Updated to latest upstream release

2018-10-29 11:09:40 -04:00 · 2018-10-29 11:09:40 -04:00 · 9d2db655b8
commit 9d2db655b8
parent 07855fe38d
5 changed files with 7 additions and 545 deletions
--- a/.gitignore
+++ b/.gitignore
@ -16,3 +16,4 @@
 /softhsm-2.3.0.tar.gz.sig
 /softhsm-2.4.0.tar.gz
 /softhsm-2.4.0.tar.gz.sig
 /softhsm-2.5.0.tar.gz
--- a/softhsm-2.3.0-reset-mutex-callbacks.patch
+++ b/softhsm-2.3.0-reset-mutex-callbacks.patch
@ -1,72 +0,0 @@
 From 16f994e7944a917fa81c8db11c56c594f4e78b40 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
 Date: Tue, 31 Jul 2018 14:59:03 +0300
 Subject: [PATCH] Reset mutex callbacks to the default version when finished
 If a PKCS11 API caller provided own mutex handling callbacks,
 we need to ensure they aren't used after C_Finalize is called
 and SoftHSM instance is recycled.
 Inability to do so may lead to a situation where callbacks might
 be provided by a different dynamically loaded object which is removed
 after C_Finalize() call. Thus, callback pointers become invalid and
 calling them leads to crashes.
 Fixes: https://github.com/opendnssec/SoftHSMv2/issues/408
 Signed-off-by: Alexander Bokovoy <abokovoy@redhat.com>
 ---
 src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp | 16 ++++++++++++----
 1 file changed, 12 insertions(+), 4 deletions(-)
 diff --git a/src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp b/src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp
 index ee94d3f..e4cc044 100644
 --- a/src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp
 +++ b/src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp
@@ -314,6 +314,15 @@ static CK_ATTRIBUTE bsAttribute(CK_ATTRIBUTE_TYPE type, const ByteString &value)
 /*****************************************************************************
  Implementation of SoftHSM class specific functions
  *****************************************************************************/
 +static void resetMutexFactoryCallbacks()
 +{
 +	// Reset MutexFactory callbacks to our versions
 +	MutexFactory::i()->setCreateMutex(OSCreateMutex);
 +	MutexFactory::i()->setDestroyMutex(OSDestroyMutex);
 +	MutexFactory::i()->setLockMutex(OSLockMutex);
 +	MutexFactory::i()->setUnlockMutex(OSUnlockMutex);
 +}
 +
 // Return the one-and-only instance
 SoftHSM* SoftHSM::i()
@@ -342,6 +351,7 @@ SoftHSM::SoftHSM()
 	slotManager = NULL;
 	sessionManager = NULL;
 	handleManager = NULL;
 +	resetMutexFactoryCallbacks();
 }
 // Destructor
@@ -352,6 +362,7 @@ SoftHSM::~SoftHSM()
 	if (slotManager != NULL) delete slotManager;
 	if (objectStore != NULL) delete objectStore;
 	if (sessionObjectStore != NULL) delete sessionObjectStore;
 +	resetMutexFactoryCallbacks();
 }
 /*****************************************************************************
@@ -402,10 +413,7 @@ CK_RV SoftHSM::C_Initialize(CK_VOID_PTR pInitArgs)
 			if (args->flags & CKF_OS_LOCKING_OK)
 			{
 				// Use our own mutex functions.
 -				MutexFactory::i()->setCreateMutex(OSCreateMutex);
 -				MutexFactory::i()->setDestroyMutex(OSDestroyMutex);
 -				MutexFactory::i()->setLockMutex(OSLockMutex);
 -				MutexFactory::i()->setUnlockMutex(OSUnlockMutex);
 +				resetMutexFactoryCallbacks();
 				MutexFactory::i()->enable();
 			}
 			else
 -- 
 2.17.1
--- a/softhsm-2.3.0-rsa-pss.patch
+++ b/softhsm-2.3.0-rsa-pss.patch
@ -1,465 +0,0 @@
 From e12d04b256f1c856003ae88c5c3bfe07ce332fa7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com>
 Date: Mon, 24 Jul 2017 13:52:59 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] Added support for CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS
 This mechanism is the most likely to be used by higher level
 software utilizing RSA-PSS as it is in par with CKM_RSA_PKCS
 and does not require to provide the whole data to be hashed.
 ---
 src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp                  | 112 +++++++++++++++++++++
 src/lib/crypto/AsymmetricAlgorithm.h |   1 +
 src/lib/crypto/OSSLRSA.cpp           | 190 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
 src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.cpp     |  47 +++++++++
 src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.h       |   1 +
 5 files changed, 351 insertions(+)
 diff --git a/src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp b/src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp
 index ee94d3f7..f2a8f594 100644
 --- a/src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp
 +++ b/src/lib/SoftHSM.cpp
@@ -640,6 +640,10 @@ CK_RV SoftHSM::C_GetMechanismList(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMech
 #ifdef HAVE_AES_KEY_WRAP_PAD
 	nrSupportedMechanisms += 1;
 #endif
 +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +	nrSupportedMechanisms += 1; // CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS
 +#endif
 +
 	CK_MECHANISM_TYPE supportedMechanisms[] =
 	{
 #ifndef WITH_FIPS
@@ -670,6 +674,9 @@ CK_RV SoftHSM::C_GetMechanismList(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE_PTR pMech
 		CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS,
 		CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS,
 		CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS,
 +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +		CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS,
 +#endif
 		CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS,
 		CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS,
 		CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS,
@@ -924,6 +931,9 @@ CK_RV SoftHSM::C_GetMechanismInfo(CK_SLOT_ID slotID, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE type, CK_
 		case CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS:
 		case CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS:
 		case CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS:
 +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +		case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
 +#endif
 		case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
 		case CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
 		case CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
@@ -3749,6 +3759,58 @@ CK_RV SoftHSM::AsymSignInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMechan
 			bAllowMultiPartOp = true;
 			isRSA = true;
 			break;
 +		case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
 +			if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL_PTR ||
 +			    pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS))
 +			{
 +				ERROR_MSG("Invalid RSA-PSS parameters");
 +				return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 +			}
 +			mechanism = AsymMech::RSA_PKCS_PSS;
 +			unsigned long allowedMgf;
 +
 +			switch(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR(pMechanism->pParameter)->hashAlg) {
 +				case CKM_SHA_1:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA1;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA1;
 +					allowedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA1;
 +					break;
 +				case CKM_SHA224:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA224;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA224;
 +					allowedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA224;
 +					break;
 +				case CKM_SHA256:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA256;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA256;
 +					allowedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA256;
 +					break;
 +				case CKM_SHA384:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA384;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA384;
 +					allowedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA384;
 +					break;
 +				case CKM_SHA512:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA512;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA512;
 +					allowedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA512;
 +					break;
 +				default:
 +					ERROR_MSG("Invalid RSA-PSS hash");
 +					return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 +			}
 +
 +			if (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR(pMechanism->pParameter)->mgf != allowedMgf) {
 +				ERROR_MSG("Hash and MGF don't match");
 +				return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 +			}
 +
 +			pssParam.sLen = CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR(pMechanism->pParameter)->sLen;
 +			param = &pssParam;
 +			paramLen = sizeof(pssParam);
 +			bAllowMultiPartOp = false;
 +			isRSA = true;
 +			break;
 		case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
 			if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL_PTR ||
 			    pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
@@ -4593,6 +4655,56 @@ CK_RV SoftHSM::AsymVerifyInit(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_MECHANISM_PTR pMech
 			bAllowMultiPartOp = true;
 			isRSA = true;
 			break;
 +		case CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
 +			if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL_PTR ||
 +			    pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS))
 +			{
 +				ERROR_MSG("Invalid parameters");
 +				return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 +			}
 +			mechanism = AsymMech::RSA_PKCS_PSS;
 +
 +			unsigned long expectedMgf;
 +			switch(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR(pMechanism->pParameter)->hashAlg) {
 +				case CKM_SHA_1:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA1;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA1;
 +					expectedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA1;
 +					break;
 +				case CKM_SHA224:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA224;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA224;
 +					expectedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA224;
 +					break;
 +				case CKM_SHA256:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA256;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA256;
 +					expectedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA256;
 +					break;
 +				case CKM_SHA384:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA384;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA384;
 +					expectedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA384;
 +					break;
 +				case CKM_SHA512:
 +					pssParam.hashAlg = HashAlgo::SHA512;
 +					pssParam.mgf = AsymRSAMGF::MGF1_SHA512;
 +					expectedMgf = CKG_MGF1_SHA512;
 +					break;
 +				default:
 +					return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 +			}
 +
 +			if (CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR(pMechanism->pParameter)->mgf != expectedMgf) {
 +				return CKR_ARGUMENTS_BAD;
 +			}
 +
 +			pssParam.sLen = CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS_PTR(pMechanism->pParameter)->sLen;
 +			param = &pssParam;
 +			paramLen = sizeof(pssParam);
 +			bAllowMultiPartOp = false;
 +			isRSA = true;
 +			break;
 		case CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS:
 			if (pMechanism->pParameter == NULL_PTR ||
 			    pMechanism->ulParameterLen != sizeof(CK_RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS) ||
 diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/AsymmetricAlgorithm.h b/src/lib/crypto/AsymmetricAlgorithm.h
 index 54ac78d5..ca0d8400 100644
 --- a/src/lib/crypto/AsymmetricAlgorithm.h
 +++ b/src/lib/crypto/AsymmetricAlgorithm.h
@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ struct AsymMech
 		RSA_SHA256_PKCS,
 		RSA_SHA384_PKCS,
 		RSA_SHA512_PKCS,
 +		RSA_PKCS_PSS,
 		RSA_SHA1_PKCS_PSS,
 		RSA_SHA224_PKCS_PSS,
 		RSA_SHA256_PKCS_PSS,
 diff --git a/src/lib/crypto/OSSLRSA.cpp b/src/lib/crypto/OSSLRSA.cpp
 index 91b6466c..1e5638a0 100644
 --- a/src/lib/crypto/OSSLRSA.cpp
 +++ b/src/lib/crypto/OSSLRSA.cpp
@@ -121,6 +121,112 @@ bool OSSLRSA::sign(PrivateKey* privateKey, const ByteString& dataToSign,
 		return true;
 	}
 +	else if (mechanism == AsymMech::RSA_PKCS_PSS)
 +	{
 +		const RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *pssParam = (RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)param;
 +
 +		// Separate implementation for RSA PKCS #1 signing without hash computation
 +
 +		// Check if the private key is the right type
 +		if (!privateKey->isOfType(OSSLRSAPrivateKey::type))
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("Invalid key type supplied");
 +
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		if (pssParam == NULL || paramLen != sizeof(RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS))
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("Invalid parameters supplied");
 +
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		size_t allowedLen;
 +		const EVP_MD* hash = NULL;
 +
 +		switch (pssParam->hashAlg)
 +		{
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA1:
 +			hash = EVP_sha1();
 +			allowedLen = 20;
 +			break;
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA224:
 +			hash = EVP_sha224();
 +			allowedLen = 28;
 +			break;
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA256:
 +			hash = EVP_sha256();
 +			allowedLen = 32;
 +			break;
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA384:
 +			hash = EVP_sha384();
 +			allowedLen = 48;
 +			break;
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA512:
 +			hash = EVP_sha512();
 +			allowedLen = 64;
 +			break;
 +		default:
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		OSSLRSAPrivateKey* osslKey = (OSSLRSAPrivateKey*) privateKey;
 +
 +		RSA* rsa = osslKey->getOSSLKey();
 +
 +		if (dataToSign.size() != allowedLen)
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("Data to sign does not match expected (%d) for RSA PSS", (int)allowedLen);
 +
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		size_t sLen = pssParam->sLen;
 +		if (sLen > ((privateKey->getBitLength()+6)/8-2-allowedLen))
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("sLen (%lu) is too large for current key size (%lu)",
 +				  (unsigned long)sLen, privateKey->getBitLength());
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		ByteString em;
 +		em.resize(osslKey->getN().size());
 +
 +		int status = RSA_padding_add_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, &em[0], (unsigned char*) dataToSign.const_byte_str(), hash, hash, pssParam->sLen);
 +		if (!status)
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("Error in RSA PSS padding generation");
 +
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +
 +		if (!RSA_blinding_on(rsa, NULL))
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("Failed to turn on blinding for OpenSSL RSA key");
 +
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		// Perform the signature operation
 +		signature.resize(osslKey->getN().size());
 +
 +		int sigLen = RSA_private_encrypt(osslKey->getN().size(), &em[0], &signature[0], rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
 +
 +		RSA_blinding_off(rsa);
 +
 +		if (sigLen == -1)
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("An error occurred while performing the RSA-PSS signature");
 +
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		signature.resize(sigLen);
 +
 +		return true;
 +	}
 	else if (mechanism == AsymMech::RSA)
 	{
 		// Separate implementation for raw RSA signing
@@ -607,6 +713,90 @@ bool OSSLRSA::verify(PublicKey* publicKey, const ByteString& originalData,
 		return (originalData == recoveredData);
 	}
 +	else if (mechanism == AsymMech::RSA_PKCS_PSS)
 +	{
 +		const RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS *pssParam = (RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS*)param;
 +
 +		if (pssParam == NULL || paramLen != sizeof(RSA_PKCS_PSS_PARAMS))
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("Invalid parameters supplied");
 +
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		// Check if the public key is the right type
 +		if (!publicKey->isOfType(OSSLRSAPublicKey::type))
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("Invalid key type supplied");
 +
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		// Perform the RSA public key operation
 +		OSSLRSAPublicKey* osslKey = (OSSLRSAPublicKey*) publicKey;
 +
 +		ByteString recoveredData;
 +
 +		recoveredData.resize(osslKey->getN().size());
 +
 +		RSA* rsa = osslKey->getOSSLKey();
 +
 +		int retLen = RSA_public_decrypt(signature.size(), (unsigned char*) signature.const_byte_str(), &recoveredData[0], rsa, RSA_NO_PADDING);
 +
 +		if (retLen == -1)
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("Public key operation failed");
 +
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		recoveredData.resize(retLen);
 +
 +		size_t allowedLen;
 +		const EVP_MD* hash = NULL;
 +
 +		switch (pssParam->hashAlg)
 +		{
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA1:
 +			hash = EVP_sha1();
 +			allowedLen = 20;
 +			break;
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA224:
 +			hash = EVP_sha224();
 +			allowedLen = 28;
 +			break;
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA256:
 +			hash = EVP_sha256();
 +			allowedLen = 32;
 +			break;
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA384:
 +			hash = EVP_sha384();
 +			allowedLen = 48;
 +			break;
 +		case HashAlgo::SHA512:
 +			hash = EVP_sha512();
 +			allowedLen = 64;
 +			break;
 +		default:
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		if (originalData.size() != allowedLen) {
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		size_t sLen = pssParam->sLen;
 +		if (sLen > ((osslKey->getBitLength()+6)/8-2-allowedLen))
 +		{
 +			ERROR_MSG("sLen (%lu) is too large for current key size (%lu)",
 +				  (unsigned long)sLen, osslKey->getBitLength());
 +			return false;
 +		}
 +
 +		int status = RSA_verify_PKCS1_PSS_mgf1(rsa, (unsigned char*)originalData.const_byte_str(), hash, hash, (unsigned char*) recoveredData.const_byte_str(), pssParam->sLen);
 +
 +		return (status == 1);
 +	}
 	else if (mechanism == AsymMech::RSA)
 	{
 		// Specific implementation for raw RSA verifiction; originalData is assumed to contain the
 diff --git a/src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.cpp b/src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.cpp
 index 4536d7aa..46ebfb61 100644
 --- a/src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.cpp
 +++ b/src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.cpp
@@ -195,6 +195,44 @@ void SignVerifyTests::signVerifySingle(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanismType, CK_SESSI
 	CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
 }
 +void SignVerifyTests::signVerifySingleData(size_t dataSize, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanismType, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateKey, CK_VOID_PTR param /* = NULL_PTR */, CK_ULONG paramLen /* = 0 */)
 +{
 +	CK_RV rv;
 +	CK_MECHANISM mechanism = { mechanismType, param, paramLen };
 +	CK_BYTE *data = (CK_BYTE*)malloc(dataSize);
 +	CK_BYTE signature[1024];
 +	CK_ULONG ulSignatureLen = 0;
 +	unsigned i;
 +
 +	CPPUNIT_ASSERT(data != NULL);
 +
 +	for (i=0;i<dataSize;i++)
 +		data[i] = i;
 +
 +	rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_SignInit(hSession,&mechanism,hPrivateKey) );
 +	CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_OK);
 +
 +	ulSignatureLen = sizeof(signature);
 +	rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Sign(hSession,data,dataSize,signature,&ulSignatureLen) );
 +	CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_OK);
 +
 +	rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_VerifyInit(hSession,&mechanism,hPublicKey) );
 +	CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_OK);
 +
 +	rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Verify(hSession,data,dataSize,signature,ulSignatureLen) );
 +	CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_OK);
 +
 +	// verify again, but now change the input that is being signed.
 +	rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_VerifyInit(hSession,&mechanism,hPublicKey) );
 +	CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_OK);
 +
 +	data[0] = 0xff;
 +	rv = CRYPTOKI_F_PTR( C_Verify(hSession,data,dataSize,signature,ulSignatureLen) );
 +	CPPUNIT_ASSERT(rv==CKR_SIGNATURE_INVALID);
 +
 +	free(data);
 +}
 +
 void SignVerifyTests::signVerifyMulti(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanismType, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateKey, CK_VOID_PTR param /* = NULL_PTR */, CK_ULONG paramLen /* = 0 */)
 {
 	CK_RV rv;
@@ -287,6 +325,15 @@ void SignVerifyTests::testRsaSignVerify()
 	signVerifyMulti(CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk);
 	signVerifyMulti(CKM_SHA384_RSA_PKCS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk);
 	signVerifyMulti(CKM_SHA512_RSA_PKCS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk);
 +
 +#ifdef WITH_OPENSSL
 +	signVerifySingleData(20, CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk, &params[0], sizeof(params[0]));
 +	signVerifySingleData(28, CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk, &params[1], sizeof(params[1]));
 +	signVerifySingleData(32, CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk, &params[2], sizeof(params[2]));
 +	signVerifySingleData(48, CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk, &params[3], sizeof(params[3]));
 +	signVerifySingleData(64, CKM_RSA_PKCS_PSS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk, &params[4], sizeof(params[4]));
 +#endif
 +
 	signVerifyMulti(CKM_SHA1_RSA_PKCS_PSS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk, &params[0], sizeof(params[0]));
 	signVerifyMulti(CKM_SHA224_RSA_PKCS_PSS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk, &params[1], sizeof(params[1]));
 	signVerifyMulti(CKM_SHA256_RSA_PKCS_PSS, hSessionRO, hPuk,hPrk, &params[2], sizeof(params[2]));
 diff --git a/src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.h b/src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.h
 index dc645ef6..0fa6a145 100644
 --- a/src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.h
 +++ b/src/lib/test/SignVerifyTests.h
@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ class SignVerifyTests : public TestsBase
 	CK_RV generateEC(const char* curve, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_BBOOL bTokenPuk, CK_BBOOL bPrivatePuk, CK_BBOOL bTokenPrk, CK_BBOOL bPrivatePrk, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hPuk, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hPrk);
 #endif
 	void signVerifySingle(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanismType, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateKey, CK_VOID_PTR param = NULL_PTR, CK_ULONG paramLen = 0);
 +	void signVerifySingleData(size_t dataSize, CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanismType, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateKey, CK_VOID_PTR param = NULL_PTR, CK_ULONG paramLen = 0);
 	void signVerifyMulti(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanismType, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPublicKey, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hPrivateKey, CK_VOID_PTR param = NULL_PTR, CK_ULONG paramLen = 0);
 	CK_RV generateKey(CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_KEY_TYPE keyType, CK_BBOOL bToken, CK_BBOOL bPrivate, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE &hKey);
 	void hmacSignVerify(CK_MECHANISM_TYPE mechanismType, CK_SESSION_HANDLE hSession, CK_OBJECT_HANDLE hKey);
--- a/softhsm.spec
+++ b/softhsm.spec
@ -2,15 +2,13 @@
 Summary: Software version of a PKCS#11 Hardware Security Module
 Name: softhsm
-Version: 2.4.0
+Version: 2.5.0
 Release: %{?prever:0.}1%{?prever:.%{prever}}%{?dist}
 License: BSD
 Url: http://www.opendnssec.org/
 Source: http://dist.opendnssec.org/source/%{?prever:testing/}%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz
 Source1: http://dist.opendnssec.org/source/%{?prever:testing/}%{name}-%{version}.tar.gz.sig
 Patch1: softhsm-2.3.0-reset-mutex-callbacks.patch
 Group: Applications/System
 BuildRequires: openssl-devel >= 1.0.1k-6, sqlite-devel >= 3.4.2, cppunit-devel
 BuildRequires: gcc-c++, pkgconfig, p11-kit-devel, nss-devel
@ -43,8 +41,6 @@ The devel package contains the libsofthsm include files
 %prep
 %setup -q -n %{name}-%{version}%{?prever}
 %patch1 -p1
 %if 0%{?prever:1}
 autoreconf -fiv
 %endif
@ -57,7 +53,7 @@ sed -i 's:^full_libdir=":#full_libdir=":g' configure.ac
 sed -i "s:libdir)/@PACKAGE@:libdir):" Makefile.in
 %build
-%configure --libdir=%{_libdir}/pkcs11 --with-openssl=%{_prefix} --enable-ecc --disable-gost \
+%configure --libdir=%{_libdir}/pkcs11 --with-openssl=%{_prefix} --enable-ecc --enable-eddsa --disable-gost \
           --with-migrate --enable-visibility --with-p11-kit=%{_datadir}/p11-kit/modules/
 make %{?_smp_mflags}
@ -116,6 +112,9 @@ if [ -f /var/softhsm/slot0.db ]; then
 fi
 %changelog
 * Mon Oct 29 2018 Simo Sorce <simo@redhat.com> - 2.5.0-1
 - Updated to latest upstream release
 * Sat Aug 11 2018 Nikos Mavrogiannopoulos <nmav@redhat.com> - 2.4.0-1
 - Updated to latest upstream release
--- a/3
+++ b/3
@ -1,2 +1 @@
-SHA512 (softhsm-2.4.0.tar.gz) = f14f65de32206500f708523ee88d8d5e3d1fd40175f1a9cd24c7760c829e2de9dbcb05453022df8186836c49a57e4eae7f2e75ce6a5346a426114f4d610a8a84
+SHA512 (softhsm-2.5.0.tar.gz) = a1e686729196dc25591eb3da57c2c8ea8494ed274ba711842b2dcae696f477a202acda13a975b8fb1eb68e8e44a79e839dbbc6ba500cab02ad13072c660752d9
 SHA512 (softhsm-2.4.0.tar.gz.sig) = a8f616e2a5ab7fdb09c0d2a850bda833be889aea0aa1e5e2bcb0012351dcf3c870e496918ba16bb0bb942bb13350ff1030b25feab29914d07897b39c30526624
`@ -1,2 +1 @@`
	`SHA512 (softhsm-2.4.0.tar.gz) = f14f65de32206500f708523ee88d8d5e3d1fd40175f1a9cd24c7760c829e2de9dbcb05453022df8186836c49a57e4eae7f2e75ce6a5346a426114f4d610a8a84`	`SHA512 (softhsm-2.5.0.tar.gz) = a1e686729196dc25591eb3da57c2c8ea8494ed274ba711842b2dcae696f477a202acda13a975b8fb1eb68e8e44a79e839dbbc6ba500cab02ad13072c660752d9`
	`SHA512 (softhsm-2.4.0.tar.gz.sig) = a8f616e2a5ab7fdb09c0d2a850bda833be889aea0aa1e5e2bcb0012351dcf3c870e496918ba16bb0bb942bb13350ff1030b25feab29914d07897b39c30526624`