import squid-4.11-3.module+el8.3.0+7851+7808b5f9

2020-11-03 06:58:15 -05:00 · 2020-11-03 06:58:15 -05:00 · 11b0ae8e0d
parent 9152c92e75
commit 11b0ae8e0d
27 changed files with 807 additions and 832 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/squid-4.4.tar.xz
+SOURCES/squid-4.11.tar.xz
--- a/.squid.metadata
+++ b/.squid.metadata
@ -1 +1 @@
-0ab6b133f65866d825bf72cbbe8cef209768b2fa SOURCES/squid-4.4.tar.xz
+053277bf5497163ffc9261b9807abda5959bb6fc SOURCES/squid-4.11.tar.xz
--- a/SOURCES/squid-3.5.9-include-guards.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-3.5.9-include-guards.patch
@ -1,95 +0,0 @@
------------------------------------------------------------
-revno: 14311
-revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
-parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
------------------------------------------------------------
-revno: 14311
-revision-id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
-parent: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
-fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
-author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
-committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
-branch nick: trunk
-timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
-message:
-  Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
------------------------------------------------------------
-# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
-# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
-# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
-# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
-# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
-# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
-# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
-#   6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
-# 
-# Begin patch
-=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
--- compat/os/linux.h	2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
-+++ compat/os/linux.h	2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
-@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
- #endif
- 
- /*
-+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
-+ *
-+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
-+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
-+ * aways present in Linux.
-+ *
-+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
-+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
-+ * to workaround it.
-+ */
-+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
-+#include <netinet/in.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-  * sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
-  *
-  * HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc
-fixes bug: http://bugs.squid-cache.org/show_bug.cgi?id=4323
-author: Francesco Chemolli <kinkie@squid-cache.org>
-committer: Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
-branch nick: trunk
-timestamp: Thu 2015-09-24 06:05:37 -0700
-message:
-  Bug 4323: Netfilter broken cross-includes with Linux 4.2
------------------------------------------------------------
-# Bazaar merge directive format 2 (Bazaar 0.90)
-# revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924130537-lqwzd1z99a3l9gt4
-# target_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk/
-# testament_sha1: c67cfca81040f3845d7c4caf2f40518511f14d0b
-# timestamp: 2015-09-24 13:06:33 +0000
-# source_branch: http://bzr.squid-cache.org/bzr/squid3/trunk
-# base_revision_id: squid3@treenet.co.nz-20150924032241-\
-#   6cx3g6hwz9xfoybr
-# 
-# Begin patch
-=== modified file 'compat/os/linux.h'
--- compat/os/linux.h	2015-01-13 07:25:36 +0000
-+++ compat/os/linux.h	2015-09-24 13:05:37 +0000
-@@ -30,6 +30,21 @@
- #endif
- 
- /*
-+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
-+ *
-+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
-+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
-+ * aways present in Linux.
-+ *
-+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
-+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
-+ * to workaround it.
-+ */
-+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
-+#include <netinet/in.h>
-+#endif
-+
-+/*
-  * sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
-  *
-  * HACK: LIBCAP_BROKEN Ugly glue to get around linux header madness colliding with glibc
-
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.11-CVE-2020-14058.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.11-CVE-2020-14058.patch
@ -0,0 +1,295 @@
+commit 93f5fda134a2a010b84ffedbe833d670e63ba4be
+Author: Christos Tsantilas <christos@chtsanti.net>
+Date:   2020-05-15 04:54:54 +0000
+
+    Fix sending of unknown validation errors to cert. validator (#633)
+    
+    Squid may be compiled with an OpenSSL release introducing X509
+    validation errors that Squid does not have the names for. Send their
+    integer codes.
+    
+    Also sync Squid certificate verification errors with OpenSSL v1.1.1g.
+    
+    This is a Measurement Factory project.
+
+diff --git a/src/format/Format.cc b/src/format/Format.cc
+index 8c5574b..4b4ad42 100644
+--- a/src/format/Format.cc
+++ b/src/format/Format.cc
+@@ -322,15 +322,6 @@ log_quoted_string(const char *str, char *out)
+     *p = '\0';
+ }
+ 
+-#if USE_OPENSSL
+-static char *
+-sslErrorName(Security::ErrorCode err, char *buf, size_t size)
+-{
+-    snprintf(buf, size, "SSL_ERR=%d", err);
+-    return buf;
+-}
+-#endif
+-
+ /// XXX: Misnamed. TODO: Split <h (and this function) to distinguish received
+ /// headers from sent headers rather than failing to distinguish requests from responses.
+ /// \retval HttpReply sent to the HTTP client (access.log and default context).
+@@ -959,9 +950,7 @@ Format::Format::assemble(MemBuf &mb, const AccessLogEntry::Pointer &al, int logS
+         case LFT_SQUID_ERROR_DETAIL:
+ #if USE_OPENSSL
+             if (al->request && al->request->errType == ERR_SECURE_CONNECT_FAIL) {
+-                out = Ssl::GetErrorName(al->request->errDetail);
+-                if (!out)
+-                    out = sslErrorName(al->request->errDetail, tmp, sizeof(tmp));
+                out = Ssl::GetErrorName(al->request->errDetail, true);
+             } else
+ #endif
+                 if (al->request && al->request->errDetail != ERR_DETAIL_NONE) {
+@@ -1263,10 +1252,7 @@ Format::Format::assemble(MemBuf &mb, const AccessLogEntry::Pointer &al, int logS
+                     for (const Security::CertErrors *sslError = srvBump->sslErrors(); sslError; sslError = sslError->next) {
+                         if (!sb.isEmpty())
+                             sb.append(separator);
+-                        if (const char *errorName = Ssl::GetErrorName(sslError->element.code))
+-                            sb.append(errorName);
+-                        else
+-                            sb.append(sslErrorName(sslError->element.code, tmp, sizeof(tmp)));
+                        sb.append(Ssl::GetErrorName(sslError->element.code, true));
+                         if (sslError->element.depth >= 0)
+                             sb.appendf("@depth=%d", sslError->element.depth);
+                     }
+diff --git a/src/ssl/ErrorDetail.cc b/src/ssl/ErrorDetail.cc
+index ddd61fd..00eb0e2 100644
+--- a/src/ssl/ErrorDetail.cc
+++ b/src/ssl/ErrorDetail.cc
+@@ -233,6 +233,9 @@ static SslErrorEntry TheSslErrorArray[] = {
+         "X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX"
+     },
+ #endif
+    {   X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION, //50
+        "X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION"
+    },
+ #if defined(X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE)
+     {
+         X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE, //51
+@@ -257,9 +260,132 @@ static SslErrorEntry TheSslErrorArray[] = {
+         "X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR"
+     },
+ #endif
+-    {   X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION,
+-        "X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION"
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP, //55
+        "X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION, //56
+        "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM, //57
+        "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE, //58
+        "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM, //59
+        "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED, //60
+        "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256, //61
+        "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH, //62
+        "X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH, //63
+        "X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH, //64
+        "X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH, //65
+        "X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH"
+     },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL, //66
+        "X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL, //67
+        "X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK, //68
+        "X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL, //69
+        "X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP, //70
+        "X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS, //71
+        "X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION, //72
+        "X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED, //73
+        "X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED, //74
+        "X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED"
+    },
+#endif
+#if defined(X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN)
+    {
+        X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN, //75
+        "X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN"
+    },
+#endif
+     { SSL_ERROR_NONE, "SSL_ERROR_NONE"},
+     {SSL_ERROR_NONE, NULL}
+ };
+@@ -286,6 +412,27 @@ static const char *OptionalSslErrors[] = {
+     "X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX",
+     "X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX",
+     "X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR",
+    "X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP",
+    "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION",
+    "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM",
+    "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE",
+    "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM",
+    "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED",
+    "X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256",
+    "X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH",
+    "X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH",
+    "X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH",
+    "X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH",
+    "X509_V_ERR_EE_KEY_TOO_SMALL",
+    "X509_V_ERR_CA_KEY_TOO_SMALL",
+    "X509_V_ERR_CA_MD_TOO_WEAK",
+    "X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CALL",
+    "X509_V_ERR_STORE_LOOKUP",
+    "X509_V_ERR_NO_VALID_SCTS",
+    "X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_NAME_VIOLATION",
+    "X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_NEEDED",
+    "X509_V_ERR_OCSP_VERIFY_FAILED",
+    "X509_V_ERR_OCSP_CERT_UNKNOWN",
+     NULL
+ };
+ 
+@@ -390,7 +537,7 @@ Ssl::ParseErrorString(const char *name, Security::Errors &errors)
+     return false; // not reached
+ }
+ 
+-const char *Ssl::GetErrorName(Security::ErrorCode value)
+const char *Ssl::GetErrorName(Security::ErrorCode value, const bool prefixRawCode)
+ {
+     if (TheSslErrors.empty())
+         loadSslErrorMap();
+@@ -399,7 +546,9 @@ const char *Ssl::GetErrorName(Security::ErrorCode value)
+     if (it != TheSslErrors.end())
+         return it->second->name;
+ 
+-    return NULL;
+    static char tmpBuffer[128];
+    snprintf(tmpBuffer, sizeof(tmpBuffer), "%s%d", prefixRawCode ? "SSL_ERR=" : "", (int)value);
+    return tmpBuffer;
+ }
+ 
+ bool
+@@ -529,21 +678,14 @@ const char *Ssl::ErrorDetail::notafter() const
+  */
+ const char *Ssl::ErrorDetail::err_code() const
+ {
+-    static char tmpBuffer[64];
+     // We can use the GetErrorName but using the detailEntry is faster,
+     // so try it first.
+-    const char *err = detailEntry.name.termedBuf();
+    if (const char *err = detailEntry.name.termedBuf())
+        return err;
+ 
+     // error details not loaded yet or not defined in error_details.txt,
+     // try the GetErrorName...
+-    if (!err)
+-        err = GetErrorName(error_no);
+-
+-    if (!err) {
+-        snprintf(tmpBuffer, 64, "%d", (int)error_no);
+-        err = tmpBuffer;
+-    }
+-    return err;
+    return GetErrorName(error_no);
+ }
+ 
+ /**
+diff --git a/src/ssl/ErrorDetail.h b/src/ssl/ErrorDetail.h
+index 48dc405..0eec0a9 100644
+--- a/src/ssl/ErrorDetail.h
+++ b/src/ssl/ErrorDetail.h
+@@ -26,8 +26,9 @@ bool ParseErrorString(const char *name, Security::Errors &);
+ /// The Security::ErrorCode code of the error described by  "name".
+ Security::ErrorCode GetErrorCode(const char *name);
+ 
+-/// The string representation of the TLS error "value"
+-const char *GetErrorName(Security::ErrorCode value);
+/// \return string representation of a known TLS error (or a raw error code)
+/// \param prefixRawCode whether to prefix raw codes with "SSL_ERR="
+const char *GetErrorName(Security::ErrorCode value, const bool prefixRawCode = false);
+ 
+ /// A short description of the TLS error "value"
+ const char *GetErrorDescr(Security::ErrorCode value);
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.11-CVE-2020-15049.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.11-CVE-2020-15049.patch
@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+commit ea12a34d338b962707d5078d6d1fc7c6eb119a22
+Author: Alex Rousskov <rousskov@measurement-factory.com>
+Date:   2020-05-13 14:05:00 +0000
+
+    Validate Content-Length value prefix (#629)
+    
+    The new code detects all invalid Content-Length prefixes but the old
+    code was already rejecting most invalid prefixes using strtoll(). The
+    newly covered (and now rejected) invalid characters are
+    
+    * explicit "+" sign;
+    * explicit "-" sign in "-0" values;
+    * isspace(3) characters that are not (relaxed) OWS characters.
+    
+    In most deployment environments, the last set is probably empty because
+    the relaxed OWS set has all the POSIX/C isspace(3) characters but the
+    new line, and the new line is unlikely to sneak in past other checks.
+    
+    Thank you, Amit Klein <amit.klein@safebreach.com>, for elevating the
+    importance of this 2016 TODO (added in commit a1b9ec2).
+
+diff --git a/CONTRIBUTORS b/CONTRIBUTORS
+index 36957f2..c10a221 100644
+--- a/CONTRIBUTORS
+++ b/CONTRIBUTORS
+@@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ Thank you!
+     Alex Wu <alex_wu2012@hotmail.com>
+     Alin Nastac <mrness@gentoo.org>
+     Alter <alter@alter.org.ua>
+    Amit Klein <amit.klein@safebreach.com>
+     Amos Jeffries
+     Amos Jeffries <amosjeffries@squid-cache.org>
+     Amos Jeffries <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
+diff --git a/src/http/ContentLengthInterpreter.cc b/src/http/ContentLengthInterpreter.cc
+index 3fdf7de..a3741eb 100644
+--- a/src/http/ContentLengthInterpreter.cc
+++ b/src/http/ContentLengthInterpreter.cc
+@@ -28,6 +28,24 @@ Http::ContentLengthInterpreter::ContentLengthInterpreter(const int aDebugLevel):
+ {
+ }
+ 
+/// checks whether all characters before the Content-Length number are allowed
+/// \returns the start of the digit sequence (or nil on errors)
+const char *
+Http::ContentLengthInterpreter::findDigits(const char *prefix, const char * const valueEnd) const
+{
+    // skip leading OWS in RFC 7230's `OWS field-value OWS`
+    const CharacterSet &whitespace = Http::One::Parser::WhitespaceCharacters();
+    while (prefix < valueEnd) {
+        const auto ch = *prefix;
+        if (CharacterSet::DIGIT[ch])
+            return prefix; // common case: a pre-trimmed field value
+        if (!whitespace[ch])
+            return nullptr; // (trimmed) length does not start with a digit
+        ++prefix;
+    }
+    return nullptr; // empty or whitespace-only value
+}
+
+ /// checks whether all characters after the Content-Length are allowed
+ bool
+ Http::ContentLengthInterpreter::goodSuffix(const char *suffix, const char * const end) const
+@@ -52,10 +70,19 @@ Http::ContentLengthInterpreter::checkValue(const char *rawValue, const int value
+ {
+     Must(!sawBad);
+ 
+    const auto valueEnd = rawValue + valueSize;
+
+    const auto digits = findDigits(rawValue, valueEnd);
+    if (!digits) {
+        debugs(55, debugLevel, "WARNING: Leading garbage or empty value in" << Raw("Content-Length", rawValue, valueSize));
+        sawBad = true;
+        return false;
+    }
+
+     int64_t latestValue = -1;
+     char *suffix = nullptr;
+-    // TODO: Handle malformed values with leading signs (e.g., "-0" or "+1").
+-    if (!httpHeaderParseOffset(rawValue, &latestValue, &suffix)) {
+
+    if (!httpHeaderParseOffset(digits, &latestValue, &suffix)) {
+         debugs(55, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: Malformed" << Raw("Content-Length", rawValue, valueSize));
+         sawBad = true;
+         return false;
+@@ -68,7 +95,7 @@ Http::ContentLengthInterpreter::checkValue(const char *rawValue, const int value
+     }
+ 
+     // check for garbage after the number
+-    if (!goodSuffix(suffix, rawValue + valueSize)) {
+    if (!goodSuffix(suffix, valueEnd)) {
+         debugs(55, debugLevel, "WARNING: Trailing garbage in" << Raw("Content-Length", rawValue, valueSize));
+         sawBad = true;
+         return false;
+diff --git a/src/http/ContentLengthInterpreter.h b/src/http/ContentLengthInterpreter.h
+index ce36e22..f22de91 100644
+--- a/src/http/ContentLengthInterpreter.h
+++ b/src/http/ContentLengthInterpreter.h
+@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ public:
+     bool sawGood;
+ 
+ protected:
+    const char *findDigits(const char *prefix, const char *valueEnd) const;
+     bool goodSuffix(const char *suffix, const char * const end) const;
+     bool checkValue(const char *start, const int size);
+     bool checkList(const String &list);
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2020-15810.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2020-15810.patch
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 diff --git a/src/HttpHeader.cc b/src/HttpHeader.cc
-index 284a057..cd9d71f 100644
+index 67543a4..19efc6d 100644
 --- a/src/HttpHeader.cc
 +++ b/src/HttpHeader.cc
-@@ -446,18 +446,6 @@ HttpHeader::parse(const char *header_start, size_t hdrLen)
+@@ -445,18 +445,6 @@ HttpHeader::parse(const char *header_start, size_t hdrLen)
             return 0;
         }
 
@ -21,8 +21,8 @@ index 284a057..cd9d71f 100644
         addEntry(e);
     }
 
-@@ -1418,6 +1406,20 @@ HttpHeaderEntry::parse(const char *field_start, const char *field_end)
-             return NULL;
+@@ -1451,6 +1439,20 @@ HttpHeaderEntry::parse(const char *field_start, const char *field_end, const htt
+         }
     }
 
 +    /* RFC 7230 section 3.2:
@ -42,15 +42,3 @@ index 284a057..cd9d71f 100644
     /* now we know we can parse it */
 
     debugs(55, 9, "parsing HttpHeaderEntry: near '" <<  getStringPrefix(field_start, field_end-field_start) << "'");
-diff --git a/src/HttpHeader.cc b/src/HttpHeader.cc
-index adeea9c..85c1c00 100644
--- a/src/HttpHeader.cc
-+++ b/src/HttpHeader.cc
-@@ -13,6 +13,7 @@
- #include "base64.h"
- #include "globals.h"
- #include "http/ContentLengthInterpreter.h"
-+#include "base/CharacterSet.h"
- #include "HttpHdrCc.h"
- #include "HttpHdrContRange.h"
- #include "HttpHdrScTarget.h" // also includes HttpHdrSc.h
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2020-15811.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2020-15811.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 diff --git a/src/HttpHeader.cc b/src/HttpHeader.cc
-index cd9d71f..adeea9c 100644
+index dc6e0ff..67543a4 100644
 --- a/src/HttpHeader.cc
 +++ b/src/HttpHeader.cc
@@ -174,6 +174,7 @@ HttpHeader::operator =(const HttpHeader &other)
@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ index cd9d71f..adeea9c 100644
     PROF_stop(HttpHeaderClean);
 }
 
-@@ -455,11 +457,23 @@ HttpHeader::parse(const char *header_start, size_t hdrLen)
+@@ -464,11 +466,23 @@ HttpHeader::parse(const char *header_start, size_t hdrLen)
                Raw("header", header_start, hdrLen));
     }
 
@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ index cd9d71f..adeea9c 100644
         // ensure our callers do not accidentally see bad Content-Length values
         delById(Http::HdrType::CONTENT_LENGTH);
 diff --git a/src/HttpHeader.h b/src/HttpHeader.h
-index 3b262be..2a73af4 100644
+index e3553a4..64f294a 100644
 --- a/src/HttpHeader.h
 +++ b/src/HttpHeader.h
@@ -140,7 +140,13 @@ public:
@ -87,10 +87,10 @@ index 3b262be..2a73af4 100644
 
 #endif /* SQUID_HTTPHEADER_H */
 diff --git a/src/client_side.cc b/src/client_side.cc
-index d61e278..429ce7f 100644
+index 5f5a79e..000a00b 100644
 --- a/src/client_side.cc
 +++ b/src/client_side.cc
-@@ -1552,9 +1552,7 @@ void
+@@ -1600,9 +1600,7 @@ void
 clientProcessRequest(ConnStateData *conn, const Http1::RequestParserPointer &hp, Http::Stream *context)
 {
     ClientHttpRequest *http = context->http;
@ -100,7 +100,7 @@ index d61e278..429ce7f 100644
     bool expectBody = false;
 
     // We already have the request parsed and checked, so we
-@@ -1611,13 +1609,7 @@ clientProcessRequest(ConnStateData *conn, const Http1::RequestParserPointer &hp,
+@@ -1659,13 +1657,7 @@ clientProcessRequest(ConnStateData *conn, const Http1::RequestParserPointer &hp,
         request->http_ver.minor = http_ver.minor;
     }
 
@ -115,7 +115,7 @@ index d61e278..429ce7f 100644
 
     mustReplyToOptions = (request->method == Http::METHOD_OPTIONS) &&
                          (request->header.getInt64(Http::HdrType::MAX_FORWARDS) == 0);
-@@ -1634,6 +1626,7 @@ clientProcessRequest(ConnStateData *conn, const Http1::RequestParserPointer &hp,
+@@ -1682,6 +1674,7 @@ clientProcessRequest(ConnStateData *conn, const Http1::RequestParserPointer &hp,
         return;
     }
 
@ -124,7 +124,7 @@ index d61e278..429ce7f 100644
         clientStreamNode *node = context->getClientReplyContext();
         clientReplyContext *repContext = dynamic_cast<clientReplyContext *>(node->data.getRaw());
 diff --git a/src/http.cc b/src/http.cc
-index 1ed98ca..68594aa 100644
+index 9654c4a..6f4d3b2 100644
 --- a/src/http.cc
 +++ b/src/http.cc
@@ -1292,6 +1292,9 @@ HttpStateData::continueAfterParsingHeader()
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.11-CVE-2020-24606.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.11-CVE-2020-24606.patch
@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+commit b789e719affbb0a6ff9c22095f6ca8db6a5f4926
+Author: Eduard Bagdasaryan <eduard.bagdasaryan@measurement-factory.com>
+Date:   2020-07-27 15:28:31 +0000
+
+    Fix livelocking in peerDigestHandleReply (#698)
+    
+    peerDigestHandleReply() was missing a premature EOF check. The existing
+    peerDigestFetchedEnough() cannot detect EOF because it does not have
+    access to receivedData.length used to indicate the EOF condition. We did
+    not adjust peerDigestFetchedEnough() because it is abused to check both
+    post-I/O state and the state after each digest processing step. The
+    latter invocations lack access to receivedData.length and should not
+    really bother with EOF anyway.
+
+diff --git a/src/peer_digest.cc b/src/peer_digest.cc
+index d48340f97..265f16183 100644
+--- a/src/peer_digest.cc
+++ b/src/peer_digest.cc
+@@ -483,6 +483,15 @@ peerDigestHandleReply(void *data, StoreIOBuffer receivedData)
+ 
+     } while (cbdataReferenceValid(fetch) && prevstate != fetch->state && fetch->bufofs > 0);
+ 
+    // Check for EOF here, thus giving the parser one extra run. We could avoid this overhead by
+    // checking at the beginning of this function. However, in this case, we would have to require
+    // that the parser does not regard EOF as a special condition (it is true now but may change
+    // in the future).
+    if (!receivedData.length) { // EOF
+        peerDigestFetchAbort(fetch, fetch->buf, "premature end of digest reply");
+        return;
+    }
+
+     /* Update the copy offset */
+     fetch->offset += receivedData.length;
+ 
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-active-ftp.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-active-ftp.patch
@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
 diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
-index 777210c..4c80511 100644
+index b665bcf..d287e55 100644
 --- a/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
 +++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.cc
@@ -778,7 +778,8 @@ Ftp::Client::connectDataChannel()
@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ index 777210c..4c80511 100644
 
 /// creates a data channel Comm close callback
 diff --git a/src/clients/FtpClient.h b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
-index 465fdb7..75dbd3b 100644
+index a76a5a0..218d696 100644
 --- a/src/clients/FtpClient.h
 +++ b/src/clients/FtpClient.h
@@ -118,7 +118,7 @@ public:
@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ index 465fdb7..75dbd3b 100644
 
     CtrlChannel ctrl; ///< FTP control channel state
 diff --git a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
-index a13cdda..b958b14 100644
+index 411bce9..31d3e36 100644
 --- a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
 +++ b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
@@ -87,6 +87,13 @@ struct GatewayFlags {
@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ index a13cdda..b958b14 100644
     int checkAuth(const HttpHeader * req_hdr);
     void checkUrlpath();
     void buildTitleUrl();
-@@ -1792,6 +1803,7 @@ ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback)
+@@ -1787,6 +1798,7 @@ ftpOpenListenSocket(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState, int fallback)
     }
 
     ftpState->listenForDataChannel(temp);
@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ index a13cdda..b958b14 100644
 }
 
 static void
-@@ -1827,13 +1839,19 @@ ftpSendPORT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
+@@ -1822,13 +1834,19 @@ ftpSendPORT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
     // pull out the internal IP address bytes to send in PORT command...
     // source them from the listen_conn->local
 
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ index a13cdda..b958b14 100644
     ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
     ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_PORT;
 
-@@ -1886,14 +1904,27 @@ ftpSendEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
+@@ -1881,14 +1899,27 @@ ftpSendEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
         return;
     }
 
@ -116,7 +116,7 @@ index a13cdda..b958b14 100644
 
     ftpState->writeCommand(cbuf);
     ftpState->state = Ftp::Client::SENT_EPRT;
-@@ -1912,7 +1943,7 @@ ftpReadEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
+@@ -1907,7 +1938,7 @@ ftpReadEPRT(Ftp::Gateway * ftpState)
         ftpSendPORT(ftpState);
         return;
     }
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.0.11-config.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.0.11-config.patch
@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-diff -up squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre.config squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre
--- squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre.config	2016-06-09 22:32:57.000000000 +0200
-+++ squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre	2016-07-11 21:08:35.090976840 +0200
-@@ -4658,7 +4658,7 @@ DOC_END
+diff --git a/src/cf.data.pre b/src/cf.data.pre
+index 26ef576..30d5509 100644
+--- a/src/cf.data.pre
+++ b/src/cf.data.pre
+@@ -5006,7 +5006,7 @@ DOC_END
 
 NAME: logfile_rotate
 TYPE: int
@ -10,7 +11,7 @@ diff -up squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre.config squid-4.0.11/src/cf.data.pre
 LOC: Config.Log.rotateNumber
 DOC_START
 	Specifies the default number of logfile rotations to make when you
-@@ -6444,11 +6444,11 @@ COMMENT_END
+@@ -6857,11 +6857,11 @@ COMMENT_END
 
 NAME: cache_mgr
 TYPE: string
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.11-convert-ipv4.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.11-convert-ipv4.patch
@ -0,0 +1,145 @@
+From 771908d313ee9c255adfb5e4fdba4d6797c18409 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
+Date: Thu, 7 Mar 2019 13:50:38 +0000
+Subject: [PATCH] Bug 4928: Cannot convert non-IPv4 to IPv4 (#379)
+
+... when reaching client_ip_max_connections
+
+The client_ip_max_connections limit is checked before the TCP dst-IP is located for the newly received TCP connection. This leaves Squid unable to fetch the NFMARK or similar
+details later on (they do not exist for [::]).
+
+Move client_ip_max_connections test later in the TCP accept process to ensure dst-IP is known when the error is produced.
+---
+ src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc | 82 ++++++++++++++++++++---------------------
+ 1 file changed, 39 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc b/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc
+index cae92a7b1e..2109913008 100644
+--- a/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc
+++ b/src/comm/TcpAcceptor.cc
+@@ -282,16 +282,7 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::acceptOne()
+     ConnectionPointer newConnDetails = new Connection();
+     const Comm::Flag flag = oldAccept(newConnDetails);
+ 
+-    /* Check for errors */
+-    if (!newConnDetails->isOpen()) {
+-
+-        if (flag == Comm::NOMESSAGE) {
+-            /* register interest again */
+-            debugs(5, 5, HERE << "try later: " << conn << " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
+-            SetSelect(conn->fd, COMM_SELECT_READ, doAccept, this, 0);
+-            return;
+-        }
+-
+    if (flag == Comm::COMM_ERROR) {
+         // A non-recoverable error; notify the caller */
+         debugs(5, 5, HERE << "non-recoverable error:" << status() << " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
+         if (intendedForUserConnections())
+@@ -301,12 +292,16 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::acceptOne()
+         return;
+     }
+ 
+-    newConnDetails->nfmark = Ip::Qos::getNfmarkFromConnection(newConnDetails, Ip::Qos::dirAccepted);
+    if (flag == Comm::NOMESSAGE) {
+        /* register interest again */
+        debugs(5, 5, "try later: " << conn << " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
+    } else {
+        debugs(5, 5, "Listener: " << conn <<
+               " accepted new connection " << newConnDetails <<
+               " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
+        notify(flag, newConnDetails);
+    }
+ 
+-    debugs(5, 5, HERE << "Listener: " << conn <<
+-           " accepted new connection " << newConnDetails <<
+-           " handler Subscription: " << theCallSub);
+-    notify(flag, newConnDetails);
+     SetSelect(conn->fd, COMM_SELECT_READ, doAccept, this, 0);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -346,8 +341,8 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::notify(const Comm::Flag flag, const Comm::ConnectionPointer &
+  *
+  * \retval Comm::OK          success. details parameter filled.
+  * \retval Comm::NOMESSAGE   attempted accept() but nothing useful came in.
+- * \retval Comm::COMM_ERROR  an outright failure occurred.
+  *                           Or this client has too many connections already.
+ * \retval Comm::COMM_ERROR  an outright failure occurred.
+  */
+ Comm::Flag
+ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
+@@ -382,15 +377,6 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
+     details->fd = sock;
+     details->remote = *gai;
+ 
+-    if ( Config.client_ip_max_connections >= 0) {
+-        if (clientdbEstablished(details->remote, 0) > Config.client_ip_max_connections) {
+-            debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: " << details->remote << " attempting more than " << Config.client_ip_max_connections << " connections.");
+-            Ip::Address::FreeAddr(gai);
+-            PROF_stop(comm_accept);
+-            return Comm::COMM_ERROR;
+-        }
+-    }
+-
+     // lookup the local-end details of this new connection
+     Ip::Address::InitAddr(gai);
+     details->local.setEmpty();
+@@ -404,6 +390,34 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
+     details->local = *gai;
+     Ip::Address::FreeAddr(gai);
+ 
+    // Perform NAT or TPROXY operations to retrieve the real client/dest IP addresses
+    if (conn->flags&(COMM_TRANSPARENT|COMM_INTERCEPTION) && !Ip::Interceptor.Lookup(details, conn)) {
+        debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: NAT/TPROXY lookup failed to locate original IPs on " << details);
+        // Failed.
+        PROF_stop(comm_accept);
+        return Comm::COMM_ERROR;
+    }
+
+#if USE_SQUID_EUI
+    if (Eui::TheConfig.euiLookup) {
+        if (details->remote.isIPv4()) {
+            details->remoteEui48.lookup(details->remote);
+        } else if (details->remote.isIPv6()) {
+            details->remoteEui64.lookup(details->remote);
+        }
+    }
+#endif
+
+    details->nfmark = Ip::Qos::getNfmarkFromConnection(details, Ip::Qos::dirAccepted);
+
+    if (Config.client_ip_max_connections >= 0) {
+        if (clientdbEstablished(details->remote, 0) > Config.client_ip_max_connections) {
+            debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "WARNING: " << details->remote << " attempting more than " << Config.client_ip_max_connections << " connections.");
+            PROF_stop(comm_accept);
+            return Comm::NOMESSAGE;
+        }
+    }
+
+     /* fdstat update */
+     // XXX : these are not all HTTP requests. use a note about type and ip:port details->
+     // so we end up with a uniform "(HTTP|FTP-data|HTTPS|...) remote-ip:remote-port"
+@@ -425,24 +439,6 @@ Comm::TcpAcceptor::oldAccept(Comm::ConnectionPointer &details)
+     /* IFF the socket is (tproxy) transparent, pass the flag down to allow spoofing */
+     F->flags.transparent = fd_table[conn->fd].flags.transparent; // XXX: can we remove this line yet?
+ 
+-    // Perform NAT or TPROXY operations to retrieve the real client/dest IP addresses
+-    if (conn->flags&(COMM_TRANSPARENT|COMM_INTERCEPTION) && !Ip::Interceptor.Lookup(details, conn)) {
+-        debugs(50, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: NAT/TPROXY lookup failed to locate original IPs on " << details);
+-        // Failed.
+-        PROF_stop(comm_accept);
+-        return Comm::COMM_ERROR;
+-    }
+-
+-#if USE_SQUID_EUI
+-    if (Eui::TheConfig.euiLookup) {
+-        if (details->remote.isIPv4()) {
+-            details->remoteEui48.lookup(details->remote);
+-        } else if (details->remote.isIPv6()) {
+-            details->remoteEui64.lookup(details->remote);
+-        }
+-    }
+-#endif
+-
+     PROF_stop(comm_accept);
+     return Comm::OK;
+ }
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.11-include-guards.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.11-include-guards.patch
@ -0,0 +1,41 @@
+diff --git a/compat/os/linux.h b/compat/os/linux.h
+index 0ff05c6..d51389b 100644
+--- a/compat/os/linux.h
+++ b/compat/os/linux.h
+@@ -44,6 +44,36 @@
+ #include <netinet/in.h>
+ #endif
+ 
+/*
+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
+ *
+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
+ * aways present in Linux.
+ *
+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
+ * to workaround it.
+ */
+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#endif
+
+/*
+ * Netfilter header madness. (see Bug 4323)
+ *
+ * Netfilter have a history of defining their own versions of network protocol
+ * primitives without sufficient protection against the POSIX defines which are
+ * aways present in Linux.
+ *
+ * netinet/in.h must be included before any other sys header in order to properly
+ * activate include guards in <linux/libc-compat.h> the kernel maintainers added
+ * to workaround it.
+ */
+#if HAVE_NETINET_IN_H
+#include <netinet/in.h>
+#endif
+
+ /*
+  * sys/capability.h is only needed in Linux apparently.
+  *
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.0.21-large-acl.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.0.21-large-acl.patch
--- a/SOURCES/squid-3.1.0.9-location.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-3.1.0.9-location.patch
@ -1,7 +1,8 @@
-diff -up squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART.location squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART
--- squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART.location	2009-06-26 12:35:27.000000000 +0200
-+++ squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART	2009-07-17 14:03:10.000000000 +0200
-@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ After you retrieved, compiled and instal
+diff --git a/QUICKSTART b/QUICKSTART
+index e5299b4..a243437 100644
+--- a/QUICKSTART
+++ b/QUICKSTART
+@@ -10,10 +10,9 @@ After you retrieved, compiled and installed the Squid software (see
 INSTALL in the same directory), you have to configure the squid.conf
 file. This is the list of the values you *need* to change, because no
 sensible defaults could be defined. Do not touch the other variables
@ -14,7 +15,7 @@ diff -up squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART.location squid-3.1.0.9/QUICKSTART
 
 ==============================================================================
 
-@@ -82,12 +81,12 @@ After editing squid.conf to your liking,
+@@ -80,12 +79,12 @@ After editing squid.conf to your liking, run Squid from the command
 line TWICE:
 
 To create any disk cache_dir configured:
--- a/SOURCES/squid-3.0.STABLE1-perlpath.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-3.0.STABLE1-perlpath.patch
@ -6,5 +6,5 @@ index 90ac6a4..8dbed90 100755
 -#!/usr/local/bin/perl -Tw
 +#!/usr/bin/perl -Tw
 #
- # * Copyright (C) 1996-2018 The Squid Software Foundation and contributors
+ # * Copyright (C) 1996-2020 The Squid Software Foundation and contributors
 # *
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.11-systemd.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.11-systemd.patch
@ -0,0 +1,39 @@
+diff --git a/configure b/configure
+index 17b2ebf..9530f6b 100755
+--- a/configure
+++ b/configure
+@@ -33915,6 +33915,7 @@ done
+   fi
+   if test "x$SYSTEMD_LIBS" != "x" ; then
+     CXXFLAGS="$SYSTEMD_CFLAGS $CXXFLAGS"
+    LDFLAGS="$SYSTEMD_LIBS $LDFLAGS"
+ 
+ $as_echo "#define USE_SYSTEMD 1" >>confdefs.h
+ 
+diff --git a/src/Debug.h b/src/Debug.h
+index 6eecd01..ddd9e38 100644
+--- a/src/Debug.h
+++ b/src/Debug.h
+@@ -99,6 +99,10 @@ public:
+ 
+     /// configures the active debugging context to write syslog ALERT
+     static void ForceAlert();
+
+    /// prefixes each grouped debugs() line after the first one in the group
+    static std::ostream& Extra(std::ostream &os) { return os << "\n    "; }
+
+ private:
+     static Context *Current; ///< deepest active context; nil outside debugs()
+ };
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index d3c5da8..806302c 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
+++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -2162,6 +2162,7 @@ if test "x$with_systemd" != "xno" -a "x$squid_host_os" = "xlinux"; then
+   fi
+   if test "x$SYSTEMD_LIBS" != "x" ; then
+     CXXFLAGS="$SYSTEMD_CFLAGS $CXXFLAGS"
+    LDFLAGS="$SYSTEMD_LIBS $LDFLAGS"
+     AC_DEFINE(USE_SYSTEMD,1,[systemd support is available])
+   else
+     with_systemd=no
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.11.tar.xz.asc
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.11.tar.xz.asc
@ -0,0 +1,25 @@
+File: squid-4.11.tar.xz
+Date: Sun Apr 19 12:56:37 UTC 2020
+Size: 2447700
+MD5 : 10f34e852153a9996aa4614670e2bda1
+SHA1: 053277bf5497163ffc9261b9807abda5959bb6fc
+Key : CD6DBF8EF3B17D3E <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
+            B068 84ED B779 C89B 044E  64E3 CD6D BF8E F3B1 7D3E
+      keyring = http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
+      keyserver = pool.sks-keyservers.net
+-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
+
+iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEsGiE7bd5yJsETmTjzW2/jvOxfT4FAl6cSpEACgkQzW2/jvOx
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+k/Xi/nocO796YS8GZBnmhS1lEGEwp/YpJBFWmIjTWMUMEOcswVA=
+=PKl0
+-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-12519.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-12519.patch
@ -1,296 +0,0 @@
-commit fdd4123629320aa1ee4c3481bb392437c90d188d
-Author: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date:   2019-05-20 11:23:13 +0000
-
-    ESI: convert parse exceptions into 500 status response  (#411)
-    
-    Produce a valid HTTP 500 status reply and continue operations when
-    ESI parser throws an exception. This will prevent incomplete ESI
-    responses reaching clients on server errors. Such responses might
-    have been cacheable and thus corrupted, albeit corrupted consistently
-    and at source by the reverse-proxy delivering them.
-    
-    ESI: throw on large stack recursions (#408)
-    
-    This reduces the impact on concurrent clients to only those
-    accessing the malformed resource.
-    
-    Depending on what type of recursion is being performed the
-    resource may appear to the client with missing segments, or
-    not at all.
-
-diff --git a/src/esi/Context.h b/src/esi/Context.h
-index f3281a1..1b08cfb 100644
--- a/src/esi/Context.h
-+++ b/src/esi/Context.h
-@@ -12,6 +12,7 @@
- #include "clientStream.h"
- #include "err_type.h"
- #include "esi/Element.h"
-+#include "esi/Esi.h"
- #include "esi/Parser.h"
- #include "http/forward.h"
- #include "http/StatusCode.h"
-@@ -113,7 +114,7 @@ public:
-     {
- 
-     public:
-        ESIElement::Pointer stack[10]; /* a stack of esi elements that are open */
-+        ESIElement::Pointer stack[ESI_STACK_DEPTH_LIMIT]; /* a stack of esi elements that are open */
-         int stackdepth; /* self explanatory */
-         ESIParser::Pointer theParser;
-         ESIElement::Pointer top();
-diff --git a/src/esi/Esi.cc b/src/esi/Esi.cc
-index cc662c4..e41d593 100644
--- a/src/esi/Esi.cc
-+++ b/src/esi/Esi.cc
-@@ -29,6 +29,7 @@
- #include "esi/Expression.h"
- #include "esi/Segment.h"
- #include "esi/VarState.h"
-+#include "FadingCounter.h"
- #include "fatal.h"
- #include "http/Stream.h"
- #include "HttpHdrSc.h"
-@@ -930,13 +931,18 @@ void
- ESIContext::addStackElement (ESIElement::Pointer element)
- {
-     /* Put on the stack to allow skipping of 'invalid' markup */
-    assert (parserState.stackdepth <11);
-+
-+    // throw an error if the stack location would be invalid
-+    if (parserState.stackdepth >= ESI_STACK_DEPTH_LIMIT)
-+        throw Esi::Error("ESI Too many nested elements");
-+    if (parserState.stackdepth < 0)
-+        throw Esi::Error("ESI elements stack error, probable error in ESI template");
-+
-     assert (!failed());
-     debugs(86, 5, "ESIContext::addStackElement: About to add ESI Node " << element.getRaw());
- 
-     if (!parserState.top()->addElement(element)) {
-        debugs(86, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ESIContext::addStackElement: failed to add esi node, probable error in ESI template");
-        flags.error = 1;
-+        throw Esi::Error("ESIContext::addStackElement failed, probable error in ESI template");
-     } else {
-         /* added ok, push onto the stack */
-         parserState.stack[parserState.stackdepth] = element;
-@@ -1188,13 +1194,10 @@ ESIContext::addLiteral (const char *s, int len)
-     assert (len);
-     debugs(86, 5, "literal length is " << len);
-     /* give a literal to the current element */
-    assert (parserState.stackdepth <11);
-     ESIElement::Pointer element (new esiLiteral (this, s, len));
- 
-    if (!parserState.top()->addElement(element)) {
-        debugs(86, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ESIContext::addLiteral: failed to add esi node, probable error in ESI template");
-        flags.error = 1;
-    }
-+    if (!parserState.top()->addElement(element))
-+        throw Esi::Error("ESIContext::addLiteral failed, probable error in ESI template");
- }
- 
- void
-@@ -1256,8 +1259,24 @@ ESIContext::parse()
- 
-         PROF_start(esiParsing);
- 
-        while (buffered.getRaw() && !flags.error)
-            parseOneBuffer();
-+        try {
-+            while (buffered.getRaw() && !flags.error)
-+                parseOneBuffer();
-+
-+        } catch (Esi::ErrorDetail &errMsg) { // FIXME: non-const for c_str()
-+            // level-2: these are protocol/syntax errors from upstream
-+            debugs(86, 2, "WARNING: ESI syntax error: " << errMsg);
-+            setError();
-+            setErrorMessage(errMsg.c_str());
-+
-+        } catch (...) {
-+            // DBG_IMPORTANT because these are local issues the admin needs to fix
-+            static FadingCounter logEntries; // TODO: set horizon less than infinity
-+            if (logEntries.count(1) < 100)
-+                debugs(86, DBG_IMPORTANT, "ERROR: ESI parser: " << CurrentException);
-+            setError();
-+            setErrorMessage("ESI parser error");
-+        }
- 
-         PROF_stop(esiParsing);
- 
-diff --git a/src/esi/Esi.h b/src/esi/Esi.h
-index 180b2c4..6fd5aac 100644
--- a/src/esi/Esi.h
-+++ b/src/esi/Esi.h
-@@ -10,6 +10,11 @@
- #define SQUID_ESI_H
- 
- #include "clientStream.h"
-+#include "sbuf/SBuf.h"
-+
-+#if !defined(ESI_STACK_DEPTH_LIMIT)
-+#define ESI_STACK_DEPTH_LIMIT 20
-+#endif
- 
- /* ESI.c */
- extern CSR esiStreamRead;
-@@ -18,5 +23,14 @@ extern CSD esiStreamDetach;
- extern CSS esiStreamStatus;
- int esiEnableProcessing (HttpReply *);
- 
-+namespace Esi
-+{
-+
-+typedef SBuf ErrorDetail;
-+/// prepare an Esi::ErrorDetail for throw on ESI parser internal errors
-+inline Esi::ErrorDetail Error(const char *msg) { return ErrorDetail(msg); }
-+
-+} // namespace Esi
-+
- #endif /* SQUID_ESI_H */
- 
-diff --git a/src/esi/Expression.cc b/src/esi/Expression.cc
-index 2b5b762..8519b03 100644
--- a/src/esi/Expression.cc
-+++ b/src/esi/Expression.cc
-@@ -10,6 +10,7 @@
- 
- #include "squid.h"
- #include "Debug.h"
-+#include "esi/Esi.h"
- #include "esi/Expression.h"
- #include "profiler/Profiler.h"
- 
-@@ -97,6 +98,17 @@ stackpop(stackmember * s, int *depth)
-     cleanmember(&s[*depth]);
- }
- 
-+static void
-+stackpush(stackmember *stack, stackmember &item, int *depth)
-+{
-+    if (*depth < 0)
-+        throw Esi::Error("ESIExpression stack has negative size");
-+    if (*depth >= ESI_STACK_DEPTH_LIMIT)
-+        throw Esi::Error("ESIExpression stack is full, cannot push");
-+
-+    stack[(*depth)++] = item;
-+}
-+
- static evaluate evalnegate;
- static evaluate evalliteral;
- static evaluate evalor;
-@@ -208,6 +220,11 @@ evalnegate(stackmember * stack, int *depth, int whereAmI, stackmember * candidat
-         /* invalid stack */
-         return 1;
- 
-+    if (whereAmI < 0)
-+        throw Esi::Error("negate expression location too small");
-+    if (*depth >= ESI_STACK_DEPTH_LIMIT)
-+        throw Esi::Error("negate expression too complex");
-+
-     if (stack[whereAmI + 1].valuetype != ESI_EXPR_EXPR)
-         /* invalid operand */
-         return 1;
-@@ -280,7 +297,7 @@ evalor(stackmember * stack, int *depth, int whereAmI, stackmember * candidate)
- 
-     srv.precedence = 1;
- 
-    stack[(*depth)++] = srv;
-+    stackpush(stack, srv, depth);
- 
-     /* we're out of way, try adding now */
-     if (!addmember(stack, depth, candidate))
-@@ -327,7 +344,7 @@ evaland(stackmember * stack, int *depth, int whereAmI, stackmember * candidate)
- 
-     srv.precedence = 1;
- 
-    stack[(*depth)++] = srv;
-+    stackpush(stack, srv, depth);
- 
-     /* we're out of way, try adding now */
-     if (!addmember(stack, depth, candidate))
-@@ -373,7 +390,7 @@ evallesseq(stackmember * stack, int *depth, int whereAmI, stackmember * candidat
- 
-     srv.precedence = 1;
- 
-    stack[(*depth)++] = srv;
-+    stackpush(stack, srv, depth);
- 
-     /* we're out of way, try adding now */
-     if (!addmember(stack, depth, candidate))
-@@ -421,7 +438,7 @@ evallessthan(stackmember * stack, int *depth, int whereAmI, stackmember * candid
- 
-     srv.precedence = 1;
- 
-    stack[(*depth)++] = srv;
-+    stackpush(stack, srv, depth);
- 
-     /* we're out of way, try adding now */
-     if (!addmember(stack, depth, candidate))
-@@ -469,7 +486,7 @@ evalmoreeq(stackmember * stack, int *depth, int whereAmI, stackmember * candidat
- 
-     srv.precedence = 1;
- 
-    stack[(*depth)++] = srv;
-+    stackpush(stack, srv, depth);
- 
-     /* we're out of way, try adding now */
-     if (!addmember(stack, depth, candidate))
-@@ -517,7 +534,7 @@ evalmorethan(stackmember * stack, int *depth, int whereAmI, stackmember * candid
- 
-     srv.precedence = 1;
- 
-    stack[(*depth)++] = srv;
-+    stackpush(stack, srv, depth);
- 
-     /* we're out of way, try adding now */
-     if (!addmember(stack, depth, candidate))
-@@ -566,7 +583,7 @@ evalequals(stackmember * stack, int *depth, int whereAmI,
- 
-     srv.precedence = 1;
- 
-    stack[(*depth)++] = srv;
-+    stackpush(stack, srv, depth);
- 
-     /* we're out of way, try adding now */
-     if (!addmember(stack, depth, candidate))
-@@ -613,7 +630,7 @@ evalnotequals(stackmember * stack, int *depth, int whereAmI, stackmember * candi
- 
-     srv.precedence = 1;
- 
-    stack[(*depth)++] = srv;
-+    stackpush(stack, srv, depth);
- 
-     /* we're out of way, try adding now */
-     if (!addmember(stack, depth, candidate))
-@@ -953,6 +970,9 @@ addmember(stackmember * stack, int *stackdepth, stackmember * candidate)
-         /* !(!(a==b))) is why thats safe */
-         /* strictly less than until we unwind */
- 
-+        if (*stackdepth >= ESI_STACK_DEPTH_LIMIT)
-+            throw Esi::Error("ESI expression too complex to add member");
-+
-         if (candidate->precedence < stack[*stackdepth - 1].precedence ||
-                 candidate->precedence < stack[*stackdepth - 2].precedence) {
-             /* must be an operator */
-@@ -968,10 +988,10 @@ addmember(stackmember * stack, int *stackdepth, stackmember * candidate)
-                 return 0;
-             }
-         } else {
-            stack[(*stackdepth)++] = *candidate;
-+            stackpush(stack, *candidate, stackdepth);
-         }
-     } else if (candidate->valuetype != ESI_EXPR_INVALID)
-        stack[(*stackdepth)++] = *candidate;
-+        stackpush(stack, *candidate, stackdepth);
- 
-     return 1;
- }
-@@ -979,7 +999,7 @@ addmember(stackmember * stack, int *stackdepth, stackmember * candidate)
- int
- ESIExpression::Evaluate(char const *s)
- {
-    stackmember stack[20];
-+    stackmember stack[ESI_STACK_DEPTH_LIMIT];
-     int stackdepth = 0;
-     char const *end;
-     PROF_start(esiExpressionEval);
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-12525.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-12525.patch
@ -1,30 +0,0 @@
-commit 409956536647b3a05ee1e367424a24ae6b8f13fd
-Author: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date:   2019-06-08 21:09:23 +0000
-
-    Fix Digest auth parameter parsing (#415)
-    
-    Only remove quoting if the domain=, uri= or qop= parameter
-    value is surrounded by double-quotes.
-
-diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-index a8a07cd..b547bf8 100644
--- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-+++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-@@ -787,14 +787,14 @@ Auth::Digest::Config::decode(char const *proxy_auth, const char *aRequestRealm)
-             if (keyName == SBuf("domain",6) || keyName == SBuf("uri",3)) {
-                 // domain is Special. Not a quoted-string, must not be de-quoted. But is wrapped in '"'
-                 // BUG 3077: uri= can also be sent to us in a mangled (invalid!) form like domain
-                if (*p == '"' && *(p + vlen -1) == '"') {
-+                if (vlen > 1 && *p == '"' && *(p + vlen -1) == '"') {
-                     value.limitInit(p+1, vlen-2);
-                 }
-             } else if (keyName == SBuf("qop",3)) {
-                 // qop is more special.
-                 // On request this must not be quoted-string de-quoted. But is several values wrapped in '"'
-                 // On response this is a single un-quoted token.
-                if (*p == '"' && *(p + vlen -1) == '"') {
-+                if (vlen > 1 && *p == '"' && *(p + vlen -1) == '"') {
-                     value.limitInit(p+1, vlen-2);
-                 } else {
-                     value.limitInit(p, vlen);
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-12527.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-12527.patch
@ -1,139 +0,0 @@
-commit 7f73e9c5d17664b882ed32590e6af310c247f320
-Author: Amos Jeffries <yadij@users.noreply.github.com>
-Date:   2019-06-19 05:58:36 +0000
-
-    Update HttpHeader::getAuth to SBuf (#416)
-    
-    Replace the fixed-size buffer for decoding base64 tokens with an
-    SBuf to avoid decoder issues on large inputs.
-    
-    Update callers to SBuf API operations for more efficient memory
-    management.
-
-diff --git a/src/HttpHeader.cc b/src/HttpHeader.cc
-index 1e2b650..284a057 100644
--- a/src/HttpHeader.cc
-+++ b/src/HttpHeader.cc
-@@ -1268,43 +1268,46 @@ HttpHeader::getContRange() const
-     return cr;
- }
- 
-const char *
-HttpHeader::getAuth(Http::HdrType id, const char *auth_scheme) const
-+SBuf
-+HttpHeader::getAuthToken(Http::HdrType id, const char *auth_scheme) const
- {
-     const char *field;
-     int l;
-     assert(auth_scheme);
-     field = getStr(id);
- 
-+    static const SBuf nil;
-     if (!field)         /* no authorization field */
-        return NULL;
-+        return nil;
- 
-     l = strlen(auth_scheme);
- 
-     if (!l || strncasecmp(field, auth_scheme, l))   /* wrong scheme */
-        return NULL;
-+        return nil;
- 
-     field += l;
- 
-     if (!xisspace(*field))  /* wrong scheme */
-        return NULL;
-+        return nil;
- 
-     /* skip white space */
-     for (; field && xisspace(*field); ++field);
- 
-     if (!*field)        /* no authorization cookie */
-        return NULL;
-+        return nil;
- 
-    static char decodedAuthToken[8192];
-+    const auto fieldLen = strlen(field);
-+    SBuf result;
-+    char *decodedAuthToken = result.rawAppendStart(BASE64_DECODE_LENGTH(fieldLen));
-     struct base64_decode_ctx ctx;
-     base64_decode_init(&ctx);
-     size_t decodedLen = 0;
-    if (!base64_decode_update(&ctx, &decodedLen, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(decodedAuthToken), strlen(field), field) ||
-+    if (!base64_decode_update(&ctx, &decodedLen, reinterpret_cast<uint8_t*>(decodedAuthToken), fieldLen, field) ||
-             !base64_decode_final(&ctx)) {
-        return NULL;
-+        return nil;
-     }
-    decodedAuthToken[decodedLen] = '\0';
-    return decodedAuthToken;
-+    result.rawAppendFinish(decodedAuthToken, decodedLen);
-+    return result;
- }
- 
- ETag
-diff --git a/src/HttpHeader.h b/src/HttpHeader.h
-index a26b127..3b262be 100644
--- a/src/HttpHeader.h
-+++ b/src/HttpHeader.h
-@@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ public:
-     HttpHdrRange *getRange() const;
-     HttpHdrSc *getSc() const;
-     HttpHdrContRange *getContRange() const;
-    const char *getAuth(Http::HdrType id, const char *auth_scheme) const;
-+    SBuf getAuthToken(Http::HdrType id, const char *auth_scheme) const;
-     ETag getETag(Http::HdrType id) const;
-     TimeOrTag getTimeOrTag(Http::HdrType id) const;
-     int hasListMember(Http::HdrType id, const char *member, const char separator) const;
-diff --git a/src/cache_manager.cc b/src/cache_manager.cc
-index da22f7a..2fae767 100644
--- a/src/cache_manager.cc
-+++ b/src/cache_manager.cc
-@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@
- #include "mgr/FunAction.h"
- #include "mgr/QueryParams.h"
- #include "protos.h"
-+#include "sbuf/StringConvert.h"
- #include "SquidConfig.h"
- #include "SquidTime.h"
- #include "Store.h"
-@@ -243,20 +244,20 @@ CacheManager::ParseHeaders(const HttpRequest * request, Mgr::ActionParams &param
-     // TODO: use the authentication system decode to retrieve these details properly.
- 
-     /* base 64 _decoded_ user:passwd pair */
-    const char *basic_cookie = request->header.getAuth(Http::HdrType::AUTHORIZATION, "Basic");
-+    const auto basic_cookie(request->header.getAuthToken(Http::HdrType::AUTHORIZATION, "Basic"));
- 
-    if (!basic_cookie)
-+    if (basic_cookie.isEmpty())
-         return;
- 
-    const char *passwd_del;
-    if (!(passwd_del = strchr(basic_cookie, ':'))) {
-+    const auto colonPos = basic_cookie.find(':');
-+    if (colonPos == SBuf::npos) {
-         debugs(16, DBG_IMPORTANT, "CacheManager::ParseHeaders: unknown basic_cookie format '" << basic_cookie << "'");
-         return;
-     }
- 
-     /* found user:password pair, reset old values */
-    params.userName.limitInit(basic_cookie, passwd_del - basic_cookie);
-    params.password = passwd_del + 1;
-+    params.userName = SBufToString(basic_cookie.substr(0, colonPos));
-+    params.password = SBufToString(basic_cookie.substr(colonPos+1));
- 
-     /* warning: this prints decoded password which maybe not be what you want to do @?@ @?@ */
-     debugs(16, 9, "CacheManager::ParseHeaders: got user: '" <<
-diff --git a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
-index b958b14..7ca5d24 100644
--- a/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
-+++ b/src/clients/FtpGateway.cc
-@@ -1050,7 +1050,7 @@ Ftp::Gateway::checkAuth(const HttpHeader * req_hdr)
- 
- #if HAVE_AUTH_MODULE_BASIC
-     /* Check HTTP Authorization: headers (better than defaults, but less than URL) */
-    const SBuf auth(req_hdr->getAuth(Http::HdrType::AUTHORIZATION, "Basic"));
-+    const auto auth(req_hdr->getAuthToken(Http::HdrType::AUTHORIZATION, "Basic"));
-     if (!auth.isEmpty()) {
-         flags.authenticated = 1;
-         loginParser(auth, false);
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-13345.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-13345.patch
@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/tools/cachemgr.cc b/tools/cachemgr.cc
-index 0c745c2..8a67eba 100644
--- a/tools/cachemgr.cc
-+++ b/tools/cachemgr.cc
-@@ -355,7 +355,7 @@ auth_html(const char *host, int port, const char *user_name)
- 
-     printf("<TR><TH ALIGN=\"left\">Manager name:</TH><TD><INPUT NAME=\"user_name\" ");
- 
-    printf("size=\"30\" VALUE=\"%s\"></TD></TR>\n", user_name);
-+    printf("size=\"30\" VALUE=\"%s\"></TD></TR>\n", rfc1738_escape(user_name));
- 
-     printf("<TR><TH ALIGN=\"left\">Password:</TH><TD><INPUT TYPE=\"password\" NAME=\"passwd\" ");
- 
-@@ -419,7 +419,7 @@ menu_url(cachemgr_request * req, const char *action)
-              script_name,
-              req->hostname,
-              req->port,
-             safe_str(req->user_name),
-+             rfc1738_escape(safe_str(req->user_name)),
-              action,
-              safe_str(req->pub_auth));
-     return url;
-@@ -1074,8 +1074,8 @@ make_pub_auth(cachemgr_request * req)
-     const int bufLen = snprintf(buf, sizeof(buf), "%s|%d|%s|%s",
-                                 req->hostname,
-                                 (int) now,
-                                req->user_name ? req->user_name : "",
-                                req->passwd);
-+                                rfc1738_escape(safe_str(req->user_name)),
-+                                rfc1738_escape(req->passwd));
-     debug("cmgr: pre-encoded for pub: %s\n", buf);
- 
-     const int encodedLen = base64_encode_len(bufLen);
-@@ -1094,8 +1094,6 @@ decode_pub_auth(cachemgr_request * req)
-     char *buf;
-     const char *host_name;
-     const char *time_str;
-    const char *user_name;
-    const char *passwd;
- 
-     debug("cmgr: decoding pub: '%s'\n", safe_str(req->pub_auth));
-     safe_free(req->passwd);
-@@ -1131,17 +1129,21 @@ decode_pub_auth(cachemgr_request * req)
- 
-     debug("cmgr: decoded time: '%s' (now: %d)\n", time_str, (int) now);
- 
-+    char *user_name;
-     if ((user_name = strtok(NULL, "|")) == NULL) {
-         xfree(buf);
-         return;
-     }
-+    rfc1738_unescape(user_name);
- 
-     debug("cmgr: decoded uname: '%s'\n", user_name);
- 
-+    char *passwd;
-     if ((passwd = strtok(NULL, "|")) == NULL) {
-         xfree(buf);
-         return;
-     }
-+    rfc1738_unescape(passwd);
- 
-     debug("cmgr: decoded passwd: '%s'\n", passwd);
- 
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2020-11945.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-CVE-2020-11945.patch
@ -1,50 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-index 45e46c0..433335a 100644
--- a/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-+++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.cc
-@@ -94,9 +94,6 @@ static void authenticateDigestNonceDelete(digest_nonce_h * nonce);
- static void authenticateDigestNonceSetup(void);
- static void authDigestNonceEncode(digest_nonce_h * nonce);
- static void authDigestNonceLink(digest_nonce_h * nonce);
-#if NOT_USED
-static int authDigestNonceLinks(digest_nonce_h * nonce);
-#endif
- static void authDigestNonceUserUnlink(digest_nonce_h * nonce);
- 
- static void
-@@ -287,21 +284,10 @@ authDigestNonceLink(digest_nonce_h * nonce)
- {
-     assert(nonce != NULL);
-     ++nonce->references;
-+    assert(nonce->references != 0); // no overflows
-     debugs(29, 9, "nonce '" << nonce << "' now at '" << nonce->references << "'.");
- }
- 
-#if NOT_USED
-static int
-authDigestNonceLinks(digest_nonce_h * nonce)
-{
-    if (!nonce)
-        return -1;
-
-    return nonce->references;
-}
-
-#endif
-
- void
- authDigestNonceUnlink(digest_nonce_h * nonce)
- {
-diff --git a/src/auth/digest/Config.h b/src/auth/digest/Config.h
-index b79ff30..2840865 100644
--- a/src/auth/digest/Config.h
-+++ b/src/auth/digest/Config.h
-@@ -44,7 +44,7 @@ struct _digest_nonce_h : public hash_link {
-     /* number of uses we've seen of this nonce */
-     unsigned long nc;
-     /* reference count */
-    short references;
-+    uint64_t references;
-     /* the auth_user this nonce has been tied to */
-     Auth::Digest::User *user;
-     /* has this nonce been invalidated ? */
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-lower-cachepeer.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-lower-cachepeer.patch
@ -1,12 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/cache_cf.cc b/src/cache_cf.cc
-index 9165ef99c..32a3df322 100644
--- a/src/cache_cf.cc
-+++ b/src/cache_cf.cc
-@@ -2081,6 +2081,7 @@ parse_peer(CachePeer ** head)
- 
-     CachePeer *p = new CachePeer;
-     p->host = xstrdup(host_str);
-+    Tolower(p->host);
-     p->name = xstrdup(host_str);
-     p->type = parseNeighborType(token);
- 
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-man-pages.patch
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.0-man-pages.patch
@ -1,26 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/src/http/url_rewriters/LFS/url_lfs_rewrite.8 b/src/http/url_rewriters/LFS/url_lfs_rewrite.8
-index 3053180..1d295fb 100644
--- a/src/http/url_rewriters/LFS/url_lfs_rewrite.8
-+++ b/src/http/url_rewriters/LFS/url_lfs_rewrite.8
-@@ -135,7 +135,7 @@
- .if n .ad l
- .nh
- .SH "NAME"
-url_lfs_rewrite
-+\& url_lfs_rewrite \- a URL-rewriter based on local file existence
- .SH "SYNOPSIS"
- .IX Header "SYNOPSIS"
- .Vb 1
-diff --git a/src/http/url_rewriters/LFS/url_lfs_rewrite.pl.in b/src/http/url_rewriters/LFS/url_lfs_rewrite.pl.in
-index a7168e0..da7055c 100755
--- a/src/http/url_rewriters/LFS/url_lfs_rewrite.pl.in
-+++ b/src/http/url_rewriters/LFS/url_lfs_rewrite.pl.in
-@@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ use Pod::Usage;
- 
- =head1 NAME
- 
-B<url_lfs_rewrite>
-+B<url_lfs_rewrite> - a URL-rewriter based on local file existence
- 
- =head1 SYNOPSIS
- 
--- a/SOURCES/squid-4.4.tar.xz.asc
+++ b/SOURCES/squid-4.4.tar.xz.asc
@ -1,25 +0,0 @@
-File: squid-4.4.tar.xz
-Date: Sat Oct 27 21:20:24 UTC 2018
-Size: 2436468
-MD5 : 892504ca9700e1f139a53f84098613bd
-SHA1: 0ab6b133f65866d825bf72cbbe8cef209768b2fa
-Key : CD6DBF8EF3B17D3E <squid3@treenet.co.nz>
-            B068 84ED B779 C89B 044E  64E3 CD6D BF8E F3B1 7D3E
-      keyring = http://www.squid-cache.org/pgp.asc
-      keyserver = pool.sks-keyservers.net
-----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE-----
-
-iQIzBAABCgAdFiEEsGiE7bd5yJsETmTjzW2/jvOxfT4FAlvU1qAACgkQzW2/jvOx
-fT5Y3Q//R3/ZtDHal9H9c4VUB1fEzkk22JfgXTzRRUdzNkN+XxDkVGmM9R0E0Opo
-9E/lsE9PcLX1EBtBXbPfwLESzfMe4QJgqq1B4FocpJcdtfCQX6ADU4Qdfc+oo8Z1
-J/xCf8XrU3yUgXn3pMnQ9DT+IuPYe+Jte7Awm148mC15GMC49NBAYAd793XZ+L2t
-fVPCbVYA40AU3xVJkxlblh7O0E8UEQ7zQMxcXM2jJJ4jJOjqecOIoJt6lyPD59q3
-UjD0EmcjTj54BpaU8r++kAc2TkLyBvFV1vWQuQRNG5IAMEOF3H8OfujCXl3lX9fD
-Tvi9763f9LxdImLJttkzgTt20XAudlUmKOdpj6t1uF+7EmNJg/ChowyLsLzlLLST
-1mGNdcUdP9VhX2aoTXN/ctn8BTQ/cNIx2VY8kKWsXB+ymFcCJRBW1cBAr3R+UzuX
-KVlsDzlxP6Dp8EFvKN3sIbM/QtpstKgbTkxro7d9XBkeldsasd5uI2Yt5PSMIs+y
-VtscqCnwDjxAIW6FNqB96J4hcOYECdWHDL3s46wEDnQaiR0IdBAN5QHn1imzM5e1
-eHuwZimqBW6vE4rPnVpPIr1Gml5OlLl3te2jsbUVmBiOwDVlQLZJQGzI5UTazvnN
-eR3QeTW+ggSAdVc6GEApELARfKPRxywLQTOlAhEPn0xayy4ByME=
-=1eSQ
-----END PGP SIGNATURE-----
--- a/SOURCES/squid.service
+++ b/SOURCES/squid.service
@ -4,14 +4,15 @@ Documentation=man:squid(8)
 After=network.target network-online.target nss-lookup.target

 [Service]
-Type=forking
+Type=notify
 LimitNOFILE=16384
+PIDFile=/run/squid.pid
 EnvironmentFile=/etc/sysconfig/squid
 ExecStartPre=/usr/libexec/squid/cache_swap.sh
-ExecStart=/usr/sbin/squid $SQUID_OPTS -f $SQUID_CONF
-ExecReload=/usr/sbin/squid $SQUID_OPTS -k reconfigure -f $SQUID_CONF
-ExecStop=/usr/sbin/squid -k shutdown -f $SQUID_CONF
-TimeoutSec=0
+ExecStart=/usr/sbin/squid --foreground $SQUID_OPTS -f ${SQUID_CONF}
+ExecReload=/usr/bin/kill -HUP $MAINPID
+KillMode=mixed
+NotifyAccess=all

 [Install]
 WantedBy=multi-user.target
--- a/SPECS/squid.spec
+++ b/SPECS/squid.spec
@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
 %define __perl_requires %{SOURCE98}

 Name:     squid
-Version:  4.4
-Release:  8%{?dist}.2
+Version:  4.11
+Release:  3%{?dist}
 Summary:  The Squid proxy caching server
 Epoch:    7
 # See CREDITS for breakdown of non GPLv2+ code
@ -26,33 +26,29 @@ Source98: perl-requires-squid.sh
 # Local patches
 # Applying upstream patches first makes it less likely that local patches
 # will break upstream ones.
-Patch201: squid-4.0.11-config.patch
-Patch202: squid-3.1.0.9-location.patch
-Patch203: squid-3.0.STABLE1-perlpath.patch
-Patch204: squid-3.5.9-include-guards.patch
-Patch205: squid-4.0.21-large-acl.patch
+Patch201: squid-4.11-config.patch
+Patch202: squid-4.11-location.patch
+Patch203: squid-4.11-perlpath.patch
+Patch204: squid-4.11-include-guards.patch
+Patch205: squid-4.11-large-acl.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=980511
-Patch206: squid-4.4.0-active-ftp.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1612524
-Patch207: squid-4.4.0-man-pages.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1691741
-Patch208: squid-4.4.0-lower-cachepeer.patch
+Patch206: squid-4.11-active-ftp.patch
+# https://github.com/squid-cache/squid/commit/c26cd1cb6a60ff196ef13c00e82576d3bfeb2e30
+Patch207: squid-4.11-systemd.patch
+Patch208: squid-4.11-convert-ipv4.patch

 # Security fixes
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1729436
-Patch500: squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-13345.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1738485
-Patch501: squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-12527.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1828368
-Patch502: squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-12519.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1828367
-Patch503: squid-4.4.0-CVE-2020-11945.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1829402
-Patch504: squid-4.4.0-CVE-2019-12525.patch
-# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1871700
-Patch505: squid-4.4.0-CVE-2020-15810.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1852554
+Patch500: squid-4.11-CVE-2020-14058.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1852550
+Patch501: squid-4.11-CVE-2020-15049.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1871705
+Patch502: squid-4.11-CVE-2020-24606.patch
 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1871702
-Patch506: squid-4.4.0-CVE-2020-15811.patch
+Patch503: squid-4.11-CVE-2020-15811.patch
+# https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1871700
+Patch504: squid-4.11-CVE-2020-15810.patch
+

 Requires: bash >= 2.0
 Requires(pre): shadow-utils
@ -82,6 +78,8 @@ BuildRequires: perl-generators
 # For test suite
 BuildRequires: pkgconfig(cppunit)
 BuildRequires: autoconf
+# systemd notify
+BuildRequires: systemd-devel

 %description
 Squid is a high-performance proxy caching server for Web clients,
@ -106,19 +104,18 @@ lookup program (dnsserver), a program for retrieving FTP data
 %patch201 -p1 -b .config
 %patch202 -p1 -b .location
 %patch203 -p1 -b .perlpath
-%patch204 -p0 -b .include-guards
+%patch204 -p1 -b .include-guards
 %patch205 -p1 -b .large_acl
 %patch206 -p1 -b .active-ftp
-%patch207 -p1 -b .man-pages
-%patch208 -p1 -b .lower-cachepeer
+%patch207 -p1 -b .systemd
+%patch208 -p1 -R -b .convert-ipv4

-%patch500 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-13345
-%patch501 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-12527
-%patch502 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-12519
-%patch503 -p1 -b .CVE-2020-11945
-%patch504 -p1 -b .CVE-2019-12525
-%patch505 -p1 -b .CVE-2020-15810
-%patch506 -p1 -b .CVE-2020-15811
+# Security patches
+%patch500 -p1 -b .cve-2020-14058
+%patch501 -p1 -b .cve-2020-15049
+%patch502 -p1 -b .cve-2020-24606
+%patch503 -p1 -b .CVE-2020-15811
+%patch504 -p1 -b .CVE-2020-15810

 # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1679526
 # Patch in the vendor documentation and used different location for documentation
@ -335,19 +332,59 @@ fi


 %changelog
-* Wed Aug 26 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-8.2
- Resolves: #1872345 - CVE-2020-15811 squid:4/squid: HTTP Request Splitting
-  could result in cache poisoning
- Resolves: #1872330 - CVE-2020-15810 squid:4/squid: HTTP Request Smuggling
-  could result in cache poisoning
+* Wed Aug 26 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-3
+- Resolves: #1871705 - CVE-2020-24606 squid: Improper Input Validation could
+  result in a DoS
+- Resolves: #1871702 - CVE-2020-15811 squid: HTTP Request Splitting could result
+  in cache poisoning
+- Resolves: #1871700 - CVE-2020-15810 squid: HTTP Request Smuggling could result
+  in cache poisoning

-* Wed Apr 29 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-8.1
- Resolves: #1828368 - CVE-2019-12519 squid: improper check for new member in
-  ESIExpression::Evaluate allows for stack buffer overflow
- Resolves: #1828367 - CVE-2020-11945 squid: improper access restriction upon
-  Digest Authentication nonce replay could lead to remote code execution
- Resolves: #1829402 - CVE-2019-12525 squid:4/squid: parsing of header
+* Thu Jul 02 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-2
+- Resolves: #1853130 - CVE-2020-15049 squid:4/squid: request smuggling and
+  poisoning attack against the HTTP cache
+- Resolves: #1853136 - CVE-2020-14058 squid:4/squid: DoS in TLS handshake
+
+* Thu May 07 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.11-1
+- new version 4.11
+- libsystemd integration
+- Resolves: #1829467 - squid:4 rebase
+- Resolves: #1828378 - CVE-2019-12521 squid:4/squid: off-by-one error in
+  addStackElement allows for a heap buffer overflow and a crash
+- Resolves: #1828377 - CVE-2019-12520 squid:4/squid: improper input validation
+  in request allows for proxy manipulation
+- Resolves: #1828375 - CVE-2019-12524 squid:4/squid: improper access restriction
+  in url_regex may lead to security bypass
+- Resolves: #1820664 - CVE-2019-18860 squid: mishandles HTML in the host
+  parameter to cachemgr.cgi which could result in squid behaving in unsecure way
+- Resolves: #1802514 - CVE-2020-8449 squid:4/squid: Improper input validation
+  issues in HTTP Request processing
+- Resolves: #1802513 - CVE-2020-8450 squid:4/squid: Buffer overflow in a Squid
+  acting as reverse-proxy
+- Resolves: #1802512 - CVE-2019-12528 squid:4/squid: Information Disclosure
+  issue in FTP Gateway
+- Resolves: #1771288 - CVE-2019-18678 squid:4/squid: HTTP Request Splitting
+  issue in HTTP message processing
+- Resolves: #1771283 - CVE-2019-18679 squid:4/squid: Information Disclosure
+  issue in HTTP Digest Authentication
+- Resolves: #1771280 - CVE-2019-18677 squid:4/squid: Cross-Site Request Forgery
+  issue in HTTP Request processing
+- Resolves: #1771275 - CVE-2019-12523 squid:4/squid: Improper input validation
+  in URI processor
+- Resolves: #1771272 - CVE-2019-18676 squid:4/squid: Buffer overflow in URI
+  processor
+- Resolves: #1771264 - CVE-2019-12526 squid:4/squid: Heap overflow issue in URN
+  processing
+- Resolves: #1738581 - CVE-2019-12529 squid: OOB read in Proxy-Authorization
+  header causes DoS
+
+* Tue Apr 28 2020 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-9
+- Resolves: #1738583 - CVE-2019-12525 squid:4/squid: parsing of header
  Proxy-Authentication leads to memory corruption
+- Resolves: #1828369 - CVE-2020-11945 squid: improper access restriction upon
+  Digest Authentication nonce replay could lead to remote code execution
+- Resolves: #1828370 - CVE-2019-12519 squid: improper check for new member in
+  ESIExpression::Evaluate allows for stack buffer overflow

 * Fri Aug 23 2019 Lubos Uhliarik <luhliari@redhat.com> - 7:4.4-8
 - Resolves: # 1738485 - CVE-2019-12527 squid:4/squid: heap-based buffer overflow