.gitignore

@@ -1 +1,28 @@
-SOURCES/shadow-4.6.tar.xz
+shadow-4.1.4.2.tar.bz2
+/shadow-4.1.4.3.tar.bz2
+/shadow-4.1.5.tar.bz2
+/shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2
+/shadow-4.1.5.1.tar.bz2.sig
+/shadow-4.2.1.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.2.1.tar.xz.sig
+/shadow-4.3.1.tar.gz
+/shadow-4.5.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.5.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.6.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.6.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.8.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.8.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.8.1.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.8.1.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.9.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.9.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.11.1.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.11.1.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.12.3.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.12.3.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.13.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.13.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.14.0.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.14.0.tar.xz.asc
+/shadow-4.15.0.tar.xz
+/shadow-4.15.0.tar.xz.asc

.shadow-utils.metadata

@@ -1 +0,0 @@
-0b84eb1010fda5edca2a9d1733f9480200e02de6 SOURCES/shadow-4.6.tar.xz

SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch

@@ -1,36 +0,0 @@
-Index: shadow-4.5/lib/semanage.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/lib/semanage.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/lib/semanage.c
-@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_h
- 		goto done;
- 	}
- 
-+#if 0
- 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
- 	if (ret != 0) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
-@@ -150,6 +151,7 @@ static int semanage_user_mod (semanage_h
- 		ret = 1;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-+#endif
- 
- 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);
- 	if (ret != 0) {
-@@ -200,6 +202,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_h
- 		goto done;
- 	}
- 
-+#if 0
- 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_mlsrange (handle, seuser, DEFAULT_SERANGE);
- 	if (ret != 0) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
-@@ -208,6 +211,7 @@ static int semanage_user_add (semanage_h
- 		ret = 1;
- 		goto done;
- 	}
-+#endif
- 
- 	ret = semanage_seuser_set_sename (handle, seuser, seuser_name);
- 	if (ret != 0) {

SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-Index: shadow-4.5/man/newusers.8.xml
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/man/newusers.8.xml
-+++ shadow-4.5/man/newusers.8.xml
-@@ -218,7 +218,15 @@
- 	  <para>
- 	    If this field does not specify an existing directory, the
- 	    specified directory is created, with ownership set to the
--	    user being created or updated and its primary group.
-+	    user being created or updated and its primary group. Note 
-+            that newusers does not create parent directories of the new 
-+            user's home directory. The newusers command will fail to 
-+            create the home directory if the parent directories do not 
-+            exist, and will send a message to stderr informing the user 
-+            of the failure. The newusers command will not halt or return 
-+            a failure to the calling shell if it fails to create the home 
-+            directory, it will continue to process the batch of new users 
-+            specified.
- 	  </para>
- 	  <para>
- 	    If the home directory of an existing user is changed,

SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-Index: shadow-4.5/src/useradd.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/src/useradd.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/src/useradd.c
-@@ -323,7 +323,7 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
- 	              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
- 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
- #endif
--	SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "failed adding user '%s', data deleted", user_name));
-+	SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "failed adding user '%s', exit code: %d", user_name, code));
- 	exit (code);
- }
- 

SOURCES/shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-Index: shadow-4.5/src/userdel.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/src/userdel.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/src/userdel.c
-@@ -143,8 +143,9 @@ static void usage (int status)
- 	                  "\n"
- 	                  "Options:\n"),
- 	                Prog);
--	(void) fputs (_("  -f, --force                   force removal of files,\n"
--	                "                                even if not owned by user\n"),
-+	(void) fputs (_("  -f, --force                   force some actions that would fail otherwise\n"
-+			"                                e.g. removal of user still logged in\n"
-+			"                                or files, even if not owned by the user\n"),
- 	              usageout);
- 	(void) fputs (_("  -h, --help                    display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
- 	(void) fputs (_("  -r, --remove                  remove home directory and mail spool\n"), usageout);

SOURCES/shadow-4.2.1-no-lock-dos.patch

@@ -1,16 +0,0 @@
-Index: shadow-4.5/lib/commonio.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/lib/commonio.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/lib/commonio.c
-@@ -140,7 +140,10 @@ static int do_lock_file (const char *fil
- 	int retval;
- 	char buf[32];
- 
--	fd = open (file, O_CREAT | O_EXCL | O_WRONLY, 0600);
-+	/* We depend here on the fact, that the file name is pid-specific.
-+	 * So no O_EXCL here and no DoS.
-+	 */
-+	fd = open (file, O_CREAT | O_TRUNC | O_WRONLY, 0600);
- 	if (-1 == fd) {
- 		if (log) {
- 			(void) fprintf (stderr,

SOURCES/shadow-4.2.1-null-tm.patch

@@ -1,91 +0,0 @@
-Index: shadow-4.5/src/faillog.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/src/faillog.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/src/faillog.c
-@@ -163,10 +163,14 @@ static void print_one (/*@null@*/const s
- 	}
- 
- 	tm = localtime (&fl.fail_time);
-+	if (tm == NULL) {
-+		cp = "(unknown)";
-+	} else {
- #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
--	strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%D %H:%M:%S %z", tm);
--	cp = ptime;
-+		strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%D %H:%M:%S %z", tm);
-+		cp = ptime;
- #endif
-+	}
- 	printf ("%-9s   %5d    %5d   ",
- 	        pw->pw_name, fl.fail_cnt, fl.fail_max);
- 	/* FIXME: cp is not defined ifndef HAVE_STRFTIME */
-Index: shadow-4.5/src/chage.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/src/chage.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/src/chage.c
-@@ -168,6 +168,10 @@ static void date_to_str (char *buf, size
- 	struct tm *tp;
- 
- 	tp = gmtime (&date);
-+	if (tp == NULL) {
-+		(void) snprintf (buf, maxsize, "(unknown)");
-+		return;
-+	}
- #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
- 	(void) strftime (buf, maxsize, "%Y-%m-%d", tp);
- #else
-Index: shadow-4.5/src/lastlog.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/src/lastlog.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/src/lastlog.c
-@@ -158,13 +158,17 @@ static void print_one (/*@null@*/const s
- 
- 	ll_time = ll.ll_time;
- 	tm = localtime (&ll_time);
-+	if (tm == NULL) {
-+		cp = "(unknown)";
-+	} else {
- #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
--	strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y", tm);
--	cp = ptime;
-+		strftime (ptime, sizeof (ptime), "%a %b %e %H:%M:%S %z %Y", tm);
-+		cp = ptime;
- #else
--	cp = asctime (tm);
--	cp[24] = '\0';
-+		cp = asctime (tm);
-+		cp[24] = '\0';
- #endif
-+	}
- 
- 	if (ll.ll_time == (time_t) 0) {
- 		cp = _("**Never logged in**\0");
-Index: shadow-4.5/src/passwd.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/src/passwd.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/src/passwd.c
-@@ -455,6 +455,9 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *date_to
- 	struct tm *tm;
- 
- 	tm = gmtime (&t);
-+	if (tm == NULL) {
-+		return "(unknown)";
-+	}
- #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
- 	(void) strftime (buf, sizeof buf, "%m/%d/%Y", tm);
- #else				/* !HAVE_STRFTIME */
-Index: shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/src/usermod.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
-@@ -210,6 +210,10 @@ static void date_to_str (/*@unique@*//*@
- 	} else {
- 		time_t t = (time_t) date;
- 		tp = gmtime (&t);
-+		if (tp == NULL) {
-+			strncpy (buf, "unknown", maxsize);
-+			return;
-+		}
- #ifdef HAVE_STRFTIME
- 		strftime (buf, maxsize, "%Y-%m-%d", tp);
- #else

SOURCES/shadow-4.5-crypt_h.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-Index: shadow-4.5/configure.ac
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/configure.ac
-+++ shadow-4.5/configure.ac
-@@ -32,9 +32,9 @@ AC_HEADER_STDC
- AC_HEADER_SYS_WAIT
- AC_HEADER_STDBOOL
- 
--AC_CHECK_HEADERS(errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h utmp.h \
--	utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h paths.h \
--	utime.h ulimit.h sys/resource.h gshadow.h lastlog.h \
-+AC_CHECK_HEADERS(crypt.h errno.h fcntl.h limits.h unistd.h sys/time.h \
-+	utmp.h utmpx.h termios.h termio.h sgtty.h sys/ioctl.h syslog.h \
-+	paths.h utime.h ulimit.h sys/resource.h gshadow.h lastlog.h \
- 	locale.h rpc/key_prot.h netdb.h acl/libacl.h attr/libattr.h \
- 	attr/error_context.h)
- 
-Index: shadow-4.5/lib/defines.h
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/lib/defines.h
-+++ shadow-4.5/lib/defines.h
-@@ -4,6 +4,8 @@
- #ifndef _DEFINES_H_
- #define _DEFINES_H_
- 
-+#include "config.h"
-+
- #if HAVE_STDBOOL_H
- # include <stdbool.h>
- #else
-@@ -94,6 +96,10 @@ char *strchr (), *strrchr (), *strtok ()
- # include <unistd.h>
- #endif
- 
-+#if HAVE_CRYPT_H
-+# include <crypt.h>		/* crypt(3) may be defined in here */
-+#endif
-+
- #if TIME_WITH_SYS_TIME
- # include <sys/time.h>
- # include <time.h>

SOURCES/shadow-4.5-long-entry.patch

@@ -1,84 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.5/lib/defines.h.long-entry shadow-4.5/lib/defines.h
---- shadow-4.5/lib/defines.h.long-entry	2014-09-01 16:36:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.5/lib/defines.h	2018-04-20 11:53:07.419308212 +0200
-@@ -382,4 +382,7 @@ extern char *strerror ();
- # endif
- #endif
- 
-+/* Maximum length of passwd entry */
-+#define PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH 32768
-+
- #endif				/* _DEFINES_H_ */
-diff -up shadow-4.5/lib/pwio.c.long-entry shadow-4.5/lib/pwio.c
---- shadow-4.5/lib/pwio.c.long-entry	2015-11-17 17:45:15.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.5/lib/pwio.c	2018-04-20 12:10:24.400837235 +0200
-@@ -79,7 +79,10 @@ static int passwd_put (const void *ent,
- 	    || (pw->pw_gid == (gid_t)-1)
- 	    || (valid_field (pw->pw_gecos, ":\n") == -1)
- 	    || (valid_field (pw->pw_dir, ":\n") == -1)
--	    || (valid_field (pw->pw_shell, ":\n") == -1)) {
-+	    || (valid_field (pw->pw_shell, ":\n") == -1)
-+	    || (strlen (pw->pw_name) + strlen (pw->pw_passwd) +
-+	        strlen (pw->pw_gecos) + strlen (pw->pw_dir) +
-+	        strlen (pw->pw_shell) + 100 > PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH)) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-diff -up shadow-4.5/lib/sgetpwent.c.long-entry shadow-4.5/lib/sgetpwent.c
---- shadow-4.5/lib/sgetpwent.c.long-entry	2014-09-01 16:36:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.5/lib/sgetpwent.c	2018-04-20 12:16:31.911513808 +0200
-@@ -57,7 +57,7 @@
- struct passwd *sgetpwent (const char *buf)
- {
- 	static struct passwd pwent;
--	static char pwdbuf[1024];
-+	static char pwdbuf[PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH];
- 	register int i;
- 	register char *cp;
- 	char *fields[NFIELDS];
-@@ -67,8 +67,10 @@ struct passwd *sgetpwent (const char *bu
- 	 * the password structure remain valid.
- 	 */
- 
--	if (strlen (buf) >= sizeof pwdbuf)
-+	if (strlen (buf) >= sizeof pwdbuf) {
-+		fprintf (stderr, "Too long passwd entry encountered, file corruption?\n");
- 		return 0;	/* fail if too long */
-+	}
- 	strcpy (pwdbuf, buf);
- 
- 	/*
-diff -up shadow-4.5/lib/sgetspent.c.long-entry shadow-4.5/lib/sgetspent.c
---- shadow-4.5/lib/sgetspent.c.long-entry	2014-09-01 16:36:40.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.5/lib/sgetspent.c	2018-04-20 12:16:54.505056257 +0200
-@@ -48,7 +48,7 @@
-  */
- struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *string)
- {
--	static char spwbuf[1024];
-+	static char spwbuf[PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH];
- 	static struct spwd spwd;
- 	char *fields[FIELDS];
- 	char *cp;
-@@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ struct spwd *sgetspent (const char *stri
- 	 */
- 
- 	if (strlen (string) >= sizeof spwbuf) {
-+		fprintf (stderr, "Too long shadow entry encountered, file corruption?\n");
- 		return 0;	/* fail if too long */
- 	}
- 	strcpy (spwbuf, string);
-diff -up shadow-4.5/lib/shadowio.c.long-entry shadow-4.5/lib/shadowio.c
---- shadow-4.5/lib/shadowio.c.long-entry	2016-12-07 06:30:41.000000001 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.5/lib/shadowio.c	2018-04-20 12:12:03.292171667 +0200
-@@ -79,7 +79,9 @@ static int shadow_put (const void *ent,
- 
- 	if (   (NULL == sp)
- 	    || (valid_field (sp->sp_namp, ":\n") == -1)
--	    || (valid_field (sp->sp_pwdp, ":\n") == -1)) {
-+	    || (valid_field (sp->sp_pwdp, ":\n") == -1)
-+	    || (strlen (sp->sp_namp) + strlen (sp->sp_pwdp) +
-+	        1000 > PASSWD_ENTRY_MAX_LENGTH)) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 

SOURCES/shadow-4.5-usermod-unlock.patch

@@ -1,64 +0,0 @@
-Index: shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/src/usermod.c
-+++ shadow-4.5/src/usermod.c
-@@ -455,14 +455,17 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
- 		strcat (buf, pw_pass);
- 		pw_pass = buf;
- 	} else if (Uflg && pw_pass[0] == '!') {
--		char *s;
-+		char *s = pw_pass;
- 
--		if (pw_pass[1] == '\0') {
-+		while ('!' == *s)
-+			++s;
-+
-+		if (*s == '\0') {
- 			fprintf (stderr,
- 			         _("%s: unlocking the user's password would result in a passwordless account.\n"
- 			           "You should set a password with usermod -p to unlock this user's password.\n"),
- 			         Prog);
--			return pw_pass;
-+			return NULL;
- 		}
- 
- #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-@@ -471,12 +474,15 @@ static char *new_pw_passwd (char *pw_pas
- 		              user_newname, (unsigned int) user_newid, 1);
- #endif
- 		SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "unlock user '%s' password", user_newname));
--		s = pw_pass;
--		while ('\0' != *s) {
--			*s = *(s + 1);
--			s++;
--		}
-+		memmove (pw_pass, s, strlen (s) + 1);
- 	} else if (pflg) {
-+		if (strchr (user_pass, ':') != NULL) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: The password field cannot contain a colon character.\n"),
-+			         Prog);
-+			return NULL;
-+
-+		}
- #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
- 		audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
- 		              "updating-password",
-@@ -525,6 +531,8 @@ static void new_pwent (struct passwd *pw
- 	if (   (!is_shadow_pwd)
- 	    || (strcmp (pwent->pw_passwd, SHADOW_PASSWD_STRING) != 0)) {
- 		pwent->pw_passwd = new_pw_passwd (pwent->pw_passwd);
-+		if (pwent->pw_passwd == NULL)
-+			fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
- 	}
- 
- 	if (uflg) {
-@@ -639,6 +647,8 @@ static void new_spent (struct spwd *spen
- 	 *  + aging has been requested
- 	 */
- 	spent->sp_pwdp = new_pw_passwd (spent->sp_pwdp);
-+	if (spent->sp_pwdp == NULL)
-+		fail_exit(E_PW_UPDATE);
- 
- 	if (pflg) {
- 		spent->sp_lstchg = (long) gettime () / SCALE;

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-check-local-groups.patch

@@ -1,642 +0,0 @@
-From 140510de9de4771feb3af1d859c09604043a4c9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: ikerexxe <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 27 Mar 2020 14:23:02 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH 1/2] usermod: check only local groups with -G option
-
-Check only local groups when adding new supplementary groups to a user
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1727236
----
- src/usermod.c | 220 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++------------------
- 1 file changed, 143 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/usermod.c b/src/usermod.c
-index 05b98715..ef430296 100644
---- a/src/usermod.c
-+++ b/src/usermod.c
-@@ -183,6 +183,7 @@ static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
- static void date_to_str (/*@unique@*//*@out@*/char *buf, size_t maxsize,
-                          long int date);
- static int get_groups (char *);
-+static struct group * get_local_group (char * grp_name);
- static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status);
- static void new_pwent (struct passwd *);
- static void new_spent (struct spwd *);
-@@ -196,7 +197,9 @@ static void grp_update (void);
- 
- static void process_flags (int, char **);
- static void close_files (void);
-+static void close_group_files (void);
- static void open_files (void);
-+static void open_group_files (void);
- static void usr_update (void);
- static void move_home (void);
- static void update_lastlog (void);
-@@ -253,6 +256,11 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Open the group files
-+	 */
-+	open_group_files ();
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * So long as there is some data to be converted, strip off each
- 	 * name and look it up. A mix of numerical and string values for
-@@ -272,7 +280,7 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 		 * Names starting with digits are treated as numerical GID
- 		 * values, otherwise the string is looked up as is.
- 		 */
--		grp = prefix_getgr_nam_gid (list);
-+		grp = get_local_group (list);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * There must be a match, either by GID value or by
-@@ -322,6 +330,8 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 		gr_free ((struct group *)grp);
- 	} while (NULL != list);
- 
-+	close_group_files ();
-+
- 	user_groups[ngroups] = (char *) 0;
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -334,6 +344,44 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * get_local_group - checks if a given group name exists locally
-+ *
-+ *	get_local_group() checks if a given group name exists locally.
-+ *	If the name exists the group information is returned, otherwise NULL is
-+ *	returned.
-+ */
-+static struct group * get_local_group(char * grp_name)
-+{
-+	const struct group *grp;
-+	struct group *result_grp = NULL;
-+	long long int gid;
-+	char *endptr;
-+
-+	gid = strtoll (grp_name, &endptr, 10);
-+	if (   ('\0' != *grp_name)
-+		&& ('\0' == *endptr)
-+		&& (ERANGE != errno)
-+		&& (gid == (gid_t)gid)) {
-+		grp = gr_locate_gid ((gid_t) gid);
-+	}
-+	else {
-+		grp = gr_locate(grp_name);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (grp != NULL) {
-+		result_grp = __gr_dup (grp);
-+		if (NULL == result_grp) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+					_("%s: Out of memory. Cannot find group '%s'.\n"),
-+					Prog, grp_name);
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return result_grp;
-+}
-+
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- struct ulong_range
- {
-@@ -1447,50 +1495,7 @@ static void close_files (void)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (Gflg || lflg) {
--		if (gr_close () == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
--			         Prog, gr_dbname ());
--			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
--			         "failure while writing changes to %s",
--			         gr_dbname ()));
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--#ifdef SHADOWGRP
--		if (is_shadow_grp) {
--			if (sgr_close () == 0) {
--				fprintf (stderr,
--				         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
--				         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--				SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
--				         "failure while writing changes to %s",
--				         sgr_dbname ()));
--				fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--			}
--		}
--#endif
--#ifdef SHADOWGRP
--		if (is_shadow_grp) {
--			if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
--				fprintf (stderr,
--				         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
--				         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--				SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
--				         "failed to unlock %s",
--				         sgr_dbname ()));
--				/* continue */
--			}
--		}
--#endif
--		if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
--			         Prog, gr_dbname ());
--			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
--			         "failed to unlock %s",
--			         gr_dbname ()));
--			/* continue */
--		}
-+		close_group_files ();
- 	}
- 
- 	if (is_shadow_pwd) {
-@@ -1559,6 +1564,60 @@ static void close_files (void)
- #endif
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * close_group_files - close all of the files that were opened
-+ *
-+ *	close_group_files() closes all of the files that were opened related
-+ *  with groups. This causes any modified entries to be written out.
-+ */
-+static void close_group_files (void)
-+{
-+	if (gr_close () == 0) {
-+		fprintf (stderr,
-+					_("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
-+					Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
-+					"failure while writing changes to %s",
-+					gr_dbname ()));
-+		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+	}
-+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
-+	if (is_shadow_grp) {
-+		if (sgr_close () == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+						_("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
-+						Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
-+						"failure while writing changes to %s",
-+						sgr_dbname ()));
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
-+	if (is_shadow_grp) {
-+		if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+						_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
-+						Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
-+						"failed to unlock %s",
-+						sgr_dbname ()));
-+			/* continue */
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif
-+	if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
-+		fprintf (stderr,
-+					_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
-+					Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
-+					"failed to unlock %s",
-+					gr_dbname ()));
-+		/* continue */
-+	}
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * open_files - lock and open the password files
-  *
-@@ -1594,38 +1653,7 @@ static void open_files (void)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (Gflg || lflg) {
--		/*
--		 * Lock and open the group file. This will load all of the
--		 * group entries.
--		 */
--		if (gr_lock () == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
--			         Prog, gr_dbname ());
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--		gr_locked = true;
--		if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
--			         Prog, gr_dbname ());
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--#ifdef SHADOWGRP
--		if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_lock () == 0)) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
--			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--		sgr_locked = true;
--		if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0)) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
--			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--#endif
-+		open_group_files ();
- 	}
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- 	if (vflg || Vflg) {
-@@ -1661,6 +1689,44 @@ static void open_files (void)
- #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * open_group_files - lock and open the group files
-+ *
-+ *	open_group_files() loads all of the group entries.
-+ */
-+static void open_group_files (void)
-+{
-+	if (gr_lock () == 0) {
-+		fprintf (stderr,
-+					_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
-+					Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+	}
-+	gr_locked = true;
-+	if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
-+		fprintf (stderr,
-+					_("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
-+					Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
-+	if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_lock () == 0)) {
-+		fprintf (stderr,
-+					_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
-+					Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+	}
-+	sgr_locked = true;
-+	if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0)) {
-+		fprintf (stderr,
-+					_("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
-+					Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+	}
-+#endif
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * usr_update - create the user entries
-  *
--- 
-2.25.4
-
-
-From 8762f465d487a52bf68f9c0b7c3c1eb3caea7bc9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: ikerexxe <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
-Date: Mon, 30 Mar 2020 09:08:23 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH 2/2] useradd: check only local groups with -G option
-
-Check only local groups when adding new supplementary groups to a user
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1727236
----
- src/useradd.c | 234 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-----------------
- 1 file changed, 157 insertions(+), 77 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
-index 645d4a40..90210233 100644
---- a/src/useradd.c
-+++ b/src/useradd.c
-@@ -211,6 +211,7 @@ static void get_defaults (void);
- static void show_defaults (void);
- static int set_defaults (void);
- static int get_groups (char *);
-+static struct group * get_local_group (char * grp_name);
- static void usage (int status);
- static void new_pwent (struct passwd *);
- 
-@@ -220,7 +221,10 @@ static void grp_update (void);
- 
- static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv);
- static void close_files (void);
-+static void close_group_files (void);
-+static void unlock_group_files (void);
- static void open_files (void);
-+static void open_group_files (void);
- static void open_shadow (void);
- static void faillog_reset (uid_t);
- static void lastlog_reset (uid_t);
-@@ -731,6 +735,11 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 
-+	/*
-+	 * Open the group files
-+	 */
-+	open_group_files ();
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * So long as there is some data to be converted, strip off
- 	 * each name and look it up. A mix of numerical and string
-@@ -749,7 +758,7 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 		 * Names starting with digits are treated as numerical
- 		 * GID values, otherwise the string is looked up as is.
- 		 */
--		grp = prefix_getgr_nam_gid (list);
-+		grp = get_local_group (list);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * There must be a match, either by GID value or by
-@@ -799,6 +808,9 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 		user_groups[ngroups++] = xstrdup (grp->gr_name);
- 	} while (NULL != list);
- 
-+	close_group_files ();
-+	unlock_group_files ();
-+
- 	user_groups[ngroups] = (char *) 0;
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -811,6 +823,44 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * get_local_group - checks if a given group name exists locally
-+ *
-+ *	get_local_group() checks if a given group name exists locally.
-+ *	If the name exists the group information is returned, otherwise NULL is
-+ *	returned.
-+ */
-+static struct group * get_local_group(char * grp_name)
-+{
-+	const struct group *grp;
-+	struct group *result_grp = NULL;
-+	long long int gid;
-+	char *endptr;
-+
-+	gid = strtoll (grp_name, &endptr, 10);
-+	if (   ('\0' != *grp_name)
-+		&& ('\0' == *endptr)
-+		&& (ERANGE != errno)
-+		&& (gid == (gid_t)gid)) {
-+		grp = gr_locate_gid ((gid_t) gid);
-+	}
-+	else {
-+		grp = gr_locate(grp_name);
-+	}
-+
-+	if (grp != NULL) {
-+		result_grp = __gr_dup (grp);
-+		if (NULL == result_grp) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+					_("%s: Out of memory. Cannot find group '%s'.\n"),
-+					Prog, grp_name);
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+	}
-+
-+	return result_grp;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * usage - display usage message and exit
-  */
-@@ -1530,23 +1580,9 @@ static void close_files (void)
- 		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", spw_dbname ()));
- 		fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
- 	}
--	if (do_grp_update) {
--		if (gr_close () == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
--			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", gr_dbname ()));
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--#ifdef	SHADOWGRP
--		if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_close () == 0)) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
--			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sgr_dbname ()));
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--#endif
--	}
-+
-+	close_group_files ();
-+
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- 	if (is_sub_uid  && (sub_uid_close () == 0)) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
-@@ -1587,34 +1623,9 @@ static void close_files (void)
- 		/* continue */
- 	}
- 	pw_locked = false;
--	if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
--		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
--		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
--#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
--		audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
--		              "unlocking-group-file",
--		              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
--		              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
--#endif
--		/* continue */
--	}
--	gr_locked = false;
--#ifdef	SHADOWGRP
--	if (is_shadow_grp) {
--		if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
--#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
--			audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
--			              "unlocking-gshadow-file",
--			              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
--			              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
--#endif
--			/* continue */
--		}
--		sgr_locked = false;
--	}
--#endif
-+
-+	unlock_group_files ();
-+
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- 	if (is_sub_uid) {
- 		if (sub_uid_unlock () == 0) {
-@@ -1647,6 +1658,71 @@ static void close_files (void)
- #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
- }
- 
-+/*
-+ * close_group_files - close all of the files that were opened
-+ *
-+ *	close_group_files() closes all of the files that were opened related
-+ *  with groups. This causes any modified entries to be written out.
-+ */
-+static void close_group_files (void)
-+{
-+	if (do_grp_update) {
-+		if (gr_close () == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", gr_dbname ()));
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+#ifdef	SHADOWGRP
-+		if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_close () == 0)) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
-+			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failure while writing changes to %s", sgr_dbname ()));
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
-+	}
-+}
-+
-+/*
-+ * unlock_group_files - unlock all of the files that were locked
-+ *
-+ *	unlock_group_files() unlocks all of the files that were locked related
-+ *  with groups. This causes any modified entries to be written out.
-+ */
-+static void unlock_group_files (void)
-+{
-+	if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
-+		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", gr_dbname ()));
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+		audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
-+		              "unlocking-group-file",
-+		              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
-+		              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
-+#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
-+		/* continue */
-+	}
-+	gr_locked = false;
-+#ifdef	SHADOWGRP
-+	if (is_shadow_grp) {
-+		if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr, _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"), Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR, "failed to unlock %s", sgr_dbname ()));
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+			audit_logger (AUDIT_ADD_USER, Prog,
-+			              "unlocking-gshadow-file",
-+			              user_name, AUDIT_NO_ID,
-+			              SHADOW_AUDIT_FAILURE);
-+#endif /* WITH_AUDIT */
-+			/* continue */
-+		}
-+		sgr_locked = false;
-+	}
-+#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * open_files - lock and open the password files
-  *
-@@ -1668,37 +1744,8 @@ static void open_files (void)
- 
- 	/* shadow file will be opened by open_shadow(); */
- 
--	/*
--	 * Lock and open the group file.
--	 */
--	if (gr_lock () == 0) {
--		fprintf (stderr,
--		         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
--		         Prog, gr_dbname ());
--		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--	}
--	gr_locked = true;
--	if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
--		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
--		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--	}
--#ifdef  SHADOWGRP
--	if (is_shadow_grp) {
--		if (sgr_lock () == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
--			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--		sgr_locked = true;
--		if (sgr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
--			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--	}
--#endif
-+	open_group_files ();
-+
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- 	if (is_sub_uid) {
- 		if (sub_uid_lock () == 0) {
-@@ -1733,6 +1780,39 @@ static void open_files (void)
- #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
- }
- 
-+static void open_group_files (void)
-+{
-+	if (gr_lock () == 0) {
-+		fprintf (stderr,
-+		         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
-+		         Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+	}
-+	gr_locked = true;
-+	if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
-+		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: cannot open %s\n"), Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+	}
-+
-+#ifdef  SHADOWGRP
-+	if (is_shadow_grp) {
-+		if (sgr_lock () == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
-+			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+		sgr_locked = true;
-+		if (sgr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
-+			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+	}
-+#endif /* SHADOWGRP */
-+}
-+
- static void open_shadow (void)
- {
- 	if (!is_shadow_pwd) {
--- 
-2.25.4
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-chgrp-guard.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/usermod.8.xml.chgrp-guard shadow-4.6/man/usermod.8.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/usermod.8.xml.chgrp-guard	2018-11-06 09:08:54.170095358 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/usermod.8.xml	2018-12-18 15:24:12.283181180 +0100
-@@ -195,6 +195,12 @@
- 	    The group ownership of files outside of the user's home directory
- 	    must be fixed manually.
- 	  </para>
-+	  <para>
-+	    The change of the group ownership of files inside of the user's
-+	    home directory is also not done if the home dir owner uid is
-+	    different from the current or new user id. This is safety measure
-+	    for special home directories such as <filename>/</filename>.
-+	  </para>
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
-       <varlistentry>
-@@ -372,6 +378,12 @@
- 	    must be fixed manually.
- 	  </para>
- 	  <para>
-+	    The change of the user ownership of files inside of the user's
-+	    home directory is also not done if the home dir owner uid is
-+	    different from the current or new user id. This is safety measure
-+	    for special home directories such as <filename>/</filename>.
-+	  </para>
-+	  <para>
- 	    No checks will be performed with regard to the
- 	    <option>UID_MIN</option>, <option>UID_MAX</option>,
- 	    <option>SYS_UID_MIN</option>, or <option>SYS_UID_MAX</option>
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.chgrp-guard shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.chgrp-guard	2018-12-18 15:24:12.286181249 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c	2018-12-18 15:26:51.227841435 +0100
-@@ -2336,7 +2336,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (!mflg && (uflg || gflg)) {
--		if (access (dflg ? prefix_user_newhome : prefix_user_home, F_OK) == 0) {
-+		struct stat sb;
-+
-+		if (stat (dflg ? prefix_user_newhome : prefix_user_home, &sb) == 0 &&
-+			((uflg && sb.st_uid == user_newid) || sb.st_uid == user_id)) {
- 			/*
- 			 * Change the UID on all of the files owned by
- 			 * `user_id' to `user_newid' in the user's home

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-coverity.patch

@@ -1,223 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/lib/commonio.c.coverity shadow-4.6/lib/commonio.c
---- shadow-4.6/lib/commonio.c.coverity	2018-10-10 09:50:59.307738194 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/lib/commonio.c	2018-10-10 09:55:32.919319048 +0200
-@@ -382,7 +382,7 @@ int commonio_lock_nowait (struct commoni
- 	char* lock = NULL;
- 	size_t lock_file_len;
- 	size_t file_len;
--	int err;
-+	int err = 0;
- 
- 	if (db->locked) {
- 		return 1;
-@@ -391,12 +391,10 @@ int commonio_lock_nowait (struct commoni
- 	lock_file_len = strlen(db->filename) + 6; /* sizeof ".lock" */
- 	file = (char*)malloc(file_len);
- 	if(file == NULL) {
--		err = ENOMEM;
- 		goto cleanup_ENOMEM;
- 	}
- 	lock = (char*)malloc(lock_file_len);
- 	if(lock == NULL) {
--		err = ENOMEM;
- 		goto cleanup_ENOMEM;
- 	}
- 	snprintf (file, file_len, "%s.%lu",
-diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/console.c.coverity shadow-4.6/libmisc/console.c
---- shadow-4.6/libmisc/console.c.coverity	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/console.c	2018-10-10 11:56:51.368837533 +0200
-@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static bool is_listed (const char *cfgin
- static bool is_listed (const char *cfgin, const char *tty, bool def)
- {
- 	FILE *fp;
--	char buf[200], *s;
-+	char buf[1024], *s;
- 	const char *cons;
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -70,7 +70,8 @@ static bool is_listed (const char *cfgin
- 
- 	if (*cons != '/') {
- 		char *pbuf;
--		strcpy (buf, cons);
-+		strncpy (buf, cons, sizeof (buf));
-+		buf[sizeof (buf) - 1] = '\0';
- 		pbuf = &buf[0];
- 		while ((s = strtok (pbuf, ":")) != NULL) {
- 			if (strcmp (s, tty) == 0) {
-diff -up shadow-4.6/lib/spawn.c.coverity shadow-4.6/lib/spawn.c
---- shadow-4.6/lib/spawn.c.coverity	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000001 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/lib/spawn.c	2018-10-10 11:36:49.035784609 +0200
-@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ int run_command (const char *cmd, const
- 	do {
- 		wpid = waitpid (pid, status, 0);
- 	} while (   ((pid_t)-1 == wpid && errno == EINTR)
--	         || (wpid != pid));
-+	         || ((pid_t)-1 != wpid && wpid != pid));
- 
- 	if ((pid_t)-1 == wpid) {
- 		fprintf (stderr, "%s: waitpid (status: %d): %s\n",
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.coverity shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.coverity	2018-10-10 09:50:59.303738098 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c	2018-10-12 13:51:54.480490257 +0200
-@@ -314,7 +314,7 @@ static void fail_exit (int code)
- static void get_defaults (void)
- {
- 	FILE *fp;
--	char* default_file = USER_DEFAULTS_FILE;
-+	char *default_file = USER_DEFAULTS_FILE;
- 	char buf[1024];
- 	char *cp;
- 
-@@ -324,6 +324,8 @@ static void get_defaults (void)
- 
- 		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(USER_DEFAULTS_FILE) + 2;
- 		default_file = malloc(len);
-+                if (default_file == NULL)
-+                       return;
- 		wlen = snprintf(default_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, USER_DEFAULTS_FILE);
- 		assert (wlen == (int) len -1);
- 	}
-@@ -334,7 +336,7 @@ static void get_defaults (void)
- 
- 	fp = fopen (default_file, "r");
- 	if (NULL == fp) {
--		return;
-+		goto getdef_err;
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -445,7 +447,7 @@ static void get_defaults (void)
- 		}
- 	}
- 	(void) fclose (fp);
--
-+     getdef_err:
- 	if(prefix[0]) {
- 		free(default_file);
- 	}
-@@ -480,8 +482,8 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
- 	FILE *ifp;
- 	FILE *ofp;
- 	char buf[1024];
--	char* new_file = NEW_USER_FILE;
--	char* default_file = USER_DEFAULTS_FILE;
-+	char *new_file = NULL;
-+	char *default_file = USER_DEFAULTS_FILE;
- 	char *cp;
- 	int ofd;
- 	int wlen;
-@@ -492,17 +494,30 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
- 	bool out_shell = false;
- 	bool out_skel = false;
- 	bool out_create_mail_spool = false;
-+	size_t len;
-+	int ret = -1;
- 
--	if(prefix[0]) {
--		size_t len;
- 
--		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(NEW_USER_FILE) + 2;
--		new_file = malloc(len);
--		wlen = snprintf(new_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, NEW_USER_FILE);
--		assert (wlen == (int) len -1);
-+	len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(NEW_USER_FILE) + 2;
-+	new_file = malloc(len);
-+        if (new_file == NULL) {
-+		fprintf (stderr,
-+		         _("%s: cannot create new defaults file: %s\n"),
-+		         Prog, strerror(errno));
-+		return -1;
-+        }
-+	wlen = snprintf(new_file, len, "%s%s%s", prefix, prefix[0]?"/":"", NEW_USER_FILE);
-+	assert (wlen <= (int) len -1);
- 
-+	if(prefix[0]) {
- 		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(USER_DEFAULTS_FILE) + 2;
- 		default_file = malloc(len);
-+		if (default_file == NULL) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: cannot create new defaults file: %s\n"),
-+			         Prog, strerror(errno));
-+			goto setdef_err;
-+		}
- 		wlen = snprintf(default_file, len, "%s/%s", prefix, USER_DEFAULTS_FILE);
- 		assert (wlen == (int) len -1);
- 	}
-@@ -515,7 +530,7 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
- 		fprintf (stderr,
- 		         _("%s: cannot create new defaults file\n"),
- 		         Prog);
--		return -1;
-+		goto setdef_err;
- 	}
- 
- 	ofp = fdopen (ofd, "w");
-@@ -523,7 +538,7 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
- 		fprintf (stderr,
- 		         _("%s: cannot open new defaults file\n"),
- 		         Prog);
--		return -1;
-+		goto setdef_err;
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -550,7 +565,7 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
- 				         _("%s: line too long in %s: %s..."),
- 				         Prog, default_file, buf);
- 				(void) fclose (ifp);
--				return -1;
-+				goto setdef_err;
- 			}
- 		}
- 
-@@ -614,7 +629,7 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
- 	    || (fsync (fileno (ofp)) != 0)
- 	    || (fclose (ofp) != 0)) {
- 		unlink (new_file);
--		return -1;
-+		goto setdef_err;
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -629,7 +644,7 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
- 		         _("%s: Cannot create backup file (%s): %s\n"),
- 		         Prog, buf, strerror (err));
- 		unlink (new_file);
--		return -1;
-+		goto setdef_err;
- 	}
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -640,11 +655,11 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
- 		fprintf (stderr,
- 		         _("%s: rename: %s: %s\n"),
- 		         Prog, new_file, strerror (err));
--		return -1;
-+		goto setdef_err;
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
- 	audit_logger (AUDIT_USYS_CONFIG, Prog,
--	              "changing-useradd-defaults",
-+	              "changing useradd defaults",
- 	              NULL, AUDIT_NO_ID,
- 	              SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
- #endif
-@@ -654,13 +669,14 @@ static int set_defaults (void)
- 	         (unsigned int) def_group, def_home, def_shell,
- 	         def_inactive, def_expire, def_template,
- 	         def_create_mail_spool));
--
-+	ret = 0;
-+    setdef_err:
-+	free(new_file);
- 	if(prefix[0]) {
--		free(new_file);
- 		free(default_file);
- 	}
- 
--	return 0;
-+	return ret;
- }
- 
- /*

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-getenforce.patch

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c.getenforce shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c
---- shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c.getenforce	2018-05-28 15:10:15.870315221 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c	2018-05-28 15:10:15.894315731 +0200
-@@ -75,7 +75,7 @@ int set_selinux_file_context (const char
- 	}
- 	return 0;
-     error:
--	if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
-+	if (security_getenforce () > 0) {
- 		return 1;
- 	}
- 	return 0;
-@@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ int reset_selinux_file_context (void)
- 		selinux_checked = true;
- 	}
- 	if (selinux_enabled) {
--		if (setfscreatecon (NULL) != 0) {
-+		if (setfscreatecon (NULL) != 0 && security_getenforce () > 0) {
- 			return 1;
- 		}
- 	}

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-getsubids.patch

@@ -1,244 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/getsubids.1.xml.getsubids shadow-4.6/man/getsubids.1.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/getsubids.1.xml.getsubids	2021-12-09 10:40:50.730275761 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/getsubids.1.xml	2021-12-09 10:40:50.730275761 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,141 @@
-+<?xml version="1.0" encoding="UTF-8"?>
-+<!--
-+   Copyright (c) 2021 Iker Pedrosa
-+   All rights reserved.
-+
-+   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+   are met:
-+   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+   3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
-+      endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+      specific prior written permission.
-+
-+   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
-+   ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
-+   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
-+   PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
-+   HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
-+   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
-+   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+-->
-+<!DOCTYPE refentry PUBLIC "-//OASIS//DTD DocBook V4.5//EN"
-+  "http://www.oasis-open.org/docbook/xml/4.5/docbookx.dtd" [
-+<!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->
-+]>
-+
-+<refentry id='getsubids.1'>
-+  <refentryinfo>
-+    <author>
-+      <firstname>Iker</firstname>
-+      <surname>Pedrosa</surname>
-+      <contrib>Creation, 2021</contrib>
-+    </author>
-+  </refentryinfo>
-+  <refmeta>
-+    <refentrytitle>getsubids</refentrytitle>
-+    <manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
-+    <refmiscinfo class="sectdesc">User Commands</refmiscinfo>
-+    <refmiscinfo class="source">shadow-utils</refmiscinfo>
-+    <refmiscinfo class="version">&SHADOW_UTILS_VERSION;</refmiscinfo>
-+  </refmeta>
-+  <refnamediv id='name'>
-+    <refname>getsubids</refname>
-+    <refpurpose>get the subordinate id ranges for a user</refpurpose>
-+  </refnamediv>
-+
-+  <refsynopsisdiv id='synopsis'>
-+    <cmdsynopsis>
-+      <command>getsubids</command>
-+      <arg choice='opt'>
-+        <replaceable>options</replaceable>
-+      </arg>
-+      <arg choice='plain'>
-+        <replaceable>USER</replaceable>
-+      </arg>
-+    </cmdsynopsis>
-+  </refsynopsisdiv>
-+
-+  <refsect1 id='description'>
-+    <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-+    <para>
-+      The <command>getsubids</command> command lists the subordinate user ID
-+      ranges for a given user. The subordinate group IDs can be listed using
-+      the <option>-g</option> option.
-+    </para>
-+  </refsect1>
-+
-+  <refsect1 id='options'>
-+    <title>OPTIONS</title>
-+    <para>
-+      The options which apply to the <command>getsubids</command> command are:
-+    </para>
-+    <variablelist remap='IP'>
-+      <varlistentry>
-+        <term>
-+          <option>-g</option>
-+        </term>
-+        <listitem>
-+          <para>
-+            List the subordinate group ID ranges.
-+          </para>
-+        </listitem>
-+      </varlistentry>
-+    </variablelist>
-+  </refsect1>
-+
-+  <refsect1 id='example'>
-+    <title>EXAMPLE</title>
-+    <para>
-+      For example, to obtain the subordinate UIDs of the testuser:
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-+<programlisting>
-+$ getsubids testuser
-+0: testuser 100000 65536
-+</programlisting>
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-+      This command output provides (in order from left to right) the list
-+      index, username, UID range start, and number of UIDs in range.
-+    </para>
-+  </refsect1>
-+
-+  <refsect1 id='see_also'>
-+    <title>SEE ALSO</title>
-+    <para>
-+      <citerefentry>
-+        <refentrytitle>login.defs</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
-+      </citerefentry>,
-+      <citerefentry>
-+        <refentrytitle>newgidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
-+      </citerefentry>,
-+      <citerefentry>
-+        <refentrytitle>newuidmap</refentrytitle><manvolnum>1</manvolnum>
-+      </citerefentry>,
-+      <citerefentry>
-+        <refentrytitle>subgid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
-+      </citerefentry>,
-+      <citerefentry>
-+        <refentrytitle>subuid</refentrytitle><manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
-+      </citerefentry>,
-+      <citerefentry>
-+        <refentrytitle>useradd</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
-+      </citerefentry>,
-+      <citerefentry>
-+        <refentrytitle>userdel</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
-+      </citerefentry>.
-+      <citerefentry>
-+        <refentrytitle>usermod</refentrytitle><manvolnum>8</manvolnum>
-+      </citerefentry>,
-+    </para>
-+  </refsect1>
-+</refentry>
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/Makefile.am.getsubids shadow-4.6/man/Makefile.am
---- shadow-4.6/man/Makefile.am.getsubids	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/Makefile.am	2021-12-09 10:40:50.730275761 +0100
-@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@ man_MANS += $(man_nopam)
- endif
- 
- man_subids = \
-+	man1/getsubids.1 \
- 	man1/newgidmap.1 \
- 	man1/newuidmap.1 \
- 	man5/subgid.5 \
-@@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ man_XMANS = \
- 	expiry.1.xml \
- 	faillog.5.xml \
- 	faillog.8.xml \
-+	getsubids.1.xml \
- 	gpasswd.1.xml \
- 	groupadd.8.xml \
- 	groupdel.8.xml \
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/getsubids.c.getsubids shadow-4.6/src/getsubids.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/getsubids.c.getsubids	2021-12-09 10:40:50.730275761 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/getsubids.c	2021-12-09 10:40:50.730275761 +0100
-@@ -0,0 +1,46 @@
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <string.h>
-+#include <stdlib.h>
-+#include "subid.h"
-+#include "prototypes.h"
-+
-+const char *Prog;
-+FILE *shadow_logfd = NULL;
-+
-+void usage(void)
-+{
-+	fprintf(stderr, "Usage: %s [-g] user\n", Prog);
-+	fprintf(stderr, "    list subuid ranges for user\n");
-+	fprintf(stderr, "    pass -g to list subgid ranges\n");
-+	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
-+}
-+
-+int main(int argc, char *argv[])
-+{
-+	int i, count=0;
-+	struct subid_range *ranges;
-+	const char *owner;
-+
-+	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
-+	shadow_logfd = stderr;
-+	if (argc < 2)
-+		usage();
-+	owner = argv[1];
-+	if (argc == 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "-g") == 0) {
-+		owner = argv[2];
-+		count = get_subgid_ranges(owner, &ranges);
-+	} else if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0) {
-+		usage();
-+	} else {
-+		count = get_subuid_ranges(owner, &ranges);
-+	}
-+	if (!ranges) {
-+		fprintf(stderr, "Error fetching ranges\n");
-+		exit(1);
-+	}
-+	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
-+		printf("%d: %s %lu %lu\n", i, owner,
-+			ranges[i].start, ranges[i].count);
-+	}
-+	return 0;
-+}
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/Makefile.am.getsubids shadow-4.6/src/Makefile.am
---- shadow-4.6/src/Makefile.am.getsubids	2021-12-09 10:40:50.710275627 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/Makefile.am	2021-12-09 10:45:04.465985510 +0100
-@@ -140,8 +140,8 @@ if WITH_TCB
- endif
- 
- if ENABLE_SUBIDS
--noinst_PROGRAMS += list_subid_ranges  \
--					get_subid_owners \
-+bin_PROGRAMS    +=  getsubids
-+noinst_PROGRAMS +=  get_subid_owners \
- 					new_subid_range \
- 					free_subid_range \
- 					check_subid_range
-@@ -156,13 +156,13 @@ MISCLIBS = \
- 	$(LIBCRYPT) \
- 	$(LIBTCB)
- 
--list_subid_ranges_LDADD = \
-+getsubids_LDADD = \
- 	$(top_builddir)/lib/libshadow.la \
- 	$(top_builddir)/libmisc/libmisc.la \
- 	$(top_builddir)/libsubid/libsubid.la \
- 	$(MISCLIBS) -ldl
- 
--list_subid_ranges_CPPFLAGS = \
-+getsubids_CPPFLAGS = \
- 	-I$(top_srcdir)/lib \
- 	-I$(top_srcdir)/libmisc \
- 	-I$(top_srcdir)/libsubid

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-goodname.patch

@@ -1,104 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname shadow-4.6/libmisc/chkname.c
---- shadow-4.6/libmisc/chkname.c.goodname	2020-10-23 12:50:47.202529031 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/chkname.c	2020-10-23 12:54:54.604692559 +0200
-@@ -49,25 +49,44 @@
- static bool is_valid_name (const char *name)
- {
- 	/*
--	 * User/group names must match [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]
--	 */
--	if (('\0' == *name) ||
--	    !((('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name)) || ('_' == *name))) {
-+         * User/group names must match gnu e-regex:
-+         *    [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]{0,30}[a-zA-Z0-9_.$-]?
-+         *
-+         * as a non-POSIX, extension, allow "$" as the last char for
-+         * sake of Samba 3.x "add machine script"
-+         *
-+         * Also do not allow fully numeric names or just "." or "..".
-+         */
-+	int numeric;
-+
-+	if ('\0' == *name ||
-+	    ('.' == *name && (('.' == name[1] && '\0' == name[2]) ||
-+			      '\0' == name[1])) ||
-+	    !((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
-+	      (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
-+	      (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
-+	      *name == '_' ||
-+	      *name == '.')) {
- 		return false;
- 	}
- 
-+	numeric = isdigit(*name);
-+
- 	while ('\0' != *++name) {
--		if (!(( ('a' <= *name) && ('z' >= *name) ) ||
--		      ( ('0' <= *name) && ('9' >= *name) ) ||
--		      ('_' == *name) ||
--		      ('-' == *name) ||
--		      ( ('$' == *name) && ('\0' == *(name + 1)) )
-+		if (!((*name >= 'a' && *name <= 'z') ||
-+		      (*name >= 'A' && *name <= 'Z') ||
-+		      (*name >= '0' && *name <= '9') ||
-+		      *name == '_' ||
-+		      *name == '.' ||
-+		      *name == '-' ||
-+		      (*name == '$' && name[1] == '\0')
- 		     )) {
- 			return false;
- 		}
-+		numeric &= isdigit(*name);
- 	}
- 
--	return true;
-+	return !numeric;
- }
- 
- bool is_valid_user_name (const char *name)
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.6/man/groupadd.8.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/groupadd.8.xml.goodname	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/groupadd.8.xml	2020-10-23 12:50:47.202529031 +0200
-@@ -273,10 +273,14 @@
-    <refsect1 id='caveats'>
-      <title>CAVEATS</title>
-      <para>
--       Groupnames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
--       followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
--       They can end with a dollar sign.
--       In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
-+       Groupnames may begin with lower and upper case letters, digits,
-+       underscores, or periods. They may continue with all the aforementioned
-+       characters, or dashes. Finally, they can end with a dollar sign.
-+
-+       Fully numeric groupnames and groupnames containing only . or .. are
-+       disallowed.
-+
-+       In regular expression terms: [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*[$]?
-      </para>
-      <para>
-        Groupnames may only be up to &GROUP_NAME_MAX_LENGTH; characters long.
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname shadow-4.6/man/useradd.8.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/useradd.8.xml.goodname	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/useradd.8.xml	2020-10-23 12:50:47.202529031 +0200
-@@ -650,10 +650,16 @@
-     </para>
- 
-     <para>
--      Usernames must start with a lower case letter or an underscore,
--      followed by lower case letters, digits, underscores, or dashes.
--      They can end with a dollar sign.
--      In regular expression terms: [a-z_][a-z0-9_-]*[$]?
-+      Usernames may begin with lower and upper case letters, digits,
-+      underscores, or periods. They may continue with all the aforementioned
-+      characters, or dashes. Finally, they can end with a dollar sign.
-+
-+      Fully numeric usernames and usernames containing only . or .. are
-+      disallowed. It is not recommended to use usernames beginning
-+      with . character as their home directories will be hidden in
-+      the <command>ls</command> output.
-+
-+      In regular expression terms: [a-zA-Z0-9_.][a-zA-Z0-9_.-]*[$]?
-     </para>
-     <para>
-       Usernames may only be up to 32 characters long.

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-gpasswd-fix-password-leak.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.9/src/gpasswd.c.gpasswd-fix-password-leak shadow-4.9/src/gpasswd.c
---- shadow-4.9/src/gpasswd.c.gpasswd-fix-password-leak	2023-07-12 09:38:32.062546006 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.9/src/gpasswd.c	2023-07-12 09:42:33.194154548 +0200
-@@ -857,6 +857,7 @@ static void change_passwd (struct group
- 		strzero (cp);
- 		cp = getpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
- 		if (NULL == cp) {
-+			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
- 			exit (1);
- 		}
- 

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-groupdel-fix-sigsegv-when-passwd-does-not-exist.patch

@@ -1,13 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.9/libmisc/prefix_flag.c.groupdel-fix-sigsegv-when-passwd-does-not-exist shadow-4.9/libmisc/prefix_flag.c
---- shadow-4.9/libmisc/prefix_flag.c.groupdel-fix-sigsegv-when-passwd-does-not-exist	2021-11-19 09:21:36.997091941 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.9/libmisc/prefix_flag.c	2021-11-19 09:22:19.001341010 +0100
-@@ -288,6 +288,9 @@ extern struct passwd* prefix_getpwent()
- 	if(!passwd_db_file) {
- 		return getpwent();
- 	}
-+	if (!fp_pwent) {
-+		return NULL;
-+	}
- 	return fgetpwent(fp_pwent);
- }
- extern void prefix_endpwent()

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-home_mode-directive.patch

@@ -1,201 +0,0 @@
-From a847899b521b0df0665e442845bcff23407d9ea0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Duncan Overbruck <mail@duncano.de>
-Date: Sat, 11 Jan 2020 22:19:37 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] add new HOME_MODE login.defs(5) option
-
-This option can be used to set a separate mode for useradd(8) and
-newusers(8) to create the home directories with.
-If this option is not set, the current behavior of using UMASK
-or the default umask is preserved.
-
-There are many distributions that set UMASK to 077 by default just
-to create home directories not readable by others and use things like
-/etc/profile, bashrc or sudo configuration files to set a less
-restrictive
-umask. This has always resulted in bug reports because it is hard
-to follow as users tend to change files like bashrc and are not about
-setting the umask to counteract the umask set in /etc/login.defs.
-
-A recent change in sudo has also resulted in many bug reports about
-this. sudo now tries to respect the umask set by pam modules and on
-systems where pam does not set a umask, the login.defs UMASK value is
-used.
----
- etc/login.defs             | 7 ++++++-
- lib/getdef.c               | 1 +
- man/login.defs.5.xml       | 4 ++++
- man/login.defs.d/UMASK.xml | 3 ++-
- src/newusers.c             | 6 +++---
- src/useradd.c              | 5 +++--
- 6 files changed, 19 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/etc/login.defs b/etc/login.defs
-index cd2597dc..a2f8cd50 100644
---- a/etc/login.defs
-+++ b/etc/login.defs
-@@ -195,12 +195,17 @@ KILLCHAR	025
- # Default initial "umask" value used by login(1) on non-PAM enabled systems.
- # Default "umask" value for pam_umask(8) on PAM enabled systems.
- # UMASK is also used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
--# home directories.
-+# home directories if HOME_MODE is not set.
- # 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered
- # for increased privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin
- # must make up their mind.
- UMASK		022
- 
-+# HOME_MODE is used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
-+# home directories.
-+# If HOME_MODE is not set, the value of UMASK is used to create the mode.
-+HOME_MODE	0700
-+
- #
- # Password aging controls:
- #
-diff --git a/lib/getdef.c b/lib/getdef.c
-index bbb273f4..00f6abfe 100644
---- a/lib/getdef.c
-+++ b/lib/getdef.c
-@@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
- 	{"FAKE_SHELL", NULL},
- 	{"GID_MAX", NULL},
- 	{"GID_MIN", NULL},
-+	{"HOME_MODE", NULL},
- 	{"HUSHLOGIN_FILE", NULL},
- 	{"KILLCHAR", NULL},
- 	{"LOGIN_RETRIES", NULL},
-diff --git a/man/login.defs.5.xml b/man/login.defs.5.xml
-index ebf60ba3..9e95da20 100644
---- a/man/login.defs.5.xml
-+++ b/man/login.defs.5.xml
-@@ -50,6 +50,7 @@
- <!ENTITY FAKE_SHELL            SYSTEM "login.defs.d/FAKE_SHELL.xml">
- <!ENTITY FTMP_FILE             SYSTEM "login.defs.d/FTMP_FILE.xml">
- <!ENTITY GID_MAX               SYSTEM "login.defs.d/GID_MAX.xml">
-+<!ENTITY HOME_MODE             SYSTEM "login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml">
- <!ENTITY HUSHLOGIN_FILE        SYSTEM "login.defs.d/HUSHLOGIN_FILE.xml">
- <!ENTITY ISSUE_FILE            SYSTEM "login.defs.d/ISSUE_FILE.xml">
- <!ENTITY KILLCHAR              SYSTEM "login.defs.d/KILLCHAR.xml">
-@@ -185,6 +186,7 @@
-       &FAKE_SHELL;
-       &FTMP_FILE;
-       &GID_MAX; <!-- documents also GID_MIN -->
-+      &HOME_MODE;
-       &HUSHLOGIN_FILE;
-       &ISSUE_FILE;
-       &KILLCHAR;
-@@ -401,6 +403,7 @@
- 	    ENCRYPT_METHOD
- 	    GID_MAX GID_MIN
- 	    MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP MD5_CRYPT_ENAB
-+	    HOME_MODE
- 	    PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_WARN_AGE
- 	    <phrase condition="sha_crypt">SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS
- 	    SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS</phrase>
-@@ -481,6 +484,7 @@
- 	  <para>
- 	    CREATE_HOME
- 	    GID_MAX GID_MIN
-+	    HOME_MODE
- 	    MAIL_DIR MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP
- 	    PASS_MAX_DAYS PASS_MIN_DAYS PASS_WARN_AGE
-	    SUB_GID_COUNT SUB_GID_MAX SUB_GID_MIN
-diff --git a/man/login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml b/man/login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..21aa55f7
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/man/login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml
-@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
-+<!--
-+   Copyright (c) 1991 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
-+   Copyright (c) 1991 - 1993, Chip Rosenthal
-+   Copyright (c) 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
-+   All rights reserved.
-+  
-+   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
-+   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
-+   are met:
-+   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
-+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
-+   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
-+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
-+      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
-+   3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
-+      endorse or promote products derived from this software without
-+      specific prior written permission.
-+  
-+   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
-+   ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
-+   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
-+   PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
-+   HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
-+   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
-+   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
-+   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
-+   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
-+   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
-+   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
-+-->
-+<varlistentry>
-+  <term><option>HOME_MODE</option> (number)</term>
-+  <listitem>
-+    <para>
-+      The mode for new home directories. If not specified,
-+      the <option>UMASK</option> is used to create the mode.
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-+      <command>useradd</command> and <command>newusers</command> use this
-+      to set the mode of the home directory they create.
-+    </para>
-+  </listitem>
-+</varlistentry>
-diff --git a/man/login.defs.d/UMASK.xml b/man/login.defs.d/UMASK.xml
-index d7b71a5e..0f061dbb 100644
---- a/man/login.defs.d/UMASK.xml
-+++ b/man/login.defs.d/UMASK.xml
-@@ -37,7 +37,8 @@
-     </para>
-     <para>
-       <command>useradd</command> and <command>newusers</command> use this
--      mask to set the mode of the home directory they create
-+      mask to set the mode of the home directory they create if
-+      <option>HOME_MODE</option> is not set.
-     </para>
-     <para condition="no_pam">
-       It is also used by <command>login</command> to define users' initial
-diff --git a/src/newusers.c b/src/newusers.c
-index 99c69f78..e9fe0e27 100644
---- a/src/newusers.c
-+++ b/src/newusers.c
-@@ -1216,9 +1216,9 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 		if (   ('\0' != fields[5][0])
- 		    && (access (newpw.pw_dir, F_OK) != 0)) {
- /* FIXME: should check for directory */
--			mode_t msk = 0777 & ~getdef_num ("UMASK",
--			                                 GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK);
--			if (mkdir (newpw.pw_dir, msk) != 0) {
-+			mode_t mode = getdef_num ("HOME_MODE",
-+			                          0777 & ~getdef_num ("UMASK", GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK));
-+			if (mkdir (newpw.pw_dir, mode) != 0) {
- 				fprintf (stderr,
- 				         _("%s: line %d: mkdir %s failed: %s\n"),
- 				         Prog, line, newpw.pw_dir,
-diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
-index 4af0f7c6..8b453e3c 100644
---- a/src/useradd.c
-+++ b/src/useradd.c
-@@ -2152,8 +2152,9 @@ static void create_home (void)
- 			fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
- 		}
- 		(void) chown (prefix_user_home, user_id, user_gid);
--		chmod (prefix_user_home,
--		       0777 & ~getdef_num ("UMASK", GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK));
-+		mode_t mode = getdef_num ("HOME_MODE",
-+		                          0777 & ~getdef_num ("UMASK", GETDEF_DEFAULT_UMASK));
-+		chmod (prefix_user_home, mode);
- 		home_added = true;
- #ifdef WITH_AUDIT
- 		audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_MGMT, Prog,
--- 
-2.25.2
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-ignore-login-prompt.patch

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/lib/getdef.c.login-prompt shadow-4.6/lib/getdef.c
---- shadow-4.6/lib/getdef.c.login-prompt	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/lib/getdef.c	2019-03-21 15:06:58.009280504 +0100
-@@ -94,6 +94,7 @@ static struct itemdef def_table[] = {
- 	{"KILLCHAR", NULL},
- 	{"LOGIN_RETRIES", NULL},
- 	{"LOGIN_TIMEOUT", NULL},
-+	{"LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT", NULL},
- 	{"LOG_OK_LOGINS", NULL},
- 	{"LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB", NULL},
- 	{"MAIL_DIR", NULL},

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-install_subid_h.patch

@@ -1,28 +0,0 @@
-From 77e39de1e6cbd6925f16bb260abb7d216296886b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 09:21:11 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Install subid.h
-
-Now subid.h gets installed under /usr/include/shadow/subid.h
-
-Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
----
- libsubid/Makefile.am | 2 ++
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/libsubid/Makefile.am b/libsubid/Makefile.am
-index f543b5eb..189165b0 100644
---- a/libsubid/Makefile.am
-+++ b/libsubid/Makefile.am
-@@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ libsubid_la_LDFLAGS = -Wl,-soname,libsubid.so.@LIBSUBID_ABI@ \
- 	-shared -version-info @LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR@
- libsubid_la_SOURCES = api.c
- 
-+pkginclude_HEADERS = subid.h
-+
- MISCLIBS = \
- 	$(LIBAUDIT) \
- 	$(LIBSELINUX) \
--- 
-2.31.1
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids.patch

@@ -1,151 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/lib/nss.c.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids shadow-4.8.1/lib/nss.c
---- shadow-4.8.1/lib/nss.c.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids	2021-05-25 09:37:14.772741048 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/lib/nss.c	2021-05-25 09:37:14.782741188 +0200
-@@ -116,14 +116,6 @@ void nss_init(char *nsswitch_path) {
- 				subid_nss = NULL;
- 				goto done;
- 			}
--			subid_nss->has_any_range = dlsym(h, "shadow_subid_has_any_range");
--			if (!subid_nss->has_any_range) {
--				fprintf(shadow_logfd, "%s did not provide @has_any_range@\n", libname);
--				dlclose(h);
--				free(subid_nss);
--				subid_nss = NULL;
--				goto done;
--			}
- 			subid_nss->find_subid_owners = dlsym(h, "shadow_subid_find_subid_owners");
- 			if (!subid_nss->find_subid_owners) {
- 				fprintf(shadow_logfd, "%s did not provide @find_subid_owners@\n", libname);
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h
---- shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids	2021-05-25 09:37:14.780741160 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h	2021-05-25 09:37:14.782741188 +0200
-@@ -279,18 +279,6 @@ extern bool nss_is_initialized();
- 
- struct subid_nss_ops {
- 	/*
--	 * nss_has_any_range: does a user own any subid range
--	 *
--	 * @owner: username
--	 * @idtype: subuid or subgid
--	 * @result: true if a subid allocation was found for @owner
--	 *
--	 * returns success if the module was able to determine an answer (true or false),
--	 * else an error status.
--	 */
--	enum subid_status (*has_any_range)(const char *owner, enum subid_type idtype, bool *result);
--
--	/*
- 	 * nss_has_range: does a user own a given subid range
- 	 *
- 	 * @owner: username
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.c.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.c
---- shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.c.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids	2021-05-25 09:37:14.780741160 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.c	2021-05-25 09:37:14.782741188 +0200
-@@ -598,19 +598,8 @@ int sub_uid_open (int mode)
- 	return commonio_open (&subordinate_uid_db, mode);
- }
- 
--bool sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner)
-+bool local_sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner)
- {
--	struct subid_nss_ops *h;
--	bool found;
--	enum subid_status status;
--	h = get_subid_nss_handle();
--	if (h) {
--		status = h->has_any_range(owner, ID_TYPE_UID, &found);
--		if (status == SUBID_STATUS_SUCCESS && found)
--			return true;
--		return false;
--	}
--
- 	return range_exists (&subordinate_uid_db, owner);
- }
- 
-@@ -720,18 +709,8 @@ bool have_sub_gids(const char *owner, gi
- 	return have_range(&subordinate_gid_db, owner, start, count);
- }
- 
--bool sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner)
-+bool local_sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner)
- {
--	struct subid_nss_ops *h;
--	bool found;
--	enum subid_status status;
--	h = get_subid_nss_handle();
--	if (h) {
--		status = h->has_any_range(owner, ID_TYPE_GID, &found);
--		if (status == SUBID_STATUS_SUCCESS && found)
--			return true;
--		return false;
--	}
- 	return range_exists (&subordinate_gid_db, owner);
- }
- 
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.h.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.h
---- shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.h.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids	2021-05-25 09:37:14.780741160 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.h	2021-05-25 09:37:14.782741188 +0200
-@@ -16,7 +16,7 @@
- extern int sub_uid_close(void);
- extern bool have_sub_uids(const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
- extern bool sub_uid_file_present (void);
--extern bool sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner);
-+extern bool local_sub_uid_assigned(const char *owner);
- extern int sub_uid_lock (void);
- extern int sub_uid_setdbname (const char *filename);
- extern /*@observer@*/const char *sub_uid_dbname (void);
-@@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ extern void free_subordinate_ranges(stru
- extern int sub_gid_close(void);
- extern bool have_sub_gids(const char *owner, gid_t start, unsigned long count);
- extern bool sub_gid_file_present (void);
--extern bool sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner);
-+extern bool local_sub_gid_assigned(const char *owner);
- extern int sub_gid_lock (void);
- extern int sub_gid_setdbname (const char *filename);
- extern /*@observer@*/const char *sub_gid_dbname (void);
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/newusers.c.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids shadow-4.8.1/src/newusers.c
---- shadow-4.8.1/src/newusers.c.libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids	2021-05-25 09:37:14.776741104 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/src/newusers.c	2021-05-25 09:37:25.955897160 +0200
-@@ -1021,6 +1021,24 @@ static void close_files (void)
- #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
- }
- 
-+static bool want_subuids(void)
-+{
-+	if (get_subid_nss_handle() != NULL)
-+		return false;
-+	if (getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 65536) == 0)
-+		return false;
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
-+static bool want_subgids(void)
-+{
-+	if (get_subid_nss_handle() != NULL)
-+		return false;
-+	if (getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 65536) == 0)
-+		return false;
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
- int main (int argc, char **argv)
- {
- 	char buf[BUFSIZ];
-@@ -1250,7 +1268,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 		/*
- 		 * Add subordinate uids if the user does not have them.
- 		 */
--		if (is_sub_uid && !sub_uid_assigned(fields[0])) {
-+		if (is_sub_uid && want_subuids() && !local_sub_uid_assigned(fields[0])) {
- 			uid_t sub_uid_start = 0;
- 			unsigned long sub_uid_count = 0;
- 			if (find_new_sub_uids(fields[0], &sub_uid_start, &sub_uid_count) == 0) {
-@@ -1270,7 +1288,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 		/*
- 		 * Add subordinate gids if the user does not have them.
- 		 */
--		if (is_sub_gid && !sub_gid_assigned(fields[0])) {
-+		if (is_sub_gid && want_subgids() && !local_sub_gid_assigned(fields[0])) {
- 			gid_t sub_gid_start = 0;
- 			unsigned long sub_gid_count = 0;
- 			if (find_new_sub_gids(fields[0], &sub_gid_start, &sub_gid_count) == 0) {

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-libsubid_init_not_print_error_messages.patch

@@ -1,40 +0,0 @@
-From b0e86b959fe5c086ffb5e7eaf3c1b1e9219411e9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Date: Sun, 23 May 2021 08:03:10 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] libsubid_init: don't print messages on error
-
-Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
----
- libsubid/api.c | 7 ++-----
- 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 5 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libsubid/api.c b/libsubid/api.c
-index c4848142..b477b271 100644
---- a/libsubid/api.c
-+++ b/libsubid/api.c
-@@ -46,12 +46,10 @@ bool libsubid_init(const char *progname, FILE * logfd)
- {
- 	if (progname) {
- 		progname = strdup(progname);
--		if (progname) {
-+		if (progname)
- 			Prog = progname;
--		} else {
--			fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory");
-+		else
- 			return false;
--		}
- 	}
- 
- 	if (logfd) {
-@@ -60,7 +58,6 @@ bool libsubid_init(const char *progname, FILE * logfd)
- 	}
- 	shadow_logfd = fopen("/dev/null", "w");
- 	if (!shadow_logfd) {
--		fprintf(stderr, "ERROR opening /dev/null for error messages.  Using stderr.");
- 		shadow_logfd = stderr;
- 		return false;
- 	}
--- 
-2.30.2
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-libsubid_init_return_false.patch

@@ -1,37 +0,0 @@
-From e34f49c1966fcaa9390a544a0136ec189a3c870e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 08:48:03 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] libsubid_init: return false if out of memory
-
-The rest of the run isn't likely to get much better, is it?
-
-Thanks to Alexey for pointing this out.
-
-Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Cc: Alexey Tikhonov <atikhono@redhat.com>
----
- libsubid/api.c | 6 ++++--
- 1 file changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libsubid/api.c b/libsubid/api.c
-index 8ca09859..8618e500 100644
---- a/libsubid/api.c
-+++ b/libsubid/api.c
-@@ -46,10 +46,12 @@ bool libsubid_init(const char *progname, FILE * logfd)
- {
- 	if (progname) {
- 		progname = strdup(progname);
--		if (progname)
-+		if (progname) {
- 			Prog = progname;
--		else
-+		} else {
- 			fprintf(stderr, "Out of memory");
-+			return false;
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	if (logfd) {
--- 
-2.30.2
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-libsubid_make_logfd_not_extern.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-From 1d767fb779d7b203ad609540d1dc605cf62d1050 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Date: Fri, 28 May 2021 22:02:16 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] libsubid/api.c: make shadow_logfd not extern
-
-Closes #346
-
-Also #include stdio.h
-
-Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
----
- libsubid/api.c   | 2 +-
- libsubid/subid.h | 1 +
- 2 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
-
-diff --git a/libsubid/api.c b/libsubid/api.c
-index b477b271..a7b904d0 100644
---- a/libsubid/api.c
-+++ b/libsubid/api.c
-@@ -40,7 +40,7 @@
- #include "subid.h"
- 
- const char *Prog = "(libsubid)";
--extern FILE * shadow_logfd;
-+FILE *shadow_logfd;
- 
- bool libsubid_init(const char *progname, FILE * logfd)
- {
-diff --git a/libsubid/subid.h b/libsubid/subid.h
-index 5fef2572..eabafe4d 100644
---- a/libsubid/subid.h
-+++ b/libsubid/subid.h
-@@ -1,4 +1,5 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
-+#include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdbool.h>
- 
- #ifndef SUBID_RANGE_DEFINED
--- 
-2.31.1
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable.patch

@@ -1,264 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/configure.ac.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable shadow-4.8.1/configure.ac
---- shadow-4.8.1/configure.ac.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable	2021-05-24 15:02:56.165917066 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/configure.ac	2021-05-24 15:02:56.184917324 +0200
-@@ -1,6 +1,6 @@
- dnl Process this file with autoconf to produce a configure script.
- AC_PREREQ([2.69])
--m4_define([libsubid_abi_major], 2)
-+m4_define([libsubid_abi_major], 3)
- m4_define([libsubid_abi_minor], 0)
- m4_define([libsubid_abi_micro], 0)
- m4_define([libsubid_abi], [libsubid_abi_major.libsubid_abi_minor.libsubid_abi_micro])
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h
---- shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable	2021-05-24 15:02:56.184917324 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/lib/prototypes.h	2021-05-24 16:38:57.610619467 +0200
-@@ -309,16 +309,15 @@ struct subid_nss_ops {
- 	 *
- 	 * @owner - string representing username being queried
- 	 * @id_type - subuid or subgid
--	 * @ranges - pointer to an array of struct subordinate_range pointers, or
--	 *           NULL.  The returned array of struct subordinate_range and its
--	 *           members must be freed by the caller.
-+	 * @ranges - pointer to an array of struct subid_range, or NULL.  The
-+	 *           returned array must be freed by the caller.
- 	 * @count - pointer to an integer into which the number of returned ranges
- 	 *          is written.
- 
- 	 * returns success if the module was able to determine an answer,
- 	 * else an error status.
- 	 */
--	enum subid_status (*list_owner_ranges)(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subordinate_range ***ranges, int *count);
-+	enum subid_status (*list_owner_ranges)(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_range **ranges, int *count);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * nss_find_subid_owners: find uids who own a given subuid or subgid.
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/libsubid/api.c.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable shadow-4.8.1/libsubid/api.c
---- shadow-4.8.1/libsubid/api.c.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable	2021-05-24 15:03:01.467989079 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/libsubid/api.c	2021-05-24 16:42:32.091584531 +0200
-@@ -68,26 +68,21 @@ bool libsubid_init(const char *progname,
- }
- 
- static
--int get_subid_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subordinate_range ***ranges)
-+int get_subid_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_range **ranges)
- {
- 	return list_owner_ranges(owner, id_type, ranges);
- }
- 
--int get_subuid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subordinate_range ***ranges)
-+int get_subuid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subid_range **ranges)
- {
- 	return get_subid_ranges(owner, ID_TYPE_UID, ranges);
- }
- 
--int get_subgid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subordinate_range ***ranges)
-+int get_subgid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subid_range **ranges)
- {
- 	return get_subid_ranges(owner, ID_TYPE_GID, ranges);
- }
- 
--void subid_free_ranges(struct subordinate_range **ranges, int count)
--{
--	return free_subordinate_ranges(ranges, count);
--}
--
- static
- int get_subid_owner(unsigned long id, enum subid_type id_type, uid_t **owner)
- {
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/libsubid/subid.h.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable shadow-4.8.1/libsubid/subid.h
---- shadow-4.8.1/libsubid/subid.h.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable	2021-05-24 15:03:01.468989093 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/libsubid/subid.h	2021-05-24 16:43:49.697657383 +0200
-@@ -3,6 +3,15 @@
- 
- #ifndef SUBID_RANGE_DEFINED
- #define SUBID_RANGE_DEFINED 1
-+
-+/* subid_range is just a starting point and size of a range */
-+struct subid_range {
-+	unsigned long start;
-+	unsigned long count;
-+};
-+
-+/* subordinage_range is a subid_range plus an owner, representing
-+ * a range in /etc/subuid or /etc/subgid */
- struct subordinate_range {
- 	const char *owner;
- 	unsigned long start;
-@@ -41,32 +50,27 @@ bool libsubid_init(const char *progname,
-  * get_subuid_ranges: return a list of UID ranges for a user
-  *
-  * @owner: username being queried
-- * @ranges: a pointer to a subordinate range ** in which the result will be
-- *          returned.
-+ * @ranges: a pointer to an array of subid_range structs in which the result
-+ *          will be returned.
-+ *
-+ * The caller must free(ranges) when done.
-  *
-  * returns: number of ranges found, ir < 0 on error.
-  */
--int get_subuid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subordinate_range ***ranges);
-+int get_subuid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subid_range **ranges);
- 
- /*
-  * get_subgid_ranges: return a list of GID ranges for a user
-  *
-  * @owner: username being queried
-- * @ranges: a pointer to a subordinate range ** in which the result will be
-- *          returned.
-+ * @ranges: a pointer to an array of subid_range structs in which the result
-+ *          will be returned.
-  *
-- * returns: number of ranges found, ir < 0 on error.
-- */
--int get_subgid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subordinate_range ***ranges);
--
--/*
-- * subid_free_ranges: free an array of subordinate_ranges returned by either
-- *                    get_subuid_ranges() or get_subgid_ranges().
-+ * The caller must free(ranges) when done.
-  *
-- * @ranges: the ranges to free
-- * @count: the number of ranges in @ranges
-+ * returns: number of ranges found, ir < 0 on error.
-  */
--void subid_free_ranges(struct subordinate_range **ranges, int count);
-+int get_subgid_ranges(const char *owner, struct subid_range **ranges);
- 
- /*
-  * get_subuid_owners: return a list of uids to which the given uid has been
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.c.libsubid-simplify shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.c
---- shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.c.libsubid-simplify	2021-05-24 17:27:38.721035241 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.c	2021-05-24 17:28:06.481420946 +0200
-@@ -11,6 +11,7 @@
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include "commonio.h"
- #include "subordinateio.h"
-+#include "../libsubid/subid.h"
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <ctype.h>
-@@ -308,25 +309,21 @@ static bool have_range(struct commonio_d
- 	return false;
- }
- 
--static bool append_range(struct subordinate_range ***ranges, const struct subordinate_range *new, int n)
-+static bool append_range(struct subid_range **ranges, const struct subordinate_range *new, int n)
- {
--	struct subordinate_range *tmp;
- 	if (!*ranges) {
--		*ranges = malloc(sizeof(struct subordinate_range *));
-+		*ranges = malloc(sizeof(struct subid_range));
- 		if (!*ranges)
- 			return false;
- 	} else {
--		struct subordinate_range **new;
--		new = realloc(*ranges, (n + 1) * (sizeof(struct subordinate_range *)));
--		if (!new)
-+		struct subid_range *alloced;
-+		alloced = realloc(*ranges, (n + 1) * (sizeof(struct subid_range)));
-+		if (!alloced)
- 			return false;
--		*ranges = new;
-+		*ranges = alloced;
- 	}
--	(*ranges)[n] = NULL;
--	tmp = subordinate_dup(new);
--	if (!tmp)
--		return false;
--	(*ranges)[n] = tmp;
-+	(*ranges)[n].start = new->start;
-+	(*ranges)[n].count = new->count;
- 	return true;
- }
- 
-@@ -785,10 +782,10 @@ gid_t sub_gid_find_free_range(gid_t min,
-  *
-  * The caller must free the subordinate range list.
-  */
--int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subordinate_range ***in_ranges)
-+int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_range **in_ranges)
- {
- 	// TODO - need to handle owner being either uid or username
--	struct subordinate_range **ranges = NULL;
-+	struct subid_range *ranges = NULL;
- 	const struct subordinate_range *range;
- 	struct commonio_db *db;
- 	enum subid_status status;
-@@ -826,7 +823,7 @@ int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner,
- 	while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
- 		if (0 == strcmp(range->owner, owner)) {
- 			if (!append_range(&ranges, range, count++)) {
--				free_subordinate_ranges(ranges, count-1);
-+				free(ranges);
- 				ranges = NULL;
- 				count = -1;
- 				goto out;
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.h.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.h
---- shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.h.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable	2021-05-24 15:03:01.467989079 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/lib/subordinateio.h	2021-05-24 16:40:56.978269647 +0200
-@@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ extern int sub_uid_unlock (void);
- extern int sub_uid_add (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
- extern int sub_uid_remove (const char *owner, uid_t start, unsigned long count);
- extern uid_t sub_uid_find_free_range(uid_t min, uid_t max, unsigned long count);
--extern int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subordinate_range ***ranges);
-+extern int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_range **ranges);
- extern bool new_subid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, enum subid_type id_type, bool reuse);
- extern bool release_subid_range(struct subordinate_range *range, enum subid_type id_type);
- extern int find_subid_owners(unsigned long id, enum subid_type id_type, uid_t **uids);
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/src/list_subid_ranges.c.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable shadow-4.8.1/src/list_subid_ranges.c
---- shadow-4.8.1/src/list_subid_ranges.c.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable	2021-05-24 15:03:01.468989093 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/src/list_subid_ranges.c	2021-05-24 16:45:10.884779740 +0200
-@@ -17,27 +17,29 @@ void usage(void)
- int main(int argc, char *argv[])
- {
- 	int i, count=0;
--	struct subordinate_range **ranges;
-+	struct subid_range *ranges;
-+	const char *owner;
- 
- 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
- 	shadow_logfd = stderr;
--	if (argc < 2) {
-+	if (argc < 2)
- 		usage();
--	}
--	if (argc == 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "-g") == 0)
--		count = get_subgid_ranges(argv[2], &ranges);
--	else if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0)
-+	owner = argv[1];
-+	if (argc == 3 && strcmp(argv[1], "-g") == 0) {
-+		owner = argv[2];
-+		count = get_subgid_ranges(owner, &ranges);
-+	} else if (argc == 2 && strcmp(argv[1], "-h") == 0) {
- 		usage();
--	else
--		count = get_subuid_ranges(argv[1], &ranges);
-+	} else {
-+		count = get_subuid_ranges(owner, &ranges);
-+	}
- 	if (!ranges) {
- 		fprintf(stderr, "Error fetching ranges\n");
- 		exit(1);
- 	}
- 	for (i = 0; i < count; i++) {
--		printf("%d: %s %lu %lu\n", i, ranges[i]->owner,
--			ranges[i]->start, ranges[i]->count);
-+		printf("%d: %s %lu %lu\n", i, owner,
-+			ranges[i].start, ranges[i].count);
- 	}
--	subid_free_ranges(ranges, count);
- 	return 0;
- }
-diff -up shadow-4.8.1/tests/libsubid/04_nss/libsubid_zzz.c.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable shadow-4.8.1/tests/libsubid/04_nss/libsubid_zzz.c
---- shadow-4.8.1/tests/libsubid/04_nss/libsubid_zzz.c.libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable	2021-05-24 15:02:56.166917079 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.8.1/tests/libsubid/04_nss/libsubid_zzz.c	2021-05-24 15:03:01.469989106 +0200
-@@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ enum subid_status shadow_subid_list_owne
- 	if (strcmp(owner, "conn") == 0)
- 		return SUBID_STATUS_ERROR_CONN;
- 
--	*ranges = NULL;
-+	*in_ranges = NULL;
- 	if (strcmp(owner, "user1") != 0 && strcmp(owner, "ubuntu") != 0 &&
- 	    strcmp(owner, "group1") != 0)
- 		return SUBID_STATUS_SUCCESS;

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-man-mention-nss-in-newuidmap.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 186b1b7ac1a68d0fcc618a22da1a99232b420911 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Date: Tue, 4 May 2021 14:39:26 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] manpages: mention NSS in new[ug]idmap manpages
-
-Closes #328
-
-Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
----
- man/newgidmap.1.xml | 3 ++-
- man/newuidmap.1.xml | 3 ++-
- 2 files changed, 4 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/man/newgidmap.1.xml b/man/newgidmap.1.xml
-index 71b03e56..76fc1e30 100644
---- a/man/newgidmap.1.xml
-+++ b/man/newgidmap.1.xml
-@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@
-     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-     <para>
-       The <command>newgidmap</command> sets <filename>/proc/[pid]/gid_map</filename> based on its
--      command line arguments and the gids allowed in <filename>/etc/subgid</filename>.
-+      command line arguments and the gids allowed (either in <filename>/etc/subgid</filename> or
-+      through the configured NSS subid module).
-       Note that the root user is not exempted from the requirement for a valid
-       <filename>/etc/subgid</filename> entry.
-     </para>
-diff --git a/man/newuidmap.1.xml b/man/newuidmap.1.xml
-index a6f1f085..44eca50a 100644
---- a/man/newuidmap.1.xml
-+++ b/man/newuidmap.1.xml
-@@ -88,7 +88,8 @@
-     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-     <para>
-       The <command>newuidmap</command> sets <filename>/proc/[pid]/uid_map</filename> based on its
--      command line arguments and the uids allowed in <filename>/etc/subuid</filename>.
-+      command line arguments and the uids allowed (either in <filename>/etc/subuid</filename> or
-+      through the configured NSS subid module).
-       Note that the root user is not exempted from the requirement for a valid
-       <filename>/etc/subuid</filename> entry.
-     </para>
--- 
-2.30.2
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-man_clarify_subid_delegation.patch

@@ -1,166 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/newgidmap.1.xml.man_clarify_subid_delegation shadow-4.6/man/newgidmap.1.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/newgidmap.1.xml.man_clarify_subid_delegation	2021-11-03 09:58:34.176484342 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/newgidmap.1.xml	2021-11-03 09:58:34.191484452 +0100
-@@ -80,10 +80,15 @@
-   <refsect1 id='description'>
-     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-     <para>
--      The <command>newgidmap</command> sets <filename>/proc/[pid]/gid_map</filename> based on its
--      command line arguments and the gids allowed (either in <filename>/etc/subgid</filename> or
--      through the configured NSS subid module).
--      Note that the root user is not exempted from the requirement for a valid
-+      The <command>newgidmap</command> sets <filename>/proc/[pid]/gid_map</filename>
-+      based on its command line arguments and the gids allowed. Subgid
-+      delegation can either be managed via <filename>/etc/subgid</filename>
-+      or through the configured NSS subid module. These options are mutually
-+      exclusive.
-+    </para>
-+
-+    <para>
-+      Note that the root group is not exempted from the requirement for a valid
-       <filename>/etc/subgid</filename> entry.
-     </para>
- 
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/newuidmap.1.xml.man_clarify_subid_delegation shadow-4.6/man/newuidmap.1.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/newuidmap.1.xml.man_clarify_subid_delegation	2021-11-03 09:58:34.176484342 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/newuidmap.1.xml	2021-11-03 09:58:34.191484452 +0100
-@@ -80,9 +80,14 @@
-   <refsect1 id='description'>
-     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-     <para>
--      The <command>newuidmap</command> sets <filename>/proc/[pid]/uid_map</filename> based on its
--      command line arguments and the uids allowed (either in <filename>/etc/subuid</filename> or
--      through the configured NSS subid module).
-+      The <command>newuidmap</command> sets <filename>/proc/[pid]/uid_map</filename>
-+      based on its command line arguments and the uids allowed. Subuid
-+      delegation can either be managed via <filename>/etc/subuid</filename> or
-+      through the configured NSS subid module. These options are mutually
-+      exclusive.
-+    </para>
-+
-+    <para>
-       Note that the root user is not exempted from the requirement for a valid
-       <filename>/etc/subuid</filename> entry.
-     </para>
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/subgid.5.xml.man_clarify_subid_delegation shadow-4.6/man/subgid.5.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/subgid.5.xml.man_clarify_subid_delegation	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/subgid.5.xml	2021-11-03 09:59:55.752084920 +0100
-@@ -32,6 +32,18 @@
- <!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->
- ]>
- <refentry id='subgid.5'>
-+  <refentryinfo>
-+    <author>
-+      <firstname>Eric</firstname>
-+      <surname>Biederman</surname>
-+      <contrib>Creation, 2013</contrib>
-+    </author>
-+    <author>
-+      <firstname>Iker</firstname>
-+      <surname>Pedrosa</surname>
-+      <contrib>Developer, 2021</contrib>
-+    </author>
-+  </refentryinfo>
-   <refmeta>
-     <refentrytitle>subgid</refentrytitle>
-     <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
-@@ -41,12 +53,37 @@
-   </refmeta>
-   <refnamediv id='name'>
-     <refname>subgid</refname>
--    <refpurpose>the subordinate gid file</refpurpose>
-+    <refpurpose>the configuration for subordinate group ids</refpurpose>
-   </refnamediv>
- 
-   <refsect1 id='description'>
-     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-     <para>
-+      Subgid authorizes a group id to map ranges of group ids from its namespace
-+      into child namespaces.
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-+      The delegation of the subordinate gids can be configured via the
-+      <replaceable>subid</replaceable> field in
-+      <filename>/etc/nsswitch.conf</filename> file. Only one value can be set
-+      as the delegation source. Setting this field to
-+      <replaceable>files</replaceable> configures the delegation of gids to
-+      <filename>/etc/subgid</filename>. Setting any other value treats
-+      the delegation as a plugin following with a name of the form
-+      <replaceable>libsubid_$value.so</replaceable>. If the value or plugin is
-+      missing, then the subordinate gid delegation falls back to
-+      <replaceable>files</replaceable>.
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-+      Note, that <command>groupadd</command> will only create entries in
-+      <filename>/etc/subgid</filename> if subid delegation is managed via subid
-+      files.
-+    </para>
-+  </refsect1>
-+
-+  <refsect1 id='local-subordinate-delegation'>
-+    <title>LOCAL SUBORDINATE DELEGATION</title>
-+    <para>
-       Each line in <filename>/etc/subgid</filename> contains
-       a user name and a range of subordinate group ids that user
-       is allowed to use.
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/subuid.5.xml.man_clarify_subid_delegation shadow-4.6/man/subuid.5.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/subuid.5.xml.man_clarify_subid_delegation	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/subuid.5.xml	2021-11-03 10:00:18.888255255 +0100
-@@ -32,6 +32,18 @@
- <!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->
- ]>
- <refentry id='subuid.5'>
-+  <refentryinfo>
-+    <author>
-+      <firstname>Eric</firstname>
-+      <surname>Biederman</surname>
-+      <contrib>Creation, 2013</contrib>
-+    </author>
-+    <author>
-+      <firstname>Iker</firstname>
-+      <surname>Pedrosa</surname>
-+      <contrib>Developer, 2021</contrib>
-+    </author>
-+  </refentryinfo>
-   <refmeta>
-     <refentrytitle>subuid</refentrytitle>
-     <manvolnum>5</manvolnum>
-@@ -41,12 +53,37 @@
-   </refmeta>
-   <refnamediv id='name'>
-     <refname>subuid</refname>
--    <refpurpose>the subordinate uid file</refpurpose>
-+    <refpurpose>the configuration for subordinate user ids</refpurpose>
-   </refnamediv>
- 
-   <refsect1 id='description'>
-     <title>DESCRIPTION</title>
-     <para>
-+      Subuid authorizes a user id to map ranges of user ids from its namespace
-+      into child namespaces.
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-+      The delegation of the subordinate uids can be configured via the
-+      <replaceable>subid</replaceable> field in
-+      <filename>/etc/nsswitch.conf</filename> file. Only one value can be set
-+      as the delegation source. Setting this field to
-+      <replaceable>files</replaceable> configures the delegation of uids to
-+      <filename>/etc/subuid</filename>. Setting any other value treats
-+      the delegation as a plugin following with a name of the form
-+      <replaceable>libsubid_$value.so</replaceable>. If the value or plugin is
-+      missing, then the subordinate uid delegation falls back to
-+      <replaceable>files</replaceable>.
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-+      Note, that <command>useradd</command> will only create entries in
-+      <filename>/etc/subuid</filename> if subid delegation is managed via subid
-+      files.
-+    </para>
-+  </refsect1>
-+
-+  <refsect1 id='local-subordinate-delegation'>
-+    <title>LOCAL SUBORDINATE DELEGATION</title>
-+    <para>
-       Each line in <filename>/etc/subuid</filename> contains
-       a user name and a range of subordinate user ids that user
-       is allowed to use.

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-manfix.patch

@@ -1,349 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.6/man/groupmems.8.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/groupmems.8.xml	2020-10-23 13:15:24.105387634 +0200
-@@ -179,20 +179,10 @@
-   <refsect1 id='setup'>
-     <title>SETUP</title>
-     <para>
--      The <command>groupmems</command> executable should be in mode
--      <literal>2770</literal> as user <emphasis>root</emphasis> and in group
--      <emphasis>groups</emphasis>. The system administrator can add users to
--      group <emphasis>groups</emphasis> to allow or disallow them using the
--      <command>groupmems</command> utility to manage their own group
--      membership list.
-+      In this operating system the <command>groupmems</command> executable
-+      is not setuid and regular users cannot use it to manipulate
-+      the membership of their own group.
-     </para>
--
--    <programlisting>
--	$ groupadd -r groups
--	$ chmod 2770 groupmems
--	$ chown root.groups groupmems
--	$ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
--    </programlisting>
-   </refsect1>
- 
-   <refsect1 id='configuration'>
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/chage.1.xml.manfix shadow-4.6/man/chage.1.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/chage.1.xml.manfix	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/chage.1.xml	2020-10-23 13:15:24.105387634 +0200
-@@ -102,6 +102,9 @@
- 	    Set the number of days since January 1st, 1970 when the password
- 	    was last changed. The date may also be expressed in the format
- 	    YYYY-MM-DD (or the format more commonly used in your area).
-+	    If the <replaceable>LAST_DAY</replaceable> is set to
-+	    <emphasis>0</emphasis> the user is forced to change his password
-+	    on the next log on.
- 	  </para>
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
-@@ -119,6 +122,13 @@
- 	    system again.
- 	  </para>
- 	  <para>
-+	    For example the following can be used to set an account to expire
-+	    in 180 days:
-+	  </para>
-+	  <programlisting>
-+	    chage -E $(date -d +180days +%Y-%m-%d)
-+	  </programlisting>
-+	  <para>
- 	    Passing the number <emphasis remap='I'>-1</emphasis> as the
- 	    <replaceable>EXPIRE_DATE</replaceable> will remove an account
- 	    expiration date.
-@@ -233,6 +243,18 @@
-       The <command>chage</command> program requires a shadow password file to
-       be available.
-     </para>
-+    <para>
-+      The chage program will report only the information from the shadow
-+      password file. This implies that configuration from other sources
-+     (e.g. LDAP or empty password hash field from the passwd file) that
-+     affect the user's login will not be shown in the chage output.
-+    </para>
-+    <para>
-+      The <command>chage</command> program will also not report any
-+      inconsistency between the shadow and passwd files (e.g. missing x in
-+      the passwd file). The <command>pwck</command> can be used to check
-+      for this kind of inconsistencies.
-+    </para>
-     <para>The <command>chage</command> command is restricted to the root
-       user, except for the <option>-l</option> option, which may be used by
-       an unprivileged user to determine when their password or account is due
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix shadow-4.6/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5
---- shadow-4.6/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5	2020-10-23 13:15:24.106387639 +0200
-@@ -147,10 +147,6 @@ 以下の参照表は、
- shadow パスワード機能のどのプログラムが
- どのパラメータを使用するかを示したものである。
- .na
--.IP chfn 12
--CHFN_AUTH CHFN_RESTRICT
--.IP chsh 12
--CHFN_AUTH
- .IP groupadd 12
- GID_MAX GID_MIN
- .IP newusers 12
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.5.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.5.xml	2020-10-23 13:15:43.280475188 +0200
-@@ -162,6 +162,27 @@
-       long numeric parameters is machine-dependent.
-     </para>
- 
-+    <para>
-+      Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
-+      behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
-+      tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
-+      passwd command) should be configured elsewhere. The only values that
-+      affect PAM modules are <emphasis>ENCRYPT_METHOD</emphasis> and <emphasis>SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS</emphasis>
-+      for pam_unix module, <emphasis>FAIL_DELAY</emphasis> for pam_faildelay module,
-+      and <emphasis>UMASK</emphasis> for pam_umask module. Refer to
-+      pam(8) for more information.
-+    </para>
-+
-+    <para>
-+      Please also take into account that this man page is generic and some of
-+      the options may be unsupported by currently installed tools. In case of
-+      doubt check <xref linkend="cross_references"/> and
-+      <xref linkend="see_also"/>. For example see
-+      <citerefentry><refentrytitle>login</refentrytitle>
-+      <manvolnum>1</manvolnum></citerefentry> for login specific options such
-+      as <emphasis>LOGIN_STRING</emphasis>.
-+    </para>
-+
-     <para>The following configuration items are provided:</para>
- 
-     <variablelist remap='IP'>
-@@ -252,16 +273,6 @@
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
-       <varlistentry>
--	<term>chfn</term>
--	<listitem>
--	  <para>
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CHFN_AUTH</phrase>
--	    CHFN_RESTRICT
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
--	  </para>
--	</listitem>
--      </varlistentry>
--      <varlistentry>
- 	<term>chgpasswd</term>
- 	<listitem>
- 	  <para>
-@@ -282,14 +293,6 @@
- 	  </para>
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
--      <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
--	<term>chsh</term>
--	<listitem>
--	  <para>
--	    CHSH_AUTH LOGIN_STRING
--	  </para>
--	</listitem>
--      </varlistentry>
-       <!-- expiry: no variables (CONSOLE_GROUPS linked, but not used) -->
-       <!-- faillog: no variables -->
-       <varlistentry>
-@@ -350,34 +353,6 @@
-       </varlistentry>
-       <!-- id: no variables -->
-       <!-- lastlog: no variables -->
--      <varlistentry>
--	<term>login</term>
--	<listitem>
--	  <para>
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
--	    CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
--	    ENV_TZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
--	    ERASECHAR FAIL_DELAY
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">FAILLOG_ENAB</phrase>
--	    FAKE_SHELL
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">FTMP_FILE</phrase>
--	    HUSHLOGIN_FILE
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ISSUE_FILE</phrase>
--	    KILLCHAR
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LASTLOG_ENAB</phrase>
--	    LOGIN_RETRIES
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
--	    LOGIN_TIMEOUT LOG_OK_LOGINS LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">MAIL_CHECK_ENAB MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE
--	    MOTD_FILE NOLOGINS_FILE PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
--	    QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
--	    TTYGROUP TTYPERM TTYTYPE_FILE
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ULIMIT UMASK</phrase>
--	    USERGROUPS_ENAB
--	  </para>
--	</listitem>
--      </varlistentry>
-       <!-- logoutd: no variables -->
-       <varlistentry>
- 	<term>newgrp / sg</term>
-@@ -405,17 +380,6 @@
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
-       <!-- nologin: no variables -->
--      <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
--	<term>passwd</term>
--	<listitem>
--	  <para>
--	    ENCRYPT_METHOD MD5_CRYPT_ENAB OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB
--	    PASS_ALWAYS_WARN PASS_CHANGE_TRIES PASS_MAX_LEN PASS_MIN_LEN
--	    <phrase condition="sha_crypt">SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS
--	    SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS</phrase>
--	  </para>
--	</listitem>
--      </varlistentry>
-       <varlistentry>
- 	<term>pwck</term>
- 	<listitem>
-@@ -442,32 +406,6 @@
- 	  </para>
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
--      <varlistentry>
--	<term>su</term>
--	<listitem>
--	  <para>
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
--	    CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
--	    ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_TZ LOGIN_STRING MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
--	    MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
--	    SULOG_FILE SU_NAME
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">SU_WHEEL_ONLY</phrase>
--	    SYSLOG_SU_ENAB
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">USERGROUPS_ENAB</phrase>
--	  </para>
--	</listitem>
--      </varlistentry>
--      <varlistentry>
--	<term>sulogin</term>
--	<listitem>
--	  <para>
--	    ENV_HZ
--	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_TZ</phrase>
--	  </para>
--	</listitem>
--      </varlistentry>
-       <varlistentry>
- 	<term>useradd</term>
- 	<listitem>
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/shadow.5.xml.manfix shadow-4.6/man/shadow.5.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/shadow.5.xml.manfix	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/shadow.5.xml	2020-10-23 13:15:24.106387639 +0200
-@@ -129,7 +129,7 @@
- 	<listitem>
- 	  <para>
- 	    The date of the last password change, expressed as the number
--	    of days since Jan 1, 1970.
-+	    of days since Jan 1, 1970 00:00 UTC.
- 	  </para>
- 	  <para>
- 	    The value 0 has a special meaning, which is that the user
-@@ -208,8 +208,8 @@
- 	  </para>
- 	  <para>
- 	    After expiration of the password and this expiration period is
--	    elapsed, no login is possible using the current user's
--	    password.  The user should contact her administrator.
-+	    elapsed, no login is possible for the user.
-+	    The user should contact her administrator.
- 	  </para>
- 	  <para>
- 	    An empty field means that there are no enforcement of an
-@@ -224,7 +224,7 @@
- 	<listitem>
- 	  <para>
- 	    The date of expiration of the account, expressed as the number
--	    of days since Jan 1, 1970.
-+	    of days since Jan 1, 1970 00:00 UTC.
- 	  </para>
- 	  <para>
- 	    Note that an account expiration differs from a password
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/useradd.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.6/man/useradd.8.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/useradd.8.xml.manfix	2020-10-23 13:15:24.100387611 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/useradd.8.xml	2020-10-23 13:15:24.106387639 +0200
-@@ -347,6 +347,11 @@
- 	    <option>CREATE_HOME</option> is not enabled, no home
- 	    directories are created.
- 	  </para>
-+	  <para>
-+	    The directory where the user's home directory is created must
-+	    exist and have proper SELinux context and permissions. Otherwise
-+	    the user's home directory cannot be created or accessed.
-+	  </para>
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
-       <varlistentry>
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/usermod.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.6/man/usermod.8.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/usermod.8.xml.manfix	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/usermod.8.xml	2020-10-23 13:15:24.106387639 +0200
-@@ -132,7 +132,8 @@
- 	    If the <option>-m</option>
- 	    option is given, the contents of the current home directory will
- 	    be moved to the new home directory, which is created if it does
--	    not already exist.
-+	    not already exist. If the current home directory does not exist
-+	    the new home directory will not be created.
- 	  </para>
- 	</listitem>
-       </varlistentry>
-@@ -256,7 +257,8 @@
- 	<listitem>
- 	  <para>
- 	    Move the content of the user's home directory to the new
--	    location.
-+	    location. If the current home directory does not exist
-+	    the new home directory will not be created.
- 	  </para>
- 	  <para>
- 	    This option is only valid in combination with the
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml.manfix shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml.manfix	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.d/SUB_GID_COUNT.xml	2020-10-23 13:15:24.106387639 +0200
-@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
-     <para>
-       The default values for <option>SUB_GID_MIN</option>,
-       <option>SUB_GID_MAX</option>, <option>SUB_GID_COUNT</option>
--      are respectively 100000, 600100000 and 10000.
-+      are respectively 100000, 600100000 and 65536.
-     </para>
-   </listitem>
- </varlistentry>
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml.manfix shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml.manfix	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.d/SUB_UID_COUNT.xml	2020-10-23 13:15:24.106387639 +0200
-@@ -42,7 +42,7 @@
-     <para>
-       The default values for <option>SUB_UID_MIN</option>,
-       <option>SUB_UID_MAX</option>, <option>SUB_UID_COUNT</option>
--      are respectively 100000, 600100000 and 10000.
-+      are respectively 100000, 600100000 and 65536.
-     </para>
-   </listitem>
- </varlistentry>
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/groupadd.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.6/man/groupadd.8.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/groupadd.8.xml.manfix	2020-10-23 13:15:24.100387611 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/groupadd.8.xml	2020-10-23 13:15:24.106387639 +0200
-@@ -322,13 +322,13 @@
- 	<varlistentry>
- 	  <term><replaceable>4</replaceable></term>
- 	  <listitem>
--	    <para>GID not unique (when <option>-o</option> not used)</para>
-+	    <para>GID is already used (when called without <option>-o</option>)</para>
- 	  </listitem>
- 	</varlistentry>
- 	<varlistentry>
- 	  <term><replaceable>9</replaceable></term>
- 	  <listitem>
--	    <para>group name not unique</para>
-+	    <para>group name is already used</para>
- 	  </listitem>
- 	</varlistentry>
- 	<varlistentry>

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-move-home.patch

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.move-home shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.move-home	2018-05-28 14:59:05.594076665 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c	2018-05-28 15:00:28.479837392 +0200
-@@ -1845,6 +1845,11 @@ static void move_home (void)
- 			         Prog, prefix_user_home, prefix_user_newhome);
- 			fail_exit (E_HOMEDIR);
- 		}
-+	} else {
-+		fprintf (stderr,
-+		         _("%s: The previous home directory (%s) does "
-+		           "not exist or is inaccessible. Move cannot be completed.\n"),
-+		         Prog, prefix_user_home);
- 	}
- }
- 

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-orig-context.patch

@@ -1,128 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/lib/commonio.c.orig-context shadow-4.6/lib/commonio.c
---- shadow-4.6/lib/commonio.c.orig-context	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/lib/commonio.c	2018-05-28 14:56:37.287929667 +0200
-@@ -961,7 +961,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *
- 		snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s-", db->filename);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
-+		if (set_selinux_file_context (buf, db->filename) != 0) {
- 			errors++;
- 		}
- #endif
-@@ -994,7 +994,7 @@ int commonio_close (struct commonio_db *
- 	snprintf (buf, sizeof buf, "%s+", db->filename);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (buf) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (buf, db->filename) != 0) {
- 		errors++;
- 	}
- #endif
-diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/copydir.c.orig-context shadow-4.6/libmisc/copydir.c
---- shadow-4.6/libmisc/copydir.c.orig-context	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/copydir.c	2018-05-28 14:56:37.287929667 +0200
-@@ -484,7 +484,7 @@ static int copy_dir (const char *src, co
- 	 */
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
-@@ -605,7 +605,7 @@ static int copy_symlink (const char *src
- 	}
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
- 		free (oldlink);
- 		return -1;
- 	}
-@@ -684,7 +684,7 @@ static int copy_special (const char *src
- 	int err = 0;
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
-@@ -744,7 +744,7 @@ static int copy_file (const char *src, c
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst) != 0) {
-+	if (set_selinux_file_context (dst, NULL) != 0) {
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- #endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
-diff -up shadow-4.6/lib/prototypes.h.orig-context shadow-4.6/lib/prototypes.h
---- shadow-4.6/lib/prototypes.h.orig-context	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/lib/prototypes.h	2018-05-28 14:56:37.287929667 +0200
-@@ -326,7 +326,7 @@ extern /*@observer@*/const char *crypt_m
- 
- /* selinux.c */
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name);
-+extern int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, const char *orig_name);
- extern int reset_selinux_file_context (void);
- #endif
- 
-diff -up shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c.orig-context shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c
---- shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c.orig-context	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/lib/selinux.c	2018-05-28 14:56:37.287929667 +0200
-@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ static bool selinux_enabled;
-  *	Callers may have to Reset SELinux to create files with default
-  *	contexts with reset_selinux_file_context
-  */
--int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name)
-+int set_selinux_file_context (const char *dst_name, const char *orig_name)
- {
- 	/*@null@*/security_context_t scontext = NULL;
- 
-@@ -62,19 +62,23 @@ int set_selinux_file_context (const char
- 	if (selinux_enabled) {
- 		/* Get the default security context for this file */
- 		if (matchpathcon (dst_name, 0, &scontext) < 0) {
--			if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
--				return 1;
--			}
-+			/* We could not get the default, copy the original */
-+			if (orig_name == NULL)
-+				goto error;
-+			if (getfilecon (orig_name, &scontext) < 0)
-+				goto error;
- 		}
- 		/* Set the security context for the next created file */
--		if (setfscreatecon (scontext) < 0) {
--			if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
--				return 1;
--			}
--		}
-+		if (setfscreatecon (scontext) < 0)
-+			goto error;
- 		freecon (scontext);
- 	}
- 	return 0;
-+    error:
-+	if (security_getenforce () != 0) {
-+		return 1;
-+	}
-+	return 0;
- }
- 
- /*
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.orig-context shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.orig-context	2018-05-28 14:56:37.288929688 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c	2018-05-28 14:58:02.242730903 +0200
-@@ -2020,7 +2020,7 @@ static void create_home (void)
- {
- 	if (access (prefix_user_home, F_OK) != 0) {
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		if (set_selinux_file_context (prefix_user_home) != 0) {
-+		if (set_selinux_file_context (prefix_user_home, NULL) != 0) {
- 			fprintf (stderr,
- 			         _("%s: cannot set SELinux context for home directory %s\n"),
- 			         Prog, user_home);

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-redhat.patch

@@ -1,41 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.redhat shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.redhat	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c	2018-05-28 13:37:16.695651258 +0200
-@@ -98,7 +98,7 @@ const char *Prog;
- static gid_t def_group = 100;
- static const char *def_gname = "other";
- static const char *def_home = "/home";
--static const char *def_shell = "";
-+static const char *def_shell = "/sbin/nologin";
- static const char *def_template = SKEL_DIR;
- static const char *def_create_mail_spool = "no";
- 
-@@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ static const char *def_expire = "";
- #define	VALID(s)	(strcspn (s, ":\n") == strlen (s))
- 
- static const char *user_name = "";
--static const char *user_pass = "!";
-+static const char *user_pass = "!!";
- static uid_t user_id;
- static gid_t user_gid;
- static const char *user_comment = "";
-@@ -1114,9 +1114,9 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
- 		};
- 		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:P:s:u:UZ:",
-+		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:P:s:u:UZ:",
- #else				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
--		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMNop:rR:P:s:u:U",
-+		                         "b:c:d:De:f:g:G:hk:K:lmMnNop:rR:P:s:u:U",
- #endif				/* !WITH_SELINUX */
- 		                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
- 			switch (c) {
-@@ -1267,6 +1267,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
- 			case 'M':
- 				Mflg = true;
- 				break;
-+			case 'n':
- 			case 'N':
- 				Nflg = true;
- 				break;

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-regular-user.patch

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-From fd4405b763d26649339069532e79bd45013c8c38 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
-Date: Mon, 20 Jan 2020 13:58:07 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] Do not mistake a regular user process for a namespaced one
-
-In case there is a regular user with a process running on a system
-with uid falling into a namespaced uid range of another user.
-The user with the colliding namespaced uid range will not be
-allowed to be deleted without forcing the action with -f.
-
-The user_busy() is adjusted to check whether the suspected process
-is really a namespaced process in a different namespace.
----
- libmisc/user_busy.c | 44 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 36 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libmisc/user_busy.c b/libmisc/user_busy.c
-index b0867568..324bb946 100644
---- a/libmisc/user_busy.c
-+++ b/libmisc/user_busy.c
-@@ -39,6 +39,7 @@
- #include <sys/types.h>
- #include <dirent.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
-+#include <unistd.h>
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
-@@ -106,6 +107,31 @@ static int user_busy_utmp (const char *name)
- #endif				/* !__linux__ */
- 
- #ifdef __linux__
-+#ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
-+#define in_parentuid_range(uid) ((uid) >= parentuid && (uid) < parentuid + range)
-+static int different_namespace (const char *sname)
-+{
-+	/* 41: /proc/xxxxxxxxxx/task/xxxxxxxxxx/ns/user + \0 */
-+	char path[41];
-+	char buf[512], buf2[512];
-+	ssize_t llen1, llen2;
-+
-+	snprintf (path, 41, "/proc/%s/ns/user", sname);
-+
-+	if ((llen1 = readlink (path, buf, sizeof(buf))) == -1)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if ((llen2 = readlink ("/proc/self/ns/user", buf2, sizeof(buf2))) == -1)
-+		return 0;
-+
-+	if (llen1 == llen2 && memcmp (buf, buf2, llen1) == 0)
-+		return 0; /* same namespace */
-+
-+	return 1;
-+}
-+#endif                          /* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
-+
-+
- static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid)
- {
- 	/* 40: /proc/xxxxxxxxxx/task/xxxxxxxxxx/status + \0 */
-@@ -114,7 +140,6 @@ static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid)
- 	FILE *sfile;
- 
- 	snprintf (status, 40, "/proc/%s/status", sname);
--	status[39] = '\0';
- 
- 	sfile = fopen (status, "r");
- 	if (NULL == sfile) {
-@@ -123,26 +148,29 @@ static int check_status (const char *name, const char *sname, uid_t uid)
- 	while (fgets (line, sizeof (line), sfile) == line) {
- 		if (strncmp (line, "Uid:\t", 5) == 0) {
- 			unsigned long ruid, euid, suid;
-+
- 			assert (uid == (unsigned long) uid);
-+			(void) fclose (sfile);
- 			if (sscanf (line,
- 			            "Uid:\t%lu\t%lu\t%lu\n",
- 			            &ruid, &euid, &suid) == 3) {
- 				if (   (ruid == (unsigned long) uid)
- 				    || (euid == (unsigned long) uid)
--				    || (suid == (unsigned long) uid)
-+				    || (suid == (unsigned long) uid) ) {
-+					return 1;
-+				}
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
--				    || have_sub_uids(name, ruid, 1)
--				    || have_sub_uids(name, euid, 1)
--				    || have_sub_uids(name, suid, 1)
--#endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
-+				if (    different_namespace (sname)
-+				     && (   have_sub_uids(name, ruid, 1)
-+				         || have_sub_uids(name, euid, 1)
-+				         || have_sub_uids(name, suid, 1))
- 				   ) {
--					(void) fclose (sfile);
- 					return 1;
- 				}
-+#endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
- 			} else {
- 				/* Ignore errors. This is just a best effort. */
- 			}
--			(void) fclose (sfile);
- 			return 0;
- 		}
- 	}
--- 
-2.25.2
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-remove-login-string-references.patch

@@ -1,19 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.5.xml.remove_login_string_references shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.5.xml
---- shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.5.xml.remove_login_string_references	2021-04-27 13:01:49.428338258 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/login.defs.5.xml	2021-04-27 13:01:49.433338329 +0200
-@@ -58,7 +58,6 @@
- <!ENTITY LOG_OK_LOGINS         SYSTEM "login.defs.d/LOG_OK_LOGINS.xml">
- <!ENTITY LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB      SYSTEM "login.defs.d/LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB.xml">
- <!ENTITY LOGIN_RETRIES         SYSTEM "login.defs.d/LOGIN_RETRIES.xml">
--<!ENTITY LOGIN_STRING          SYSTEM "login.defs.d/LOGIN_STRING.xml">
- <!ENTITY LOGIN_TIMEOUT         SYSTEM "login.defs.d/LOGIN_TIMEOUT.xml">
- <!ENTITY MAIL_CHECK_ENAB       SYSTEM "login.defs.d/MAIL_CHECK_ENAB.xml">
- <!ENTITY MAIL_DIR              SYSTEM "login.defs.d/MAIL_DIR.xml">
-@@ -214,7 +213,6 @@
-       &LOG_OK_LOGINS;
-       &LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB;
-       &LOGIN_RETRIES;
--      &LOGIN_STRING;
-       &LOGIN_TIMEOUT;
-       &MAIL_CHECK_ENAB;
-       &MAIL_DIR;

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-respect_enable_static_no.patch

@@ -1,24 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/configure.ac.respect_enable_static_no shadow-4.6/configure.ac
---- shadow-4.6/configure.ac.respect_enable_static_no	2021-11-03 12:09:39.852829632 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/configure.ac	2021-11-03 12:10:32.447203434 +0100
-@@ -311,6 +311,8 @@ if test "$with_sha_crypt" = "yes"; then
- 	AC_DEFINE(USE_SHA_CRYPT, 1, [Define to allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms])
- fi
- 
-+AM_CONDITIONAL(ENABLE_SHARED, test "x$enable_shared" = "xyes")
-+
- if test "$with_nscd" = "yes"; then
- 	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
- 	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_NSCD, 1, [Define to support flushing of nscd caches])],
-diff -up shadow-4.6/libsubid/Makefile.am.respect_enable_static_no shadow-4.6/libsubid/Makefile.am
---- shadow-4.6/libsubid/Makefile.am.respect_enable_static_no	2021-11-03 12:09:39.851829625 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/libsubid/Makefile.am	2021-11-03 12:09:39.852829632 +0100
-@@ -1,6 +1,8 @@
- lib_LTLIBRARIES = libsubid.la
-+if ENABLE_SHARED
- libsubid_la_LDFLAGS = -Wl,-soname,libsubid.so.@LIBSUBID_ABI@ \
- 	-shared -version-info @LIBSUBID_ABI_MAJOR@
-+endif
- libsubid_la_SOURCES = api.c
- 
- pkginclude_HEADERS = subid.h

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-salt-remove-rounds.patch

@@ -1,15 +0,0 @@
-diff --git a/libmisc/salt.c b/libmisc/salt.c
-index c72447ea..4940d76e 100644
---- a/libmisc/salt.c
-+++ b/libmisc/salt.c
-@@ -248,6 +248,10 @@ static /*@observer@*/const char *gensalt (size_t salt_size)
- 		result[0] = '\0';
- 	}
- 
-+	if (strstr(result, "rounds=") != NULL) {
-+		result[3] = '\0';
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Concatenate a pseudo random salt.
- 	 */

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-selinux-perms.patch

@@ -1,284 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c.selinux-perms shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c
---- shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c.selinux-perms	2019-12-01 18:02:43.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.8/src/chgpasswd.c	2020-01-13 10:21:44.558107260 +0100
-@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-+#include <selinux/avc.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifdef WITH_LIBAUDIT
-+#include <libaudit.h>
-+#endif
- #ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- #include "pam_defs.h"
-@@ -80,6 +87,9 @@ static bool sgr_locked = false;
- #endif
- static bool gr_locked = false;
- 
-+/* The name of the caller */
-+static char *myname = NULL;
-+
- /* local function prototypes */
- static void fail_exit (int code);
- static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status);
-@@ -334,6 +344,63 @@ static void check_perms (void)
- #endif				/* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
- }
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+static int
-+log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
-+{
-+    int audit_fd;
-+    va_list ap;
-+
-+    va_start(ap, fmt);
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+    audit_fd = audit_open();
-+
-+    if (audit_fd >= 0) {
-+	char *buf;
-+
-+	if (vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap) < 0)
-+		goto ret;
-+	audit_log_user_avc_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
-+				   NULL, 0);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	free(buf);
-+	goto ret;
-+    }
-+
-+#endif
-+    vsyslog (LOG_USER | LOG_INFO, fmt, ap);
-+ret:
-+    va_end(ap);
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+selinux_check_root (void)
-+{
-+    int status = -1;
-+    security_context_t user_context;
-+    union selinux_callback old_callback;
-+
-+    if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1)
-+	return;
-+
-+    old_callback = selinux_get_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG);
-+    /* setup callbacks */
-+    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) &log_callback);
-+    if ((status = getprevcon(&user_context)) < 0) {
-+	selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
-+	exit(1);
-+    }
-+
-+    status = selinux_check_access(user_context, user_context, "passwd", "passwd", NULL);
-+
-+    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
-+    freecon(user_context);
-+    if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() != 0)
-+	exit(1);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /*
-  * open_files - lock and open the group databases
-  */
-@@ -427,6 +494,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	const struct group *gr;
- 	struct group newgr;
-+	struct passwd *pw = NULL;
- 	int errors = 0;
- 	int line = 0;
- 
-@@ -436,12 +504,37 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
- 	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	selinux_check_root ();
-+#endif
-+
- 	process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
- 
- 	process_flags (argc, argv);
- 
- 	OPENLOG ("chgpasswd");
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+	audit_help_open ();
-+#endif
-+
-+	/*
-+	 * Determine the name of the user that invoked this command. This
-+	 * is really hit or miss because there are so many ways that command
-+	 * can be executed and so many ways to trip up the routines that
-+	 * report the user name.
-+	 */
-+	pw = get_my_pwent ();
-+	if (NULL == pw) {
-+		fprintf (stderr, _("%s: Cannot determine your user name.\n"),
-+		         Prog);
-+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN,
-+		         "Cannot determine the user name of the caller (UID %lu)",
-+		         (unsigned long) getuid ()));
-+		exit (E_NOPERM);
-+	}
-+	myname = xstrdup (pw->pw_name);
-+
- 	check_perms ();
- 
- #ifdef SHADOWGRP
-@@ -536,6 +629,15 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 			newgr.gr_passwd = cp;
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+		{
-+
-+			audit_logger_with_group (AUDIT_GRP_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
-+		              "change-password",
-+		              myname, AUDIT_NO_ID, gr->gr_name,
-+		              SHADOW_AUDIT_SUCCESS);
-+		}
-+#endif
- 		/* 
- 		 * The updated group file entry is then put back and will
- 		 * be written to the group file later, after all the
-diff -up shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c.selinux-perms shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c
---- shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c.selinux-perms	2019-12-01 18:02:43.000000000 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.8/src/chpasswd.c	2020-01-13 10:21:44.558107260 +0100
-@@ -39,6 +39,13 @@
- #include <pwd.h>
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <stdlib.h>
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+#include <selinux/selinux.h>
-+#include <selinux/avc.h>
-+#endif
-+#ifdef WITH_LIBAUDIT
-+#include <libaudit.h>
-+#endif
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- #include "pam_defs.h"
- #endif				/* USE_PAM */
-@@ -332,6 +339,63 @@ static void check_perms (void)
- #endif				/* USE_PAM */
- }
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+static int
-+log_callback (int type, const char *fmt, ...)
-+{
-+    int audit_fd;
-+    va_list ap;
-+
-+    va_start(ap, fmt);
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+    audit_fd = audit_open();
-+
-+    if (audit_fd >= 0) {
-+	char *buf;
-+
-+	if (vasprintf (&buf, fmt, ap) < 0)
-+		goto ret;
-+	audit_log_user_avc_message(audit_fd, AUDIT_USER_AVC, buf, NULL, NULL,
-+				   NULL, 0);
-+	audit_close(audit_fd);
-+	free(buf);
-+	goto ret;
-+    }
-+
-+#endif
-+    vsyslog (LOG_USER | LOG_INFO, fmt, ap);
-+ret:
-+    va_end(ap);
-+    return 0;
-+}
-+
-+static void
-+selinux_check_root (void)
-+{
-+    int status = -1;
-+    security_context_t user_context;
-+    union selinux_callback old_callback;
-+
-+    if (is_selinux_enabled() < 1)
-+	return;
-+
-+    old_callback = selinux_get_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG);
-+    /* setup callbacks */
-+    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, (union selinux_callback) &log_callback);
-+    if ((status = getprevcon(&user_context)) < 0) {
-+	selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
-+	exit(1);
-+    }
-+
-+    status = selinux_check_access(user_context, user_context, "passwd", "passwd", NULL);
-+
-+    selinux_set_callback(SELINUX_CB_LOG, old_callback);
-+    freecon(user_context);
-+    if (status != 0 && security_getenforce() != 0)
-+	exit(1);
-+}
-+#endif
-+
- /*
-  * open_files - lock and open the password databases
-  */
-@@ -428,6 +492,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	(void) bindtextdomain (PACKAGE, LOCALEDIR);
- 	(void) textdomain (PACKAGE);
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_SELINUX
-+	selinux_check_root ();
-+#endif
-+
- 	process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
- 
- 	process_flags (argc, argv);
-@@ -440,6 +508,10 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	OPENLOG ("chpasswd");
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+	audit_help_open ();
-+#endif
-+
- 	check_perms ();
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
-@@ -566,6 +638,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 			newpw.pw_passwd = cp;
- 		}
- 
-+#ifdef WITH_AUDIT
-+		audit_logger (AUDIT_USER_CHAUTHTOK, Prog,
-+		              "updating-password",
-+		              pw->pw_name, (unsigned int) pw->pw_uid, 1);
-+#endif
- 		/* 
- 		 * The updated password file entry is then put back and will
- 		 * be written to the password file later, after all the
-Index: shadow-4.5/src/Makefile.am
-===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/src/Makefile.am
-+++ shadow-4.5/src/Makefile.am
-@@ -87,9 +87,9 @@ chage_LDADD    = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID)
- newuidmap_LDADD    = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
- newgidmap_LDADD    = $(LDADD) $(LIBSELINUX)
- chfn_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
--chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
-+chgpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBCRYPT)
- chsh_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(LIBMD)
--chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
-+chpasswd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBCRYPT)
- gpasswd_LDADD  = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT)
- groupadd_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)
- groupdel_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM_SUID) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX)

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-selinux.patch

@@ -1,115 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/lib/semanage.c.selinux shadow-4.6/lib/semanage.c
---- shadow-4.6/lib/semanage.c.selinux	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/lib/semanage.c	2018-05-28 13:38:20.551008911 +0200
-@@ -294,6 +294,9 @@ int set_seuser (const char *login_name,
- 
- 	ret = 0;
- 
-+        /* drop obsolete matchpathcon cache */
-+        matchpathcon_fini();
-+
- done:
- 	semanage_seuser_key_free (key);
- 	semanage_handle_destroy (handle);
-@@ -369,6 +372,10 @@ int del_seuser (const char *login_name)
- 	}
- 
- 	ret = 0;
-+
-+        /* drop obsolete matchpathcon cache */
-+        matchpathcon_fini();
-+
- done:
- 	semanage_handle_destroy (handle);
- 	return ret;
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.selinux shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.selinux	2018-05-28 13:43:30.996748997 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c	2018-05-28 13:44:04.645486199 +0200
-@@ -2120,6 +2120,7 @@ static void create_mail (void)
-  */
- int main (int argc, char **argv)
- {
-+	int rv = E_SUCCESS;
- #ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
-@@ -2342,27 +2343,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	usr_update ();
- 
--	if (mflg) {
--		create_home ();
--		if (home_added) {
--			copy_tree (def_template, prefix_user_home, false, false,
--			           (uid_t)-1, user_id, (gid_t)-1, user_gid);
--		} else {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--			         _("%s: warning: the home directory already exists.\n"
--			           "Not copying any file from skel directory into it.\n"),
--			         Prog);
--		}
--
--	}
--
--	/* Do not create mail directory for system accounts */
--	if (!rflg) {
--		create_mail ();
--	}
--
- 	close_files ();
- 
-+	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
-+	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * tallylog_reset needs to be able to lookup
- 	 * a valid existing user name,
-@@ -2373,8 +2358,9 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
--	if (Zflg) {
--		if (set_seuser (user_name, user_selinux) != 0) {
-+	if (Zflg && *user_selinux) {
-+		if (is_selinux_enabled () > 0) {
-+		    if (set_seuser (user_name, user_selinux) != 0) {
- 			fprintf (stderr,
- 			         _("%s: warning: the user name %s to %s SELinux user mapping failed.\n"),
- 			         Prog, user_name, user_selinux);
-@@ -2383,14 +2369,31 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 			              "adding SELinux user mapping",
- 			              user_name, (unsigned int) user_id, 0);
- #endif				/* WITH_AUDIT */
--			fail_exit (E_SE_UPDATE);
-+			rv = E_SE_UPDATE;
-+		    }
- 		}
- 	}
--#endif				/* WITH_SELINUX */
-+#endif
- 
--	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
--	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	if (mflg) {
-+		create_home ();
-+		if (home_added) {
-+			copy_tree (def_template, prefix_user_home, false, true,
-+			           (uid_t)-1, user_id, (gid_t)-1, user_gid);
-+		} else {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: warning: the home directory already exists.\n"
-+			           "Not copying any file from skel directory into it.\n"),
-+			         Prog);
-+		}
-+
-+	}
-+
-+	/* Do not create mail directory for system accounts */
-+	if (!rflg) {
-+		create_mail ();
-+	}
- 
--	return E_SUCCESS;
-+	return rv;
- }
- 

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-skip-over-reserved-ids.patch

@@ -1,214 +0,0 @@
-From baae5b4a06c905d9f52ed1f922a0d7d0625d11cf Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Martin Kletzander <nert.pinx@gmail.com>
-Date: Wed, 1 Feb 2023 15:36:41 +0100
-Subject: [PATCH] find_new_[gu]id(): Skip over IDs that are reserved for legacy
- reasons
-
-Some programs don't support `(uint16_t) -1` or `(uint32_t) -1` as user
-or group IDs.  This is because `-1` is used as an error code or as an
-unspecified ID, e.g. in `chown(2)` parameters, and in the past, `gid_t`
-and `uid_t` have changed width.  For legacy reasons, those values have
-been kept reserved in programs today (for example systemd does this; see
-the documentation in the link below).
-
-This should not be confused with catching overflow in the ID values,
-since that is already caught by our ERANGE checks.  This is about not
-using reserved values that have been reserved for legacy reasons.
-
-Link: <https://systemd.io/UIDS-GIDS/>
-Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
-Signed-off-by: Martin Kletzander <mkletzan@redhat.com>
----
- libmisc/find_new_gid.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- libmisc/find_new_uid.c | 38 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++----------
- 2 files changed, 56 insertions(+), 20 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libmisc/find_new_gid.c b/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
-index 70ba95a2..da1d8d55 100644
---- a/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
-+++ b/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
-@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_group, gid_t *min_id, gid_t *max_id,
-  *
-  * On success, return 0
-  * If the ID is in use, return EEXIST
-+ * If the ID might clash with -1, return EINVAL
-  * If the ID is outside the range, return ERANGE
-  * In other cases, return errno from getgrgid()
-  */
-@@ -111,6 +112,11 @@ static int check_gid (const gid_t gid,
- 		return ERANGE;
- 	}
- 
-+	/* Check for compatibility with 16b and 32b gid_t error codes */
-+	if (gid == UINT16_MAX || gid == UINT32_MAX) {
-+		return EINVAL;
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Check whether we already detected this GID
- 	 * using the gr_next() loop
-@@ -182,10 +188,10 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
- 			 * gr_locate_gid() found the GID in an as-yet uncommitted
- 			 * entry. We'll proceed below and auto-set a GID.
- 			 */
--		} else if (result == EEXIST || result == ERANGE) {
-+		} else if (result == EEXIST || result == ERANGE || result == EINVAL) {
- 			/*
- 			 * Continue on below. At this time, we won't
--			 * treat these two cases differently.
-+			 * treat these three cases differently.
- 			 */
- 		} else {
- 			/*
-@@ -296,8 +302,11 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
- 				*gid = id;
- 				free (used_gids);
- 				return 0;
--			} else if (result == EEXIST) {
--				/* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+			} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
-+				/*
-+				 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
-+				 * continue to the next.
-+				 */
- 			} else {
- 				/*
- 				 * An unexpected error occurred.
-@@ -339,8 +348,11 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
- 					*gid = id;
- 					free (used_gids);
- 					return 0;
--				} else if (result == EEXIST) {
--					/* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+				} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
-+					/*
-+					 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
-+					 * continue to the next.
-+					 */
- 				} else {
- 					/*
- 					 * An unexpected error occurred.
-@@ -399,8 +411,11 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
- 				*gid = id;
- 				free (used_gids);
- 				return 0;
--			} else if (result == EEXIST) {
--				/* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+			} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
-+				/*
-+				 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
-+				 * continue to the next.
-+				 */
- 			} else {
- 				/*
- 				 * An unexpected error occurred.
-@@ -442,8 +457,11 @@ int find_new_gid (bool sys_group,
- 					*gid = id;
- 					free (used_gids);
- 					return 0;
--				} else if (result == EEXIST) {
--					/* This GID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+				} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
-+					/*
-+					 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
-+					 * continue to the next.
-+					 */
- 				} else {
- 					/*
- 					 * An unexpected error occurred.
-diff --git a/libmisc/find_new_uid.c b/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
-index 6b71dfe5..09885236 100644
---- a/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
-+++ b/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
-@@ -98,6 +98,7 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_user, uid_t *min_id, uid_t *max_id,
-  *
-  * On success, return 0
-  * If the ID is in use, return EEXIST
-+ * If the ID might clash with -1, return EINVAL
-  * If the ID is outside the range, return ERANGE
-  * In other cases, return errno from getpwuid()
-  */
-@@ -111,6 +112,11 @@ static int check_uid(const uid_t uid,
- 		return ERANGE;
- 	}
- 
-+	/* Check for compatibility with 16b and 32b uid_t error codes */
-+	if (uid == UINT16_MAX || uid == UINT32_MAX) {
-+		return EINVAL;
-+	}
-+
- 	/*
- 	 * Check whether we already detected this UID
- 	 * using the pw_next() loop
-@@ -182,10 +188,10 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
- 			 * pw_locate_uid() found the UID in an as-yet uncommitted
- 			 * entry. We'll proceed below and auto-set an UID.
- 			 */
--		} else if (result == EEXIST || result == ERANGE) {
-+		} else if (result == EEXIST || result == ERANGE || result == EINVAL) {
- 			/*
- 			 * Continue on below. At this time, we won't
--			 * treat these two cases differently.
-+			 * treat these three cases differently.
- 			 */
- 		} else {
- 			/*
-@@ -296,8 +302,11 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
- 				*uid = id;
- 				free (used_uids);
- 				return 0;
--			} else if (result == EEXIST) {
--				/* This UID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+			} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
-+				/*
-+				 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
-+				 * continue to the next.
-+				 */
- 			} else {
- 				/*
- 				 * An unexpected error occurred.
-@@ -339,8 +348,11 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
- 					*uid = id;
- 					free (used_uids);
- 					return 0;
--				} else if (result == EEXIST) {
--					/* This UID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+				} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
-+					/*
-+					 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
-+					 * continue to the next.
-+					 */
- 				} else {
- 					/*
- 					 * An unexpected error occurred.
-@@ -399,8 +411,11 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
- 				*uid = id;
- 				free (used_uids);
- 				return 0;
--			} else if (result == EEXIST) {
--				/* This UID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+			} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
-+				/*
-+				 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
-+				 * continue to the next.
-+				 */
- 			} else {
- 				/*
- 				 * An unexpected error occurred.
-@@ -442,8 +457,11 @@ int find_new_uid(bool sys_user,
- 					*uid = id;
- 					free (used_uids);
- 					return 0;
--				} else if (result == EEXIST) {
--					/* This UID is in use, we'll continue to the next */
-+				} else if (result == EEXIST || result == EINVAL) {
-+					/*
-+					 * This GID is in use or unusable, we'll
-+					 * continue to the next.
-+					 */
- 				} else {
- 					/*
- 					 * An unexpected error occurred.
--- 
-2.40.1
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-sssd-flush.patch

@@ -1,641 +0,0 @@
-From 4aaf05d72e9d6daf348cefb8a6ad35d2966cbe9b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Jakub Hrozek <jakub.hrozek@posteo.se>
-Date: Wed, 12 Sep 2018 14:22:11 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] Flush sssd caches in addition to nscd caches
-
-Some distributions, notably Fedora, have the following order of nsswitch
-modules by default:
-    passwd: sss files
-    group:  sss files
-
-The advantage of serving local users through SSSD is that the nss_sss
-module has a fast mmapped-cache that speeds up NSS lookups compared to
-accessing the disk an opening the files on each NSS request.
-
-Traditionally, this has been done with the help of nscd, but using nscd
-in parallel with sssd is cumbersome, as both SSSD and nscd use their own
-independent caching, so using nscd in setups where sssd is also serving
-users from some remote domain (LDAP, AD, ...) can result in a bit of
-unpredictability.
-
-More details about why Fedora chose to use sss before files can be found
-on e.g.:
-    https://fedoraproject.org//wiki/Changes/SSSDCacheForLocalUsers
-or:
-    https://docs.pagure.org/SSSD.sssd/design_pages/files_provider.html
-
-Now, even though sssd watches the passwd and group files with the help
-of inotify, there can still be a small window where someone requests a
-user or a group, finds that it doesn't exist, adds the entry and checks
-again. Without some support in shadow-utils that would explicitly drop
-the sssd caches, the inotify watch can fire a little late, so a
-combination of commands like this:
-    getent passwd user || useradd user; getent passwd user
-can result in the second getent passwd not finding the newly added user
-as the racy behaviour might still return the cached negative hit from
-the first getent passwd.
-
-This patch more or less copies the already existing support that
-shadow-utils had for dropping nscd caches, except using the "sss_cache"
-tool that sssd ships.
----
- configure.ac    | 10 +++++++
- lib/Makefile.am |  2 ++
- lib/commonio.c  |  2 ++
- lib/sssd.c      | 75 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- lib/sssd.h      | 17 +++++++++++
- src/chfn.c      |  2 ++
- src/chgpasswd.c |  2 ++
- src/chpasswd.c  |  2 ++
- src/chsh.c      |  2 ++
- src/gpasswd.c   |  2 ++
- src/groupadd.c  |  2 ++
- src/groupdel.c  |  2 ++
- src/groupmod.c  |  2 ++
- src/grpck.c     |  2 ++
- src/grpconv.c   |  2 ++
- src/grpunconv.c |  2 ++
- src/newusers.c  |  2 ++
- src/passwd.c    |  2 ++
- src/pwck.c      |  2 ++
- src/pwconv.c    |  2 ++
- src/pwunconv.c  |  2 ++
- src/useradd.c   |  2 ++
- src/userdel.c   |  2 ++
- src/usermod.c   |  2 ++
- src/vipw.c      |  2 ++
- 25 files changed, 146 insertions(+)
- create mode 100644 lib/sssd.c
- create mode 100644 lib/sssd.h
-
-diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
-index 41068a5d..10ad70cf 100644
---- a/configure.ac
-+++ b/configure.ac
-@@ -280,6 +280,9 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
- AC_ARG_WITH(nscd,
- 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-nscd], [enable support for nscd @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
- 	[with_nscd=$withval], [with_nscd=yes])
-+AC_ARG_WITH(sssd,
-+	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-sssd], [enable support for flushing sssd caches @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
-+	[with_sssd=$withval], [with_sssd=yes])
- AC_ARG_WITH(group-name-max-length,
- 	[AC_HELP_STRING([--with-group-name-max-length], [set max group name length @<:@default=16@:>@])],
- 	[with_group_name_max_length=$withval], [with_group_name_max_length=yes])
-@@ -304,6 +307,12 @@ if test "$with_nscd" = "yes"; then
- 	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for nscd support])])
- fi
- 
-+if test "$with_sssd" = "yes"; then
-+	AC_CHECK_FUNC(posix_spawn,
-+	              [AC_DEFINE(USE_SSSD, 1, [Define to support flushing of sssd caches])],
-+	              [AC_MSG_ERROR([posix_spawn is needed for sssd support])])
-+fi
-+
- dnl Check for some functions in libc first, only if not found check for
- dnl other libraries.  This should prevent linking libnsl if not really
- dnl needed (Linux glibc, Irix), but still link it if needed (Solaris).
-@@ -679,5 +688,6 @@ echo "	shadow group support:		$enable_shadowgrp"
- echo "	S/Key support:			$with_skey"
- echo "	SHA passwords encryption:	$with_sha_crypt"
- echo "	nscd support:			$with_nscd"
-+echo "	sssd support:			$with_sssd"
- echo "	subordinate IDs support:	$enable_subids"
- echo
-diff --git a/lib/Makefile.am b/lib/Makefile.am
-index 6db86cd6..fd634542 100644
---- a/lib/Makefile.am
-+++ b/lib/Makefile.am
-@@ -30,6 +30,8 @@ libshadow_la_SOURCES = \
- 	lockpw.c \
- 	nscd.c \
- 	nscd.h \
-+	sssd.c \
-+	sssd.h \
- 	pam_defs.h \
- 	port.c \
- 	port.h \
-diff --git a/lib/commonio.c b/lib/commonio.c
-index d06b8e7d..96f2d5f7 100644
---- a/lib/commonio.c
-+++ b/lib/commonio.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
- #include <stdio.h>
- #include <signal.h>
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #ifdef WITH_TCB
- #include <tcb.h>
- #endif				/* WITH_TCB */
-@@ -485,6 +486,7 @@ static void dec_lock_count (void)
- 			if (nscd_need_reload) {
- 				nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
- 				nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+				sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 				nscd_need_reload = false;
- 			}
- #ifdef HAVE_LCKPWDF
-diff --git a/lib/sssd.c b/lib/sssd.c
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..80e49e55
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/lib/sssd.c
-@@ -0,0 +1,75 @@
-+/* Author: Peter Vrabec <pvrabec@redhat.com> */
-+
-+#include <config.h>
-+#ifdef USE_SSSD
-+
-+#include <stdio.h>
-+#include <sys/wait.h>
-+#include <sys/types.h>
-+#include "exitcodes.h"
-+#include "defines.h"
-+#include "prototypes.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
-+
-+#define MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED "%s: Failed to flush the sssd cache.\n"
-+
-+int sssd_flush_cache (int dbflags)
-+{
-+	int status, code, rv;
-+	const char *cmd = "/usr/sbin/sss_cache";
-+	char *sss_cache_args = NULL;
-+	const char *spawnedArgs[] = {"sss_cache", NULL, NULL};
-+	const char *spawnedEnv[] = {NULL};
-+	int i = 0;
-+
-+	sss_cache_args = malloc(4);
-+	if (sss_cache_args == NULL) {
-+	    return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	sss_cache_args[i++] = '-';
-+	if (dbflags & SSSD_DB_PASSWD) {
-+		sss_cache_args[i++] = 'U';
-+	}
-+	if (dbflags & SSSD_DB_GROUP) {
-+		sss_cache_args[i++] = 'G';
-+	}
-+	sss_cache_args[i++] = '\0';
-+	if (i == 2) {
-+		/* Neither passwd nor group, nothing to do */
-+		free(sss_cache_args);
-+		return 0;
-+	}
-+	spawnedArgs[1] = sss_cache_args;
-+
-+	rv = run_command (cmd, spawnedArgs, spawnedEnv, &status);
-+	free(sss_cache_args);
-+	if (rv != 0) {
-+		/* run_command writes its own more detailed message. */
-+		(void) fprintf (stderr, _(MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED), Prog);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	code = WEXITSTATUS (status);
-+	if (!WIFEXITED (status)) {
-+		(void) fprintf (stderr,
-+		                _("%s: sss_cache did not terminate normally (signal %d)\n"),
-+		                Prog, WTERMSIG (status));
-+		return -1;
-+	} else if (code == E_CMD_NOTFOUND) {
-+		/* sss_cache is not installed, or it is installed but uses an
-+		   interpreter that is missing.  Probably the former. */
-+		return 0;
-+	} else if (code != 0) {
-+		(void) fprintf (stderr, _("%s: sss_cache exited with status %d\n"),
-+		                Prog, code);
-+		(void) fprintf (stderr, _(MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED), Prog);
-+		return -1;
-+	}
-+
-+	return 0;
-+}
-+#else				/* USE_SSSD */
-+extern int errno;		/* warning: ANSI C forbids an empty source file */
-+#endif				/* USE_SSSD */
-+
-diff --git a/lib/sssd.h b/lib/sssd.h
-new file mode 100644
-index 00000000..00ff2a8a
---- /dev/null
-+++ b/lib/sssd.h
-@@ -0,0 +1,17 @@
-+#ifndef _SSSD_H_
-+#define _SSSD_H_
-+
-+#define SSSD_DB_PASSWD	0x001
-+#define SSSD_DB_GROUP	0x002
-+
-+/*
-+ * sssd_flush_cache - flush specified service buffer in sssd cache
-+ */
-+#ifdef	USE_SSSD
-+extern int sssd_flush_cache (int dbflags);
-+#else
-+#define sssd_flush_cache(service) (0)
-+#endif
-+
-+#endif
-+
-diff --git a/src/chfn.c b/src/chfn.c
-index 18aa3de7..0725e1c7 100644
---- a/src/chfn.c
-+++ b/src/chfn.c
-@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- #include "pam_defs.h"
- #endif
-@@ -746,6 +747,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user '%s' information", user));
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD);
- 
- 	closelog ();
- 	exit (E_SUCCESS);
-diff --git a/src/chgpasswd.c b/src/chgpasswd.c
-index 13203a46..e5f2eb7e 100644
---- a/src/chgpasswd.c
-+++ b/src/chgpasswd.c
-@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
- #endif				/* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
-@@ -581,6 +582,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	close_files ();
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	return (0);
- }
-diff --git a/src/chpasswd.c b/src/chpasswd.c
-index 918b27ee..49e79cdb 100644
---- a/src/chpasswd.c
-+++ b/src/chpasswd.c
-@@ -44,6 +44,7 @@
- #endif				/* USE_PAM */
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
-@@ -624,6 +625,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD);
- 
- 	return (0);
- }
-diff --git a/src/chsh.c b/src/chsh.c
-index c89708b9..910e3dd4 100644
---- a/src/chsh.c
-+++ b/src/chsh.c
-@@ -46,6 +46,7 @@
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "pwauth.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
-@@ -557,6 +558,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "changed user '%s' shell to '%s'", user, loginsh));
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD);
- 
- 	closelog ();
- 	exit (E_SUCCESS);
-diff --git a/src/gpasswd.c b/src/gpasswd.c
-index c4a492b1..4d75af96 100644
---- a/src/gpasswd.c
-+++ b/src/gpasswd.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #ifdef SHADOWGRP
- #include "sgroupio.h"
-@@ -1201,6 +1202,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	close_files ();
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	exit (E_SUCCESS);
- }
-diff --git a/src/groupadd.c b/src/groupadd.c
-index b57006c5..2dd8eec9 100644
---- a/src/groupadd.c
-+++ b/src/groupadd.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
- #include "sgroupio.h"
-@@ -625,6 +626,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	close_files ();
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	return E_SUCCESS;
- }
-diff --git a/src/groupdel.c b/src/groupdel.c
-index 70bed010..f941a84a 100644
---- a/src/groupdel.c
-+++ b/src/groupdel.c
-@@ -49,6 +49,7 @@
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
- #include "sgroupio.h"
-@@ -492,6 +493,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	close_files ();
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	return E_SUCCESS;
- }
-diff --git a/src/groupmod.c b/src/groupmod.c
-index b293b98f..1dca5fc9 100644
---- a/src/groupmod.c
-+++ b/src/groupmod.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #ifdef	SHADOWGRP
- #include "sgroupio.h"
-@@ -877,6 +878,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	close_files ();
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	return E_SUCCESS;
- }
-diff --git a/src/grpck.c b/src/grpck.c
-index ea5d3b39..6140b10d 100644
---- a/src/grpck.c
-+++ b/src/grpck.c
-@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- 
- #ifdef SHADOWGRP
-@@ -870,6 +871,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	close_files (changed);
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Tell the user what we did and exit.
-diff --git a/src/grpconv.c b/src/grpconv.c
-index f95f4960..5e5eaaca 100644
---- a/src/grpconv.c
-+++ b/src/grpconv.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- #include <unistd.h>
- #include <getopt.h>
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- /*@-exitarg@*/
- #include "exitcodes.h"
-@@ -273,6 +274,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
-diff --git a/src/grpunconv.c b/src/grpunconv.c
-index 253f06f5..e4105c26 100644
---- a/src/grpunconv.c
-+++ b/src/grpunconv.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- #include <grp.h>
- #include <getopt.h>
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- /*@-exitarg@*/
- #include "exitcodes.h"
-@@ -236,6 +237,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
-diff --git a/src/newusers.c b/src/newusers.c
-index 8e4bef97..7c3bb1c2 100644
---- a/src/newusers.c
-+++ b/src/newusers.c
-@@ -62,6 +62,7 @@
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
- #include "sgroupio.h"
- #include "shadowio.h"
-@@ -1233,6 +1234,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- #ifdef USE_PAM
- 	unsigned int i;
-diff --git a/src/passwd.c b/src/passwd.c
-index 3af3e651..5bea2765 100644
---- a/src/passwd.c
-+++ b/src/passwd.c
-@@ -51,6 +51,7 @@
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "pwauth.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
-@@ -1150,6 +1151,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	SYSLOG ((LOG_INFO, "password for '%s' changed by '%s'", name, myname));
- 	closelog ();
-diff --git a/src/pwck.c b/src/pwck.c
-index 05df68ec..0ffb711e 100644
---- a/src/pwck.c
-+++ b/src/pwck.c
-@@ -48,6 +48,7 @@
- #include "shadowio.h"
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #ifdef WITH_TCB
- #include "tcbfuncs.h"
- #endif				/* WITH_TCB */
-@@ -877,6 +878,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	close_files (changed);
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * Tell the user what we did and exit.
-diff --git a/src/pwconv.c b/src/pwconv.c
-index d6ee31a8..9c69fa13 100644
---- a/src/pwconv.c
-+++ b/src/pwconv.c
-@@ -72,6 +72,7 @@
- #include "pwio.h"
- #include "shadowio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- 
- /*
-  * exit status values
-@@ -328,6 +329,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD);
- 
- 	return E_SUCCESS;
- }
-diff --git a/src/pwunconv.c b/src/pwunconv.c
-index fabf0237..e11ea494 100644
---- a/src/pwunconv.c
-+++ b/src/pwunconv.c
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
- #include <getopt.h>
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
- #include "shadowio.h"
-@@ -250,6 +251,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD);
- 
- 	return 0;
- }
-diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
-index ca90f076..b0c2224d 100644
---- a/src/useradd.c
-+++ b/src/useradd.c
-@@ -60,6 +60,7 @@
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "pwauth.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
-@@ -2425,6 +2426,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * tallylog_reset needs to be able to lookup
-diff --git a/src/userdel.c b/src/userdel.c
-index c8de1d31..0715e4fe 100644
---- a/src/userdel.c
-+++ b/src/userdel.c
-@@ -53,6 +53,7 @@
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "pwauth.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
-@@ -1328,6 +1329,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	return ((0 != errors) ? E_HOMEDIR : E_SUCCESS);
- }
-diff --git a/src/usermod.c b/src/usermod.c
-index 7355ad31..fd9a98a6 100644
---- a/src/usermod.c
-+++ b/src/usermod.c
-@@ -57,6 +57,7 @@
- #include "getdef.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "pwauth.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
-@@ -2255,6 +2256,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- #ifdef WITH_SELINUX
- 	if (Zflg) {
-diff --git a/src/vipw.c b/src/vipw.c
-index 6d730f65..2cfac6b4 100644
---- a/src/vipw.c
-+++ b/src/vipw.c
-@@ -42,6 +42,7 @@
- #include "defines.h"
- #include "groupio.h"
- #include "nscd.h"
-+#include "sssd.h"
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "pwio.h"
- #include "sgroupio.h"
-@@ -556,6 +557,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("passwd");
- 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
-+	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
- 
- 	return E_SUCCESS;
- }

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-sssd-redirect-warning.patch

@@ -1,59 +0,0 @@
-From 87257a49a1821d67870aa9760c71b6791583709c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: ikerexxe <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
-Date: Fri, 2 Oct 2020 16:09:42 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] lib/sssd: redirect warning message to file
-
-Instead of printing warning in stderr print it to file. This way the
-user is not spammed with unnecessary messages when updating packages.
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1749001
----
- lib/sssd.c | 14 ++++++--------
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 8 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/lib/sssd.c b/lib/sssd.c
-index 80e49e55..f864ce68 100644
---- a/lib/sssd.c
-+++ b/lib/sssd.c
-@@ -11,7 +11,7 @@
- #include "prototypes.h"
- #include "sssd.h"
- 
--#define MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED "%s: Failed to flush the sssd cache.\n"
-+#define MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED "%s: Failed to flush the sssd cache."
- 
- int sssd_flush_cache (int dbflags)
- {
-@@ -46,24 +46,22 @@ int sssd_flush_cache (int dbflags)
- 	free(sss_cache_args);
- 	if (rv != 0) {
- 		/* run_command writes its own more detailed message. */
--		(void) fprintf (stderr, _(MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED), Prog);
-+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED, Prog));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
- 	code = WEXITSTATUS (status);
- 	if (!WIFEXITED (status)) {
--		(void) fprintf (stderr,
--		                _("%s: sss_cache did not terminate normally (signal %d)\n"),
--		                Prog, WTERMSIG (status));
-+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "%s: sss_cache did not terminate normally (signal %d)",
-+			Prog, WTERMSIG (status)));
- 		return -1;
- 	} else if (code == E_CMD_NOTFOUND) {
- 		/* sss_cache is not installed, or it is installed but uses an
- 		   interpreter that is missing.  Probably the former. */
- 		return 0;
- 	} else if (code != 0) {
--		(void) fprintf (stderr, _("%s: sss_cache exited with status %d\n"),
--		                Prog, code);
--		(void) fprintf (stderr, _(MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED), Prog);
-+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, "%s: sss_cache exited with status %d", Prog, code));
-+		SYSLOG ((LOG_WARN, MSG_SSSD_FLUSH_CACHE_FAILED, Prog));
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
--- 
-2.26.2
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-sysugid-min-limit.patch

@@ -1,34 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.min-limit shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c
---- shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c.min-limit	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000001 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_gid.c	2018-11-06 10:51:20.554963292 +0100
-@@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_group, g
-                             (unsigned long) *max_id);
- 			return EINVAL;
- 		}
-+		/*
-+		 * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
-+		 * work right with it.
-+		 */
-+		if (*min_id == 0) {
-+			*min_id = (gid_t) 1;
-+		}
- 	} else {
- 		/* Non-system groups */
- 
-diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c.min-limit shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c
---- shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c.min-limit	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000001 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/find_new_uid.c	2018-11-06 10:51:39.341399569 +0100
-@@ -82,6 +82,13 @@ static int get_ranges (bool sys_user, ui
-                             (unsigned long) *max_id);
- 			return EINVAL;
- 		}
-+		/*
-+		 * Zero is reserved for root and the allocation algorithm does not
-+		 * work right with it.
-+		 */
-+		if (*min_id == 0) {
-+			*min_id = (uid_t) 1;
-+		}
- 	} else {
- 		/* Non-system users */
- 

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-use-itstool.patch

@@ -1,31 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/man/generate_translations.mak.use-itstool shadow-4.6/man/generate_translations.mak
---- shadow-4.6/man/generate_translations.mak.use-itstool	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/man/generate_translations.mak	2018-07-31 16:42:21.623990969 +0200
-@@ -5,8 +5,19 @@ config.xml: ../config.xml.in
- 	$(MAKE) -C .. config.xml
- 	cp ../config.xml $@
- 
--%.xml: ../%.xml ../po/$(LANG).po
--	xml2po --expand-all-entities -l $(LANG) -p ../po/$(LANG).po -o $@ ../$@
-+messages.mo: ../po/$(LANG).po
-+	msgfmt ../po/$(LANG).po -o messages.mo
-+
-+login.defs.d:
-+	ln -sf ../login.defs.d login.defs.d
-+
-+%.xml: ../%.xml messages.mo login.defs.d
-+	if grep -q SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE $< ; then \
-+	    sed -e 's/^<!-- SHADOW-CONFIG-HERE -->/<!ENTITY % config SYSTEM "config.xml">%config;/' $< > $@; \
-+	else \
-+	    sed -e 's/^\(<!DOCTYPE .*docbookx.dtd"\)>/\1 [<!ENTITY % config SYSTEM "config.xml">%config;]>/' $< > $@; \
-+	fi
-+	itstool -d -l $(LANG) -m messages.mo -o . $@
- 	sed -i 's:\(^<refentry .*\)>:\1 lang="$(LANG)">:' $@
- 
- include ../generate_mans.mak
-@@ -16,4 +27,4 @@ $(man_MANS):
- 	@echo you need to run configure with --enable-man to generate man pages
- endif
- 
--CLEANFILES = .xml2po.mo $(EXTRA_DIST) $(addsuffix .xml,$(EXTRA_DIST)) config.xml
-+CLEANFILES = messages.mo login.defs.d $(EXTRA_DIST) $(addsuffix .xml,$(EXTRA_DIST)) config.xml

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-use-lckpwdf.patch

@@ -1,190 +0,0 @@
-commit 408b8a548243aebaa6d773beeae8ddf4bb6100f0
-Author: Tomas Mraz <tmraz@fedoraproject.org>
-Date:   Thu May 2 14:33:06 2019 +0200
-
-    Use the lckpwdf() again if prefix is not set
-    
-    The implementation of prefix option dropped the use of lckpwdf().
-    However that is incorrect as other tools manipulating the shadow passwords
-    such as PAM use lckpwdf() and do not know anything about the
-    shadow's own locking mechanism.
-    
-    This reverts the implementation to use lckpwdf() if prefix option
-    is not used.
-
-diff --git a/lib/commonio.c b/lib/commonio.c
-index 26e518f2..94dda779 100644
---- a/lib/commonio.c
-+++ b/lib/commonio.c
-@@ -364,6 +364,7 @@ static void free_linked_list (struct commonio_db *db)
- int commonio_setname (struct commonio_db *db, const char *name)
- {
- 	snprintf (db->filename, sizeof (db->filename), "%s", name);
-+	db->setname = true;
- 	return 1;
- }
- 
-@@ -414,37 +415,39 @@ cleanup_ENOMEM:
- 
- int commonio_lock (struct commonio_db *db)
- {
--/*#ifdef HAVE_LCKPWDF*/ /* not compatible with prefix option*/
--#if 0
--	/*
--	 * only if the system libc has a real lckpwdf() - the one from
--	 * lockpw.c calls us and would cause infinite recursion!
--	 */
-+	int i;
- 
-+#ifdef HAVE_LCKPWDF
- 	/*
--	 * Call lckpwdf() on the first lock.
--	 * If it succeeds, call *_lock() only once
--	 * (no retries, it should always succeed).
-+	 * Only if the system libc has a real lckpwdf() - the one from
-+	 * lockpw.c calls us and would cause infinite recursion!
-+	 * It is also not used with the prefix option.
- 	 */
--	if (0 == lock_count) {
--		if (lckpwdf () == -1) {
--			if (geteuid () != 0) {
--				(void) fprintf (stderr,
--				                "%s: Permission denied.\n",
--				                Prog);
-+	if (!db->setname) {
-+		/*
-+		 * Call lckpwdf() on the first lock.
-+		 * If it succeeds, call *_lock() only once
-+		 * (no retries, it should always succeed).
-+		 */
-+		if (0 == lock_count) {
-+			if (lckpwdf () == -1) {
-+				if (geteuid () != 0) {
-+					(void) fprintf (stderr,
-+					                "%s: Permission denied.\n",
-+					                Prog);
-+				}
-+				return 0;	/* failure */
- 			}
--			return 0;	/* failure */
- 		}
--	}
- 
--	if (commonio_lock_nowait (db, true) != 0) {
--		return 1;	/* success */
--	}
-+		if (commonio_lock_nowait (db, true) != 0) {
-+			return 1;	/* success */
-+		}
- 
--	ulckpwdf ();
--	return 0;		/* failure */
--#else				/* !HAVE_LCKPWDF */
--	int i;
-+		ulckpwdf ();
-+		return 0;		/* failure */
-+	}
-+#endif				/* !HAVE_LCKPWDF */
- 
- 	/*
- 	 * lckpwdf() not used - do it the old way.
-@@ -471,7 +474,6 @@ int commonio_lock (struct commonio_db *db)
- 		}
- 	}
- 	return 0;		/* failure */
--#endif				/* !HAVE_LCKPWDF */
- }
- 
- static void dec_lock_count (void)
-diff --git a/lib/commonio.h b/lib/commonio.h
-index 40e5708f..64e83073 100644
---- a/lib/commonio.h
-+++ b/lib/commonio.h
-@@ -143,6 +143,7 @@ struct commonio_db {
- 	bool isopen:1;
- 	bool locked:1;
- 	bool readonly:1;
-+	bool setname:1;
- };
- 
- extern int commonio_setname (struct commonio_db *, const char *);
-diff --git a/lib/groupio.c b/lib/groupio.c
-index ae2302b5..bffb06e0 100644
---- a/lib/groupio.c
-+++ b/lib/groupio.c
-@@ -139,7 +139,8 @@ static /*@owned@*/struct commonio_db group_db = {
- 	false,			/* changed */
- 	false,			/* isopen */
- 	false,			/* locked */
--	false			/* readonly */
-+	false,			/* readonly */
-+	false			/* setname */
- };
- 
- int gr_setdbname (const char *filename)
-diff --git a/lib/pwio.c b/lib/pwio.c
-index 7ee85377..127719cb 100644
---- a/lib/pwio.c
-+++ b/lib/pwio.c
-@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ static struct commonio_db passwd_db = {
- 	false,			/* changed */
- 	false,			/* isopen */
- 	false,			/* locked */
--	false			/* readonly */
-+	false,			/* readonly */
-+	false			/* setname */
- };
- 
- int pw_setdbname (const char *filename)
-diff --git a/lib/sgroupio.c b/lib/sgroupio.c
-index 5423626a..ffbdb263 100644
---- a/lib/sgroupio.c
-+++ b/lib/sgroupio.c
-@@ -238,7 +238,8 @@ static struct commonio_db gshadow_db = {
- 	false,			/* changed */
- 	false,			/* isopen */
- 	false,			/* locked */
--	false			/* readonly */
-+	false,			/* readonly */
-+	false			/* setname */
- };
- 
- int sgr_setdbname (const char *filename)
-diff --git a/lib/shadowio.c b/lib/shadowio.c
-index 5fa3d312..676b1f1a 100644
---- a/lib/shadowio.c
-+++ b/lib/shadowio.c
-@@ -114,7 +114,8 @@ static struct commonio_db shadow_db = {
- 	false,			/* changed */
- 	false,			/* isopen */
- 	false,			/* locked */
--	false			/* readonly */
-+	false,			/* readonly */
-+	false			/* setname */
- };
- 
- int spw_setdbname (const char *filename)
-diff --git a/lib/subordinateio.c b/lib/subordinateio.c
-index a662e67e..dd779c59 100644
---- a/lib/subordinateio.c
-+++ b/lib/subordinateio.c
-@@ -550,7 +550,8 @@ static struct commonio_db subordinate_uid_db = {
- 	false,			/* changed */
- 	false,			/* isopen */
- 	false,			/* locked */
--	false			/* readonly */
-+	false,			/* readonly */
-+	false			/* setname */
- };
- 
- int sub_uid_setdbname (const char *filename)
-@@ -631,7 +632,8 @@ static struct commonio_db subordinate_gid_db = {
- 	false,			/* changed */
- 	false,			/* isopen */
- 	false,			/* locked */
--	false			/* readonly */
-+	false,			/* readonly */
-+	false			/* setname */
- };
- 
- int sub_gid_setdbname (const char *filename)

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-useradd-check-if-subid-range-exists.patch

@@ -1,20 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.useradd-check-if-subid-range-exists shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.useradd-check-if-subid-range-exists	2023-05-17 10:39:41.457826153 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c	2023-05-17 10:41:30.937036772 +0200
-@@ -2019,14 +2019,14 @@ static void usr_update (void)
- 		fail_exit (E_PW_UPDATE);
- 	}
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
--	if (is_sub_uid &&
-+	if (is_sub_uid && !local_sub_uid_assigned(user_name) &&
- 	    (sub_uid_add(user_name, sub_uid_start, sub_uid_count) == 0)) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
- 		         _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),
- 		         Prog, sub_uid_dbname ());
- 		fail_exit (E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
- 	}
--	if (is_sub_gid &&
-+	if (is_sub_gid && !local_sub_gid_assigned(user_name) &&
- 	    (sub_gid_add(user_name, sub_gid_start, sub_gid_count) == 0)) {
- 		fprintf (stderr,
- 		         _("%s: failed to prepare the new %s entry\n"),

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-useradd_SUB_UID_COUNT-0.patch

@@ -1,44 +0,0 @@
-From 663824ef4ca927aa2b4319b69e0bfa68282ec719 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
-Date: Sat, 22 May 2021 11:42:02 -0500
-Subject: [PATCH] Fix useradd with SUB_UID_COUNT=0
-
-Closes #298
-
-Fix useradd when SUB_UID_COUNT=0 in login.defs.
-
-Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
----
- src/useradd.c | 8 ++++++--
- 1 file changed, 6 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
-index 06accb2f..9862ae55 100644
---- a/src/useradd.c
-+++ b/src/useradd.c
-@@ -2386,6 +2386,8 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- 	uid_t uid_min;
- 	uid_t uid_max;
-+	unsigned long subuid_count;
-+	unsigned long subgid_count;
- #endif
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -2427,9 +2429,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- 	uid_min = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("UID_MIN", 1000UL);
- 	uid_max = (uid_t) getdef_ulong ("UID_MAX", 60000UL);
--	is_sub_uid = sub_uid_file_present () && !rflg &&
-+	subuid_count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_UID_COUNT", 65536);
-+	subgid_count = getdef_ulong ("SUB_GID_COUNT", 65536);
-+	is_sub_uid = subuid_count > 0 && sub_uid_file_present () && !rflg &&
- 	    (!user_id || (user_id <= uid_max && user_id >= uid_min));
--	is_sub_gid = sub_gid_file_present () && !rflg &&
-+	is_sub_gid = subgid_count > 0 && sub_gid_file_present () && !rflg &&
- 	    (!user_id || (user_id <= uid_max && user_id >= uid_min));
- #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
- 
--- 
-2.30.2
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-useradd_dont_try_to_create_0_subuids.patch

@@ -1,21 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.useradd_dont_try_to_create_0_subuids shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c.useradd_dont_try_to_create_0_subuids	2021-11-03 11:55:00.189562187 +0100
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/useradd.c	2021-11-03 11:57:34.128658978 +0100
-@@ -2350,7 +2350,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 	}
- 
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
--	if (is_sub_uid) {
-+	if (is_sub_uid && subuid_count != 0) {
- 		if (find_new_sub_uids(user_name, &sub_uid_start, &sub_uid_count) < 0) {
- 			fprintf (stderr,
- 			         _("%s: can't create subordinate user IDs\n"),
-@@ -2358,7 +2358,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
- 			fail_exit(E_SUB_UID_UPDATE);
- 		}
- 	}
--	if (is_sub_gid) {
-+	if (is_sub_gid && subgid_count != 0) {
- 		if (find_new_sub_gids(user_name, &sub_gid_start, &sub_gid_count) < 0) {
- 			fprintf (stderr,
- 			         _("%s: can't create subordinate group IDs\n"),

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-usermod-allow-all-group-types.patch

@@ -1,322 +0,0 @@
-From e481437ab9ebe9a8bf8fbaabe986d42b2f765991 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
-Date: Tue, 3 Aug 2021 08:57:20 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] usermod: allow all group types with -G option
-
-The only way of removing a group from the supplementary list is to use
--G option, and list all groups that the user is a member of except for
-the one that wants to be removed. The problem lies when there's a user
-that contains both local and remote groups, and the group to be removed
-is a local one. As we need to include the remote group with -G option
-the command will fail.
-
-This reverts commit 140510de9de4771feb3af1d859c09604043a4c9b. This way,
-it would be possible to remove the remote groups from the supplementary
-list.
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=1967641
-Resolves: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues/338
-
-Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
----
- src/usermod.c | 220 ++++++++++++++++++--------------------------------
- 1 file changed, 77 insertions(+), 143 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/src/usermod.c b/src/usermod.c
-index 03bb9b9d..a0c03afa 100644
---- a/src/usermod.c
-+++ b/src/usermod.c
-@@ -187,7 +187,6 @@ static bool sub_gid_locked = false;
- static void date_to_str (/*@unique@*//*@out@*/char *buf, size_t maxsize,
-                          long int date);
- static int get_groups (char *);
--static struct group * get_local_group (char * grp_name);
- static /*@noreturn@*/void usage (int status);
- static void new_pwent (struct passwd *);
- static void new_spent (struct spwd *);
-@@ -201,9 +200,7 @@ static void grp_update (void);
- 
- static void process_flags (int, char **);
- static void close_files (void);
--static void close_group_files (void);
- static void open_files (void);
--static void open_group_files (void);
- static void usr_update (void);
- static void move_home (void);
- static void update_lastlog (void);
-@@ -260,11 +257,6 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 		return 0;
- 	}
- 
--	/*
--	 * Open the group files
--	 */
--	open_group_files ();
--
- 	/*
- 	 * So long as there is some data to be converted, strip off each
- 	 * name and look it up. A mix of numerical and string values for
-@@ -284,7 +276,7 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 		 * Names starting with digits are treated as numerical GID
- 		 * values, otherwise the string is looked up as is.
- 		 */
--		grp = get_local_group (list);
-+		grp = prefix_getgr_nam_gid (list);
- 
- 		/*
- 		 * There must be a match, either by GID value or by
-@@ -334,8 +326,6 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 		gr_free ((struct group *)grp);
- 	} while (NULL != list);
- 
--	close_group_files ();
--
- 	user_groups[ngroups] = (char *) 0;
- 
- 	/*
-@@ -348,44 +338,6 @@ static int get_groups (char *list)
- 	return 0;
- }
- 
--/*
-- * get_local_group - checks if a given group name exists locally
-- *
-- *	get_local_group() checks if a given group name exists locally.
-- *	If the name exists the group information is returned, otherwise NULL is
-- *	returned.
-- */
--static struct group * get_local_group(char * grp_name)
--{
--	const struct group *grp;
--	struct group *result_grp = NULL;
--	long long int gid;
--	char *endptr;
--
--	gid = strtoll (grp_name, &endptr, 10);
--	if (   ('\0' != *grp_name)
--		&& ('\0' == *endptr)
--		&& (ERANGE != errno)
--		&& (gid == (gid_t)gid)) {
--		grp = gr_locate_gid ((gid_t) gid);
--	}
--	else {
--		grp = gr_locate(grp_name);
--	}
--
--	if (grp != NULL) {
--		result_grp = __gr_dup (grp);
--		if (NULL == result_grp) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--					_("%s: Out of memory. Cannot find group '%s'.\n"),
--					Prog, grp_name);
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--	}
--
--	return result_grp;
--}
--
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- struct ulong_range
- {
-@@ -1523,7 +1475,50 @@ static void close_files (void)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (Gflg || lflg) {
--		close_group_files ();
-+		if (gr_close () == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
-+			         Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
-+			         "failure while writing changes to %s",
-+			         gr_dbname ()));
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
-+		if (is_shadow_grp) {
-+			if (sgr_close () == 0) {
-+				fprintf (stderr,
-+				         _("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
-+				         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+				SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
-+				         "failure while writing changes to %s",
-+				         sgr_dbname ()));
-+				fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+			}
-+		}
-+#endif
-+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
-+		if (is_shadow_grp) {
-+			if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
-+				fprintf (stderr,
-+				         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
-+				         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+				SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
-+				         "failed to unlock %s",
-+				         sgr_dbname ()));
-+				/* continue */
-+			}
-+		}
-+#endif
-+		if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
-+			         Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
-+			         "failed to unlock %s",
-+			         gr_dbname ()));
-+			/* continue */
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	if (is_shadow_pwd) {
-@@ -1592,60 +1587,6 @@ static void close_files (void)
- #endif
- }
- 
--/*
-- * close_group_files - close all of the files that were opened
-- *
-- *	close_group_files() closes all of the files that were opened related
-- *  with groups. This causes any modified entries to be written out.
-- */
--static void close_group_files (void)
--{
--	if (gr_close () == 0) {
--		fprintf (stderr,
--					_("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
--					Prog, gr_dbname ());
--		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
--					"failure while writing changes to %s",
--					gr_dbname ()));
--		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--	}
--#ifdef SHADOWGRP
--	if (is_shadow_grp) {
--		if (sgr_close () == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--						_("%s: failure while writing changes to %s\n"),
--						Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
--						"failure while writing changes to %s",
--						sgr_dbname ()));
--			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--		}
--	}
--#endif
--#ifdef SHADOWGRP
--	if (is_shadow_grp) {
--		if (sgr_unlock () == 0) {
--			fprintf (stderr,
--						_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
--						Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--			SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
--						"failed to unlock %s",
--						sgr_dbname ()));
--			/* continue */
--		}
--	}
--#endif
--	if (gr_unlock () == 0) {
--		fprintf (stderr,
--					_("%s: failed to unlock %s\n"),
--					Prog, gr_dbname ());
--		SYSLOG ((LOG_ERR,
--					"failed to unlock %s",
--					gr_dbname ()));
--		/* continue */
--	}
--}
--
- /*
-  * open_files - lock and open the password files
-  *
-@@ -1681,7 +1622,38 @@ static void open_files (void)
- 	}
- 
- 	if (Gflg || lflg) {
--		open_group_files ();
-+		/*
-+		 * Lock and open the group file. This will load all of the
-+		 * group entries.
-+		 */
-+		if (gr_lock () == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
-+			         Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+		gr_locked = true;
-+		if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
-+			         Prog, gr_dbname ());
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+#ifdef SHADOWGRP
-+		if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_lock () == 0)) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
-+			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+		sgr_locked = true;
-+		if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0)) {
-+			fprintf (stderr,
-+			         _("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
-+			         Prog, sgr_dbname ());
-+			fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
-+		}
-+#endif
- 	}
- #ifdef ENABLE_SUBIDS
- 	if (vflg || Vflg) {
-@@ -1717,44 +1689,6 @@ static void open_files (void)
- #endif				/* ENABLE_SUBIDS */
- }
- 
--/*
-- * open_group_files - lock and open the group files
-- *
-- *	open_group_files() loads all of the group entries.
-- */
--static void open_group_files (void)
--{
--	if (gr_lock () == 0) {
--		fprintf (stderr,
--					_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
--					Prog, gr_dbname ());
--		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--	}
--	gr_locked = true;
--	if (gr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0) {
--		fprintf (stderr,
--					_("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
--					Prog, gr_dbname ());
--		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--	}
--
--#ifdef SHADOWGRP
--	if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_lock () == 0)) {
--		fprintf (stderr,
--					_("%s: cannot lock %s; try again later.\n"),
--					Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--	}
--	sgr_locked = true;
--	if (is_shadow_grp && (sgr_open (O_CREAT | O_RDWR) == 0)) {
--		fprintf (stderr,
--					_("%s: cannot open %s\n"),
--					Prog, sgr_dbname ());
--		fail_exit (E_GRP_UPDATE);
--	}
--#endif
--}
--
- /*
-  * usr_update - create the user entries
-  *
--- 
-2.31.1
-

SOURCES/shadow-4.6-usermod-crash.patch

@@ -1,42 +0,0 @@
-diff -up shadow-4.6/libmisc/prefix_flag.c.usermod-crash shadow-4.6/libmisc/prefix_flag.c
---- shadow-4.6/libmisc/prefix_flag.c.usermod-crash	2018-04-29 18:42:37.000000000 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/libmisc/prefix_flag.c	2018-05-28 15:14:10.642302440 +0200
-@@ -319,6 +319,7 @@ extern struct group *prefix_getgr_nam_gi
- {
- 	long long int gid;
- 	char *endptr;
-+	struct group *g;
- 
- 	if (NULL == grname) {
- 		return NULL;
-@@ -333,7 +334,8 @@ extern struct group *prefix_getgr_nam_gi
- 	    	&& (gid == (gid_t)gid)) {
- 			return prefix_getgrgid ((gid_t) gid);
- 		}
--		return prefix_getgrnam (grname);
-+		g = prefix_getgrnam (grname);
-+		return g ? __gr_dup(g) : NULL;
- 	}
- 	else
- 		return getgr_nam_gid(grname);
-diff -up shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.usermod-crash shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c
---- shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c.usermod-crash	2018-05-28 15:12:37.920332763 +0200
-+++ shadow-4.6/src/usermod.c	2018-05-28 15:15:50.337422470 +0200
-@@ -1276,11 +1276,13 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
- 		prefix_user_home = xmalloc(len);
- 		wlen = snprintf(prefix_user_home, len, "%s/%s", prefix, user_home);
- 		assert (wlen == (int) len -1);
-+		if (user_newhome) {
-+			len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(user_newhome) + 2;
-+			prefix_user_newhome = xmalloc(len);
-+			wlen = snprintf(prefix_user_newhome, len, "%s/%s", prefix, user_newhome);
-+			assert (wlen == (int) len -1);
-+		}
- 
--		len = strlen(prefix) + strlen(user_newhome) + 2;
--		prefix_user_newhome = xmalloc(len);
--		wlen = snprintf(prefix_user_newhome, len, "%s/%s", prefix, user_newhome);
--		assert (wlen == (int) len -1);
- 	}
- 	else {
- 		prefix_user_home = user_home;

SOURCES/shadow-4.6.tar.xz.asc

@@ -1,11 +0,0 @@
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SOURCES/shadow-4.9-subordinateio-compare-owner-ID.patch

@@ -1,108 +0,0 @@
-From 3ec32f9975f262073f8fbdecd2bfaee4a1d3db48 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
-Date: Wed, 13 Jul 2022 09:55:14 +0200
-Subject: [PATCH] subordinateio: also compare the owner ID
-
-IDs already populate /etc/subuid and /etc/subgid files so it's necessary
-not only to check for the owner name but also for the owner ID of a
-given range.
-
-Resolves: https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=2093311
-
-Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
----
- lib/subordinateio.c | 50 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
- 1 file changed, 50 insertions(+)
-
-diff --git a/lib/subordinateio.c b/lib/subordinateio.c
-index 9ca70b8b..6bc45283 100644
---- a/lib/subordinateio.c
-+++ b/lib/subordinateio.c
-@@ -17,6 +17,8 @@
- #include <ctype.h>
- #include <fcntl.h>
- 
-+#define ID_SIZE 31
-+
- /*
-  * subordinate_dup: create a duplicate range
-  *
-@@ -745,6 +747,40 @@ gid_t sub_gid_find_free_range(gid_t min, gid_t max, unsigned long count)
- 	return start == ULONG_MAX ? (gid_t) -1 : start;
- }
- 
-+static bool get_owner_id(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, char *id)
-+{
-+	struct passwd *pw;
-+	struct group *gr;
-+	int ret = 0;
-+
-+	switch (id_type) {
-+	case ID_TYPE_UID:
-+		pw = getpwnam(owner);
-+		if (pw == NULL) {
-+			return false;
-+		}
-+		ret = snprintf(id, ID_SIZE, "%u", pw->pw_uid);
-+		if (ret < 0 || ret >= ID_SIZE) {
-+			return false;
-+		}
-+		break;
-+	case ID_TYPE_GID:
-+		gr = getgrnam(owner);
-+		if (gr == NULL) {
-+			return false;
-+		}
-+		ret = snprintf(id, ID_SIZE, "%u", gr->gr_gid);
-+		if (ret < 0 || ret >= ID_SIZE) {
-+			return false;
-+		}
-+		break;
-+	default:
-+		return false;
-+	}
-+
-+	return true;
-+}
-+
- /*
-  * int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subordinate_range ***ranges)
-  *
-@@ -770,6 +806,8 @@ int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_r
- 	enum subid_status status;
- 	int count = 0;
- 	struct subid_nss_ops *h;
-+	char id[ID_SIZE];
-+	bool have_owner_id;
- 
- 	*in_ranges = NULL;
- 
-@@ -798,6 +836,8 @@ int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_r
- 		return -1;
- 	}
- 
-+	have_owner_id = get_owner_id(owner, id_type, id);
-+
- 	commonio_rewind(db);
- 	while ((range = commonio_next(db)) != NULL) {
- 		if (0 == strcmp(range->owner, owner)) {
-@@ -808,6 +848,16 @@ int list_owner_ranges(const char *owner, enum subid_type id_type, struct subid_r
- 				goto out;
- 			}
- 		}
-+
-+		// Let's also compare with the ID
-+		if (have_owner_id == true && 0 == strcmp(range->owner, id)) {
-+			if (!append_range(&ranges, range, count++)) {
-+				free(ranges);
-+				ranges = NULL;
-+				count = -1;
-+				goto out;
-+			}
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- out:
--- 
-2.36.1
-

SOURCES/shadow-utils.login.defs

@@ -1,98 +0,0 @@
-#
-# Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
-# behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
-# tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
-# passwd command) should therefore be configured elsewhere. Refer to
-# /etc/pam.d/system-auth for more information.
-#
-
-# *REQUIRED*
-#   Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the
-#   home directory.  If you _do_ define both, MAIL_DIR takes precedence.
-#   QMAIL_DIR is for Qmail
-#
-#QMAIL_DIR	Maildir
-MAIL_DIR	/var/spool/mail
-#MAIL_FILE	.mail
-
-# Default initial "umask" value used by login(1) on non-PAM enabled systems.
-# Default "umask" value for pam_umask(8) on PAM enabled systems.
-# UMASK is also used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
-# home directories if HOME_MODE is not set.
-# 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered
-# for increased privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin
-# must make up their mind.
-UMASK		022
-
-# HOME_MODE is used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
-# home directories.
-# If HOME_MODE is not set, the value of UMASK is used to create the mode.
-HOME_MODE	0700
-
-# Password aging controls:
-#
-#	PASS_MAX_DAYS	Maximum number of days a password may be used.
-#	PASS_MIN_DAYS	Minimum number of days allowed between password changes.
-#	PASS_MIN_LEN	Minimum acceptable password length.
-#	PASS_WARN_AGE	Number of days warning given before a password expires.
-#
-PASS_MAX_DAYS	99999
-PASS_MIN_DAYS	0
-PASS_MIN_LEN	5
-PASS_WARN_AGE	7
-
-#
-# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd
-#
-UID_MIN                  1000
-UID_MAX                 60000
-# System accounts
-SYS_UID_MIN               201
-SYS_UID_MAX               999
-
-#
-# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd
-#
-GID_MIN                  1000
-GID_MAX                 60000
-# System accounts
-SYS_GID_MIN               201
-SYS_GID_MAX               999
-
-#
-# If defined, this command is run when removing a user.
-# It should remove any at/cron/print jobs etc. owned by
-# the user to be removed (passed as the first argument).
-#
-#USERDEL_CMD	/usr/sbin/userdel_local
-
-#
-# If useradd should create home directories for users by default
-# On RH systems, we do. This option is overridden with the -m flag on
-# useradd command line.
-#
-CREATE_HOME	yes
-
-# This enables userdel to remove user groups if no members exist.
-#
-USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
-
-#
-# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
-# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
-# If set to BCRYPT, BCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
-#
-ENCRYPT_METHOD SHA512
-
-#
-# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
-#
-# Define the number of SHA rounds.
-# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
-# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
-# this value is increased.
-#
-# The values must be within the 1000-999999999 range.
-#
-SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
-

gating.yaml

@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+# recipients: sssd-qe
+--- !Policy
+product_versions:
+  - rhel-10
+decision_context: osci_compose_gate
+rules:
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: osci.brew-build.tier0.functional}
+  - !PassingTestCaseRule {test_case_name: baseos-ci.brew-build.tier1.functional}
+

passwd.pamd

@@ -0,0 +1,5 @@
+#%PAM-1.0
+# This tool only uses the password stack.
+password   substack	system-auth
+-password   optional	pam_gnome_keyring.so use_authtok
+password   substack	postlogin

shadow-4.13-newidmap-support-passing-pid-as-fd.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
+From 6974df39a708abf8bafbdfa2b7827e0f70f874cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 22:49:42 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd
+
+Closes #635
+
+newuidmap and newgidmap currently take an integner pid as
+the first argument, determining the process id on which to
+act.  Accept also "fd:N", where N must be an open file
+descriptor to the /proc/pid directory for the process to
+act upon.  This way, if you
+
+exec 10</proc/99
+newuidmap fd:10 100000 0 65536
+
+and pid 99 dies and a new process happens to take pid 99 before
+newuidmap happens to do its work, then since newuidmap will use
+openat() using fd 10, it won't change the mapping for the new
+process.
+
+Example:
+
+// terminal 1:
+serge@jerom ~/src/nsexec$ ./nsexec -W -s 0 -S 0 -U
+about to unshare with 10000000
+Press any key to exec (I am 129176)
+
+// terminal 2:
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ exec 10</proc/129176
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ sudo chown root src/newuidmap src/newgidmap
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ sudo chmod u+s src/newuidmap
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ sudo chmod u+s src/newgidmap
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ ./src/newuidmap fd:10 0 100000 10
+serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ ./src/newgidmap fd:10 0 100000 10
+
+// Terminal 1:
+uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
+
+Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+---
+ lib/get_pid.c       | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ lib/prototypes.h    |  2 ++
+ man/newgidmap.1.xml | 11 ++++++++++
+ man/newuidmap.1.xml | 11 ++++++++++
+ src/newgidmap.c     | 41 ++++++++++++++----------------------
+ src/newuidmap.c     | 40 +++++++++++++----------------------
+ 6 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/get_pid.c b/lib/get_pid.c
+index 10184bf0..ab91d158 100644
+--- a/lib/get_pid.c
++++ b/lib/get_pid.c
+@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
+ 
+ #include "prototypes.h"
+ #include "defines.h"
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
+ 
+ int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
+ {
+@@ -29,3 +32,51 @@ int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
+ 	return 1;
+ }
+ 
++/*
++ * If use passed in fd:4 as an argument, then return the
++ * value '4', the fd to use.
++ */
++int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
++{
++	long long int val;
++	char *endptr;
++
++	errno = 0;
++	val = strtoll (pidfdstr, &endptr, 10);
++	if (   ('\0' == *pidfdstr)
++	    || ('\0' != *endptr)
++	    || (ERANGE == errno)
++	    || (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (pid_t)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
++		return 0;
++	}
++
++	return (int)val;
++}
++
++int open_pidfd(const char *pidstr)
++{
++	int proc_dir_fd;
++	int written;
++	char proc_dir_name[32];
++	pid_t target;
++
++	if (get_pid(pidstr, &target) == 0)
++		return -ENOENT;
++
++	/* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
++	written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
++		target);
++	if ((written <= 0) || ((size_t)written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
++		fprintf(stderr, "snprintf of proc path failed for %u: %s\n",
++			target, strerror(errno));
++		return -EINVAL;
++	}
++
++	proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
++	if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
++		fprintf(stderr, _("Could not open proc directory for target %u: %s\n"),
++			target, strerror(errno));
++		return -EINVAL;
++	}
++	return proc_dir_fd;
++}
+diff --git a/lib/prototypes.h b/lib/prototypes.h
+index 400d5b97..21df6f61 100644
+--- a/lib/prototypes.h
++++ b/lib/prototypes.h
+@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ extern int getlong (const char *numstr, /*@out@*/long int *result);
+ 
+ /* get_pid.c */
+ extern int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid);
++extern int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr);
++extern int open_pidfd(const char *pidstr);
+ 
+ /* getrange */
+ extern int getrange (const char *range,
+diff --git a/man/newgidmap.1.xml b/man/newgidmap.1.xml
+index e4ebc69e..9b7683eb 100644
+--- a/man/newgidmap.1.xml
++++ b/man/newgidmap.1.xml
+@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@
+     <para>
+       Note that newgidmap may be used only once for a given process.
+     </para>
++    <para>
++      Instead of an integer process id, the first argument may be
++      specified as <replaceable>fd:N</replaceable>, where the integer N
++      is the file descriptor number for the calling process's opened
++      file for <filename>/proc/[pid[</filename>.  In this case,
++      <command>newgidmap</command> will use
++      <refentrytitle>openat</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum>
++      to open the <filename>gid_map</filename> file under that
++      directory, avoiding a TOCTTOU in case the process exits and
++      the pid is immediately reused.
++    </para>
+ 
+   </refsect1>
+ 
+diff --git a/man/newuidmap.1.xml b/man/newuidmap.1.xml
+index f5cb5b48..ca917a77 100644
+--- a/man/newuidmap.1.xml
++++ b/man/newuidmap.1.xml
+@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@
+     <para>
+       Note that newuidmap may be used only once for a given process.
+     </para>
++    <para>
++      Instead of an integer process id, the first argument may be
++      specified as <replaceable>fd:N</replaceable>, where the integer N
++      is the file descriptor number for the calling process's opened
++      file for <filename>/proc/[pid[</filename>.  In this case,
++      <command>newuidmap</command> will use
++      <refentrytitle>openat</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum>
++      to open the <filename>uid_map</filename> file under that
++      directory, avoiding a TOCTTOU in case the process exits and
++      the pid is immediately reused.
++    </para>
+   </refsect1>
+ 
+   <refsect1 id='options'>
+diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
+index 01d0fe90..d6d29725 100644
+--- a/src/newgidmap.c
++++ b/src/newgidmap.c
+@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
+ 
+ static void usage(void)
+ {
+-	fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s <pid> <gid> <lowergid> <count> [ <gid> <lowergid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
++	fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [<pid|fd:<pidfd>] <gid> <lowergid> <count> [ <gid> <lowergid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
+ 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -143,15 +143,12 @@ out:
+  */
+ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+-	char proc_dir_name[32];
+ 	char *target_str;
+-	pid_t target;
+ 	int proc_dir_fd;
+ 	int ranges;
+ 	struct map_range *mappings;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+-	int written;
+ 	bool allow_setgroups = false;
+ 
+ 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+@@ -168,25 +165,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	/* Find the process that needs its user namespace
+ 	 * gid mapping set.
+ 	 */
+-	target_str = argv[1];
+-	if (!get_pid(target_str, &target))
+-		usage();
+ 
+-	/* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
+-	written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
+-		target);
+-	if ((written <= 0) || (written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: snprintf of proc path failed: %s\n",
+-			Prog, strerror(errno));
+-	}
+-
+-	proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
+-	if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not open proc directory for target %u\n"),
+-			Prog, target);
+-		return EXIT_FAILURE;
++	target_str = argv[1];
++	if (strlen(target_str) > 3 && strncmp(target_str, "fd:", 3) == 0) {
++		/* the user passed in a /proc/pid fd for the process */
++		target_str = &target_str[3];
++		proc_dir_fd = get_pidfd_from_fd(target_str);
++		if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
++			usage();
++	} else {
++		proc_dir_fd = open_pidfd(target_str);
++		if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
++			usage();
+ 	}
+-
+ 	/* Who am i? */
+ 	pw = get_my_pwent ();
+ 	if (NULL == pw) {
+@@ -200,8 +191,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
+ 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
+-			Prog, target);
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for process\n"),
++			Prog);
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -213,8 +204,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	    (!getdef_bool("GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS") && (getgid() != pw->pw_gid)) ||
+ 	    (pw->pw_uid != st.st_uid) ||
+ 	    (getgid() != st.st_gid)) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target %u is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
+-			Prog, target,
++		fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target process is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
++			Prog,
+ 			(unsigned long int)getuid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_uid, (unsigned long int)st.st_uid,
+ 			(unsigned long int)getgid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_gid, (unsigned long int)st.st_gid);
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+diff --git a/src/newuidmap.c b/src/newuidmap.c
+index e8798409..e99655c9 100644
+--- a/src/newuidmap.c
++++ b/src/newuidmap.c
+@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
+ 
+ static void usage(void)
+ {
+-	fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s <pid> <uid> <loweruid> <count> [ <uid> <loweruid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
++	fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [<pid>|fd:<pidfd>] <uid> <loweruid> <count> [ <uid> <loweruid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
+ 	exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
+ }
+ 
+@@ -73,15 +73,12 @@ static void usage(void)
+  */
+ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+-	char proc_dir_name[32];
+ 	char *target_str;
+-	pid_t target;
+ 	int proc_dir_fd;
+ 	int ranges;
+ 	struct map_range *mappings;
+ 	struct stat st;
+ 	struct passwd *pw;
+-	int written;
+ 
+ 	Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
+ 	log_set_progname(Prog);
+@@ -94,26 +91,20 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	if (argc < 2)
+ 		usage();
+ 
++	target_str = argv[1];
+ 	/* Find the process that needs its user namespace
+ 	 * uid mapping set.
+ 	 */
+-	target_str = argv[1];
+-	if (!get_pid(target_str, &target))
+-		usage();
+-
+-	/* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
+-	written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
+-		target);
+-	if ((written <= 0) || (written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, "%s: snprintf of proc path failed: %s\n",
+-			Prog, strerror(errno));
+-	}
+-
+-	proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
+-	if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not open proc directory for target %u\n"),
+-			Prog, target);
+-		return EXIT_FAILURE;
++	if (strlen(target_str) > 3 && strncmp(target_str, "fd:", 3) == 0) {
++		/* the user passed in a /proc/pid fd for the process */
++		target_str = &target_str[3];
++		proc_dir_fd = get_pidfd_from_fd(target_str);
++		if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
++			usage();
++	} else {
++		proc_dir_fd = open_pidfd(target_str);
++		if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
++			usage();
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/* Who am i? */
+@@ -129,8 +120,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
+ 	if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
+-			Prog, target);
++		fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target process\n"), Prog);
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ 	}
+ 
+@@ -142,8 +132,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
+ 	    (!getdef_bool("GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS") && (getgid() != pw->pw_gid)) ||
+ 	    (pw->pw_uid != st.st_uid) ||
+ 	    (getgid() != st.st_gid)) {
+-		fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target process %u is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
+-			Prog, target,
++		fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target process is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
++			Prog,
+ 			(unsigned long int)getuid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_uid, (unsigned long int)st.st_uid,
+ 			(unsigned long int)getgid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_gid, (unsigned long int)st.st_gid);
+ 		return EXIT_FAILURE;
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
+From 7ff33fae6f9cd79c0e012671c37a172e9a681d0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 13:52:32 -0600
+Subject: [PATCH] get_pidfd_from_fd: return -1 on error, not 0
+
+Fixes: 6974df39a: newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd
+Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+---
+ lib/get_pid.c | 3 ++-
+ 1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/get_pid.c b/lib/get_pid.c
+index ab91d158..5b6d9da4 100644
+--- a/lib/get_pid.c
++++ b/lib/get_pid.c
+@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
+ /*
+  * If use passed in fd:4 as an argument, then return the
+  * value '4', the fd to use.
++ * On error, return -1.
+  */
+ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
+ {
+@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
+ 	    || ('\0' != *endptr)
+ 	    || (ERANGE == errno)
+ 	    || (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (pid_t)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
+-		return 0;
++		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	return (int)val;
+-- 
+2.39.2
+
+From 05e2adf509ba0e3779dae66a276b86927a8e1e0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: =?UTF-8?q?Vin=C3=ADcius=20dos=20Santos=20Oliveira?=
+ <vini.ipsmaker@gmail.com>
+Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 18:06:02 -0300
+Subject: [PATCH] Validate fds created by the user
+
+write_mapping() will do the following:
+
+openat(proc_dir_fd, map_file, O_WRONLY);
+
+An attacker could create a directory containing a symlink named
+"uid_map" pointing to any file owned by root, and thus allow him to
+overwrite any root-owned file.
+---
+ lib/get_pid.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/lib/get_pid.c b/lib/get_pid.c
+index 5b6d9da4..8e5e6014 100644
+--- a/lib/get_pid.c
++++ b/lib/get_pid.c
+@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
+ {
+ 	long long int val;
+ 	char *endptr;
++	struct stat st;
++	dev_t proc_st_dev, proc_st_rdev;
+ 
+ 	errno = 0;
+ 	val = strtoll (pidfdstr, &endptr, 10);
+@@ -51,6 +53,21 @@ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
++	if (stat("/proc/self/uid_map", &st) < 0) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	proc_st_dev = st.st_dev;
++	proc_st_rdev = st.st_rdev;
++
++	if (fstat(val, &st) < 0) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
++	if (st.st_dev != proc_st_dev || st.st_rdev != proc_st_rdev) {
++		return -1;
++	}
++
+ 	return (int)val;
+ }
+ 
+-- 
+2.39.2
+

shadow-4.14.0-passwd-stdin.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,288 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.14.0/libmisc/agetpass.c.orig shadow-4.14.0/libmisc/agetpass.c
+--- shadow-4.14.0/libmisc/agetpass.c.orig	2024-01-24 20:06:20.557577853 +0100
++++ shadow-4.14.0/libmisc/agetpass.c	2024-01-24 21:21:06.379445080 +0100
+@@ -32,6 +32,7 @@
+  * SYNOPSIS
+  *	[[gnu::malloc(erase_pass)]]
+  *	char *agetpass(const char *prompt);
++ *	char *agetpass_stdin();
+  *
+  *	void erase_pass(char *pass);
+  *
+@@ -64,6 +65,10 @@
+  *	erased by calling erase_pass(), to avoid possibly leaking the
+  *	password.
+  *
++ *   agetpass_stdin()
++ *	This function is the same as previous one (agetpass). Just the
++ *	password is read from stdin and terminal is not required.
++ *
+  *   erase_pass()
+  *	This function first clears the password, by calling
+  *	explicit_bzero(3) (or an equivalent call), and then frees the
+@@ -92,8 +97,8 @@
+  */
+ 
+ 
+-char *
+-agetpass(const char *prompt)
++static char *
++agetpass_internal(const char *prompt, int flags)
+ {
+ 	char    *pass;
+ 	size_t  len;
+@@ -110,7 +115,7 @@ agetpass(const char *prompt)
+ 	if (pass == NULL)
+ 		return NULL;
+ 
+-	if (readpassphrase(prompt, pass, PASS_MAX + 2, RPP_REQUIRE_TTY) == NULL)
++	if (readpassphrase(prompt, pass, PASS_MAX + 2, flags) == NULL)
+ 		goto fail;
+ 
+ 	len = strlen(pass);
+@@ -126,6 +131,17 @@ fail:
+ 	return NULL;
+ }
+ 
++char *
++agetpass(const char *prompt)
++{
++	return agetpass_internal(prompt, RPP_REQUIRE_TTY);
++}
++
++char *
++agetpass_stdin()
++{
++	return agetpass_internal(NULL, RPP_STDIN);
++}
+ 
+ void
+ erase_pass(char *pass)
+diff -up shadow-4.14.0/lib/prototypes.h.orig shadow-4.14.0/lib/prototypes.h
+--- shadow-4.14.0/lib/prototypes.h.orig	2024-01-24 22:06:18.786184942 +0100
++++ shadow-4.14.0/lib/prototypes.h	2024-01-24 20:19:45.299231059 +0100
+@@ -47,6 +47,7 @@ extern int expire (const struct passwd *
+ extern void erase_pass(char *pass);
+ ATTR_MALLOC(erase_pass)
+ extern char *agetpass(const char *prompt);
++extern char *agetpass_stdin();
+ 
+ /* isexpired.c */
+ extern int isexpired (const struct passwd *, /*@null@*/const struct spwd *);
+diff -up shadow-4.14.0/man/passwd.1.xml.orig shadow-4.14.0/man/passwd.1.xml
+--- shadow-4.14.0/man/passwd.1.xml.orig	2024-01-24 20:33:31.438972506 +0100
++++ shadow-4.14.0/man/passwd.1.xml	2024-01-29 17:36:31.082495245 +0100
+@@ -341,6 +341,17 @@
+ 	  </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
++      <varlistentry>
++	<term>
++	  <option>-s</option>, <option>--stdin</option>
++	</term>
++	<listitem>
++	  <para>
++	    This option is used to indicate that passwd should read the new password from standard
++	    input, which can be a pipe.
++	  </para>
++	</listitem>
++      </varlistentry>
+     </variablelist>
+   </refsect1>
+ 
+diff -up shadow-4.14.0/src/passwd.c.orig shadow-4.14.0/src/passwd.c
+--- shadow-4.14.0/src/passwd.c.orig	2024-01-24 13:57:15.714549266 +0100
++++ shadow-4.14.0/src/passwd.c	2024-01-29 17:33:59.421508534 +0100
+@@ -65,7 +65,8 @@ static bool
+     Sflg = false,			/* -S - show password status */
+     uflg = false,			/* -u - unlock the user's password */
+     wflg = false,			/* -w - set warning days */
+-    xflg = false;			/* -x - set maximum days */
++    xflg = false,			/* -x - set maximum days */
++    sflg = false;			/* -s - read passwd from stdin */
+ 
+ /*
+  * set to 1 if there are any flags which require root privileges,
+@@ -156,6 +157,7 @@ usage (int status)
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -w, --warndays WARN_DAYS      set expiration warning days to WARN_DAYS\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -x, --maxdays MAX_DAYS        set maximum number of days before password\n"
+ 	                "                                change to MAX_DAYS\n"), usageout);
++	(void) fputs (_("  -s, --stdin                   read new token from stdin\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs ("\n", usageout);
+ 	exit (status);
+ }
+@@ -275,7 +277,7 @@ static int new_password (const struct pa
+ 			pass_max_len = getdef_num ("PASS_MAX_LEN", 8);
+ 		}
+ 	}
+-	if (!qflg) {
++	if (!qflg && !sflg) {
+ 		if (pass_max_len == -1) {
+ 			(void) printf (_(
+ "Enter the new password (minimum of %d characters)\n"
+@@ -289,55 +291,67 @@ static int new_password (const struct pa
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ 
+-	warned = false;
+-	for (i = getdef_num ("PASS_CHANGE_TRIES", 5); i > 0; i--) {
+-		cp = agetpass (_("New password: "));
++	if (sflg) {
++		/*
++		 * root is setting the passphrase from stdin
++		 */
++		cp = agetpass_stdin ();
+ 		if (NULL == cp) {
+-			memzero (orig, sizeof orig);
+-			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+-		if (warned && (strcmp (pass, cp) != 0)) {
+-			warned = false;
+-		}
+ 		STRFCPY (pass, cp);
+ 		erase_pass (cp);
++	} else {
++		warned = false;
++		for (i = getdef_num ("PASS_CHANGE_TRIES", 5); i > 0; i--) {
++			cp = agetpass (_("New password: "));
++			if (NULL == cp) {
++				memzero (orig, sizeof orig);
++				memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
++				return -1;
++			}
++			if (warned && (strcmp (pass, cp) != 0)) {
++				warned = false;
++			}
++			STRFCPY (pass, cp);
++			erase_pass (cp);
+ 
+-		if (!amroot && !obscure(orig, pass, pw)) {
+-			(void) puts (_("Try again."));
+-			continue;
+-		}
++			if (!amroot && !obscure(orig, pass, pw)) {
++				(void) puts (_("Try again."));
++				continue;
++			}
+ 
+-		/*
+-		 * If enabled, warn about weak passwords even if you are
+-		 * root (enter this password again to use it anyway).
+-		 * --marekm
+-		 */
+-		if (amroot && !warned && getdef_bool ("PASS_ALWAYS_WARN")
+-		    && !obscure(orig, pass, pw)) {
+-			(void) puts (_("\nWarning: weak password (enter it again to use it anyway)."));
+-			warned = true;
+-			continue;
++			/*
++			 * If enabled, warn about weak passwords even if you are
++			 * root (enter this password again to use it anyway).
++			 * --marekm
++			 */
++			if (amroot && !warned && getdef_bool ("PASS_ALWAYS_WARN")
++				&& !obscure(orig, pass, pw)) {
++				(void) puts (_("\nWarning: weak password (enter it again to use it anyway)."));
++				warned = true;
++				continue;
++			}
++			cp = agetpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
++			if (NULL == cp) {
++				memzero (orig, sizeof orig);
++				memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
++				return -1;
++			}
++			if (strcmp (cp, pass) != 0) {
++				erase_pass (cp);
++				(void) fputs (_("They don't match; try again.\n"), stderr);
++			} else {
++				erase_pass (cp);
++				break;
++			}
+ 		}
+-		cp = agetpass (_("Re-enter new password: "));
+-		if (NULL == cp) {
+-			memzero (orig, sizeof orig);
++		memzero (orig, sizeof orig);
++
++		if (i == 0) {
+ 			memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+ 			return -1;
+ 		}
+-		if (strcmp (cp, pass) != 0) {
+-			erase_pass (cp);
+-			(void) fputs (_("They don't match; try again.\n"), stderr);
+-		} else {
+-			erase_pass (cp);
+-			break;
+-		}
+-	}
+-	memzero (orig, sizeof orig);
+-
+-	if (i == 0) {
+-		memzero (pass, sizeof pass);
+-		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+@@ -714,6 +728,7 @@ static void update_shadow (void)
+  *	-u	unlock the password of the named account (*)
+  *	-w #	set sp_warn to # days (*)
+  *	-x #	set sp_max to # days (*)
++ *	-s	read password from stdin
+  *
+  *	(*) requires root permission to execute.
+  *
+@@ -781,10 +796,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 			{"unlock",      no_argument,       NULL, 'u'},
+ 			{"warndays",    required_argument, NULL, 'w'},
+ 			{"maxdays",     required_argument, NULL, 'x'},
++			{"stdin",       no_argument,       NULL, 's'},
+ 			{NULL, 0, NULL, '\0'}
+ 		};
+ 
+-		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv, "adehi:kln:qr:R:P:Suw:x:",
++		while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv, "adehi:kln:qr:R:P:Suw:x:s",
+ 		                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+ 			switch (c) {
+ 			case 'a':
+@@ -877,6 +893,15 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 				xflg = true;
+ 				anyflag = true;
+ 				break;
++			case 's':
++				if (!amroot) {
++					(void) fprintf (stderr,
++					                _("%s: only root can use --stdin/-s option\n"),
++					                Prog);
++					usage (E_BAD_ARG);
++				}
++				sflg = true;
++				break;
+ 			default:
+ 				usage (E_BAD_ARG);
+ 			}
+@@ -1068,7 +1093,16 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	 * Don't set the real UID for PAM...
+ 	 */
+ 	if (!anyflag && use_pam) {
+-		do_pam_passwd (name, qflg, kflg);
++		if (sflg) {
++			cp = agetpass_stdin ();
++			if (cp == NULL) {
++				exit (E_FAILURE);
++			}
++			do_pam_passwd_non_interactive ("passwd", name, cp);
++			erase_pass (cp);
++		} else {
++			do_pam_passwd (name, qflg, kflg);
++		}
+ 		exit (E_SUCCESS);
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
+@@ -1102,4 +1136,3 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 
+ 	return E_SUCCESS;
+ }
+-

shadow-4.14.0-remove-libcrack.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,306 @@
+From 43b4e5a6c41f5c43cad18810f9229e40e8c4a57e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2023 12:53:37 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/2] Remove FascistHistory() and FascistHistoryPw() calls
+
+These functions don't seem to exist anymore.  I can't find them in
+Debian, nor in a web search.  They probably were functions from an
+ancient implementation of cracklib that doesn't exist anymore.
+
+$ git remote -v
+origin	git@github.com:cracklib/cracklib.git (fetch)
+origin	git@github.com:cracklib/cracklib.git (push)
+$ grep -rni fascisthistory
+$ git log --grep FascistHistory
+$ git log -S FascistHistory
+
+Closes: <https://codesearch.debian.net/search?q=FascistHistory&literal=1>
+Cc: Mike Frysinger <vapier@gentoo.org>
+Acked-by: Michael Vetter <jubalh@iodoru.org>
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+---
+ configure.ac  |  4 ----
+ libmisc/obscure.c |  8 --------
+ src/passwd.c  | 33 ++-------------------------------
+ 3 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 2c8cca3f..5c8c7764 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -526,10 +526,6 @@ if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
+ 	echo "checking cracklib flavour, don't be surprised by the results"
+ 	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistCheck,
+ 		[LIBCRACK=-lcrack AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK, 1, [Defined if you have libcrack.])])
+-	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistory,
+-		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST, 1, [Defined if you have the ts&szs cracklib.]))
+-	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistHistoryPw,
+-		AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW, 1, [Defined if it includes *Pw functions.]))
+ fi
+ 
+ if test "$with_btrfs" != "no"; then
+diff --git a/libmisc/obscure.c b/libmisc/obscure.c
+index ccffb71d..4070d4e4 100644
+--- a/libmisc/obscure.c
++++ b/libmisc/obscure.c
+@@ -100,11 +100,7 @@ static /*@observer@*//*@null@*/const char *password_check (
+ #ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK
+ 	char *dictpath;
+ 
+-#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW
+-	char *FascistCheckPw ();
+-#else
+ 	char *FascistCheck ();
+-#endif
+ #endif
+ 
+ 	if (strcmp (new, old) == 0) {
+@@ -133,11 +129,7 @@ static /*@observer@*//*@null@*/const char *password_check (
+ 
+ 		dictpath = getdef_str ("CRACKLIB_DICTPATH");
+ 		if (NULL != dictpath) {
+-#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW
+-			msg = FascistCheckPw (new, dictpath, pwdp);
+-#else
+ 			msg = FascistCheck (new, dictpath);
+-#endif
+ 		}
+ #endif
+ 	}
+diff --git a/src/passwd.c b/src/passwd.c
+index 67608619..a4f49320 100644
+--- a/src/passwd.c
++++ b/src/passwd.c
+@@ -114,7 +114,6 @@ static bool do_update_pwd = false;
+ /* local function prototypes */
+ NORETURN static void usage (int);
+ 
+-static bool reuse (const char *, const struct passwd *);
+ static int new_password (const struct passwd *);
+ 
+ static void check_password (const struct passwd *, const struct spwd *);
+@@ -163,27 +162,6 @@ usage (int status)
+ 	exit (status);
+ }
+ 
+-static bool reuse (const char *pass, const struct passwd *pw)
+-{
+-#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST
+-	const char *reason;
+-
+-#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW
+-	const char *FascistHistoryPw (const char *, const struct passwd *);
+-
+-	reason = FascistHistory (pass, pw);
+-#else				/* !HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW */
+-	const char *FascistHistory (const char *, int);
+-
+-	reason = FascistHistory (pass, pw->pw_uid);
+-#endif				/* !HAVE_LIBCRACK_PW */
+-	if (NULL != reason) {
+-		(void) printf (_("Bad password: %s.  "), reason);
+-		return true;
+-	}
+-#endif				/* HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST */
+-	return false;
+-}
+ 
+ /*
+  * new_password - validate old password and replace with new (both old and
+@@ -202,10 +180,6 @@ static int new_password (const struct passwd *pw)
+ 	int pass_max_len = -1;
+ 	const char *method;
+ 
+-#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST
+-	int HistUpdate (const char *, const char *);
+-#endif				/* HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST */
+-
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Authenticate the user. The user will be prompted for their own
+ 	 * password.
+@@ -306,7 +280,7 @@ static int new_password (const struct passwd *pw)
+ 		STRFCPY (pass, cp);
+ 		erase_pass (cp);
+ 
+-		if (!amroot && (!obscure (orig, pass, pw) || reuse (pass, pw))) {
++		if (!amroot && !obscure(orig, pass, pw)) {
+ 			(void) puts (_("Try again."));
+ 			continue;
+ 		}
+@@ -317,7 +291,7 @@ static int new_password (const struct passwd *pw)
+ 		 * --marekm
+ 		 */
+ 		if (amroot && !warned && getdef_bool ("PASS_ALWAYS_WARN")
+-		    && (!obscure (orig, pass, pw) || reuse (pass, pw))) {
++		    && !obscure(orig, pass, pw)) {
+ 			(void) puts (_("\nWarning: weak password (enter it again to use it anyway)."));
+ 			warned = true;
+ 			continue;
+@@ -357,9 +331,6 @@ static int new_password (const struct passwd *pw)
+ 		return -1;
+ 	}
+ 
+-#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST
+-	HistUpdate (pw->pw_name, crypt_passwd);
+-#endif				/* HAVE_LIBCRACK_HIST */
+ 	STRFCPY (crypt_passwd, cp);
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+-- 
+2.43.0
+
+
+From 45f34ee8c196a98397504cb7ed8576b6f1825cf9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Date: Mon, 30 Oct 2023 13:31:42 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH 2/2] Remove libcrack support
+
+Signed-off-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+---
+ configure.ac                       | 11 -----------
+ etc/login.defs                     |  5 -----
+ lib/getdef.c                       |  1 -
+ libmisc/obscure.c                      | 22 ----------------------
+ libsubid/Makefile.am               |  1 -
+ src/Makefile.am                    |  2 +-
+ 7 files changed, 2 insertions(+), 42 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 5c8c7764..c2b0a1a5 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -243,9 +243,6 @@ AC_ARG_WITH(skey,
+ AC_ARG_WITH(tcb,
+ 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-tcb], [use tcb support (incomplete) @<:@default=yes if found@:>@])],
+ 	[with_tcb=$withval], [with_tcb=maybe])
+-AC_ARG_WITH(libcrack,
+-	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-libcrack], [use libcrack @<:@default=no@:>@])],
+-	[with_libcrack=$withval], [with_libcrack=no])
+ AC_ARG_WITH(sha-crypt,
+ 	[AS_HELP_STRING([--with-sha-crypt], [allow the SHA256 and SHA512 password encryption algorithms @<:@default=yes@:>@])],
+ 	[with_sha_crypt=$withval], [with_sha_crypt=yes])
+@@ -521,13 +518,6 @@ if test "$with_audit" != "no"; then
+ 	fi
+ fi
+ 
+-AC_SUBST(LIBCRACK)
+-if test "$with_libcrack" = "yes"; then
+-	echo "checking cracklib flavour, don't be surprised by the results"
+-	AC_CHECK_LIB(crack, FascistCheck,
+-		[LIBCRACK=-lcrack AC_DEFINE(HAVE_LIBCRACK, 1, [Defined if you have libcrack.])])
+-fi
+-
+ if test "$with_btrfs" != "no"; then
+ 	AC_CHECK_HEADERS([sys/statfs.h linux/magic.h linux/btrfs_tree.h], \
+ 		[btrfs_headers="yes"], [btrfs_headers="no"])
+@@ -768,7 +758,6 @@ echo
+ echo "shadow will be compiled with the following features:"
+ echo
+ echo "	auditing support:		$with_audit"
+-echo "	CrackLib support:		$with_libcrack"
+ echo "	PAM support:			$with_libpam"
+ if test "$with_libpam" = "yes"; then
+ echo "	suid account management tools:	$enable_acct_tools_setuid"
+diff --git a/etc/login.defs b/etc/login.defs
+index 114dbcd9..33622c29 100644
+--- a/etc/login.defs
++++ b/etc/login.defs
+@@ -227,11 +227,6 @@ PASS_WARN_AGE	7
+ #
+ SU_WHEEL_ONLY	no
+ 
+-#
+-# If compiled with cracklib support, sets the path to the dictionaries
+-#
+-CRACKLIB_DICTPATH	/var/cache/cracklib/cracklib_dict
+-
+ #
+ # Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd(8)
+ #
+diff --git a/lib/getdef.c b/lib/getdef.c
+index 977660c2..d64e6343 100644
+--- a/lib/getdef.c
++++ b/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ struct itemdef {
+ #define PAMDEFS					\
+ 	{"CHFN_AUTH", NULL},			\
+ 	{"CHSH_AUTH", NULL},			\
+-	{"CRACKLIB_DICTPATH", NULL},		\
+ 	{"ENV_HZ", NULL},			\
+ 	{"ENVIRON_FILE", NULL},			\
+ 	{"ENV_TZ", NULL},			\
+diff --git a/libmisc/obscure.c b/libmisc/obscure.c
+index 4070d4e4..2aece68b 100644
+--- a/libmisc/obscure.c
++++ b/libmisc/obscure.c
+@@ -12,11 +12,6 @@
+ #ident "$Id$"
+ 
+ 
+-/*
+- * This version of obscure.c contains modifications to support "cracklib"
+- * by Alec Muffet (alec.muffett@uk.sun.com).  You must obtain the Cracklib
+- * library source code for this function to operate.
+- */
+ #include <ctype.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ 
+@@ -97,12 +92,6 @@ static /*@observer@*//*@null@*/const char *password_check (
+ 	const char *msg = NULL;
+ 	char *oldmono, *newmono, *wrapped;
+ 
+-#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK
+-	char *dictpath;
+-
+-	char *FascistCheck ();
+-#endif
+-
+ 	if (strcmp (new, old) == 0) {
+ 		return _("no change");
+ 	}
+@@ -121,17 +110,6 @@ static /*@observer@*//*@null@*/const char *password_check (
+ 		msg = _("too similar");
+ 	} else if (strstr (wrapped, newmono) != NULL) {
+ 		msg = _("rotated");
+-	} else {
+-#ifdef HAVE_LIBCRACK
+-		/*
+-		 * Invoke Alec Muffett's cracklib routines.
+-		 */
+-
+-		dictpath = getdef_str ("CRACKLIB_DICTPATH");
+-		if (NULL != dictpath) {
+-			msg = FascistCheck (new, dictpath);
+-		}
+-#endif
+ 	}
+ 	strzero (newmono);
+ 	strzero (oldmono);
+diff --git a/libsubid/Makefile.am b/libsubid/Makefile.am
+index 5ba0ab35..b6488e77 100644
+--- a/libsubid/Makefile.am
++++ b/libsubid/Makefile.am
+@@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ MISCLIBS = \
+ 	$(LIBAUDIT) \
+ 	$(LIBSELINUX) \
+ 	$(LIBSEMANAGE) \
+-	$(LIBCRACK) \
+ 	$(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) \
+ 	$(LIBSKEY) \
+ 	$(LIBMD) \
+diff --git a/src/Makefile.am b/src/Makefile.am
+index fcfee9d2..b6cb09ef 100644
+--- a/src/Makefile.am
++++ b/src/Makefile.am
+@@ -123,7 +123,7 @@ login_LDADD    = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBSKEY) $(L
+ newgrp_LDADD   = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBCRYPT) $(LIBECONF)
+ newusers_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT) $(LIBECONF) -ldl
+ nologin_LDADD  =
+-passwd_LDADD   = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBCRACK) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBECONF) -ldl
++passwd_LDADD   = $(LDADD) $(LIBPAM) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBCRYPT_NOPAM) $(LIBECONF) -ldl
+ pwck_LDADD     = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBECONF)
+ pwconv_LDADD   = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBECONF)
+ pwunconv_LDADD = $(LDADD) $(LIBAUDIT) $(LIBSELINUX) $(LIBECONF)
+-- 
+2.43.0
+

shadow-4.15.0-account-tools-setuid.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,380 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/src/chpasswd.c.account-tools-setuid shadow-4.15.0/src/chpasswd.c
+--- shadow-4.15.0/src/chpasswd.c.account-tools-setuid	2024-03-08 22:27:04.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/src/chpasswd.c	2024-03-11 11:21:57.561150382 +0100
+@@ -443,9 +443,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	char *cp;
+ 	const char *salt;
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	bool use_pam = true;
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	int errors = 0;
+ 	int line = 0;
+@@ -469,19 +471,23 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	process_root_flag ("-R", argc, argv);
+ 	prefix = process_prefix_flag ("-P", argc, argv);
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (md5flg || eflg || cflg || prefix[0]) {
+ 		use_pam = false;
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	OPENLOG (Prog);
+ 
+ 	check_perms ();
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (!use_pam)
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	{
+ 		is_shadow_pwd = spw_file_present ();
+ 
+@@ -543,6 +549,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		}
+ 		newpwd = cp;
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (use_pam) {
+ 			if (do_pam_passwd_non_interactive (Prog, name, newpwd) != 0) {
+@@ -553,6 +560,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 			}
+ 		} else
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		{
+ 		const struct spwd *sp;
+ 		struct spwd newsp;
+@@ -672,9 +680,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	 * password database.
+ 	 */
+ 	if (0 != errors) {
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		if (!use_pam)
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		{
+ 			fprintf (stderr,
+ 			         _("%s: error detected, changes ignored\n"),
+@@ -683,9 +693,11 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		fail_exit (1);
+ 	}
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	if (!use_pam)
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	{
+ 	/* Save the changes */
+ 		close_files ();
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/src/groupmems.c.account-tools-setuid shadow-4.15.0/src/groupmems.c
+--- shadow-4.15.0/src/groupmems.c.account-tools-setuid	2024-03-08 22:27:04.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/src/groupmems.c	2024-03-11 11:16:18.365408572 +0100
+@@ -14,9 +14,11 @@
+ #include <grp.h>
+ #include <stdio.h>
+ #include <sys/types.h>
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ #include "pam_defs.h"
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ #include <pwd.h>
+ 
+ #include "alloc.h"
+@@ -430,6 +432,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ static void check_perms (void)
+ {
+ 	if (!list) {
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		pam_handle_t *pamh = NULL;
+ 		int retval;
+@@ -463,7 +466,8 @@ static void check_perms (void)
+ 			fail_exit (1);
+ 		}
+ 		(void) pam_end (pamh, retval);
+-#endif
++#endif /* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	}
+ }
+ 
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/src/newusers.c.account-tools-setuid shadow-4.15.0/src/newusers.c
+--- shadow-4.15.0/src/newusers.c.account-tools-setuid	2024-03-08 22:27:04.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/src/newusers.c	2024-03-11 11:20:07.198909046 +0100
+@@ -59,6 +59,7 @@
+ static const char Prog[] = "newusers";
+ 
+ static bool rflg = false;	/* create a system account */
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ static /*@null@*//*@observer@*/char *crypt_method = NULL;
+ #define cflg (NULL != crypt_method)
+@@ -75,6 +76,7 @@ static long bcrypt_rounds = 13;
+ static long yescrypt_cost = 5;
+ #endif				/* USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ static bool is_shadow;
+ #ifdef SHADOWGRP
+@@ -97,9 +99,11 @@ NORETURN static void fail_exit (int);
+ static int add_group (const char *, const char *, gid_t *, gid_t);
+ static int get_user_id (const char *, uid_t *);
+ static int add_user (const char *, uid_t, gid_t);
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ static int update_passwd (struct passwd *, const char *);
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *, const char *);
+ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv);
+ static void check_flags (void);
+@@ -121,6 +125,7 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ 	                  "Options:\n"),
+ 	                Prog);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -b, --badname                 allow bad names\n"), usageout);
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 	(void) fprintf (usageout,
+ 	                _("  -c, --crypt-method METHOD     the crypt method (one of %s)\n"),
+@@ -136,9 +141,11 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ #endif
+ 	               );
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -h, --help                    display this help message and exit\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -r, --system                  create system accounts\n"), usageout);
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -R, --root CHROOT_DIR         directory to chroot into\n"), usageout);
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 	(void) fputs (_("  -s, --sha-rounds              number of rounds for the SHA, BCRYPT\n"
+@@ -146,6 +153,7 @@ static void usage (int status)
+ 	              usageout);
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	(void) fputs ("\n", usageout);
+ 
+ 	exit (status);
+@@ -405,6 +413,7 @@ static int add_user (const char *name, u
+ 	return (pw_update (&pwent) == 0) ? -1 : 0;
+ }
+ 
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ /*
+  * update_passwd - update the password in the passwd entry
+@@ -457,6 +466,7 @@ static int update_passwd (struct passwd
+ 	return 0;
+ }
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ /*
+  * add_passwd - add or update the encrypted password
+@@ -465,10 +475,13 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ {
+ 	const struct spwd *sp;
+ 	struct spwd spent;
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 	char *cp;
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 	void *crypt_arg = NULL;
+ 	if (NULL != crypt_method) {
+@@ -505,13 +518,14 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ 		return update_passwd (pwd, password);
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Do the first and easiest shadow file case. The user already
+ 	 * exists in the shadow password file.
+ 	 */
+ 	sp = spw_locate (pwd->pw_name);
+-#ifndef USE_PAM
++#if !defined(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID) && !defined(USE_PAM)
+ 	if (NULL != sp) {
+ 		spent = *sp;
+ 		if (   (NULL != crypt_method)
+@@ -547,7 +561,7 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ 	if (strcmp (pwd->pw_passwd, "x") != 0) {
+ 		return update_passwd (pwd, password);
+ 	}
+-#else				/* USE_PAM */
++#else				/* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID && !USE_PAM */
+ 	/*
+ 	 * If there is already a shadow entry, do not touch it.
+ 	 * If there is already a passwd entry with a password, do not
+@@ -558,14 +572,14 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ 	    || (strcmp (pwd->pw_passwd, "x") != 0)) {
+ 		return 0;
+ 	}
+-#endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif				/* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID && !USE_PAM */
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Now the really hard case - I need to create an entirely new
+ 	 * shadow password file entry.
+ 	 */
+ 	spent.sp_namp = pwd->pw_name;
+-#ifndef USE_PAM
++#if !defined(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID) && !defined(USE_PAM)
+ 	if ((crypt_method != NULL) && (0 == strcmp(crypt_method, "NONE"))) {
+ 		spent.sp_pwdp = (char *)password;
+ 	} else {
+@@ -610,35 +624,41 @@ static int add_passwd (struct passwd *pw
+ static void process_flags (int argc, char **argv)
+ {
+ 	int c;
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+         int bad_s;
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif 				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 	static struct option long_options[] = {
+ 		{"badname",      no_argument,       NULL, 'b'},
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		{"crypt-method", required_argument, NULL, 'c'},
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		{"help",         no_argument,       NULL, 'h'},
+ 		{"system",       no_argument,       NULL, 'r'},
+ 		{"root",         required_argument, NULL, 'R'},
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 		{"sha-rounds",   required_argument, NULL, 's'},
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		{NULL, 0, NULL, '\0'}
+ 	};
+ 
+ 	while ((c = getopt_long (argc, argv,
+-#ifndef USE_PAM
++#if !defined(ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID) && !defined(USE_PAM)
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 	                         "c:bhrs:",
+ #else				/* !USE_SHA_CRYPT && !USE_BCRYPT && !USE_YESCRYPT */
+ 	                         "c:bhr",
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+-#else				/* USE_PAM */
++#else				/* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID && !USE_PAM */
+ 	                         "bhr",
+ #endif
+ 	                         long_options, NULL)) != -1) {
+@@ -646,11 +666,13 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ 		case 'b':
+ 			allow_bad_names = true;
+ 			break;
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ 		case 'c':
+ 			crypt_method = optarg;
+ 			break;
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		case 'h':
+ 			usage (EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ 			break;
+@@ -659,6 +681,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ 			break;
+ 		case 'R': /* no-op, handled in process_root_flag () */
+ 			break;
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 		case 's':
+@@ -698,6 +721,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+ 			break;
+ #endif				/* USE_SHA_CRYPT || USE_BCRYPT || USE_YESCRYPT */
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		default:
+ 			usage (EXIT_FAILURE);
+ 			break;
+@@ -730,6 +754,7 @@ static void process_flags (int argc, cha
+  */
+ static void check_flags (void)
+ {
++#ifndef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifndef USE_PAM
+ #if defined(USE_SHA_CRYPT) || defined(USE_BCRYPT) || defined(USE_YESCRYPT)
+ 	if (sflg && !cflg) {
+@@ -762,6 +787,7 @@ static void check_flags (void)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* !USE_PAM */
++#endif /* !ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ }
+ 
+ /*
+@@ -1052,12 +1078,14 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	int line = 0;
+ 	uid_t uid;
+ 	gid_t gid;
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	int *lines = NULL;
+ 	char **usernames = NULL;
+ 	char **passwords = NULL;
+ 	unsigned int nusers = 0;
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	log_set_progname(Prog);
+ 	log_set_logfd(stderr);
+@@ -1195,6 +1223,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		}
+ 		newpw = *pw;
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 		/* keep the list of user/password for later update by PAM */
+ 		nusers++;
+@@ -1211,6 +1240,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		usernames[nusers-1] = strdup (fields[0]);
+ 		passwords[nusers-1] = strdup (fields[1]);
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 		if (add_passwd (&newpw, fields[1]) != 0) {
+ 			fprintf (stderr,
+ 			         _("%s: line %d: can't update password\n"),
+@@ -1327,6 +1357,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	nscd_flush_cache ("group");
+ 	sssd_flush_cache (SSSD_DB_PASSWD | SSSD_DB_GROUP);
+ 
++#ifdef ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID
+ #ifdef USE_PAM
+ 	unsigned int i;
+ 	/* Now update the passwords using PAM */
+@@ -1339,6 +1370,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 		}
+ 	}
+ #endif				/* USE_PAM */
++#endif /* ACCT_TOOLS_SETUID */
+ 
+ 	exit (EXIT_SUCCESS);
+ }

shadow-4.15.0-date-parsing.patch

@@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
-Index: shadow-4.5/libmisc/getdate.y
+Index: shadow-4.5/lib/getdate.y
 ===================================================================
---- shadow-4.5.orig/libmisc/getdate.y
-+++ shadow-4.5/libmisc/getdate.y
+--- shadow-4.5.orig/lib/getdate.y
++++ shadow-4.5/lib/getdate.y
 @@ -152,6 +152,7 @@ static int	yyHaveDay;
  static int	yyHaveRel;
  static int	yyHaveTime;

shadow-4.15.0-getdef-spurious-error.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,137 @@
+From ead55e9ba8958504e23e29545f90c4dd925c7462 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 17:39:46 -0500
+Subject: [PATCH] getdef: avoid spurious error messages about unknown
+ configuration options
+
+def_find can return NULL for unset, not just unknown, config options.  So
+move the decision of whether to log an error message about an unknown config
+option back into def_find, which knows the difference.  Only putdef_str()
+will pass a char* srcfile to def_find, so only calls from putdef_str will
+cause the message, which was the original intent of fa68441bc4be8.
+
+closes #967
+
+fixes: fa68441bc4be8 ("Improve the login.defs unknown item error message")
+Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
+---
+ lib/getdef.c | 30 ++++++++++++++++--------------
+ 1 file changed, 16 insertions(+), 14 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/lib/getdef.c b/lib/getdef.c
+index 4d4d4e19..ef2ae1f0 100644
+--- a/lib/getdef.c
++++ b/lib/getdef.c
+@@ -176,7 +176,7 @@ static const char* def_fname = LOGINDEFS;	/* login config defs file       */
+ static bool def_loaded = false;		/* are defs already loaded?     */
+ 
+ /* local function prototypes */
+-static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *);
++static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *, const char *);
+ static void def_load (void);
+ 
+ 
+@@ -195,7 +195,7 @@ static void def_load (void);
+ 		def_load ();
+ 	}
+ 
+-	d = def_find (item);
++	d = def_find (item, NULL);
+ 	return (NULL == d) ? NULL : d->value;
+ }
+ 
+@@ -214,7 +214,7 @@ bool getdef_bool (const char *item)
+ 		def_load ();
+ 	}
+ 
+-	d = def_find (item);
++	d = def_find (item, NULL);
+ 	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
+ 		return false;
+ 	}
+@@ -240,7 +240,7 @@ int getdef_num (const char *item, int dflt)
+ 		def_load ();
+ 	}
+ 
+-	d = def_find (item);
++	d = def_find (item, NULL);
+ 	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
+ 		return dflt;
+ 	}
+@@ -275,7 +275,7 @@ unsigned int getdef_unum (const char *item, unsigned int dflt)
+ 		def_load ();
+ 	}
+ 
+-	d = def_find (item);
++	d = def_find (item, NULL);
+ 	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
+ 		return dflt;
+ 	}
+@@ -310,7 +310,7 @@ long getdef_long (const char *item, long dflt)
+ 		def_load ();
+ 	}
+ 
+-	d = def_find (item);
++	d = def_find (item, NULL);
+ 	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
+ 		return dflt;
+ 	}
+@@ -342,7 +342,7 @@ unsigned long getdef_ulong (const char *item, unsigned long dflt)
+ 		def_load ();
+ 	}
+ 
+-	d = def_find (item);
++	d = def_find (item, NULL);
+ 	if ((NULL == d) || (NULL == d->value)) {
+ 		return dflt;
+ 	}
+@@ -375,12 +375,9 @@ int putdef_str (const char *name, const char *value, const char *srcfile)
+ 	 * Locate the slot to save the value.  If this parameter
+ 	 * is unknown then "def_find" will print an err message.
+ 	 */
+-	d = def_find (name);
+-	if (NULL == d) {
+-		if (NULL != srcfile)
+-			SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "shadow: unknown configuration item '%s' in '%s'", name, srcfile));
++	d = def_find (name, srcfile);
++	if (NULL == d)
+ 		return -1;
+-	}
+ 
+ 	/*
+ 	 * Save off the value.
+@@ -404,9 +401,12 @@ int putdef_str (const char *name, const char *value, const char *srcfile)
+  *
+  * Search through a table of configurable items to locate the
+  * specified configuration option.
++ *
++ * If srcfile is not NULL, and the item is not found, then report an error saying
++ * the unknown item was used in this file.
+  */
+ 
+-static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name)
++static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name, const char *srcfile)
+ {
+ 	struct itemdef *ptr;
+ 
+@@ -432,6 +432,8 @@ static /*@observer@*/ /*@null@*/struct itemdef *def_find (const char *name)
+ 	fprintf (shadow_logfd,
+ 	         _("configuration error - unknown item '%s' (notify administrator)\n"),
+ 	         name);
++	if (srcfile != NULL)
++		SYSLOG ((LOG_CRIT, "shadow: unknown configuration item '%s' in '%s'", name, srcfile));
+ 
+ out:
+ 	return NULL;
+@@ -610,7 +612,7 @@ int main (int argc, char **argv)
+ 	def_load ();
+ 
+ 	for (i = 0; i < NUMDEFS; ++i) {
+-		d = def_find (def_table[i].name);
++		d = def_find (def_table[i].name, NULL);
+ 		if (NULL == d) {
+ 			printf ("error - lookup '%s' failed\n",
+ 			        def_table[i].name);
+-- 
+2.44.0
+

shadow-4.15.0-manfix.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,162 @@
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix shadow-4.15.0/man/groupmems.8.xml
+--- shadow-4.15.0/man/groupmems.8.xml.manfix	2023-05-26 04:56:11.000000000 +0200
++++ shadow-4.15.0/man/groupmems.8.xml	2024-02-09 10:42:20.337036378 +0100
+@@ -156,20 +156,10 @@
+   <refsect1 id='setup'>
+     <title>SETUP</title>
+     <para>
+-      The <command>groupmems</command> executable should be in mode
+-      <literal>2710</literal> as user <emphasis>root</emphasis> and in group
+-      <emphasis>groups</emphasis>. The system administrator can add users to
+-      group <emphasis>groups</emphasis> to allow or disallow them using the
+-      <command>groupmems</command> utility to manage their own group
+-      membership list.
++      In this operating system the <command>groupmems</command> executable
++      is not setuid and regular users cannot use it to manipulate
++      the membership of their own group.
+     </para>
+-
+-    <programlisting>
+-	$ groupadd -r groups
+-	$ chmod 2710 groupmems
+-	$ chown root:groups groupmems
+-	$ groupmems -g groups -a gk4
+-    </programlisting>
+   </refsect1>
+ 
+   <refsect1 id='configuration'>
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix shadow-4.15.0/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5
+--- shadow-4.15.0/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5.manfix	2023-03-13 21:58:56.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/man/ja/man5/login.defs.5	2024-02-09 10:42:20.337036378 +0100
+@@ -123,10 +123,6 @@ 以下の参照表は、
+ shadow パスワード機能のどのプログラムが
+ どのパラメータを使用するかを示したものである。
+ .na
+-.IP chfn 12
+-CHFN_AUTH CHFN_RESTRICT
+-.IP chsh 12
+-CHFN_AUTH
+ .IP groupadd 12
+ GID_MAX GID_MIN
+ .IP newusers 12
+diff -up shadow-4.15.0/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix shadow-4.15.0/man/login.defs.5.xml
+--- shadow-4.15.0/man/login.defs.5.xml.manfix	2024-01-22 22:36:43.000000000 +0100
++++ shadow-4.15.0/man/login.defs.5.xml	2024-02-09 10:45:49.014407259 +0100
+@@ -144,6 +144,17 @@
+       long numeric parameters is machine-dependent.
+     </para>
+ 
++    <para>
++      Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
++      behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
++      tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
++      passwd command) should be configured elsewhere. The only values that
++      affect PAM modules are <emphasis>ENCRYPT_METHOD</emphasis> and <emphasis>SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS</emphasis>
++      for pam_unix module, <emphasis>FAIL_DELAY</emphasis> for pam_faildelay module,
++      and <emphasis>UMASK</emphasis> for pam_umask module. Refer to
++      pam(8) for more information.
++    </para>
++
+     <para>The following configuration items are provided:</para>
+ 
+     <variablelist remap='IP'>
+@@ -240,16 +251,6 @@
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+-	<term>chfn</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CHFN_AUTH</phrase>
+-	    CHFN_RESTRICT
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>chgpasswd</term>
+ 	<listitem>
+ 	  <para>
+@@ -276,14 +277,6 @@
+ 	  </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
+-	<term>chsh</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    CHSH_AUTH LOGIN_STRING
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <!-- expiry: no variables (CONSOLE_GROUPS linked, but not used) -->
+       <!-- faillog: no variables -->
+       <varlistentry>
+@@ -352,34 +345,6 @@
+ 	  <para>LASTLOG_UID_MAX</para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+-	<term>login</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
+-	    CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+-	    ENV_TZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
+-	    ERASECHAR FAIL_DELAY
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">FAILLOG_ENAB</phrase>
+-	    FAKE_SHELL
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">FTMP_FILE</phrase>
+-	    HUSHLOGIN_FILE
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ISSUE_FILE</phrase>
+-	    KILLCHAR
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LASTLOG_ENAB LASTLOG_UID_MAX</phrase>
+-	    LOGIN_RETRIES
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">LOGIN_STRING</phrase>
+-	    LOGIN_TIMEOUT LOG_OK_LOGINS LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">MAIL_CHECK_ENAB MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE
+-	    MOTD_FILE NOLOGINS_FILE PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB
+-	    QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
+-	    TTYGROUP TTYPERM TTYTYPE_FILE
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ULIMIT UMASK</phrase>
+-	    USERGROUPS_ENAB
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <!-- logoutd: no variables -->
+       <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>newgrp / sg</term>
+@@ -451,32 +416,6 @@
+ 	  </para>
+ 	</listitem>
+       </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry>
+-	<term>su</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">CONSOLE</phrase>
+-	    CONSOLE_GROUPS DEFAULT_HOME
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_HZ ENVIRON_FILE</phrase>
+-	    ENV_PATH ENV_SUPATH
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">ENV_TZ LOGIN_STRING MAIL_CHECK_ENAB
+-	    MAIL_DIR MAIL_FILE QUOTAS_ENAB</phrase>
+-	    SULOG_FILE SU_NAME
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">SU_WHEEL_ONLY</phrase>
+-	    SYSLOG_SU_ENAB
+-	    <phrase condition="no_pam">USERGROUPS_ENAB</phrase>
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+-      <varlistentry condition="no_pam">
+-	<term>sulogin</term>
+-	<listitem>
+-	  <para>
+-	    ENV_HZ
+-	    ENV_TZ
+-	  </para>
+-	</listitem>
+-      </varlistentry>
+       <varlistentry>
+ 	<term>useradd</term>
+ 	<listitem>

shadow-4.15.0-useradd-fix-write-full-return.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,34 @@
+From 8903b94c86c978e8abef623358fd3e4629c06967 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+Date: Mon, 9 Sep 2024 10:36:17 +0200
+Subject: [PATCH] useradd: fix write_full() return value
+
+write_full() returns -1 on error and useradd was checking another value.
+
+Closes: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/issues/1072
+Fixes: f45498a6c286 ("libmisc/write_full.c: Improve write_full()")
+
+Reported-by: <https://github.com/brown-midas>
+Suggested-by: <https://github.com/brown-midas>
+Reviewed-by: Alejandro Colomar <alx@kernel.org>
+Reviewed-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
+---
+ src/useradd.c | 2 +-
+ 1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
+
+diff --git a/src/useradd.c b/src/useradd.c
+index 02c500d0..d64fd892 100644
+--- a/src/useradd.c
++++ b/src/useradd.c
+@@ -2042,7 +2042,7 @@ static void lastlog_reset (uid_t uid)
+ 		return;
+ 	}
+ 	if (   (lseek (fd, offset_uid, SEEK_SET) != offset_uid)
+-	    || (write_full (fd, &ll, sizeof (ll)) != (ssize_t) sizeof (ll))
++	    || (write_full (fd, &ll, sizeof (ll)) == -1)
+ 	    || (fsync (fd) != 0)) {
+ 		fprintf (stderr,
+ 		         _("%s: failed to reset the lastlog entry of UID %lu: %s\n"),
+-- 
+2.46.0
+

shadow-utils-configure-gshadow.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,20 @@
+The missing #include <gshadow.h> causes the configure check to fail
+spuriously, resulting in HAVE_SHADOWGRP not being defined.
+
+Submitted upstream: <https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/595>
+
+diff --git a/configure.ac b/configure.ac
+index 924254a0c8171802..6c7d9839979e037d 100644
+--- a/configure.ac
++++ b/configure.ac
+@@ -116,6 +116,10 @@ if test "$ac_cv_header_shadow_h" = "yes"; then
+ 		ac_cv_libc_shadowgrp,
+ 		AC_RUN_IFELSE([AC_LANG_SOURCE([
+ 				#include <shadow.h>
++				#ifdef HAVE_GSHADOW_H
++				#include <gshadow.h>
++				#endif
++				int
+ 				main()
+ 				{
+ 					struct sgrp *sg = sgetsgent("test:x::");

shadow-utils.HOME_MODE.xml

@@ -0,0 +1,43 @@
+<!--
+   Copyright (c) 1991 - 1993, Julianne Frances Haugh
+   Copyright (c) 1991 - 1993, Chip Rosenthal
+   Copyright (c) 2007 - 2009, Nicolas François
+   All rights reserved.
+  
+   Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
+   modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
+   are met:
+   1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
+   2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
+      notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in the
+      documentation and/or other materials provided with the distribution.
+   3. The name of the copyright holders or contributors may not be used to
+      endorse or promote products derived from this software without
+      specific prior written permission.
+  
+   THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE COPYRIGHT HOLDERS AND CONTRIBUTORS
+   ``AS IS'' AND ANY EXPRESS OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+   LIMITED TO, THE IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A
+   PARTICULAR PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED.  IN NO EVENT SHALL THE COPYRIGHT
+   HOLDERS OR CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
+   SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT NOT
+   LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES; LOSS OF USE,
+   DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION) HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY
+   THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT, STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT
+   (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE) ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE
+   OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
+-->
+<varlistentry>
+  <term><option>HOME_MODE</option> (number)</term>
+  <listitem>
+    <para>
+      The mode for new home directories. If not specified,
+      the <option>UMASK</option> is used to create the mode.
+    </para>
+    <para>
+      <command>useradd</command> and <command>newusers</command> use this
+      to set the mode of the home directory they create.
+    </para>
+  </listitem>
+</varlistentry>

shadow-utils.login.defs

@@ -0,0 +1,315 @@
+#
+# Please note that the parameters in this configuration file control the
+# behavior of the tools from the shadow-utils component. None of these
+# tools uses the PAM mechanism, and the utilities that use PAM (such as the
+# passwd command) should therefore be configured elsewhere. Refer to
+# /etc/pam.d/system-auth for more information.
+#
+
+#
+# Delay in seconds before being allowed another attempt after a login failure
+# Note: When PAM is used, some modules may enforce a minimum delay (e.g.
+#       pam_unix(8) enforces a 2s delay)
+#
+#FAIL_DELAY		3
+
+# Currently FAILLOG_ENAB is not supported
+
+#
+# Enable display of unknown usernames when login(1) failures are recorded.
+#
+#LOG_UNKFAIL_ENAB	no
+
+# Currently LOG_OK_LOGINS is not supported
+
+# Currently LASTLOG_ENAB is not supported
+
+#
+# Limit the highest user ID number for which the lastlog entries should
+# be updated.
+#
+# No LASTLOG_UID_MAX means that there is no user ID limit for writing
+# lastlog entries.
+#
+#LASTLOG_UID_MAX
+
+# Currently MAIL_CHECK_ENAB is not supported
+
+# Currently OBSCURE_CHECKS_ENAB is not supported
+
+# Currently PORTTIME_CHECKS_ENAB is not supported
+
+# Currently QUOTAS_ENAB is not supported
+
+# Currently SYSLOG_SU_ENAB is not supported
+
+#
+# Enable "syslog" logging of newgrp(1) and sg(1) activity.
+#
+#SYSLOG_SG_ENAB		yes
+
+# Currently CONSOLE is not supported
+
+# Currently SULOG_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently MOTD_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently ISSUE_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently TTYTYPE_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently FTMP_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently NOLOGINS_FILE is not supported
+
+# Currently SU_NAME is not supported
+
+# *REQUIRED*
+#   Directory where mailboxes reside, _or_ name of file, relative to the
+#   home directory.  If you _do_ define both, MAIL_DIR takes precedence.
+#
+MAIL_DIR	/var/spool/mail
+#MAIL_FILE	.mail
+
+#
+# If defined, file which inhibits all the usual chatter during the login
+# sequence.  If a full pathname, then hushed mode will be enabled if the
+# user's name or shell are found in the file.  If not a full pathname, then
+# hushed mode will be enabled if the file exists in the user's home directory.
+#
+#HUSHLOGIN_FILE	.hushlogin
+#HUSHLOGIN_FILE	/etc/hushlogins
+
+# Currently ENV_TZ is not supported
+
+# Currently ENV_HZ is not supported
+
+#
+# The default PATH settings, for superuser and normal users.
+#
+# (they are minimal, add the rest in the shell startup files)
+#ENV_SUPATH	PATH=/sbin:/bin:/usr/sbin:/usr/bin
+#ENV_PATH	PATH=/bin:/usr/bin
+
+#
+# Terminal permissions
+#
+#	TTYGROUP	Login tty will be assigned this group ownership.
+#	TTYPERM		Login tty will be set to this permission.
+#
+# If you have a write(1) program which is "setgid" to a special group
+# which owns the terminals, define TTYGROUP as the number of such group
+# and TTYPERM as 0620.  Otherwise leave TTYGROUP commented out and
+# set TTYPERM to either 622 or 600.
+#
+#TTYGROUP	tty
+#TTYPERM		0600
+
+# Currently ERASECHAR, KILLCHAR and ULIMIT are not supported
+
+# Default initial "umask" value used by login(1) on non-PAM enabled systems.
+# Default "umask" value for pam_umask(8) on PAM enabled systems.
+# UMASK is also used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
+# home directories if HOME_MODE is not set.
+# 022 is the default value, but 027, or even 077, could be considered
+# for increased privacy. There is no One True Answer here: each sysadmin
+# must make up their mind.
+UMASK		022
+
+# HOME_MODE is used by useradd(8) and newusers(8) to set the mode for new
+# home directories.
+# If HOME_MODE is not set, the value of UMASK is used to create the mode.
+HOME_MODE	0700
+
+# Password aging controls:
+#
+#	PASS_MAX_DAYS	Maximum number of days a password may be used.
+#	PASS_MIN_DAYS	Minimum number of days allowed between password changes.
+#	PASS_MIN_LEN	Minimum acceptable password length.
+#	PASS_WARN_AGE	Number of days warning given before a password expires.
+#
+PASS_MAX_DAYS	99999
+PASS_MIN_DAYS	0
+PASS_MIN_LEN	8
+PASS_WARN_AGE	7
+
+# Currently SU_WHEEL_ONLY is not supported
+
+# Currently CRACKLIB_DICTPATH is not supported
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic uid selection in useradd(8)
+#
+UID_MIN                  1000
+UID_MAX                 60000
+# System accounts
+SYS_UID_MIN               201
+SYS_UID_MAX               999
+# Extra per user uids
+SUB_UID_MIN		   524288
+SUB_UID_MAX		600100000
+SUB_UID_COUNT		    65536
+
+#
+# Min/max values for automatic gid selection in groupadd(8)
+#
+GID_MIN                  1000
+GID_MAX                 60000
+# System accounts
+SYS_GID_MIN               201
+SYS_GID_MAX               999
+# Extra per user group ids
+SUB_GID_MIN		   524288
+SUB_GID_MAX		600100000
+SUB_GID_COUNT		    65536
+
+#
+# Max number of login(1) retries if password is bad
+#
+#LOGIN_RETRIES		3
+
+#
+# Max time in seconds for login(1)
+#
+#LOGIN_TIMEOUT		60
+
+#
+# Maximum number of attempts to change password if rejected (too easy)
+#
+PASS_CHANGE_TRIES	5
+
+#
+# Warn about weak passwords (but still allow them) if you are root.
+#
+PASS_ALWAYS_WARN	yes
+
+#
+# Number of significant characters in the password for crypt().
+# Default is 8, don't change unless your crypt() is better.
+# Ignored if MD5_CRYPT_ENAB set to "yes".
+#
+#PASS_MAX_LEN		8
+
+# Currently CHFN_AUTH is not supported
+
+#
+# Which fields may be changed by regular users using chfn(1) - use
+# any combination of letters "frwh" (full name, room number, work
+# phone, home phone).  If not defined, no changes are allowed.
+# For backward compatibility, "yes" = "rwh" and "no" = "frwh".
+# 
+#CHFN_RESTRICT		rwh
+
+# Currently LOGIN_STRING is not supported
+
+# Currently MD5_CRYPT_ENAB is not supported
+
+#
+# If set to MD5, MD5-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA256, SHA256-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to SHA512, SHA512-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to BCRYPT, BCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to YESCRYPT, YESCRYPT-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password
+# If set to DES, DES-based algorithm will be used for encrypting password (default)
+#
+ENCRYPT_METHOD YESCRYPT
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to SHA256 or SHA512.
+#
+# Define the number of SHA rounds.
+# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
+# this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, the libc will choose the default number of rounds (5000).
+# The values must be within the 1000-999999999 range.
+#
+#SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 5000
+
+# Currently SHA_CRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS is not supported
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to BCRYPT.
+#
+# Define the number of BCRYPT rounds.
+# With a lot of rounds, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU resources will be needed to authenticate users if
+# this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, 13 rounds will be attempted.
+# If only one of the MIN or MAX values is set, then this value will be used.
+# If MIN > MAX, the highest value will be used.
+#
+#BCRYPT_MIN_ROUNDS 13
+#BCRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS 31
+
+#
+# Only works if ENCRYPT_METHOD is set to YESCRYPT.
+#
+# Define the YESCRYPT cost factor.
+# With a higher cost factor, it is more difficult to brute-force the password.
+# However, more CPU time and more memory will be needed to authenticate users
+# if this value is increased.
+#
+# If not specified, a cost factor of 5 will be used.
+# The value must be within the 1-11 range.
+#
+#YESCRYPT_COST_FACTOR 5
+
+# Currently CONSOLE_GROUPS is not supported
+
+#
+# Should login be allowed if we can't cd to the home directory?
+# Default is yes.
+#
+#DEFAULT_HOME	yes
+
+# Currently ENVIRON_FILE is not supported
+
+#
+# If defined, this command is run when removing a user.
+# It should remove any at/cron/print jobs etc. owned by
+# the user to be removed (passed as the first argument).
+#
+#USERDEL_CMD	/usr/sbin/userdel_local
+
+#
+# Enables userdel(8) to remove user groups if no members exist.
+#
+USERGROUPS_ENAB yes
+
+#
+# If set to a non-zero number, the shadow utilities will make sure that
+# groups never have more than this number of users on one line.
+# This permits to support split groups (groups split into multiple lines,
+# with the same group ID, to avoid limitation of the line length in the
+# group file).
+#
+# 0 is the default value and disables this feature.
+#
+#MAX_MEMBERS_PER_GROUP	0
+
+#
+# If useradd(8) should create home directories for users by default (non
+# system users only).
+# This option is overridden with the -M or -m flags on the useradd(8)
+# command-line.
+#
+CREATE_HOME	yes
+
+#
+# Force use shadow, even if shadow passwd & shadow group files are
+# missing.
+#
+#FORCE_SHADOW    yes
+
+#
+# Select the HMAC cryptography algorithm.
+# Used in pam_timestamp module to calculate the keyed-hash message
+# authentication code.
+#
+# Note: It is recommended to check hmac(3) to see the possible algorithms
+# that are available in your system.
+#
+HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO SHA512

shadow-utils.spec

@@ -1,123 +1,70 @@
 Summary: Utilities for managing accounts and shadow password files
 Name: shadow-utils
-Version: 4.6
-Release: 22%{?dist}
+Version: 4.15.0
+Release: 5%{?dist}
 Epoch: 2
-URL: http://pkg-shadow.alioth.debian.org/
+License: BSD-3-Clause AND GPL-2.0-or-later
+URL: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
 Source0: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/v%{version}/shadow-%{version}.tar.xz
 Source1: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/releases/download/v%{version}/shadow-%{version}.tar.xz.asc
 Source2: shadow-utils.useradd
 Source3: shadow-utils.login.defs
 Source4: shadow-bsd.txt
 Source5: https://www.gnu.org/licenses/old-licenses/gpl-2.0.txt
+Source6: shadow-utils.HOME_MODE.xml
+Source7: passwd.pamd
 
 ### Globals ###
-%global includesubiddir %{_includedir}/shadow 
+%global includesubiddir %{_includedir}/shadow
 
 ### Patches ###
-Patch0: shadow-4.6-redhat.patch
-Patch1: shadow-4.6-goodname.patch
-Patch2: shadow-4.1.5.1-info-parent-dir.patch
-Patch6: shadow-4.6-selinux.patch
-Patch10: shadow-4.6-orig-context.patch
-Patch11: shadow-4.1.5.1-logmsg.patch
-Patch14: shadow-4.1.5.1-default-range.patch
-Patch15: shadow-4.6-manfix.patch
-Patch17: shadow-4.1.5.1-userdel-helpfix.patch
-Patch19: shadow-4.2.1-date-parsing.patch
-Patch21: shadow-4.6-move-home.patch
-Patch22: shadow-4.6-audit-update.patch
-Patch23: shadow-4.5-usermod-unlock.patch
-Patch24: shadow-4.2.1-no-lock-dos.patch
-Patch28: shadow-4.6-selinux-perms.patch
-Patch29: shadow-4.2.1-null-tm.patch
-Patch31: shadow-4.6-getenforce.patch
-Patch32: shadow-4.5-crypt_h.patch
-Patch33: shadow-4.5-long-entry.patch
-Patch34: shadow-4.6-usermod-crash.patch
-Patch35: shadow-4.6-coverity.patch
-Patch36: shadow-4.6-use-itstool.patch
-Patch37: shadow-4.6-sssd-flush.patch
-Patch38: shadow-4.6-sysugid-min-limit.patch
-Patch39: shadow-4.6-chgrp-guard.patch
-Patch40: shadow-4.6-ignore-login-prompt.patch
-Patch41: shadow-4.6-use-lckpwdf.patch
-# Upstreamed
-Patch42: shadow-4.6-regular-user.patch
-# Upstreamed
-Patch43: shadow-4.6-home_mode-directive.patch
-# Upstreamed
-Patch44: shadow-4.6-check-local-groups.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e84df9e163e133eb11a2728024ff3e3440592cf8
-Patch45: shadow-4.6-sssd-redirect-warning.patch
-# Unused option in Fedora/RHEL - non upstreamable
-Patch46: shadow-4.6-remove-login-string-references.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e481437ab9ebe9a8bf8fbaabe986d42b2f765991
-Patch47: shadow-4.6-usermod-allow-all-group-types.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/0a7888b1fad613a052b988b01a71933b67296e68
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/607f1dd549cf9abc87af1cf29275f0d2d11eea29
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/b5fb1b38eea2fb0489ed088c82daf6700e72363e
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/43a917cce54019799a8de037fd63780a2b640afc
-Patch48: shadow-4.6-libsubid_creation.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/514c1328b6c90d817ae0a9f7addfb3c9a11a275a
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/8492dee6632e340dee76eee895c3e30877bebf45
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/0f4347d1483191b2142546416a9eefe0c9459600
-Patch49: shadow-4.6-libsubid_nsswitch_support.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/186b1b7ac1a68d0fcc618a22da1a99232b420911
-Patch50: shadow-4.6-man-mention-nss-in-newuidmap.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/f9831a4a1a20b0e8fe47cc72ec20018ec04dbb90
-Patch51: shadow-4.6-libsubid_not_print_error_messages.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/c6cab4a7bafa18d9d65a333cac1261e7b5e32bc9
-Patch52: shadow-4.6-libsubid_init_return_false.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/2f1f45d64fc7c10e7a3cbe00e89f63714343e526
-Patch53: shadow-4.6-useradd_SUB_UID_COUNT-0.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/ea7af4e1543c63590d4107ae075fea385028997d
-Patch54: shadow-4.6-libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/0fe42f571c69f0105d31305f995c9887aeb9525e
-Patch55: shadow-4.6-libsubid_init_not_print_error_messages.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/ec1951c181faed188464396b2cfdd2efb726c7f3
-Patch56: shadow-4.6-libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/087112244327be50abc24f9ec8afbf60ae8b2dec
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/pull/353
-Patch57: shadow-4.6-man_clarify_subid_delegation.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/bd920ab36a6c641e4a8769f8c7f8ca738ec61820
-Patch58: shadow-4.6-libsubid_make_logfd_not_extern.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/0dffc7c61200f492eeac03c29fa7e93b62d3cead
-Patch59: shadow-4.6-useradd_dont_try_to_create_0_subuids.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/77e39de1e6cbd6925f16bb260abb7d216296886b
-Patch60: shadow-4.6-install_subid_h.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/fa986b1d73605ecca54a4f19249227aeab827bf6
-Patch61: shadow-4.6-respect_enable_static_no.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/3b6ccf642c6bb2b7db087f09ee563ae9318af734
-Patch62: shadow-4.6-getsubids.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/a757b458ffb4fb9a40bcbb4f7869449431c67f83
-Patch63: shadow-4.6-groupdel-fix-sigsegv-when-passwd-does-not-exist.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/3ec32f9975f262073f8fbdecd2bfaee4a1d3db48
-Patch64: shadow-4.9-subordinateio-compare-owner-ID.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/e0524e813a3bae2891b33a66f35876841c11cee7
-Patch65: shadow-4.6-useradd-check-if-subid-range-exists.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/baae5b4a06c905d9f52ed1f922a0d7d0625d11cf
-Patch66: shadow-4.6-skip-over-reserved-ids.patch
-# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/65c88a43a23c2391dcc90c0abda3e839e9c57904
-Patch67: shadow-4.6-gpasswd-fix-password-leak.patch
-Patch68: shadow-4.6-salt-remove-rounds.patch
+# Misc manual page changes - non-upstreamable
+Patch0: shadow-4.15.0-manfix.patch
+# Date parsing improvement - could be upstreamed
+Patch1: shadow-4.15.0-date-parsing.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/d8e6a8b99b4d844328d875287babf6e13860d464
+Patch2: shadow-4.15.0-sast-fixes.patch
+# Audit message changes - partially upstreamed
+Patch3: shadow-4.15.0-audit-update.patch
+# Probably non-upstreamable
+Patch4: shadow-4.15.0-account-tools-setuid.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/ead55e9ba8958504e23e29545f90c4dd925c7462
+Patch5: shadow-4.15.0-getdef-spurious-error.patch
+# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/903593249630054ab5df327481f7386f718088cc
+Patch6: shadow-4.15.0-useradd-fix-write-full-return.patch
 
-License: BSD and GPLv2+
-Group: System Environment/Base
-BuildRequires: gcc
-BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.25.2-1
-BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 1.6.5
-BuildRequires: libsemanage-devel
-BuildRequires: libacl-devel, libattr-devel
-BuildRequires: bison, flex, docbook-style-xsl, docbook-dtds
-BuildRequires: autoconf, automake, libtool, gettext-devel
-BuildRequires: /usr/bin/xsltproc, /usr/bin/itstool
-Requires: libselinux >= 1.25.2-1
+### Dependencies ###
 Requires: audit-libs >= 1.6.5
+Requires: libselinux >= 1.25.2-1
+Requires: pam-libs
 Requires: setup
-Requires(pre): coreutils
-Requires(post): coreutils
-Buildroot: %{_tmppath}/%{name}-%{version}-%{release}-root-%(%{__id_u} -n)
+
+### Build Dependencies ###
+BuildRequires: audit-libs-devel >= 1.6.5
+BuildRequires: autoconf
+BuildRequires: automake
+BuildRequires: bison
+BuildRequires: docbook-dtds
+BuildRequires: docbook-style-xsl
+BuildRequires: flex
+BuildRequires: gcc
+BuildRequires: gettext-devel
+BuildRequires: git
+BuildRequires: itstool
+BuildRequires: libacl-devel
+BuildRequires: libattr-devel
+BuildRequires: libeconf-devel
+BuildRequires: libselinux-devel >= 1.25.2-1
+BuildRequires: libsemanage-devel
+BuildRequires: libtool
+BuildRequires: libxslt
+BuildRequires: make
+BuildRequires: pam-devel
+
+### Provides ###
+Provides: shadow = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
+Provides: passwd = 0.80-18
+Obsoletes: passwd <= 0.80-19
 
 %description
 The shadow-utils package includes the necessary programs for
@@ -150,69 +97,16 @@ Requires: shadow-utils-subid = %{epoch}:%{version}-%{release}
 Development files for shadow-utils-subid.
 
 %prep
-%setup -q -n shadow-%{version}
-%patch0 -p1 -b .redhat
-%patch1 -p1 -b .goodname
-%patch2 -p1 -b .info-parent-dir
-%patch6 -p1 -b .selinux
-%patch10 -p1 -b .orig-context
-%patch11 -p1 -b .logmsg
-%patch14 -p1 -b .default-range
-%patch15 -p1 -b .manfix
-%patch17 -p1 -b .userdel
-%patch19 -p1 -b .date-parsing
-%patch21 -p1 -b .move-home
-%patch22 -p1 -b .audit-update
-%patch23 -p1 -b .unlock
-%patch24 -p1 -b .no-lock-dos
-%patch28 -p1 -b .selinux-perms
-%patch29 -p1 -b .null-tm
-%patch31 -p1 -b .getenforce
-%patch32 -p1 -b .crypt_h
-%patch33 -p1 -b .long-entry
-%patch34 -p1 -b .usermod-crash
-%patch35 -p1 -b .coverity
-%patch36 -p1 -b .use-itstool
-%patch37 -p1 -b .sssd-flush
-%patch38 -p1 -b .sysugid-min-limit
-%patch39 -p1 -b .chgrp-guard
-%patch40 -p1 -b .login-prompt
-%patch41 -p1 -b .use-lckpwdf
-%patch42 -p1 -b .regular-user
-%patch43 -p1 -b .home_mode-directive
-%patch44 -p1 -b .check-local-groups
-%patch45 -p1 -b .sssd-redirect-warning
-%patch46 -p1 -b .remove-login-string-references
-%patch47 -p1 -b .usermod-allow-all-group-types
-%patch48 -p1 -b .libsubid_creation
-%patch49 -p1 -b .libsubid_nsswitch_support
-%patch50 -p1 -b .man-mention-nss-in-newuidmap
-%patch51 -p1 -b .libsubid_not_print_error_messages
-%patch52 -p1 -b .libsubid_init_return_false
-%patch53 -p1 -b .useradd_SUB_UID_COUNT-0
-%patch54 -p1 -b .libsubid_simplify_ranges_variable
-%patch55 -p1 -b .libsubid_init_not_print_error_messages
-%patch56 -p1 -b .libsubid_fix_newusers_nss_provides_subids
-%patch57 -p1 -b .man_clarify_subid_delegation
-%patch58 -p1 -b .libsubid_make_logfd_not_extern
-%patch59 -p1 -b .useradd_dont_try_to_create_0_subuids
-%patch60 -p1 -b .install_subid_h
-%patch61 -p1 -b .respect_enable_static_no
-%patch62 -p1 -b .getsubids
-%patch63 -p1 -b .groupdel-fix-sigsegv-when-passwd-does-not-exist
-%patch64 -p1 -b .subordinateio-compare-owner-ID
-%patch65 -p1 -b .useradd-check-if-subid-range-exists
-%patch66 -p1 -b .skip-over-reserved-ids
-%patch67 -p1 -b .gpasswd-fix-password-leak
-%patch68 -p1 -b .salt-remove-rounds
+%autosetup -p 1 -S git -n shadow-%{version}
 
 iconv -f ISO88591 -t utf-8  doc/HOWTO > doc/HOWTO.utf8
 cp -f doc/HOWTO.utf8 doc/HOWTO
 
 cp -a %{SOURCE4} %{SOURCE5} .
+cp -a %{SOURCE6} man/login.defs.d/HOME_MODE.xml
 
 # Force regeneration of getdate.c
-rm libmisc/getdate.c
+rm lib/getdate.c
 
 %build
 %ifarch sparc64
@@ -229,75 +123,82 @@ autoreconf
         --enable-shadowgrp \
         --enable-man \
         --with-audit \
+        --with-libpam \
         --with-sha-crypt \
+        --with-bcrypt \
+        --with-yescrypt \
         --with-selinux \
+        --without-libbsd \
         --without-libcrack \
-        --without-libpam \
+        --without-nscd \
+        --without-sssd \
         --enable-shared \
-        --with-group-name-max-length=32
+        --with-group-name-max-length=32 \
+        --enable-lastlog \
+        --enable-logind=no \
+        --disable-account-tools-setuid
 %make_build
 
 %install
-rm -rf $RPM_BUILD_ROOT
-%make_install gnulocaledir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_datadir}/locale MKINSTALLDIRS=`pwd`/mkinstalldirs
-install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/default
-install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
-install -p -c -m 0600 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
+%make_install gnulocaledir=$RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_datadir}/locale MKINSTALLDIRS=`pwd`/mkinstalldirs
+install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/default
+install -p -c -m 0644 %{SOURCE3} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
+install -p -c -m 0600 %{SOURCE2} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
+install -d -m 755 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}
+install -m 644 %{SOURCE7} $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/passwd
 
 
 ln -s useradd $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/adduser
-ln -s useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
-for subdir in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/{??,??_??,??_??.*}/man* ; do
+ln -s useradd.8 $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/adduser.8
+for subdir in $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/{??,??_??,??_??.*}/man* ; do
         test -d $subdir && test -e $subdir/useradd.8 && echo ".so man8/useradd.8" > $subdir/adduser.8
 done
 
 # Remove binaries we don't use.
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/chfn
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/chsh
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/expiry
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/groups
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/login
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/passwd
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/su
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_bindir}/faillog
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/login.access
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sysconfdir}/limits
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/logoutd
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_sbindir}/nologin
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/chfn.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/chfn.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/chsh.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/chsh.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/expiry.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/expiry.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/groups.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/groups.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/login.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/login.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man1/su.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man1/su.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/limits.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/limits.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/login.access.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/login.access.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/passwd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/porttime.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/porttime.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/suauth.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/suauth.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/logoutd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/logoutd.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/nologin.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/nologin.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man3/getspnam.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man3/getspnam.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man5/faillog.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man5/faillog.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/man8/faillog.*
-rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_mandir}/*/man8/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/chfn
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/chsh
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/expiry
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/groups
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/login
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/su
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_bindir}/faillog
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/logoutd
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_sbindir}/nologin
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/chfn.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/chfn.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/chsh.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/chsh.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/expiry.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/expiry.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/groups.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/groups.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/login.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/login.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man1/su.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man1/su.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/passwd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/suauth.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/suauth.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/logoutd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/logoutd.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/nologin.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/nologin.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man3/getspnam.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man3/getspnam.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man5/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man5/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/man8/faillog.*
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/*/man8/faillog.*
+
+# Remove PAM service files we don't use.
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chfn
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chpasswd
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/chsh
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/groupmems
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/login
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/newusers
+rm $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_pam_confdir}/su
 
 find $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir} -depth -type d -empty -delete
 %find_lang shadow
@@ -310,18 +211,20 @@ for dir in $(ls -1d $RPM_BUILD_ROOT%{_mandir}/{??,??_??}) ; do
 done
 
 # Move header files to its own folder
+echo $(ls)
 mkdir -p $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{includesubiddir}
 install -m 644 libsubid/subid.h $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{includesubiddir}/
 
-# Remove .la files created by libsubid
+# Remove .la and .a files created by libsubid
 rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.la
+rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.a
 
 %files -f shadow.lang
 %doc NEWS doc/HOWTO README
-%{!?_licensedir:%global license %%doc}
 %license gpl-2.0.txt shadow-bsd.txt
 %attr(0644,root,root)   %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/login.defs
 %attr(0644,root,root)   %config(noreplace) %{_sysconfdir}/default/useradd
+%config(noreplace) %{_pam_confdir}/passwd
 %{_bindir}/sg
 %attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/chage
 %attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/gpasswd
@@ -329,6 +232,7 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.la
 %attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/newgrp
 %attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_setgid=ep) %{_bindir}/newgidmap
 %attr(0755,root,root) %caps(cap_setuid=ep) %{_bindir}/newuidmap
+%attr(4755,root,root) %{_bindir}/passwd
 %{_sbindir}/adduser
 %attr(0755,root,root)   %{_sbindir}/user*
 %attr(0755,root,root)   %{_sbindir}/group*
@@ -346,6 +250,7 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.la
 %{_mandir}/man1/newgrp.1*
 %{_mandir}/man1/newgidmap.1*
 %{_mandir}/man1/newuidmap.1*
+%{_mandir}/man1/passwd.*
 %{_mandir}/man3/shadow.3*
 %{_mandir}/man5/shadow.5*
 %{_mandir}/man5/login.defs.5*
@@ -375,97 +280,285 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.la
 %{_libdir}/libsubid.so
 
 %changelog
-* Tue Nov 21 2023 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-22
-- salt: remove rounds from salt string. Resolves: RHEL-16668
+* Mon Nov  4 2024 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.15.0-5
+- Disable nscd. Resolves: RHEL-56355
+- useradd: fix write_full() return value
 
-* Thu Nov  2 2023 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-21
-- login.defs: include SHA_CRYPT_MAX_ROUNDS. Resolves: RHEL-15024
+* Tue Oct 29 2024 Troy Dawson <tdawson@redhat.com> - 2:4.15.0-4
+- Bump release for October 2024 mass rebuild:
+  Resolves: RHEL-64018
 
-* Wed Jul 12 2023 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-19
-- gpasswd: fix password leak. Resolves: #2215947
+* Mon Jun 24 2024 Troy Dawson <tdawson@redhat.com> - 2:4.15.0-3
+- Bump release for June 2024 mass rebuild
 
-* Wed May 17 2023 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-18
-- Update patch to close label to reset libselinux state. Resolves: #1984740
-- useradd: check if subid range exists for user. Resolves: #2012929
-- find_new_[gu]id: Skip over IDs that are reserved for legacy reasons. Resolves: #1994269
+* Tue Jun 18 2024 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.15.0-2
+- Fix static analyzer detected issues. Resolves: RHEL-35383
 
-* Thu Jul 21 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-17
-- subordinateio: also compare the owner ID. Resolves: #2093311
+* Wed Apr  3 2024 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.15.0-1
+- Rebase to version 4.15.0
+- getdef: avoid spurious error messages about unknown configuration options
+
+* Mon Feb 12 2024 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.14.0-6
+- Build linking `libpam`
+
+* Thu Feb  1 2024 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.14.0-5
+- passwd: Provide binary from this package. Enable libpam and
+  disable account-tools-setuid. Provide passwd PAM service file.
+  Resolves: #2233275
+- passwd: provide --stdin option
+
+* Mon Jan 29 2024 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.14.0-4
+- Disable SSSD support. Resolves: #2253182
+
+* Sat Jan 27 2024 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.14.0-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_40_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Oct  3 2023 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.14.0-2
+- useradd: Set proper SELinux labels for def_usrtemplate
+
+* Wed Aug 16 2023 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.14.0-1
+- Rebase to version 4.14.0. Resolves: #2229000
+
+* Sat Jul 22 2023 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.13-8
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_39_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Tue Jun 06 2023 Yaakov Selkowitz <yselkowi@redhat.com> - 2:4.13-7
+- Remove unused libbsd-devel dependency
+
+* Mon Mar  6 2023 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.13-6
+- Add libbsd-devel and libeconf-devel as build dependencies
+
+* Thu Mar  2 2023 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.13-5
+- newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd. Resolves: #2174752
+
+* Sat Jan 21 2023 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.13-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_38_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Nov 23 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.13-3
+- Change SUB_UID_MIN and SUB_GID_MIN to 524288. Resolves: #2144558
+
+* Mon Nov 21 2022 Florian Weimer <fweimer@redhat.com> - 2:4.13-2
+- Fix gshadow configure check (switching to glibc implementation)
+
+* Wed Nov  9 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.13-1
+- Rebase to version 4.13
+- SPDX license migration
+
+* Wed Oct  5 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.12.3-3
+- chage: Fix regression in print_date. Resolves: #2129336
+
+* Fri Sep  9 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.12.3-2
+- useradd: Do not reset non-existent data in {last,fail}log
+
+* Mon Aug 22 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.12.3-1
+- Rebase to version 4.12.3. Resolves: #2117809
+
+* Mon Aug  1 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.11.1-4
+- useradd: modify check ID range for system users. Resolves: #2093692
+
+* Sat Jul 23 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.11.1-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_37_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Feb 10 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.11.1-2
+- Fix explicit subid requirement for subid-devel
+
+* Tue Jan 25 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.11.1-1
+- Rebase to version 4.11.1 (#2034038)
 - Fix release sources
-- Add subid requirement for subid-devel
+- Add explicit subid requirement for subid-devel
 
-* Thu Dec  9 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-16
-- getsubids: provide system binary and man page. Resolves: #2013016
-- groupdel: fix SIGSEGV when passwd does not exist. Resolves: #1986782
+* Sat Jan 22 2022 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.9-10
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_36_Mass_Rebuild
 
-* Tue Oct 19 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-15
-- Creation of subid and subid-devel subpackages (#2013009)
-- libsubid: creation and nsswitch support
+* Mon Jan 17 2022 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-9
+- nss: get shadow_logfd with log_get_logfd() (#2038811)
+- lib: make shadow_logfd and Prog not extern
+- lib: rename Prog to shadow_progname
+- lib: provide default values for shadow_progname
+- libsubid: use log_set_progname in subid_init
+
+* Fri Nov 19 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-8
+- getsubids: provide system binary and man page (#1980780)
+- pwck: fix segfault when calling fprintf() (#2021339)
+- newgrp: fix segmentation fault (#2019553)
+- groupdel: fix SIGSEGV when passwd does not exist (#1986111)
+
+* Fri Nov 12 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-7
+- useradd: change SELinux labels for home files (#2022658)
+
+* Thu Nov  4 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-6
+- useradd: revert fix memleak of grp (#2018697)
+
+* Wed Oct 27 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-5
+- useradd: generate home and mail directories with selinux user attribute
+
+* Thu Sep 23 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-4
+- login.defs: include HMAC_CRYPTO_ALGO key
+- Clean spec file: organize dependencies and move License location
+
+* Tue Aug 17 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-3
+- libmisc: fix default value in SHA_get_salt_rounds()
+
+* Mon Aug  9 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-2
+- useradd: avoid generating an empty subid range (#1990653)
+
+* Wed Aug  4 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.9-1
+- Rebase to version 4.9
+- usermod: allow all group types with -G option (#1975327)
+- Clean spec file
+
+* Fri Jul 23 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-20
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_35_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Wed Jul 14 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-19
+- Add patch to fix 'fread returns element count, not element size'
+
+* Wed Jul 14 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-18
+- Fix regression issues detected in rhbz#667593 and rhbz#672510
+
+* Mon Jul 12 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-17
+- Enable bcrypt support, as libxcrypt supports it well
+
+* Sun Jul 04 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-16
+- Add a patch to obtain random bytes using getentropy()
+- Update shadow-4.8-crypt_h.patch with the upstreamed version
+- Add a patch to make use of crypt_gensalt() from libxcrypt
+
+* Tue Jun 29 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-15
+- useradd: free correct pointer (#1976809)
+
+* Mon Jun 28 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-14
+- Add a patch to fix the used prefix for the bcrypt hash method
+- Add a patch to cleanup the code in libmisc/salt.c
+- Add a patch adding some clarifying comments in libmisc/salt.c
+- Add a patch to obtain random bytes from /dev/urandom
+
+* Mon Jun 28 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-13
+- Covscan fixes
+
+* Mon Jun 21 2021 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-12
+- Backport support for yescrypt hash method
+- Add a patch to fix the parameter type of YESCRYPT_salt_cost()
+
+* Mon Jun 21 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-11
 - libsubid: don't print error messages on stderr by default
 - libsubid: libsubid_init return false if out of memory
+- useradd: fix SUB_UID_COUNT=0
 - libsubid: don't return owner in list_owner_ranges API call
 - libsubid: libsubid_init don't print messages on error
 - libsubid: fix newusers when nss provides subids
-- libsubid: make shadow_logfd not extern
-- useradd: fix SUB_UID_COUNT=0
-- man: mention NSS in new[ug]idmap manpages
 - man: clarify subid delegation
+- libsubid: make shadow_logfd not extern
 
-* Thu Aug 12 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-14
-- usermod: allow all group types with -G option (#1967641)
+* Thu May  6 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-10
+- man: mention NSS in new[ug]idmap manpages
+- libsubid: move development header to shadow folder
 
-* Mon May  3 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-13
-- man: Remove references to LOGIN_STRING in login.defs (#1884702)
+* Fri Apr 16 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-9
+- libsubid: creation and nsswitch support
+- Creation of subid and subid-devel subpackages
 
-* Fri Oct 23 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-12
-- lib/sssd: redirect warning message to file (#1749001)
-- useradd: clarify valid usernames/groupnames (#1869432)
-- login.defs: link login specific information to its own package (#1804766)
+* Mon Mar 29 2021 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-8
+- man: include lastlog file caveat (#951564)
+- Upstream links to several patches
+- Spec file cleanup by Robert Scheck
+- Add BuildRequires: make by Tom Stellard
 
-* Fri Aug  7 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-11
-- change UMASK value and add HOME_MODE in login.defs (#1777718)
+* Wed Jan 27 2021 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-7
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_34_Mass_Rebuild
 
-* Tue May  5 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-10
-- check only local groups when adding new supplementary groups to a user
+* Mon Nov  9 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-6
+- commonio: force lock file sync (#1862056)
 
-* Fri Apr 17 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-9
-- do not mistake a regular user process for a namespaced one (#1788696)
-- add HOME_MODE support in login.defs (#1777718)
+* Tue Nov  3 2020 Petr Lautrbach <plautrba@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-5
+- Rebuild with libsemanage.so.2
 
-* Fri Jun  7 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-8
-- properly audit group password change
-- do not add uid of a new (not yet added) user to the audit message
+* Wed Jul 29 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8.1-4
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_33_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu May 14 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-3
+- check only local groups when adding new supplementary groups to a user (#1727236)
+
+* Tue Mar 24 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-2
+- useradd: clarify the useradd -d parameter behavior in man page
+
+* Tue Mar 17 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8.1-1
+- updated upstream to 4.8.1
+
+* Tue Mar 17 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8-5
+- synchronized login.defs with upstream file (#1261099 and #1807957)
+
+* Mon Feb 24 2020 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.8-4
+- fix useradd: doesn't generate spool mail with the proper SELinux user identity
+  (#1690527)
+
+* Thu Jan 30 2020 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.8-3
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_32_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Thu Jan 16 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.8-2
+- make the invalid shell check into warning
+
+* Mon Jan 13 2020 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.8-1
+- update to current upstream release 4.8
+
+* Mon Sep  2 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-16
+- fix SELinux related problem in chpasswd/chgpasswd when run with -R
+  (patch by Petr Lautrbach) (#1747215)
+
+* Fri Jul 26 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.6-15
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_31_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Fri Jun  7 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-14
+- minor auditing fixes
+
+* Fri May  3 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-13
 - use lckpwdf() again to disable concurrent edits of databases by
   other applications
-- clarify chage manual page in regards to shadow and passwd
-  inconsistency
-- fix minor issues in groupadd and login.defs manual pages
-- Ignore LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT variable in login.defs
+
+* Tue Apr  2 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-12
 - force regeneration of getdate.c otherwise the date parsing fix
   is not applied
 
-* Tue Dec 18 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-7
+* Fri Mar 22 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-11
+- clarify chage manual page in regards to shadow and passwd
+  inconsistency (#1686440)
+
+* Thu Mar 21 2019 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-10
+- Ignore LOGIN_PLAIN_PROMPT variable in login.defs
+
+* Thu Mar  7 2019 Tim Landscheidt <tim@tim-landscheidt.de> - 2:4.6-9
+- Remove obsolete requirements for post/pre scriptlets
+
+* Sat Feb 02 2019 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.6-8
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_30_Mass_Rebuild
+
+* Mon Jan 14 2019 Björn Esser <besser82@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.6-7
+- Rebuilt for libcrypt.so.2 (#1666033)
+
+* Tue Dec 18 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-6
 - usermod: guard against unsafe change of ownership of
   special home directories
 
-* Fri Nov 30 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-6
-- drop trailing space from login.defs ENCRYPT_METHOD setting
-
 * Mon Nov 19 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-5
+- use itstool instead of xml2po
+
+* Tue Nov  6 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-4
 - use cap_setxid file capabilities for newxidmap instead of making them setuid
 - limit the SYS_U/GID_MIN value to 1 as the algorithm does not work with 0
   and the 0 is always used by root anyway
 - manual page improvements
+
+* Wed Oct 10 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-3
+- fix some issues from Coverity scan
 - flush sssd caches - patch by Jakub Hrozek
 
-* Fri Oct 12 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-4
-- fix some issues from Coverity scan
+* Sat Jul 14 2018 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.6-2
+- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_29_Mass_Rebuild
 
-* Tue Jul 31 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-2
-- use itstool instead of xml2po
+* Mon May 28 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-1
+- update to current upstream release 4.6
 
-* Tue Jul 31 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.6-1
-- Update to current upstream release 4.6
+* Fri Apr 20 2018 Tomáš Mráz <tmraz@redhat.com> - 2:4.5-10
 - Raise limit for passwd and shadow entry length but also prevent
   writing longer entries (#1422497)
 

sources

@@ -0,0 +1,2 @@
+SHA512 (shadow-4.15.0.tar.xz) = 88d72fb706f6792b460c14a9b1b42fe0b5962834ec3793f296cbc138807736b5ad73d3f802cda74db740a71545eb1c8ec47447c2250299eb730ed2b2674e2249
+SHA512 (shadow-4.15.0.tar.xz.asc) = 0a39d6a45b7d8df12aade89ed9fc9d481c91297dbd34e85fe831426c1d0051cbcf8478759306b8871cd6b1835604c5836decf398d0165c50ac52fee365561446

tests/sanity/Makefile

@@ -0,0 +1,77 @@
+# Copyright (c) 2006 Red Hat, Inc. All rights reserved. This copyrighted material 
+# is made available to anyone wishing to use, modify, copy, or
+# redistribute it subject to the terms and conditions of the GNU General
+# Public License v.2.
+#
+# This program is distributed in the hope that it will be useful, but WITHOUT ANY
+# WARRANTY; without even the implied warranty of MERCHANTABILITY or FITNESS FOR A
+# PARTICULAR PURPOSE. See the GNU General Public License for more details.
+#
+# You should have received a copy of the GNU General Public License
+# along with this program; if not, write to the Free Software
+# Foundation, Inc., 51 Franklin Street, Fifth Floor, Boston, MA 02110-1301, USA.
+#
+# Author: Jakub Hrozek
+
+#~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#
+# Example Makefile for RHTS                                          #
+# This example is geared towards a test for a specific package       #
+# It does most of the work for you, but may require further coding   #
+#~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~#
+
+# The toplevel namespace within which the test lives.
+TOPLEVEL_NAMESPACE=CoreOS
+
+# The name of the package under test:
+PACKAGE_NAME=shadow-utils
+
+# The path of the test below the package:
+RELATIVE_PATH=sanity
+
+# Version of the Test. Used with make tag.
+export TESTVERSION=1.1
+
+# The combined namespace of the test.
+export TEST=/$(TOPLEVEL_NAMESPACE)/$(PACKAGE_NAME)/$(RELATIVE_PATH)
+
+# A phony target is one that is not really the name of a file.
+# It is just a name for some commands to be executed when you
+# make an explicit request. There are two reasons to use a
+# phony target: to avoid a conflict with a file of the same
+# name, and to improve performance.
+.PHONY: all install download clean
+
+# Executables to be built should be added here, they will be generated on the system under test.
+BUILT_FILES= 
+
+# Data files, .c files, scripts anything needed to either compile the test and/or run it.
+FILES=$(METADATA) Makefile PURPOSE sanity_test.py runtest.sh
+
+run: $(FILES) build
+	./runtest.sh
+
+build: $(BUILT_FILES)
+	chmod a+x ./sanity_test.py
+	chmod a+x ./runtest.sh
+
+clean:
+	rm -f *~ *.rpm $(BUILT_FILES)
+
+# Include Common Makefile
+include /usr/share/rhts/lib/rhts-make.include
+
+# Generate the testinfo.desc here:
+$(METADATA): Makefile
+	@touch $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Owner:        Jakub Hrozek <jhrozek@redhat.com>" > $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Name:         $(TEST)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Path:         $(TEST_DIR)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "TestVersion:  $(TESTVERSION)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "License:      GNU GPL" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Description:  Basic sanity test for shadow-utils" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "TestTime:     5m" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "RunFor:       $(PACKAGE_NAME)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Requires:     $(PACKAGE_NAME)" >> $(METADATA)
+	@echo "Requires:     python" >> $(METADATA)
+	rhts-lint $(METADATA)
+

tests/sanity/PURPOSE

@@ -0,0 +1,10 @@
+This is a basic sanity test for the shadow-utils package. It is implemented
+in python on top of the unittesting.py module.
+
+Its purpose is to ensure that the binaries in the shadow-utils package behave
+as expected and its switches/options work correctly.
+
+For the most part, every binary in the shadow-utils package is represented by
+a single class named Test<BinaryName>, i.e. TestUsermod etc. There are some 
+exceptions, like TestUseraddWeirdNameTest though.
+

tests/sanity/runtest.sh

@@ -0,0 +1,24 @@
+#!/bin/bash
+. /usr/bin/rhts-environment.sh
+. /usr/share/beakerlib/beakerlib.sh || exit 1
+
+rlJournalStart
+rlFileBackup --clean /etc/default/useradd- /etc/default/useradd
+setenforce 0
+python sanity_test.py -v
+setenforce 1
+rlFileRestore
+
+EXIT=$?
+if [[ $EXIT -eq 0 ]]; then
+    RESULT="PASS"
+else
+    RESULT="FAIL"
+fi
+
+
+rlJournalEnd
+
+echo "Result: $RESULT"
+echo "Exit: $EXIT"
+report_result $TEST $RESULT $EXIT

tests/tests.yml

@@ -0,0 +1,13 @@
+---
+# This first play always runs on the local staging system
+- hosts: localhost
+  roles:
+  - role: standard-test-beakerlib
+    tags:
+    - classic
+    - atomic
+    tests:
+    - sanity
+    required_packages:
+    - shadow-utils     # sanity test needs shadow-utils
+    - python           # sanity test needs python