Update to shim-15.6~rc1

Resolves: CVE-2022-28737

Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>

0001-SBAT-Policy-latest-should-be-a-one-shot.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,69 @@
+From 77144e5a404df89b45941bfc54fd2f59e0ee607b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>
+Date: Tue, 24 May 2022 11:49:44 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 1/6] SBAT Policy latest should be a one-shot
+
+Since booting from removable media can be hard to detect,
+setting a persistent latest SBAT policy is risky in a typical
+client system. This changes latest to be a one-shot operation
+that could be set at the time of an OS update if desired.
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Setje-Eilers <Jan.SetjeEilers@oracle.com>
+---
+ sbat.c | 21 +++++++++++++--------
+ 1 file changed, 13 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/sbat.c b/sbat.c
+index 637df5ecdd6..9b872082e35 100644
+--- a/sbat.c
++++ b/sbat.c
+@@ -369,6 +369,16 @@ preserve_sbat_uefi_variable(UINT8 *sbat, UINTN sbatsize, UINT32 attributes,
+ 	return false;
+ }
+ 
++static void
++clear_sbat_policy()
++{
++	EFI_STATUS efi_status = EFI_SUCCESS;
++
++	efi_status = del_variable(SBAT_POLICY, SHIM_LOCK_GUID);
++	if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
++		console_error(L"Could not reset SBAT Policy", efi_status);
++}
++
+ EFI_STATUS
+ set_sbat_uefi_variable(void)
+ {
+@@ -394,6 +404,7 @@ set_sbat_uefi_variable(void)
+ 			case SBAT_POLICY_LATEST:
+ 				dprint("Custom sbat policy: latest\n");
+ 				sbat_var = SBAT_VAR_LATEST;
++				clear_sbat_policy();
+ 				break;
+ 			case SBAT_POLICY_PREVIOUS:
+ 				dprint("Custom sbat policy: previous\n");
+@@ -408,19 +419,13 @@ set_sbat_uefi_variable(void)
+ 					reset_sbat = true;
+ 					sbat_var = SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL;
+ 				}
+-				efi_status = del_variable(SBAT_POLICY, SHIM_LOCK_GUID);
+-				if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
+-					console_error(L"Could not reset SBAT Policy",
+-						      efi_status);
++				clear_sbat_policy();
+ 				break;
+ 			default:
+ 				console_error(L"SBAT policy state %llu is invalid",
+ 					      EFI_INVALID_PARAMETER);
+-				efi_status = del_variable(SBAT_POLICY, SHIM_LOCK_GUID);
+-				if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
+-					console_error(L"Could not reset SBAT Policy",
+-						      efi_status);
+ 				sbat_var = SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS;
++				clear_sbat_policy();
+ 				break;
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.35.1
+

0002-pe-Fix-a-buffer-overflow-when-SizeOfRawData-VirtualS.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+From e99bdbb827a50cde019393d3ca1e89397db221a7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 15:41:00 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 2/6] pe: Fix a buffer overflow when SizeOfRawData >
+ VirtualSize
+
+During image loading, the size of the destination buffer for the image
+is determined by the SizeOfImage field in the optional header. The start
+and end virtual addresses of each section, as determined by each section's
+VirtualAddress and VirtualSize fields, are bounds checked against the
+allocated buffer. However, the amount of data copied to the destination
+buffer is determined by the section's SizeOfRawData filed. If this is
+larger than the VirtualSize, then the copy can overflow the destination
+buffer.
+
+Fix this by limiting the amount of data to copy to the section's
+VirtualSize. In the case where a section has SizeOfRawData > VirtualSize,
+the excess data is discarded.
+
+This fixes CVE-2022-28737
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+---
+ pe.c | 15 +++++++++------
+ 1 file changed, 9 insertions(+), 6 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
+index 5d0c6b0bad0..1eb3f59a4f7 100644
+--- a/pe.c
++++ b/pe.c
+@@ -1089,6 +1089,7 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
+ 	int i;
+ 	EFI_IMAGE_SECTION_HEADER *Section;
+ 	char *base, *end;
++	UINT32 size;
+ 	PE_COFF_LOADER_IMAGE_CONTEXT context;
+ 	unsigned int alignment, alloc_size;
+ 	int found_entry_point = 0;
+@@ -1274,13 +1275,15 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
+ 				return EFI_UNSUPPORTED;
+ 			}
+ 
+-			if (Section->SizeOfRawData > 0)
+-				CopyMem(base, data + Section->PointerToRawData,
+-					Section->SizeOfRawData);
++			size = Section->Misc.VirtualSize;
++			if (size > Section->SizeOfRawData)
++				size = Section->SizeOfRawData;
+ 
+-			if (Section->SizeOfRawData < Section->Misc.VirtualSize)
+-				ZeroMem(base + Section->SizeOfRawData,
+-					Section->Misc.VirtualSize - Section->SizeOfRawData);
++			if (size > 0)
++				CopyMem(base, data + Section->PointerToRawData, size);
++
++			if (size < Section->Misc.VirtualSize)
++				ZeroMem(base + size, Section->Misc.VirtualSize - size);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-- 
+2.35.1
+

0003-pe-Perform-image-verification-earlier-when-loading-g.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,78 @@
+From 5a82d7973656c68f006aac1ed462e7bb37075d92 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 16:02:19 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH 3/6] pe: Perform image verification earlier when loading grub
+
+The second stage loader was being verified after loading it into
+memory. As an additional hardening measure to avoid performing risky
+memcpys using header fields from a potentially specially crafted image,
+perform the verification before this so that it can be rejected earlier.
+
+Signed-off-by: Chris Coulson <chris.coulson@canonical.com>
+---
+ pe.c | 42 +++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 25 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
+index 1eb3f59a4f7..1d120f2d78d 100644
+--- a/pe.c
++++ b/pe.c
+@@ -1106,7 +1106,31 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * We only need to verify the binary if we're in secure mode
++	 * Perform the image verification before we start copying data around
++	 * in order to load it.
++	 */
++	if (secure_mode ()) {
++		efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
++					   sha1hash);
++
++		if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
++			if (verbose)
++				console_print(L"Verification failed: %r\n", efi_status);
++			else
++				console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
++			return efi_status;
++		} else {
++			if (verbose)
++				console_print(L"Verification succeeded\n");
++		}
++	}
++
++	/*
++	 * Calculate the hash for the TPM measurement.
++	 * XXX: We're computing these twice in secure boot mode when the
++	 *  buffers already contain the previously computed hashes. Also,
++	 *  this is only useful for the TPM1.2 case. We should try to fix
++	 *  this in a follow-up.
+ 	 */
+ 	efi_status = generate_hash(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
+ 				   sha1hash);
+@@ -1287,22 +1311,6 @@ handle_image (void *data, unsigned int datasize,
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	if (secure_mode ()) {
+-		efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize, &context, sha256hash,
+-					   sha1hash);
+-
+-		if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status)) {
+-			if (verbose)
+-				console_print(L"Verification failed: %r\n", efi_status);
+-			else
+-				console_error(L"Verification failed", efi_status);
+-			return efi_status;
+-		} else {
+-			if (verbose)
+-				console_print(L"Verification succeeded\n");
+-		}
+-	}
+-
+ 	if (context.NumberOfRvaAndSizes <= EFI_IMAGE_DIRECTORY_ENTRY_BASERELOC) {
+ 		perror(L"Image has no relocation entry\n");
+ 		FreePool(buffer);
+-- 
+2.35.1
+

0004-Update-advertised-sbat-generation-number-for-shim.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,21 @@
+From 80e34fc3d55106680a245f6338bec627114bed35 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 13:14:24 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 4/6] Update advertised sbat generation number for shim
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>
+---
+ data/sbat.csv | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/data/sbat.csv b/data/sbat.csv
+index ad838f2aff3..7a5169fb39f 100755
+--- a/data/sbat.csv
++++ b/data/sbat.csv
+@@ -1,2 +1,2 @@
+ sbat,1,SBAT Version,sbat,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim/blob/main/SBAT.md
+-shim,1,UEFI shim,shim,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim
++shim,2,UEFI shim,shim,1,https://github.com/rhboot/shim
+-- 
+2.35.1
+

0005-Update-SBAT-generation-requirements-for-05-24-22.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,31 @@
+From 9a09faf390eea083c3bef1b07c7e043ebe0cc1f6 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>
+Date: Tue, 10 May 2022 14:09:26 -0700
+Subject: [PATCH 5/6] Update SBAT generation requirements for 05/24/22
+
+bump shim SBAT generation requirement to 2 for CVE-2022-28737
+bump GRUB2 SBAT generation requirement to 2 for CVE-2021-3695
+
+Signed-off-by: Jan Setje-Eilers <jan.setjeeilers@oracle.com>
+---
+ include/sbat.h | 4 ++--
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/include/sbat.h b/include/sbat.h
+index 904880decfb..aca4359870f 100644
+--- a/include/sbat.h
++++ b/include/sbat.h
+@@ -31,8 +31,8 @@
+ 	SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_DATE "\n" \
+ 	SBAT_VAR_PREVIOUS_REVOCATIONS
+ 
+-#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE SBAT_VAR_ORIGINAL_DATE
+-#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS
++#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "2022052400"
++#define SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS "shim,2\ngrub,2\n"
+ #define SBAT_VAR_LATEST \
+ 	SBAT_VAR_SIG SBAT_VAR_VERSION SBAT_VAR_LATEST_DATE "\n" \
+ 	SBAT_VAR_LATEST_REVOCATIONS
+-- 
+2.35.1
+

0006-Also-avoid-CVE-2022-28737-in-verify_image.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,84 @@
+From 159151b6649008793d6204a34d7b9c41221fb4b0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+Date: Tue, 3 May 2022 17:05:20 -0400
+Subject: [PATCH 6/6] Also avoid CVE-2022-28737 in verify_image()
+
+PR 446 ("Add verify_image") duplicates some of the code affected by
+Chris Coulson's defense in depth patch against CVE-2022-28737 ("pe:
+Perform image verification earlier when loading grub").
+
+This patch makes the same change to the new function.
+
+Signed-off-by: Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com>
+---
+ pe.c | 46 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------------
+ 1 file changed, 27 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/pe.c b/pe.c
+index 1d120f2d78d..ba3e2bbc444 100644
+--- a/pe.c
++++ b/pe.c
+@@ -1038,26 +1038,9 @@ EFI_STATUS verify_image(void *data, unsigned int datasize,
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+-	 * We only need to verify the binary if we're in secure mode
++	 * Perform the image verification before we start copying data around
++	 * in order to load it.
+ 	 */
+-	efi_status = generate_hash(data, datasize, context, sha256hash,
+-				   sha1hash);
+-	if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
+-		return efi_status;
+-
+-	/* Measure the binary into the TPM */
+-#ifdef REQUIRE_TPM
+-	efi_status =
+-#endif
+-	tpm_log_pe((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)data, datasize,
+-		   (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)context->ImageAddress,
+-		   li->FilePath, sha1hash, 4);
+-#ifdef REQUIRE_TPM
+-	if (efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
+-		return efi_status;
+-	}
+-#endif
+-
+ 	if (secure_mode()) {
+ 		efi_status = verify_buffer(data, datasize,
+ 					   context, sha256hash, sha1hash);
+@@ -1071,6 +1054,31 @@ EFI_STATUS verify_image(void *data, unsigned int datasize,
+ 			console_print(L"Verification succeeded\n");
+ 	}
+ 
++	/*
++	 * Calculate the hash for the TPM measurement.
++	 * XXX: We're computing these twice in secure boot mode when the
++	 *  buffers already contain the previously computed hashes. Also,
++	 *  this is only useful for the TPM1.2 case. We should try to fix
++	 *  this in a follow-up.
++	 */
++	efi_status = generate_hash(data, datasize, context, sha256hash,
++				   sha1hash);
++	if (EFI_ERROR(efi_status))
++		return efi_status;
++
++	/* Measure the binary into the TPM */
++#ifdef REQUIRE_TPM
++	efi_status =
++#endif
++	tpm_log_pe((EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)data, datasize,
++		   (EFI_PHYSICAL_ADDRESS)(UINTN)context->ImageAddress,
++		   li->FilePath, sha1hash, 4);
++#ifdef REQUIRE_TPM
++	if (efi_status != EFI_SUCCESS) {
++		return efi_status;
++	}
++#endif
++
+ 	return EFI_SUCCESS;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.35.1
+

shim-unsigned-x64.spec

@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@
 %global dbxfile %{nil}
 
 Name:		shim-unsigned-%{efiarch}
-Version:	15.5
+Version:	15.6~rc1
 Release:	1.el9
 Summary:	First-stage UEFI bootloader
 ExclusiveArch:	x86_64
@@ -34,6 +34,13 @@ Source3:	sbat.redhat.csv
 
 Source100:	shim-find-debuginfo.sh
 
+Patch0001:	0001-SBAT-Policy-latest-should-be-a-one-shot.patch
+Patch0002:	0002-pe-Fix-a-buffer-overflow-when-SizeOfRawData-VirtualS.patch
+Patch0003:	0003-pe-Perform-image-verification-earlier-when-loading-g.patch
+Patch0004:	0004-Update-advertised-sbat-generation-number-for-shim.patch
+Patch0005:	0005-Update-SBAT-generation-requirements-for-05-24-22.patch
+Patch0006:	0006-Also-avoid-CVE-2022-28737-in-verify_image.patch
+
 BuildRequires:	gcc make
 BuildRequires:	elfutils-libelf-devel
 BuildRequires:	git openssl-devel openssl
@@ -92,7 +99,7 @@ BuildArch:	noarch
 %debug_desc
 
 %prep
-%autosetup -S git -n shim-%{version}
+%autosetup -S git_am -n shim-%{version}
 git config --unset user.email
 git config --unset user.name
 mkdir build-%{efiarch}
@@ -155,6 +162,10 @@ cd ..
 %files debugsource -f build-%{efiarch}/debugsource.list
 
 %changelog
+* Tue May 24 2022 Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> - 15.6~rc1-1.el9
+- Update to shim-15.6~rc1
+  Resolves: CVE-2022-28737
+
 * Wed Mar 09 2022 Peter Jones <pjones@redhat.com> - 15.5-1
 - Update to shim-15.5
   Related: rhbz#1932057

sources

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SHA512 (shim-15.5.tar.bz2) = 91fbda1ef0b4ea36538b57179488169f37eb8522d8dbbbf2eeb40708bc013073b4454b4205a957df13e1e15b9151c6013a8292691f9e3ab28ba7d0935fcc4fab
+SHA512 (shim-15.6~rc1.tar.bz2) = e654f04fcf171c69fd3cf0396c246cbdb43fee8a865ebe14a9ed75f7ddef79d14cb7c58a382f7407ec34508131d58c700f4ef8bab2203ee7ec06d9a326a4c950