNK : Http1::HTTP_PARSE_MIME;
-@@ -143,22 +143,20 @@ Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &tok)
- 
- /// Parses the chunk-ext list (RFC 9112 section 7.1.1:
- /// chunk-ext = *( BWS ";" BWS chunk-ext-name [ BWS "=" BWS chunk-ext-val ] )
--bool
-+void
- Http::One::TeChunkedParser::parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &callerTok)
- {
--    bool foundChunkExt = false;
-     do {
-         auto tok = callerTok;
- 
-         ParseBws(tok);
- 
-         if (!tok.skip(';'))
--            return foundChunkExt; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
-+            return; // reached the end of extensions (if any)
- 
-         parseOneChunkExtension(tok);
-         buf_ = tok.remaining(); // got one extension
-         callerTok = tok;
--        foundChunkExt = true;
-     } while (true);
- }
- 
-diff --git a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-index 8c5d4bb4cba..02eacd1bb89 100644
---- a/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-+++ b/src/http/one/TeChunkedParser.h
-@@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ class TeChunkedParser : public Http1::Parser
- private:
-     bool parseChunkSize(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkMetadataSuffix(Tokenizer &);
--    bool parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-+    void parseChunkExtensions(Tokenizer &);
-     void parseOneChunkExtension(Tokenizer &);
-     bool parseChunkBody(Tokenizer &tok);
-     bool parseChunkEnd(Tokenizer &tok);
-
-From f79936a234e722adb2dd08f31cf6019d81ee712c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
-Date: Thu, 10 Oct 2024 23:31:08 -0400
-Subject: [PATCH 6/6] fixup: Deadly typo
-
----
- src/http/one/Parser.cc | 4 ++--
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/http/one/Parser.cc b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-index d3937e5e96b..7403a9163a2 100644
---- a/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-+++ b/src/http/one/Parser.cc
-@@ -296,12 +296,12 @@ ParseBws_(Parser::Tokenizer &tok, const CharacterSet &bwsChars)
- void
- Http::One::ParseBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
-+    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
- }
- 
- void
- Http::One::ParseStrictBws(Parser::Tokenizer &tok)
- {
--    ParseBws_(tok, Parser::WhitespaceCharacters());
-+    ParseBws_(tok, CharacterSet::WSP);
- }
- 
-

SPECS/squid.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:     squid
 Version:  4.15
-Release:  10%{?dist}.3
+Release:  9%{?dist}
 Summary:  The Squid proxy caching server
 Epoch:    7
 # See CREDITS for breakdown of non GPLv2+ code
@@ -65,15 +65,7 @@ Patch308: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch
 Patch309: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2254663
 Patch310: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264309
+
-Patch311: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2268366
-Patch312: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch
-# Regression caused by squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46846.patch
-# Upstream PR: https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/pull/1914
-Patch313: squid-4.15-ignore-wsp-after-chunk-size.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2260051
-Patch314: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-23638.patch
 
 Requires: bash >= 2.0
 Requires(pre): shadow-utils
@@ -90,6 +82,8 @@ BuildRequires: openssl-devel
 BuildRequires: krb5-devel
 # time_quota requires DB
 BuildRequires: libdb-devel
+# ESI support requires Expat & libxml2
+BuildRequires: expat-devel libxml2-devel
 # TPROXY requires libcap, and also increases security somewhat
 BuildRequires: libcap-devel
 # eCAP support
@@ -147,10 +141,7 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 %patch308 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49285
 %patch309 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49286
 %patch310 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
-%patch311 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25617
+
-%patch312 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
-%patch313 -p1 -b .ignore-wsp-chunk-sz
-%patch314 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-23638
 
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1679526
 # Patch in the vendor documentation and used different location for documentation
@@ -195,7 +186,7 @@ autoconf
    --enable-storeio="aufs,diskd,ufs,rock" \
    --enable-diskio \
    --enable-wccpv2 \
-   --disable-esi \
+   --enable-esi \
    --enable-ecap \
    --with-aio \
    --with-default-user="squid" \
@@ -367,25 +358,6 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
-* Wed Nov 13 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.3
-- Resolves: RHEL-22593 - CVE-2024-23638 squid:4/squid: vulnerable to
-  a Denial of Service attack against Cache Manager error responses
-
-* Thu Nov 07 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.2
-- Disable ESI support
-- Resolves: RHEL-65075 - CVE-2024-45802 squid:4/squid: Denial of Service
-  processing ESI response content
-
-* Mon Oct 14 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10.1
-- Resolves: RHEL-56024 - (Regression) Transfer-encoding:chunked data is not sent
-  to the client in its complementary
-
-* Tue Mar 19 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-10
-- Resolves: RHEL-28529 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Chunked
-  Decoding (CVE-2024-25111)
-- Resolves: RHEL-26088 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP header
-  parser (CVE-2024-25617)
-
 * Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-9
 - Resolves: RHEL-19552 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP request 
   parsing (CVE-2023-50269)