SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch

@@ -1,193 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index b006300..023e411 100644
---- a/src/http.cc
-+++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -52,6 +52,7 @@
- #include "rfc1738.h"
- #include "SquidConfig.h"
- #include "SquidTime.h"
-+#include "SquidMath.h"
- #include "StatCounters.h"
- #include "Store.h"
- #include "StrList.h"
-@@ -1150,18 +1151,26 @@ HttpStateData::readReply(const CommIoCbParams &io)
-      * Plus, it breaks our lame *HalfClosed() detection
-      */
- 
--    Must(maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(true));
--    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
--    rd.conn = io.conn;
--    rd.size = entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, inBuf.spaceSize()));
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission) || !moreDataPermission)) {
-+        abortTransaction("ready to read required data, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
-+        return;
-+    }
-+
-+    const auto readSizeMax = maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(moreDataPermission);
-+    // TODO: Move this logic inside maybeMakeSpaceAvailable():
-+    const auto readSizeWanted = readSizeMax ? entry->bytesWanted(Range<size_t>(0, readSizeMax)) : 0;
- 
--    if (rd.size <= 0) {
-+    if (readSizeWanted <= 0) {
-         assert(entry->mem_obj);
-         AsyncCall::Pointer nilCall;
-         entry->mem_obj->delayRead(DeferredRead(readDelayed, this, CommRead(io.conn, NULL, 0, nilCall)));
-         return;
-     }
- 
-+    CommIoCbParams rd(this); // will be expanded with ReadNow results
-+    rd.conn = io.conn;
-+    rd.size = readSizeWanted;
-     switch (Comm::ReadNow(rd, inBuf)) {
-     case Comm::INPROGRESS:
-         if (inBuf.isEmpty())
-@@ -1520,8 +1529,11 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
-     if (!Comm::IsConnOpen(serverConnection) || fd_table[serverConnection->fd].closing())
-         return;
- 
--    if (!maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(false))
-+    size_t moreDataPermission = 0;
-+    if ((!canBufferMoreReplyBytes(&moreDataPermission)) || !moreDataPermission) {
-+        abortTransaction("more response bytes required, but the read buffer is full and cannot be drained");
-         return;
-+    }
- 
-     // XXX: get rid of the do_next_read flag
-     // check for the proper reasons preventing read(2)
-@@ -1539,40 +1551,79 @@ HttpStateData::maybeReadVirginBody()
-     Comm::Read(serverConnection, call);
- }
- 
-+/// Desired inBuf capacity based on various capacity preferences/limits:
-+/// * a smaller buffer may not hold enough for look-ahead header/body parsers;
-+/// * a smaller buffer may result in inefficient tiny network reads;
-+/// * a bigger buffer may waste memory;
-+/// * a bigger buffer may exceed SBuf storage capabilities (SBuf::maxSize);
-+size_t
-+HttpStateData::calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const
-+{
-+    if (!flags.headers_parsed)
-+        return Config.maxReplyHeaderSize;
-+
-+    // XXX: Our inBuf is not used to maintain the read-ahead gap, and using
-+    // Config.readAheadGap like this creates huge read buffers for large
-+    // read_ahead_gap values. TODO: Switch to using tcp_recv_bufsize as the
-+    // primary read buffer capacity factor.
-+    //
-+    // TODO: Cannot reuse throwing NaturalCast() here. Consider removing
-+    // .value() dereference in NaturalCast() or add/use NaturalCastOrMax().
-+    const auto configurationPreferences = NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).second ? NaturalSum<size_t>(Config.readAheadGap).first : SBuf::maxSize;
-+
-+    // TODO: Honor TeChunkedParser look-ahead and trailer parsing requirements
-+    // (when explicit configurationPreferences are set too low).
-+
-+    return std::min<size_t>(configurationPreferences, SBuf::maxSize);
-+}
-+
-+/// The maximum number of virgin reply bytes we may buffer before we violate
-+/// the currently configured response buffering limits.
-+/// \retval std::nullopt means that no more virgin response bytes can be read
-+/// \retval 0 means that more virgin response bytes may be read later
-+/// \retval >0 is the number of bytes that can be read now (subject to other constraints)
- bool
--HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool doGrow)
-+HttpStateData::canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const
- {
--    // how much we are allowed to buffer
--    const int limitBuffer = (flags.headers_parsed ? Config.readAheadGap : Config.maxReplyHeaderSize);
--
--    if (limitBuffer < 0 || inBuf.length() >= (SBuf::size_type)limitBuffer) {
--        // when buffer is at or over limit already
--        debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << limitBuffer << ". buffer has (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
--        debugs(11, DBG_DATA, "buffer has {" << inBuf << "}");
--        // Process next response from buffer
--        processReply();
--        return false;
-+#if USE_ADAPTATION
-+    // If we do not check this now, we may say the final "no" prematurely below
-+    // because inBuf.length() will decrease as adaptation drains buffered bytes.
-+    if (responseBodyBuffer) {
-+        debugs(11, 3, "yes, but waiting for adaptation to drain read buffer");
-+        *maxReadSize = 0; // yes, we may be able to buffer more (but later)
-+        return true;
-+    }
-+#endif
-+
-+    const auto maxCapacity = calcReadBufferCapacityLimit();
-+    if (inBuf.length() >= maxCapacity) {
-+        debugs(11, 3, "no, due to a full buffer: " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize() << "; limit: " << maxCapacity);
-+        return false; // no, configuration prohibits buffering more
-     }
- 
-+    *maxReadSize = (maxCapacity - inBuf.length()); // positive
-+    debugs(11, 7, "yes, may read up to " << *maxReadSize << " into " << inBuf.length() << '/' << inBuf.spaceSize());
-+    return true; // yes, can read up to this many bytes (subject to other constraints)
-+}
-+
-+/// prepare read buffer for reading
-+/// \return the maximum number of bytes the caller should attempt to read
-+/// \retval 0 means that the caller should delay reading
-+size_t
-+HttpStateData::maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(const size_t maxReadSize)
-+{
-     // how much we want to read
--    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), (limitBuffer - inBuf.length()));
-+    const size_t read_size = calcBufferSpaceToReserve(inBuf.spaceSize(), maxReadSize);
- 
--    if (!read_size) {
-+    if (read_size < 2) {
-         debugs(11, 7, "will not read up to " << read_size << " into buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
--        return false;
-+        return 0;
-     }
- 
--    // just report whether we could grow or not, do not actually do it
--    if (doGrow)
--        return (read_size >= 2);
--
-     // we may need to grow the buffer
-     inBuf.reserveSpace(read_size);
--    debugs(11, 8, (!flags.do_next_read ? "will not" : "may") <<
--           " read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buf(" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() <<
--           ") from " << serverConnection);
--
--    return (inBuf.spaceSize() >= 2); // only read if there is 1+ bytes of space available
-+    debugs(11, 7, "may read up to " << read_size << " bytes info buffer (" << inBuf.length() << "/" << inBuf.spaceSize() << ") from " << serverConnection);
-+    return read_size;
- }
- 
- /// called after writing the very last request byte (body, last-chunk, etc)
-diff --git a/src/http.h b/src/http.h
-index 8965b77..007d2e6 100644
---- a/src/http.h
-+++ b/src/http.h
-@@ -15,6 +15,8 @@
- #include "http/StateFlags.h"
- #include "sbuf/SBuf.h"
- 
-+#include <optional>
-+
- class FwdState;
- class HttpHeader;
- 
-@@ -107,16 +109,9 @@ private:
- 
-     void abortTransaction(const char *reason) { abortAll(reason); } // abnormal termination
- 
--    /**
--     * determine if read buffer can have space made available
--     * for a read.
--     *
--     * \param grow  whether to actually expand the buffer
--     *
--     * \return whether the buffer can be grown to provide space
--     *         regardless of whether the grow actually happened.
--     */
--    bool maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(bool grow);
-+    size_t calcReadBufferCapacityLimit() const;
-+    bool canBufferMoreReplyBytes(size_t *maxReadSize) const;
-+    size_t maybeMakeSpaceAvailable(size_t maxReadSize);
- 
-     // consuming request body
-     virtual void handleMoreRequestBodyAvailable();

SOURCES/squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch

@@ -1,105 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/SquidString.h b/src/SquidString.h
-index a791885..b9aef38 100644
---- a/src/SquidString.h
-+++ b/src/SquidString.h
-@@ -114,7 +114,16 @@ private:
- 
-     size_type len_;  /* current length  */
- 
--    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 65535; ///< 64K limit protects some fixed-size buffers
-+    /// An earlier 64KB limit was meant to protect some fixed-size buffers, but
-+    /// (a) we do not know where those buffers are (or whether they still exist)
-+    /// (b) too many String users unknowingly exceeded that limit and asserted.
-+    /// We are now using a larger limit to reduce the number of (b) cases,
-+    /// especially cases where "compact" lists of items grow 50% in size when we
-+    /// convert them to canonical form. The new limit is selected to withstand
-+    /// concatenation and ~50% expansion of two HTTP headers limited by default
-+    /// request_header_max_size and reply_header_max_size settings.
-+    static const size_type SizeMax_ = 3*64*1024 - 1;
-+
-     /// returns true after increasing the first argument by extra if the sum does not exceed SizeMax_
-     static bool SafeAdd(size_type &base, size_type extra) { if (extra <= SizeMax_ && base <= SizeMax_ - extra) { base += extra; return true; } return false; }
- 
-diff --git a/src/cache_cf.cc b/src/cache_cf.cc
-index a9c1b7e..46f07bb 100644
---- a/src/cache_cf.cc
-+++ b/src/cache_cf.cc
-@@ -935,6 +935,18 @@ configDoConfigure(void)
-                (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestBufferSize, (uint32_t)Config.maxRequestHeaderSize);
-     }
- 
-+    // Warn about the dangers of exceeding String limits when manipulating HTTP
-+    // headers. Technically, we do not concatenate _requests_, so we could relax
-+    // their check, but we keep the two checks the same for simplicity sake.
-+    const auto safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax = (String::SizeMaxXXX()+1)/3;
-+    // TODO: static_assert(safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax >= 64*1024); // no WARNINGs for default settings
-+    if (Config.maxRequestHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
-+        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing request_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
-+               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxRequestHeaderSize << " bytes");
-+    if (Config.maxReplyHeaderSize > safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax)
-+        debugs(3, DBG_CRITICAL, "WARNING: Increasing reply_header_max_size beyond " << safeRawHeaderValueSizeMax <<
-+               " bytes makes Squid more vulnerable to denial-of-service attacks; configured value: " << Config.maxReplyHeaderSize << " bytes");
-+
-     /*
-      * Disable client side request pipelining if client_persistent_connections OFF.
-      * Waste of resources queueing any pipelined requests when the first will close the connection.
-diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
-index bc2ddcd..d55b870 100644
---- a/src/cf.data.pre
-+++ b/src/cf.data.pre
-@@ -6196,11 +6196,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
- DEFAULT: 64 KB
- LOC: Config.maxRequestHeaderSize
- DOC_START
--	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a request.
--	Request headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
--	Placing a limit on the request header size will catch certain
--	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
--	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
-+	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP request
-+	(including request-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
-+	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
-+	limit also applies to received FTP commands.
-+
-+	This limit has no direct affect on Squid memory consumption.
-+
-+	Squid does not check this limit when sending requests.
- DOC_END
- 
- NAME: reply_header_max_size
-@@ -6209,11 +6212,14 @@ TYPE: b_size_t
- DEFAULT: 64 KB
- LOC: Config.maxReplyHeaderSize
- DOC_START
--	This specifies the maximum size for HTTP headers in a reply.
--	Reply headers are usually relatively small (about 512 bytes).
--	Placing a limit on the reply header size will catch certain
--	bugs (for example with persistent connections) and possibly
--	buffer-overflow or denial-of-service attacks.
-+	This directives limits the header size of a received HTTP response
-+	(including status-line). Increasing this limit beyond its 64 KB default
-+	exposes certain old Squid code to various denial-of-service attacks. This
-+	limit also applies to FTP command responses.
-+
-+	Squid also checks this limit when loading hit responses from disk cache.
-+
-+	Squid does not check this limit when sending responses.
- DOC_END
- 
- NAME: request_body_max_size
-diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index 877172d..b006300 100644
---- a/src/http.cc
-+++ b/src/http.cc
-@@ -1820,8 +1820,9 @@ HttpStateData::httpBuildRequestHeader(HttpRequest * request,
- 
-         String strFwd = hdr_in->getList(Http::HdrType::X_FORWARDED_FOR);
- 
--        // if we cannot double strFwd size, then it grew past 50% of the limit
--        if (!strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
-+        // Detect unreasonably long header values. And paranoidly check String
-+        // limits: a String ought to accommodate two reasonable-length values.
-+        if (strFwd.size() > 32*1024 || !strFwd.canGrowBy(strFwd.size())) {
-             // There is probably a forwarding loop with Via detection disabled.
-             // If we do nothing, String will assert on overflow soon.
-             // TODO: Terminate all transactions with huge XFF?

SPECS/squid.spec

@@ -2,7 +2,7 @@
 
 Name:     squid
 Version:  4.15
-Release:  7%{?dist}.10
+Release:  9%{?dist}
 Summary:  The Squid proxy caching server
 Epoch:    7
 # See CREDITS for breakdown of non GPLv2+ code
@@ -63,12 +63,9 @@ Patch307: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-46724.patch
 Patch308: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49285.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2252923
 Patch309: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-49286.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2264309
-Patch310: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25617.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2268366
-Patch311: squid-4.15-CVE-2024-25111.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2254663
-Patch312: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch
+Patch310: squid-4.15-CVE-2023-50269.patch
+
 
 Requires: bash >= 2.0
 Requires(pre): shadow-utils
@@ -143,9 +140,8 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 %patch307 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-46724
 %patch308 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49285
 %patch309 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-49286
-%patch310 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25617
-%patch311 -p1 -b .CVE-2024-25111
-%patch312 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
+%patch310 -p1 -b .CVE-2023-50269
+
 
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1679526
 # Patch in the vendor documentation and used different location for documentation
@@ -362,43 +358,26 @@ fi
 
 
 %changelog
-* Thu Mar 14 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7.10
-- Resolves: RHEL-19551 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP request
+* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-9
+- Resolves: RHEL-19552 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP request 
   parsing (CVE-2023-50269)
 
-* Fri Mar 08 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7.9
-- Resolves: RHEL-28611 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Chunked
-  Decoding (CVE-2024-25111)
-
-* Mon Feb 26 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7.6
-- Resolves: RHEL-26087 - squid:4/squid: denial of service in HTTP header
-  parser (CVE-2024-25617)
-
-* Thu Dec 07 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7.5
-- Resolves: RHEL-18483 - squid:4/squid: Buffer over-read in the HTTP Message
+* Fri Feb 02 2024 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-8
+- Resolves: RHEL-18351 - squid:4/squid: Buffer over-read in the HTTP Message
   processing feature (CVE-2023-49285)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18485 - squid:4/squid: Incorrect Check of Function Return
+- Resolves: RHEL-18342 - squid:4/squid: Incorrect Check of Function Return
   Value In Helper Process management (CVE-2023-49286)
-
-* Wed Dec 06 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7.4
-- Resolves: RHEL-16764 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in SSL Certificate
+- Resolves: RHEL-18230 - squid:4/squid: Denial of Service in SSL Certificate
   validation (CVE-2023-46724)
-- Resolves: RHEL-16775 - squid:4/squid: NULL pointer dereference in the gopher
+- Resolves: RHEL-15911 - squid:4/squid: NULL pointer dereference in the gopher
   protocol code (CVE-2023-46728)
-- Resolves: RHEL-18257 - squid crashes in assertion when a parent peer exists
-
-* Thu Nov 30 2023 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7.3
-- Related: RHEL-14792 - squid: squid multiple issues in HTTP response caching
-- Fix mistake in the patch
-
-* Tue Nov 21 2023 Tomas Korbar <tkorbar@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7.2
-- Resolves: RHEL-14792 - squid: squid multiple issues in HTTP response caching
-
-* Mon Oct 30 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7.1
-- Resolves: RHEL-14801 - squid: squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Digest
-  Authentication
-- Resolves: RHEL-14776 - squid: squid: Request/Response smuggling in HTTP/1.1
-  and ICAP
+- Resolves: RHEL-18251 - squid crashes in assertion when a parent peer exists
+- Resolves: RHEL-14794 - squid: squid multiple issues in HTTP response caching
+  (CVE-2023-5824)
+- Resolves: RHEL-14803 - squid: squid: Denial of Service in HTTP Digest
+  Authentication (CVE-2023-46847)
+- Resolves: RHEL-14777 - squid: squid: Request/Response smuggling in HTTP/1.1
+  and ICAP (CVE-2023-46846)
 
 * Wed Aug 16 2023 Luboš Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.15-7
 - Resolves: #2076717 - Crash with half_closed_client on