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shim-unsigned-x64/SOURCES/0062-Implement-lennysz-s-suggestions-for-MokListRT.patch
CentOS Sources 00a828377a import shim-unsigned-x64-15-7.el8
2021-09-10 04:30:16 +00:00

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From 65be350308783a8ef537246c8ad0545b4e6ad069 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
Date: Sat, 25 Jul 2020 22:13:57 -0400
Subject: [PATCH 62/62] Implement lennysz's suggestions for MokListRT
Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
---
mok.c | 726 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
shim.c | 7 +-
include/PeImage.h | 3 +-
3 files changed, 515 insertions(+), 221 deletions(-)
diff --git a/mok.c b/mok.c
index 4e141fb21fc..3e6c7e43025 100644
--- a/mok.c
+++ b/mok.c
@@ -7,6 +7,8 @@
#include <stdint.h>
+#include "hexdump.h"
+
/*
* Check if a variable exists
*/
@@ -25,6 +27,15 @@ static BOOLEAN check_var(CHAR16 *varname)
return FALSE;
}
+#define SetVariable(name, guid, attrs, varsz, var) ({ \
+ EFI_STATUS efi_status_; \
+ efi_status_ = gRT->SetVariable(name, guid, attrs, varsz, var); \
+ dprint_(L"%a:%d:%a() SetVariable(\"%s\", ... varsz=0x%llx) = %r\n",\
+ __FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, \
+ name, varsz, efi_status_); \
+ efi_status_; \
+})
+
/*
* If the OS has set any of these variables we need to drop into MOK and
* handle them appropriately
@@ -193,33 +204,296 @@ should_mirror_build_cert(struct mok_state_variable *v)
static const uint8_t null_sha256[32] = { 0, };
+typedef UINTN SIZE_T;
+
+static EFI_STATUS
+get_max_var_sz(UINT32 attrs, SIZE_T *max_var_szp)
+{
+ EFI_STATUS efi_status;
+ uint64_t max_storage_sz = 0;
+ uint64_t remaining_sz = 0;
+ uint64_t max_var_sz = 0;
+
+ *max_var_szp = 0;
+ efi_status = gRT->QueryVariableInfo(attrs, &max_storage_sz,
+ &remaining_sz, &max_var_sz);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ perror(L"Could not get variable storage info: %r\n", efi_status);
+ return efi_status;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * I just don't trust implementations to not be showing static data
+ * for max_var_sz
+ */
+ *max_var_szp = (max_var_sz < remaining_sz) ? max_var_sz : remaining_sz;
+ dprint("max_var_sz:%lx remaining_sz:%lx max_storage_sz:%lx\n",
+ max_var_sz, remaining_sz, max_storage_sz);
+ return efi_status;
+}
+
+/*
+ * If any entries fit in < maxsz, and nothing goes wrong, create a variable
+ * of the given name and guid with as many esd entries as possible in it,
+ * and updates *esdp with what would be the next entry (even if makes *esdp
+ * > esl+esl->SignatureListSize), and returns whatever SetVariable()
+ * returns
+ *
+ * If no entries fit (i.e. sizeof(esl) + esl->SignatureSize > maxsz),
+ * returns EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ */
+static EFI_STATUS
+mirror_one_esl(CHAR16 *name, EFI_GUID *guid, UINT32 attrs,
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *esl, EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *esd,
+ UINTN *newsz, SIZE_T maxsz)
+{
+ EFI_STATUS efi_status;
+ SIZE_T howmany, varsz = 0, esdsz;
+ UINT8 *var, *data;
+
+ howmany = min((maxsz - sizeof(*esl)) / esl->SignatureSize,
+ (esl->SignatureListSize - sizeof(*esl)) / esl->SignatureSize);
+ if (howmany < 1) {
+ return EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * We always assume esl->SignatureHeaderSize is 0 (and so far,
+ * that's true as per UEFI 2.8)
+ */
+ esdsz = howmany * esl->SignatureSize;
+ data = (UINT8 *)esd;
+ dprint(L"Trying to add %lx signatures to \"%s\" of size %lx\n",
+ howmany, name, esl->SignatureSize);
+
+ /*
+ * Because of the semantics of variable_create_esl(), the first
+ * owner guid from the data is not part of esdsz, or the data.
+ *
+ * Compensate here.
+ */
+ efi_status = variable_create_esl(data + sizeof(EFI_GUID),
+ esdsz - sizeof(EFI_GUID),
+ &esl->SignatureType,
+ &esd->SignatureOwner,
+ &var, &varsz);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) || !var || !varsz) {
+ LogError(L"Couldn't allocate %lu bytes for mok variable \"%s\": %r\n",
+ varsz, var, efi_status);
+ return efi_status;
+ }
+
+ dprint(L"new esl:\n");
+ dhexdumpat(var, varsz, 0);
+
+ efi_status = SetVariable(name, guid, attrs, varsz, var);
+ FreePool(var);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ LogError(L"Couldn't create mok variable \"%s\": %r\n",
+ varsz, var, efi_status);
+ return efi_status;
+ }
+
+ *newsz = esdsz;
+
+ return efi_status;
+}
+
+static EFI_STATUS
+mirror_mok_db(CHAR16 *name, CHAR8 *name8, EFI_GUID *guid, UINT32 attrs,
+ UINT8 *FullData, SIZE_T FullDataSize, BOOLEAN only_first)
+{
+ EFI_STATUS efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ SIZE_T max_var_sz;
+
+ if (only_first) {
+ efi_status = get_max_var_sz(attrs, &max_var_sz);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ LogError(L"Could not get maximum variable size: %r",
+ efi_status);
+ return efi_status;
+ }
+
+ if (FullDataSize <= max_var_sz) {
+ efi_status = SetVariable(name, guid, attrs,
+ FullDataSize, FullData);
+ return efi_status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ CHAR16 *namen;
+ CHAR8 *namen8;
+ UINTN namelen, namesz;
+
+ namelen = StrLen(name);
+ namesz = namelen * 2;
+ if (only_first) {
+ namen = name;
+ namen8 = name8;
+ } else {
+ namelen += 18;
+ namesz += 34;
+ namen = AllocateZeroPool(namesz);
+ if (!namen) {
+ LogError(L"Could not allocate %lu bytes", namesz);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+ namen8 = AllocateZeroPool(namelen);
+ if (!namen8) {
+ FreePool(namen);
+ LogError(L"Could not allocate %lu bytes", namelen);
+ return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
+ }
+ }
+
+ UINTN pos, i;
+ const SIZE_T minsz = sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST)
+ + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA)
+ + SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE;
+ BOOLEAN did_one = FALSE;
+
+ /*
+ * Create any entries that can fit.
+ */
+ if (!only_first) {
+ dprint(L"full data for \"%s\":\n", name);
+ dhexdumpat(FullData, FullDataSize, 0);
+ }
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *esl = NULL;
+ UINTN esl_end_pos = 0;
+ for (i = 0, pos = 0; FullDataSize - pos >= minsz && FullData; ) {
+ EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *esd = NULL;
+
+ dprint(L"pos:0x%llx FullDataSize:0x%llx\n", pos, FullDataSize);
+ if (esl == NULL || pos >= esl_end_pos) {
+ UINT8 *nesl = FullData + pos;
+ dprint(L"esl:0x%llx->0x%llx\n", esl, nesl);
+ esl = (EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST *)nesl;
+ esl_end_pos = pos + esl->SignatureListSize;
+ dprint(L"pos:0x%llx->0x%llx\n", pos, pos + sizeof(*esl));
+ pos += sizeof(*esl);
+ }
+ esd = (EFI_SIGNATURE_DATA *)(FullData + pos);
+ if (pos >= FullDataSize)
+ break;
+ if (esl->SignatureListSize == 0 || esl->SignatureSize == 0)
+ break;
+
+ dprint(L"esl[%lu] 0x%llx = {sls=0x%lx, ss=0x%lx} esd:0x%llx\n",
+ i, esl, esl->SignatureListSize, esl->SignatureSize, esd);
+
+ if (!only_first) {
+ SPrint(namen, namelen, L"%s%lu", name, i);
+ namen[namelen-1] = 0;
+ /* uggggh */
+ UINTN j;
+ for (j = 0; j < namelen; j++)
+ namen8[j] = (CHAR8)(namen[j] & 0xff);
+ namen8[namelen - 1] = 0;
+ }
+
+ /*
+ * In case max_var_sz is computed dynamically, refresh the
+ * value here.
+ */
+ efi_status = get_max_var_sz(attrs, &max_var_sz);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ LogError(L"Could not get maximum variable size: %r",
+ efi_status);
+ if (!only_first) {
+ FreePool(namen);
+ FreePool(namen8);
+ }
+ return efi_status;
+ }
+
+ SIZE_T howmany;
+ UINTN adj = 0;
+ howmany = min((max_var_sz - sizeof(*esl)) / esl->SignatureSize,
+ (esl->SignatureListSize - sizeof(*esl)) / esl->SignatureSize);
+ if (!only_first && i == 0 && howmany >= 1) {
+ adj = howmany * esl->SignatureSize;
+ dprint(L"pos:0x%llx->0x%llx\n", pos, pos + adj);
+ pos += adj;
+ i++;
+ continue;
+
+ }
+
+ efi_status = mirror_one_esl(namen, guid, attrs,
+ esl, esd, &adj, max_var_sz);
+ dprint(L"esd:0x%llx adj:0x%llx\n", esd, adj);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) && efi_status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ LogError(L"Could not mirror mok variable \"%s\": %r\n",
+ namen, efi_status);
+ break;
+ }
+
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ did_one = TRUE;
+ if (only_first)
+ break;
+ dprint(L"pos:0x%llx->0x%llx\n", pos, pos + adj);
+ pos += adj;
+ i++;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (only_first && !did_one) {
+ /*
+ * In this case we're going to try to create a
+ * dummy variable so that there's one there. It
+ * may or may not work, because on some firmware
+ * builds when the SetVariable call above fails it
+ * does actually set the variable(!), so aside from
+ * not using the allocation if it doesn't work, we
+ * don't care about failures here.
+ */
+ UINT8 *var;
+ UINTN varsz;
+
+ efi_status = variable_create_esl(
+ null_sha256, sizeof(null_sha256),
+ &EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
+ &var, &varsz);
+ /*
+ * from here we don't really care if it works or
+ * doesn't.
+ */
+ if (!EFI_ERROR(efi_status) && var && varsz) {
+ SetVariable(name, guid,
+ EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
+ | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
+ varsz, var);
+ FreePool(var);
+ }
+ efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
+ } else if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ perror(L"Failed to set %s: %r\n", name, efi_status);
+ }
+ return efi_status;
+}
+
+
static EFI_STATUS nonnull(1)
-mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
+mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v,
+ BOOLEAN only_first)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
uint8_t *FullData = NULL;
size_t FullDataSize = 0;
vendor_addend_category_t addend_category = VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE;
uint8_t *p = NULL;
-
+ uint32_t attrs = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
+ EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS;
+ BOOLEAN measure = v->flags & MOK_VARIABLE_MEASURE;
+ BOOLEAN log = v->flags & MOK_VARIABLE_LOG;
size_t build_cert_esl_sz = 0, addend_esl_sz = 0;
+ bool reuse = FALSE;
if (v->categorize_addend)
addend_category = v->categorize_addend(v);
- /*
- * we're always mirroring the original data, whether this is an efi
- * security database or not
- */
- dprint(L"v->name:\"%s\" v->rtname:\"%s\"\n", v->name, v->rtname);
- dprint(L"v->data_size:%lu v->data:0x%08llx\n", v->data_size, v->data);
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx\n", FullDataSize, FullData);
- if (v->data_size) {
- FullDataSize = v->data_size;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx\n",
- FullDataSize, FullData);
- }
-
/*
* if it is, there's more data
*/
@@ -227,7 +501,7 @@ mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
/*
* We're mirroring (into) an efi security database, aka an
- * array of efi_signature_list_t. Its layout goes like:
+ * array of EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST. Its layout goes like:
*
* existing_variable_data
* existing_variable_data_size
@@ -251,30 +525,7 @@ mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
*/
/*
- * first bit is existing data, but we added that above
- */
-
- /*
- * then the build cert if it's there
- */
- if (should_mirror_build_cert(v)) {
- efi_status = fill_esl(*v->build_cert,
- *v->build_cert_size,
- &EFI_CERT_TYPE_X509_GUID,
- &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
- NULL, &build_cert_esl_sz);
- if (efi_status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
- perror(L"Could not add built-in cert to %s: %r\n",
- v->name, efi_status);
- return efi_status;
- }
- FullDataSize += build_cert_esl_sz;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx\n",
- FullDataSize, FullData);
- }
-
- /*
- * then the addend data
+ * *first* vendor_db or vendor_cert
*/
switch (addend_category) {
case VENDOR_ADDEND_DB:
@@ -282,7 +533,7 @@ mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
* if it's an ESL already, we use it wholesale
*/
FullDataSize += *v->addend_size;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx\n",
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
break;
case VENDOR_ADDEND_X509:
@@ -296,17 +547,51 @@ mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
return efi_status;
}
FullDataSize += addend_esl_sz;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx\n",
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
break;
default:
case VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE:
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx\n",
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
break;
}
+
+ /*
+ * then the build cert if it's there
+ */
+ if (should_mirror_build_cert(v)) {
+ efi_status = fill_esl(*v->build_cert,
+ *v->build_cert_size,
+ &EFI_CERT_TYPE_X509_GUID,
+ &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
+ NULL, &build_cert_esl_sz);
+ if (efi_status != EFI_BUFFER_TOO_SMALL) {
+ perror(L"Could not add built-in cert to %s: %r\n",
+ v->name, efi_status);
+ return efi_status;
+ }
+ FullDataSize += build_cert_esl_sz;
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:0x%lx FullData:0x%llx\n",
+ FullDataSize, FullData);
+ }
+
}
+ /*
+ * we're always mirroring the original data, whether this is an efi
+ * security database or not
+ */
+ dprint(L"v->name:\"%s\" v->rtname:\"%s\"\n", v->name, v->rtname);
+ dprint(L"v->data_size:%lu v->data:0x%llx\n", v->data_size, v->data);
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n", FullDataSize, FullData);
+ if (v->data_size) {
+ FullDataSize += v->data_size;
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx\n",
+ FullDataSize, FullData);
+ }
+ if (v->data_size == FullDataSize)
+ reuse = TRUE;
/*
* Now we have the full size
@@ -316,38 +601,33 @@ mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
* allocate the buffer, or use the old one if it's just the
* existing data.
*/
- if (FullDataSize != v->data_size) {
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx allocating FullData\n",
+ if (FullDataSize == v->data_size) {
+ FullData = v->data;
+ FullDataSize = v->data_size;
+ p = FullData + FullDataSize;
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
+ FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
+ v->data = NULL;
+ v->data_size = 0;
+ } else {
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx allocating FullData\n",
FullDataSize, FullData);
- FullData = AllocatePool(FullDataSize);
+ /*
+ * make sure we've got some zeroes at the end, just
+ * in case.
+ */
+ UINTN allocsz = FullDataSize + sizeof(EFI_SIGNATURE_LIST);
+ allocsz = ALIGN_VALUE(allocsz, 4096);
+ FullData = AllocateZeroPool(FullDataSize);
if (!FullData) {
- FreePool(v->data);
- v->data = NULL;
- v->data_size = 0;
perror(L"Failed to allocate %lu bytes for %s\n",
FullDataSize, v->name);
return EFI_OUT_OF_RESOURCES;
}
p = FullData;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
- FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
- if (v->data && v->data_size) {
- CopyMem(p, v->data, v->data_size);
- p += v->data_size;
- }
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
- FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
- } else {
- FullData = v->data;
- FullDataSize = v->data_size;
- p = FullData + FullDataSize;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
- FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
- v->data = NULL;
- v->data_size = 0;
}
}
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
/*
@@ -355,35 +635,13 @@ mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
*/
if (v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB) {
/*
- * first bit is existing data, but again, we added that above
+ * first vendor_cert or vendor_db
*/
-
- /*
- * second is the build cert
- */
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
- FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
- if (should_mirror_build_cert(v)) {
- efi_status = fill_esl(*v->build_cert,
- *v->build_cert_size,
- &EFI_CERT_TYPE_X509_GUID,
- &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
- p, &build_cert_esl_sz);
- if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- perror(L"Could not add built-in cert to %s: %r\n",
- v->name, efi_status);
- return efi_status;
- }
- p += build_cert_esl_sz;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
- FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
- }
-
switch (addend_category) {
case VENDOR_ADDEND_DB:
CopyMem(p, *v->addend, *v->addend_size);
p += *v->addend_size;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
break;
case VENDOR_ADDEND_X509:
@@ -397,16 +655,53 @@ mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
return efi_status;
}
p += addend_esl_sz;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
break;
default:
case VENDOR_ADDEND_NONE:
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
break;
}
+
+ /*
+ * then is the build cert
+ */
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
+ FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
+ if (should_mirror_build_cert(v)) {
+ efi_status = fill_esl(*v->build_cert,
+ *v->build_cert_size,
+ &EFI_CERT_TYPE_X509_GUID,
+ &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
+ p, &build_cert_esl_sz);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ perror(L"Could not add built-in cert to %s: %r\n",
+ v->name, efi_status);
+ return efi_status;
+ }
+ p += build_cert_esl_sz;
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
+ FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
+ }
}
+
+ /*
+ * last bit is existing data, unless it's the only thing,
+ * in which case it's already there.
+ */
+ if (!reuse) {
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
+ FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
+ if (v->data && v->data_size) {
+ CopyMem(p, v->data, v->data_size);
+ p += v->data_size;
+ }
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
+ FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
+ }
+
/*
* We always want to create our key databases, so in this case we
* need a dummy entry
@@ -422,68 +717,55 @@ mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
return efi_status;
}
p = FullData + FullDataSize;
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%08llx p:0x%08llx pos:%lld\n",
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
}
- dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%016llx p:0x%016llx pos:%lld\n",
+ dprint(L"FullDataSize:%lu FullData:0x%llx p:0x%llx pos:%lld\n",
FullDataSize, FullData, p, p-(uintptr_t)FullData);
- if (FullDataSize) {
- uint32_t attrs = EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS |
- EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS;
- uint64_t max_storage_sz = 0;
- uint64_t remaining_sz = 0;
- uint64_t max_var_sz = 0;
- UINT8 *tmp = NULL;
- UINTN tmpsz = 0;
-
- efi_status = gRT->QueryVariableInfo(attrs, &max_storage_sz,
- &remaining_sz, &max_var_sz);
- if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- perror(L"Could not get variable storage info: %r\n", efi_status);
- return efi_status;
- }
- dprint(L"calling SetVariable(\"%s\", 0x%016llx, 0x%08lx, %lu, 0x%016llx)\n",
- v->rtname, v->guid,
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
- FullDataSize, FullData);
- efi_status = gRT->SetVariable(v->rtname, v->guid,
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
- FullDataSize, FullData);
- if (efi_status == EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER && max_var_sz < FullDataSize) {
+ if (FullDataSize && v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_KEYDB) {
+ dprint(L"calling mirror_mok_db(\"%s\", datasz=%lu)\n",
+ v->rtname, FullDataSize);
+ efi_status = mirror_mok_db(v->rtname, (CHAR8 *)v->rtname8, v->guid,
+ attrs, FullData, FullDataSize,
+ only_first);
+ dprint(L"mirror_mok_db(\"%s\", datasz=%lu) returned %r\n",
+ v->rtname, FullDataSize, efi_status);
+ } else if (FullDataSize && only_first) {
+ efi_status = SetVariable(v->rtname, v->guid, attrs,
+ FullDataSize, FullData);
+ }
+ if (FullDataSize && only_first) {
+ if (measure) {
/*
- * In this case we're going to try to create a
- * dummy variable so that there's one there. It
- * may or may not work, because on some firmware
- * builds when the SetVariable call above fails it
- * does actually set the variable(!), so aside from
- * not using the allocation if it doesn't work, we
- * don't care about failures here.
+ * Measure this into PCR 7 in the Microsoft format
*/
- console_print(L"WARNING: Maximum volatile variable size is %lu.\n", max_var_sz);
- console_print(L"WARNING: Cannot set %s (%lu bytes)\n", v->rtname, FullDataSize);
- perror(L"Failed to set %s: %r\n", v->rtname, efi_status);
- efi_status = variable_create_esl(
- null_sha256, sizeof(null_sha256),
- &EFI_CERT_SHA256_GUID, &SHIM_LOCK_GUID,
- &tmp, &tmpsz);
+ efi_status = tpm_measure_variable(v->name, *v->guid,
+ FullDataSize, FullData);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ dprint(L"tpm_measure_variable(\"%s\",%lu,0x%llx)->%r\n",
+ v->name, FullDataSize, FullData, efi_status);
+ return efi_status;
+ }
+ }
+
+ if (log) {
/*
- * from here we don't really care if it works or
- * doens't.
+ * Log this variable into whichever PCR the table
+ * says.
*/
- if (!EFI_ERROR(efi_status) && tmp && tmpsz) {
- gRT->SetVariable(v->rtname, v->guid,
- EFI_VARIABLE_BOOTSERVICE_ACCESS
- | EFI_VARIABLE_RUNTIME_ACCESS,
- tmpsz, tmp);
- FreePool(tmp);
+ EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS datap =
+ (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)FullData,
+ efi_status = tpm_log_event(datap, FullDataSize,
+ v->pcr, (CHAR8 *)v->name8);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ dprint(L"tpm_log_event(0x%llx, %lu, %lu, \"%s\")->%r\n",
+ FullData, FullDataSize, v->pcr, v->name,
+ efi_status);
+ return efi_status;
}
- efi_status = EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER;
- } else if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- perror(L"Failed to set %s: %r\n", v->rtname, efi_status);
}
+
}
if (v->data && v->data_size && v->data != FullData) {
FreePool(v->data);
@@ -501,19 +783,20 @@ mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v)
* EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION status at the same time.
*/
static EFI_STATUS nonnull(1)
-maybe_mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v, EFI_STATUS ret)
+maybe_mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v,
+ EFI_STATUS ret, BOOLEAN only_first)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
BOOLEAN present = FALSE;
if (v->rtname) {
- if (v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST) {
+ if (!only_first && (v->flags & MOK_MIRROR_DELETE_FIRST)) {
dprint(L"deleting \"%s\"\n", v->rtname);
efi_status = LibDeleteVariable(v->rtname, v->guid);
dprint(L"LibDeleteVariable(\"%s\",...) => %r\n", v->rtname, efi_status);
}
- efi_status = mirror_one_mok_variable(v);
+ efi_status = mirror_one_mok_variable(v, only_first);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
if (ret != EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
ret = efi_status;
@@ -530,34 +813,6 @@ maybe_mirror_one_mok_variable(struct mok_state_variable *v, EFI_STATUS ret)
*v->state = v->data[0];
}
- if (v->flags & MOK_VARIABLE_MEASURE) {
- /*
- * Measure this into PCR 7 in the Microsoft format
- */
- efi_status = tpm_measure_variable(v->name, *v->guid,
- v->data_size,
- v->data);
- if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- if (ret != EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
- ret = efi_status;
- }
- }
-
- if (v->flags & MOK_VARIABLE_LOG) {
- /*
- * Log this variable into whichever PCR the table
- * says.
- */
- EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS datap =
- (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)v->data,
- efi_status = tpm_log_event(datap, v->data_size,
- v->pcr, (CHAR8 *)v->name8);
- if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- if (ret != EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
- ret = efi_status;
- }
- }
-
return ret;
}
@@ -567,6 +822,66 @@ struct mok_variable_config_entry {
UINT8 data[];
};
+EFI_STATUS import_one_mok_state(struct mok_state_variable *v,
+ BOOLEAN only_first)
+{
+ EFI_STATUS ret = EFI_SUCCESS;
+ EFI_STATUS efi_status;
+
+ user_insecure_mode = 0;
+ ignore_db = 0;
+
+ UINT32 attrs = 0;
+ BOOLEAN delete = FALSE;
+
+ dprint(L"importing mok state for \"%s\"\n", v->name);
+
+ efi_status = get_variable_attr(v->name,
+ &v->data, &v->data_size,
+ *v->guid, &attrs);
+ if (efi_status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
+ v->data = NULL;
+ v->data_size = 0;
+ } else if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ perror(L"Could not verify %s: %r\n", v->name,
+ efi_status);
+ delete = TRUE;
+ } else {
+ if (!(attrs & v->yes_attr)) {
+ perror(L"Variable %s is missing attributes:\n",
+ v->name);
+ perror(L" 0x%08x should have 0x%08x set.\n",
+ attrs, v->yes_attr);
+ delete = TRUE;
+ }
+ if (attrs & v->no_attr) {
+ perror(L"Variable %s has incorrect attribute:\n",
+ v->name);
+ perror(L" 0x%08x should not have 0x%08x set.\n",
+ attrs, v->no_attr);
+ delete = TRUE;
+ }
+ }
+ if (delete == TRUE) {
+ perror(L"Deleting bad variable %s\n", v->name);
+ efi_status = LibDeleteVariable(v->name, v->guid);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ perror(L"Failed to erase %s\n", v->name);
+ ret = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
+ }
+ FreePool(v->data);
+ v->data = NULL;
+ v->data_size = 0;
+ }
+
+ dprint(L"maybe mirroring \"%s\". original data:\n", v->name);
+ dhexdumpat(v->data, v->data_size, 0);
+
+ ret = maybe_mirror_one_mok_variable(v, ret, only_first);
+ dprint(L"returning %r\n", ret);
+ return ret;
+}
+
/*
* Verify our non-volatile MoK state. This checks the variables above
* accessable and have valid attributes. If they don't, it removes
@@ -594,58 +909,22 @@ EFI_STATUS import_mok_state(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
size_t npages = 0;
struct mok_variable_config_entry config_template;
- dprint(L"importing mok state\n");
+ dprint(L"importing minimal mok state variables\n");
for (i = 0; mok_state_variables[i].name != NULL; i++) {
struct mok_state_variable *v = &mok_state_variables[i];
- UINT32 attrs = 0;
- BOOLEAN delete = FALSE;
- efi_status = get_variable_attr(v->name,
- &v->data, &v->data_size,
- *v->guid, &attrs);
- dprint(L"maybe mirroring %s\n", v->name);
- if (efi_status == EFI_NOT_FOUND) {
- v->data = NULL;
- v->data_size = 0;
- } else if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- perror(L"Could not verify %s: %r\n", v->name,
- efi_status);
+ efi_status = import_one_mok_state(v, TRUE);
+ if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ dprint(L"import_one_mok_state(ih, \"%s\", TRUE): %r\n",
+ v->rtname);
/*
* don't clobber EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION from some
* other variable in the list.
*/
if (ret != EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
ret = efi_status;
- delete = TRUE;
- } else {
- if (!(attrs & v->yes_attr)) {
- perror(L"Variable %s is missing attributes:\n",
- v->name);
- perror(L" 0x%08x should have 0x%08x set.\n",
- attrs, v->yes_attr);
- delete = TRUE;
- }
- if (attrs & v->no_attr) {
- perror(L"Variable %s has incorrect attribute:\n",
- v->name);
- perror(L" 0x%08x should not have 0x%08x set.\n",
- attrs, v->no_attr);
- delete = TRUE;
- }
- }
- if (delete == TRUE) {
- perror(L"Deleting bad variable %s\n", v->name);
- efi_status = LibDeleteVariable(v->name, v->guid);
- if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- perror(L"Failed to erase %s\n", v->name);
- ret = EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION;
- }
- FreePool(v->data);
- v->data = NULL;
- v->data_size = 0;
}
- ret = maybe_mirror_one_mok_variable(v, ret);
if (v->data && v->data_size) {
config_sz += v->data_size;
config_sz += sizeof(config_template);
@@ -669,8 +948,6 @@ EFI_STATUS import_mok_state(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status) || !config_table) {
console_print(L"Allocating %lu pages for mok config table failed: %r\n",
npages, efi_status);
- if (ret != EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
- ret = efi_status;
config_table = NULL;
} else {
ZeroMem(config_table, npages << EFI_PAGE_SHIFT);
@@ -703,6 +980,16 @@ EFI_STATUS import_mok_state(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
}
}
+ /*
+ * This is really just to make it easy for userland.
+ */
+ dprint(L"importing full mok state variables\n");
+ for (i = 0; mok_state_variables[i].name != NULL; i++) {
+ struct mok_state_variable *v = &mok_state_variables[i];
+
+ import_one_mok_state(v, FALSE);
+ }
+
/*
* Enter MokManager if necessary. Any actual *changes* here will
* cause MokManager to demand a machine reboot, so this is safe to
@@ -712,6 +999,9 @@ EFI_STATUS import_mok_state(EFI_HANDLE image_handle)
efi_status = check_mok_request(image_handle);
dprint(L"mok returned %r\n", efi_status);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+ /*
+ * don't clobber EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION
+ */
if (ret != EFI_SECURITY_VIOLATION)
ret = efi_status;
return ret;
diff --git a/shim.c b/shim.c
index 9248642bd57..1a4d7bb9ded 100644
--- a/shim.c
+++ b/shim.c
@@ -1445,7 +1445,10 @@ static EFI_STATUS handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
sha256hash, sha1hash);
if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
- console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
+ if (verbose)
+ console_print(L"Verification failed: %r\n", efi_status);
+ else
+ console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
return efi_status;
} else {
if (verbose)
@@ -2648,7 +2651,6 @@ shim_init(void)
{
EFI_STATUS efi_status;
- setup_verbosity();
dprint(L"%a", shim_version);
/* Set the second stage loader */
@@ -2797,6 +2799,7 @@ efi_main (EFI_HANDLE passed_image_handle, EFI_SYSTEM_TABLE *passed_systab)
* Ensure that gnu-efi functions are available
*/
InitializeLib(image_handle, systab);
+ setup_verbosity();
dprint(L"vendor_authorized:0x%08lx vendor_authorized_size:%lu\n",
__FILE__, __LINE__, __func__, vendor_authorized, vendor_authorized_size);
diff --git a/include/PeImage.h b/include/PeImage.h
index a606e8b2a9f..209b96fb8ff 100644
--- a/include/PeImage.h
+++ b/include/PeImage.h
@@ -768,7 +768,8 @@ typedef struct {
UINT8 CertData[1];
} WIN_CERTIFICATE_EFI_PKCS;
-#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
+#define SHA1_DIGEST_SIZE 20
+#define SHA256_DIGEST_SIZE 32
#define WIN_CERT_TYPE_PKCS_SIGNED_DATA 0x0002
typedef struct {
--
2.26.2
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