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newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd

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Resolves: #2174752

Signed-off-by: Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com>
This commit is contained in:
Iker Pedrosa 2023-03-02 14:36:39 +01:00
parent f7089c062f
commit c0c2ea7769
2 changed files with 453 additions and 2 deletions
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441
shadow-4.13-newidmap-support-passing-pid-as-fd.patch Normal file
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@ -0,0 +1,441 @@
From 6974df39a708abf8bafbdfa2b7827e0f70f874cb Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Date: Mon, 6 Feb 2023 22:49:42 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd
Closes #635
newuidmap and newgidmap currently take an integner pid as
the first argument, determining the process id on which to
act. Accept also "fd:N", where N must be an open file
descriptor to the /proc/pid directory for the process to
act upon. This way, if you
exec 10</proc/99
newuidmap fd:10 100000 0 65536
and pid 99 dies and a new process happens to take pid 99 before
newuidmap happens to do its work, then since newuidmap will use
openat() using fd 10, it won't change the mapping for the new
process.
Example:
// terminal 1:
serge@jerom ~/src/nsexec$ ./nsexec -W -s 0 -S 0 -U
about to unshare with 10000000
Press any key to exec (I am 129176)
// terminal 2:
serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ exec 10</proc/129176
serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ sudo chown root src/newuidmap src/newgidmap
serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ sudo chmod u+s src/newuidmap
serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ sudo chmod u+s src/newgidmap
serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ ./src/newuidmap fd:10 0 100000 10
serge@jerom ~/src/shadow$ ./src/newgidmap fd:10 0 100000 10
// Terminal 1:
uid=0(root) gid=0(root) groups=0(root)
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
lib/get_pid.c | 51 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
lib/prototypes.h | 2 ++
man/newgidmap.1.xml | 11 ++++++++++
man/newuidmap.1.xml | 11 ++++++++++
src/newgidmap.c | 41 ++++++++++++++----------------------
src/newuidmap.c | 40 +++++++++++++----------------------
6 files changed, 106 insertions(+), 50 deletions(-)
diff --git a/lib/get_pid.c b/lib/get_pid.c
index 10184bf0..ab91d158 100644
--- a/lib/get_pid.c
+++ b/lib/get_pid.c
@@ -10,6 +10,9 @@
#include "prototypes.h"
#include "defines.h"
+#include <sys/types.h>
+#include <sys/stat.h>
+#include <fcntl.h>
int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
{
@@ -29,3 +32,51 @@ int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
return 1;
}
+/*
+ * If use passed in fd:4 as an argument, then return the
+ * value '4', the fd to use.
+ */
+int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
+{
+ long long int val;
+ char *endptr;
+
+ errno = 0;
+ val = strtoll (pidfdstr, &endptr, 10);
+ if ( ('\0' == *pidfdstr)
+ || ('\0' != *endptr)
+ || (ERANGE == errno)
+ || (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (pid_t)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
+ return 0;
+ }
+
+ return (int)val;
+}
+
+int open_pidfd(const char *pidstr)
+{
+ int proc_dir_fd;
+ int written;
+ char proc_dir_name[32];
+ pid_t target;
+
+ if (get_pid(pidstr, &target) == 0)
+ return -ENOENT;
+
+ /* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
+ written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
+ target);
+ if ((written <= 0) || ((size_t)written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
+ fprintf(stderr, "snprintf of proc path failed for %u: %s\n",
+ target, strerror(errno));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+
+ proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
+ if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
+ fprintf(stderr, _("Could not open proc directory for target %u: %s\n"),
+ target, strerror(errno));
+ return -EINVAL;
+ }
+ return proc_dir_fd;
+}
diff --git a/lib/prototypes.h b/lib/prototypes.h
index 400d5b97..21df6f61 100644
--- a/lib/prototypes.h
+++ b/lib/prototypes.h
@@ -160,6 +160,8 @@ extern int getlong (const char *numstr, /*@out@*/long int *result);
/* get_pid.c */
extern int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid);
+extern int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr);
+extern int open_pidfd(const char *pidstr);
/* getrange */
extern int getrange (const char *range,
diff --git a/man/newgidmap.1.xml b/man/newgidmap.1.xml
index e4ebc69e..9b7683eb 100644
--- a/man/newgidmap.1.xml
+++ b/man/newgidmap.1.xml
@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@
<para>
Note that newgidmap may be used only once for a given process.
</para>
+ <para>
+ Instead of an integer process id, the first argument may be
+ specified as <replaceable>fd:N</replaceable>, where the integer N
+ is the file descriptor number for the calling process's opened
+ file for <filename>/proc/[pid[</filename>. In this case,
+ <command>newgidmap</command> will use
+ <refentrytitle>openat</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum>
+ to open the <filename>gid_map</filename> file under that
+ directory, avoiding a TOCTTOU in case the process exits and
+ the pid is immediately reused.
+ </para>
</refsect1>
diff --git a/man/newuidmap.1.xml b/man/newuidmap.1.xml
index f5cb5b48..ca917a77 100644
--- a/man/newuidmap.1.xml
+++ b/man/newuidmap.1.xml
@@ -116,6 +116,17 @@
<para>
Note that newuidmap may be used only once for a given process.
</para>
+ <para>
+ Instead of an integer process id, the first argument may be
+ specified as <replaceable>fd:N</replaceable>, where the integer N
+ is the file descriptor number for the calling process's opened
+ file for <filename>/proc/[pid[</filename>. In this case,
+ <command>newuidmap</command> will use
+ <refentrytitle>openat</refentrytitle><manvolnum>2</manvolnum>
+ to open the <filename>uid_map</filename> file under that
+ directory, avoiding a TOCTTOU in case the process exits and
+ the pid is immediately reused.
+ </para>
</refsect1>
<refsect1 id='options'>
diff --git a/src/newgidmap.c b/src/newgidmap.c
index 01d0fe90..d6d29725 100644
--- a/src/newgidmap.c
+++ b/src/newgidmap.c
@@ -69,7 +69,7 @@ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
static void usage(void)
{
- fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s <pid> <gid> <lowergid> <count> [ <gid> <lowergid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
+ fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [<pid|fd:<pidfd>] <gid> <lowergid> <count> [ <gid> <lowergid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
@@ -143,15 +143,12 @@ out:
*/
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char proc_dir_name[32];
char *target_str;
- pid_t target;
int proc_dir_fd;
int ranges;
struct map_range *mappings;
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw;
- int written;
bool allow_setgroups = false;
Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
@@ -168,25 +165,19 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
/* Find the process that needs its user namespace
* gid mapping set.
*/
- target_str = argv[1];
- if (!get_pid(target_str, &target))
- usage();
- /* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
- written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
- target);
- if ((written <= 0) || (written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: snprintf of proc path failed: %s\n",
- Prog, strerror(errno));
- }
-
- proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
- if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not open proc directory for target %u\n"),
- Prog, target);
- return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ target_str = argv[1];
+ if (strlen(target_str) > 3 && strncmp(target_str, "fd:", 3) == 0) {
+ /* the user passed in a /proc/pid fd for the process */
+ target_str = &target_str[3];
+ proc_dir_fd = get_pidfd_from_fd(target_str);
+ if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
+ usage();
+ } else {
+ proc_dir_fd = open_pidfd(target_str);
+ if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
+ usage();
}
-
/* Who am i? */
pw = get_my_pwent ();
if (NULL == pw) {
@@ -200,8 +191,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
- Prog, target);
+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for process\n"),
+ Prog);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
@@ -213,8 +204,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
(!getdef_bool("GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS") && (getgid() != pw->pw_gid)) ||
(pw->pw_uid != st.st_uid) ||
(getgid() != st.st_gid)) {
- fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target %u is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
- Prog, target,
+ fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target process is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
+ Prog,
(unsigned long int)getuid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_uid, (unsigned long int)st.st_uid,
(unsigned long int)getgid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_gid, (unsigned long int)st.st_gid);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
diff --git a/src/newuidmap.c b/src/newuidmap.c
index e8798409..e99655c9 100644
--- a/src/newuidmap.c
+++ b/src/newuidmap.c
@@ -64,7 +64,7 @@ static void verify_ranges(struct passwd *pw, int ranges,
static void usage(void)
{
- fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s <pid> <uid> <loweruid> <count> [ <uid> <loweruid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
+ fprintf(stderr, _("usage: %s [<pid>|fd:<pidfd>] <uid> <loweruid> <count> [ <uid> <loweruid> <count> ] ... \n"), Prog);
exit(EXIT_FAILURE);
}
@@ -73,15 +73,12 @@ static void usage(void)
*/
int main(int argc, char **argv)
{
- char proc_dir_name[32];
char *target_str;
- pid_t target;
int proc_dir_fd;
int ranges;
struct map_range *mappings;
struct stat st;
struct passwd *pw;
- int written;
Prog = Basename (argv[0]);
log_set_progname(Prog);
@@ -94,26 +91,20 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
if (argc < 2)
usage();
+ target_str = argv[1];
/* Find the process that needs its user namespace
* uid mapping set.
*/
- target_str = argv[1];
- if (!get_pid(target_str, &target))
- usage();
-
- /* max string length is 6 + 10 + 1 + 1 = 18, allocate 32 bytes */
- written = snprintf(proc_dir_name, sizeof(proc_dir_name), "/proc/%u/",
- target);
- if ((written <= 0) || (written >= sizeof(proc_dir_name))) {
- fprintf(stderr, "%s: snprintf of proc path failed: %s\n",
- Prog, strerror(errno));
- }
-
- proc_dir_fd = open(proc_dir_name, O_DIRECTORY);
- if (proc_dir_fd < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not open proc directory for target %u\n"),
- Prog, target);
- return EXIT_FAILURE;
+ if (strlen(target_str) > 3 && strncmp(target_str, "fd:", 3) == 0) {
+ /* the user passed in a /proc/pid fd for the process */
+ target_str = &target_str[3];
+ proc_dir_fd = get_pidfd_from_fd(target_str);
+ if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
+ usage();
+ } else {
+ proc_dir_fd = open_pidfd(target_str);
+ if (proc_dir_fd < 0)
+ usage();
}
/* Who am i? */
@@ -129,8 +120,7 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
/* Get the effective uid and effective gid of the target process */
if (fstat(proc_dir_fd, &st) < 0) {
- fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target %u\n"),
- Prog, target);
+ fprintf(stderr, _("%s: Could not stat directory for target process\n"), Prog);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
}
@@ -142,8 +132,8 @@ int main(int argc, char **argv)
(!getdef_bool("GRANT_AUX_GROUP_SUBIDS") && (getgid() != pw->pw_gid)) ||
(pw->pw_uid != st.st_uid) ||
(getgid() != st.st_gid)) {
- fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target process %u is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
- Prog, target,
+ fprintf(stderr, _( "%s: Target process is owned by a different user: uid:%lu pw_uid:%lu st_uid:%lu, gid:%lu pw_gid:%lu st_gid:%lu\n" ),
+ Prog,
(unsigned long int)getuid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_uid, (unsigned long int)st.st_uid,
(unsigned long int)getgid(), (unsigned long int)pw->pw_gid, (unsigned long int)st.st_gid);
return EXIT_FAILURE;
--
2.39.2
From 7ff33fae6f9cd79c0e012671c37a172e9a681d0b Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 13:52:32 -0600
Subject: [PATCH] get_pidfd_from_fd: return -1 on error, not 0
Fixes: 6974df39a: newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd
Signed-off-by: Serge Hallyn <serge@hallyn.com>
---
lib/get_pid.c | 3 ++-
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/lib/get_pid.c b/lib/get_pid.c
index ab91d158..5b6d9da4 100644
--- a/lib/get_pid.c
+++ b/lib/get_pid.c
@@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ int get_pid (const char *pidstr, pid_t *pid)
/*
* If use passed in fd:4 as an argument, then return the
* value '4', the fd to use.
+ * On error, return -1.
*/
int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
{
@@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
|| ('\0' != *endptr)
|| (ERANGE == errno)
|| (/*@+longintegral@*/val != (pid_t)val)/*@=longintegral@*/) {
- return 0;
+ return -1;
}
return (int)val;
--
2.39.2
From 05e2adf509ba0e3779dae66a276b86927a8e1e0e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Vin=C3=ADcius=20dos=20Santos=20Oliveira?=
<vini.ipsmaker@gmail.com>
Date: Fri, 24 Feb 2023 18:06:02 -0300
Subject: [PATCH] Validate fds created by the user
write_mapping() will do the following:
openat(proc_dir_fd, map_file, O_WRONLY);
An attacker could create a directory containing a symlink named
"uid_map" pointing to any file owned by root, and thus allow him to
overwrite any root-owned file.
---
lib/get_pid.c | 17 +++++++++++++++++
1 file changed, 17 insertions(+)
diff --git a/lib/get_pid.c b/lib/get_pid.c
index 5b6d9da4..8e5e6014 100644
--- a/lib/get_pid.c
+++ b/lib/get_pid.c
@@ -41,6 +41,8 @@ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
{
long long int val;
char *endptr;
+ struct stat st;
+ dev_t proc_st_dev, proc_st_rdev;
errno = 0;
val = strtoll (pidfdstr, &endptr, 10);
@@ -51,6 +53,21 @@ int get_pidfd_from_fd(const char *pidfdstr)
return -1;
}
+ if (stat("/proc/self/uid_map", &st) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ proc_st_dev = st.st_dev;
+ proc_st_rdev = st.st_rdev;
+
+ if (fstat(val, &st) < 0) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
+ if (st.st_dev != proc_st_dev || st.st_rdev != proc_st_rdev) {
+ return -1;
+ }
+
return (int)val;
}
--
2.39.2

14
shadow-utils.spec
View File

@ -1,7 +1,7 @@
Summary: Utilities for managing accounts and shadow password files
Name: shadow-utils
Version: 4.13
Release: 4%{?dist}
Release: 5%{?dist}
Epoch: 2
License: BSD-3-Clause AND GPL-2.0-or-later
URL: https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow
@ -25,13 +25,19 @@ Patch1: shadow-4.13-default-range.patch
Patch2: shadow-4.9-manfix.patch
# Date parsing improvement - could be upstreamed
Patch3: shadow-4.2.1-date-parsing.patch
# Audit message changes - upstreamability unknown
# Audit message changes - partially upstreamed
# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/37412f505ed0bc5c9e3f04b2266b40f8f6fc310f
Patch4: shadow-4.11.1-audit-update.patch
# Changes related to password unlocking - could be upstreamed
Patch5: shadow-4.5-usermod-unlock.patch
# Additional SElinux related changes - upstreamability unknown
Patch6: shadow-4.12.3-selinux-perms.patch
# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/a281f241b592aec636d1b93a99e764499d68c7ef
Patch7: shadow-utils-configure-gshadow.patch
# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/6974df39a708abf8bafbdfa2b7827e0f70f874cb
# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/7ff33fae6f9cd79c0e012671c37a172e9a681d0b
# https://github.com/shadow-maint/shadow/commit/05e2adf509ba0e3779dae66a276b86927a8e1e0e
Patch8: shadow-4.13-newidmap-support-passing-pid-as-fd.patch
### Dependencies ###
Requires: audit-libs >= 1.6.5
@ -100,6 +106,7 @@ Development files for shadow-utils-subid.
%patch5 -p1 -b .unlock
%patch6 -p1 -b .selinux-perms
%patch7 -p1
%patch8 -p1 -b .newidmap-pid-fd
iconv -f ISO88591 -t utf-8 doc/HOWTO > doc/HOWTO.utf8
cp -f doc/HOWTO.utf8 doc/HOWTO
@ -273,6 +280,9 @@ rm -f $RPM_BUILD_ROOT/%{_libdir}/libsubid.a
%{_libdir}/libsubid.so
%changelog
* Thu Mar 2 2023 Iker Pedrosa <ipedrosa@redhat.com> - 2:4.13-5
- newuidmap and newgidmap: support passing pid as fd. Resolves: #2174752
* Sat Jan 21 2023 Fedora Release Engineering <releng@fedoraproject.org> - 2:4.13-4
- Rebuilt for https://fedoraproject.org/wiki/Fedora_38_Mass_Rebuild