Update to 0.14.3
This commit is contained in:
parent
61e4e136e0
commit
28d8705203
@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
|
||||
From 0000000000000000000000000000000000000000 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
|
||||
From: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
|
||||
Date: Thu, 29 Nov 2018 14:18:39 +0100
|
||||
Subject: [PATCH] memslot: Fix off-by-one error in group/slot boundary check
|
||||
|
||||
RedMemSlotInfo keeps an array of groups, and each group contains an
|
||||
array of slots. Unfortunately, these checks are off by 1, they check
|
||||
that the index is greater or equal to the number of elements in the
|
||||
array, while these arrays are 0 based. The check should only check for
|
||||
strictly greater than the number of elements.
|
||||
|
||||
For the group array, this is not a big issue, as these memslot groups
|
||||
are created by spice-server users (eg QEMU), and the group ids used to
|
||||
index that array are also generated by the spice-server user, so it
|
||||
should not be possible for the guest to set them to arbitrary values.
|
||||
|
||||
The slot id is more problematic, as it's calculated from a QXLPHYSICAL
|
||||
address, and such addresses are usually set by the guest QXL driver, so
|
||||
the guest can set these to arbitrary values, including malicious values,
|
||||
which are probably easy to build from the guest PCI configuration.
|
||||
|
||||
This patch fixes the arrays bound check, and adds a test case for this.
|
||||
This fixes CVE-2019-3813.
|
||||
|
||||
Signed-off-by: Christophe Fergeau <cfergeau@redhat.com>
|
||||
---
|
||||
server/memslot.c | 4 ++--
|
||||
server/tests/test-qxl-parsing.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
|
||||
2 files changed, 32 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
|
||||
|
||||
diff --git a/server/memslot.c b/server/memslot.c
|
||||
index ede77e7..ea6f981 100644
|
||||
--- a/server/memslot.c
|
||||
+++ b/server/memslot.c
|
||||
@@ -97,13 +97,13 @@ void *memslot_get_virt(RedMemSlotInfo *info, QXLPHYSICAL addr, uint32_t add_size
|
||||
|
||||
MemSlot *slot;
|
||||
|
||||
- if (group_id > info->num_memslots_groups) {
|
||||
+ if (group_id >= info->num_memslots_groups) {
|
||||
spice_critical("group_id too big");
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
slot_id = memslot_get_id(info, addr);
|
||||
- if (slot_id > info->num_memslots) {
|
||||
+ if (slot_id >= info->num_memslots) {
|
||||
print_memslots(info);
|
||||
spice_critical("slot_id %d too big, addr=%" PRIx64, slot_id, addr);
|
||||
return NULL;
|
||||
diff --git a/server/tests/test-qxl-parsing.c b/server/tests/test-qxl-parsing.c
|
||||
index 47139a4..5b8d0f2 100644
|
||||
--- a/server/tests/test-qxl-parsing.c
|
||||
+++ b/server/tests/test-qxl-parsing.c
|
||||
@@ -85,6 +85,31 @@ static void deinit_qxl_surface(QXLSurfaceCmd *qxl)
|
||||
g_free(from_physical(qxl->u.surface_create.data));
|
||||
}
|
||||
|
||||
+static void test_memslot_invalid_group_id(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ RedMemSlotInfo mem_info;
|
||||
+ init_meminfo(&mem_info);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ memslot_get_virt(&mem_info, 0, 16, 1);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static void test_memslot_invalid_slot_id(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ RedMemSlotInfo mem_info;
|
||||
+ init_meminfo(&mem_info);
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ memslot_get_virt(&mem_info, 1 << mem_info.memslot_id_shift, 16, 0);
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
+static void test_memslot_invalid_addresses(void)
|
||||
+{
|
||||
+ g_test_trap_subprocess("/server/memslot-invalid-addresses/subprocess/group_id", 0, 0);
|
||||
+ g_test_trap_assert_stderr("*group_id too big*");
|
||||
+
|
||||
+ g_test_trap_subprocess("/server/memslot-invalid-addresses/subprocess/slot_id", 0, 0);
|
||||
+ g_test_trap_assert_stderr("*slot_id 1 too big*");
|
||||
+}
|
||||
+
|
||||
static void test_no_issues(void)
|
||||
{
|
||||
RedMemSlotInfo mem_info;
|
||||
@@ -262,6 +287,11 @@ int main(int argc, char *argv[])
|
||||
{
|
||||
g_test_init(&argc, &argv, NULL);
|
||||
|
||||
+ /* try to use invalid memslot group/slot */
|
||||
+ g_test_add_func("/server/memslot-invalid-addresses", test_memslot_invalid_addresses);
|
||||
+ g_test_add_func("/server/memslot-invalid-addresses/subprocess/group_id", test_memslot_invalid_group_id);
|
||||
+ g_test_add_func("/server/memslot-invalid-addresses/subprocess/slot_id", test_memslot_invalid_slot_id);
|
||||
+
|
||||
/* try to create a surface with no issues, should succeed */
|
||||
g_test_add_func("/server/qxl-parsing-no-issues", test_no_issues);
|
||||
|
4
sources
4
sources
@ -1,3 +1,3 @@
|
||||
SHA512 (spice-0.14.2.tar.bz2) = 1093b618ea4a7ff31944429ce2903abecfc8d20c35f2d9c8c837a6e053ee429c0115e40665542637a717869209523ac05d15cdb5e77563102d5d3915e4aaaf76
|
||||
SHA512 (spice-0.14.2.tar.bz2.sign) = ef7f6806d4c050014e22d9c43b0364766ae98c4b505ecdebd7975e820863e663363b1e19d25bcc20453239a3817e96f9e8ac37c01ec231a06b0ea8129e40af36
|
||||
SHA512 (spice-0.14.3.tar.bz2) = 9ecdc455ff25c71ac1fe6c576654b51efbfb860110bd6828065d23f7462d5c5cac772074d1a40f033386258d970b77275b2007bcfdffb23fdff2137154ea46e4
|
||||
SHA512 (spice-0.14.3.tar.bz2.sign) = 1f1fadebe7b4ecedcc98b6c622d83a39e7cbd6e67699dfde0ed6c3f443ef228578c16e409e2b6d0ef4e2d2b3d54b1d5c1798ac7817db50902a03cc323ba24181
|
||||
SHA512 (victortoso-E37A484F.keyring) = 091755da8a358c8c8ebd3b5443b4b5eb3c260afed943454c085d48c973de6a42763547c321c64e4da5c1b2983ad0c5146aaeddeb1d54ef414f7e6a530a3bf14a
|
||||
|
@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
|
||||
Name: spice
|
||||
Version: 0.14.2
|
||||
Release: 3%{?dist}
|
||||
Version: 0.14.3
|
||||
Release: 1%{?dist}
|
||||
Summary: Implements the SPICE protocol
|
||||
License: LGPLv2+
|
||||
URL: http://www.spice-space.org/
|
||||
@ -86,7 +86,7 @@ mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}
|
||||
%files server
|
||||
%{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc}
|
||||
%license COPYING
|
||||
%doc README NEWS
|
||||
%doc README CHANGELOG.md
|
||||
%{_libdir}/libspice-server.so.1*
|
||||
|
||||
%files server-devel
|
||||
@ -96,6 +96,9 @@ mkdir -p %{buildroot}%{_libexecdir}
|
||||
|
||||
|
||||
%changelog
|
||||
* Thu Feb 27 2020 Victor Toso <victortoso@redhat.com> - 0.14.3-1
|
||||
- Update to 0.14.3
|
||||
|
||||
* Fri Jan 31 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 0.14.2-3
|
||||
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
|
||||
|
||||
|
Loading…
Reference in New Issue
Block a user