diff --git a/Makefile b/Makefile index b8486a0..7edc9f0 100644 --- a/Makefile +++ b/Makefile @@ -61,6 +61,7 @@ SEMODULE ?= $(tc_usrsbindir)/semodule SEMOD_PKG ?= $(tc_usrbindir)/semodule_package SEMOD_LNK ?= $(tc_usrbindir)/semodule_link SEMOD_EXP ?= $(tc_usrbindir)/semodule_expand +SEPOLGEN ?= $(tc_usrbindir)/sepolgen-ifgen LOADPOLICY ?= $(tc_usrsbindir)/load_policy SETFILES ?= $(tc_sbindir)/setfiles XMLLINT ?= $(BINDIR)/xmllint @@ -248,7 +249,7 @@ seusers := $(appconf)/seusers appdir := $(contextpath) user_default_contexts := $(wildcard config/appconfig-$(TYPE)/*_default_contexts) user_default_contexts_names := $(addprefix $(contextpath)/users/,$(subst _default_contexts,,$(notdir $(user_default_contexts)))) -appfiles := $(addprefix $(appdir)/,default_contexts default_type initrc_context failsafe_context userhelper_context removable_context dbus_contexts sepgsql_contexts x_contexts customizable_types securetty_types) $(contextpath)/files/media $(user_default_contexts_names) +appfiles := $(addprefix $(appdir)/,default_contexts default_type initrc_context failsafe_context userhelper_context removable_context dbus_contexts sepgsql_contexts x_contexts customizable_types securetty_types virtual_image_context virtual_domain_context lxc_contexts) $(contextpath)/files/media $(user_default_contexts_names) net_contexts := $(builddir)net_contexts all_layers := $(shell find $(wildcard $(moddir)/*) -maxdepth 0 -type d) @@ -406,7 +407,7 @@ $(moddir)/kernel/corenetwork.if: $(moddir)/kernel/corenetwork.te.in $(moddir)/ke @echo "#" >> $@ $(verbose) cat $@.in >> $@ $(verbose) $(GREP) "^[[:blank:]]*network_(interface|node|port|packet)(_controlled)?\(.*\)" $< \ - | $(M4) -D self_contained_policy $(M4PARAM) $@.m4 - \ + | $(M4) -D self_contained_policy $(M4PARAM) $(m4divert) $@.m4 $(m4undivert) - \ | $(SED) -e 's/dollarsone/\$$1/g' -e 's/dollarszero/\$$0/g' >> $@ $(moddir)/kernel/corenetwork.te: $(moddir)/kernel/corenetwork.te.m4 $(moddir)/kernel/corenetwork.te.in diff --git a/Rules.modular b/Rules.modular index 168a14f..c2bf491 100644 --- a/Rules.modular +++ b/Rules.modular @@ -207,6 +207,7 @@ validate: $(base_pkg) $(mod_pkgs) @echo "Validating policy linking." $(verbose) $(SEMOD_LNK) -o $(tmpdir)/test.lnk $^ $(verbose) $(SEMOD_EXP) $(tmpdir)/test.lnk $(tmpdir)/policy.bin + $(verbose) $(SEPOLGEN) -p $(tmpdir)/policy.bin -i $(poldir) -o $(tmpdir)/output @echo "Success." ######################################## diff --git a/man/man8/NetworkManager_selinux.8 b/man/man8/NetworkManager_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..74ab63c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/NetworkManager_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +.TH "NetworkManager_selinux" "8" "NetworkManager" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "NetworkManager SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +NetworkManager_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the NetworkManager processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B NetworkManager +(Manager for dynamically switching between networks) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux NetworkManager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their NetworkManager processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for NetworkManager: + + +.EX +.PP +.B NetworkManager_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the NetworkManager_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as NetworkManager etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/NetworkManager/system-connections(/.*)?, /etc/NetworkManager/NetworkManager\.conf + +.EX +.PP +.B NetworkManager_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the NetworkManager_etc_t type, if you want to store NetworkManager files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B NetworkManager_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the NetworkManager_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the NetworkManager_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/s?bin/wpa_supplicant, /usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant, /sbin/wpa_supplicant, /usr/sbin/nm-system-settings, /usr/sbin/wicd, /usr/s?bin/NetworkManager, /usr/sbin/NetworkManagerDispatcher + +.EX +.PP +.B NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the NetworkManager_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/wicd, /etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher\.d(/.*)?, /usr/libexec/nm-dispatcher.action + +.EX +.PP +.B NetworkManager_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the NetworkManager_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as NetworkManager log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/wpa_supplicant.*, /var/log/wicd.* + +.EX +.PP +.B NetworkManager_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the NetworkManager_tmp_t type, if you want to store NetworkManager temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B NetworkManager_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the NetworkManager_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as NetworkManager unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/NetworkManager\.service, /lib/systemd/system/NetworkManager\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B NetworkManager_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the NetworkManager_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the NetworkManager files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/wicd/wired-settings.conf, /var/lib/wicd(/.*)?, /etc/wicd/manager-settings.conf, /etc/wicd/wireless-settings.conf, /var/lib/NetworkManager(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B NetworkManager_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the NetworkManager_var_run_t type, if you want to store the NetworkManager files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/nm-dhclient.*, /var/run/wpa_supplicant(/.*)?, /var/run/NetworkManager\.pid, /var/run/wpa_supplicant-global, /var/run/nm-dns-dnsmasq\.conf, /var/run/NetworkManager(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux NetworkManager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their NetworkManager processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for NetworkManager: + +.EX +.B NetworkManager_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), NetworkManager(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/abrt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/abrt_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1acfb1b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/abrt_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,250 @@ +.TH "abrt_selinux" "8" "abrt" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "abrt SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +abrt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the abrt processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B abrt +(ABRT - automated bug-reporting tool) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. abrt policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run abrt with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow ABRT to run in abrt_handle_event_t domain to handle ABRT event script, you must turn on the abrt_handle_event boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P abrt_handle_event 1 +.EE + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. +.TP +Allow abrt servers to read the /var/abrt directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/abrt(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/abrt +.pp +.TP +Allow abrt servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_abrt_anon_write boolean to be set. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/abrt/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/abrt/incoming + + +.PP +If you want to allow ABRT to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the abrt_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P abrt_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux abrt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for abrt: + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_dump_oops_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_dump_oops_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_dump_oops_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_etc_t type, if you want to store abrt files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_handle_event_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_handle_event_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_handle_event_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_helper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_helper_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_retrace_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_retrace_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/retrace-server(/.*)?, /var/cache/abrt-retrace(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_retrace_coredump_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_retrace_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_retrace_spool_t type, if you want to store the abrt retrace files under the /var/spool directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/retrace-server(/.*)?, /var/spool/abrt-retrace(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the abrt_retrace_worker_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/retrace-server-worker, /usr/bin/abrt-retrace-worker + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_tmp_t type, if you want to store abrt temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as abrt unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_var_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_var_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/abrt(/.*)?, /var/spool/abrt(/.*)?, /var/cache/abrt-di(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as abrt var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B abrt_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the abrt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the abrt files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/abrtd?\.socket, /var/run/abrtd?\.lock, /var/run/abrt(/.*)?, /var/run/abrt\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux abrt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their abrt processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for abrt: + +.EX +.B abrt_handle_event_t, abrt_helper_t, abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_t, abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_dump_oops_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), abrt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/accountsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/accountsd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4fe880f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/accountsd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.TH "accountsd_selinux" "8" "accountsd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "accountsd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +accountsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the accountsd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B accountsd +(AccountsService and daemon for manipulating user account information via D-Bus) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux accountsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their accountsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for accountsd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B accountsd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the accountsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the accountsd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B accountsd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the accountsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as accountsd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B accountsd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the accountsd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the accountsd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux accountsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their accountsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for accountsd: + +.EX +.B accountsd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), accountsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/acct_selinux.8 b/man/man8/acct_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..323cee4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/acct_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.TH "acct_selinux" "8" "acct" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "acct SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +acct_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the acct processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B acct +(Berkeley process accounting) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux acct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their acct processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for acct: + + +.EX +.PP +.B acct_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the acct_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as acct content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/account(/.*)?, /var/account(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B acct_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the acct_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the acct_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/accton, /sbin/accton, /etc/cron\.(daily|monthly)/acct + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux acct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their acct processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for acct: + +.EX +.B acct_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), acct(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/afs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/afs_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7832fa4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/afs_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,294 @@ +.TH "afs_selinux" "8" "afs" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "afs SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +afs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the afs processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B afs +(Andrew Filesystem server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux afs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for afs: + + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_bosserver_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_bosserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_bosserver_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/afs(/.*)?, /usr/vice/cache(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_config_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/afs/local(/.*)?, /usr/afs/etc(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_dbdir_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_dbdir_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs dbdir data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/vice/etc/afsd, /usr/sbin/afsd + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_files_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_files_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/vicepc, /vicepb, /vicepa + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_fsserver_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_fsserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_fsserver_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/afs/bin/volserver, /usr/afs/bin/fileserver, /usr/afs/bin/salvager + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/afs, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openafs-client + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_ka_db_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_ka_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs ka database content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_kaserver_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_kaserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_kaserver_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_logfile_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_logfile_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs logfile data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_pt_db_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_pt_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs pt database content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_ptserver_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_ptserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_ptserver_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_vl_db_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_vl_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as afs vl database content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B afs_vlserver_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the afs_vlserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the afs_vlserver_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux afs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for afs: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B afs_bos_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B afs_client_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B afs_fs_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B afs_ka_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B afs_pt_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B afs_vl_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux afs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their afs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for afs: + +.EX +.B afs_kaserver_t, afs_t, afs_fsserver_t, afs_bosserver_t, afs_vlserver_t, afs_ptserver_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), afs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/aiccu_selinux.8 b/man/man8/aiccu_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efc06eb --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/aiccu_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "aiccu_selinux" "8" "aiccu" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "aiccu SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +aiccu_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the aiccu processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B aiccu +(Automatic IPv6 Connectivity Client Utility) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux aiccu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aiccu processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for aiccu: + + +.EX +.PP +.B aiccu_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aiccu_etc_t type, if you want to store aiccu files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aiccu_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aiccu_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aiccu_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aiccu_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aiccu_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aiccu_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aiccu_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aiccu_var_run_t type, if you want to store the aiccu files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux aiccu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aiccu processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for aiccu: + +.EX +.B aiccu_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), aiccu(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/aide_selinux.8 b/man/man8/aide_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0863697 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/aide_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +.TH "aide_selinux" "8" "aide" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "aide SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +aide_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the aide processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B aide +(Aide filesystem integrity checker) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux aide policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aide processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for aide: + + +.EX +.PP +.B aide_db_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aide_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as aide database content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aide_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aide_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aide_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aide_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aide_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as aide log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/aide\.log, /var/log/aide(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux aide policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aide processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for aide: + +.EX +.B aide_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), aide(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/aisexec_selinux.8 b/man/man8/aisexec_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d4a539 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/aisexec_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "aisexec_selinux" "8" "aisexec" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "aisexec SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +aisexec_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the aisexec processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B aisexec +(Aisexec Cluster Engine) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux aisexec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aisexec processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for aisexec: + + +.EX +.PP +.B aisexec_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aisexec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aisexec_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aisexec_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aisexec_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the aisexec_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aisexec_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aisexec_tmp_t type, if you want to store aisexec temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aisexec_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aisexec_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store aisexec files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aisexec_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aisexec_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the aisexec files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aisexec_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aisexec_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as aisexec var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B aisexec_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the aisexec_var_run_t type, if you want to store the aisexec files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux aisexec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their aisexec processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for aisexec: + +.EX +.B aisexec_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), aisexec(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ajaxterm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ajaxterm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ff7f95 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ajaxterm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +.TH "ajaxterm_selinux" "8" "ajaxterm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ajaxterm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ajaxterm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ajaxterm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ajaxterm +(policy for ajaxterm) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ajaxterm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ajaxterm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ajaxterm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ajaxterm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ajaxterm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ajaxterm_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ajaxterm_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ajaxterm_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ajaxterm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ajaxterm files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ajaxterm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ajaxterm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ajaxterm: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ajaxterm_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ajaxterm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ajaxterm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ajaxterm: + +.EX +.B ajaxterm_ssh_t, ajaxterm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ajaxterm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/alsa_selinux.8 b/man/man8/alsa_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a8a29d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/alsa_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "alsa_selinux" "8" "alsa" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "alsa SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +alsa_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the alsa processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B alsa +(Ainit ALSA configuration tool) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux alsa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their alsa processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for alsa: + + +.EX +.PP +.B alsa_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the alsa_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as alsa etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/alsa/pcm(/.*)?, /etc/alsa/asound\.state, /usr/share/alsa/pcm(/.*)?, /etc/asound\.state, /etc/asound(/.*)?, /usr/share/alsa/alsa\.conf + +.EX +.PP +.B alsa_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the alsa_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the alsa_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/salsa, /sbin/alsactl, /usr/bin/ainit, /usr/bin/alsaunmute, /sbin/salsa, /usr/sbin/alsactl, /bin/alsaunmute + +.EX +.PP +.B alsa_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the alsa_home_t type, if you want to store alsa files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B alsa_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the alsa_tmp_t type, if you want to store alsa temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B alsa_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the alsa_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as alsa unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B alsa_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the alsa_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the alsa files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux alsa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their alsa processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for alsa: + +.EX +.B alsa_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), alsa(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/amanda_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amanda_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ada188 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/amanda_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +.TH "amanda_selinux" "8" "amanda" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "amanda SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +amanda_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amanda processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B amanda +(Advanced Maryland Automatic Network Disk Archiver) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux amanda policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for amanda: + + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_amandates_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_amandates_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda amandates data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_config_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/amanda(/.*)?, /var/lib/amanda/\.amandahosts + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/amanda/[^/]+(/.*)?, /etc/amanda/.*/tapelist(/.*)?, /etc/amanda/.*/index(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_dumpdates_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_dumpdates_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda dumpdates data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_gnutarlists_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_gnutarlists_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda gnutarlists data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_inetd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_inetd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_inetd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/amanda/amindexd, /usr/lib/amanda/amidxtaped, /usr/lib/amanda/amandad + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as amanda log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/amanda(/.*)?, /var/lib/amanda/[^/]*/log(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_recover_dir_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_recover_dir_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda recover dir data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_recover_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_recover_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amanda_recover_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_tmp_t type, if you want to store amanda temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_usr_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_usr_lib_t type, if you want to treat the files as amanda usr lib data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amanda_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amanda_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the amanda files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/amanda, /var/lib/amanda/[^/]+/index(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux amanda policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for amanda: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B amanda_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux amanda policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amanda processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for amanda: + +.EX +.B amanda_t, amanda_recover_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), amanda(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/amavis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amavis_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..52d2f0d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/amavis_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,193 @@ +.TH "amavis_selinux" "8" "amavis" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "amavis SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +amavis_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amavis processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B amavis +( +Daemon that interfaces mail transfer agents and content +checkers, such as virus scanners. +) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux amavis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amavis processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for amavis: + + +.EX +.PP +.B amavis_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amavis_etc_t type, if you want to store amavis files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/amavis\.conf, /etc/amavisd(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B amavis_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amavis_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amavis_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/amavisd.*, /usr/lib/AntiVir/antivir + +.EX +.PP +.B amavis_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amavis_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amavis_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amavis_quarantine_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amavis_quarantine_t type, if you want to treat the files as amavis quarantine data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amavis_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amavis_spool_t type, if you want to store the amavis files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amavis_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amavis_tmp_t type, if you want to store amavis temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amavis_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amavis_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the amavis files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/amavis(/.*)?, /var/amavis(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B amavis_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amavis_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as amavis var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B amavis_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amavis_var_run_t type, if you want to store the amavis files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux amavis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amavis processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for amavis: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B amavisd_recv_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B amavisd_send_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux amavis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amavis processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for amavis: + +.EX +.B amavis_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), amavis(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/amtu_selinux.8 b/man/man8/amtu_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..511f260 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/amtu_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "amtu_selinux" "8" "amtu" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "amtu SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +amtu_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the amtu processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B amtu +(Abstract Machine Test Utility) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux amtu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amtu processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for amtu: + + +.EX +.PP +.B amtu_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the amtu_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the amtu_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux amtu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their amtu processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for amtu: + +.EX +.B amtu_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), amtu(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/apcupsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apcupsd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dab6c6a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/apcupsd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +.TH "apcupsd_selinux" "8" "apcupsd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "apcupsd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +apcupsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the apcupsd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B apcupsd +(APC UPS monitoring daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux apcupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apcupsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for apcupsd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B apcupsd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apcupsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apcupsd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/apcupsd, /usr/sbin/apcupsd + +.EX +.PP +.B apcupsd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apcupsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apcupsd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apcupsd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apcupsd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as apcupsd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B apcupsd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apcupsd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as apcupsd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/apcupsd\.status.*, /var/log/apcupsd\.events.* + +.EX +.PP +.B apcupsd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apcupsd_tmp_t type, if you want to store apcupsd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apcupsd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apcupsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as apcupsd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apcupsd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apcupsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the apcupsd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux apcupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apcupsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for apcupsd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B apcupsd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux apcupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apcupsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for apcupsd: + +.EX +.B apcupsd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), apcupsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/apm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c6243c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/apm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +.TH "apm_selinux" "8" "apm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "apm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +apm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the apm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B apm +(Advanced power management daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux apm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for apm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B apm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apm_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apmd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/powersaved, /usr/sbin/acpid, /usr/sbin/apmd + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as apmd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_tmp_t type, if you want to store apmd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the apmd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/\.?acpid\.socket, /var/run/apmd\.pid, /var/run/powersaved\.pid, /var/run/powersave_socket + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux apm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for apm: + +.EX +.B apm_t, apmd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), apm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/apmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/apmd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6449d94 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/apmd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +.TH "apmd_selinux" "8" "apmd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "apmd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +apmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the apmd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux apmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for apmd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B apm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apm_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the apmd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/powersaved, /usr/sbin/acpid, /usr/sbin/apmd + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as apmd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_tmp_t type, if you want to store apmd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as apmd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B apmd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the apmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the apmd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/\.?acpid\.socket, /var/run/apmd\.pid, /var/run/powersaved\.pid, /var/run/powersave_socket + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux apmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their apmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for apmd: + +.EX +.B apm_t, apmd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), apmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/arpwatch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/arpwatch_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8052609 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/arpwatch_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.TH "arpwatch_selinux" "8" "arpwatch" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "arpwatch SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +arpwatch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the arpwatch processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B arpwatch +(Ethernet activity monitor) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux arpwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their arpwatch processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for arpwatch: + + +.EX +.PP +.B arpwatch_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the arpwatch_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as arpwatch content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/arpwatch(/.*)?, /var/lib/arpwatch(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B arpwatch_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the arpwatch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the arpwatch_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B arpwatch_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the arpwatch_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the arpwatch_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B arpwatch_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the arpwatch_tmp_t type, if you want to store arpwatch temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B arpwatch_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the arpwatch_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as arpwatch unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B arpwatch_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the arpwatch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the arpwatch files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux arpwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their arpwatch processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for arpwatch: + +.EX +.B arpwatch_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), arpwatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/asterisk_selinux.8 b/man/man8/asterisk_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c00565c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/asterisk_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +.TH "asterisk_selinux" "8" "asterisk" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "asterisk SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +asterisk_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the asterisk processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B asterisk +(Asterisk IP telephony server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux asterisk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their asterisk processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for asterisk: + + +.EX +.PP +.B asterisk_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the asterisk_etc_t type, if you want to store asterisk files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B asterisk_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the asterisk_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the asterisk_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B asterisk_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the asterisk_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the asterisk_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B asterisk_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the asterisk_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as asterisk log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B asterisk_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the asterisk_spool_t type, if you want to store the asterisk files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B asterisk_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the asterisk_tmp_t type, if you want to store asterisk temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B asterisk_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the asterisk_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store asterisk files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B asterisk_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the asterisk_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the asterisk files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B asterisk_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the asterisk_var_run_t type, if you want to store the asterisk files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux asterisk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their asterisk processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for asterisk: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B asterisk_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux asterisk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their asterisk processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for asterisk: + +.EX +.B asterisk_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), asterisk(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/audisp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/audisp_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc30264 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/audisp_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "audisp_selinux" "8" "audisp" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "audisp SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +audisp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the audisp processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux audisp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their audisp processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for audisp: + + +.EX +.PP +.B audisp_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the audisp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the audisp_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/audispd, /usr/sbin/audispd + +.EX +.PP +.B audisp_remote_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the audisp_remote_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the audisp_remote_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/audisp-remote, /sbin/audisp-remote + +.EX +.PP +.B audisp_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the audisp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the audisp files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux audisp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their audisp processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for audisp: + +.EX +.B audisp_remote_t, audisp_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), audisp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/auditadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/auditadm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cba947e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/auditadm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +.TH "auditadm_selinux" "8" "auditadm" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "auditadm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +auditadm_r \- \fBAudit administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to. + +Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user. + +Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. + +Roles usually have default types assigned to them. + +The default type for the auditadm_r role is auditadm_t. + +You can use the +.B newrole +program to transition directly to this role. + +.B newrole -r auditadm_r -t auditadm_t + +.B sudo +can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command. + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=auditadm_r TYPE=auditadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:auditadm_r:auditadm_t:LEVEL + +If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role. + +You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following + +.B semanage user -l + +If you wanted to add auditadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r auditadm_r' staff_u + + + +SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role. +You can list these rules using the following command. + +.B sesearch --role_allow + +SELinux policy allows the sysadm_r, secadm_r, staff_r roles can transition to the auditadm_r role. + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/auditctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/auditctl_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96a49e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/auditctl_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "auditctl_selinux" "8" "auditctl" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "auditctl SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +auditctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the auditctl processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux auditctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditctl processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for auditctl: + + +.EX +.PP +.B auditctl_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the auditctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the auditctl_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/auditctl, /usr/sbin/auditctl + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux auditctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditctl processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for auditctl: + +.EX +.B auditctl_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), auditctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/auditd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/auditd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50c15c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/auditd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +.TH "auditd_selinux" "8" "auditd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "auditd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +auditd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the auditd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux auditd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for auditd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B audit_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the audit_spool_t type, if you want to store the audit files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B auditd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the auditd_etc_t type, if you want to store auditd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B auditd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the auditd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the auditd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/auditd, /usr/sbin/auditd + +.EX +.PP +.B auditd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the auditd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the auditd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B auditd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the auditd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as auditd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/audit(/.*)?, /var/log/audit\.log + +.EX +.PP +.B auditd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the auditd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as auditd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B auditd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the auditd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the auditd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/audit_events, /var/run/auditd_sock, /var/run/auditd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux auditd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for auditd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B audit_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux auditd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their auditd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for auditd: + +.EX +.B auditadm_su_t, auditadm_seunshare_t, auditadm_dbusd_t, auditadm_t, auditadm_sudo_t, auditadm_wine_t, auditadm_screen_t, auditadm_gkeyringd_t, auditd_t, auditctl_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), auditd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/automount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/automount_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff75942 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/automount_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +.TH "automount_selinux" "8" "automount" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "automount SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +automount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the automount processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B automount +(Filesystem automounter service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux automount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their automount processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for automount: + + +.EX +.PP +.B automount_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the automount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the automount_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/automount, /etc/apm/event\.d/autofs + +.EX +.PP +.B automount_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the automount_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the automount_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B automount_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the automount_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B automount_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the automount_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as automount lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B automount_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the automount_tmp_t type, if you want to store automount temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B automount_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the automount_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as automount unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B automount_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the automount_var_run_t type, if you want to store the automount files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux automount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their automount processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for automount: + +.EX +.B automount_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), automount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/avahi_selinux.8 b/man/man8/avahi_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f489dad --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/avahi_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +.TH "avahi_selinux" "8" "avahi" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "avahi SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +avahi_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the avahi processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B avahi +(mDNS/DNS-SD daemon implementing Apple ZeroConf architecture) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. avahi policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run avahi with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbu, you must turn on the httpd_dbus_avahi boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux avahi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their avahi processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for avahi: + + +.EX +.PP +.B avahi_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the avahi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the avahi_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/avahi-dnsconfd, /usr/sbin/avahi-autoipd, /usr/sbin/avahi-daemon + +.EX +.PP +.B avahi_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the avahi_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the avahi_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B avahi_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the avahi_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as avahi unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B avahi_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the avahi_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the avahi files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B avahi_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the avahi_var_run_t type, if you want to store the avahi files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux avahi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their avahi processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for avahi: + +.EX +.B avahi_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), avahi(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/awstats_selinux.8 b/man/man8/awstats_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b76d620 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/awstats_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +.TH "awstats_selinux" "8" "awstats" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "awstats SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +awstats_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the awstats processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B awstats +( +AWStats is a free powerful and featureful tool that generates advanced +web, streaming, ftp or mail server statistics, graphically. +) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux awstats policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their awstats processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for awstats: + + +.EX +.PP +.B awstats_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the awstats_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the awstats_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B awstats_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the awstats_tmp_t type, if you want to store awstats temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B awstats_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the awstats_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the awstats files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux awstats policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their awstats processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for awstats: + +.EX +.B awstats_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), awstats(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/bcfg2_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bcfg2_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fcb6393 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/bcfg2_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "bcfg2_selinux" "8" "bcfg2" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "bcfg2 SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +bcfg2_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bcfg2 processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B bcfg2 +(policy for bcfg2) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux bcfg2 policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bcfg2 processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for bcfg2: + + +.EX +.PP +.B bcfg2_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bcfg2_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bcfg2_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bcfg2_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bcfg2_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bcfg2_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bcfg2_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bcfg2_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as bcfg2 unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bcfg2_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bcfg2_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the bcfg2 files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux bcfg2 policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bcfg2 processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for bcfg2: + +.EX +.B bcfg2_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), bcfg2(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/bitlbee_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bitlbee_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c1b8b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/bitlbee_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +.TH "bitlbee_selinux" "8" "bitlbee" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "bitlbee SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +bitlbee_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bitlbee processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B bitlbee +(Bitlbee service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux bitlbee policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bitlbee processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for bitlbee: + + +.EX +.PP +.B bitlbee_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bitlbee_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as bitlbee configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bitlbee_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bitlbee_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bitlbee_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/bitlbee, /usr/bin/bip + +.EX +.PP +.B bitlbee_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bitlbee_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bitlbee_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bitlbee_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bitlbee_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as bitlbee log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bitlbee_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bitlbee_tmp_t type, if you want to store bitlbee temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bitlbee_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bitlbee_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bitlbee files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/bitlbee\.pid, /var/run/bip(/.*)?, /var/run/bitlbee\.sock + +.EX +.PP +.B bitlbee_var_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bitlbee_var_t type, if you want to store the bit files under the /var directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux bitlbee policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bitlbee processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for bitlbee: + +.EX +.B bitlbee_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), bitlbee(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/blktap_selinux.8 b/man/man8/blktap_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a344b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/blktap_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +.TH "blktap_selinux" "8" "blktap" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "blktap SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +blktap_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the blktap processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. blktap policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run blktap with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux blktap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blktap processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for blktap: + + +.EX +.PP +.B blktap_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the blktap_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the blktap_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/blktapctrl, /usr/sbin/tapdisk + +.EX +.PP +.B blktap_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the blktap_var_run_t type, if you want to store the blktap files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux blktap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blktap processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for blktap: + +.EX +.B blktap_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), blktap(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/blueman_selinux.8 b/man/man8/blueman_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..834703f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/blueman_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "blueman_selinux" "8" "blueman" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "blueman SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +blueman_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the blueman processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B blueman +(policy for blueman) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux blueman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blueman processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for blueman: + + +.EX +.PP +.B blueman_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the blueman_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the blueman_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux blueman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their blueman processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for blueman: + +.EX +.B blueman_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), blueman(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/bluetooth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bluetooth_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d344b7b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/bluetooth_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +.TH "bluetooth_selinux" "8" "bluetooth" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "bluetooth SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +bluetooth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bluetooth processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B bluetooth +(Bluetooth tools and system services) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. bluetooth policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run bluetooth with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow xguest users to use blue tooth device, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux bluetooth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bluetooth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for bluetooth: + + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_conf_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_conf_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth conf read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/hcid, /usr/bin/rfcomm, /usr/sbin/sdpd, /usr/bin/hidd, /usr/sbin/bluetoothd, /usr/sbin/hid2hci, /usr/bin/dund, /usr/sbin/hciattach + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_helper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_helper_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_helper_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_tmp_t type, if you want to store bluetooth helper temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store bluetooth helper files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bluetooth_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dund, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bluetooth, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pand + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as bluetooth unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the bluetooth files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B bluetooth_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bluetooth_var_run_t type, if you want to store the bluetooth files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/bluetoothd_address, /var/run/sdp + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux bluetooth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bluetooth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for bluetooth: + +.EX +.B bluetooth_helper_t, bluetooth_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), bluetooth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/boinc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/boinc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae842c8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/boinc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +.TH "boinc_selinux" "8" "boinc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "boinc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +boinc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the boinc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B boinc +(policy for boinc) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux boinc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their boinc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for boinc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B boinc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the boinc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the boinc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B boinc_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the boinc_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the boinc_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B boinc_project_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the boinc_project_tmp_t type, if you want to store boinc project temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B boinc_project_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the boinc_project_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the boinc project files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/boinc/projects(/.*)?, /var/lib/boinc/slots(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B boinc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the boinc_tmp_t type, if you want to store boinc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B boinc_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the boinc_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store boinc files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B boinc_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the boinc_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the boinc files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux boinc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their boinc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for boinc: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B boinc_client_ctrl_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B boinc_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux boinc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their boinc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for boinc: + +.EX +.B boinc_t, boinc_project_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), boinc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/bootloader_selinux.8 b/man/man8/bootloader_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..892a587 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/bootloader_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +.TH "bootloader_selinux" "8" "bootloader" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "bootloader SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +bootloader_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the bootloader processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B bootloader +(Policy for the kernel modules, kernel image, and bootloader) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. bootloader policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run bootloader with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloade, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux bootloader policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bootloader processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for bootloader: + + +.EX +.PP +.B bootloader_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bootloader_etc_t type, if you want to store bootloader files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/yaboot\.conf.*, /etc/default/grub, /etc/lilo\.conf.* + +.EX +.PP +.B bootloader_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bootloader_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the bootloader_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ybin.*, /usr/sbin/grub.*, /sbin/lilo.*, /sbin/ybin.*, /usr/sbin/lilo.*, /sbin/grub.* + +.EX +.PP +.B bootloader_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the bootloader_tmp_t type, if you want to store bootloader temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux bootloader policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their bootloader processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for bootloader: + +.EX +.B bootloader_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), bootloader(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/brctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/brctl_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..664324c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/brctl_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "brctl_selinux" "8" "brctl" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "brctl SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +brctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the brctl processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B brctl +(Utilities for configuring the linux ethernet bridge) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux brctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their brctl processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for brctl: + + +.EX +.PP +.B brctl_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the brctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the brctl_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux brctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their brctl processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for brctl: + +.EX +.B brctl_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), brctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cachefilesd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cachefilesd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..03e5916 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cachefilesd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "cachefilesd_selinux" "8" "cachefilesd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cachefilesd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cachefilesd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cachefilesd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cachefilesd +(policy for cachefilesd) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cachefilesd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cachefilesd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cachefilesd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cachefiles_var_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cachefiles_var_t type, if you want to store the cachef files under the /var directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/cachefilesd\.pid, /var/fscache(/.*)?, /var/cache/fscache(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B cachefilesd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cachefilesd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cachefilesd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/cachefilesd, /usr/sbin/cachefilesd + +.EX +.PP +.B cachefilesd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cachefilesd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cachefilesd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cachefilesd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cachefilesd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cachefilesd: + +.EX +.B cachefilesd_t, cachefiles_kernel_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cachefilesd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/calamaris_selinux.8 b/man/man8/calamaris_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..831d1b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/calamaris_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.TH "calamaris_selinux" "8" "calamaris" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "calamaris SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +calamaris_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the calamaris processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B calamaris +(Squid log analysis) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux calamaris policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their calamaris processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for calamaris: + + +.EX +.PP +.B calamaris_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the calamaris_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the calamaris_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B calamaris_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the calamaris_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as calamaris log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B calamaris_www_t +.EE + +- Set files with the calamaris_www_t type, if you want to treat the files as calamaris www data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux calamaris policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their calamaris processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for calamaris: + +.EX +.B calamaris_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), calamaris(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/callweaver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/callweaver_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..00210e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/callweaver_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "callweaver_selinux" "8" "callweaver" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "callweaver SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +callweaver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the callweaver processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B callweaver +(Open source PBX project) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux callweaver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their callweaver processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for callweaver: + + +.EX +.PP +.B callweaver_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the callweaver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the callweaver_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B callweaver_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the callweaver_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the callweaver_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B callweaver_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the callweaver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as callweaver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B callweaver_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the callweaver_spool_t type, if you want to store the callweaver files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B callweaver_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the callweaver_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the callweaver files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B callweaver_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the callweaver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the callweaver files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux callweaver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their callweaver processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for callweaver: + +.EX +.B callweaver_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), callweaver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/canna_selinux.8 b/man/man8/canna_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f254edc --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/canna_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "canna_selinux" "8" "canna" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "canna SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +canna_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the canna processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B canna +(Canna - kana-kanji conversion server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux canna policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their canna processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for canna: + + +.EX +.PP +.B canna_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the canna_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the canna_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/catdic, /usr/bin/cannaping, /usr/sbin/jserver, /usr/sbin/cannaserver + +.EX +.PP +.B canna_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the canna_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the canna_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B canna_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the canna_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as canna log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/wnn(/.*)?, /var/log/canna(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B canna_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the canna_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the canna files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/wnn/dic(/.*)?, /var/lib/canna/dic(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B canna_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the canna_var_run_t type, if you want to store the canna files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/\.iroha_unix/.*, /var/run/wnn-unix(/.*)?, /var/run/\.iroha_unix + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux canna policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their canna processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for canna: + +.EX +.B canna_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), canna(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cardmgr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cardmgr_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a494bcb --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cardmgr_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +.TH "cardmgr_selinux" "8" "cardmgr" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cardmgr SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cardmgr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cardmgr processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cardmgr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cardmgr processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cardmgr: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cardmgr_dev_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cardmgr_dev_t type, if you want to treat the files as cardmgr dev data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cardmgr_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cardmgr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cardmgr_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/cardmgr, /etc/apm/event\.d/pcmcia, /usr/sbin/cardmgr + +.EX +.PP +.B cardmgr_lnk_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cardmgr_lnk_t type, if you want to treat the files as cardmgr lnk data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cardmgr_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cardmgr_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cardmgr files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cardmgr_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cardmgr_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cardmgr files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/cardmgr\.pid, /var/run/stab, /var/lib/pcmcia(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cardmgr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cardmgr processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cardmgr: + +.EX +.B cardmgr_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cardmgr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ccs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ccs_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2d4fde --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ccs_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "ccs_selinux" "8" "ccs" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ccs SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ccs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ccs processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ccs +(Cluster Configuration System) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ccs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ccs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ccs: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ccs_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ccs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ccs_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ccsd, /sbin/ccsd + +.EX +.PP +.B ccs_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ccs_tmp_t type, if you want to store ccs temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ccs_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ccs_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ccs files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ccs_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ccs_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ccs files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ccs_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ccs_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ccs var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ccs_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ccs_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ccs files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/cluster/ccsd\.pid, /var/run/cluster/ccsd\.sock + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ccs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ccs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ccs: + +.EX +.B ccs_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ccs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cdcc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cdcc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..217f349 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cdcc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +.TH "cdcc_selinux" "8" "cdcc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cdcc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cdcc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cdcc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cdcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdcc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cdcc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cdcc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cdcc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cdcc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cdcc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cdcc_tmp_t type, if you want to store cdcc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cdcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdcc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cdcc: + +.EX +.B cdcc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cdcc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cdrecord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cdrecord_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db2a2e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cdrecord_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +.TH "cdrecord_selinux" "8" "cdrecord" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cdrecord SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cdrecord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cdrecord processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cdrecord +(Policy for cdrecord) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. cdrecord policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run cdrecord with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow cdrecord to read various content. nfs, samba, removable devices, user temp and untrusted content file, you must turn on the cdrecord_read_content boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P cdrecord_read_content 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cdrecord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdrecord processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cdrecord: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cdrecord_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cdrecord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cdrecord_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/cdrecord, /usr/bin/wodim, /usr/bin/growisofs + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cdrecord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cdrecord processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cdrecord: + +.EX +.B cdrecord_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cdrecord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/certmaster_selinux.8 b/man/man8/certmaster_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf4f6c4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/certmaster_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +.TH "certmaster_selinux" "8" "certmaster" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "certmaster SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +certmaster_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the certmaster processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B certmaster +(Certmaster SSL certificate distribution service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux certmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmaster processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for certmaster: + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmaster_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmaster_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as certmaster etc read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmaster_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmaster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmaster_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmaster_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmaster_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmaster_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmaster_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmaster_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the certmaster files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmaster_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmaster_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as certmaster var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmaster_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmaster_var_run_t type, if you want to store the certmaster files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux certmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmaster processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for certmaster: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B certmaster_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux certmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmaster processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for certmaster: + +.EX +.B certmaster_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), certmaster(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/certmonger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/certmonger_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f01973 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/certmonger_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.TH "certmonger_selinux" "8" "certmonger" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "certmonger SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +certmonger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the certmonger processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B certmonger +(Certificate status monitor and PKI enrollment client) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux certmonger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmonger processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for certmonger: + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmonger_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmonger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmonger_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmonger_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmonger_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmonger_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmonger_unconfined_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmonger_unconfined_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certmonger_unconfined_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmonger_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmonger_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the certmonger files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B certmonger_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certmonger_var_run_t type, if you want to store the certmonger files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux certmonger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certmonger processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for certmonger: + +.EX +.B certmonger_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), certmonger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/certwatch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/certwatch_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..612259c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/certwatch_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "certwatch_selinux" "8" "certwatch" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "certwatch SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +certwatch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the certwatch processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B certwatch +(Digital Certificate Tracking) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux certwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certwatch processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for certwatch: + + +.EX +.PP +.B certwatch_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the certwatch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the certwatch_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux certwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their certwatch processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for certwatch: + +.EX +.B certwatch_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), certwatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cfengine_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cfengine_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0831deb --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cfengine_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "cfengine_selinux" "8" "cfengine" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cfengine SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cfengine_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cfengine processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cfengine +(policy for cfengine) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cfengine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cfengine: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cfengine_execd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cfengine_execd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_execd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cfengine_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cfengine_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-serverd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-execd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-monitord + +.EX +.PP +.B cfengine_monitord_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cfengine_monitord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_monitord_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cfengine_serverd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cfengine_serverd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cfengine_serverd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cfengine_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cfengine_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cfengine files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cfengine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cfengine processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cfengine: + +.EX +.B cfengine_execd_t, cfengine_monitord_t, cfengine_serverd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cfengine(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cgclear_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cgclear_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8dc7a1f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cgclear_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "cgclear_selinux" "8" "cgclear" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cgclear SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cgclear_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cgclear processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cgclear policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgclear processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cgclear: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cgclear_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cgclear_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgclear_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/cgclear, /usr/sbin/cgclear + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cgclear policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgclear processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cgclear: + +.EX +.B cgclear_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cgclear(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cgconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cgconfig_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf8323b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cgconfig_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "cgconfig_selinux" "8" "cgconfig" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cgconfig SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cgconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cgconfig processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cgconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgconfig processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cgconfig: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cgconfig_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cgconfig_etc_t type, if you want to store cgconfig files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/sysconfig/cgconfig, /etc/cgconfig.conf + +.EX +.PP +.B cgconfig_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cgconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgconfig_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/cgconfigparser, /sbin/cgconfigparser + +.EX +.PP +.B cgconfig_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cgconfig_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgconfig_initrc_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cgconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgconfig processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cgconfig: + +.EX +.B cgconfig_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cgconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cgred_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cgred_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8cf1b40 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cgred_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +.TH "cgred_selinux" "8" "cgred" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cgred SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cgred_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cgred processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cgred policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgred processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cgred: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cgred_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cgred_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgred_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/cgrulesengd, /usr/sbin/cgrulesengd + +.EX +.PP +.B cgred_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cgred_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cgred_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cgred_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cgred_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cgred log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cgred_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cgred_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cgred files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cgred policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cgred processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cgred: + +.EX +.B cgred_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cgred(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/checkpc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/checkpc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c6fcde --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/checkpc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +.TH "checkpc_selinux" "8" "checkpc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "checkpc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +checkpc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the checkpc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux checkpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for checkpc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B checkpc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the checkpc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the checkpc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B checkpc_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the checkpc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as checkpc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux checkpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for checkpc: + +.EX +.B checkpc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), checkpc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/checkpolicy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/checkpolicy_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b67fcc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/checkpolicy_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "checkpolicy_selinux" "8" "checkpolicy" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "checkpolicy SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +checkpolicy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the checkpolicy processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux checkpolicy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpolicy processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for checkpolicy: + + +.EX +.PP +.B checkpolicy_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the checkpolicy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the checkpolicy_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux checkpolicy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their checkpolicy processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for checkpolicy: + +.EX +.B checkpolicy_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), checkpolicy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/chfn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chfn_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c81760f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/chfn_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "chfn_selinux" "8" "chfn" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "chfn SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +chfn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chfn processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux chfn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chfn processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for chfn: + + +.EX +.PP +.B chfn_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chfn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chfn_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/chfn, /usr/bin/chsh + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux chfn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chfn processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for chfn: + +.EX +.B chfn_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), chfn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/chkpwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chkpwd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..03d8e09 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/chkpwd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "chkpwd_selinux" "8" "chkpwd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "chkpwd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +chkpwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chkpwd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux chkpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chkpwd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for chkpwd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B chkpwd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chkpwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chkpwd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/unix_verify, /sbin/unix_chkpwd, /usr/sbin/unix_verify, /usr/sbin/validate, /usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux chkpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chkpwd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for chkpwd: + +.EX +.B chkpwd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), chkpwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/chrome_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chrome_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e83770b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/chrome_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +.TH "chrome_selinux" "8" "chrome" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "chrome SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +chrome_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chrome processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B chrome +(policy for chrome) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. chrome policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run chrome with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbo, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux chrome policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chrome processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for chrome: + + +.EX +.PP +.B chrome_sandbox_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chrome_sandbox_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox, /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox + +.EX +.PP +.B chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chrome_sandbox_nacl_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap, /opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap + +.EX +.PP +.B chrome_sandbox_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_tmp_t type, if you want to store chrome sandbox temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store chrome sandbox files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux chrome policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chrome processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for chrome: + +.EX +.B chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), chrome(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/chronyd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/chronyd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b178fb9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/chronyd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +.TH "chronyd_selinux" "8" "chronyd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "chronyd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +chronyd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the chronyd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B chronyd +(Chrony NTP background daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux chronyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chronyd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for chronyd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B chronyd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chronyd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chronyd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B chronyd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chronyd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the chronyd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B chronyd_keys_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chronyd_keys_t type, if you want to treat the files as chronyd keys data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B chronyd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chronyd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store chronyd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B chronyd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chronyd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as chronyd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/chrony.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/chronyd.* + +.EX +.PP +.B chronyd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chronyd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the chronyd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B chronyd_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chronyd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as chronyd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B chronyd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the chronyd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the chronyd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/chronyd(/.*), /var/run/chronyd\.sock, /var/run/chronyd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux chronyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chronyd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for chronyd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B chronyd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux chronyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their chronyd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for chronyd: + +.EX +.B chronyd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), chronyd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ciped_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ciped_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e387cea --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ciped_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "ciped_selinux" "8" "ciped" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ciped SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ciped_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ciped processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ciped policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ciped processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ciped: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ciped_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ciped_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ciped_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ciped policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ciped processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ciped: + +.EX +.B ciped_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ciped(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/clamd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clamd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ffdf73 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/clamd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +.TH "clamd_selinux" "8" "clamd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "clamd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +clamd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clamd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. clamd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run clamd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow clamscan to read user conten, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow clamd to use JIT compile, you must turn on the clamd_use_jit boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P clamd_use_jit 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux clamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for clamd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B clamd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clamd_etc_t type, if you want to store clamd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B clamd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clamd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clamd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/clamd, /usr/sbin/clamav-milter + +.EX +.PP +.B clamd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clamd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clamd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B clamd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clamd_tmp_t type, if you want to store clamd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B clamd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clamd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the clamd files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/clamd.*, /var/clamav(/.*)?, /var/lib/clamav(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B clamd_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clamd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as clamd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/clamav.*, /var/log/clamd.* + +.EX +.PP +.B clamd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clamd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the clamd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/amavis(d)?/clamd\.pid, /var/run/clamd.*, /var/run/clamav.*, /var/spool/MailScanner(/.*)?, /var/spool/amavisd/clamd\.sock + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux clamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for clamd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B clamd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux clamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for clamd: + +.EX +.B clamd_t, clamscan_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), clamd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/clamscan_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clamscan_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b82f56 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/clamscan_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,98 @@ +.TH "clamscan_selinux" "8" "clamscan" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "clamscan SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +clamscan_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clamscan processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. clamscan policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run clamscan with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow clamscan to read user conten, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux clamscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamscan processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for clamscan: + + +.EX +.PP +.B clamscan_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clamscan_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clamscan_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/clamdscan, /usr/bin/clamscan + +.EX +.PP +.B clamscan_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clamscan_tmp_t type, if you want to store clamscan temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux clamscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clamscan processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for clamscan: + +.EX +.B clamscan_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), clamscan(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/clogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clogd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c68d541 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/clogd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.TH "clogd_selinux" "8" "clogd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "clogd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +clogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clogd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B clogd +(clogd - Clustered Mirror Log Server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux clogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for clogd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B clogd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clogd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B clogd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clogd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store clogd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B clogd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the clogd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux clogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for clogd: + +.EX +.B clogd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), clogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/clvmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/clvmd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f25da6c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/clvmd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "clvmd_selinux" "8" "clvmd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "clvmd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +clvmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the clvmd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux clvmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clvmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for clvmd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B clvmd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clvmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clvmd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B clvmd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clvmd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the clvmd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B clvmd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clvmd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store clvmd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B clvmd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the clvmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the clvmd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux clvmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their clvmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for clvmd: + +.EX +.B clvmd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), clvmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cmirrord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cmirrord_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..056abd4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cmirrord_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "cmirrord_selinux" "8" "cmirrord" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cmirrord SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cmirrord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cmirrord processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cmirrord +(Cluster mirror log daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cmirrord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cmirrord processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cmirrord: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cmirrord_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cmirrord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cmirrord_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cmirrord_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cmirrord_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cmirrord_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cmirrord_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cmirrord_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store cmirrord files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cmirrord_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cmirrord_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cmirrord files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cmirrord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cmirrord processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cmirrord: + +.EX +.B cmirrord_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cmirrord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cobblerd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cobblerd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a63029 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cobblerd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +.TH "cobblerd_selinux" "8" "cobblerd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cobblerd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cobblerd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cobblerd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. cobblerd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run cobblerd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow Cobbler to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the cobbler_can_network_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P cobbler_can_network_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Cobbler to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to cobbler over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Cobbler to access cifs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_cifs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_cifs 1 +.EE + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. +.TP +Allow cobblerd servers to read the /var/cobblerd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/cobblerd(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/cobblerd +.pp +.TP +Allow cobblerd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_cobblerd_anon_write boolean to be set. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/cobblerd/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/cobblerd/incoming + + +.PP +If you want to allow Cobbler to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the cobbler_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P cobbler_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cobblerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cobblerd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cobblerd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cobbler_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cobbler_etc_t type, if you want to store cobbler files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cobbler_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cobbler_tmp_t type, if you want to store cobbler temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cobbler_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cobbler_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cobbler files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/cobbler(/.*)?, /var/www/cobbler/images(/.*)?, /var/www/cobbler/repo_mirror(/.*)?, /var/lib/tftpboot/pxelinux\.cfg(/.*)?, /var/lib/tftpboot/memdisk, /var/lib/tftpboot/s390x(/.*)?, /var/www/cobbler/links(/.*)?, /var/lib/tftpboot/menu\.c32, /var/lib/tftpboot/yaboot, /var/www/cobbler/localmirror(/.*)?, /var/www/cobbler/ks_mirror(/.*)?, /var/lib/tftpboot/grub(/.*)?, /var/www/cobbler/pub(/.*)?, /var/lib/tftpboot/ppc(/.*)?, /var/lib/tftpboot/pxelinux\.0, /var/lib/tftpboot/images(/.*)?, /var/lib/tftpboot/etc(/.*)?, /var/www/cobbler/rendered(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B cobbler_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cobbler_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cobbler var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cobblerd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cobblerd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cobblerd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cobblerd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cobblerd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cobblerd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cobblerd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cobblerd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as cobblerd unit content. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux cobblerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cobblerd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for cobblerd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B cobbler_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cobblerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cobblerd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cobblerd: + +.EX +.B cobblerd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cobblerd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/collectd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/collectd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6210747 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/collectd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +.TH "collectd_selinux" "8" "collectd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "collectd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +collectd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the collectd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B collectd +(policy for collectd) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. collectd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run collectd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow collectd to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the collectd_can_network_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P collectd_can_network_connect 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux collectd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their collectd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for collectd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B collectd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the collectd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the collectd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B collectd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the collectd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the collectd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B collectd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the collectd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as collectd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B collectd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the collectd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the collectd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B collectd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the collectd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the collectd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux collectd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their collectd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for collectd: + +.EX +.B collectd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), collectd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/colord_selinux.8 b/man/man8/colord_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ed4ac6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/colord_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "colord_selinux" "8" "colord" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "colord SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +colord_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the colord processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B colord +(GNOME color manager) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux colord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their colord processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for colord: + + +.EX +.PP +.B colord_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the colord_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the colord_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/colord-sane, /usr/libexec/colord + +.EX +.PP +.B colord_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the colord_tmp_t type, if you want to store colord temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B colord_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the colord_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store colord files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B colord_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the colord_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as colord unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B colord_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the colord_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the colord files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/color(/.*)?, /var/lib/colord(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux colord policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their colord processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for colord: + +.EX +.B colord_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), colord(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/comsat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/comsat_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da3d8e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/comsat_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +.TH "comsat_selinux" "8" "comsat" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "comsat SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +comsat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the comsat processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B comsat +(Comsat, a biff server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux comsat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their comsat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for comsat: + + +.EX +.PP +.B comsat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the comsat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the comsat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B comsat_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the comsat_tmp_t type, if you want to store comsat temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B comsat_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the comsat_var_run_t type, if you want to store the comsat files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux comsat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their comsat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for comsat: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B comsat_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux comsat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their comsat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for comsat: + +.EX +.B comsat_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), comsat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/consolekit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/consolekit_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cac5397 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/consolekit_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "consolekit_selinux" "8" "consolekit" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "consolekit SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +consolekit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the consolekit processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B consolekit +(Framework for facilitating multiple user sessions on desktops) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux consolekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consolekit processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for consolekit: + + +.EX +.PP +.B consolekit_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the consolekit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the consolekit_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B consolekit_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the consolekit_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as consolekit log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B consolekit_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the consolekit_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store consolekit files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B consolekit_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the consolekit_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as consolekit unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B consolekit_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the consolekit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the consolekit files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/console-kit-daemon\.pid, /var/run/ConsoleKit(/.*)?, /var/run/consolekit\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux consolekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consolekit processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for consolekit: + +.EX +.B consolekit_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), consolekit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/consoletype_selinux.8 b/man/man8/consoletype_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..931d27b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/consoletype_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "consoletype_selinux" "8" "consoletype" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "consoletype SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +consoletype_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the consoletype processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B consoletype +( +Determine of the console connected to the controlling terminal. +) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux consoletype policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consoletype processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for consoletype: + + +.EX +.PP +.B consoletype_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the consoletype_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the consoletype_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/consoletype, /sbin/consoletype + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux consoletype policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their consoletype processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for consoletype: + +.EX +.B consoletype_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), consoletype(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/corosync_selinux.8 b/man/man8/corosync_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a20c704 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/corosync_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,149 @@ +.TH "corosync_selinux" "8" "corosync" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "corosync SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +corosync_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the corosync processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B corosync +(Corosync Cluster Engine) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux corosync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their corosync processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for corosync: + + +.EX +.PP +.B corosync_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the corosync_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the corosync_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ccs_tool, /usr/sbin/corosync, /usr/sbin/corosync-notifyd, /usr/lib(64)?/heartbeat/heartbeat, /usr/sbin/cman_tool + +.EX +.PP +.B corosync_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the corosync_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the corosync_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/heartbeat, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/corosync + +.EX +.PP +.B corosync_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the corosync_tmp_t type, if you want to store corosync temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B corosync_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the corosync_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store corosync files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B corosync_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the corosync_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as corosync unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B corosync_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the corosync_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the corosync files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/corosync(/.*)?, /usr/lib(64)?/heartbeat(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B corosync_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the corosync_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as corosync var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B corosync_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the corosync_var_run_t type, if you want to store the corosync files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/hearbeat(/.*)?, /var/run/corosync\.pid, /var/run/cman_.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux corosync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their corosync processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for corosync: + +.EX +.B corosync_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), corosync(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/couchdb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/couchdb_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..61ec71c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/couchdb_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +.TH "couchdb_selinux" "8" "couchdb" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "couchdb SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +couchdb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the couchdb processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B couchdb +(policy for couchdb) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux couchdb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their couchdb processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for couchdb: + + +.EX +.PP +.B couchdb_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the couchdb_etc_t type, if you want to store couchdb files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B couchdb_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the couchdb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the couchdb_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B couchdb_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the couchdb_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as couchdb log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B couchdb_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the couchdb_tmp_t type, if you want to store couchdb temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B couchdb_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the couchdb_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as couchdb unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B couchdb_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the couchdb_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the couchdb files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B couchdb_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the couchdb_var_run_t type, if you want to store the couchdb files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux couchdb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their couchdb processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for couchdb: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B couchdb_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux couchdb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their couchdb processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for couchdb: + +.EX +.B couchdb_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), couchdb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/courier_selinux.8 b/man/man8/courier_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3dc9d81 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/courier_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,165 @@ +.TH "courier_selinux" "8" "courier" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "courier SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +courier_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the courier processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B courier +(Courier IMAP and POP3 email servers) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux courier policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for courier: + + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_authdaemon_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_authdaemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_authdaemon_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_etc_t type, if you want to store courier files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/courier/rootcerts(/.*)?, /etc/courier(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/courierlogger, /usr/lib/courier/courier/.*, /usr/sbin/courierldapaliasd + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_pcp_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_pcp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_pcp_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_pop_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_pop_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_pop_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/courier/imapd, /usr/lib/courier/courier/courierpop.*, /usr/lib/courier/pop3d, /usr/lib/courier/courier/imaplogin, /usr/bin/imapd + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_spool_t type, if you want to store the courier files under the /var/spool directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/authdaemon(/.*)?, /var/spool/courier(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_sqwebmail_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_sqwebmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_sqwebmail_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_tcpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_tcpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the courier_tcpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the courier files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B courier_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the courier_var_run_t type, if you want to store the courier files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux courier policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their courier processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for courier: + +.EX +.B courier_sqwebmail_t, courier_tcpd_t, courier_authdaemon_t, courier_pcp_t, courier_pop_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), courier(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cpucontrol_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cpucontrol_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e50677e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cpucontrol_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +.TH "cpucontrol_selinux" "8" "cpucontrol" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cpucontrol SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cpucontrol_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cpucontrol processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cpucontrol +(Services for loading CPU microcode and CPU frequency scaling) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cpucontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpucontrol processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cpucontrol: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cpucontrol_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cpucontrol_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as cpucontrol configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cpucontrol_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cpucontrol_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cpucontrol_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/microcode_ctl, /usr/sbin/microcode_ctl + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cpucontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpucontrol processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cpucontrol: + +.EX +.B cpucontrol_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cpucontrol(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cpufreqselector_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cpufreqselector_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7b10a3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cpufreqselector_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "cpufreqselector_selinux" "8" "cpufreqselector" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cpufreqselector SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cpufreqselector_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cpufreqselector processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cpufreqselector +(Command-line CPU frequency settings) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cpufreqselector policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpufreqselector processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cpufreqselector: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cpufreqselector_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cpufreqselector_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cpufreqselector_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cpufreqselector policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpufreqselector processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cpufreqselector: + +.EX +.B cpufreqselector_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cpufreqselector(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cpuspeed_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cpuspeed_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8142e64 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cpuspeed_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "cpuspeed_selinux" "8" "cpuspeed" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cpuspeed SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cpuspeed_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cpuspeed processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cpuspeed policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpuspeed processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cpuspeed: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cpuspeed_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cpuspeed_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cpuspeed_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/cpuspeed, /usr/sbin/powernowd, /usr/sbin/cpufreqd + +.EX +.PP +.B cpuspeed_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cpuspeed_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cpuspeed files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cpuspeed policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cpuspeed processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cpuspeed: + +.EX +.B cpuspeed_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cpuspeed(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/crack_selinux.8 b/man/man8/crack_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..328fc4d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/crack_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "crack_selinux" "8" "crack" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "crack SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +crack_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the crack processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux crack policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crack processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for crack: + + +.EX +.PP +.B crack_db_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crack_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as crack database content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/cracklib(/.*)?, /usr/share/cracklib(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cracklib_dict.* + +.EX +.PP +.B crack_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crack_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crack_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/cracklib-[a-z]*, /usr/sbin/crack_[a-z]* + +.EX +.PP +.B crack_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crack_tmp_t type, if you want to store crack temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux crack policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crack processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for crack: + +.EX +.B crack_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), crack(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/crond_selinux.8 b/man/man8/crond_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b717fd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/crond_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +.TH "crond_selinux" "8" "crond" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "crond SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +crond_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the crond processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. crond policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run crond with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to enable extra rules in the cron domain to support fcron, you must turn on the fcron_crond boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P fcron_crond 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow system cron jobs to relabel filesystem for restoring file contexts, you must turn on the cron_can_relabel boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P cron_can_relabel 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux crond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crond processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for crond: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cron_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cron_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cron log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cron_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cron_spool_t type, if you want to store the cron files under the /var/spool directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/fcron, /var/spool/cron/crontabs + +.EX +.PP +.B cron_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cron_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cron files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cron_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cron_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cron files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B crond_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crond_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crond_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/atd, /usr/sbin/fcron, /usr/sbin/cron(d)? + +.EX +.PP +.B crond_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crond_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crond_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B crond_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crond_tmp_t type, if you want to store crond temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B crond_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crond_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as crond unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/atd\.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/crond\.service, /lib/systemd/system/crond\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B crond_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crond_var_run_t type, if you want to store the crond files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/crond?\.pid, /var/run/.*cron.*, /var/run/fcron\.pid, /var/run/crond?\.reboot, /var/run/fcron\.fifo, /var/run/atd\.pid, /var/run/anacron\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux crond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crond processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for crond: + +.EX +.B crond_t, cronjob_t, crontab_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), crond(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/crontab_selinux.8 b/man/man8/crontab_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3de534f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/crontab_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "crontab_selinux" "8" "crontab" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "crontab SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +crontab_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the crontab processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux crontab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crontab processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for crontab: + + +.EX +.PP +.B crontab_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crontab_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the crontab_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/(f)?crontab, /usr/bin/at + +.EX +.PP +.B crontab_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the crontab_tmp_t type, if you want to store crontab temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux crontab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their crontab processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for crontab: + +.EX +.B crontab_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), crontab(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ctdbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ctdbd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1da47eb --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ctdbd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +.TH "ctdbd_selinux" "8" "ctdbd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ctdbd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ctdbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ctdbd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ctdbd +(policy for ctdbd) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ctdbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ctdbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ctdbd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ctdbd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ctdbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ctdbd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ctdbd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ctdbd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ctdbd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ctdbd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ctdbd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ctdbd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ctdbd_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ctdbd_spool_t type, if you want to store the ctdbd files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ctdbd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ctdbd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ctdbd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ctdbd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ctdbd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ctdbd files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/ctdb(/.*)?, /var/lib/ctdbd(/.*)?, /etc/ctdb(/.*)?, /var/ctdbd(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B ctdbd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ctdbd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ctdbd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ctdbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ctdbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ctdbd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ctdb_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ctdbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ctdbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ctdbd: + +.EX +.B ctdbd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ctdbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cups_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cups_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8bedca4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cups_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +.TH "cups_selinux" "8" "cups" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cups SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cups_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cups processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cups +(Common UNIX printing system) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cups policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cups processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cups: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cups_pdf_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cups_pdf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cups_pdf_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cups_pdf_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cups_pdf_tmp_t type, if you want to store cups pdf temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_config_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_config_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/printconf-backend, /usr/sbin/hal_lpadmin, /usr/lib/udev/udev-configure-printer, /usr/libexec/cups-pk-helper-mechanism, /usr/libexec/hal_lpadmin, /lib/udev/udev-configure-printer, /usr/bin/cups-config-daemon + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_config_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_config_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd config files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/cups(/.*)?, /etc/cups(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_interface_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_interface_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd interface data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cupsd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/cups(/.*)?, /usr/local/Brother/fax/.*\.log, /var/log/turboprint.* + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_lpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_lpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_lpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd lpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_lpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd lpd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_rw_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd rw files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/cups/lpoptions.*, /usr/local/linuxprinter/ppd(/.*)?, /etc/cups/subscriptions.*, /usr/local/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /etc/cups/classes\.conf.*, /usr/lib/bjlib(/.*)?, /etc/cups/ppd(/.*)?, /opt/gutenprint/ppds(/.*)?, /etc/printcap.*, /etc/alchemist/namespace/printconf(/.*)?, /usr/local/Printer/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /etc/cups/ppds\.dat, /etc/cups/certs, /etc/cups/certs/.*, /etc/cups/printers\.conf.*, /var/lib/cups/certs/.*, /var/lib/cups/certs, /var/cache/foomatic(/.*)?, /var/cache/alchemist/printconf.*, /etc/cups/cupsd\.conf.*, /var/cache/cups(/.*)?, /usr/share/foomatic/db/oldprinterids + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/ccpd(/.*)?, /var/ekpd(/.*)?, /var/turboprint(/.*)?, /var/run/cups(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cups policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cups processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cups: + +.EX +.B cupsd_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cups_pdf_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cups(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cupsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cupsd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ce03af --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cupsd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +.TH "cupsd_selinux" "8" "cupsd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cupsd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cupsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cupsd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cupsd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cups_pdf_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cups_pdf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cups_pdf_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cups_pdf_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cups_pdf_tmp_t type, if you want to store cups pdf temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_config_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_config_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/printconf-backend, /usr/sbin/hal_lpadmin, /usr/lib/udev/udev-configure-printer, /usr/libexec/cups-pk-helper-mechanism, /usr/libexec/hal_lpadmin, /lib/udev/udev-configure-printer, /usr/bin/cups-config-daemon + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_config_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_config_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd config files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/cups(/.*)?, /etc/cups(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_interface_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_interface_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd interface data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cupsd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/cups(/.*)?, /usr/local/Brother/fax/.*\.log, /var/log/turboprint.* + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_lpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cupsd_lpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_lpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd lpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_lpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_lpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd lpd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_rw_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store cupsd rw files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/cups/lpoptions.*, /usr/local/linuxprinter/ppd(/.*)?, /etc/cups/subscriptions.*, /usr/local/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /etc/cups/classes\.conf.*, /usr/lib/bjlib(/.*)?, /etc/cups/ppd(/.*)?, /opt/gutenprint/ppds(/.*)?, /etc/printcap.*, /etc/alchemist/namespace/printconf(/.*)?, /usr/local/Printer/(.*/)?inf(/.*)?, /etc/cups/ppds\.dat, /etc/cups/certs, /etc/cups/certs/.*, /etc/cups/printers\.conf.*, /var/lib/cups/certs/.*, /var/lib/cups/certs, /var/cache/foomatic(/.*)?, /var/cache/alchemist/printconf.*, /etc/cups/cupsd\.conf.*, /var/cache/cups(/.*)?, /usr/share/foomatic/db/oldprinterids + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_tmp_t type, if you want to store cupsd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as cupsd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cupsd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cupsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cupsd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/ccpd(/.*)?, /var/ekpd(/.*)?, /var/turboprint(/.*)?, /var/run/cups(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cupsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cupsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cupsd: + +.EX +.B cupsd_t, cupsd_config_t, cupsd_lpd_t, cups_pdf_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cupsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cvs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cvs_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5047556 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cvs_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +.TH "cvs_selinux" "8" "cvs" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cvs SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cvs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cvs processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cvs +(Concurrent versions system) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. cvs policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run cvs with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow cvs daemon to read shado, you must turn on the allow_cvs_read_shadow boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_cvs_read_shadow 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cvs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cvs: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cvs_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cvs_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as cvs content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/opt/cvs(/.*)?, /var/cvs(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B cvs_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cvs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cvs_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cvs_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cvs_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cvs_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cvs_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cvs_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cvs_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cvs_tmp_t type, if you want to store cvs temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cvs_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cvs_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cvs files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux cvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cvs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for cvs: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B cvs_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cvs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cvs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cvs: + +.EX +.B cvs_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cvs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/cyphesis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cyphesis_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25cbcca --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cyphesis_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +.TH "cyphesis_selinux" "8" "cyphesis" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cyphesis SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cyphesis_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cyphesis processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cyphesis +(Cyphesis WorldForge game server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cyphesis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyphesis processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cyphesis: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cyphesis_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyphesis_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cyphesis_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cyphesis_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyphesis_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as cyphesis log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cyphesis_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyphesis_tmp_t type, if you want to store cyphesis temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cyphesis_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyphesis_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cyphesis files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux cyphesis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyphesis processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for cyphesis: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B cyphesis_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cyphesis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyphesis processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cyphesis: + +.EX +.B cyphesis_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cyphesis(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/cyrus_selinux.8 b/man/man8/cyrus_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9b68c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/cyrus_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "cyrus_selinux" "8" "cyrus" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "cyrus SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +cyrus_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the cyrus processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B cyrus +(Cyrus is an IMAP service intended to be run on sealed servers) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux cyrus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyrus processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for cyrus: + + +.EX +.PP +.B cyrus_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyrus_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cyrus_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/cyrus-master, /usr/lib/cyrus/master + +.EX +.PP +.B cyrus_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyrus_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the cyrus_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cyrus_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyrus_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cyrus_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyrus_tmp_t type, if you want to store cyrus temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B cyrus_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyrus_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the cyrus files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/imap(/.*)?, /var/lib/imap(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B cyrus_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the cyrus_var_run_t type, if you want to store the cyrus files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux cyrus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their cyrus processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for cyrus: + +.EX +.B cyrus_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), cyrus(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dbadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dbadm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4bbec80 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dbadm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +.TH "dbadm_selinux" "8" "dbadm" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "dbadm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dbadm_r \- \fBDatabase administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to. + +Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user. + +Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. + +Roles usually have default types assigned to them. + +The default type for the dbadm_r role is dbadm_t. + +You can use the +.B newrole +program to transition directly to this role. + +.B newrole -r dbadm_r -t dbadm_t + +.B sudo +can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command. + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=dbadm_r TYPE=dbadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:dbadm_r:dbadm_t:LEVEL + +If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role. + +You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following + +.B semanage user -l + +If you wanted to add dbadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r dbadm_r' staff_u + + + +SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role. +You can list these rules using the following command. + +.B sesearch --role_allow + +SELinux policy allows the staff_r role can transition to the dbadm_r role. + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/dbskkd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dbskkd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..224a13a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dbskkd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "dbskkd_selinux" "8" "dbskkd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dbskkd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dbskkd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dbskkd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dbskkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dbskkd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dbskkd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dbskkd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dbskkd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dbskkd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dbskkd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dbskkd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dbskkd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dbskkd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dbskkd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dbskkd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux dbskkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dbskkd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for dbskkd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dbskkd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dbskkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dbskkd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dbskkd: + +.EX +.B dbskkd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dbskkd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dcc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dcc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ac78346 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dcc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +.TH "dcc_selinux" "8" "dcc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dcc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dcc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dcc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dcc +(Distributed checksum clearinghouse spam filtering) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dcc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_client_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_client_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcc_client_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_client_map_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_client_map_t type, if you want to treat the files as dcc client map data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/dcc/map, /etc/dcc/map, /var/run/dcc/map, /var/dcc/map + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_client_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_client_tmp_t type, if you want to store dcc client temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_dbclean_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_dbclean_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcc_dbclean_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_dbclean_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_dbclean_tmp_t type, if you want to store dcc dbclean temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dcc files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_var_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_var_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/dcc(/.*)?, /var/dcc(/.*)?, /var/lib/dcc(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B dccd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccifd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccifd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccifd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccifd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccifd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccifd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccifd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccifd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccifd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/dcc/dccifd, /var/run/dcc/dccifd + +.EX +.PP +.B dccm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccm_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccm_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccm_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccm temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccm_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccm files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux dcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for dcc: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dcc_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dccm_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dcc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dcc: + +.EX +.B dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccifd_t, dccd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dcc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dccd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dccd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2da502a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dccd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +.TH "dccd_selinux" "8" "dccd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dccd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dccd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dccd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dccd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dccd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_client_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_client_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcc_client_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_client_map_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_client_map_t type, if you want to treat the files as dcc client map data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/dcc/map, /etc/dcc/map, /var/run/dcc/map, /var/dcc/map + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_client_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_client_tmp_t type, if you want to store dcc client temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_dbclean_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_dbclean_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcc_dbclean_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_dbclean_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_dbclean_tmp_t type, if you want to store dcc dbclean temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dcc files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcc_var_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcc_var_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/dcc(/.*)?, /var/dcc(/.*)?, /var/lib/dcc(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B dccd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux dccd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for dccd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dcc_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dccm_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dccd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dccd: + +.EX +.B dccm_t, dcc_client_t, dcc_dbclean_t, dccifd_t, dccd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dccd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dccifd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dccifd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c80e92b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dccifd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +.TH "dccifd_selinux" "8" "dccifd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dccifd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dccifd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dccifd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dccifd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccifd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dccifd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccifd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccifd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccifd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccifd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccifd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccifd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccifd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccifd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccifd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/dcc/dccifd, /var/run/dcc/dccifd + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dccifd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccifd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dccifd: + +.EX +.B dccifd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dccifd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dccm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dccm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9a2caa --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dccm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "dccm_selinux" "8" "dccm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dccm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dccm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dccm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dccm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dccm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dccm_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccm_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccm_tmp_t type, if you want to store dccm temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dccm_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dccm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dccm files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux dccm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for dccm: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dccm_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dccm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dccm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dccm: + +.EX +.B dccm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dccm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dcerpcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dcerpcd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7e28fe1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dcerpcd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "dcerpcd_selinux" "8" "dcerpcd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dcerpcd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dcerpcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dcerpcd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dcerpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcerpcd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dcerpcd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcerpcd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcerpcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dcerpcd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcerpcd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcerpcd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dcerpcd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcerpcd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcerpcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dcerpcd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dcerpcd_var_socket_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dcerpcd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as dcerpcd var socket data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dcerpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dcerpcd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dcerpcd: + +.EX +.B dcerpcd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dcerpcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ddclient_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ddclient_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..13df14d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ddclient_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +.TH "ddclient_selinux" "8" "ddclient" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ddclient SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ddclient_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ddclient processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ddclient +(Update dynamic IP address at DynDNS.org) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ddclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ddclient processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ddclient: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ddclient_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ddclient_etc_t type, if you want to store ddclient files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/ddclient\.conf, /etc/ddtcd\.conf + +.EX +.PP +.B ddclient_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ddclient_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ddclient_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ddclient, /usr/sbin/ddtcd + +.EX +.PP +.B ddclient_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ddclient_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ddclient_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ddclient_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ddclient_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ddclient log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ddclient_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ddclient_tmp_t type, if you want to store ddclient temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ddclient_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ddclient_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ddclient files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ddclient_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ddclient_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ddclient files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/ddtcd\.pid, /var/run/ddclient\.pid + +.EX +.PP +.B ddclient_var_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ddclient_var_t type, if you want to store the ddcl files under the /var directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ddclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ddclient processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ddclient: + +.EX +.B ddclient_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ddclient(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/deltacloudd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/deltacloudd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7d2381f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/deltacloudd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "deltacloudd_selinux" "8" "deltacloudd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "deltacloudd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +deltacloudd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the deltacloudd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux deltacloudd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their deltacloudd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for deltacloudd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B deltacloudd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the deltacloudd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the deltacloudd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B deltacloudd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the deltacloudd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as deltacloudd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B deltacloudd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the deltacloudd_tmp_t type, if you want to store deltacloudd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B deltacloudd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the deltacloudd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the deltacloudd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux deltacloudd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their deltacloudd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for deltacloudd: + +.EX +.B deltacloudd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), deltacloudd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/denyhosts_selinux.8 b/man/man8/denyhosts_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff32a2b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/denyhosts_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.TH "denyhosts_selinux" "8" "denyhosts" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "denyhosts SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +denyhosts_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the denyhosts processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B denyhosts +(DenyHosts SSH dictionary attack mitigation) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux denyhosts policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their denyhosts processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for denyhosts: + + +.EX +.PP +.B denyhosts_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the denyhosts_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the denyhosts_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B denyhosts_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the denyhosts_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the denyhosts_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B denyhosts_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the denyhosts_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the denyhosts files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B denyhosts_var_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the denyhosts_var_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as denyhosts var lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B denyhosts_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the denyhosts_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as denyhosts var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux denyhosts policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their denyhosts processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for denyhosts: + +.EX +.B denyhosts_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), denyhosts(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/depmod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/depmod_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5dcbff --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/depmod_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "depmod_selinux" "8" "depmod" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "depmod SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +depmod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the depmod processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux depmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their depmod processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for depmod: + + +.EX +.PP +.B depmod_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the depmod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the depmod_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/depmod.*, /usr/sbin/depmod.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux depmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their depmod processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for depmod: + +.EX +.B depmod_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), depmod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/devicekit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/devicekit_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fbd38fb --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/devicekit_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +.TH "devicekit_selinux" "8" "devicekit" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "devicekit SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +devicekit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the devicekit processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B devicekit +(Devicekit modular hardware abstraction layer) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux devicekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for devicekit: + + +.EX +.PP +.B devicekit_disk_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the devicekit_disk_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_disk_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/udev/udisks-part-id, /lib/udisks2/udisksd, /usr/lib/udisks2/udisksd, /lib/udev/udisks-part-id, /usr/libexec/devkit-disks-daemon, /usr/libexec/udisks-daemon + +.EX +.PP +.B devicekit_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the devicekit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B devicekit_power_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the devicekit_power_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the devicekit_power_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/upowerd, /usr/libexec/devkit-power-daemon + +.EX +.PP +.B devicekit_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the devicekit_tmp_t type, if you want to store devicekit temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B devicekit_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the devicekit_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the devicekit files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/udisks.*, /var/lib/DeviceKit-.*, /var/lib/upower(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B devicekit_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the devicekit_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as devicekit var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/pm-suspend\.log, /var/log/pm-powersave\.log + +.EX +.PP +.B devicekit_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the devicekit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the devicekit files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/upower(/.*)?, /var/run/udisks.*, /var/run/devkit(/.*)?, /var/run/DeviceKit-disks(/.*)?, /var/run/pm-utils(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux devicekit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their devicekit processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for devicekit: + +.EX +.B devicekit_power_t, devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), devicekit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dhcpc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dhcpc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b805e27 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dhcpc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,152 @@ +.TH "dhcpc_selinux" "8" "dhcpc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dhcpc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dhcpc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dhcpc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. dhcpc policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run dhcpc with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables command, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dhcpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dhcpc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/dhcpcd, /usr/sbin/pump, /sbin/dhclient.*, /usr/sbin/dhcpcd, /sbin/pump, /usr/sbin/dhclient.*, /usr/sbin/dhcdbd, /sbin/dhcdbd + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpc_helper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpc_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpc_helper_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpc_state_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpc_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcpc state data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/dhclient(/.*)?, /var/lib/dhcp3?/dhclient.*, /var/lib/wifiroamd(/.*)?, /var/lib/dhcpcd(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpc_tmp_t type, if you want to store dhcpc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpc_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dhcpc files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux dhcpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for dhcpc: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dhcpc_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dhcpc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dhcpc: + +.EX +.B dhcpc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dhcpc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/dhcpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dhcpd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..db3ea11 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dhcpd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +.TH "dhcpd_selinux" "8" "dhcpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dhcpd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dhcpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dhcpd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. dhcpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run dhcpd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables command, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dhcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dhcpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcp_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcp_etc_t type, if you want to store dhcp files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/dhcp3(/.*)?, /etc/dhcp3?/dhclient.*, /etc/dhcpd(6)?\.conf, /etc/dhcpc.*, /etc/dhclient-script, /etc/dhclient.*conf, /etc/dhcp/dhcpd(6)?\.conf + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcp_state_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcp_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcp state data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dhcpd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpd_state_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpd_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcpd state data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/dhcp(3)?/dhcpd\.leases.*, /var/lib/dhcpd(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store dhcpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as dhcpd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/dhcpcd.*, /lib/systemd/system/dhcpcd.* + +.EX +.PP +.B dhcpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dhcpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dhcpd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux dhcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for dhcpd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dhcpc_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dhcpd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dhcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dhcpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dhcpd: + +.EX +.B dhcpc_t, dhcpd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dhcpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/dictd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dictd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53e911a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dictd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +.TH "dictd_selinux" "8" "dictd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dictd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dictd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dictd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dictd +(Dictionary daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dictd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dictd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dictd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dictd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dictd_etc_t type, if you want to store dictd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dictd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dictd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dictd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dictd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dictd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dictd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dictd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dictd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dictd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dictd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dictd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dictd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux dictd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dictd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for dictd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dict_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dictd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dictd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dictd: + +.EX +.B dictd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dictd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dirsrv_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dirsrv_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c06f47 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dirsrv_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,217 @@ +.TH "dirsrv_selinux" "8" "dirsrv" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dirsrv SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dirsrv_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dirsrv processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dirsrv +(policy for dirsrv) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dirsrv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrv processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dirsrv: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_config_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrv configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrv_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_share_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_share_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrv share data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_snmp_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrv_snmp_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dirsrv snmp var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv snmp files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_tmp_t type, if you want to store dirsrv temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store dirsrv files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_var_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_var_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrv var lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dirsrv var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrv_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrv_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dirsrv files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_config_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?, /etc/dirsrv/dsgw(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/start-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/stop-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/restart-ds-admin + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_tmp_t type, if you want to store dirsrvadmin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_remove, /usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_create + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dirsrv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrv processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dirsrv: + +.EX +.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrvadmin_t, dirsrv_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dirsrv(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f314f5a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dirsrvadmin_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +.TH "dirsrvadmin_selinux" "8" "dirsrvadmin" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dirsrvadmin SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dirsrvadmin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dirsrvadmin processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dirsrvadmin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrvadmin processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dirsrvadmin: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_config_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?, /etc/dirsrv/dsgw(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/start-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/stop-ds-admin, /usr/sbin/restart-ds-admin + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as dirsrvadmin lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_tmp_t type, if you want to store dirsrvadmin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_remove, /usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_create + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dirsrvadmin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dirsrvadmin processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dirsrvadmin: + +.EX +.B dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrvadmin_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dirsrvadmin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/disk_selinux.8 b/man/man8/disk_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3d396c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/disk_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "disk_selinux" "8" "disk" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "disk SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +disk_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the disk processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux disk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their disk processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for disk: + + +.EX +.PP +.B disk_munin_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the disk_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the disk_munin_plugin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/munin/plugins/diskstat.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/hddtemp.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/smart_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/df.* + +.EX +.PP +.B disk_munin_plugin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the disk_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store disk munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux disk policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their disk processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for disk: + +.EX +.B disk_munin_plugin_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), disk(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dkim_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dkim_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ff5f6d1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dkim_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +.TH "dkim_selinux" "8" "dkim" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dkim SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dkim_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dkim processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dkim +(DomainKeys Identified Mail milter) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dkim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dkim processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dkim: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dkim_milter_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dkim_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as dkim milter content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/dkim-milter(/.*)?, /var/run/dkim-milter(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B dkim_milter_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dkim_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dkim_milter_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dkim_milter_private_key_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dkim_milter_private_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as dkim milter private key data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dkim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dkim processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dkim: + +.EX +.B dkim_milter_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dkim(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dlm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dlm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1bdbac --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dlm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "dlm_selinux" "8" "dlm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dlm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dlm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dlm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dlm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dlm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dlm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dlm_controld_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dlm_controld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dlm_controld_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dlm_controld_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dlm_controld_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store dlm controld files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dlm_controld_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dlm_controld_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dlm controld var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dlm_controld_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dlm_controld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dlm controld files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dlm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dlm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dlm: + +.EX +.B dlm_controld_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dlm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dmesg_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dmesg_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ba27b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dmesg_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,96 @@ +.TH "dmesg_selinux" "8" "dmesg" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dmesg SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dmesg_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dmesg processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dmesg +(Policy for dmesg) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. dmesg policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run dmesg with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dmesg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmesg processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dmesg: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dmesg_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dmesg_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dmesg_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/dmesg, /bin/dmesg + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dmesg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmesg processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dmesg: + +.EX +.B dmesg_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dmesg(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/dmidecode_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dmidecode_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2c6acf --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dmidecode_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "dmidecode_selinux" "8" "dmidecode" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dmidecode SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dmidecode_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dmidecode processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dmidecode +(Decode DMI data for x86/ia64 bioses) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dmidecode policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmidecode processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dmidecode: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dmidecode_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dmidecode_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dmidecode_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ownership, /usr/sbin/dmidecode, /usr/sbin/vpddecode + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dmidecode policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dmidecode processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dmidecode: + +.EX +.B dmidecode_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dmidecode(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dnsmasq_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dnsmasq_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2913852 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dnsmasq_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +.TH "dnsmasq_selinux" "8" "dnsmasq" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dnsmasq SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dnsmasq_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dnsmasq processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dnsmasq +(dnsmasq DNS forwarder and DHCP server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dnsmasq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnsmasq processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dnsmasq: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dnsmasq_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnsmasq_etc_t type, if you want to store dnsmasq files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dnsmasq_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnsmasq_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dnsmasq_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dnsmasq_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dnsmasq_lease_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnsmasq_lease_t type, if you want to treat the files as dnsmasq lease data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/dnsmasq(/.*)?, /var/lib/misc/dnsmasq\.leases + +.EX +.PP +.B dnsmasq_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnsmasq_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as dnsmasq unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/dnsmasq.*, /lib/systemd/system/dnsmasq.* + +.EX +.PP +.B dnsmasq_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnsmasq_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dnsmasq var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dnsmasq_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnsmasq_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dnsmasq files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/dnsmasq\.pid, /var/run/libvirt/network(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dnsmasq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnsmasq processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dnsmasq: + +.EX +.B dnsmasq_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dnsmasq(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dnssec_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dnssec_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8a6a53 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dnssec_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +.TH "dnssec_selinux" "8" "dnssec" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dnssec SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dnssec_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dnssec processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dnssec +(policy for dnssec_trigger) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dnssec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnssec processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dnssec: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dnssec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnssec_t type, if you want to treat the files as dnssec data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/unbound/.*\.key, /var/named/chroot/etc/rndc\.key, /etc/dnssec-trigger/dnssec_trigger_server\.key, /etc/rndc\.key + +.EX +.PP +.B dnssec_trigger_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnssec_trigger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dnssec_trigger_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dnssec_trigger_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dnssec_trigger_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dnssec trigger files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux dnssec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnssec processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for dnssec: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B dnssec_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dnssec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dnssec processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dnssec: + +.EX +.B dnssec_trigger_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dnssec(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dovecot_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dovecot_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9dccfb5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dovecot_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +.TH "dovecot_selinux" "8" "dovecot" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dovecot SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dovecot_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dovecot processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dovecot +(Dovecot POP and IMAP mail server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dovecot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dovecot: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_auth_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_auth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_auth_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/dovecot/auth, /usr/libexec/dovecot/dovecot-auth + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_auth_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_auth_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot auth temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_cert_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_cert_t type, if you want to treat the files as dovecot certificate data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/ssl/private/dovecot\.pem, /etc/pki/dovecot(/.*)?, /usr/share/ssl/certs/dovecot\.pem + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_deliver_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_deliver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_deliver_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/dovecot/dovecot-lda, /usr/libexec/dovecot/deliver + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_deliver_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_deliver_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot deliver temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_etc_t type, if you want to store dovecot files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/dovecot(/.*)?*, /etc/dovecot\.conf.* + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dovecot_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_passwd_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_passwd_t type, if you want to treat the files as dovecot passwd data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_spool_t type, if you want to store the dovecot files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_tmp_t type, if you want to store dovecot temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dovecot files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/dovecot/login/ssl-parameters.dat, /var/lib/dovecot(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dovecot var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/dovecot\.log.*, /var/log/dovecot(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B dovecot_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dovecot_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dovecot files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dovecot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dovecot processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dovecot: + +.EX +.B dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dovecot(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/drbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/drbd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9cd65f4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/drbd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +.TH "drbd_selinux" "8" "drbd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "drbd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +drbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the drbd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B drbd +(policy for drbd) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux drbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their drbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for drbd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B drbd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the drbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the drbd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/drbdadm, /sbin/drbdadm, /usr/lib/ocf/resource.\d/linbit/drbd, /usr/sbin/drbdsetup, /sbin/drbdsetup + +.EX +.PP +.B drbd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the drbd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as drbd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B drbd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the drbd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the drbd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux drbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their drbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for drbd: + +.EX +.B drbd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), drbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/dspam_selinux.8 b/man/man8/dspam_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fba374b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/dspam_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "dspam_selinux" "8" "dspam" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "dspam SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +dspam_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the dspam processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B dspam +(policy for dspam) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux dspam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dspam processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for dspam: + + +.EX +.PP +.B dspam_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dspam_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dspam_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dspam_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dspam_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the dspam_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dspam_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dspam_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as dspam log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dspam_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dspam_tmp_t type, if you want to store dspam temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dspam_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dspam_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the dspam files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B dspam_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the dspam_var_run_t type, if you want to store the dspam files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux dspam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their dspam processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for dspam: + +.EX +.B dspam_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), dspam(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/entropyd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/entropyd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..907170c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/entropyd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +.TH "entropyd_selinux" "8" "entropyd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "entropyd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +entropyd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the entropyd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B entropyd +(Generate entropy from audio input) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. entropyd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run entropyd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow the use of the audio devices as the source for the entropy feed, you must turn on the entropyd_use_audio boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P entropyd_use_audio 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux entropyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their entropyd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for entropyd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B entropyd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the entropyd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the entropyd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/audio-entropyd, /usr/sbin/haveged + +.EX +.PP +.B entropyd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the entropyd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the entropyd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/audio-entropyd\.pid, /var/run/haveged\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux entropyd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their entropyd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for entropyd: + +.EX +.B entropyd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), entropyd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/eventlogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/eventlogd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01e8f18 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/eventlogd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "eventlogd_selinux" "8" "eventlogd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "eventlogd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +eventlogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the eventlogd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux eventlogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their eventlogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for eventlogd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B eventlogd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the eventlogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the eventlogd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B eventlogd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the eventlogd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the eventlogd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B eventlogd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the eventlogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the eventlogd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B eventlogd_var_socket_t +.EE + +- Set files with the eventlogd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as eventlogd var socket data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux eventlogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their eventlogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for eventlogd: + +.EX +.B eventlogd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), eventlogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/evtchnd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/evtchnd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fc58144 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/evtchnd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +.TH "evtchnd_selinux" "8" "evtchnd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "evtchnd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +evtchnd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the evtchnd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux evtchnd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their evtchnd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for evtchnd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B evtchnd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the evtchnd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the evtchnd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B evtchnd_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the evtchnd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as evtchnd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B evtchnd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the evtchnd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the evtchnd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/evtchnd, /var/run/evtchnd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux evtchnd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their evtchnd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for evtchnd: + +.EX +.B evtchnd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), evtchnd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/exim_selinux.8 b/man/man8/exim_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb54ea6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/exim_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +.TH "exim_selinux" "8" "exim" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "exim SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +exim_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the exim processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B exim +(Exim mail transfer agent) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. exim policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run exim with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow exim to read unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_read_user_files boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P exim_read_user_files 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow exim to connect to databases (PostgreSQL, MySQL, you must turn on the exim_can_connect_db boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P exim_can_connect_db 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow exim to create, read, write, and delete unprivileged user files, you must turn on the exim_manage_user_files boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P exim_manage_user_files 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux exim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their exim processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for exim: + + +.EX +.PP +.B exim_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the exim_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the exim_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/exim_tidydb, /usr/sbin/exim[0-9]? + +.EX +.PP +.B exim_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the exim_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the exim_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B exim_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the exim_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B exim_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the exim_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as exim log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B exim_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the exim_spool_t type, if you want to store the exim files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B exim_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the exim_tmp_t type, if you want to store exim temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B exim_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the exim_var_run_t type, if you want to store the exim files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux exim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their exim processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for exim: + +.EX +.B exim_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), exim(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/fail2ban_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fail2ban_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8084e6e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/fail2ban_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +.TH "fail2ban_selinux" "8" "fail2ban" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "fail2ban SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +fail2ban_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fail2ban processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B fail2ban +(Update firewall filtering to ban IP addresses with too many password failures) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux fail2ban policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fail2ban processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for fail2ban: + + +.EX +.PP +.B fail2ban_client_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fail2ban_client_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_client_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fail2ban_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fail2ban_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/fail2ban-server, /usr/bin/fail2ban + +.EX +.PP +.B fail2ban_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fail2ban_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fail2ban_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fail2ban_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fail2ban_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fail2ban log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fail2ban_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fail2ban_tmp_t type, if you want to store fail2ban temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fail2ban_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fail2ban_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the fail2ban files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fail2ban_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fail2ban_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fail2ban files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux fail2ban policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fail2ban processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for fail2ban: + +.EX +.B fail2ban_client_t, fail2ban_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), fail2ban(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/fcoemon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fcoemon_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f07e27 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/fcoemon_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +.TH "fcoemon_selinux" "8" "fcoemon" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "fcoemon SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +fcoemon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fcoemon processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B fcoemon +(policy for fcoemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux fcoemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fcoemon processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for fcoemon: + + +.EX +.PP +.B fcoemon_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fcoemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fcoemon_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fcoemon_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fcoemon_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fcoemon files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/fcm(/.*)?, /var/run/fcoemon\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux fcoemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fcoemon processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for fcoemon: + +.EX +.B fcoemon_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), fcoemon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/fenced_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fenced_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a95cd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/fenced_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +.TH "fenced_selinux" "8" "fenced" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "fenced SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +fenced_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fenced processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. fenced policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run fenced with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow fenced domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the fenced_can_network_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P fenced_can_network_connect 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux fenced policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fenced processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for fenced: + + +.EX +.PP +.B fenced_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fenced_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fenced_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/fence_node, /usr/sbin/fence_tool, /usr/sbin/fenced + +.EX +.PP +.B fenced_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fenced_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as fenced lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B fenced_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fenced_tmp_t type, if you want to store fenced temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fenced_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fenced_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store fenced files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fenced_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fenced_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fenced var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fenced_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fenced_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fenced files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/cluster/fenced_override, /var/run/cluster/fence_scsi.*, /var/run/fenced\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux fenced policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fenced processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for fenced: + +.EX +.B fenced_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), fenced(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/fetchmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fetchmail_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65f9aa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/fetchmail_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.TH "fetchmail_selinux" "8" "fetchmail" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "fetchmail SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +fetchmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fetchmail processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B fetchmail +(Remote-mail retrieval and forwarding utility) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux fetchmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fetchmail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for fetchmail: + + +.EX +.PP +.B fetchmail_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fetchmail_etc_t type, if you want to store fetchmail files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fetchmail_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fetchmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fetchmail_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fetchmail_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fetchmail_home_t type, if you want to store fetchmail files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fetchmail_uidl_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fetchmail_uidl_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fetchmail_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fetchmail_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fetchmail files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux fetchmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fetchmail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for fetchmail: + +.EX +.B fetchmail_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), fetchmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/fingerd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fingerd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1c9f85 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/fingerd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "fingerd_selinux" "8" "fingerd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "fingerd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +fingerd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fingerd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux fingerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fingerd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for fingerd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B fingerd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fingerd_etc_t type, if you want to store fingerd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fingerd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fingerd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fingerd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/cron\.weekly/(c)?fingerd, /usr/sbin/[cef]fingerd, /usr/sbin/in\.fingerd + +.EX +.PP +.B fingerd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fingerd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fingerd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fingerd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fingerd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fingerd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux fingerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fingerd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for fingerd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B fingerd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux fingerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fingerd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for fingerd: + +.EX +.B fingerd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), fingerd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/firewalld_selinux.8 b/man/man8/firewalld_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c6d98d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/firewalld_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.TH "firewalld_selinux" "8" "firewalld" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "firewalld SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +firewalld_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the firewalld processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B firewalld +(policy for firewalld) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux firewalld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewalld processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for firewalld: + + +.EX +.PP +.B firewalld_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firewalld_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as firewalld etc read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B firewalld_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firewalld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firewalld_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B firewalld_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firewalld_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firewalld_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B firewalld_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firewalld_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as firewalld unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B firewalld_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firewalld_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as firewalld var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B firewalld_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firewalld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the firewalld files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/firewalld(/.*)?, /var/run/firewalld\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux firewalld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewalld processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for firewalld: + +.EX +.B firewallgui_t, firewalld_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), firewalld(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/firewallgui_selinux.8 b/man/man8/firewallgui_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fd604e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/firewallgui_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.TH "firewallgui_selinux" "8" "firewallgui" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "firewallgui SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +firewallgui_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the firewallgui processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B firewallgui +(policy for firewallgui) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux firewallgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewallgui processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for firewallgui: + + +.EX +.PP +.B firewallgui_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firewallgui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firewallgui_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B firewallgui_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firewallgui_tmp_t type, if you want to store firewallgui temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux firewallgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firewallgui processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for firewallgui: + +.EX +.B firewallgui_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), firewallgui(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/firstboot_selinux.8 b/man/man8/firstboot_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1bbe5c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/firstboot_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +.TH "firstboot_selinux" "8" "firstboot" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "firstboot SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +firstboot_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the firstboot processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B firstboot +( +Final system configuration run during the first boot +after installation of Red Hat/Fedora systems. +) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux firstboot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firstboot processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for firstboot: + + +.EX +.PP +.B firstboot_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firstboot_etc_t type, if you want to store firstboot files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B firstboot_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firstboot_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the firstboot_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/firstboot/firstboot\.py, /usr/sbin/firstboot + +.EX +.PP +.B firstboot_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the firstboot_tmp_t type, if you want to store firstboot temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux firstboot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their firstboot processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for firstboot: + +.EX +.B firstboot_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), firstboot(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/foghorn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/foghorn_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..828ba62 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/foghorn_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "foghorn_selinux" "8" "foghorn" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "foghorn SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +foghorn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the foghorn processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux foghorn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their foghorn processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for foghorn: + + +.EX +.PP +.B foghorn_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the foghorn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the foghorn_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B foghorn_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the foghorn_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store foghorn files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B foghorn_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the foghorn_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as foghorn var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B foghorn_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the foghorn_var_run_t type, if you want to store the foghorn files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux foghorn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their foghorn processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for foghorn: + +.EX +.B foghorn_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), foghorn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/fprintd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fprintd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cd72389 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/fprintd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.TH "fprintd_selinux" "8" "fprintd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "fprintd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +fprintd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fprintd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B fprintd +(DBus fingerprint reader service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux fprintd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fprintd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for fprintd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B fprintd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fprintd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fprintd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fprintd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fprintd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the fprintd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux fprintd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fprintd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for fprintd: + +.EX +.B fprintd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), fprintd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/freshclam_selinux.8 b/man/man8/freshclam_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f012b28 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/freshclam_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "freshclam_selinux" "8" "freshclam" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "freshclam SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +freshclam_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the freshclam processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux freshclam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their freshclam processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for freshclam: + + +.EX +.PP +.B freshclam_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the freshclam_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the freshclam_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B freshclam_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the freshclam_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as freshclam var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/clamav/freshclam.*, /var/log/freshclam.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux freshclam policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their freshclam processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for freshclam: + +.EX +.B freshclam_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), freshclam(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/fsadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fsadm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9400571 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/fsadm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +.TH "fsadm_selinux" "8" "fsadm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "fsadm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +fsadm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fsadm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux fsadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsadm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for fsadm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B fsadm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fsadm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fsadm_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/partx, /usr/sbin/fdisk, /sbin/mkfs.*, /sbin/blockdev, /usr/sbin/sfdisk, /sbin/dumpe2fs, /sbin/mkdosfs, /sbin/mke2fs, /sbin/e4fsck, /usr/sbin/dosfsck, /usr/sbin/blockdev, /usr/sbin/lsraid, /usr/bin/partition_uuid, /sbin/raidautorun, /usr/sbin/findfs, /usr/sbin/scsi_info, /usr/sbin/raidstart, /sbin/mkreiserfs, /sbin/sfdisk, /usr/sbin/raidautorun, /usr/sbin/make_reiser4, /usr/sbin/partx, /usr/sbin/resize.*fs, /usr/sbin/fsck.*, /usr/sbin/dumpe2fs, /usr/sbin/mkdosfs, /sbin/blkid, /usr/sbin/hdparm, /sbin/make_reiser4, /sbin/dump, /sbin/swapon.*, /usr/sbin/jfs_.*, /usr/bin/scsi_unique_id, /sbin/findfs, /usr/sbin/smartctl, /usr/bin/syslinux, /usr/sbin/blkid, /usr/sbin/mke2fs, /sbin/tune2fs, /sbin/losetup.*, /sbin/resize.*fs, /usr/sbin/tune2fs, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-fsck, /sbin/parted, /sbin/partprobe, /sbin/dosfsck, /usr/sbin/mkfs.*, /sbin/e2label, /lib/systemd/systemd-fsck, /usr/sbin/reiserfs(ck|tune), /sbin/mkraid, /sbin/install-mbr, /sbin/scsi_info, /sbin/e2fsck, /sbin/fsck.*, /usr/sbin/install-mbr, /usr/sbin/clubufflush, /sbin/jfs_.*, /sbin/raidstart, /sbin/lsraid, /usr/sbin/losetup.*, /usr/sbin/mkreiserfs, /usr/sbin/swapon.*, /usr/sbin/e2fsck, /sbin/reiserfs(ck|tune), /usr/sbin/e4fsck, /usr/sbin/dump, /usr/sbin/partprobe, /sbin/fdisk, /usr/sbin/e2label, /usr/sbin/parted, /usr/bin/raw, /sbin/mke4fs, /usr/sbin/cfdisk, /usr/sbin/mke4fs, /sbin/cfdisk, /usr/sbin/mkraid, /sbin/hdparm + +.EX +.PP +.B fsadm_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fsadm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as fsadm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fsadm_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fsadm_tmp_t type, if you want to store fsadm temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux fsadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsadm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for fsadm: + +.EX +.B fsadm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), fsadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/fsdaemon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/fsdaemon_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0f3466e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/fsdaemon_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "fsdaemon_selinux" "8" "fsdaemon" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "fsdaemon SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +fsdaemon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the fsdaemon processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux fsdaemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsdaemon processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for fsdaemon: + + +.EX +.PP +.B fsdaemon_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fsdaemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fsdaemon_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the fsdaemon_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fsdaemon_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fsdaemon_tmp_t type, if you want to store fsdaemon temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B fsdaemon_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the fsdaemon_var_run_t type, if you want to store the fsdaemon files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux fsdaemon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their fsdaemon processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for fsdaemon: + +.EX +.B fsdaemon_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), fsdaemon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8 index 5bebd82..c617a6e 100644 --- a/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8 +++ b/man/man8/ftpd_selinux.8 @@ -1,65 +1,321 @@ -.TH "ftpd_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ftpd SELinux policy documentation" +.TH "ftpd_selinux" "8" "ftpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ftpd SELinux Policy documentation" .SH "NAME" -.PP -ftpd_selinux \- Security-Enhanced Linux policy for ftp daemons. +ftpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ftpd processes .SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ftpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ftpd with the tightest access possible. + + .PP -Security-Enhanced Linux provides security for ftp daemons via flexible mandatory access control. -.SH FILE_CONTEXTS +If you want to allow ftp to read and write files in the user home directorie, you must turn on the ftp_home_dir boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P ftp_home_dir 1 +.EE + .PP -SELinux requires files to have a file type. File types may be specified with semanage and are restored with restorecon. Policy governs the access that daemons have to files. -.TP -Allow ftp servers to read the /var/ftp directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +If you want to allow ftp servers to login to local users and read/write all files on the system, governed by DAC, you must turn on the allow_ftpd_full_access boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_ftpd_full_access 1 +.EE + .PP -.B -semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/ftp(/.*)?" -.TP -.B -restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftp -.TP -Allow ftp servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_ftpd_anon_write boolean to be set. +If you want to allow ftp servers to connect to mysql database port, you must turn on the ftpd_connect_db boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P ftpd_connect_db 1 +.EE + .PP -.B -semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/ftp/incoming(/.*)?" -.TP -.B -restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftp/incoming +If you want to allow ftp servers to use cifs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the allow_ftpd_use_cifs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_ftpd_use_cifs 1 +.EE -.SH BOOLEANS .PP -SELinux policy is based on least privilege required and may also be customizable by setting a boolean with setsebool. -.TP -Allow ftp servers to read and write files with the public_content_rw_t file type. +If you want to allow ftp servers to use nfs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the allow_ftpd_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_ftpd_use_nfs 1 +.EE + .PP -.B -setsebool -P allow_ftpd_anon_write on -.TP -Allow ftp servers to read or write files in the user home directories. +If you want to allow sftp-internal to read and write files in the user home directorie, you must turn on the sftpd_enable_homedirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sftpd_enable_homedirs 1 +.EE + .PP -.B -setsebool -P ftp_home_dir on -.TP -Allow ftp servers to read or write all files on the system. +If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP client connecting to the ftp port and ephemeral port, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ftp boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp 1 +.EE + .PP -.B -setsebool -P allow_ftpd_full_access on +If you want to allow sftp-internal to login to local users and read/write all files on the system, governed by DAC, you must turn on the sftpd_full_access boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sftpd_full_access 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow ftp servers to connect to all ports > 102, you must turn on the ftpd_connect_all_unreserved boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P ftpd_connect_all_unreserved 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP server by listening on the ftp port, you must turn on the httpd_enable_ftp_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1 +.EE + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. .TP -Allow ftp servers to use cifs for public file transfer services. +Allow ftpd servers to read the /var/ftpd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. .PP .B -setsebool -P allow_ftpd_use_cifs on +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/ftpd(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftpd +.pp .TP -Allow ftp servers to use nfs for public file transfer services. +Allow ftpd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_ftpd_anon_write boolean to be set. .PP .B -setsebool -P allow_ftpd_use_nfs on -.TP -system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. -.SH AUTHOR +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/ftpd/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/ftpd/incoming + + .PP -This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . +If you want to allow tftp to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the tftp_anon_write boolean. -.SH "SEE ALSO" +.EX +.B setsebool -P tftp_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow ftp servers to upload files, used for public file transfer services. Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the allow_ftpd_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_ftpd_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow anon internal-sftp to upload files, used for public file transfer services, directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the sftpd_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sftpd_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ftpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpd_etc_t type, if you want to store ftpd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ftpwho, /etc/cron\.monthly/proftpd, /usr/sbin/in\.ftpd, /usr/sbin/proftpd, /usr/kerberos/sbin/ftpd, /usr/sbin/muddleftpd, /usr/sbin/vsftpd + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpd_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/proftpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/vsftpd + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ftpd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ftpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ftpd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ftpd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ftpd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX .PP +.B ftpdctl_exec_t +.EE -selinux(8), ftpd(8), setsebool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8) +- Set files with the ftpdctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpdctl_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpdctl_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpdctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store ftpdctl temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ftpd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ftp_data_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ftp_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ftpd: + +.EX +.B ftpd_t, ftpdctl_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ftpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/ftpdctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ftpdctl_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8903b4b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ftpdctl_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +.TH "ftpdctl_selinux" "8" "ftpdctl" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ftpdctl SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ftpdctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ftpdctl processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ftpdctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpdctl processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ftpdctl: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpdctl_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpdctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ftpdctl_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ftpdctl_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ftpdctl_tmp_t type, if you want to store ftpdctl temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ftpdctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ftpdctl processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ftpdctl: + +.EX +.B ftpdctl_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ftpdctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/games_selinux.8 b/man/man8/games_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4ba69f7 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/games_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "games_selinux" "8" "games" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "games SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +games_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the games processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B games +(Games) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux games policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their games processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for games: + + +.EX +.PP +.B games_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the games_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as games content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/games(/.*)?, /var/lib/games(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B games_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the games_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the games_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/sol, /usr/bin/blackjack, /usr/bin/micq, /usr/bin/gnome-stones, /usr/bin/gnotski, /usr/bin/kshisen, /usr/bin/klickety, /usr/bin/lskat, /usr/bin/atlantik, /usr/bin/ksame, /usr/bin/kgoldrunner, /usr/bin/lskatproc, /usr/bin/gataxx, /usr/bin/katomic, /usr/bin/Maelstrom, /usr/bin/ksmiletris, /usr/bin/gnotravex, /usr/bin/ksirtet, /usr/bin/ktuberling, /usr/bin/kbounce, /usr/bin/kenolaba, /usr/bin/kmahjongg, /usr/bin/ksnake, /usr/games/.*, /usr/bin/gnobots2, /usr/bin/civserver.*, /usr/bin/civclient.*, /usr/bin/kwin4, /usr/bin/ktron, /usr/bin/mahjongg, /usr/bin/kbackgammon, /usr/bin/kblackbox, /usr/bin/kjumpingcube, /usr/bin/gnect, /usr/bin/kbattleship, /usr/bin/same-gnome, /usr/bin/kasteroids, /usr/bin/ksokoban, /usr/bin/kolf, /usr/bin/konquest, /usr/bin/kreversi, /usr/bin/kpoker, /usr/lib/games(/.*)?, /usr/bin/glines, /usr/bin/kfouleggs, /usr/bin/kmines, /usr/bin/gnibbles, /usr/bin/kspaceduel, /usr/bin/gnomine, /usr/bin/kpat, /usr/bin/iagno, /usr/bin/gtali, /usr/bin/klines, /usr/bin/kwin4proc + +.EX +.PP +.B games_srv_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the games_srv_var_run_t type, if you want to store the games srv files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B games_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the games_tmp_t type, if you want to store games temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B games_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the games_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store games files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux games policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their games processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for games: + +.EX +.B games_t, games_srv_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), games(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/gconfd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gconfd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6146c3a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gconfd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +.TH "gconfd_selinux" "8" "gconfd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gconfd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gconfd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gconfd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gconfd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gconfd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gconf_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gconf_etc_t type, if you want to store gconf files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gconf_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gconf_home_t type, if you want to store gconf files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/root/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)?, /root/\.local.* + +.EX +.PP +.B gconf_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gconf_tmp_t type, if you want to store gconf temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gconfd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gconfd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gconfd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gconfdefaultsm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gconfdefaultsm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gconfdefaultsm_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gconfd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gconfd: + +.EX +.B gconfdefaultsm_t, gconfd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gconfd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/gconfdefaultsm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gconfdefaultsm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71a23ac --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gconfdefaultsm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "gconfdefaultsm_selinux" "8" "gconfdefaultsm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gconfdefaultsm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gconfdefaultsm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gconfdefaultsm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gconfdefaultsm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfdefaultsm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gconfdefaultsm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gconfdefaultsm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gconfdefaultsm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gconfdefaultsm_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gconfdefaultsm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gconfdefaultsm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gconfdefaultsm: + +.EX +.B gconfdefaultsm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gconfdefaultsm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/getty_selinux.8 b/man/man8/getty_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85b78f2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/getty_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,129 @@ +.TH "getty_selinux" "8" "getty" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "getty SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +getty_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the getty processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B getty +(Policy for getty) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux getty policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their getty processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for getty: + + +.EX +.PP +.B getty_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the getty_etc_t type, if you want to store getty files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B getty_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the getty_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the getty_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/.*getty, /sbin/.*getty + +.EX +.PP +.B getty_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the getty_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as getty lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B getty_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the getty_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as getty log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/mgetty\.log.*, /var/log/vgetty\.log\..* + +.EX +.PP +.B getty_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the getty_tmp_t type, if you want to store getty temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B getty_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the getty_var_run_t type, if you want to store the getty files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/voice(/.*)?, /var/spool/fax(/.*)?, /var/run/mgetty\.pid.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux getty policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their getty processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for getty: + +.EX +.B getty_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), getty(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/gfs_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gfs_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c681f11 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gfs_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "gfs_selinux" "8" "gfs" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gfs SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gfs_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gfs processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gfs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gfs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gfs: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gfs_controld_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gfs_controld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gfs_controld_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gfs_controld_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gfs_controld_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store gfs controld files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gfs_controld_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gfs_controld_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as gfs controld var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gfs_controld_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gfs_controld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the gfs controld files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gfs policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gfs processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gfs: + +.EX +.B gfs_controld_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gfs(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/git_shell_selinux.8 b/man/man8/git_shell_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6031c31 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/git_shell_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,183 @@ +.TH "git_shell_selinux" "8" "git_shell" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "git_shell SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +git_shell_u \- \fBgit_shell user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +\fBgit_shell_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux +policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBgit_shell_r\fP. The +default role has a default type, \fBgit_shell_t\fP, associated with it. + +The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like: + +.B git_shell_u:git_shell_r:git_shell_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023 + +Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login. +Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell. + +SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access. + +By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag + +On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user. + +You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using: + +.B semanage login -l + +If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the git_shell_u user, you would execute: + +.B semanage login -m -s git_shell_u __default__ + + +.SH USER DESCRIPTION + +The SELinux user git_shell_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role. + +.SH SUDO + +The SELinux type git_shell_t is not allowed to execute sudo. + +.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN + +The SELinux user git_shell_u is not able to X Windows login. + +.SH TERMINAL LOGIN + +The SELinux user git_shell_u is not able to terminal login. + +.SH NETWORK + +.TP +The SELinux user git_shell_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports. + +.B dns_port_t: 53 + +.B ocsp_port_t: 9080 + +.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444 + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. git_shell_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run git_shell_t with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ping 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1 +.EE + +.SH HOME_EXEC + +The SELinux user git_shell_u is able execute home content files. + +.SH TRANSITIONS + +Three things can happen when git_shell_t attempts to execute a program. + +\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny git_shell_t from executing the program. + +.TP + +\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow git_shell_t to execute the program in the current user type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user git_shell_t can execute without transitioning: + +.B sesearch -A -s git_shell_t -c file -p execute_no_trans + +.TP + +\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow git_shell_t to execute the program and transition to a new type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user git_shell_t can execute and transition: + +.B $ sesearch -A -s git_shell_t -c process -p transition + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/gitosis_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gitosis_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0db16b5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gitosis_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +.TH "gitosis_selinux" "8" "gitosis" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gitosis SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gitosis_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gitosis processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B gitosis +(Tools for managing and hosting git repositories) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gitosis policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gitosis with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mai, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gitosis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gitosis processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gitosis: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gitosis_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gitosis_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gitosis_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/gitosis-serve, /usr/bin/gl-auth-command + +.EX +.PP +.B gitosis_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gitosis_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the gitosis files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/gitolite(/.*)?, /var/lib/gitosis(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gitosis policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gitosis processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gitosis: + +.EX +.B gitosis_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gitosis(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/glance_selinux.8 b/man/man8/glance_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5fe5fae --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/glance_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +.TH "glance_selinux" "8" "glance" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "glance SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +glance_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the glance processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B glance +(policy for glance) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux glance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for glance: + + +.EX +.PP +.B glance_api_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the glance_api_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_api_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B glance_api_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the glance_api_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_api_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B glance_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the glance_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as glance log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B glance_registry_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the glance_registry_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_registry_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B glance_registry_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the glance_registry_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the glance_registry_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B glance_registry_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the glance_registry_tmp_t type, if you want to store glance registry temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B glance_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the glance_tmp_t type, if you want to store glance temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B glance_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the glance_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the glance files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B glance_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the glance_var_run_t type, if you want to store the glance files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux glance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for glance: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B glance_registry_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux glance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their glance processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for glance: + +.EX +.B glance_registry_t, glance_api_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), glance(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/gnomeclock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gnomeclock_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9664dd6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gnomeclock_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "gnomeclock_selinux" "8" "gnomeclock" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gnomeclock SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gnomeclock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gnomeclock processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B gnomeclock +(Gnome clock handler for setting the time) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gnomeclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomeclock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gnomeclock: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gnomeclock_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gnomeclock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gnomeclock_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/gsd-datetime-mechanism, /usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/kcmdatetimehelper, /usr/libexec/gnome-clock-applet-mechanism + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gnomeclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomeclock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gnomeclock: + +.EX +.B gnomeclock_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gnomeclock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/gnomesystemmm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gnomesystemmm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d92b3e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gnomesystemmm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "gnomesystemmm_selinux" "8" "gnomesystemmm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gnomesystemmm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gnomesystemmm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gnomesystemmm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gnomesystemmm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomesystemmm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gnomesystemmm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gnomesystemmm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gnomesystemmm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gnomesystemmm_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/ksysguardprocesslist_helper, /usr/libexec/gnome-system-monitor-mechanism + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gnomesystemmm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gnomesystemmm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gnomesystemmm: + +.EX +.B gnomesystemmm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gnomesystemmm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/gpg_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpg_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9072646 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gpg_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +.TH "gpg_selinux" "8" "gpg" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gpg SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gpg_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpg processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B gpg +(Policy for GNU Privacy Guard and related programs) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gpg policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gpg with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow usage of the gpg-agent --write-env-file option. This also allows gpg-agent to manage user files, you must turn on the gpg_agent_env_file boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P gpg_agent_env_file 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to run gpg in gpg-web domai, you must turn on the httpd_use_gpg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg 1 +.EE + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. +.TP +Allow gpg servers to read the /var/gpg directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/gpg(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/gpg +.pp +.TP +Allow gpg servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_gpg_anon_write boolean to be set. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/gpg/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/gpg/incoming + + +.PP +If you want to allow gpg web domain to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the gpg_web_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P gpg_web_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gpg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gpg: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpg_agent_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpg_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_agent_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpg_agent_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpg_agent_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpg agent temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpg_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpg_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/gpg(2)?, /usr/bin/kgpg, /usr/lib/gnupg/.* + +.EX +.PP +.B gpg_helper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpg_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpg_helper_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpg_pinentry_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpg_pinentry_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpg pinentry temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store gpg pinentry files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpg_secret_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpg_secret_t type, if you want to treat the files as gpg se secret data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gpg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpg processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gpg: + +.EX +.B gpg_t, gpg_pinentry_t, gpg_helper_t, gpg_web_t, gpg_agent_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gpg(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/gpm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c67dba --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gpm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "gpm_selinux" "8" "gpm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gpm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gpm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B gpm +(General Purpose Mouse driver) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gpm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpm_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpm_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as gpm configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpm_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpm_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpm_tmp_t type, if you want to store gpm temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpm_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the gpm files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpmctl_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpmctl_t type, if you want to treat the files as gpmctl data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/dev/gpmctl, /dev/gpmdata + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gpm: + +.EX +.B gpm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gpm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/gpsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gpsd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..804e552 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gpsd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +.TH "gpsd_selinux" "8" "gpsd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gpsd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gpsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gpsd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B gpsd +(gpsd monitor daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gpsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gpsd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpsd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpsd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpsd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gpsd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpsd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpsd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store gpsd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gpsd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gpsd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the gpsd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/gpsd\.sock, /var/run/gpsd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux gpsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for gpsd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B gpsd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gpsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gpsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gpsd: + +.EX +.B gpsd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gpsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/greylist_selinux.8 b/man/man8/greylist_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..893c92e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/greylist_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "greylist_selinux" "8" "greylist" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "greylist SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +greylist_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the greylist processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux greylist policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their greylist processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for greylist: + + +.EX +.PP +.B greylist_milter_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the greylist_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as greylist milter content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/milter-greylist\.pid, /var/run/milter-greylist(/.*)?, /var/lib/milter-greylist(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B greylist_milter_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the greylist_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the greylist_milter_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux greylist policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their greylist processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for greylist: + +.EX +.B greylist_milter_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), greylist(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/groupadd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/groupadd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7774b5f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/groupadd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "groupadd_selinux" "8" "groupadd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "groupadd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +groupadd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the groupadd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux groupadd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupadd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for groupadd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B groupadd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the groupadd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the groupadd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/gpasswd, /usr/bin/gpasswd, /usr/sbin/groupdel, /usr/sbin/groupadd, /usr/sbin/groupmod + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux groupadd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupadd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for groupadd: + +.EX +.B groupadd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), groupadd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/groupd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/groupd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7285b15 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/groupd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "groupd_selinux" "8" "groupd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "groupd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +groupd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the groupd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux groupd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for groupd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B groupd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the groupd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the groupd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B groupd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the groupd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store groupd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B groupd_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the groupd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as groupd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B groupd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the groupd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the groupd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux groupd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their groupd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for groupd: + +.EX +.B groupadd_t, groupd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), groupd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/gssd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/gssd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e36991 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/gssd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +.TH "gssd_selinux" "8" "gssd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "gssd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +gssd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the gssd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. gssd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run gssd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt, you must turn on the allow_gssd_read_tmp boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_gssd_read_tmp 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux gssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gssd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for gssd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B gssd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gssd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the gssd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/rpc\.gssd, /usr/sbin/rpc\.svcgssd + +.EX +.PP +.B gssd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gssd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B gssd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the gssd_tmp_t type, if you want to store gssd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux gssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their gssd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for gssd: + +.EX +.B gssd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), gssd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/guest_selinux.8 b/man/man8/guest_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..faeeaf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/guest_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,188 @@ +.TH "guest_selinux" "8" "guest" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "guest SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +guest_u \- \fBLeast privledge terminal user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +\fBguest_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux +policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBguest_r\fP. The +default role has a default type, \fBguest_t\fP, associated with it. + +The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like: + +.B guest_u:guest_r:guest_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023 + +Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login. +Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell. + +SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access. + +By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag + +On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user. + +You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using: + +.B semanage login -l + +If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the guest_u user, you would execute: + +.B semanage login -m -s guest_u __default__ + + +If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user guest, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage login -a -s guest_u joe + + +.SH USER DESCRIPTION + +The SELinux user guest_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role. + +.SH SUDO + +The SELinux type guest_t is not allowed to execute sudo. + +.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN + +The SELinux user guest_u is not able to X Windows login. + +.SH TERMINAL LOGIN + +The SELinux user guest_u is able to terminal login. + +.SH NETWORK + +.TP +The SELinux user guest_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports. + +.B dns_port_t: 53 + +.B ocsp_port_t: 9080 + +.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444 + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. guest_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run guest_t with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ping 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1 +.EE + +.SH HOME_EXEC + +The SELinux user guest_u is able execute home content files. + +.SH TRANSITIONS + +Three things can happen when guest_t attempts to execute a program. + +\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny guest_t from executing the program. + +.TP + +\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow guest_t to execute the program in the current user type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user guest_t can execute without transitioning: + +.B sesearch -A -s guest_t -c file -p execute_no_trans + +.TP + +\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow guest_t to execute the program and transition to a new type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user guest_t can execute and transition: + +.B $ sesearch -A -s guest_t -c process -p transition + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/hddtemp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hddtemp_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..132cb89 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/hddtemp_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +.TH "hddtemp_selinux" "8" "hddtemp" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "hddtemp SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +hddtemp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hddtemp processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B hddtemp +(hddtemp hard disk temperature tool running as a daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux hddtemp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hddtemp processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for hddtemp: + + +.EX +.PP +.B hddtemp_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hddtemp_etc_t type, if you want to store hddtemp files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B hddtemp_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hddtemp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hddtemp_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B hddtemp_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hddtemp_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hddtemp_initrc_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux hddtemp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hddtemp processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for hddtemp: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B hddtemp_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux hddtemp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hddtemp processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for hddtemp: + +.EX +.B hddtemp_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), hddtemp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/hostname_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hostname_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..519b849 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/hostname_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "hostname_selinux" "8" "hostname" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "hostname SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +hostname_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hostname processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B hostname +(Policy for changing the system host name) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux hostname policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hostname processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for hostname: + + +.EX +.PP +.B hostname_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hostname_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hostname_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/bin/hostname, /usr/bin/hostname + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux hostname policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hostname processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for hostname: + +.EX +.B hostname_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), hostname(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/hplip_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hplip_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..05353ce --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/hplip_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +.TH "hplip_selinux" "8" "hplip" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "hplip SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +hplip_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hplip processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux hplip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hplip processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for hplip: + + +.EX +.PP +.B hplip_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hplip_etc_t type, if you want to store hplip files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B hplip_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hplip_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hplip_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/hpijs, /usr/share/hplip/.*\.py, /usr/sbin/hp-[^/]+, /usr/lib/cups/backend/hp.*, /usr/sbin/hpiod + +.EX +.PP +.B hplip_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hplip_tmp_t type, if you want to store hplip temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B hplip_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hplip_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the hplip files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B hplip_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hplip_var_run_t type, if you want to store the hplip files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/hp.*\.pid, /var/run/hp.*\.port + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux hplip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hplip processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for hplip: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B hplip_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux hplip policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hplip processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for hplip: + +.EX +.B hplip_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), hplip(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8 index 16e8b13..335b09f 100644 --- a/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8 +++ b/man/man8/httpd_selinux.8 @@ -1,120 +1,1514 @@ -.TH "httpd_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "httpd Selinux Policy documentation" -.de EX -.nf -.ft CW -.. -.de EE -.ft R -.fi -.. +.TH "httpd_selinux" "8" "httpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "httpd SELinux Policy documentation" .SH "NAME" -httpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd daemon +httpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the httpd processes .SH "DESCRIPTION" -Security-Enhanced Linux secures the httpd server via flexible mandatory access + +SELinux Linux secures +.B httpd +(Apache web server) +processes via flexible mandatory access control. -.SH FILE_CONTEXTS + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. httpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run httpd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to act as a rela, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_relay boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_relay 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to databases over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_db boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_db 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to run gpg in gpg-web domai, you must turn on the httpd_use_gpg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_use_gpg 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to execute cgi script, you must turn on the httpd_enable_cgi boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_cgi 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to access cifs file system, you must turn on the httpd_use_cifs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_use_cifs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_pa, you must turn on the allow_httpd_mod_auth_pam boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_httpd_mod_auth_pam 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to read home directorie, you must turn on the httpd_enable_homedirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_homedirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbu, you must turn on the httpd_dbus_avahi boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_dbus_avahi 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to unify HTTPD handling of all content files, you must turn on the httpd_unified boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_unified 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to the network using any TCP port, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd scripts and modules execmem/execstac, you must turn on the httpd_execmem boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_execmem 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to connect to the ldap por, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ldap boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ldap 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_ntlm_winbin, you must turn on the allow_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to unify HTTPD to communicate with the terminal. Needed for entering the passphrase for certificates at the terminal, you must turn on the httpd_tty_comm boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_tty_comm 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP client connecting to the ftp port and ephemeral port, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_ftp boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_ftp 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to read user conten, you must turn on the httpd_read_user_content boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_read_user_content 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to access nfs file system, you must turn on the httpd_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Apache to execute tmp content, you must turn on the httpd_tmp_exec boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd processes to manage IPA conten, you must turn on the httpd_manage_ipa boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_manage_ipa 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow http daemon to send mai, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to use built in scripting (usually php, you must turn on the httpd_builtin_scripting boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_builtin_scripting 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow http daemon to check spa, you must turn on the httpd_can_check_spam boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow BIND to bind apache port, you must turn on the named_bind_http_port boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P named_bind_http_port 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to connect to memcache serve, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_memcache boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to cobbler over the network, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow HTTPD to run SSI executables in the same domain as system CGI scripts, you must turn on the httpd_ssi_exec boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_ssi_exec 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to act as a FTP server by listening on the ftp port, you must turn on the httpd_enable_ftp_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_enable_ftp_server 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow http daemon to connect to zabbi, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_zabbix boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd daemon to change system limit, you must turn on the httpd_setrlimit boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_setrlimit 1 +.EE + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. +.TP +Allow httpd servers to read the /var/httpd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/httpd(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/httpd +.pp +.TP +Allow httpd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_httpd_anon_write boolean to be set. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/httpd/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/httpd/incoming + + +.PP +If you want to allow apache scripts to write to public content, directories/files must be labeled public_rw_content_t., you must turn on the allow_httpd_sys_script_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_httpd_sys_script_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Apache to modify public files used for public file transfer services, directories/files must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the allow_httpd_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_httpd_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. -Policy governs the access daemons have to these files. -SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their web services in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd processes in as secure a method as possible. .PP -The following file contexts types are defined for httpd: +The following file types are defined for httpd: + + .EX -httpd_sys_content_t -.EE -- Set files with httpd_sys_content_t if you want httpd_sys_script_exec_t scripts and the daemon to read the file, and disallow other non sys scripts from access. +.PP +.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd apcupsd cgi content. + + .EX -httpd_sys_script_exec_t -.EE -- Set cgi scripts with httpd_sys_script_exec_t to allow them to run with access to all sys types. +.PP +.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd apcupsd cgi access file. + + .EX -httpd_sys_content_rw_t +.PP +.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_ra_content_t .EE -- Set files with httpd_sys_content_rw_t if you want httpd_sys_script_exec_t scripts and the daemon to read/write the data, and disallow other non sys scripts from access. + +- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd apcupsd cgi read/append content. + + .EX -httpd_sys_content_ra_t +.PP +.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_rw_content_t .EE -- Set files with httpd_sys_content_ra_t if you want httpd_sys_script_exec_t scripts and the daemon to read/append to the file, and disallow other non sys scripts from access. + +- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd apcupsd cgi read/write content. + + .EX -httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t -.EE -- Set cgi scripts with httpd_unconfined_script_exec_t to allow them to run without any SELinux protection. This should only be used for a very complex httpd scripts, after exhausting all other options. It is better to use this script rather than turning off SELinux protection for httpd. +.PP +.B httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t +.EE -.SH NOTE -With certain policies you can define additional file contexts based on roles like user or staff. httpd_user_script_exec_t can be defined where it would only have access to "user" contexts. +- Set files with the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t domain. -.SH SHARING FILES -If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. allow_DOMAIN_anon_write. So for httpd you would execute: +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/www/apcupsd/upsfstats\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsstats\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/upsimage\.cgi, /var/www/apcupsd/multimon\.cgi, /var/www/cgi-bin/apcgui(/.*)? .EX -setsebool -P allow_httpd_anon_write=1 +.PP +.B httpd_awstats_content_t .EE -or +- Set files with the httpd_awstats_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd awstats content. + .EX -setsebool -P allow_httpd_sys_script_anon_write=1 +.PP +.B httpd_awstats_htaccess_t .EE -.SH BOOLEANS -SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. SELinux can be setup to prevent certain http scripts from working. httpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run httpd with the tightest access possible. +- Set files with the httpd_awstats_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd awstats access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_awstats_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_awstats_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd awstats read/append content. + + +.EX .PP -httpd can be setup to allow cgi scripts to be executed, set httpd_enable_cgi to allow this +.B httpd_awstats_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_awstats_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd awstats read/write content. + .EX -setsebool -P httpd_enable_cgi 1 +.PP +.B httpd_awstats_script_exec_t .EE +- Set files with the httpd_awstats_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_awstats_script_t domain. + + +.EX .PP -SELinux policy for httpd can be setup to not allowed to access users home directories. If you want to allow access to users home directories you need to set the httpd_enable_homedirs boolean and change the context of the files that you want people to access off the home dir. +.B httpd_bugzilla_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd bugzilla content. + .EX -setsebool -P httpd_enable_homedirs 1 -chcon -R -t httpd_sys_content_t ~user/public_html +.PP +.B httpd_bugzilla_htaccess_t .EE +- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd bugzilla access file. + + +.EX .PP -SELinux policy for httpd can be setup to not allow access to the controlling terminal. In most cases this is preferred, because an intruder might be able to use the access to the terminal to gain privileges. But in certain situations httpd needs to prompt for a password to open a certificate file, in these cases, terminal access is required. Set the httpd_tty_comm boolean to allow terminal access. +.B httpd_bugzilla_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd bugzilla read/append content. + .EX -setsebool -P httpd_tty_comm 1 +.PP +.B httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t .EE +- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd bugzilla read/write content. + + +.EX .PP -httpd can be configured to not differentiate file controls based on context, i.e. all files labeled as httpd context can be read/write/execute. Setting this boolean to false allows you to setup the security policy such that one httpd service can not interfere with another. +.B httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_bugzilla_script_t domain. + .EX -setsebool -P httpd_unified 0 +.PP +.B httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t .EE +- Set files with the httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd bugzilla temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX .PP -SELinu policy for httpd can be configured to turn on sending email. This is a security feature, since it would prevent a vulnerabiltiy in http from causing a spam attack. I certain situations, you may want http modules to send mail. You can turn on the httpd_send_mail boolean. +.B httpd_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/php-.*, /var/cache/mediawiki(/.*)?, /var/cache/lighttpd(/.*)?, /var/cache/php-mmcache(/.*)?, /var/cache/mod_gnutls(/.*)?, /var/cache/mod_ssl(/.*)?, /var/cache/jetty(/.*)?, /var/cache/mod_.*, /var/cache/ssl.*\.sem, /var/cache/httpd(/.*)?, /var/cache/rt3(/.*)?, /var/cache/php-eaccelerator(/.*)?, /var/cache/mason(/.*)?, /var/cache/mod_proxy(/.*)? .EX -setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1 .PP -httpd can be configured to turn off internal scripting (PHP). PHP and other -loadable modules run under the same context as httpd. Therefore several policy rules allow httpd greater access to the system then is needed if you only use external cgi scripts. +.B httpd_cobbler_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cobbler content. + .EX -setsebool -P httpd_builtin_scripting 0 +.PP +.B httpd_cobbler_htaccess_t .EE +- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd cobbler access file. + + +.EX .PP -SELinux policy can be setup such that httpd scripts are not allowed to connect out to the network. -This would prevent a hacker from breaking into you httpd server and attacking -other machines. If you need scripts to be able to connect you can set the httpd_can_network_connect boolean on. +.B httpd_cobbler_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cobbler read/append content. + .EX -setsebool -P httpd_can_network_connect 1 +.PP +.B httpd_cobbler_rw_content_t .EE +- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cobbler read/write content. + + +.EX .PP -system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. -.SH AUTHOR -This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . +.B httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t +.EE -.SH "SEE ALSO" -selinux(8), httpd(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8) +- Set files with the httpd_cobbler_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_cobbler_script_t domain. +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_collectd_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_collectd_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd collectd content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_collectd_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_collectd_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd collectd access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_collectd_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_collectd_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd collectd read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_collectd_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_collectd_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd collectd read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_collectd_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_collectd_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_collectd_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_config_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/vhosts, /etc/httpd(/.*)?, /etc/apache(2)?(/.*)?, /etc/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)?, /etc/lighttpd(/.*)?, /var/lib/stickshift/.httpd.d(/.*)?, /etc/cherokee(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_cvs_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_cvs_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cvs content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_cvs_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_cvs_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd cvs access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_cvs_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_cvs_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cvs read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_cvs_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_cvs_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd cvs read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_cvs_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_cvs_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_cvs_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/cvsweb/cvsweb\.cgi, /var/www/cgi-bin/cvsweb\.cgi + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dirsrvadmin content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd dirsrvadmin access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dirsrvadmin read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dirsrvadmin read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/dirsrv/dsgw-cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dspam_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dspam_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dspam content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dspam_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dspam_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd dspam access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dspam_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dspam_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dspam read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dspam_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dspam_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd dspam read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_dspam_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_dspam_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_dspam_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/apache(2)?, /usr/bin/mongrel_rails, /usr/lib/apache-ssl/.+, /usr/sbin/httpd\.event, /usr/sbin/httpd(\.worker)?, /usr/sbin/cherokee, /usr/sbin/apache-ssl(2)?, /usr/sbin/lighttpd + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_git_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_git_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd git content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_git_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_git_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd git access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_git_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_git_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd git read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_git_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_git_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd git read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/gitweb-caching(/.*)?, /var/cache/cgit(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_git_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_git_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_git_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/www/gitweb-caching/gitweb\.cgi, /var/www/cgi-bin/cgit, /var/www/git/gitweb\.cgi + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_helper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_helper_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/init\.d/cherokee, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/httpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lighttpd + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_libra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_libra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd libra content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_libra_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_libra_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd libra access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_libra_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_libra_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd libra read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_libra_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_libra_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd libra read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_libra_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_libra_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_libra_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as httpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)?, /var/log/httpd(/.*)?, /var/log/apache(2)?(/.*)?, /var/log/cherokee(/.*)?, /var/log/roundcubemail(/.*)?, /var/log/cgiwrap\.log.*, /var/log/lighttpd(/.*)?, /var/log/suphp\.log, /var/log/cacti(/.*)?, /var/log/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)?, /etc/httpd/logs, /var/log/jetty(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mediawiki_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mediawiki content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/www/wiki/.*\.php, /usr/share/mediawiki(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mediawiki_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd mediawiki access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mediawiki_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mediawiki read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mediawiki_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mediawiki read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mediawiki_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_mediawiki_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc_tex, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc, /usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc_tes + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_modules_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd modules. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/cherokee(/.*)?, /usr/lib/lighttpd(/.*)?, /usr/lib/apache(/.*)?, /etc/httpd/modules, /usr/lib/httpd(/.*)?, /usr/lib/apache2/modules(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mojomojo_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mojomojo content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mojomojo_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd mojomojo access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mojomojo_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mojomojo read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd mojomojo read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_mojomojo_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd mojomojo temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_munin_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_munin_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd munin content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_munin_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_munin_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd munin access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_munin_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_munin_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd munin read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_munin_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_munin_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd munin read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_munin_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_munin_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_munin_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nagios_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nagios_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nagios content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nagios_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nagios_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd nagios access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nagios_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nagios_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nagios read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nagios_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nagios_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nagios read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nagios_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nagios_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_nagios_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/cgi-bin/nagios(/.+)?, /usr/lib/nagios/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/netsaint(/.*)?, /usr/lib/nagios/cgi(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nutups_cgi_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nutups cgi content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nutups_cgi_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd nutups cgi access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nutups_cgi_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nutups cgi read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nutups_cgi_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd nutups cgi read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsstats\.cgi, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsimage\.cgi, /var/www/nut-cgi-bin/upsset\.cgi + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_passwd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_passwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_passwd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_php_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_php_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_php_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_php_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_php_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd php temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_prewikka_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd prewikka content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_prewikka_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd prewikka access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_prewikka_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd prewikka read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_prewikka_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd prewikka read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_prewikka_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_prewikka_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_rotatelogs_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd smokeping cgi content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd smokeping cgi access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd smokeping cgi read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd smokeping cgi read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_squid_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_squid_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squid content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_squid_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_squid_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd squid access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_squid_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_squid_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squid read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_squid_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_squid_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squid read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_squid_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_squid_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_squid_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_squirrelmail_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_squirrelmail_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd squirrelmail data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_suexec_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_suexec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_suexec_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/apache(2)?/suexec(2)?, /usr/sbin/suexec, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/(nph-)?cgiwrap(d)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_suexec_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_suexec_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd suexec temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_sys_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_sys_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd sys content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/icecast(/.*)?, /usr/share/htdig(/.*)?, /etc/htdig(/.*)?, /var/www/svn/conf(/.*)?, /usr/share/doc/ghc/html(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythtv/data(/.*)?, /var/lib/htdig(/.*)?, /srv/gallery2(/.*)?, /srv/([^/]*/)?www(/.*)?, /usr/share/ntop/html(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythweb(/.*)?, /var/lib/cacti/rra(/.*)?, /usr/share/openca/htdocs(/.*)?, /usr/share/selinux-policy[^/]*/html(/.*)?, /usr/share/drupal.*, /var/lib/trac(/.*)?, /var/www(/.*)?, /var/www/icons(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_sys_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_sys_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd sys access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_sys_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_sys_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd sys read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_sys_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_sys_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd sys read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/viewvc(/.*)?, /etc/WebCalendar(/.*)?, /etc/mock/koji(/.*)?, /var/lib/svn(/.*)?, /var/spool/gosa(/.*)?, /etc/zabbix/web(/.*)?, /var/lib/pootle/po(/.*)?, /etc/drupal.*, /var/www/gallery/albums(/.*)?, /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/uploads(/.*)?, /var/www/html/configuration\.php, /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/upgrade(/.*)?, /var/lib/drupal.*, /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-content(/.*)?, /var/lib/dokuwiki(/.*)?, /var/www/moodledata(/.*)?, /var/www/svn(/.*)?, /var/www/html/wp-content(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_sys_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_sys_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_sys_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/www/svn/hooks(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythweb/mythweb\.pl, /usr/share/wordpress/.*\.php, /usr/lib/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/perl(/.*)?, /usr/share/mythtv/mythweather/scripts(/.*)?, /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-config\.php, /var/www/html/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /var/www/cgi-bin(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store httpd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/httpd.?\.service, /lib/systemd/system/jetty.*\.service, /lib/systemd/system/httpd.*\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_user_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_user_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd user content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_user_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_user_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd user access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_user_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_user_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd user read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_user_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_user_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd user read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_user_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_user_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_user_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the httpd files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/rt3/data/RT-Shredder(/.*)?, /var/lib/jetty(/.*)?, /var/lib/httpd(/.*)?, /var/lib/cherokee(/.*)?, /var/lib/dav(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the httpd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/mod_.*, /var/run/wsgi.*, /var/run/apache.*, /var/run/jetty(/.*)?, /var/run/gcache_port, /opt/dirsrv/var/run/dirsrv/dsgw/cookies(/.*)?, /var/run/httpd.*, /var/run/dirsrv/admin-serv.*, /var/lib/php/session(/.*)?, /var/run/lighttpd(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_w3c_validator_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd w3c validator content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_w3c_validator_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd w3c validator access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_w3c_validator_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd w3c validator read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_w3c_validator_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd w3c validator read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_w3c_validator_script_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/w3c-markup-validator/cgi-bin(/.*)?, /usr/lib/cgi-bin/check + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t type, if you want to store httpd w3c validator temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_zoneminder_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd zoneminder content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_zoneminder_htaccess_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_htaccess_t type, if you want to treat the file as a httpd zoneminder access file. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_zoneminder_ra_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_ra_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd zoneminder read/append content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_zoneminder_rw_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_rw_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as httpd zoneminder read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the httpd_zoneminder_script_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for httpd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B http_cache_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B http_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux httpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their httpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for httpd: + +.EX +.B httpd_collectd_script_t, httpd_cvs_script_t, httpd_rotatelogs_t, httpd_bugzilla_script_t, httpd_smokeping_cgi_script_t, httpd_nagios_script_t, httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, httpd_suexec_t, httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_php_t, httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_user_script_t, httpd_awstats_script_t, httpd_libra_script_t, httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_t, httpd_nutups_cgi_script_t, httpd_munin_script_t, httpd_zoneminder_script_t, httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_dspam_script_t, httpd_prewikka_script_t, httpd_git_script_t, httpd_t, httpd_passwd_t, httpd_helper_t, httpd_squid_script_t, httpd_cobbler_script_t, httpd_mediawiki_script_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), httpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/hwclock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/hwclock_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1928dc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/hwclock_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "hwclock_selinux" "8" "hwclock" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "hwclock SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +hwclock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the hwclock processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux hwclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hwclock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for hwclock: + + +.EX +.PP +.B hwclock_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the hwclock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the hwclock_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/hwclock, /sbin/hwclock + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux hwclock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their hwclock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for hwclock: + +.EX +.B hwclock_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), hwclock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/iceauth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iceauth_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53e495f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/iceauth_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +.TH "iceauth_selinux" "8" "iceauth" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "iceauth SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +iceauth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iceauth processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux iceauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iceauth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for iceauth: + + +.EX +.PP +.B iceauth_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iceauth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iceauth_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/iceauth, /usr/X11R6/bin/iceauth + +.EX +.PP +.B iceauth_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iceauth_home_t type, if you want to store iceauth files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/root/\.DCOP.*, /root/\.ICEauthority.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux iceauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iceauth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for iceauth: + +.EX +.B iceauth_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), iceauth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/icecast_selinux.8 b/man/man8/icecast_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ca10859 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/icecast_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +.TH "icecast_selinux" "8" "icecast" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "icecast SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +icecast_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the icecast processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B icecast +( ShoutCast compatible streaming media server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. icecast policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run icecast with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow icecast to connect to all ports, not just sound ports, you must turn on the icecast_connect_any boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P icecast_connect_any 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux icecast policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their icecast processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for icecast: + + +.EX +.PP +.B icecast_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the icecast_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the icecast_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B icecast_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the icecast_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the icecast_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B icecast_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the icecast_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as icecast log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B icecast_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the icecast_var_run_t type, if you want to store the icecast files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux icecast policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their icecast processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for icecast: + +.EX +.B icecast_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), icecast(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/ifconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ifconfig_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2444a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ifconfig_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "ifconfig_selinux" "8" "ifconfig" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ifconfig SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ifconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ifconfig processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ifconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ifconfig processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ifconfig: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ifconfig_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ifconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ifconfig_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ipx_internal_net, /sbin/ipx_configure, /sbin/tc, /usr/sbin/ipx_configure, /usr/sbin/iwconfig, /usr/sbin/ipx_interface, /usr/sbin/mii-tool, /usr/sbin/ethtool, /sbin/ipx_internal_net, /usr/sbin/ifconfig, /bin/ip, /usr/bin/ip, /usr/sbin/tc, /sbin/iwconfig, /sbin/ifconfig, /sbin/mii-tool, /sbin/ethtool, /usr/sbin/ip, /sbin/ipx_interface, /sbin/ip + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ifconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ifconfig processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ifconfig: + +.EX +.B ifconfig_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ifconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/inetd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/inetd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..122a8f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/inetd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ +.TH "inetd_selinux" "8" "inetd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "inetd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +inetd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the inetd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B inetd +(Internet services daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux inetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for inetd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B inetd_child_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the inetd_child_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the inetd_child_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/identd, /usr/local/lib/pysieved/pysieved.*\.py, /usr/sbin/in\..*d + +.EX +.PP +.B inetd_child_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the inetd_child_tmp_t type, if you want to store inetd child temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B inetd_child_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the inetd_child_var_run_t type, if you want to store the inetd child files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B inetd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the inetd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the inetd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/inetd, /usr/sbin/xinetd, /usr/sbin/rlinetd + +.EX +.PP +.B inetd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the inetd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as inetd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B inetd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the inetd_tmp_t type, if you want to store inetd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B inetd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the inetd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the inetd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux inetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for inetd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B inetd_child_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux inetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their inetd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for inetd: + +.EX +.B inetd_t, inetd_child_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), inetd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/init_selinux.8 b/man/man8/init_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce0a398 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/init_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,167 @@ +.TH "init_selinux" "8" "init" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "init SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +init_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the init processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B init +(System initialization programs (init and init scripts)) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. init policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run init with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to enable support for upstart as the init program, you must turn on the init_upstart boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P init_upstart 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to enable support for systemd as the init program, you must turn on the init_systemd boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P init_systemd 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their init processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for init: + + +.EX +.PP +.B init_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the init_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the init_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/init(ng)?, /lib/systemd/[^/]*, /sbin/init(ng)?, /bin/systemd, /usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/[^/]*, /usr/bin/systemd, /lib/systemd/system-generators/[^/]*, /sbin/upstart, /usr/sbin/upstart, /usr/lib/systemd/[^/]* + +.EX +.PP +.B init_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the init_var_run_t type, if you want to store the init files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B initctl_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initctl_t type, if you want to treat the files as initctl data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_devpts_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc devpts data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/startx, /etc/rc\.d/rc, /usr/libexec/dcc/stop-.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup-ipsec, /usr/lib/systemd/fedora[^/]*, /lib/systemd/fedora[^/]*, /usr/sbin/start-dirsrv, /usr/sbin/open_init_pty, /usr/sbin/ldap-agent, /etc/X11/prefdm, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services-mechanism\.py, /etc/rc\.d/rc\.[^/]+, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/.*, /usr/libexec/dcc/start-.*, /usr/sbin/apachectl, /usr/sbin/restart-dirsrv, /etc/init\.d/.*, /usr/bin/sepg_ctl + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_state_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc state data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_tmp_t type, if you want to store initrc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the initrc files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/setmixer_flag, /var/run/runlevel\.dir, /var/run/random-seed, /var/run/utmp + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux init policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their init processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for init: + +.EX +.B initrc_t, init_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), init(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/initrc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/initrc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2fa2434 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/initrc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +.TH "initrc_selinux" "8" "initrc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "initrc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +initrc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the initrc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux initrc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their initrc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for initrc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_devpts_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc devpts data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/startx, /etc/rc\.d/rc, /usr/libexec/dcc/stop-.*, /etc/sysconfig/network-scripts/ifup-ipsec, /usr/lib/systemd/fedora[^/]*, /lib/systemd/fedora[^/]*, /usr/sbin/start-dirsrv, /usr/sbin/open_init_pty, /usr/sbin/ldap-agent, /etc/X11/prefdm, /usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services-mechanism\.py, /etc/rc\.d/rc\.[^/]+, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/.*, /usr/libexec/dcc/start-.*, /usr/sbin/apachectl, /usr/sbin/restart-dirsrv, /etc/init\.d/.*, /usr/bin/sepg_ctl + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_state_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as initrc state data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_tmp_t type, if you want to store initrc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B initrc_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the initrc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the initrc files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/setmixer_flag, /var/run/runlevel\.dir, /var/run/random-seed, /var/run/utmp + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux initrc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their initrc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for initrc: + +.EX +.B initrc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), initrc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/innd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/innd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..541f9e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/innd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +.TH "innd_selinux" "8" "innd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "innd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +innd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the innd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux innd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their innd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for innd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B innd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the innd_etc_t type, if you want to store innd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B innd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the innd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the innd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/suck, /usr/lib/news/bin/convdate, /usr/lib/news/bin/filechan, /usr/lib/news/bin/nntpget, /usr/sbin/in\.nnrpd, /usr/lib/news/bin/innfeed, /usr/lib/news/bin/shlock, /usr/lib/news/bin/archive, /usr/lib/news/bin/innconfval, /usr/lib/news/bin/innd, /usr/lib/news/bin/actsync, /usr/lib/news/bin/innxbatch, /usr/bin/inews, /usr/lib/news/bin/batcher, /usr/sbin/innd.*, /usr/lib/news/bin/expire, /usr/lib/news/bin/nnrpd, /usr/lib/news/bin/inndstart, /usr/lib/news/bin/ctlinnd, /usr/bin/rpost, /usr/lib/news/bin/buffchan, /etc/news/boot, /usr/lib/news/bin/ovdb_recover, /usr/lib/news/bin/startinnfeed, /usr/lib/news/bin/makehistory, /usr/lib/news/bin/newsrequeue, /usr/lib/news/bin/makedbz, /usr/bin/rnews, /usr/lib/news/bin/innxmit, /usr/lib/news/bin/fastrm, /usr/lib/news/bin/getlist, /usr/lib/news/bin/sm, /usr/lib/news/bin/grephistory, /usr/lib/news/bin/rnews, /usr/lib/news/bin/overchan, /usr/lib/news/bin/cvtbatch, /usr/lib/news/bin/prunehistory, /usr/lib/news/bin/inews, /usr/lib/news/bin/shrinkfile, /usr/lib/news/bin/expireover, /usr/lib/news/bin/inndf + +.EX +.PP +.B innd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the innd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the innd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B innd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the innd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as innd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B innd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the innd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the innd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B innd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the innd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the innd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/innd(/.*)?, /var/run/news(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux innd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their innd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for innd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B innd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux innd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their innd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for innd: + +.EX +.B innd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), innd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/insmod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/insmod_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e25a12 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/insmod_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.TH "insmod_selinux" "8" "insmod" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "insmod SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +insmod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the insmod processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. insmod policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run insmod with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to disallow programs and users from transitioning to insmod domain, you must turn on the secure_mode_insmod boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P secure_mode_insmod 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modem, you must turn on the pppd_can_insmod boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux insmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their insmod processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for insmod: + + +.EX +.PP +.B insmod_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the insmod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the insmod_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/modprobe.*, /sbin/rmmod.*, /sbin/insmod.*, /usr/sbin/modprobe.*, /usr/bin/kmod, /usr/sbin/insmod.*, /usr/sbin/rmmod.* + +.EX +.PP +.B insmod_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the insmod_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store insmod files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux insmod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their insmod processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for insmod: + +.EX +.B insmod_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), insmod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/ipsec_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ipsec_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3273369 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ipsec_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,199 @@ +.TH "ipsec_selinux" "8" "ipsec" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ipsec SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ipsec_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ipsec processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ipsec +(TCP/IP encryption) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ipsec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ipsec: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_conf_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_conf_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec conf content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/ipsec\.conf, /etc/racoon(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/local/lib/ipsec/eroute, /usr/lib/ipsec/pluto, /usr/local/lib/ipsec/pluto, /usr/lib/ipsec/klipsdebug, /usr/libexec/ipsec/eroute, /usr/libexec/ipsec/pluto, /usr/lib/ipsec/spi, /usr/lib/ipsec/eroute, /usr/local/lib/ipsec/klipsdebug, /usr/local/lib/ipsec/spi, /usr/libexec/ipsec/spi, /usr/libexec/ipsec/klipsdebug + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/racoon, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ipsec + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_key_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_key_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec key content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/ipsec\.secrets, /etc/racoon/psk\.txt, /etc/racoon/certs(/.*)?, /etc/ipsec\.d(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ipsec log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_mgmt_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ipsec_mgmt_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/ipsec/_plutorun, /usr/libexec/ipsec/_plutoload, /usr/libexec/nm-openswan-service, /usr/lib/ipsec/_plutoload, /usr/sbin/ipsec, /usr/libexec/ipsec/_plutorun + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_mgmt_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ipsec mgmt lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_mgmt_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_mgmt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ipsec mgmt files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_tmp_t type, if you want to store ipsec temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ipsec_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ipsec_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ipsec files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/racoon\.pid, /var/run/pluto(/.*)?, /var/racoon(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ipsec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ipsec: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ipsecnat_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ipsec policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ipsec processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ipsec: + +.EX +.B ipsec_t, ipsec_mgmt_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ipsec(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/iptables_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iptables_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e6b3de --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/iptables_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +.TH "iptables_selinux" "8" "iptables" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "iptables SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +iptables_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iptables processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B iptables +(Policy for iptables) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. iptables policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run iptables with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables command, you must turn on the dhcpc_exec_iptables boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P dhcpc_exec_iptables 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux iptables policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iptables processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for iptables: + + +.EX +.PP +.B iptables_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iptables_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iptables_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/ebtables-restore, /usr/sbin/ipvsadm-restore, /usr/sbin/ipchains.*, /usr/sbin/ip6?tables, /sbin/ebtables, /usr/sbin/ip6?tables-restore, /usr/sbin/xtables-multi, /sbin/ipchains.*, /sbin/ip6?tables, /usr/sbin/ebtables-restore, /usr/sbin/ebtables, /sbin/ipvsadm, /usr/sbin/ipvsadm-save, /sbin/xtables-multi, /sbin/ipvsadm-restore, /usr/sbin/ip6?tables-multi, /sbin/ip6?tables-multi, /usr/sbin/ipvsadm, /sbin/ipvsadm-save, /sbin/ip6?tables-restore + +.EX +.PP +.B iptables_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iptables_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iptables_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ebtables, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ip6?tables + +.EX +.PP +.B iptables_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iptables_tmp_t type, if you want to store iptables temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B iptables_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iptables_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as iptables unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/vsftpd.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/proftpd.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/iptables6?.service, /lib/systemd/system/ip6tables.service, /lib/systemd/system/slapd.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/vsftpd.*, /lib/systemd/system/ppp.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/kdump.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/slapd.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/ppp.*, /lib/systemd/system/kdump.service, /lib/systemd/system/proftpd.*, /lib/systemd/system/iptables.service + +.EX +.PP +.B iptables_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iptables_var_run_t type, if you want to store the iptables files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux iptables policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iptables processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for iptables: + +.EX +.B iptables_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), iptables(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/irc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/irc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6bd8081 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/irc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,123 @@ +.TH "irc_selinux" "8" "irc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "irc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +irc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the irc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B irc +(IRC client policy) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux irc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for irc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B irc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the irc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the irc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/ircII, /usr/bin/tinyirc, /usr/bin/[st]irc + +.EX +.PP +.B irc_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the irc_home_t type, if you want to store irc files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B irc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the irc_tmp_t type, if you want to store irc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux irc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for irc: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ircd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux irc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for irc: + +.EX +.B irc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), irc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/irqbalance_selinux.8 b/man/man8/irqbalance_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..daf7657 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/irqbalance_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.TH "irqbalance_selinux" "8" "irqbalance" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "irqbalance SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +irqbalance_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the irqbalance processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B irqbalance +(IRQ balancing daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux irqbalance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irqbalance processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for irqbalance: + + +.EX +.PP +.B irqbalance_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the irqbalance_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the irqbalance_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B irqbalance_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the irqbalance_var_run_t type, if you want to store the irqbalance files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux irqbalance policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irqbalance processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for irqbalance: + +.EX +.B irqbalance_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), irqbalance(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/irssi_selinux.8 b/man/man8/irssi_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3320869 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/irssi_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +.TH "irssi_selinux" "8" "irssi" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "irssi SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +irssi_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the irssi processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. irssi policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run irssi with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow the Irssi IRC Client to connect to any port, and to bind to any unreserved port, you must turn on the irssi_use_full_network boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P irssi_use_full_network 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux irssi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irssi processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for irssi: + + +.EX +.PP +.B irssi_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the irssi_etc_t type, if you want to store irssi files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B irssi_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the irssi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the irssi_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B irssi_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the irssi_home_t type, if you want to store irssi files in the users home directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux irssi policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their irssi processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for irssi: + +.EX +.B irssi_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), irssi(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/iscsid_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iscsid_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f0d9c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/iscsid_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +.TH "iscsid_selinux" "8" "iscsid" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "iscsid SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +iscsid_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iscsid processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux iscsid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iscsid processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for iscsid: + + +.EX +.PP +.B iscsi_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iscsi_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as iscsi lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B iscsi_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iscsi_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as iscsi log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/iscsiuio\.log.*, /var/log/brcm-iscsi\.log + +.EX +.PP +.B iscsi_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iscsi_tmp_t type, if you want to store iscsi temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B iscsi_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iscsi_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the iscsi files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B iscsi_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iscsi_var_run_t type, if you want to store the iscsi files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B iscsid_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iscsid_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iscsid_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/brcm_iscsiuio, /sbin/iscsiuio, /usr/sbin/iscsiuio, /usr/sbin/iscsid, /usr/sbin/brcm_iscsiuio, /sbin/iscsid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux iscsid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iscsid processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for iscsid: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B iscsi_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux iscsid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iscsid processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for iscsid: + +.EX +.B iscsid_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), iscsid(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/iwhd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/iwhd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2031201 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/iwhd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +.TH "iwhd_selinux" "8" "iwhd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "iwhd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +iwhd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the iwhd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux iwhd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iwhd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for iwhd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B iwhd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iwhd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iwhd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B iwhd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iwhd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the iwhd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B iwhd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iwhd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as iwhd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B iwhd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iwhd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the iwhd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B iwhd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the iwhd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the iwhd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux iwhd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their iwhd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for iwhd: + +.EX +.B iwhd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), iwhd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/jabberd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/jabberd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5f3d39d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/jabberd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +.TH "jabberd_selinux" "8" "jabberd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "jabberd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +jabberd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the jabberd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux jabberd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for jabberd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B jabberd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the jabberd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/s2s, /usr/bin/sm + +.EX +.PP +.B jabberd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the jabberd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B jabberd_router_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the jabberd_router_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jabberd_router_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/c2s, /usr/bin/router + +.EX +.PP +.B jabberd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the jabberd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the jabberd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux jabberd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for jabberd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B jabber_client_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B jabber_interserver_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B jabber_router_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux jabberd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jabberd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for jabberd: + +.EX +.B jabberd_router_t, jabberd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), jabberd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/jockey_selinux.8 b/man/man8/jockey_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..239af62 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/jockey_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +.TH "jockey_selinux" "8" "jockey" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "jockey SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +jockey_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the jockey processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B jockey +(policy for jockey) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux jockey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jockey processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for jockey: + + +.EX +.PP +.B jockey_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the jockey_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B jockey_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the jockey_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the jockey_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B jockey_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the jockey_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as jockey var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/jockey\.log, /var/log/jockey(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux jockey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their jockey processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for jockey: + +.EX +.B jockey_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), jockey(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/kadmind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kadmind_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b56c5c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/kadmind_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +.TH "kadmind_selinux" "8" "kadmind" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "kadmind SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +kadmind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kadmind processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux kadmind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kadmind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for kadmind: + + +.EX +.PP +.B kadmind_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kadmind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kadmind_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/(local/)?(kerberos/)?sbin/kadmind, /usr/kerberos/sbin/kadmin\.local + +.EX +.PP +.B kadmind_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kadmind_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as kadmind log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kadmind_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kadmind_tmp_t type, if you want to store kadmind temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kadmind_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kadmind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the kadmind files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux kadmind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kadmind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for kadmind: + +.EX +.B kadmind_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), kadmind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/kdump_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kdump_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b47a14d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/kdump_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.TH "kdump_selinux" "8" "kdump" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "kdump SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +kdump_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kdump processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B kdump +(Kernel crash dumping mechanism) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux kdump policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdump processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for kdump: + + +.EX +.PP +.B kdump_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kdump_etc_t type, if you want to store kdump files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kdump_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kdump_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdump_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/kdump, /usr/sbin/kexec, /sbin/kdump, /sbin/kexec + +.EX +.PP +.B kdump_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kdump_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdump_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kdump_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kdump_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as kdump unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kdumpgui_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kdumpgui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpgui_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kdumpgui_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kdumpgui_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpgui temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux kdump policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdump processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for kdump: + +.EX +.B kdumpgui_t, kdump_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), kdump(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/kdumpgui_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kdumpgui_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..82754b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/kdumpgui_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.TH "kdumpgui_selinux" "8" "kdumpgui" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "kdumpgui SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +kdumpgui_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kdumpgui processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B kdumpgui +(system-config-kdump GUI) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux kdumpgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpgui processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for kdumpgui: + + +.EX +.PP +.B kdumpgui_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kdumpgui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kdumpgui_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kdumpgui_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kdumpgui_tmp_t type, if you want to store kdumpgui temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux kdumpgui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kdumpgui processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for kdumpgui: + +.EX +.B kdumpgui_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), kdumpgui(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/keyboardd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/keyboardd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..782e48f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/keyboardd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "keyboardd_selinux" "8" "keyboardd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "keyboardd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +keyboardd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the keyboardd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B keyboardd +(policy for system-setup-keyboard daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux keyboardd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keyboardd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for keyboardd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B keyboardd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the keyboardd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the keyboardd_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux keyboardd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keyboardd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for keyboardd: + +.EX +.B keyboardd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), keyboardd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/keystone_selinux.8 b/man/man8/keystone_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c2d5b6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/keystone_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.TH "keystone_selinux" "8" "keystone" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "keystone SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +keystone_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the keystone processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B keystone +(policy for keystone) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux keystone policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keystone processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for keystone: + + +.EX +.PP +.B keystone_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the keystone_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the keystone_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B keystone_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the keystone_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as keystone log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B keystone_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the keystone_tmp_t type, if you want to store keystone temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B keystone_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the keystone_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as keystone unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B keystone_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the keystone_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the keystone files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux keystone policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their keystone processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for keystone: + +.EX +.B keystone_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), keystone(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/kismet_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kismet_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..678bdc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/kismet_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +.TH "kismet_selinux" "8" "kismet" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "kismet SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +kismet_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kismet processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B kismet +(Kismet is an 802.11 layer2 wireless network detector, sniffer, and intrusion detection system) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux kismet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kismet processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for kismet: + + +.EX +.PP +.B kismet_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kismet_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kismet_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kismet_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kismet_home_t type, if you want to store kismet files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kismet_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kismet_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as kismet log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kismet_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kismet_tmp_t type, if you want to store kismet temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kismet_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kismet_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store kismet files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kismet_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kismet_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the kismet files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B kismet_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kismet_var_run_t type, if you want to store the kismet files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux kismet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kismet processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for kismet: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B kismet_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux kismet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kismet processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for kismet: + +.EX +.B kismet_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), kismet(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/klogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/klogd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9dcdb4f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/klogd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +.TH "klogd_selinux" "8" "klogd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "klogd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +klogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the klogd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux klogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their klogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for klogd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B klogd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the klogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the klogd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/rklogd, /sbin/klogd, /sbin/rklogd, /usr/sbin/klogd + +.EX +.PP +.B klogd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the klogd_tmp_t type, if you want to store klogd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B klogd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the klogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the klogd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux klogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their klogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for klogd: + +.EX +.B klogd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), klogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/kpropd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/kpropd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ad7425 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/kpropd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +.TH "kpropd_selinux" "8" "kpropd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "kpropd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +kpropd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the kpropd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux kpropd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpropd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for kpropd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B kpropd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the kpropd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the kpropd_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux kpropd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpropd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for kpropd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B kprop_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux kpropd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their kpropd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for kpropd: + +.EX +.B kpropd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), kpropd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/krb5kdc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/krb5kdc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a01b27 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/krb5kdc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +.TH "krb5kdc_selinux" "8" "krb5kdc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "krb5kdc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +krb5kdc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the krb5kdc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux krb5kdc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their krb5kdc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for krb5kdc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B krb5kdc_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the krb5kdc_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as krb5kdc configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/kerberos/krb5kdc(/.*)?, /etc/krb5kdc(/.*)?, /usr/local/var/krb5kdc(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B krb5kdc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the krb5kdc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the krb5kdc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B krb5kdc_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the krb5kdc_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as krb5kdc lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.*\.ok, /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/from_master.* + +.EX +.PP +.B krb5kdc_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the krb5kdc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as krb5kdc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B krb5kdc_principal_t +.EE + +- Set files with the krb5kdc_principal_t type, if you want to treat the files as krb5kdc principal data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/local/var/krb5kdc/principal.*, /etc/krb5kdc/principal.*, /var/kerberos/krb5kdc/principal.* + +.EX +.PP +.B krb5kdc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the krb5kdc_tmp_t type, if you want to store krb5kdc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B krb5kdc_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the krb5kdc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the krb5kdc files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux krb5kdc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their krb5kdc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for krb5kdc: + +.EX +.B krb5kdc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), krb5kdc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ksmtuned_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ksmtuned_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5874ff2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ksmtuned_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "ksmtuned_selinux" "8" "ksmtuned" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ksmtuned SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ksmtuned_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ksmtuned processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ksmtuned +(Kernel Samepage Merging (KSM) Tuning Daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ksmtuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ksmtuned processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ksmtuned: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ksmtuned_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ksmtuned_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ksmtuned_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ksmtuned_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ksmtuned_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ksmtuned_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ksmtuned log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ksmtuned_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ksmtuned_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ksmtuned files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ksmtuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ksmtuned processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ksmtuned: + +.EX +.B ksmtuned_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ksmtuned(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ktalkd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ktalkd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b084b7 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ktalkd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "ktalkd_selinux" "8" "ktalkd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ktalkd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ktalkd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ktalkd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ktalkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ktalkd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ktalkd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ktalkd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ktalkd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ktalkd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/in\.talkd, /usr/bin/ktalkd, /usr/sbin/in\.ntalkd + +.EX +.PP +.B ktalkd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ktalkd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ktalkd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ktalkd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ktalkd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ktalkd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ktalkd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ktalkd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ktalkd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ktalkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ktalkd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ktalkd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ktalkd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ktalkd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ktalkd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ktalkd: + +.EX +.B ktalkd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ktalkd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/l2tpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/l2tpd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be9e0f9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/l2tpd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.TH "l2tpd_selinux" "8" "l2tpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "l2tpd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +l2tpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the l2tpd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B l2tpd +(policy for l2tpd) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux l2tpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their l2tpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for l2tpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B l2tpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the l2tpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the l2tpd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/xl2tpd, /usr/sbin/openl2tpd + +.EX +.PP +.B l2tpd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the l2tpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the l2tpd_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/xl2tpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openl2tpd + +.EX +.PP +.B l2tpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the l2tpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the l2tpd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/xl2tpd(/.*)?, /var/run/xl2tpd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux l2tpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their l2tpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for l2tpd: + +.EX +.B l2tpd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), l2tpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ldconfig_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ldconfig_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..488c36b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ldconfig_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +.TH "ldconfig_selinux" "8" "ldconfig" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ldconfig SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ldconfig_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ldconfig processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ldconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ldconfig processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ldconfig: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ldconfig_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ldconfig_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ldconfig_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ldconfig_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ldconfig_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ldconfig, /sbin/ldconfig + +.EX +.PP +.B ldconfig_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ldconfig_tmp_t type, if you want to store ldconfig temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ldconfig policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ldconfig processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ldconfig: + +.EX +.B ldconfig_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ldconfig(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/libra_selinux.8 b/man/man8/libra_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8b6ac6e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/libra_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +.TH "libra_selinux" "8" "libra" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "libra SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +libra_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the libra processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux libra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their libra processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for libra: + + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_cgroup_read_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_cgroup_read_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the libra_cgroup_read_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the libra_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/rhc-restorer, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mcollective, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/libra + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_initrc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_initrc_tmp_t type, if you want to store libra initrc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as libra log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_mail_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store libra mail temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_private_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_private_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as libra private content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_rw_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_rw_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as libra rw content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_tmp_t type, if you want to store libra temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the libra files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B libra_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the libra_var_run_t type, if you want to store the libra files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux libra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their libra processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for libra: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B libra_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux libra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their libra processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for libra: + +.EX +.B libra_t, libra_initrc_t, libra_mail_t, libra_net_app_t, libra_min_app_t, libra_app_t, libra_min_t, libra_net_t, libra_cgroup_read_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), libra(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/lircd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lircd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b5ddb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lircd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,135 @@ +.TH "lircd_selinux" "8" "lircd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lircd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lircd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lircd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B lircd +(Linux infared remote control daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lircd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lircd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lircd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lircd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lircd_etc_t type, if you want to store lircd files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/lircd\.conf, /etc/lirc(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B lircd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lircd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lircd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lircd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lircd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lircd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lircd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lircd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lircd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/lirc(/.*)?, /var/run/lircd(/.*)?, /var/run/lircd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux lircd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lircd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for lircd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B lirc_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lircd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lircd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lircd: + +.EX +.B lircd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lircd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/livecd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/livecd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01c43d5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/livecd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.TH "livecd_selinux" "8" "livecd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "livecd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +livecd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the livecd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B livecd +(Livecd tool for building alternate livecd for different os and policy versions) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux livecd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their livecd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for livecd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B livecd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the livecd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the livecd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B livecd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the livecd_tmp_t type, if you want to store livecd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux livecd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their livecd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for livecd: + +.EX +.B livecd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), livecd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/lldpad_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lldpad_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25e0ebf --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lldpad_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.TH "lldpad_selinux" "8" "lldpad" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lldpad SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lldpad_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lldpad processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B lldpad +(policy for lldpad) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lldpad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lldpad processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lldpad: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lldpad_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lldpad_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lldpad_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lldpad_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lldpad_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lldpad_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lldpad_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lldpad_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store lldpad files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lldpad_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lldpad_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lldpad files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lldpad_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lldpad_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lldpad files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lldpad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lldpad processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lldpad: + +.EX +.B lldpad_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lldpad(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/load_selinux.8 b/man/man8/load_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..27bf215 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/load_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,116 @@ +.TH "load_selinux" "8" "load" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "load SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +load_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the load processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. load policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run load with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to prevent all confined domains from loading policy, setting enforcing mode, and changing boolean values. Set this to true and you have to reboot to set it bac, you must turn on the secure_mode_policyload boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P secure_mode_policyload 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloade, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow all domains to have the kernel load module, you must turn on the domain_kernel_load_modules boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P domain_kernel_load_modules 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux load policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their load processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for load: + + +.EX +.PP +.B load_policy_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the load_policy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the load_policy_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/load_policy, /sbin/load_policy + +.EX +.PP +.B loadkeys_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the loadkeys_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the loadkeys_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/bin/unikeys, /usr/bin/unikeys, /bin/loadkeys, /usr/bin/loadkeys + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux load policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their load processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for load: + +.EX +.B loadkeys_t, load_policy_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), load(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/loadkeys_selinux.8 b/man/man8/loadkeys_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7ea5471 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/loadkeys_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "loadkeys_selinux" "8" "loadkeys" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "loadkeys SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +loadkeys_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the loadkeys processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B loadkeys +(Load keyboard mappings) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux loadkeys policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their loadkeys processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for loadkeys: + + +.EX +.PP +.B loadkeys_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the loadkeys_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the loadkeys_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/bin/unikeys, /usr/bin/unikeys, /bin/loadkeys, /usr/bin/loadkeys + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux loadkeys policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their loadkeys processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for loadkeys: + +.EX +.B loadkeys_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), loadkeys(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/locate_selinux.8 b/man/man8/locate_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9c0a33 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/locate_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +.TH "locate_selinux" "8" "locate" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "locate SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +locate_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the locate processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux locate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their locate processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for locate: + + +.EX +.PP +.B locate_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the locate_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the locate_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B locate_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the locate_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as locate log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B locate_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the locate_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the locate files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux locate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their locate processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for locate: + +.EX +.B locate_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), locate(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/lockdev_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lockdev_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c899a1b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lockdev_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.TH "lockdev_selinux" "8" "lockdev" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lockdev SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lockdev_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lockdev processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B lockdev +(device locking policy for lockdev) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lockdev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lockdev processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lockdev: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lockdev_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lockdev_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lockdev_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lockdev_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lockdev_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as lockdev lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lockdev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lockdev processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lockdev: + +.EX +.B lockdev_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lockdev(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/logadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/logadm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0edd73f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/logadm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +.TH "logadm_selinux" "8" "logadm" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "logadm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +logadm_r \- \fBLog administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to. + +Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user. + +Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. + +Roles usually have default types assigned to them. + +The default type for the logadm_r role is logadm_t. + +You can use the +.B newrole +program to transition directly to this role. + +.B newrole -r logadm_r -t logadm_t + +.B sudo +can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command. + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=logadm_r TYPE=logadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:logadm_r:logadm_t:LEVEL + +If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role. + +You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following + +.B semanage user -l + +If you wanted to add logadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r logadm_r' staff_u + + + +SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role. +You can list these rules using the following command. + +.B sesearch --role_allow + +SELinux policy allows the staff_r role can transition to the logadm_r role. + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/logrotate_selinux.8 b/man/man8/logrotate_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f01fd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/logrotate_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "logrotate_selinux" "8" "logrotate" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "logrotate SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +logrotate_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the logrotate processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B logrotate +(Rotate and archive system logs) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux logrotate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logrotate processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for logrotate: + + +.EX +.PP +.B logrotate_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logrotate_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the logrotate_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/logrotate, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly)/sysklogd + +.EX +.PP +.B logrotate_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logrotate_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as logrotate lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B logrotate_mail_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logrotate_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store logrotate mail temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B logrotate_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logrotate_tmp_t type, if you want to store logrotate temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B logrotate_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logrotate_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the logrotate files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux logrotate policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logrotate processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for logrotate: + +.EX +.B logrotate_t, logrotate_mail_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), logrotate(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/logwatch_selinux.8 b/man/man8/logwatch_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a03fd51 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/logwatch_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "logwatch_selinux" "8" "logwatch" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "logwatch SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +logwatch_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the logwatch processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B logwatch +(System log analyzer and reporter) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux logwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logwatch processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for logwatch: + + +.EX +.PP +.B logwatch_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logwatch_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/epylog(/.*)?, /var/cache/logwatch(/.*)?, /var/lib/logcheck(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B logwatch_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logwatch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the logwatch_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/logcheck, /usr/sbin/epylog, /usr/share/logwatch/scripts/logwatch\.pl + +.EX +.PP +.B logwatch_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logwatch_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as logwatch lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B logwatch_mail_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logwatch_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store logwatch mail temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B logwatch_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logwatch_tmp_t type, if you want to store logwatch temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B logwatch_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the logwatch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the logwatch files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux logwatch policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their logwatch processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for logwatch: + +.EX +.B logwatch_t, logwatch_mail_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), logwatch(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/lpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lpd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f69947a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lpd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +.TH "lpd_selinux" "8" "lpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lpd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lpd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B lpd +(Line printer daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. lpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run lpd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to use lpd server instead of cup, you must turn on the use_lpd_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P use_lpd_server 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store lpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lpd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/lprng(/.*)?, /var/spool/turboprint(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lpd: + +.EX +.B lpd_t, lpr_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/lpr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lpr_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..90d47ef --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lpr_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "lpr_selinux" "8" "lpr" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lpr SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lpr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lpr processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lpr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpr processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lpr: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lpr_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lpr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lpr_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/accept, /usr/bin/cancel(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/lp(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/lpstat(\.cups)?, /usr/sbin/lpc(\.cups)?, /usr/local/linuxprinter/bin/l?lpr, /usr/bin/lpoptions, /usr/sbin/lpadmin, /usr/sbin/lpinfo, /opt/gutenprint/s?bin(/.*)?, /usr/bin/lpr(\.cups)?, /usr/bin/lpq(\.cups)?, /usr/sbin/lpmove, /usr/bin/lprm(\.cups)? + +.EX +.PP +.B lpr_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lpr_tmp_t type, if you want to store lpr temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lpr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lpr processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lpr: + +.EX +.B lpr_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lpr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/lsassd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lsassd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..087cd7b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lsassd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +.TH "lsassd_selinux" "8" "lsassd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lsassd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lsassd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lsassd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lsassd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lsassd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lsassd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lsassd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lsassd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lsassd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lsassd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lsassd_tmp_t type, if you want to store lsassd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lsassd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lsassd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lsassd files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/likewise-open/krb5ccr_lsass, /var/lib/likewise-open/db/lsass-adstate\.filedb, /var/lib/likewise-open/lsasd\.err, /var/lib/likewise-open/db/lsass-adcache\.db, /var/lib/likewise-open/db/sam\.db + +.EX +.PP +.B lsassd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lsassd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lsassd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lsassd_var_socket_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lsassd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lsassd var socket data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/likewise-open/rpc/lsass, /var/lib/likewise-open/\.lsassd, /var/lib/likewise-open/\.ntlmd + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lsassd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lsassd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lsassd: + +.EX +.B lsassd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lsassd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/lvm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lvm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..20c9a41 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lvm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +.TH "lvm_selinux" "8" "lvm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lvm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lvm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lvm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B lvm +(Policy for logical volume management programs) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lvm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lvm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lvm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lvm_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lvm_etc_t type, if you want to store lvm files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lvm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lvm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lvm_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/dmsetup, /usr/sbin/dmsetup, /usr/sbin/pvchange, /sbin/dmraid, /sbin/pvremove, /sbin/vgextend, /sbin/vgmerge, /sbin/vgscan\.static, /usr/sbin/pvdisplay, /sbin/vgrename, /usr/sbin/vgck, /sbin/lvdisplay, /usr/sbin/vgremove, /usr/lib/lvm-10/.*, /sbin/pvs, /sbin/lvmdiskscan, /sbin/lvresize, /sbin/vgmknodes, /usr/sbin/lvdisplay, /usr/sbin/mount\.crypt, /usr/sbin/vgsplit, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup, /sbin/pvmove, /sbin/multipath\.static, /usr/sbin/pvcreate, /usr/sbin/lvmdiskscan, /usr/sbin/vgcfgbackup, /usr/sbin/vgimport, /sbin/vgck, /sbin/pvscan, /usr/sbin/lvmchange, /sbin/lvreduce, /sbin/vgremove, /sbin/vgscan, /sbin/lvremove, /lib/lvm-200/.*, /usr/sbin/lvremove, /sbin/pvcreate, /usr/sbin/lvrename, /usr/sbin/lvmsadc, /usr/sbin/lvm, /usr/lib/lvm-200/.*, /usr/sbin/pvdata, /sbin/vgchange, /sbin/lvm\.static, /sbin/vgcfgbackup, /sbin/e2fsadm, /sbin/lvm, /sbin/pvdata, /usr/sbin/lvmiopversion, /usr/sbin/vgextend, /sbin/lvextend, /usr/lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export, /sbin/vgcfgrestore, /usr/sbin/vgscan, /sbin/vgs, /sbin/lvmchange, /sbin/vgimport, /usr/sbin/lvscan, /usr/sbin/pvscan, /usr/sbin/vgreduce, /usr/sbin/dmsetup\.static, /usr/sbin/vgchange\.static, /usr/sbin/vgexport, /usr/sbin/lvextend, /usr/sbin/cryptsetup, /usr/sbin/dmraid, /usr/sbin/lvresize, /sbin/dmsetup\.static, /sbin/lvmsar, /usr/sbin/vgs, /usr/sbin/vgrename, /usr/sbin/lvs, /sbin/vgchange\.static, /usr/sbin/pvmove, /sbin/lvmsadc, /usr/sbin/vgmknodes, /sbin/lvmiopversion, /usr/sbin/vgscan\.static, /sbin/pvdisplay, /sbin/vgsplit, /usr/sbin/vgcfgrestore, /usr/sbin/kpartx, /sbin/cryptsetup, /usr/sbin/lvcreate, /lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export, /sbin/vgwrapper, /sbin/lvchange, /sbin/pvchange, /usr/sbin/lvm\.static, /usr/sbin/multipathd, /sbin/mount\.crypt, /sbin/vgcreate, /sbin/vgreduce, /usr/sbin/lvreduce, /usr/sbin/vgwrapper, /sbin/lvrename, /lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup, /sbin/multipathd, /usr/sbin/vgcreate, /usr/sbin/vgmerge, /sbin/vgexport, /usr/sbin/lvchange, /sbin/lvs, /usr/sbin/lvmsar, /usr/sbin/multipath\.static, /usr/sbin/vgdisplay, /usr/sbin/vgchange, /sbin/kpartx, /usr/sbin/pvs, /lib/lvm-10/.*, /sbin/lvscan, /sbin/lvcreate, /sbin/vgdisplay, /usr/sbin/pvremove, /usr/sbin/e2fsadm + +.EX +.PP +.B lvm_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lvm_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as lvm lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lock/lvm(/.*)?, /etc/lvm/lock(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B lvm_metadata_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lvm_metadata_t type, if you want to treat the files as lvm metadata data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/lvm/backup(/.*)?, /var/cache/multipathd(/.*)?, /etc/lvmtab\.d(/.*)?, /etc/lvmtab(/.*)?, /etc/lvm/\.cache, /etc/lvm/archive(/.*)?, /etc/lvm/cache(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B lvm_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lvm_tmp_t type, if you want to store lvm temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lvm_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lvm_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lvm files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lvm_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lvm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lvm files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/lvm(/.*)?, /var/run/multipathd\.sock, /var/run/dmevent.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lvm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lvm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lvm: + +.EX +.B lvm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lvm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/lwiod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lwiod_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..39b80fc --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lwiod_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "lwiod_selinux" "8" "lwiod" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lwiod SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lwiod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lwiod processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lwiod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwiod processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lwiod: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwiod_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwiod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lwiod_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwiod_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwiod_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lwiod files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwiod_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwiod_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lwiod files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwiod_var_socket_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwiod_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lwiod var socket data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lwiod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwiod processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lwiod: + +.EX +.B lwiod_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lwiod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/lwregd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lwregd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e954cd1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lwregd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +.TH "lwregd_selinux" "8" "lwregd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lwregd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lwregd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lwregd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lwregd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwregd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lwregd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwregd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwregd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lwregd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwregd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwregd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lwregd files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/likewise-open/db/registry\.db, /var/lib/likewise-open/regsd\.err + +.EX +.PP +.B lwregd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwregd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lwregd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwregd_var_socket_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwregd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lwregd var socket data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lwregd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwregd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lwregd: + +.EX +.B lwregd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lwregd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/lwsmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/lwsmd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..96c1b69 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/lwsmd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "lwsmd_selinux" "8" "lwsmd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "lwsmd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +lwsmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the lwsmd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux lwsmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwsmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for lwsmd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwsmd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwsmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the lwsmd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwsmd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwsmd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the lwsmd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwsmd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwsmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the lwsmd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B lwsmd_var_socket_t +.EE + +- Set files with the lwsmd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as lwsmd var socket data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux lwsmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their lwsmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for lwsmd: + +.EX +.B lwsmd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), lwsmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/mail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mail_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd12996 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mail_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,277 @@ +.TH "mail_selinux" "8" "mail" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mail SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mail processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mail policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mail with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow postfix_local domain full write access to mail_spool directorie, you must turn on the allow_postfix_local_write_mail_spool boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_postfix_local_write_mail_spool 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow http daemon to send mai, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mai, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mai, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mail: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mail_home_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mail_home_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as mail home read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mail_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mail_home_t type, if you want to store mail files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/root/\.forward, /root/.mailrc, /root/dead.letter + +.EX +.PP +.B mail_munin_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mail_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mail_munin_plugin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/munin/plugins/postfix_mail.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/mailscanner, /usr/share/munin/plugins/courier_mta_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/mailman, /usr/share/munin/plugins/exim_mail.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/qmail.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/sendmail_.* + +.EX +.PP +.B mail_munin_plugin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mail_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store mail munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mail_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mail_spool_t type, if you want to store the mail files under the /var/spool directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/mail(/.*)?, /var/spool/imap(/.*)?, /var/spool/mail(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_archive_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_archive_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman archive data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_cgi_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_cgi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_cgi_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_cgi_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_cgi_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman cgi temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/mailman.*, /var/spool/mailman.*, /var/lib/mailman.* + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mailman log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_mail_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_mail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_mail_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/mailman.*/mail/mailman, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mm-handler.*, /usr/share/doc/mailman.*/mm-handler.*, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mailmanctl, /usr/lib/mailman.*/scripts/mailman + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_mail_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman mail temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_queue_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_queue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_queue_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/mailman.*/cron/.*, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/qrunner + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_queue_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_queue_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman queue temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mailman files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux mail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for mail: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B mail_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mail: + +.EX +.B mailman_cgi_t, mailman_mail_t, mail_munin_plugin_t, mailman_queue_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/mailman_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mailman_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2cc348b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mailman_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,169 @@ +.TH "mailman_selinux" "8" "mailman" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mailman SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mailman_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mailman processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B mailman +(Mailman is for managing electronic mail discussion and e-newsletter lists) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mailman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mailman: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_archive_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_archive_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman archive data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_cgi_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_cgi_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_cgi_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_cgi_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_cgi_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman cgi temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/mailman.*, /var/spool/mailman.*, /var/lib/mailman.* + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as mailman lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mailman log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_mail_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_mail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_mail_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/mailman.*/mail/mailman, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mm-handler.*, /usr/share/doc/mailman.*/mm-handler.*, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mailmanctl, /usr/lib/mailman.*/scripts/mailman + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_mail_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman mail temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_queue_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_queue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mailman_queue_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/mailman.*/cron/.*, /usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/qrunner + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_queue_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_queue_tmp_t type, if you want to store mailman queue temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mailman_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mailman_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mailman files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mailman policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mailman processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mailman: + +.EX +.B mailman_cgi_t, mailman_mail_t, mailman_queue_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mailman(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/matahari_selinux.8 b/man/man8/matahari_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6cbe09a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/matahari_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,243 @@ +.TH "matahari_selinux" "8" "matahari" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "matahari SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +matahari_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the matahari processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B matahari +(policy for matahari) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux matahari policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their matahari processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for matahari: + + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_hostd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_hostd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_hostd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-hostd, /usr/sbin/matahari-hostd, /usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-hostd + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_hostd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_hostd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari hostd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-host\.service, /lib/systemd/system/matahari-host\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-sysconfig, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-host, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-service, /etc/init.d/matahari-sysconfig-console, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-net + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_netd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_netd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_netd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-networkd, /usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-networkd, /usr/sbin/matahari-netd + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_netd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_netd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari netd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-network\.service, /lib/systemd/system/matahari-network\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_rpcd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_rpcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_rpcd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_rpcd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_rpcd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari rpcd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-rpc.service, /lib/systemd/system/matahari-rpc.service + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_serviced_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_serviced_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_serviced_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/matahari-serviced, /usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-serviced, /usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-serviced + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_serviced_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_serviced_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari serviced unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-service\.service, /lib/systemd/system/matahari-service\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the matahari_sysconfigd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-sysconfigd, /usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-sysconfig-consoled + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as matahari sysconfigd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig-console\.service, /lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig\.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig\.service, /lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig-console\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the matahari files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B matahari_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the matahari_var_run_t type, if you want to store the matahari files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/matahari(/.*)?, /var/run/matahari\.pid, /var/run/matahari-broker\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux matahari policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their matahari processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for matahari: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B matahari_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux matahari policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their matahari processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for matahari: + +.EX +.B matahari_serviced_t, matahari_sysconfigd_t, matahari_hostd_t, matahari_netd_t, matahari_rpcd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), matahari(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/mcelog_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mcelog_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7292383 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mcelog_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.TH "mcelog_selinux" "8" "mcelog" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mcelog SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mcelog_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mcelog processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B mcelog +(policy for mcelog) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mcelog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mcelog processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mcelog: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mcelog_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mcelog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mcelog_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mcelog_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mcelog_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mcelog log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mcelog_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mcelog_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mcelog files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mcelog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mcelog processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mcelog: + +.EX +.B mcelog_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mcelog(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/mdadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mdadm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ab79be5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mdadm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +.TH "mdadm_selinux" "8" "mdadm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mdadm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mdadm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mdadm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mdadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mdadm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mdadm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mdadm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mdadm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mdadm_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/raid-check, /sbin/mdmpd, /usr/sbin/iprinit, /usr/sbin/mdadm, /usr/sbin/iprupdate, /sbin/mdadm, /usr/sbin/mdmpd, /usr/sbin/iprdump + +.EX +.PP +.B mdadm_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mdadm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mdadm files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/mdadm(/.*)?, /dev/md/.*, /dev/.mdadm\.map + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mdadm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mdadm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mdadm: + +.EX +.B mdadm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mdadm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/memcached_selinux.8 b/man/man8/memcached_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..62d286c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/memcached_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,138 @@ +.TH "memcached_selinux" "8" "memcached" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "memcached SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +memcached_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the memcached processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B memcached +(high-performance memory object caching system) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. memcached policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run memcached with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to connect to memcache serve, you must turn on the httpd_can_network_memcache boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_network_memcache 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux memcached policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their memcached processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for memcached: + + +.EX +.PP +.B memcached_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the memcached_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the memcached_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B memcached_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the memcached_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the memcached_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B memcached_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the memcached_var_run_t type, if you want to store the memcached files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/ipa_memcached(/.*)?, /var/run/memcached(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux memcached policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their memcached processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for memcached: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B memcache_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux memcached policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their memcached processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for memcached: + +.EX +.B memcached_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), memcached(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/mencoder_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mencoder_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aa093ee --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mencoder_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "mencoder_selinux" "8" "mencoder" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mencoder SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mencoder_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mencoder processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mencoder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mencoder processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mencoder: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mencoder_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mencoder_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mencoder_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mencoder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mencoder processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mencoder: + +.EX +.B mencoder_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mencoder(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/mock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mock_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7cc7e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mock_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ +.TH "mock_selinux" "8" "mock" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mock SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mock processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B mock +(policy for mock) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mock policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mock with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow mock to read files in home directories, you must turn on the mock_enable_homedirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P mock_enable_homedirs 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mock: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mock_build_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mock_build_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mock_build_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mock_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mock_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mock_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mock_etc_t type, if you want to store mock files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mock_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mock_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mock_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mock_tmp_t type, if you want to store mock temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mock_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mock_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mock files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mock: + +.EX +.B mock_t, mock_build_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/modemmanager_selinux.8 b/man/man8/modemmanager_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3772dfe --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/modemmanager_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "modemmanager_selinux" "8" "modemmanager" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "modemmanager SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +modemmanager_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the modemmanager processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B modemmanager +(Provides a DBus interface to communicate with mobile broadband (GSM, CDMA, UMTS, ...) cards) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux modemmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their modemmanager processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for modemmanager: + + +.EX +.PP +.B modemmanager_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the modemmanager_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the modemmanager_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux modemmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their modemmanager processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for modemmanager: + +.EX +.B modemmanager_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), modemmanager(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/mongod_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mongod_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7282fb2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mongod_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +.TH "mongod_selinux" "8" "mongod" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mongod SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mongod_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mongod processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mongod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mongod processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mongod: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mongod_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mongod_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mongod_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/mongod, /usr/share/aeolus-conductor/dbomatic/dbomatic + +.EX +.PP +.B mongod_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mongod_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mongod_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mongod_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mongod_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mongod log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mongod_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mongod_tmp_t type, if you want to store mongod temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mongod_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mongod_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mongod files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mongod_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mongod_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mongod files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/mongodb(/.*)?, /var/run/aeolus/dbomatic\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux mongod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mongod processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for mongod: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B mongod_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mongod policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mongod processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mongod: + +.EX +.B mongod_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mongod(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/mount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mount_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9744fa7 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mount_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +.TH "mount_selinux" "8" "mount" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mount SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mount processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B mount +(Policy for mount) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mount policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mount with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow the mount command to mount any directory or file, you must turn on the allow_mount_anyfile boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_mount_anyfile 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable medi, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mount processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mount: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mount_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mount_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/mount.*, /sbin/umount.*, /usr/bin/umount.*, /usr/sbin/umount.*, /bin/umount.*, /usr/bin/mount.*, /bin/mount.*, /usr/sbin/mount.* + +.EX +.PP +.B mount_loopback_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mount_loopback_t type, if you want to treat the files as mount loopback data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mount_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mount_tmp_t type, if you want to store mount temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mount_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mount_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mount files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/run/mount(/.*)?, /dev/\.mount(/.*)?, /var/run/mount(/.*)?, /var/run/davfs2(/.*)?, /var/cache/davfs2(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mount processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mount: + +.EX +.B mount_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/mozilla_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mozilla_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2b94a8b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mozilla_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,179 @@ +.TH "mozilla_selinux" "8" "mozilla" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mozilla SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mozilla_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mozilla processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B mozilla +(Policy for Mozilla and related web browsers) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mozilla policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mozilla with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow confined web browsers to read home directory conten, you must turn on the mozilla_read_content boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P mozilla_read_content 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mozilla policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mozilla: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as mozilla configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox, /usr/lib/galeon/galeon, /usr/lib/netscape/.+/communicator/communicator-smotif\.real, /usr/bin/netscape, /usr/bin/mozilla-bin-[0-9].*, /usr/bin/epiphany-bin, /usr/lib/mozilla[^/]*/reg.+, /usr/lib/netscape/base-4/wrapper, /usr/bin/mozilla-snapshot, /usr/lib/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox-bin, /usr/bin/mozilla-[0-9].*, /usr/lib/firefox[^/]*/mozilla-.*, /usr/lib/mozilla[^/]*/mozilla-.*, /usr/bin/mozilla, /usr/bin/epiphany + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_home_t type, if you want to store mozilla files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_plugin_config_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mozilla_plugin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/nspluginscan, /usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/npviewer.bin, /usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/plugin-container, /usr/bin/nspluginviewer + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_plugin_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as mozilla plugin read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_plugin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store mozilla plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mozilla plugin files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_tmp_t type, if you want to store mozilla temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mozilla_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mozilla_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mozilla files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mozilla policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mozilla processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mozilla: + +.EX +.B mozilla_t, mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mozilla(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/mpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mpd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..76210f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mpd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,206 @@ +.TH "mpd_selinux" "8" "mpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mpd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mpd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B mpd +(Music Player Daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mpd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow mplayer executable stac, you must turn on the allow_mplayer_execstack boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_mplayer_execstack 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow all daemons to write corefiles to , you must turn on the allow_daemons_dump_core boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_daemons_dump_core 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Apache to execute tmp content, you must turn on the httpd_tmp_exec boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_tmp_exec 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfine, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt, you must turn on the allow_gssd_read_tmp boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_gssd_read_tmp 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mpd_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mpd_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as mpd content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/mpd/playlists(/.*)?, /var/lib/mpd/music(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B mpd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mpd_etc_t type, if you want to store mpd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mpd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mpd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mpd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store mpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mpd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mpd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mpd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mpd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mpd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux mpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for mpd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B mpd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mpd: + +.EX +.B mpd_t, mplayer_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/mplayer_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mplayer_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0098b19 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mplayer_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +.TH "mplayer_selinux" "8" "mplayer" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mplayer SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mplayer_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mplayer processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B mplayer +(Mplayer media player and encoder) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mplayer policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mplayer with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow mplayer executable stac, you must turn on the allow_mplayer_execstack boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_mplayer_execstack 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfine, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mplayer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mplayer processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mplayer: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mplayer_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mplayer_etc_t type, if you want to store mplayer files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mplayer_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mplayer_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mplayer_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/vlc, /usr/bin/mplayer, /usr/bin/xine + +.EX +.PP +.B mplayer_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mplayer_home_t type, if you want to store mplayer files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mplayer_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mplayer_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store mplayer files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mplayer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mplayer processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mplayer: + +.EX +.B mplayer_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mplayer(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/mrtg_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mrtg_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ca59e6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mrtg_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.TH "mrtg_selinux" "8" "mrtg" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mrtg SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mrtg_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mrtg processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B mrtg +(Network traffic graphing) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mrtg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mrtg processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mrtg: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mrtg_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mrtg_etc_t type, if you want to store mrtg files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mrtg_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mrtg_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mrtg_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mrtg_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mrtg_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as mrtg lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lock/mrtg(/.*)?, /etc/mrtg/mrtg\.ok + +.EX +.PP +.B mrtg_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mrtg_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mrtg log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mrtg_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mrtg_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the mrtg files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mrtg_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mrtg_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mrtg files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mrtg policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mrtg processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mrtg: + +.EX +.B mrtg_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mrtg(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/mscan_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mscan_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b9091c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mscan_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ +.TH "mscan_selinux" "8" "mscan" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mscan SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mscan_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mscan processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mscan policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mscan with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow clamscan to read user conten, you must turn on the clamscan_read_user_content boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P clamscan_read_user_content 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mscan processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mscan: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mscan_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mscan_etc_t type, if you want to store mscan files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/sysconfig/MailScanner, /etc/MailScanner(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/update_spamassassin + +.EX +.PP +.B mscan_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mscan_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mscan_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mscan_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mscan_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mscan_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mscan_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mscan_tmp_t type, if you want to store mscan temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mscan_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mscan_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mscan files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mscan policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mscan processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mscan: + +.EX +.B mscan_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mscan(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/munin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/munin_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17b161d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/munin_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +.TH "munin_selinux" "8" "munin" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "munin SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +munin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the munin processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B munin +(Munin network-wide load graphing (formerly LRRD)) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux munin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their munin processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for munin: + + +.EX +.PP +.B munin_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the munin_etc_t type, if you want to store munin files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B munin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the munin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the munin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/munin-.*, /usr/share/munin/munin-.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/.*, /usr/bin/munin-.* + +.EX +.PP +.B munin_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the munin_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the munin_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B munin_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the munin_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as munin log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B munin_plugin_state_t +.EE + +- Set files with the munin_plugin_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as munin plugin state data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B munin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the munin_tmp_t type, if you want to store munin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B munin_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the munin_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the munin files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B munin_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the munin_var_run_t type, if you want to store the munin files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux munin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their munin processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for munin: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B munin_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux munin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their munin processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for munin: + +.EX +.B munin_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), munin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/mysqld_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mysqld_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f5bb25 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mysqld_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,214 @@ +.TH "mysqld_selinux" "8" "mysqld" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mysqld SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mysqld_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mysqld processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. mysqld policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run mysqld with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql serve, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow mysqld to connect to all port, you must turn on the mysql_connect_any boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P mysql_connect_any 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mysqld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mysqld: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_db_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as mysqld database content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_etc_t type, if you want to store mysqld files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/my\.cnf, /etc/mysql(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/mysqld, /usr/sbin/mysqld(-max)? + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_home_t type, if you want to store mysqld files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as mysqld log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_safe_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_safe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqld_safe_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_tmp_t type, if you want to store mysqld temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as mysqld unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqld_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mysqld files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/mysqld(/.*)?, /var/lib/mysql/mysql\.sock + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux mysqld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for mysqld: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B mysqld_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B mysqlmanagerd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mysqld policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqld processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mysqld: + +.EX +.B mysqld_safe_t, mysqlmanagerd_t, mysqld_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mysqld(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/mysqlmanagerd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/mysqlmanagerd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6bce1f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/mysqlmanagerd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "mysqlmanagerd_selinux" "8" "mysqlmanagerd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "mysqlmanagerd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +mysqlmanagerd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the mysqlmanagerd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux mysqlmanagerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqlmanagerd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for mysqlmanagerd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqlmanagerd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqlmanagerd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqlmanagerd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqlmanagerd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqlmanagerd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the mysqlmanagerd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B mysqlmanagerd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the mysqlmanagerd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the mysqlmanagerd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux mysqlmanagerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqlmanagerd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for mysqlmanagerd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B mysqlmanagerd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux mysqlmanagerd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their mysqlmanagerd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for mysqlmanagerd: + +.EX +.B mysqlmanagerd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), mysqlmanagerd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/nagios_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nagios_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1343c2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nagios_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,225 @@ +.TH "nagios_selinux" "8" "nagios" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nagios SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nagios_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nagios processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B nagios +(Net Saint / NAGIOS - network monitoring server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nagios policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nagios: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_admin_plugin_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_linux_raid, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_disk_smb, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ide_smart, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_disk + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_etc_t type, if you want to store nagios files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios eventhandler plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nagios, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nrpe + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nagios log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/netsaint(/.*)?, /var/log/nagios(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_mail_plugin_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_services_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_services_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_services_plugin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_time, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dhcp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_radius, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nrpe, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_smtp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_sip, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ssh, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_pgsql, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ntp.*, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ldap, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_real, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ping, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nt, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_game, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_breeze, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_tcp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_rpc, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_oracle, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_cluster, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dummy, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ups, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ircd, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dig, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_fping, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_hpjd, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mysql, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_icmp, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_http, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_snmp.*, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mysql_query, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dns + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_spool_t type, if you want to store the nagios files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_system_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_system_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_system_plugin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_log, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_load, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_flexlm, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_swap, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_users, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ifstatus, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ifoperstatus, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nagios, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_sensors, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_wave, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mrtgtraf, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nwstat, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_procs, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mrtg, /usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_overcr + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios system plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_tmp_t type, if you want to store nagios temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nagios_unconfined_plugin_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the nagios files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nagios_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nagios_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nagios files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nagios policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nagios processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nagios: + +.EX +.B nagios_t, nagios_mail_plugin_t, nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t, nagios_services_plugin_t, nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_unconfined_plugin_t, nagios_admin_plugin_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nagios(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/named_selinux.8 b/man/man8/named_selinux.8 index fce0b48..653c29b 100644 --- a/man/man8/named_selinux.8 +++ b/man/man8/named_selinux.8 @@ -1,30 +1,211 @@ -.TH "named_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "named Selinux Policy documentation" -.de EX -.nf -.ft CW -.. -.de EE -.ft R -.fi -.. +.TH "named_selinux" "8" "named" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "named SELinux Policy documentation" .SH "NAME" -named_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the Internet Name server (named) daemon +named_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the named processes .SH "DESCRIPTION" -Security-Enhanced Linux secures the named server via flexible mandatory access + +SELinux Linux secures +.B named +(Berkeley internet name domain DNS server) +processes via flexible mandatory access control. + + + .SH BOOLEANS -SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. So by -default SELinux policy does not allow named to write master zone files. If you want to have named update the master zone files you need to set the named_write_master_zones boolean. +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. named policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run named with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow BIND to write the master zone files. Generally this is used for dynamic DNS or zone transfers, you must turn on the named_write_master_zones boolean. + .EX -setsebool -P named_write_master_zones 1 +.B setsebool -P named_write_master_zones 1 .EE + .PP -system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. -.SH AUTHOR -This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . +If you want to allow BIND to bind apache port, you must turn on the named_bind_http_port boolean. -.SH "SEE ALSO" -selinux(8), named(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8) +.EX +.B setsebool -P named_bind_http_port 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux named policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their named processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for named: + + +.EX +.PP +.B named_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/named/chroot/var/named/data(/.*)?, /var/named/chroot/var/tmp(/.*)?, /var/named/data(/.*)?, /var/named/chroot/var/named/slaves(/.*)?, /var/named/dynamic(/.*)?, /var/named/slaves(/.*)?, /var/named/chroot/var/named/dynamic(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B named_checkconf_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_checkconf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the named_checkconf_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B named_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as named configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/named/chroot/etc/named\.root\.hints, /etc/named\.root\.hints, /var/named/chroot(/.*)?, /var/named/named\.ca, /etc/unbound(/.*)?, /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.caching-nameserver\.conf, /etc/named\.rfc1912.zones, /etc/named\.caching-nameserver\.conf, /etc/named\.conf, /var/named/chroot/var/named/named\.ca, /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.conf, /etc/rndc.*, /var/named/chroot/etc/named\.rfc1912.zones + +.EX +.PP +.B named_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the named_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/lwresd, /usr/sbin/named, /usr/sbin/unbound + +.EX +.PP +.B named_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the named_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/named, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/unbound + +.EX +.PP +.B named_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B named_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as named log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/named.*, /var/named/chroot/var/log/named.* + +.EX +.PP +.B named_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_tmp_t type, if you want to store named temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B named_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as named unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/named.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/named.service, /lib/systemd/system/unbound.service, /lib/systemd/system/unbound-keygen.service + +.EX +.PP +.B named_var_run_t +.EE +- Set files with the named_var_run_t type, if you want to store the named files under the /run directory. +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/named/chroot/var/run/named.*, /var/run/ndc, /var/run/bind(/.*)?, /var/run/named(/.*)?, /var/run/unbound(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B named_zone_t +.EE + +- Set files with the named_zone_t type, if you want to treat the files as named zone data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/named/chroot/var/named(/.*)?, /var/named(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux named policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their named processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for named: + +.EX +.B named_t, namespace_init_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), named(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/namespace_selinux.8 b/man/man8/namespace_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7572442 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/namespace_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "namespace_selinux" "8" "namespace" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "namespace SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +namespace_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the namespace processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B namespace +(policy for namespace) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux namespace policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their namespace processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for namespace: + + +.EX +.PP +.B namespace_init_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the namespace_init_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the namespace_init_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux namespace policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their namespace processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for namespace: + +.EX +.B namespace_init_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), namespace(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ncftool_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ncftool_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..394997f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ncftool_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "ncftool_selinux" "8" "ncftool" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ncftool SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ncftool_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ncftool processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ncftool +(Netcf network configuration tool (ncftool)) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ncftool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ncftool processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ncftool: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ncftool_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ncftool_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ncftool_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ncftool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ncftool processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ncftool: + +.EX +.B ncftool_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ncftool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ndc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ndc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe49fef --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ndc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "ndc_selinux" "8" "ndc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ndc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ndc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ndc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ndc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ndc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ndc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ndc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ndc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ndc_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ndc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ndc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ndc: + +.EX +.B ndc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ndc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/netlabel_selinux.8 b/man/man8/netlabel_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d7e496 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/netlabel_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "netlabel_selinux" "8" "netlabel" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "netlabel SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +netlabel_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the netlabel processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B netlabel +(NetLabel/CIPSO labeled networking management) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux netlabel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlabel processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for netlabel: + + +.EX +.PP +.B netlabel_mgmt_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the netlabel_mgmt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the netlabel_mgmt_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/netlabelctl, /usr/sbin/netlabelctl + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux netlabel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlabel processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for netlabel: + +.EX +.B netlabel_mgmt_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), netlabel(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/netlogond_selinux.8 b/man/man8/netlogond_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e7dc32 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/netlogond_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +.TH "netlogond_selinux" "8" "netlogond" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "netlogond SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +netlogond_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the netlogond processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux netlogond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlogond processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for netlogond: + + +.EX +.PP +.B netlogond_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the netlogond_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the netlogond_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B netlogond_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the netlogond_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the netlogond files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/likewise-open/krb5-affinity.conf, /var/lib/likewise-open/LWNetsd\.err + +.EX +.PP +.B netlogond_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the netlogond_var_run_t type, if you want to store the netlogond files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B netlogond_var_socket_t +.EE + +- Set files with the netlogond_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as netlogond var socket data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux netlogond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netlogond processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for netlogond: + +.EX +.B netlogond_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), netlogond(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/netutils_selinux.8 b/man/man8/netutils_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..55eb6c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/netutils_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +.TH "netutils_selinux" "8" "netutils" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "netutils SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +netutils_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the netutils processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B netutils +(Network analysis utilities) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux netutils policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netutils processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for netutils: + + +.EX +.PP +.B netutils_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the netutils_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the netutils_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/arping, /usr/sbin/arping, /usr/sbin/tcpdump + +.EX +.PP +.B netutils_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the netutils_tmp_t type, if you want to store netutils temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux netutils policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their netutils processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for netutils: + +.EX +.B netutils_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), netutils(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/newrole_selinux.8 b/man/man8/newrole_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bdc4376 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/newrole_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "newrole_selinux" "8" "newrole" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "newrole SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +newrole_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the newrole processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux newrole policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their newrole processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for newrole: + + +.EX +.PP +.B newrole_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the newrole_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the newrole_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux newrole policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their newrole processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for newrole: + +.EX +.B newrole_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), newrole(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/nfsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nfsd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e664bc1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nfsd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,284 @@ +.TH "nfsd_selinux" "8" "nfsd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nfsd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nfsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nfsd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. nfsd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run nfsd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow xen to manage nfs file, you must turn on the xen_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xen_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs file, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow ftp servers to use nfs used for public file transfer services, you must turn on the allow_ftpd_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_ftpd_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Git daemon system to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow qemu to use nfs file system, you must turn on the qemu_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P qemu_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow rsync servers to share nfs files system, you must turn on the rsync_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P rsync_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Cobbler to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the cobbler_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P cobbler_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow httpd to access nfs file system, you must turn on the httpd_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow sge to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the sge_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sge_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow any files/directories to be exported read/write via NFS, you must turn on the nfs_export_all_rw boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P nfs_export_all_rw 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs file, you must turn on the sanlock_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to export NFS volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_share_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to determine whether Polipo can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to support NFS home directorie, you must turn on the use_nfs_home_dirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P use_nfs_home_dirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow any files/directories to be exported read/only via NFS, you must turn on the nfs_export_all_ro boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P nfs_export_all_ro 1 +.EE + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. +.TP +Allow nfsd servers to read the /var/nfsd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/nfsd(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/nfsd +.pp +.TP +Allow nfsd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_nfsd_anon_write boolean to be set. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/nfsd/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/nfsd/incoming + + +.PP +If you want to allow nfs servers to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the allow_nfsd_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_nfsd_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nfsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nfsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nfsd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nfs_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfs data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nfsd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nfsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nfsd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/rpc\.mountd, /usr/sbin/rpc\.nfsd + +.EX +.PP +.B nfsd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nfsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nfsd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nfsd_ro_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nfsd_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfsd read/only content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nfsd_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nfsd_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfsd read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nfsd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nfsd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nfsd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/nfs.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/nfs.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux nfsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nfsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for nfsd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B nfs_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nfsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nfsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nfsd: + +.EX +.B nfsd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nfsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/nginx_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nginx_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..87983d6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nginx_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +.TH "nginx_selinux" "8" "nginx" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nginx SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nginx_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nginx processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nginx policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nginx processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nginx: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nginx_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nginx_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nginx_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nginx_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nginx_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nginx_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nginx_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nginx_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nginx log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nginx_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nginx_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the nginx files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nginx_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nginx_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nginx files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nginx policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nginx processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nginx: + +.EX +.B nginx_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nginx(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/nmbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nmbd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bfcd1db --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nmbd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.TH "nmbd_selinux" "8" "nmbd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nmbd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nmbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nmbd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nmbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nmbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nmbd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nmbd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nmbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nmbd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nmbd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nmbd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nmbd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/samba/messages\.tdb, /var/run/samba/namelist\.debug, /var/run/nmbd(/.*)?, /var/run/samba/unexpected\.tdb, /var/run/samba/nmbd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux nmbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nmbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for nmbd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B nmbd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nmbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nmbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nmbd: + +.EX +.B nmbd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nmbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/nova_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nova_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c55585f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nova_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,365 @@ +.TH "nova_selinux" "8" "nova" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nova SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nova_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nova processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B nova +(openstack-nova) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nova policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nova: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_ajax_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_ajax_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_ajax_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_ajax_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_ajax_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova ajax temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_ajax_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_ajax_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova ajax unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_api_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_api_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_api_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_api_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_api_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova api temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_api_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_api_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova api unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-api\.service, /lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-api\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_cert_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_cert_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_cert_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_cert_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_cert_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova cert temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_cert_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_cert_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova cert unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-cert\.service, /lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-cert\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_compute_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_compute_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_compute_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_compute_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_compute_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova compute temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_compute_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_compute_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova compute unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_direct_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_direct_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_direct_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_direct_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_direct_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova direct temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_direct_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_direct_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova direct unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-ajax-console-proxy\.service, /lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-direct-api\.service, /lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-ajax-console-proxy\.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-direct-api\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nova log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_network_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_network_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_network_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_network_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_network_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova network temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_network_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_network_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova network unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-network\.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-network\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_objectstore_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_objectstore_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_objectstore_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_objectstore_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_objectstore_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova objectstore temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_objectstore_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_objectstore_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova objectstore unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-objectstore\.service, /lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-objectstore\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_scheduler_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_scheduler_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_scheduler_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_scheduler_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_scheduler_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova scheduler temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_scheduler_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_scheduler_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova scheduler unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-scheduler\.service, /lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-scheduler\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the nova files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nova files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_vncproxy_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_vncproxy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_vncproxy_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_vncproxy_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_vncproxy_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova vncproxy temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_vncproxy_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_vncproxy_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova vncproxy unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-vncproxy\.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-vncproxy\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_volume_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_volume_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nova_volume_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_volume_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_volume_tmp_t type, if you want to store nova volume temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nova_volume_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nova_volume_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nova volume unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-volume\.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-volume\.service + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nova policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nova processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nova: + +.EX +.B nova_api_t, nova_compute_t, nova_network_t, nova_objectstore_t, nova_vncproxy_t, nova_volume_t, nova_scheduler_t, nova_ajax_t, nova_cert_t, nova_direct_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nova(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/nrpe_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nrpe_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f6a3c05 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nrpe_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +.TH "nrpe_selinux" "8" "nrpe" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nrpe SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nrpe_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nrpe processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nrpe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nrpe processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nrpe: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nrpe_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nrpe_etc_t type, if you want to store nrpe files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nrpe_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nrpe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nrpe_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nrpe_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nrpe_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nrpe files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nrpe policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nrpe processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nrpe: + +.EX +.B nrpe_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nrpe(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/nscd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nscd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..01045df --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nscd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,128 @@ +.TH "nscd_selinux" "8" "nscd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nscd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nscd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nscd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B nscd +(Name service cache daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. nscd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run nscd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow confined applications to use nscd shared memory, you must turn on the nscd_use_shm boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P nscd_use_shm 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nscd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nscd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nscd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nscd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nscd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nscd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nscd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nscd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nscd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nscd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as nscd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nscd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nscd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as nscd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nscd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nscd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nscd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/nscd\.pid, /var/run/nscd(/.*)?, /var/db/nscd(/.*)?, /var/run/\.nscd_socket, /var/cache/nscd(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nscd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nscd: + +.EX +.B nscd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nscd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/nslcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nslcd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9a427d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nslcd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "nslcd_selinux" "8" "nslcd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nslcd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nslcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nslcd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B nslcd +(nslcd - local LDAP name service daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nslcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nslcd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nslcd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nslcd_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nslcd_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as nslcd configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nslcd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nslcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nslcd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nslcd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nslcd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nslcd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nslcd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nslcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nslcd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nslcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nslcd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nslcd: + +.EX +.B nslcd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nslcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ntop_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ntop_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb7f3a4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ntop_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ +.TH "ntop_selinux" "8" "ntop" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ntop SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ntop_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ntop processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ntop +(Network Top) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ntop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntop processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ntop: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntop_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntop_etc_t type, if you want to store ntop files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntop_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntop_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntop_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntop_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntop_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntop_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntop_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntop_tmp_t type, if you want to store ntop temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntop_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntop_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ntop files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntop_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntop_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ntop files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ntop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntop processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ntop: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ntop_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ntop policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntop processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ntop: + +.EX +.B ntop_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ntop(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ntpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ntpd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..515419d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ntpd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +.TH "ntpd_selinux" "8" "ntpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ntpd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ntpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ntpd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ntpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ntpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntp_drift_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntp_drift_t type, if you want to treat the files as ntp drift data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/ntp(/.*)?, /etc/ntp/data(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B ntpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntpd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ntpd, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly)/ntp-server, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly)/ntp-simple + +.EX +.PP +.B ntpd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntpd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntpd_key_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntpd_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as ntpd key data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/ntp/crypto(/.*)?, /etc/ntp/keys + +.EX +.PP +.B ntpd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ntpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/ntpstats(/.*)?, /var/log/xntpd.*, /var/log/ntp.* + +.EX +.PP +.B ntpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store ntpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntpd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntpd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ntpd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntpd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntpd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ntpd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/ntpd\.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/ntpd\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B ntpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ntpd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ntpdate_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ntpdate_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ntpdate_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ntpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ntpd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ntp_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ntpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ntpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ntpd: + +.EX +.B ntpd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ntpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/numad_selinux.8 b/man/man8/numad_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a63255 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/numad_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "numad_selinux" "8" "numad" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "numad SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +numad_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the numad processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B numad +(policy for numad) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux numad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their numad processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for numad: + + +.EX +.PP +.B numad_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the numad_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the numad_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B numad_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the numad_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as numad unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B numad_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the numad_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as numad var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B numad_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the numad_var_run_t type, if you want to store the numad files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux numad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their numad processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for numad: + +.EX +.B numad_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), numad(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/nut_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nut_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe354e5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nut_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "nut_selinux" "8" "nut" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nut SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nut_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nut processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B nut +(nut - Network UPS Tools ) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nut policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nut: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nut_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nut_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as nut configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nut_upsd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nut_upsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsdrvctl_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/upsdrvctl, /sbin/upsdrvctl + +.EX +.PP +.B nut_upsmon_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nut_upsmon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nut_upsmon_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nut_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nut_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nut files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nut policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nut processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nut: + +.EX +.B nut_upsd_t, nut_upsmon_t, nut_upsdrvctl_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nut(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/nx_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nx_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef2c5aa --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nx_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.TH "nx_selinux" "8" "nx" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "nx SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nx_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the nx processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B nx +(NX remote desktop) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux nx policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nx processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for nx: + + +.EX +.PP +.B nx_server_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nx_server_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the nx_server_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/opt/NX/bin/nxserver, /usr/NX/bin/nxserver, /usr/libexec/nx/nxserver + +.EX +.PP +.B nx_server_home_ssh_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nx_server_home_ssh_t type, if you want to treat the files as nx server home ssh data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/opt/NX/home/nx/\.ssh(/.*)?, /usr/NX/home/nx/\.ssh(/.*)?, /var/lib/nxserver/home/.ssh(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B nx_server_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nx_server_tmp_t type, if you want to store nx server temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B nx_server_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nx_server_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the nx server files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/NX/home(/.*)?, /opt/NX/home(/.*)?, /var/lib/nxserver(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B nx_server_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the nx_server_var_run_t type, if you want to store the nx server files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux nx policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their nx processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for nx: + +.EX +.B nx_server_t, nx_server_ssh_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), nx(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/nx_server_selinux.8 b/man/man8/nx_server_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2746ea3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/nx_server_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +.TH "nx_server_selinux" "8" "nx_server" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "nx_server SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +nx_server_r \- \fBnx_server user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to. + +Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user. + +Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. + +Roles usually have default types assigned to them. + +The default type for the nx_server_r role is nx_server_t. + +You can use the +.B newrole +program to transition directly to this role. + +.B newrole -r nx_server_r -t nx_server_t + +.B sudo +can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command. + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=nx_server_r TYPE=nx_server_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:nx_server_r:nx_server_t:LEVEL + +If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role. + +You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following + +.B semanage user -l + +If you wanted to add nx_server_r to the staff_u user, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r nx_server_r' staff_u + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/obex_selinux.8 b/man/man8/obex_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a6b6598 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/obex_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "obex_selinux" "8" "obex" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "obex SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +obex_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the obex processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B obex +(SELinux policy for obex-data-server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux obex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their obex processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for obex: + + +.EX +.PP +.B obex_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the obex_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the obex_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux obex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their obex processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for obex: + +.EX +.B obex_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), obex(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/oddjob_selinux.8 b/man/man8/oddjob_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..88a1ce7 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/oddjob_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "oddjob_selinux" "8" "oddjob" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "oddjob SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +oddjob_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the oddjob processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B oddjob +( +Oddjob provides a mechanism by which unprivileged applications can +request that specified privileged operations be performed on their +behalf. +) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux oddjob policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their oddjob processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for oddjob: + + +.EX +.PP +.B oddjob_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the oddjob_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the oddjob_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the oddjob_mkhomedir_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/oddjob/mkhomedir, /usr/lib/oddjob/mkhomedir + +.EX +.PP +.B oddjob_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the oddjob_var_run_t type, if you want to store the oddjob files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux oddjob policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their oddjob processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for oddjob: + +.EX +.B oddjob_mkhomedir_t, oddjob_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), oddjob(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/openct_selinux.8 b/man/man8/openct_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b21e586 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/openct_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +.TH "openct_selinux" "8" "openct" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "openct SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +openct_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the openct processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B openct +(Service for handling smart card readers) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux openct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openct processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for openct: + + +.EX +.PP +.B openct_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the openct_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openct_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ifdhandler, /usr/sbin/openct-control + +.EX +.PP +.B openct_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the openct_var_run_t type, if you want to store the openct files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux openct policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openct processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for openct: + +.EX +.B openct_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), openct(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/openvpn_selinux.8 b/man/man8/openvpn_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9a9b8b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/openvpn_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,166 @@ +.TH "openvpn_selinux" "8" "openvpn" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "openvpn SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +openvpn_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the openvpn processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B openvpn +(full-featured SSL VPN solution) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. openvpn policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run openvpn with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow openvpn to read home directorie, you must turn on the openvpn_enable_homedirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P openvpn_enable_homedirs 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux openvpn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openvpn processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for openvpn: + + +.EX +.PP +.B openvpn_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the openvpn_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as openvpn etc read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B openvpn_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the openvpn_etc_t type, if you want to store openvpn files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B openvpn_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the openvpn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openvpn_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B openvpn_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the openvpn_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the openvpn_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B openvpn_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the openvpn_tmp_t type, if you want to store openvpn temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B openvpn_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the openvpn_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as openvpn var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B openvpn_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the openvpn_var_run_t type, if you want to store the openvpn files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux openvpn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openvpn processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for openvpn: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B openvpn_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux openvpn policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their openvpn processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for openvpn: + +.EX +.B openvpn_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), openvpn(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/pacemaker_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pacemaker_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a43fb5b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pacemaker_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "pacemaker_selinux" "8" "pacemaker" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pacemaker SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pacemaker_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pacemaker processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B pacemaker +(policy for pacemaker) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pacemaker policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pacemaker processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pacemaker: + + +.EX +.PP +.B pacemaker_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pacemaker_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pacemaker_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pacemaker_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pacemaker_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pacemaker_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pacemaker_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pacemaker_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as pacemaker unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pacemaker_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pacemaker_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pacemaker files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/pengine(/.*)?, /var/lib/heartbeat/crm(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pacemaker_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pacemaker_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pacemaker files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pacemaker policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pacemaker processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pacemaker: + +.EX +.B pacemaker_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pacemaker(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/pads_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pads_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2bc8e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pads_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.TH "pads_selinux" "8" "pads" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pads SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pads_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pads processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B pads +(Passive Asset Detection System) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pads policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pads processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pads: + + +.EX +.PP +.B pads_config_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pads_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as pads configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/pads-assets.csv, /etc/pads-ether-codes, /etc/pads\.conf, /etc/pads-signature-list + +.EX +.PP +.B pads_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pads_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pads_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pads_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pads_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pads_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pads_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pads_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pads files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pads policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pads processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pads: + +.EX +.B pads_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pads(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/passenger_selinux.8 b/man/man8/passenger_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..872ce91 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/passenger_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "passenger_selinux" "8" "passenger" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "passenger SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +passenger_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the passenger processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B passenger +(Ruby on rails deployment for Apache and Nginx servers) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux passenger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passenger processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for passenger: + + +.EX +.PP +.B passenger_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the passenger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the passenger_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/PassengerLoggingAgent, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/apache2/PassengerHelperAgent, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/agents/PassengerWatchdog, /usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/passenger-.*/ext/apache2/ApplicationPoolServerExecutable + +.EX +.PP +.B passenger_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the passenger_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as passenger log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/passenger.*, /var/log/passenger(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B passenger_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the passenger_tmp_t type, if you want to store passenger temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B passenger_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the passenger_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the passenger files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B passenger_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the passenger_var_run_t type, if you want to store the passenger files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux passenger policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passenger processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for passenger: + +.EX +.B passenger_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), passenger(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/passwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/passwd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71d4cc4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/passwd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +.TH "passwd_selinux" "8" "passwd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "passwd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +passwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the passwd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux passwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passwd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for passwd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B passwd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the passwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the passwd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/passwd, /usr/bin/chage + +.EX +.PP +.B passwd_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the passwd_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as passwd content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/passwd\.OLD, /etc/ptmptmp, /etc/passwd-?, /etc/group-? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux passwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their passwd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for passwd: + +.EX +.B passwd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), passwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/pcscd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pcscd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..07f91c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pcscd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +.TH "pcscd_selinux" "8" "pcscd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pcscd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pcscd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pcscd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B pcscd +(PCSC smart card service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pcscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pcscd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pcscd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B pcscd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pcscd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pcscd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pcscd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pcscd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pcscd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/pcscd\.pid, /var/run/pcscd\.comm, /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)?, /var/run/pcscd\.pub, /var/run/pcscd(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pcscd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pcscd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pcscd: + +.EX +.B pcscd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pcscd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/pegasus_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pegasus_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b015c87 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pegasus_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,162 @@ +.TH "pegasus_selinux" "8" "pegasus" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pegasus SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pegasus_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pegasus processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B pegasus +(The Open Group Pegasus CIM/WBEM Server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pegasus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pegasus processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pegasus: + + +.EX +.PP +.B pegasus_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pegasus_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as pegasus configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pegasus_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pegasus_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as pegasus content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/Pegasus/pegasus_current\.conf, /var/lib/Pegasus(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pegasus_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pegasus_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pegasus_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/init_repository, /usr/sbin/cimserver + +.EX +.PP +.B pegasus_mof_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pegasus_mof_t type, if you want to treat the files as pegasus mof data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pegasus_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pegasus_tmp_t type, if you want to store pegasus temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pegasus_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pegasus_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pegasus files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux pegasus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pegasus processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for pegasus: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pegasus_http_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pegasus_https_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pegasus policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pegasus processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pegasus: + +.EX +.B pegasus_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pegasus(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ping_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ping_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bda0235 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ping_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +.TH "ping_selinux" "8" "ping" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ping SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ping_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ping processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ping policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ping with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to control users use of ping and tracerout, you must turn on the user_ping boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ping 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ping processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ping: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ping_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ping_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ping_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/ping.*, /usr/sbin/hping2, /usr/sbin/fping.*, /bin/ping.*, /usr/sbin/send_arp + +.EX +.PP +.B pingd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pingd_etc_t type, if you want to store pingd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pingd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pingd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pingd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pingd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pingd_modules_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pingd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as pingd modules. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ping processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ping: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pingd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ping processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ping: + +.EX +.B ping_t, pingd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ping(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/pingd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pingd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1259587 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pingd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +.TH "pingd_selinux" "8" "pingd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pingd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pingd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pingd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B pingd +(Pingd of the Whatsup cluster node up/down detection utility) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. pingd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run pingd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to control users use of ping and tracerout, you must turn on the user_ping boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ping 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pingd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pingd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pingd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ping_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ping_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ping_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/ping.*, /usr/sbin/hping2, /usr/sbin/fping.*, /bin/ping.*, /usr/sbin/send_arp + +.EX +.PP +.B pingd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pingd_etc_t type, if you want to store pingd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pingd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pingd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pingd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pingd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pingd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pingd_modules_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pingd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as pingd modules. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux pingd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pingd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for pingd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pingd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pingd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pingd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pingd: + +.EX +.B ping_t, pingd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pingd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/piranha_selinux.8 b/man/man8/piranha_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbd1451 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/piranha_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,238 @@ +.TH "piranha_selinux" "8" "piranha" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "piranha SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +piranha_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the piranha processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B piranha +(policy for piranha) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. piranha policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run piranha with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow piranha-lvs domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the piranha_lvs_can_network_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P piranha_lvs_can_network_connect 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux piranha policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for piranha: + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as piranha etc read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_fos_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_fos_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_fos_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_fos_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_fos_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha fos files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as piranha log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_lvs_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_lvs_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_lvs_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_lvs_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_lvs_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha lvs files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_pulse_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_pulse_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_pulse_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_pulse_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_pulse_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_pulse_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha pulse files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_web_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_web_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as piranha web configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/luci/etc(/.*)?, /var/lib/luci/cert(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_web_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_web_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as piranha web content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_web_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_web_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the piranha_web_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/piranha_gui, /usr/bin/paster + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_web_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_web_tmp_t type, if you want to store piranha web temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_web_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_web_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store piranha web files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B piranha_web_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the piranha_web_var_run_t type, if you want to store the piranha web files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux piranha policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for piranha: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B piranha_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux piranha policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their piranha processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for piranha: + +.EX +.B piranha_pulse_t, piranha_fos_t, piranha_lvs_t, piranha_web_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), piranha(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/pki_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pki_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2272c46 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pki_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,504 @@ +.TH "pki_selinux" "8" "pki" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pki SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pki_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pki processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pki policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pki: + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ca_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ca_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki ca etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/pki-ca(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/pki/ca(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ca_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ca_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ca_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ca_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ca_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki ca log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ca_tomcat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ca_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ca_tomcat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ca_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ca_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki ca files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ca_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ca_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki ca files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/pki-ca.pid, /var/run/pki/ca(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_common_dev_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_common_dev_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki common dev data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_common_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_common_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki common data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_kra_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_kra_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki kra etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/pki-kra(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/pki/kra(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_kra_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_kra_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_kra_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_kra_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_kra_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki kra log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_kra_tomcat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_kra_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_kra_tomcat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_kra_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_kra_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki kra files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_kra_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_kra_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki kra files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/pki-kra.pid, /var/run/pki/kra(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ocsp_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ocsp_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki ocsp etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/pki-ocsp(/.*)?, /etc/sysconfig/pki/ocsp(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ocsp_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ocsp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ocsp_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ocsp_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ocsp_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki ocsp log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ocsp_tomcat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ocsp_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ocsp_tomcat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ocsp_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ocsp_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki ocsp files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ocsp_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ocsp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki ocsp files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/pki-ocsp.pid, /var/run/pki/ocsp(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ra_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ra_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki ra etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/sysconfig/pki/ra(/.*)?, /etc/pki-ra(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ra_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ra_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ra_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ra_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ra_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki ra log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ra_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ra_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ra_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ra_tomcat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ra_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_ra_tomcat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ra_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ra_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki ra files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_ra_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_ra_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki ra files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tks_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tks_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tks etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/sysconfig/pki/tks(/.*)?, /etc/pki-tks(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tks_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tks_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tks_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tks_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tks_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki tks log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tks_tomcat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tks_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tks_tomcat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tks_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tks_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki tks files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tks_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tks_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki tks files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/pki-tks.pid, /var/run/pki/tks(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tps_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tps_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pki tps etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/sysconfig/pki/tps(/.*)?, /etc/pki-tps(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tps_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tps_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tps_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tps_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tps_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pki tps log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tps_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tps_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tps_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tps_tomcat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tps_tomcat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pki_tps_tomcat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tps_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tps_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pki tps files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pki_tps_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pki_tps_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pki tps files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux pki policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for pki: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pki_ca_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pki_kra_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pki_ocsp_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pki_ra_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pki_tks_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pki_tps_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pki policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pki processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pki: + +.EX +.B pki_ca_t, pki_ra_t, pki_ca_script_t, pki_ocsp_t, pki_kra_t, pki_tks_t, pki_tps_t, pki_ocsp_script_t, pki_kra_script_t, pki_tks_script_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pki(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/plymouth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/plymouth_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..581c9cb --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/plymouth_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +.TH "plymouth_selinux" "8" "plymouth" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "plymouth SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +plymouth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the plymouth processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux plymouth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for plymouth: + + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouth_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouth_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/plymouth, /bin/plymouth + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouthd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/plymouthd, /sbin/plymouthd + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_spool_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as plymouthd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux plymouth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for plymouth: + +.EX +.B plymouth_t, plymouthd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), plymouth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/plymouthd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/plymouthd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a9addd8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/plymouthd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "plymouthd_selinux" "8" "plymouthd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "plymouthd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +plymouthd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the plymouthd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B plymouthd +(Plymouth graphical boot) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux plymouthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouthd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for plymouthd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouth_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouth_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/plymouth, /bin/plymouth + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the plymouthd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/plymouthd, /sbin/plymouthd + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_spool_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as plymouthd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B plymouthd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the plymouthd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the plymouthd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux plymouthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their plymouthd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for plymouthd: + +.EX +.B plymouth_t, plymouthd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), plymouthd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/podsleuth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/podsleuth_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..413dd33 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/podsleuth_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.TH "podsleuth_selinux" "8" "podsleuth" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "podsleuth SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +podsleuth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the podsleuth processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B podsleuth +(Podsleuth is a tool to get information about an Apple (TM) iPod (TM)) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux podsleuth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their podsleuth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for podsleuth: + + +.EX +.PP +.B podsleuth_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the podsleuth_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B podsleuth_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the podsleuth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the podsleuth_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/podsleuth, /usr/libexec/hal-podsleuth + +.EX +.PP +.B podsleuth_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the podsleuth_tmp_t type, if you want to store podsleuth temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B podsleuth_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the podsleuth_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store podsleuth files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux podsleuth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their podsleuth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for podsleuth: + +.EX +.B podsleuth_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), podsleuth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/policykit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/policykit_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b14cbf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/policykit_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,153 @@ +.TH "policykit_selinux" "8" "policykit" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "policykit SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +policykit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the policykit processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B policykit +(Policy framework for controlling privileges for system-wide services) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux policykit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for policykit: + + +.EX +.PP +.B policykit_auth_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the policykit_auth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_auth_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/polkit-read-auth-helper, /usr/lib/policykit/polkit-read-auth-helper, /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1 + +.EX +.PP +.B policykit_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the policykit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/polkitd.*, /usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd.*, /usr/lib/policykit/polkitd + +.EX +.PP +.B policykit_grant_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the policykit_grant_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_grant_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/polkit-grant-helper.*, /usr/lib/policykit/polkit-grant-helper.* + +.EX +.PP +.B policykit_reload_t +.EE + +- Set files with the policykit_reload_t type, if you want to treat the files as policykit reload data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B policykit_resolve_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the policykit_resolve_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the policykit_resolve_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/policykit/polkit-resolve-exe-helper.*, /usr/libexec/polkit-resolve-exe-helper.* + +.EX +.PP +.B policykit_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the policykit_tmp_t type, if you want to store policykit temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B policykit_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the policykit_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the policykit files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/PolicyKit-public(/.*)?, /var/lib/PolicyKit(/.*)?, /var/lib/polkit-1(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B policykit_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the policykit_var_run_t type, if you want to store the policykit files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux policykit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their policykit processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for policykit: + +.EX +.B policykit_grant_t, policykit_auth_t, policykit_t, policykit_resolve_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), policykit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/polipo_selinux.8 b/man/man8/polipo_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ada080b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/polipo_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,191 @@ +.TH "polipo_selinux" "8" "polipo" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "polipo SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +polipo_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the polipo processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B polipo +(Caching web proxy) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. polipo policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run polipo with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow polipo to connect to all ports > 102, you must turn on the polipo_connect_all_unreserved boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P polipo_connect_all_unreserved 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to determine whether polipo can access cifs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_cifs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P polipo_use_cifs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to determine whether Polipo session daemon can send syslog messages, you must turn on the polipo_session_send_syslog_msg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P polipo_session_send_syslog_msg 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to determine whether Polipo session daemon can bind tcp sockets to all unreserved ports, you must turn on the polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to determine whether calling user domains can execute Polipo daemon in the polipo_session_t domain, you must turn on the polipo_session_users boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P polipo_session_users 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to determine whether Polipo can access nfs file systems, you must turn on the polipo_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P polipo_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux polipo policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their polipo processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for polipo: + + +.EX +.PP +.B polipo_cache_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the polipo_cache_home_t type, if you want to store polipo cache files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B polipo_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the polipo_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B polipo_config_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the polipo_config_home_t type, if you want to store polipo config files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B polipo_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the polipo_etc_t type, if you want to store polipo files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B polipo_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the polipo_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the polipo_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B polipo_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the polipo_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the polipo_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B polipo_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the polipo_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as polipo log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B polipo_pid_t +.EE + +- Set files with the polipo_pid_t type, if you want to store the polipo files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B polipo_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the polipo_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as polipo unit content. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux polipo policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their polipo processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for polipo: + +.EX +.B polipo_t, polipo_session_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), polipo(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/portmap_selinux.8 b/man/man8/portmap_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7513001 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/portmap_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,150 @@ +.TH "portmap_selinux" "8" "portmap" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "portmap SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +portmap_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the portmap processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B portmap +(RPC port mapping service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. portmap policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run portmap with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to act as a portmappe, you must turn on the samba_portmapper boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_portmapper 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux portmap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for portmap: + + +.EX +.PP +.B portmap_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the portmap_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portmap_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/portmap, /usr/sbin/portmap + +.EX +.PP +.B portmap_helper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the portmap_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portmap_helper_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/pmap_set, /usr/sbin/pmap_dump + +.EX +.PP +.B portmap_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the portmap_tmp_t type, if you want to store portmap temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B portmap_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the portmap_var_run_t type, if you want to store the portmap files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux portmap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for portmap: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B portmap_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux portmap policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portmap processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for portmap: + +.EX +.B portmap_helper_t, portmap_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), portmap(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/portreserve_selinux.8 b/man/man8/portreserve_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..909a5da --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/portreserve_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.TH "portreserve_selinux" "8" "portreserve" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "portreserve SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +portreserve_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the portreserve processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B portreserve +(Reserve well-known ports in the RPC port range) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux portreserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portreserve processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for portreserve: + + +.EX +.PP +.B portreserve_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the portreserve_etc_t type, if you want to store portreserve files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B portreserve_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the portreserve_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portreserve_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/portreserve, /sbin/portreserve + +.EX +.PP +.B portreserve_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the portreserve_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the portreserve_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B portreserve_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the portreserve_var_run_t type, if you want to store the portreserve files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux portreserve policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their portreserve processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for portreserve: + +.EX +.B portreserve_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), portreserve(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/postfix_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postfix_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bb778bf --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/postfix_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,422 @@ +.TH "postfix_selinux" "8" "postfix" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "postfix SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +postfix_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postfix processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B postfix +(Postfix email server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. postfix policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run postfix with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow postfix_local domain full write access to mail_spool directorie, you must turn on the allow_postfix_local_write_mail_spool boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_postfix_local_write_mail_spool 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux postfix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for postfix: + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_bounce_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_bounce_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_bounce_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_bounce_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_bounce_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix bounce temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_cleanup_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_cleanup_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_cleanup_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_cleanup_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_cleanup_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix cleanup temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_etc_t type, if you want to store postfix files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/postfix/postfix-script.*, /usr/libexec/postfix/.* + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_local_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_local_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_local_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_local_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_local_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix local temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_map_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_map_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_map_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_map_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_map_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix map temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_master_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_master_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_master_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/postcat, /usr/sbin/postfix, /usr/libexec/postfix/master, /usr/sbin/postkick, /usr/sbin/postsuper, /usr/sbin/postalias, /usr/sbin/postlock, /usr/sbin/postlog + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_pickup_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_pickup_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_pickup_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_pickup_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_pickup_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix pickup temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_pipe_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_pipe_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_pipe_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_pipe_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_pipe_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix pipe temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_postdrop_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_postdrop_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_postdrop_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_postqueue_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_postqueue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_postqueue_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_private_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_private_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix private data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_prng_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_prng_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix prng data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_public_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_public_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix public data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_qmgr_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_qmgr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_qmgr_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_qmgr_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_qmgr_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix qmgr temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_showq_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_showq_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_showq_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_smtp_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_smtp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_smtp_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/postfix/smtp, /usr/libexec/postfix/scache, /usr/libexec/postfix/lmtp + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_smtp_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_smtp_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix smtp temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_smtpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_smtpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_smtpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_smtpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_smtpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix smtpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_spool_bounce_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_spool_bounce_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix spool bounce data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_spool_flush_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_spool_flush_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix spool flush data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_spool_maildrop_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_spool_maildrop_t type, if you want to treat the files as postfix spool maildrop data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/postfix/defer(/.*)?, /var/spool/postfix/deferred(/.*)?, /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_spool_t type, if you want to store the postfix files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_var_run_t type, if you want to store the postfix files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_virtual_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_virtual_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postfix_virtual_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postfix_virtual_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postfix_virtual_tmp_t type, if you want to store postfix virtual temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux postfix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for postfix: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B postfix_policyd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux postfix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postfix processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for postfix: + +.EX +.B postfix_bounce_t, postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_showq_t, postfix_virtual_t, postfix_postdrop_t, postfix_postqueue_t, postfix_pipe_t, postfix_master_t, postfix_pickup_t, postfix_local_t, postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_qmgr_t, postfix_smtp_t, postfix_map_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), postfix(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/postgresql_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postgresql_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da21d07 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/postgresql_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +.TH "postgresql_selinux" "8" "postgresql" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "postgresql SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +postgresql_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postgresql processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B postgresql +(PostgreSQL relational database) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. postgresql policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run postgresql with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQ, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux postgresql policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgresql processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for postgresql: + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgresql_db_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgresql_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as postgresql database content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/pgsql/data(/.*)?, /usr/share/jonas/pgsql(/.*)?, /var/lib/postgres(ql)?(/.*)?, /var/lib/sepgsql(/.*)?, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B postgresql_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgresql_etc_t type, if you want to store postgresql files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/sysconfig/pgsql(/.*)?, /etc/postgresql(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B postgresql_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgresql_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgresql_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/(se)?postgres, /usr/lib/postgresql/bin/.*, /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/pg_regress, /usr/bin/initdb(\.sepgsql)? + +.EX +.PP +.B postgresql_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgresql_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgresql_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgresql_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgresql_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as postgresql lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgresql_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgresql_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as postgresql log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/pgsql/logfile(/.*)?, /var/lib/pgsql/pgstartup\.log, /var/log/postgresql(/.*)?, /var/log/postgres\.log.*, /var/lib/sepgsql/pgstartup\.log, /var/log/rhdb/rhdb(/.*)?, /var/log/sepostgresql\.log.* + +.EX +.PP +.B postgresql_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgresql_tmp_t type, if you want to store postgresql temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgresql_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgresql_var_run_t type, if you want to store the postgresql files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/postmaster.*, /var/run/postgresql(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux postgresql policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgresql processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for postgresql: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B postgresql_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux postgresql policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgresql processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for postgresql: + +.EX +.B postgresql_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), postgresql(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/postgrey_selinux.8 b/man/man8/postgrey_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d3079a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/postgrey_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,147 @@ +.TH "postgrey_selinux" "8" "postgrey" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "postgrey SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +postgrey_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the postgrey processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B postgrey +(Postfix grey-listing server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux postgrey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgrey processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for postgrey: + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgrey_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgrey_etc_t type, if you want to store postgrey files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgrey_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgrey_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgrey_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgrey_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgrey_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the postgrey_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgrey_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgrey_spool_t type, if you want to store the postgrey files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgrey_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgrey_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the postgrey files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B postgrey_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the postgrey_var_run_t type, if you want to store the postgrey files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/postgrey\.pid, /var/run/postgrey(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux postgrey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgrey processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for postgrey: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B postgrey_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux postgrey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their postgrey processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for postgrey: + +.EX +.B postgrey_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), postgrey(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/pppd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pppd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7b27311 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pppd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,189 @@ +.TH "pppd_selinux" "8" "pppd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pppd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pppd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pppd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. pppd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run pppd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow pppd to be run for a regular use, you must turn on the pppd_for_user boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P pppd_for_user 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modem, you must turn on the pppd_can_insmod boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P pppd_can_insmod 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pppd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pppd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pppd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/ppp(/.*)?, /etc/ppp/peers(/.*)?, /etc/ppp/resolv\.conf + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_etc_t type, if you want to store pppd files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/ppp, /root/.ppprc + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pppd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/pppd, /usr/sbin/ipppd, /usr/sbin/pppoe-server, /usr/sbin/ppp-watch, /sbin/pppoe-server, /sbin/ppp-watch + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pppd_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ppp, /etc/ppp/(auth|ip(v6|x)?)-(up|down) + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pppd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/ppp(/.*)?, /var/log/ppp-connect-errors.* + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_secret_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_secret_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd se secret data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_tmp_t type, if you want to store pppd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as pppd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pppd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pppd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pppd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/pppd[0-9]*\.tdb, /var/run/ppp(/.*)?, /var/run/(i)?ppp.*pid[^/]* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pppd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pppd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pppd: + +.EX +.B pppd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pppd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/pptp_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pptp_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f2fc1c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pptp_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "pptp_selinux" "8" "pptp" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pptp SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pptp_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pptp processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pptp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pptp processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pptp: + + +.EX +.PP +.B pptp_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pptp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pptp_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pptp_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pptp_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pptp log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pptp_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pptp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pptp files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux pptp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pptp processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for pptp: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pptp_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pptp policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pptp processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pptp: + +.EX +.B pptp_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pptp(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/prelink_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelink_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0be2626 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/prelink_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ +.TH "prelink_selinux" "8" "prelink" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "prelink SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +prelink_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelink processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B prelink +(Prelink ELF shared library mappings) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux prelink policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelink processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for prelink: + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelink_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelink_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelink_cron_system_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelink_cron_system_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelink_cron_system_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelink_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelink_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelink_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelink_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelink_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as prelink log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/prelink(/.*)?, /var/log/prelink\.log + +.EX +.PP +.B prelink_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelink_tmp_t type, if you want to store prelink temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelink_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelink_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store prelink files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelink_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelink_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the prelink files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/prelink(/.*)?, /var/lib/misc/prelink.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux prelink policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelink processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for prelink: + +.EX +.B prelink_cron_system_t, prelink_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), prelink(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/prelude_selinux.8 b/man/man8/prelude_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3955442 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/prelude_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,211 @@ +.TH "prelude_selinux" "8" "prelude" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "prelude SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +prelude_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the prelude processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B prelude +(Prelude hybrid intrusion detection system) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux prelude policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for prelude: + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_audisp_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_audisp_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_audisp_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/audisp-prelude, /usr/sbin/audisp-prelude + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_audisp_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_audisp_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude audisp files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_correlator_config_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_correlator_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as prelude correlator configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_correlator_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_correlator_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_correlator_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prelude-correlator, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prelude-manager, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prelude-lml + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_lml_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_lml_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the prelude_lml_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_lml_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_lml_tmp_t type, if you want to store prelude lml temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_lml_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_lml_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude lml files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as prelude log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_spool_t type, if you want to store the prelude files under the /var/spool directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/prelude(/.*)?, /var/spool/prelude-manager(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the prelude files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B prelude_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the prelude_var_run_t type, if you want to store the prelude files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux prelude policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for prelude: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B prelude_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux prelude policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their prelude processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for prelude: + +.EX +.B prelude_lml_t, prelude_t, prelude_audisp_t, prelude_correlator_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), prelude(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/privoxy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/privoxy_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4371077 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/privoxy_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +.TH "privoxy_selinux" "8" "privoxy" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "privoxy SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +privoxy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the privoxy processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B privoxy +(Privacy enhancing web proxy) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. privoxy policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run privoxy with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow privoxy to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports, you must turn on the privoxy_connect_any boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P privoxy_connect_any 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux privoxy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their privoxy processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for privoxy: + + +.EX +.PP +.B privoxy_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the privoxy_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as privoxy etc read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B privoxy_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the privoxy_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the privoxy_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B privoxy_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the privoxy_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the privoxy_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B privoxy_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the privoxy_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as privoxy log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B privoxy_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the privoxy_var_run_t type, if you want to store the privoxy files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux privoxy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their privoxy processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for privoxy: + +.EX +.B privoxy_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), privoxy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/procmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/procmail_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7a080ee --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/procmail_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.TH "procmail_selinux" "8" "procmail" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "procmail SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +procmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the procmail processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B procmail +(Procmail mail delivery agent) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux procmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their procmail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for procmail: + + +.EX +.PP +.B procmail_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the procmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the procmail_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B procmail_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the procmail_home_t type, if you want to store procmail files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B procmail_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the procmail_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as procmail log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/procmail\.log.*, /var/log/procmail(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B procmail_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the procmail_tmp_t type, if you want to store procmail temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux procmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their procmail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for procmail: + +.EX +.B procmail_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), procmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/psad_selinux.8 b/man/man8/psad_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f5331cf --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/psad_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "psad_selinux" "8" "psad" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "psad SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +psad_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the psad processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B psad +(Intrusion Detection and Log Analysis with iptables) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux psad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their psad processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for psad: + + +.EX +.PP +.B psad_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the psad_etc_t type, if you want to store psad files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B psad_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the psad_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the psad_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B psad_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the psad_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the psad_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B psad_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the psad_tmp_t type, if you want to store psad temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B psad_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the psad_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the psad files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B psad_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the psad_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as psad var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B psad_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the psad_var_run_t type, if you want to store the psad files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux psad policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their psad processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for psad: + +.EX +.B psad_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), psad(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ptal_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ptal_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..679eb3c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ptal_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.TH "ptal_selinux" "8" "ptal" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ptal SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ptal_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ptal processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ptal policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptal processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ptal: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ptal_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ptal_etc_t type, if you want to store ptal files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ptal_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ptal_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ptal_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ptal-photod, /usr/sbin/ptal-mlcd, /usr/sbin/ptal-printd + +.EX +.PP +.B ptal_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ptal_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ptal files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/ptal-mlcd(/.*)?, /var/run/ptal-printd(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ptal policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptal processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ptal: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ptal_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ptal policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptal processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ptal: + +.EX +.B ptal_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ptal(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ptchown_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ptchown_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e1f7ab --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ptchown_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "ptchown_selinux" "8" "ptchown" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ptchown SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ptchown_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ptchown processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ptchown +(helper function for grantpt(3), changes ownship and permissions of pseudotty) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ptchown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptchown processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ptchown: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ptchown_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ptchown_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ptchown_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ptchown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ptchown processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ptchown: + +.EX +.B ptchown_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ptchown(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/publicfile_selinux.8 b/man/man8/publicfile_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0235c45 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/publicfile_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +.TH "publicfile_selinux" "8" "publicfile" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "publicfile SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +publicfile_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the publicfile processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B publicfile +(publicfile supplies files to the public through HTTP and FTP) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux publicfile policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their publicfile processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for publicfile: + + +.EX +.PP +.B publicfile_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the publicfile_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as publicfile content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B publicfile_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the publicfile_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the publicfile_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/httpd, /usr/bin/ftpd + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux publicfile policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their publicfile processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for publicfile: + +.EX +.B publicfile_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), publicfile(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/pulseaudio_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pulseaudio_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ca72d3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pulseaudio_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,139 @@ +.TH "pulseaudio_selinux" "8" "pulseaudio" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pulseaudio SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pulseaudio_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pulseaudio processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B pulseaudio +(Pulseaudio network sound server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pulseaudio policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pulseaudio processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pulseaudio: + + +.EX +.PP +.B pulseaudio_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pulseaudio_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pulseaudio_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pulseaudio_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pulseaudio_home_t type, if you want to store pulseaudio files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/root/\.pulse-cookie, /root/\.pulse(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B pulseaudio_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pulseaudio_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store pulseaudio files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pulseaudio_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pulseaudio_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the pulseaudio files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pulseaudio_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pulseaudio_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pulseaudio files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux pulseaudio policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pulseaudio processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for pulseaudio: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B pulseaudio_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pulseaudio policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pulseaudio processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pulseaudio: + +.EX +.B pulseaudio_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pulseaudio(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/puppet_selinux.8 b/man/man8/puppet_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c558047 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/puppet_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,205 @@ +.TH "puppet_selinux" "8" "puppet" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "puppet SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +puppet_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the puppet processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B puppet +(Puppet client daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. puppet policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run puppet with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow Puppet client to manage all file types, you must turn on the puppet_manage_all_files boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P puppet_manage_all_files 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Puppet master to use connect to MySQL and PostgreSQL databas, you must turn on the puppetmaster_use_db boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux puppet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppet processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for puppet: + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppet_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppet_etc_t type, if you want to store puppet files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppet_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppet_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppet_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppet_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppet_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppet_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppet_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppet_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as puppet log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppet_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppet_tmp_t type, if you want to store puppet temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppet_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppet_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the puppet files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppet_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppet_var_run_t type, if you want to store the puppet files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppetca_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppetca_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetca_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppetmaster_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppetmaster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppetmaster_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppetmaster_tmp_t type, if you want to store puppetmaster temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux puppet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppet processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for puppet: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B puppet_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux puppet policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppet processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for puppet: + +.EX +.B puppet_t, puppetmaster_t, puppetca_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), puppet(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/puppetca_selinux.8 b/man/man8/puppetca_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eb647c7 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/puppetca_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "puppetca_selinux" "8" "puppetca" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "puppetca SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +puppetca_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the puppetca processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux puppetca policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetca processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for puppetca: + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppetca_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppetca_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetca_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux puppetca policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetca processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for puppetca: + +.EX +.B puppetca_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), puppetca(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/puppetmaster_selinux.8 b/man/man8/puppetmaster_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d07daa --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/puppetmaster_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +.TH "puppetmaster_selinux" "8" "puppetmaster" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "puppetmaster SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +puppetmaster_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the puppetmaster processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. puppetmaster policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run puppetmaster with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow Puppet master to use connect to MySQL and PostgreSQL databas, you must turn on the puppetmaster_use_db boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P puppetmaster_use_db 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux puppetmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetmaster processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for puppetmaster: + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppetmaster_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppetmaster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the puppetmaster_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B puppetmaster_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the puppetmaster_tmp_t type, if you want to store puppetmaster temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux puppetmaster policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their puppetmaster processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for puppetmaster: + +.EX +.B puppetmaster_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), puppetmaster(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/pyicqt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/pyicqt_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c291ab --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/pyicqt_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "pyicqt_selinux" "8" "pyicqt" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "pyicqt SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +pyicqt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the pyicqt processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B pyicqt +(PyICQt is an ICQ transport for XMPP server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux pyicqt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pyicqt processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for pyicqt: + + +.EX +.PP +.B pyicqt_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pyicqt_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the pyicqt_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pyicqt_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pyicqt_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as pyicqt log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pyicqt_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pyicqt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the pyicqt files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B pyicqt_var_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the pyicqt_var_spool_t type, if you want to store the pyicqt var files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux pyicqt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their pyicqt processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for pyicqt: + +.EX +.B pyicqt_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), pyicqt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/qdiskd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qdiskd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fe306cf --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/qdiskd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +.TH "qdiskd_selinux" "8" "qdiskd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "qdiskd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +qdiskd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qdiskd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux qdiskd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qdiskd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for qdiskd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B qdiskd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qdiskd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qdiskd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qdiskd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qdiskd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store qdiskd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qdiskd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qdiskd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the qdiskd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qdiskd_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qdiskd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as qdiskd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qdiskd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qdiskd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the qdiskd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux qdiskd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qdiskd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for qdiskd: + +.EX +.B qdiskd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), qdiskd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/qemu_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qemu_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ca4c43 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/qemu_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +.TH "qemu_selinux" "8" "qemu" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "qemu SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +qemu_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qemu processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B qemu +(QEMU machine emulator and virtualizer) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. qemu policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run qemu with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow qemu to use cifs/Samba file system, you must turn on the qemu_use_cifs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P qemu_use_cifs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow qemu to use serial/parallel communication port, you must turn on the qemu_use_comm boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P qemu_use_comm 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow qemu to use nfs file system, you must turn on the qemu_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P qemu_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow qemu to use usb device, you must turn on the qemu_use_usb boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P qemu_use_usb 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow qemu to connect fully to the networ, you must turn on the qemu_full_network boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P qemu_full_network 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow xend to run qemu-dm. Not required if using paravirt and no vfb, you must turn on the xend_run_qemu boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xend_run_qemu 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux qemu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qemu processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for qemu: + + +.EX +.PP +.B qemu_dm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qemu_dm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qemu_dm_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qemu_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qemu_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qemu_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/qemu-system-.*, /usr/libexec/qemu.*, /usr/bin/qemu, /usr/bin/qemu-kvm + +.EX +.PP +.B qemu_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qemu_var_run_t type, if you want to store the qemu files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/libvirt/qemu(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/qemu(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux qemu policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qemu processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for qemu: + +.EX +.B qemu_dm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), qemu(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/qmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qmail_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d0f7752 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/qmail_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,213 @@ +.TH "qmail_selinux" "8" "qmail" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "qmail SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +qmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qmail processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B qmail +(Qmail Mail Server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux qmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for qmail: + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_alias_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_alias_home_t type, if you want to store qmail alias files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/qmail/alias, /var/qmail/alias(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_clean_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_clean_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_clean_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_etc_t type, if you want to store qmail files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/qmail/owners(/.*)?, /var/qmail/control(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_inject_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_inject_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_inject_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_local_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_local_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_local_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_lspawn_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_lspawn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_lspawn_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_queue_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_queue_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_queue_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_remote_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_remote_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_remote_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_rspawn_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_rspawn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_rspawn_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_send_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_send_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_send_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_smtpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_smtpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_smtpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_splogger_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_splogger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_splogger_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_spool_t type, if you want to store the qmail files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_start_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_start_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_start_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qmail_tcp_env_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qmail_tcp_env_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qmail_tcp_env_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux qmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qmail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for qmail: + +.EX +.B qmail_tcp_env_t, qmail_rspawn_t, qmail_inject_t, qmail_lspawn_t, qmail_clean_t, qmail_local_t, qmail_smtpd_t, qmail_start_t, qmail_send_t, qmail_remote_t, qmail_queue_t, qmail_splogger_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), qmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/qpidd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/qpidd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..712a06e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/qpidd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +.TH "qpidd_selinux" "8" "qpidd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "qpidd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +qpidd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the qpidd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux qpidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qpidd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for qpidd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B qpidd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qpidd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qpidd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qpidd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qpidd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the qpidd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qpidd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qpidd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store qpidd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qpidd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qpidd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the qpidd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B qpidd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the qpidd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the qpidd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/qpidd(/.*)?, /var/run/qpidd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux qpidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their qpidd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for qpidd: + +.EX +.B qpidd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), qpidd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/quantum_selinux.8 b/man/man8/quantum_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..779196e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/quantum_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +.TH "quantum_selinux" "8" "quantum" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "quantum SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +quantum_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the quantum processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux quantum policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quantum processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for quantum: + + +.EX +.PP +.B quantum_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quantum_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quantum_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/quantum-server, /usr/bin/quantum-ryu-agent, /usr/bin/quantum-linuxbridge-agent, /usr/bin/quantum-openvswitch-agent + +.EX +.PP +.B quantum_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quantum_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as quantum log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B quantum_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quantum_tmp_t type, if you want to store quantum temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B quantum_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quantum_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as quantum unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B quantum_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quantum_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the quantum files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux quantum policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quantum processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for quantum: + +.EX +.B quantum_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), quantum(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/quota_selinux.8 b/man/man8/quota_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b90411d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/quota_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "quota_selinux" "8" "quota" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "quota SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +quota_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the quota processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B quota +(File system quota management) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux quota policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quota processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for quota: + + +.EX +.PP +.B quota_db_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quota_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as quota database content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/boot/a?quota\.(user|group), /etc/a?quota\.(user|group), /var/lib/stickshift/a?quota\.(user|group), /a?quota\.(user|group), /var/a?quota\.(user|group), /var/spool/(.*/)?a?quota\.(user|group) + +.EX +.PP +.B quota_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quota_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quota_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/convertquota, /usr/sbin/quota(check|on), /sbin/quota(check|on) + +.EX +.PP +.B quota_flag_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quota_flag_t type, if you want to treat the files as quota flag data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B quota_nld_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quota_nld_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the quota_nld_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B quota_nld_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the quota_nld_var_run_t type, if you want to store the quota nld files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux quota policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their quota processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for quota: + +.EX +.B quota_t, quota_nld_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), quota(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rabbitmq_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rabbitmq_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..dc1fda5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rabbitmq_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "rabbitmq_selinux" "8" "rabbitmq" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rabbitmq SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rabbitmq_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rabbitmq processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rabbitmq +(policy for rabbitmq) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rabbitmq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rabbitmq processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rabbitmq: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rabbitmq_beam_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rabbitmq_beam_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rabbitmq_beam_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rabbitmq_epmd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rabbitmq_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rabbitmq_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rabbitmq files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rabbitmq_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rabbitmq_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rabbitmq var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rabbitmq policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rabbitmq processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rabbitmq: + +.EX +.B rabbitmq_beam_t, rabbitmq_epmd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rabbitmq(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/racoon_selinux.8 b/man/man8/racoon_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d573221 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/racoon_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,94 @@ +.TH "racoon_selinux" "8" "racoon" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "racoon SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +racoon_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the racoon processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. racoon policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run racoon with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow racoon to read shado, you must turn on the racoon_read_shadow boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P racoon_read_shadow 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux racoon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their racoon processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for racoon: + + +.EX +.PP +.B racoon_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the racoon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the racoon_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B racoon_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the racoon_tmp_t type, if you want to store racoon temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux racoon policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their racoon processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for racoon: + +.EX +.B racoon_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), racoon(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/radiusd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/radiusd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6494aab --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/radiusd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,172 @@ +.TH "radiusd_selinux" "8" "radiusd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "radiusd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +radiusd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the radiusd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. radiusd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run radiusd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow users to login using a radius serve, you must turn on the authlogin_radius boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P authlogin_radius 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux radiusd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radiusd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for radiusd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B radiusd_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radiusd_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as radiusd etc read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B radiusd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radiusd_etc_t type, if you want to store radiusd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B radiusd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radiusd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radiusd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/freeradius, /etc/cron\.(daily|monthly)/radiusd, /usr/sbin/radiusd, /etc/cron\.(daily|weekly|monthly)/freeradius + +.EX +.PP +.B radiusd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radiusd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radiusd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B radiusd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radiusd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as radiusd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/radacct(/.*)?, /var/log/radiusd-freeradius(/.*)?, /var/log/radius\.log.*, /var/log/radutmp, /var/log/radwtmp.*, /var/log/radius(/.*)?, /var/log/freeradius(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B radiusd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radiusd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the radiusd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B radiusd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radiusd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the radiusd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/radiusd\.pid, /var/run/radiusd(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux radiusd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radiusd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for radiusd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B radius_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux radiusd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radiusd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for radiusd: + +.EX +.B radiusd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), radiusd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/radvd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/radvd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7f45e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/radvd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.TH "radvd_selinux" "8" "radvd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "radvd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +radvd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the radvd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B radvd +(IPv6 router advertisement daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux radvd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radvd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for radvd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B radvd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radvd_etc_t type, if you want to store radvd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B radvd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radvd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radvd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B radvd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radvd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the radvd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B radvd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the radvd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the radvd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/radvd(/.*)?, /var/run/radvd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux radvd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their radvd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for radvd: + +.EX +.B radvd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), radvd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rdisc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rdisc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f04f9bd --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rdisc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "rdisc_selinux" "8" "rdisc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rdisc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rdisc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rdisc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rdisc +(Network router discovery daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rdisc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rdisc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rdisc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rdisc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rdisc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rdisc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/rdisc, /usr/sbin/rdisc + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rdisc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rdisc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rdisc: + +.EX +.B rdisc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rdisc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/readahead_selinux.8 b/man/man8/readahead_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7966b58 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/readahead_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "readahead_selinux" "8" "readahead" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "readahead SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +readahead_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the readahead processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B readahead +(Readahead, read files into page cache for improved performance) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux readahead policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their readahead processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for readahead: + + +.EX +.PP +.B readahead_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the readahead_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the readahead_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/systemd-readahead.*, /sbin/readahead.*, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-readahead.*, /usr/sbin/readahead.* + +.EX +.PP +.B readahead_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the readahead_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the readahead files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B readahead_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the readahead_var_run_t type, if you want to store the readahead files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/systemd/readahead(/.*)?, /dev/\.systemd/readahead(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux readahead policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their readahead processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for readahead: + +.EX +.B readahead_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), readahead(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/regex_selinux.8 b/man/man8/regex_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..529dc44 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/regex_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +.TH "regex_selinux" "8" "regex" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "regex SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +regex_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the regex processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux regex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their regex processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for regex: + + +.EX +.PP +.B regex_milter_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the regex_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as regex milter content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B regex_milter_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the regex_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the regex_milter_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux regex policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their regex processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for regex: + +.EX +.B regex_milter_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), regex(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/restorecond_selinux.8 b/man/man8/restorecond_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5258999 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/restorecond_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +.TH "restorecond_selinux" "8" "restorecond" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "restorecond SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +restorecond_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the restorecond processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux restorecond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their restorecond processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for restorecond: + + +.EX +.PP +.B restorecond_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the restorecond_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the restorecond_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B restorecond_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the restorecond_var_run_t type, if you want to store the restorecond files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux restorecond policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their restorecond processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for restorecond: + +.EX +.B restorecond_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), restorecond(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rgmanager_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rgmanager_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b003935 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rgmanager_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,136 @@ +.TH "rgmanager_selinux" "8" "rgmanager" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rgmanager SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rgmanager_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rgmanager processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rgmanager +(rgmanager - Resource Group Manager) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. rgmanager policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run rgmanager with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow rgmanager domain to connect to the network using TCP, you must turn on the rgmanager_can_network_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P rgmanager_can_network_connect 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rgmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rgmanager processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rgmanager: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rgmanager_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rgmanager_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rgmanager_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rgmanager_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rgmanager_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rgmanager_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rgmanager_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rgmanager_tmp_t type, if you want to store rgmanager temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rgmanager_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rgmanager_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rgmanager files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rgmanager_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rgmanager_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rgmanager var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rgmanager_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rgmanager_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rgmanager files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/rgmanager\.pid, /var/run/cluster/rgmanager\.sk + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rgmanager policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rgmanager processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rgmanager: + +.EX +.B rgmanager_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rgmanager(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/rhev_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rhev_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..36bcd5b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rhev_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "rhev_selinux" "8" "rhev" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rhev SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rhev_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rhev processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rhev +(rhev polic module contains policies for rhev apps) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rhev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhev processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rhev: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhev_agentd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhev_agentd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhev_agentd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/rhev-agent/rhev-agentd\.py, /usr/share/ovirt-guest-agent + +.EX +.PP +.B rhev_agentd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhev_agentd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rhev agentd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhev_agentd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhev_agentd_tmp_t type, if you want to store rhev agentd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhev_agentd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhev_agentd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rhev agentd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ovirt-guest-agent\.serviceservice, /lib/systemd/system/ovirt-guest-agent\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B rhev_agentd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhev_agentd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rhev agentd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rhev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhev processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rhev: + +.EX +.B rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rhev(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rhgb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rhgb_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af7a010 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rhgb_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.TH "rhgb_selinux" "8" "rhgb" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rhgb SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rhgb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rhgb processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rhgb +( Red Hat Graphical Boot ) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rhgb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhgb processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rhgb: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhgb_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhgb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhgb_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhgb_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhgb_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rhgb files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rhgb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhgb processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rhgb: + +.EX +.B rhgb_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rhgb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rhsmcertd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rhsmcertd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ba79be --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rhsmcertd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "rhsmcertd_selinux" "8" "rhsmcertd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rhsmcertd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rhsmcertd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rhsmcertd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rhsmcertd +(Subscription Management Certificate Daemon policy) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rhsmcertd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhsmcertd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rhsmcertd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhsmcertd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhsmcertd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhsmcertd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rhsmcertd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhsmcertd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhsmcertd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as rhsmcertd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhsmcertd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhsmcertd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rhsmcertd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhsmcertd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhsmcertd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rhsmcertd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rhsmcertd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rhsmcertd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rhsmcertd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rhsmcertd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rhsmcertd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rhsmcertd: + +.EX +.B rhsmcertd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rhsmcertd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ricci_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ricci_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a36033 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ricci_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,246 @@ +.TH "ricci_selinux" "8" "ricci" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ricci SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ricci_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ricci processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ricci +(Ricci cluster management agent) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ricci policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ricci: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modcluster_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modcluster_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modcluster_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ricci modcluster files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modcluster_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ricci modcluster var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modcluster_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modcluster_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ricci modcluster files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/modclusterd\.pid, /var/run/clumond\.sock + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modclusterd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modclusterd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ricci modclusterd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modlog_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modlog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modlog_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modrpm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modrpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modrpm_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modservice_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modservice_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modservice_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modstorage_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modstorage_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ricci_modstorage_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_modstorage_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_modstorage_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as ricci modstorage lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_tmp_t type, if you want to store ricci temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the ricci files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ricci var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ricci_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ricci_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ricci files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ricci policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ricci: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ricci_modcluster_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ricci_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ricci policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ricci processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ricci: + +.EX +.B ricci_t, ricci_modservice_t, ricci_modstorage_t, ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modlog_t, ricci_modrpm_t, ricci_modcluster_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ricci(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rlogind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rlogind_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b86f39b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rlogind_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,137 @@ +.TH "rlogind_selinux" "8" "rlogind" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rlogind SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rlogind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rlogind processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rlogind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rlogind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rlogind: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rlogind_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rlogind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rlogind_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/telnetlogin, /usr/kerberos/sbin/klogind, /usr/sbin/in\.rlogind + +.EX +.PP +.B rlogind_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rlogind_home_t type, if you want to store rlogind files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/root/\.rlogin, /root/\.rhosts + +.EX +.PP +.B rlogind_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rlogind_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rlogind_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rlogind_tmp_t type, if you want to store rlogind temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rlogind_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rlogind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rlogind files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux rlogind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rlogind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for rlogind: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B rlogind_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rlogind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rlogind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rlogind: + +.EX +.B rlogind_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rlogind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/roundup_selinux.8 b/man/man8/roundup_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5269077 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/roundup_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "roundup_selinux" "8" "roundup" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "roundup SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +roundup_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the roundup processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B roundup +(Roundup Issue Tracking System policy) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux roundup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their roundup processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for roundup: + + +.EX +.PP +.B roundup_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the roundup_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the roundup_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B roundup_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the roundup_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the roundup_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B roundup_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the roundup_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the roundup files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B roundup_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the roundup_var_run_t type, if you want to store the roundup files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux roundup policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their roundup processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for roundup: + +.EX +.B roundup_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), roundup(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rpcbind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpcbind_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8fdfc21 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rpcbind_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "rpcbind_selinux" "8" "rpcbind" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rpcbind SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rpcbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpcbind processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rpcbind +(Universal Addresses to RPC Program Number Mapper) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rpcbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcbind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rpcbind: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpcbind_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpcbind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcbind_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/rpcbind, /sbin/rpcbind + +.EX +.PP +.B rpcbind_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpcbind_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcbind_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpcbind_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpcbind_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rpcbind files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/rpcbind(/.*)?, /var/cache/rpcbind(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B rpcbind_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpcbind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rpcbind files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/rpcbind\.sock, /var/run/rpcbind\.lock, /var/run/rpc.statd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rpcbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcbind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rpcbind: + +.EX +.B rpcbind_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rpcbind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rpcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpcd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f86ef74 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rpcd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +.TH "rpcd_selinux" "8" "rpcd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rpcd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rpcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpcd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rpcd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpc_pipefs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpc_pipefs_t type, if you want to treat the files as rpc pipefs data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpcd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/sm-notify, /usr/sbin/rpc\..*, /usr/sbin/rpc\.idmapd, /usr/sbin/sm-notify, /usr/sbin/rpc\.rquotad, /sbin/rpc\..* + +.EX +.PP +.B rpcd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpcd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpcd_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nfslock, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rpcidmapd + +.EX +.PP +.B rpcd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpcd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rpcd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/rpc.*, /usr/lib/systemd/system/rpc.* + +.EX +.PP +.B rpcd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rpcd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/rpc\.statd(/.*)?, /var/run/rpc\.statd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rpcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpcd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rpcd: + +.EX +.B rpcd_t, rpcbind_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rpcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rpm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rpm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c01fa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rpm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +.TH "rpm_selinux" "8" "rpm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rpm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rpm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rpm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rpm +(Policy for the RPM package manager) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rpm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpm_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/apt-get, /usr/libexec/yumDBUSBackend.py, /usr/sbin/rhn_check, /usr/bin/rpmdev-rmdevelrpms, /usr/sbin/synaptic, /usr/share/yumex/yumex-yum-backend, /usr/sbin/yum-updatesd, /usr/sbin/pup, /usr/libexec/packagekitd, /usr/bin/apt-shell, /usr/sbin/pirut, /usr/bin/package-cleanup, /usr/bin/fedora-rmdevelrpms, /bin/rpm, /usr/bin/yum, /usr/sbin/system-install-packages, /usr/bin/zif, /usr/bin/rpm, /usr/sbin/yum-complete-transaction, /usr/bin/smart, /usr/sbin/packagekitd, /usr/sbin/rhnreg_ks, /usr/share/yumex/yum_childtask\.py, /usr/sbin/up2date + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as rpm content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rpm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/yum\.log.*, /var/log/rpmpkgs.* + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rpm_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_script_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_script_tmp_t type, if you want to store rpm script temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_script_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_script_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rpm script files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_tmp_t type, if you want to store rpm temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store rpm files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_var_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_var_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/PackageKit(/.*)?, /var/cache/yum(/.*)?, /var/spool/up2date(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the rpm files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/yum(/.*)?, /var/lib/rpm(/.*)?, /var/lib/alternatives(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B rpm_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rpm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rpm files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/PackageKit(/.*)?, /var/run/yum.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rpm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rpm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rpm: + +.EX +.B rpm_t, rpm_script_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rpm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rshd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rshd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..929f616 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rshd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,115 @@ +.TH "rshd_selinux" "8" "rshd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rshd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rshd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rshd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rshd +(Remote shell service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rshd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rshd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rshd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rshd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rshd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/in\.rshd, /usr/kerberos/sbin/kshd, /usr/sbin/in\.rexecd + +.EX +.PP +.B rshd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rshd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux rshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rshd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for rshd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B rsh_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rshd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rshd: + +.EX +.B rshd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rshd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rssh_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rssh_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fea92f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rssh_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "rssh_selinux" "8" "rssh" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rssh SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rssh_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rssh processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rssh +(Restricted (scp/sftp) only shell) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rssh processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rssh: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rssh_chroot_helper_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rssh_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rssh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rssh_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rssh_ro_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rssh_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as rssh read/only content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rssh_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rssh_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as rssh read/write content. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rssh processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rssh: + +.EX +.B rssh_t, rssh_chroot_helper_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rssh(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8 index ad9ccf5..65a1b3e 100644 --- a/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8 +++ b/man/man8/rsync_selinux.8 @@ -1,52 +1,205 @@ -.TH "rsync_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rsync Selinux Policy documentation" -.de EX -.nf -.ft CW -.. -.de EE -.ft R -.fi -.. +.TH "rsync_selinux" "8" "rsync" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rsync SELinux Policy documentation" .SH "NAME" -rsync_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rsync daemon +rsync_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rsync processes .SH "DESCRIPTION" -Security-Enhanced Linux secures the rsync server via flexible mandatory access + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rsync +(Fast incremental file transfer for synchronization) +processes via flexible mandatory access control. -.SH FILE_CONTEXTS -SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. -Policy governs the access daemons have to these files. -If you want to share files using the rsync daemon, you must label the files and directories public_content_t. So if you created a special directory /var/rsync, you -would need to label the directory with the chcon tool. -.TP -chcon -t public_content_t /var/rsync -.TP -.TP -To make this change permanent (survive a relabel), use the semanage command to add the change to file context configuration: + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. rsync policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run rsync with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow rsync to run as a clien, you must turn on the rsync_client boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P rsync_client 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow rsync to export any files/directories read only, you must turn on the rsync_export_all_ro boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P rsync_export_all_ro 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow rsync servers to share nfs files system, you must turn on the rsync_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P rsync_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow rsync servers to share cifs files system, you must turn on the rsync_use_cifs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P rsync_use_cifs 1 +.EE + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. .TP +Allow rsync servers to read the /var/rsync directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +.PP +.B semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/rsync(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/rsync +.pp .TP -This command adds the following entry to /etc/selinux/POLICYTYPE/contexts/files/file_contexts.local: -.TP -/var/rsync(/.*)? system_u:object_r:publix_content_t:s0 -.TP -Run the restorecon command to apply the changes: -.TP -restorecon -R -v /var/rsync/ +Allow rsync servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_rsync_anon_write boolean to be set. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/rsync/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/rsync/incoming + + +.PP +If you want to allow rsync to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the allow_rsync_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_rsync_anon_write 1 .EE -.SH SHARING FILES -If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. allow_DOMAIN_anon_write. So for rsync you would execute: +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rsync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rsync processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rsync: + .EX -setsebool -P allow_rsync_anon_write=1 +.PP +.B rsync_data_t .EE -.SH BOOLEANS -.TP -system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. +- Set files with the rsync_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as rsync content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rsync_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rsync_etc_t type, if you want to store rsync files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rsync_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rsync_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rsync_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rsync_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rsync_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rsync log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rsync_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rsync_tmp_t type, if you want to store rsync temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rsync_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rsync_var_run_t type, if you want to store the rsync files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux rsync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rsync processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for rsync: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B rsync_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rsync policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rsync processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rsync: + +.EX +.B rsync_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + .SH AUTHOR -This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. .SH "SEE ALSO" -selinux(8), rsync(1), chcon(1), setsebool(8), semanage(8) +selinux(8), rsync(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/rtkit_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rtkit_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..50cb948 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rtkit_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "rtkit_selinux" "8" "rtkit" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rtkit SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rtkit_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rtkit processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rtkit +(Realtime scheduling for user processes) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rtkit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rtkit processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rtkit: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rtkit_daemon_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rtkit_daemon_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rtkit_daemon_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rtkit policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rtkit processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rtkit: + +.EX +.B rtkit_daemon_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rtkit(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/run_selinux.8 b/man/man8/run_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..75796ad --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/run_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,100 @@ +.TH "run_selinux" "8" "run" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "run SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +run_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the run processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. run policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run run with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow xend to run qemu-dm. Not required if using paravirt and no vfb, you must turn on the xend_run_qemu boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xend_run_qemu 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to run unconfined script, you must turn on the samba_run_unconfined boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux run policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their run processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for run: + + +.EX +.PP +.B run_init_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the run_init_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the run_init_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux run policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their run processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for run: + +.EX +.B run_init_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), run(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/rwho_selinux.8 b/man/man8/rwho_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..65c182c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/rwho_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +.TH "rwho_selinux" "8" "rwho" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "rwho SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +rwho_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the rwho processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B rwho +(Who is logged in on other machines?) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux rwho policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rwho processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for rwho: + + +.EX +.PP +.B rwho_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rwho_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rwho_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rwho_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rwho_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the rwho_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rwho_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rwho_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as rwho log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B rwho_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the rwho_spool_t type, if you want to store the rwho files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux rwho policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rwho processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for rwho: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B rwho_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux rwho policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their rwho processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for rwho: + +.EX +.B rwho_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), rwho(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/samba_selinux.8 b/man/man8/samba_selinux.8 index ca702c7..25316f0 100644 --- a/man/man8/samba_selinux.8 +++ b/man/man8/samba_selinux.8 @@ -1,56 +1,269 @@ -.TH "samba_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "Samba Selinux Policy documentation" +.TH "samba_selinux" "8" "samba" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "samba SELinux Policy documentation" .SH "NAME" -samba_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for Samba +samba_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the samba processes .SH "DESCRIPTION" -Security-Enhanced Linux secures the Samba server via flexible mandatory access + +SELinux Linux secures +.B samba +( +SMB and CIFS client/server programs for UNIX and +name Service Switch daemon for resolving names +from Windows NT servers. +) +processes via flexible mandatory access control. -.SH FILE_CONTEXTS -SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. -Policy governs the access daemons have to these files. -If you want to share files other than home directories, those files must be -labeled samba_share_t. So if you created a special directory /var/eng, you -would need to label the directory with the chcon tool. -.TP -chcon -t samba_share_t /var/eng -.TP -To make this change permanent (survive a relabel), use the semanage command to add the change to file context configuration: -.TP -semanage fcontext -a -t samba_share_t "/var/eng(/.*)?" -.TP -This command adds the following entry to /etc/selinux/POLICYTYPE/contexts/files/file_contexts.local: -.TP -/var/eng(/.*)? system_u:object_r:samba_share_t:s0 -.TP -Run the restorecon command to apply the changes: -.TP -restorecon -R -v /var/eng/ - -.SH SHARING FILES -If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. allow_DOMAIN_anon_write. So for samba you would execute: - -setsebool -P allow_smbd_anon_write=1 + + .SH BOOLEANS -.br -SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. So by -default SELinux policy turns off SELinux sharing of home directories and -the use of Samba shares from a remote machine as a home directory. -.TP -If you are setting up this machine as a Samba server and wish to share the home directories, you need to set the samba_enable_home_dirs boolean. +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. samba policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run samba with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to act as the domain controller, add users, groups and change passwords, you must turn on the samba_domain_controller boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_domain_controller 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to act as a portmappe, you must turn on the samba_portmapper boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_portmapper 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to share any file/directory read only, you must turn on the samba_export_all_ro boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_export_all_ro 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to support SAMBA home directorie, you must turn on the use_samba_home_dirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to create new home directories (e.g. via PAM, you must turn on the samba_create_home_dirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_create_home_dirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to share users home directories, you must turn on the samba_enable_home_dirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_enable_home_dirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to export ntfs/fusefs volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_fusefs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_share_fusefs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to export NFS volumes, you must turn on the samba_share_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_share_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to run unconfined script, you must turn on the samba_run_unconfined boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs file, you must turn on the sanlock_use_samba boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_samba 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to share any file/directory read/write, you must turn on the samba_export_all_rw boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_export_all_rw 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs file, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux samba policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their samba processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for samba: + + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_etc_t type, if you want to store samba files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the samba_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nmb, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/smb, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/winbind + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as samba log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_net_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_net_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the samba_net_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_net_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_net_tmp_t type, if you want to store samba net temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_secrets_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_secrets_t type, if you want to treat the files as samba secrets data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/samba/secrets\.tdb, /etc/samba/passdb\.tdb, /etc/samba/MACHINE\.SID, /etc/samba/smbpasswd + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_share_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_share_t type, if you want to treat the files as samba share data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_unconfined_script_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_unconfined_script_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the samba_unconfined_script_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as samba unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/system/smb.service, /usr/lib/systemd/system/smb.service + +.EX +.PP +.B samba_var_t +.EE + +- Set files with the samba_var_t type, if you want to store the s files under the /var directory. + .br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/samba(/.*)?, /var/cache/samba(/.*)?, /var/lib/samba(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B sambagui_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sambagui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sambagui_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux samba policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their samba processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for samba: + +.EX +.B samba_net_t, samba_unconfined_script_t, sambagui_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. -setsebool -P samba_enable_home_dirs 1 -.TP -If you want to use a remote Samba server for the home directories on this machine, you must set the use_samba_home_dirs boolean. -.br +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans -setsebool -P use_samba_home_dirs 1 -.TP -system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. .SH AUTHOR -This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. .SH "SEE ALSO" -selinux(8), samba(7), chcon(1), setsebool(8), semanage(8) +selinux(8), samba(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/sambagui_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sambagui_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..763d193 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sambagui_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "sambagui_selinux" "8" "sambagui" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sambagui SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sambagui_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sambagui processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sambagui +(system-config-samba dbus service policy) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sambagui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sambagui processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sambagui: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sambagui_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sambagui_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sambagui_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sambagui policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sambagui processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sambagui: + +.EX +.B sambagui_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sambagui(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/sandbox_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sandbox_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..437feff --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sandbox_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,148 @@ +.TH "sandbox_selinux" "8" "sandbox" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sandbox SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sandbox_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sandbox processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sandbox +(policy for sandbox) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sandbox policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sandbox with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbo, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sandbox policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sandbox processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sandbox: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sandbox_devpts_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sandbox_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as sandbox devpts data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sandbox_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sandbox_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sandbox_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sandbox_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sandbox_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as sandbox content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sandbox_min_client_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sandbox_min_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox min client files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sandbox_net_client_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sandbox_net_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox net client files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sandbox_web_client_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sandbox_web_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox web client files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sandbox_x_client_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sandbox_x_client_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox x client files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sandbox xserver files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sandbox policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sandbox processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sandbox: + +.EX +.B sandbox_x_client_t, sandbox_net_client_t, sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_x_t, sandbox_web_client_t, sandbox_min_t, sandbox_net_t, sandbox_web_t, sandbox_min_client_t, sandbox_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sandbox(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/sanlock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sanlock_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b15e691 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sanlock_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +.TH "sanlock_selinux" "8" "sanlock" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sanlock SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sanlock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sanlock processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sanlock +(policy for sanlock) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sanlock policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sanlock with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanloc, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs file, you must turn on the sanlock_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs file, you must turn on the sanlock_use_samba boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sanlock_use_samba 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sanlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sanlock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sanlock: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sanlock_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sanlock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sanlock_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sanlock_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sanlock_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sanlock_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sanlock_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sanlock_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sanlock log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sanlock_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sanlock_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sanlock files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sanlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sanlock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sanlock: + +.EX +.B sanlock_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sanlock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/saslauthd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/saslauthd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a922b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/saslauthd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +.TH "saslauthd_selinux" "8" "saslauthd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "saslauthd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +saslauthd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the saslauthd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. saslauthd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run saslauthd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow sasl to read shado, you must turn on the allow_saslauthd_read_shadow boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_saslauthd_read_shadow 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux saslauthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their saslauthd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for saslauthd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B saslauthd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the saslauthd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the saslauthd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B saslauthd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the saslauthd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the saslauthd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B saslauthd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the saslauthd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B saslauthd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the saslauthd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the saslauthd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/sasl2(/.*)?, /var/run/saslauthd(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux saslauthd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their saslauthd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for saslauthd: + +.EX +.B saslauthd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), saslauthd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/sblim_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sblim_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5c6807e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sblim_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.TH "sblim_selinux" "8" "sblim" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sblim SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sblim_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sblim processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sblim +( policy for SBLIM Gatherer ) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sblim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sblim processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sblim: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sblim_gatherd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sblim_gatherd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sblim_gatherd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sblim_reposd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sblim_reposd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sblim_reposd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sblim_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sblim_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sblim files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sblim policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sblim processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sblim: + +.EX +.B sblim_reposd_t, sblim_gatherd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sblim(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/secadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/secadm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6bf3e2b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/secadm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +.TH "secadm_selinux" "8" "secadm" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "secadm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +secadm_r \- \fBSecurity administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to. + +Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user. + +Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. + +Roles usually have default types assigned to them. + +The default type for the secadm_r role is secadm_t. + +You can use the +.B newrole +program to transition directly to this role. + +.B newrole -r secadm_r -t secadm_t + +.B sudo +can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command. + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=secadm_r TYPE=secadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:secadm_r:secadm_t:LEVEL + +If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role. + +You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following + +.B semanage user -l + +If you wanted to add secadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r secadm_r' staff_u + + + +SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role. +You can list these rules using the following command. + +.B sesearch --role_allow + +SELinux policy allows the sysadm_r, staff_r, auditadm_r roles can transition to the secadm_r role. + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/sectoolm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sectoolm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..232ac2e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sectoolm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "sectoolm_selinux" "8" "sectoolm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sectoolm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sectoolm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sectoolm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sectoolm +(Sectool security audit tool) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sectoolm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sectoolm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sectoolm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sectoolm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sectoolm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sectoolm_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sectoolm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sectoolm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sectoolm: + +.EX +.B sectoolm_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sectoolm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/selinux_selinux.8 b/man/man8/selinux_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..42b09e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/selinux_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +.TH "selinux_selinux" "8" "selinux" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "selinux SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +selinux_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the selinux processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B selinux +( +Policy for kernel security interface, in particular, selinuxfs. +) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux selinux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their selinux processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for selinux: + + +.EX +.PP +.B selinux_config_t +.EE + +- Set files with the selinux_config_t type, if you want to treat the files as selinux configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?users(/.*)?, /etc/selinux(/.*)?, /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?seusers, /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?setrans\.conf + +.EX +.PP +.B selinux_munin_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the selinux_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the selinux_munin_plugin_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B selinux_munin_plugin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the selinux_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store selinux munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B selinux_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the selinux_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the selinux files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux selinux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their selinux processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for selinux: + +.EX +.B selinux_munin_plugin_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), selinux(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/semanage_selinux.8 b/man/man8/semanage_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad680da --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/semanage_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,111 @@ +.TH "semanage_selinux" "8" "semanage" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "semanage SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +semanage_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the semanage processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux semanage policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their semanage processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for semanage: + + +.EX +.PP +.B semanage_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the semanage_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the semanage_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/system-config-selinux/system-config-selinux-dbus\.py, /usr/sbin/semanage, /usr/sbin/semodule + +.EX +.PP +.B semanage_read_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the semanage_read_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as semanage read lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B semanage_store_t +.EE + +- Set files with the semanage_store_t type, if you want to treat the files as semanage store data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/share/selinux/mls(/.*)?, /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/(active|tmp|previous)(/.*)?, /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?policy(/.*)?, /etc/share/selinux/targeted(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B semanage_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the semanage_tmp_t type, if you want to store semanage temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B semanage_trans_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the semanage_trans_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as semanage trans lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux semanage policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their semanage processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for semanage: + +.EX +.B semanage_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/sendmail_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sendmail_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2e3fa2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sendmail_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +.TH "sendmail_selinux" "8" "sendmail" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sendmail SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sendmail_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sendmail processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sendmail +(Policy for sendmail) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sendmail policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sendmail with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow http daemon to send mai, you must turn on the httpd_can_sendmail boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_sendmail 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mai, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow gitisis daemon to send mai, you must turn on the gitosis_can_sendmail boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P gitosis_can_sendmail 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sendmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sendmail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sendmail: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sendmail_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sendmail_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sendmail_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/mail(x)?, /usr/sbin/rmail, /usr/sbin/ssmtp, /usr/bin/esmtp, /var/qmail/bin/sendmail, /usr/sbin/sendmail\.postfix, /usr/lib/courier/bin/sendmail, /usr/lib/sendmail, /bin/mail(x)?, /usr/sbin/sendmail(\.sendmail)? + +.EX +.PP +.B sendmail_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sendmail_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sendmail_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sendmail_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sendmail_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sendmail_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sendmail_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sendmail log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/sendmail\.st, /var/log/mail(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B sendmail_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sendmail_tmp_t type, if you want to store sendmail temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sendmail_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sendmail_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sendmail files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/sendmail\.pid, /var/run/sm-client\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sendmail policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sendmail processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sendmail: + +.EX +.B sendmail_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sendmail(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/services_selinux.8 b/man/man8/services_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..08da721 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/services_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "services_selinux" "8" "services" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "services SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +services_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the services processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux services policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their services processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for services: + + +.EX +.PP +.B services_munin_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the services_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the services_munin_plugin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/munin/plugins/nut.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/named, /usr/share/munin/plugins/varnish_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/tomcat_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/postgres_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/asterisk_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/lpstat, /usr/share/munin/plugins/mysql_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/slapd_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/apache_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/ping_, /usr/share/munin/plugins/squid_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/fail2ban, /usr/share/munin/plugins/openvpn, /usr/share/munin/plugins/snmp_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/samba, /usr/share/munin/plugins/ntp_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/http_loadtime + +.EX +.PP +.B services_munin_plugin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the services_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store services munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux services policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their services processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for services: + +.EX +.B services_munin_plugin_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), services(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/setfiles_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setfiles_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33dfb2f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/setfiles_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "setfiles_selinux" "8" "setfiles" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "setfiles SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +setfiles_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setfiles processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux setfiles policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setfiles processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for setfiles: + + +.EX +.PP +.B setfiles_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setfiles_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setfiles_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/setfiles.*, /sbin/restorecon, /usr/sbin/setfiles.*, /usr/sbin/restorecon + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux setfiles policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setfiles processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for setfiles: + +.EX +.B setfiles_mac_t, setfiles_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), setfiles(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/setkey_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setkey_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8a21ecc --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/setkey_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "setkey_selinux" "8" "setkey" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "setkey SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +setkey_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setkey processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux setkey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setkey processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for setkey: + + +.EX +.PP +.B setkey_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setkey_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setkey_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/setkey, /sbin/setkey + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux setkey policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setkey processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for setkey: + +.EX +.B setkey_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), setkey(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/setrans_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setrans_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99b5cda --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/setrans_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "setrans_selinux" "8" "setrans" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "setrans SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +setrans_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setrans processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B setrans +(SELinux MLS/MCS label translation service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux setrans policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setrans processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for setrans: + + +.EX +.PP +.B setrans_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setrans_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setrans_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/mcstransd, /usr/sbin/mcstransd + +.EX +.PP +.B setrans_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setrans_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setrans_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B setrans_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setrans_var_run_t type, if you want to store the setrans files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/mcstransd\.pid, /var/run/setrans(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux setrans policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setrans processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for setrans: + +.EX +.B setrans_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), setrans(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/setroubleshoot_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setroubleshoot_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cbed8e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/setroubleshoot_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.TH "setroubleshoot_selinux" "8" "setroubleshoot" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "setroubleshoot SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +setroubleshoot_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setroubleshoot processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B setroubleshoot +(SELinux troubleshooting service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux setroubleshoot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshoot processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for setroubleshoot: + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setroubleshoot_fixit_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshoot_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshoot_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the setroubleshoot files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshoot_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshoot_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as setroubleshoot var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshoot_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshoot_var_run_t type, if you want to store the setroubleshoot files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshootd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshootd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setroubleshootd_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux setroubleshoot policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshoot processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for setroubleshoot: + +.EX +.B setroubleshoot_fixit_t, setroubleshootd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), setroubleshoot(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/setroubleshootd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setroubleshootd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..924d3bc --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/setroubleshootd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,103 @@ +.TH "setroubleshootd_selinux" "8" "setroubleshootd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "setroubleshootd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +setroubleshootd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setroubleshootd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux setroubleshootd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshootd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for setroubleshootd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setroubleshoot_fixit_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshoot_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshoot_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the setroubleshoot files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshoot_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshoot_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as setroubleshoot var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshoot_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshoot_var_run_t type, if you want to store the setroubleshoot files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B setroubleshootd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setroubleshootd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setroubleshootd_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux setroubleshootd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setroubleshootd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for setroubleshootd: + +.EX +.B setroubleshoot_fixit_t, setroubleshootd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), setroubleshootd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/setsebool_selinux.8 b/man/man8/setsebool_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0b850e8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/setsebool_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "setsebool_selinux" "8" "setsebool" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "setsebool SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +setsebool_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the setsebool processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux setsebool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setsebool processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for setsebool: + + +.EX +.PP +.B setsebool_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the setsebool_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the setsebool_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux setsebool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their setsebool processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for setsebool: + +.EX +.B setsebool_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), setsebool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/sge_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sge_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..636d762 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sge_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +.TH "sge_selinux" "8" "sge" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sge SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sge_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sge processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sge +(Policy for gridengine MPI jobs) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sge policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sge with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow sge to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the sge_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sge_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sge policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sge: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sge_execd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sge_execd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sge_execd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sge_job_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sge_job_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sge_job_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sge_shepherd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sge_shepherd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sge_shepherd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sge_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sge_spool_t type, if you want to store the sge files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sge_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sge_tmp_t type, if you want to store sge temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sge policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sge processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sge: + +.EX +.B sge_execd_t, sge_job_ssh_t, sge_shepherd_t, sge_job_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sge(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/shorewall_selinux.8 b/man/man8/shorewall_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b02195e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/shorewall_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +.TH "shorewall_selinux" "8" "shorewall" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "shorewall SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +shorewall_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the shorewall processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B shorewall +(Shoreline Firewall high-level tool for configuring netfilter) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux shorewall policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shorewall processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for shorewall: + + +.EX +.PP +.B shorewall_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shorewall_etc_t type, if you want to store shorewall files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /etc/shorewall(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B shorewall_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shorewall_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the shorewall_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/shorewall6?, /sbin/shorewall-lite, /usr/sbin/shorewall-lite, /usr/sbin/shorewall6? + +.EX +.PP +.B shorewall_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shorewall_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the shorewall_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/shorewall, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/shorewall-lite + +.EX +.PP +.B shorewall_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shorewall_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as shorewall lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B shorewall_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shorewall_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as shorewall log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B shorewall_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shorewall_tmp_t type, if you want to store shorewall temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B shorewall_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shorewall_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the shorewall files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/shorewall-lite(/.*)?, /var/lib/shorewall(/.*)?, /var/lib/shorewall6(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux shorewall policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shorewall processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for shorewall: + +.EX +.B shorewall_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), shorewall(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/showmount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/showmount_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df89321 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/showmount_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "showmount_selinux" "8" "showmount" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "showmount SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +showmount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the showmount processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux showmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their showmount processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for showmount: + + +.EX +.PP +.B showmount_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the showmount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the showmount_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux showmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their showmount processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for showmount: + +.EX +.B showmount_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), showmount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/shutdown_selinux.8 b/man/man8/shutdown_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..733dd9c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/shutdown_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,97 @@ +.TH "shutdown_selinux" "8" "shutdown" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "shutdown SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +shutdown_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the shutdown processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B shutdown +(System shutdown command) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux shutdown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shutdown processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for shutdown: + + +.EX +.PP +.B shutdown_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shutdown_etc_t type, if you want to store shutdown files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B shutdown_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shutdown_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the shutdown_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/shutdown, /usr/sbin/shutdown, /usr/lib/upstart/shutdown, /lib/upstart/shutdown + +.EX +.PP +.B shutdown_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the shutdown_var_run_t type, if you want to store the shutdown files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux shutdown policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their shutdown processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for shutdown: + +.EX +.B shutdown_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), shutdown(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/slapd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/slapd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4031380 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/slapd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +.TH "slapd_selinux" "8" "slapd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "slapd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +slapd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the slapd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux slapd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their slapd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for slapd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_cert_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_cert_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd certificate data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_db_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_db_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd database content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/openldap/slapd\.d(/.*)?, /var/lib/ldap(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_etc_t type, if you want to store slapd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the slapd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the slapd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as slapd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_replog_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_replog_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd replog data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_tmp_t type, if you want to store slapd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store slapd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as slapd unit content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B slapd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the slapd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the slapd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/slapd\.args, /var/run/openldap(/.*)?, /var/run/slapd\.pid, /var/run/ldapi, /var/run/slapd.* + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux slapd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their slapd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for slapd: + +.EX +.B slapd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), slapd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/smbcontrol_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smbcontrol_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f4a491 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/smbcontrol_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "smbcontrol_selinux" "8" "smbcontrol" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "smbcontrol SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +smbcontrol_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smbcontrol processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux smbcontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbcontrol processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for smbcontrol: + + +.EX +.PP +.B smbcontrol_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smbcontrol_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smbcontrol_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux smbcontrol policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbcontrol processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for smbcontrol: + +.EX +.B smbcontrol_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), smbcontrol(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/smbd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smbd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..78125d2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/smbd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,151 @@ +.TH "smbd_selinux" "8" "smbd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "smbd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +smbd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smbd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. +.TP +Allow smbd servers to read the /var/smbd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/smbd(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/smbd +.pp +.TP +Allow smbd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_smbd_anon_write boolean to be set. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/smbd/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/smbd/incoming + + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to modify public files used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be labeled public_content_rw_t., you must turn on the allow_smbd_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_smbd_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux smbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for smbd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B smbd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smbd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smbd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B smbd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smbd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B smbd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smbd_tmp_t type, if you want to store smbd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B smbd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smbd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the smbd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/samba/gencache\.tdb, /var/run/samba/share_info\.tdb, /var/run/samba(/.*)?, /var/run/samba/locking\.tdb, /var/run/samba/connections\.tdb, /var/run/samba/smbd\.pid, /var/run/samba/sessionid\.tdb, /var/run/samba/brlock\.tdb + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux smbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for smbd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B smbd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux smbd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for smbd: + +.EX +.B smbcontrol_t, smbmount_t, smbd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), smbd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/smbmount_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smbmount_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e5fd258 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/smbmount_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "smbmount_selinux" "8" "smbmount" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "smbmount SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +smbmount_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smbmount processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux smbmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbmount processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for smbmount: + + +.EX +.PP +.B smbmount_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smbmount_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smbmount_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/smbmnt, /usr/bin/smbmount + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux smbmount policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smbmount processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for smbmount: + +.EX +.B smbmount_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), smbmount(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/smokeping_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smokeping_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6eb81ca --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/smokeping_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "smokeping_selinux" "8" "smokeping" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "smokeping SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +smokeping_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smokeping processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B smokeping +(Smokeping network latency measurement) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux smokeping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smokeping processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for smokeping: + + +.EX +.PP +.B smokeping_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smokeping_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smokeping_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B smokeping_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smokeping_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smokeping_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B smokeping_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smokeping_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the smokeping files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B smokeping_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smokeping_var_run_t type, if you want to store the smokeping files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux smokeping policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smokeping processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for smokeping: + +.EX +.B smokeping_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), smokeping(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/smoltclient_selinux.8 b/man/man8/smoltclient_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7290f4e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/smoltclient_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.TH "smoltclient_selinux" "8" "smoltclient" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "smoltclient SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +smoltclient_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the smoltclient processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B smoltclient +(The Fedora hardware profiler client) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux smoltclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smoltclient processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for smoltclient: + + +.EX +.PP +.B smoltclient_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smoltclient_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the smoltclient_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B smoltclient_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the smoltclient_tmp_t type, if you want to store smoltclient temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux smoltclient policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their smoltclient processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for smoltclient: + +.EX +.B smoltclient_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), smoltclient(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/snmpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/snmpd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce8506a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/snmpd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,141 @@ +.TH "snmpd_selinux" "8" "snmpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "snmpd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +snmpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the snmpd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux snmpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snmpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for snmpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B snmpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snmpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snmpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B snmpd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snmpd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snmpd_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/snmpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/snmptrapd + +.EX +.PP +.B snmpd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snmpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as snmpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B snmpd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snmpd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the snmpd files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/agentx(/.*)?, /usr/share/snmp/mibs/\.index, /var/net-snmp(/.*)?, /var/lib/net-snmp(/.*)?, /var/lib/snmp(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B snmpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snmpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the snmpd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/net-snmpd(/.*)?, /var/run/snmpd\.pid, /var/run/snmpd(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux snmpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snmpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for snmpd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B snmp_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux snmpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snmpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for snmpd: + +.EX +.B snmpd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), snmpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/snort_selinux.8 b/man/man8/snort_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a3cd80 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/snort_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.TH "snort_selinux" "8" "snort" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "snort SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +snort_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the snort processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B snort +(Snort network intrusion detection system) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux snort policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snort processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for snort: + + +.EX +.PP +.B snort_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snort_etc_t type, if you want to store snort files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B snort_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snort_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snort_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/snort-plain, /usr/s?bin/snort + +.EX +.PP +.B snort_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snort_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the snort_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B snort_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snort_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as snort log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B snort_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snort_tmp_t type, if you want to store snort temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B snort_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the snort_var_run_t type, if you want to store the snort files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux snort policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their snort processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for snort: + +.EX +.B snort_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), snort(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/sosreport_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sosreport_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d92aa21 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sosreport_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.TH "sosreport_selinux" "8" "sosreport" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sosreport SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sosreport_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sosreport processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sosreport +(sosreport - Generate debugging information for system) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sosreport policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sosreport processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sosreport: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sosreport_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sosreport_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sosreport_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sosreport_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sosreport_tmp_t type, if you want to store sosreport temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sosreport_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sosreport_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sosreport files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sosreport policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sosreport processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sosreport: + +.EX +.B sosreport_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sosreport(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/soundd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/soundd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c912c3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/soundd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +.TH "soundd_selinux" "8" "soundd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "soundd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +soundd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the soundd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux soundd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their soundd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for soundd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B soundd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the soundd_etc_t type, if you want to store soundd files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/yiff(/.*)?, /etc/nas(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B soundd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the soundd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the soundd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/gpe-soundserver, /usr/sbin/yiff, /usr/bin/nasd + +.EX +.PP +.B soundd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the soundd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the soundd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B soundd_state_t +.EE + +- Set files with the soundd_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as soundd state data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B soundd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the soundd_tmp_t type, if you want to store soundd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B soundd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the soundd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store soundd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B soundd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the soundd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the soundd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/nasd(/.*)?, /var/run/yiff-[0-9]+\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux soundd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their soundd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for soundd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B soundd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux soundd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their soundd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for soundd: + +.EX +.B soundd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), soundd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/spamass_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamass_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3285cb1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/spamass_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,106 @@ +.TH "spamass_selinux" "8" "spamass" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "spamass SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +spamass_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamass processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. spamass policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run spamass with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow user spamassassin clients to use the network, you must turn on the spamassassin_can_network boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P spamassassin_can_network 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux spamass policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamass processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for spamass: + + +.EX +.PP +.B spamass_milter_data_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamass_milter_data_t type, if you want to treat the files as spamass milter content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/spamass-milter(/.*)?, /var/run/spamass-milter\.pid + +.EX +.PP +.B spamass_milter_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamass_milter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamass_milter_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B spamass_milter_state_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamass_milter_state_t type, if you want to treat the files as spamass milter state data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux spamass policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamass processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for spamass: + +.EX +.B spamass_milter_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), spamass(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/spamc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3be61d7 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/spamc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "spamc_selinux" "8" "spamc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "spamc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +spamc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux spamc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for spamc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B spamc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/spamc, /usr/bin/razor.*, /usr/bin/sa-learn, /usr/bin/spamassassin + +.EX +.PP +.B spamc_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamc_home_t type, if you want to store spamc files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/root/\.razor(/.*)?, /root/\.spamassassin(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B spamc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamc_tmp_t type, if you want to store spamc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux spamc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for spamc: + +.EX +.B spamc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), spamc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/spamd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/spamd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cb40498 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/spamd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,222 @@ +.TH "spamd_selinux" "8" "spamd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "spamd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +spamd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the spamd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. spamd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run spamd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow user spamassassin clients to use the network, you must turn on the spamassassin_can_network boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P spamassassin_can_network 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow spamd to read/write user home directories, you must turn on the spamd_enable_home_dirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P spamd_enable_home_dirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow http daemon to check spa, you must turn on the httpd_can_check_spam boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_check_spam 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux spamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for spamd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_compiled_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_compiled_t type, if you want to treat the files as spamd compiled data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_etc_t type, if you want to store spamd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/spamd, /usr/bin/mimedefang-multiplexor, /usr/bin/spamd, /usr/bin/mimedefang + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/spamd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mimedefang.* + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as spamd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/razor-agent\.log, /var/log/spamd\.log, /var/log/mimedefang + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_spool_t type, if you want to store the spamd files under the /var/spool directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/spamd(/.*)?, /var/spool/spamassassin(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_tmp_t type, if you want to store spamd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_update_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_update_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the spamd_update_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the spamd files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/spamassassin(/.*)?, /var/lib/razor(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B spamd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the spamd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the spamd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/spamassassin(/.*)?, /var/spool/MIMEDefang(/.*)?, /var/spool/MD-Quarantine(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux spamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for spamd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B spamd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux spamd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their spamd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for spamd: + +.EX +.B spamc_t, spamd_t, spamd_update_t, spamass_milter_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), spamd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/squid_selinux.8 b/man/man8/squid_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5d1acc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/squid_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ +.TH "squid_selinux" "8" "squid" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "squid SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +squid_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the squid processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B squid +(Squid caching http proxy server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. squid policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run squid with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow squid to run as a transparent proxy (TPROXY, you must turn on the squid_use_tproxy boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P squid_use_tproxy 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow squid to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports, you must turn on the squid_connect_any boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P squid_connect_any 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux squid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for squid: + + +.EX +.PP +.B squid_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the squid_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/squid(/.*)?, /var/spool/squid(/.*)?, /var/squidGuard(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B squid_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the squid_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as squid configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/squid(/.*)?, /usr/share/squid(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B squid_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the squid_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the squid_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B squid_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the squid_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the squid_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B squid_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the squid_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as squid log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/squid(/.*)?, /var/log/squidGuard(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B squid_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the squid_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store squid files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B squid_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the squid_var_run_t type, if you want to store the squid files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux squid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for squid: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B squid_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux squid policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their squid processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for squid: + +.EX +.B squid_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), squid(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/srvsvcd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/srvsvcd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..036f028 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/srvsvcd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "srvsvcd_selinux" "8" "srvsvcd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "srvsvcd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +srvsvcd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the srvsvcd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux srvsvcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their srvsvcd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for srvsvcd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B srvsvcd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the srvsvcd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the srvsvcd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B srvsvcd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the srvsvcd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the srvsvcd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B srvsvcd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the srvsvcd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the srvsvcd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B srvsvcd_var_socket_t +.EE + +- Set files with the srvsvcd_var_socket_t type, if you want to treat the files as srvsvcd var socket data. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux srvsvcd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their srvsvcd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for srvsvcd: + +.EX +.B srvsvcd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), srvsvcd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ssh_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ssh_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a3beeec --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ssh_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,254 @@ +.TH "ssh_selinux" "8" "ssh" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ssh SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ssh_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ssh processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ssh +(Secure shell client and server policy) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ssh policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ssh with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow ssh with chroot env to read and write files in the user home directorie, you must turn on the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow host key based authenticatio, you must turn on the allow_ssh_keysign boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_ssh_keysign 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ssh: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_agent_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_agent_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_agent_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_agent_tmp_t type, if you want to store ssh agent temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_home_t type, if you want to store ssh files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?, /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?, /root/\.shosts, /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?, /root/\.ssh(/.*)?, /var/lib/stickshift/.*/\.ssh(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_keygen_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_keygen_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keygen_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_keysign_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_keysign_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keysign_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ssh files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_key_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as sshd key data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/primes + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sshd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sshd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/sshd\.init\.pid, /var/run/sshd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux ssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for ssh: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ssh_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ssh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ssh processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ssh: + +.EX +.B sshd_sandbox_t, ssh_keysign_t, ssh_keygen_t, ssh_t, sshd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ssh(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/sshd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sshd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b78c331 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sshd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,248 @@ +.TH "sshd_selinux" "8" "sshd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sshd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sshd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sshd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sshd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sshd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow ssh with chroot env to read and write files in the user home directorie, you must turn on the ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_, you must turn on the ssh_sysadm_login boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P ssh_sysadm_login 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow host key based authenticatio, you must turn on the allow_ssh_keysign boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_ssh_keysign 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow fenced domain to execute ssh, you must turn on the fenced_can_ssh boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P fenced_can_ssh 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow internal-sftp to read and write files in the user ssh home directories, you must turn on the sftpd_write_ssh_home boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sftpd_write_ssh_home 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sshd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sshd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_agent_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_agent_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_agent_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_agent_tmp_t type, if you want to store ssh agent temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_home_t type, if you want to store ssh files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)?, /var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)?, /root/\.shosts, /var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)?, /root/\.ssh(/.*)?, /var/lib/stickshift/.*/\.ssh(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_keygen_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_keygen_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keygen_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_keysign_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_keysign_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ssh_keysign_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ssh_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ssh_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store ssh files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sshd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_key_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_key_t type, if you want to treat the files as sshd key data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub, /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key, /etc/ssh/primes + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store sshd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sshd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sshd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sshd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/sshd\.init\.pid, /var/run/sshd\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux sshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sshd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for sshd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B ssh_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sshd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sshd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sshd: + +.EX +.B sshd_sandbox_t, ssh_keysign_t, ssh_keygen_t, ssh_t, sshd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sshd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/sssd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sssd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d9a7d4a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sssd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "sssd_selinux" "8" "sssd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sssd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sssd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sssd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sssd +(System Security Services Daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sssd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sssd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sssd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sssd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sssd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sssd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sssd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sssd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sssd_public_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sssd_public_t type, if you want to treat the files as sssd public data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sssd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sssd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the sssd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sssd_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sssd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sssd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B sssd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sssd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the sssd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sssd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sssd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sssd: + +.EX +.B sssd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sssd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/staff_selinux.8 b/man/man8/staff_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..039dc00 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/staff_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,244 @@ +.TH "staff_selinux" "8" "staff" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "staff SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +staff_u \- \fBAdministrator's unprivileged user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +\fBstaff_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux +policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBstaff_r\fP. The +default role has a default type, \fBstaff_t\fP, associated with it. + +The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like: + +.B staff_u:staff_r:staff_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023 + +Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login. +Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell. + +SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access. + +By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag + +On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user. + +You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using: + +.B semanage login -l + +If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the staff_u user, you would execute: + +.B semanage login -m -s staff_u __default__ + + +If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user staff, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage login -a -s staff_u joe + + +.SH USER DESCRIPTION + +The SELinux user staff_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role. + +.SH SUDO + +The SELinux user staff can execute sudo. + +You can set up sudo to allow staff to transition to an administrative domain: + +Add one or more of the following record to sudoers using visudo. + + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=ftpadmin_r TYPE=ftpadmin_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:ftpadmin_r:ftpadmin_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=auditadm_r TYPE=auditadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:auditadm_r:auditadm_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=dbadm_r TYPE=dbadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:dbadm_r:dbadm_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=logadm_r TYPE=logadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:logadm_r:logadm_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=secadm_r TYPE=secadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:secadm_r:secadm_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=sysadm_r TYPE=sysadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=unconfined_r TYPE=unconfined_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:unconfined_r:unconfined_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=webadm_r TYPE=webadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:webadm_r:webadm_t:LEVEL + +You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record. + +List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing: + +.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name + +Modify the roles list and add staff_r to this list. + +.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r ftpadmin_r auditadm_r dbadm_r logadm_r secadm_r sysadm_r unconfined_r webadm_r' staff_u + +For more details you can see semanage man page. + + +.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN + +The SELinux user staff_u is able to X Windows login. + +.SH TERMINAL LOGIN + +The SELinux user staff_u is able to terminal login. + +.SH NETWORK + +.TP +The SELinux user staff_u is able to listen on the following tcp ports. + +.B xserver_port_t: 6000-6020 + +.TP +The SELinux user staff_u is able to listen on the following udp ports. + +.B all ports with out defined types + +.TP +The SELinux user staff_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports. + +.B all ports + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. staff_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run staff_t with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ping 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1 +.EE + +.SH HOME_EXEC + +The SELinux user staff_u is able execute home content files. + +.SH TRANSITIONS + +Three things can happen when staff_t attempts to execute a program. + +\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny staff_t from executing the program. + +.TP + +\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow staff_t to execute the program in the current user type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user staff_t can execute without transitioning: + +.B sesearch -A -s staff_t -c file -p execute_no_trans + +.TP + +\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow staff_t to execute the program and transition to a new type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user staff_t can execute and transition: + +.B $ sesearch -A -s staff_t -c process -p transition + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/stunnel_selinux.8 b/man/man8/stunnel_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0af68a0 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/stunnel_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +.TH "stunnel_selinux" "8" "stunnel" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "stunnel SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +stunnel_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the stunnel processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B stunnel +(SSL Tunneling Proxy) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux stunnel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stunnel processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for stunnel: + + +.EX +.PP +.B stunnel_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the stunnel_etc_t type, if you want to store stunnel files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B stunnel_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the stunnel_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the stunnel_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/stunnel, /usr/bin/stunnel + +.EX +.PP +.B stunnel_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the stunnel_tmp_t type, if you want to store stunnel temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B stunnel_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the stunnel_var_run_t type, if you want to store the stunnel files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux stunnel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stunnel processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for stunnel: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B stunnel_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux stunnel policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their stunnel processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for stunnel: + +.EX +.B stunnel_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), stunnel(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/sulogin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sulogin_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6cff947 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sulogin_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "sulogin_selinux" "8" "sulogin" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sulogin SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sulogin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sulogin processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sulogin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sulogin processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sulogin: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sulogin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sulogin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sulogin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/sushell, /sbin/sulogin, /usr/sbin/sulogin, /sbin/sushell + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sulogin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sulogin processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sulogin: + +.EX +.B sulogin_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sulogin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/svc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/svc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1c06ece --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/svc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ +.TH "svc_selinux" "8" "svc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "svc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +svc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the svc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux svc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for svc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B svc_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the svc_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as svc configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/dnscache/env(/.*)?, /var/tinydns/env(/.*)?, /var/axfrdns/env(/.*)?, /var/service/.*/env(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B svc_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the svc_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as svc log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B svc_multilog_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the svc_multilog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svc_multilog_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B svc_run_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the svc_run_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svc_run_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/tinydns/run, /var/qmail/supervise/.*/run, /var/axfrdns/log/run, /usr/bin/setuidgid, /usr/bin/fghack, /var/tinydns/log/run, /var/service/.*/log/run, /var/axfrdns/run, /var/qmail/supervise/.*/log/run, /usr/bin/envuidgid, /usr/bin/envdir, /var/dnscache/run, /usr/bin/softlimit, /var/service/.*/run.*, /usr/bin/pgrphack, /var/dnscache/log/run, /usr/bin/setlock + +.EX +.PP +.B svc_start_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the svc_start_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the svc_start_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/svok, /usr/bin/svscan, /usr/bin/svc, /usr/bin/svscanboot, /usr/bin/supervise + +.EX +.PP +.B svc_svc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the svc_svc_t type, if you want to treat the files as svc svc data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/service, /var/tinydns(/.*)?, /service/.*, /var/service/.*, /var/qmail/supervise(/.*)?, /var/dnscache(/.*)?, /var/axfrdns(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux svc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their svc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for svc: + +.EX +.B svc_multilog_t, svc_start_t, svc_run_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), svc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/swat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/swat_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd9a083 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/swat_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ +.TH "swat_selinux" "8" "swat" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "swat SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +swat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the swat processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux swat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their swat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for swat: + + +.EX +.PP +.B swat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the swat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the swat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B swat_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the swat_tmp_t type, if you want to store swat temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B swat_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the swat_var_run_t type, if you want to store the swat files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux swat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their swat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for swat: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B swat_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux swat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their swat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for swat: + +.EX +.B swat_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), swat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/sysadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sysadm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..679f836 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sysadm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,230 @@ +.TH "sysadm_selinux" "8" "sysadm" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "sysadm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sysadm_u \- \fBGeneral system administration role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +\fBsysadm_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux +policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBsysadm_r\fP. The +default role has a default type, \fBsysadm_t\fP, associated with it. + +The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like: + +.B sysadm_u:sysadm_r:sysadm_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023 + +Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login. +Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell. + +SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access. + +By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag + +On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user. + +You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using: + +.B semanage login -l + +If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the sysadm_u user, you would execute: + +.B semanage login -m -s sysadm_u __default__ + + +If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user sysadm, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage login -a -s sysadm_u joe + + +.SH USER DESCRIPTION + +The SELinux user sysadm_u is an admin user. It means that a mapped Linux user to this SELinux user is intended for administrative actions. Usually this is assigned to a root Linux user. + +.SH SUDO + +The SELinux user sysadm can execute sudo. + +You can set up sudo to allow sysadm to transition to an administrative domain: + +Add one or more of the following record to sudoers using visudo. + + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=auditadm_r TYPE=auditadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:auditadm_r:auditadm_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=secadm_r TYPE=secadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:secadm_r:secadm_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=staff_r TYPE=staff_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:staff_r:staff_t:LEVEL + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=user_r TYPE=user_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as sysadm_u:user_r:user_t:LEVEL + +You might also need to add one or more of these new roles to your SELinux user record. + +List the SELinux roles your SELinux user can reach by executing: + +.B $ semanage user -l |grep selinux_name + +Modify the roles list and add sysadm_r to this list. + +.B $ semanage user -m -R 'sysadm_r auditadm_r secadm_r staff_r user_r' sysadm_u + +For more details you can see semanage man page. + + +.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN + +The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to X Windows login. + +.SH TERMINAL LOGIN + +The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to terminal login. + +.SH NETWORK + +.TP +The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to listen on the following tcp ports. + +.B all ports with out defined types + +.TP +The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to listen on the following udp ports. + +.B ntp_port_t: 123 + +.B all ports with out defined types + +.TP +The SELinux user sysadm_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports. + +.B all ports + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. sysadm_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run sysadm_t with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ping 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1 +.EE + +.SH HOME_EXEC + +The SELinux user sysadm_u is able execute home content files. + +.SH TRANSITIONS + +Three things can happen when sysadm_t attempts to execute a program. + +\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny sysadm_t from executing the program. + +.TP + +\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow sysadm_t to execute the program in the current user type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user sysadm_t can execute without transitioning: + +.B sesearch -A -s sysadm_t -c file -p execute_no_trans + +.TP + +\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow sysadm_t to execute the program and transition to a new type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user sysadm_t can execute and transition: + +.B $ sesearch -A -s sysadm_t -c process -p transition + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/syslogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/syslogd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..875440a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/syslogd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,182 @@ +.TH "syslogd_selinux" "8" "syslogd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "syslogd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +syslogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the syslogd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. syslogd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run syslogd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to determine whether Polipo session daemon can send syslog messages, you must turn on the polipo_session_send_syslog_msg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P polipo_session_send_syslog_msg 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow syslogd daemon to send mai, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_can_sendmail boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_can_sendmail 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow syslogd the ability to read/write terminal, you must turn on the logging_syslogd_use_tty boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P logging_syslogd_use_tty 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux syslogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their syslogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for syslogd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B syslog_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the syslog_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as syslog configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rsyslog.conf, /etc/syslog.conf + +.EX +.PP +.B syslogd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the syslogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the syslogd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/systemd-kmsg-syslogd, /usr/sbin/rsyslogd, /usr/sbin/syslog-ng, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-kmsg-syslogd, /usr/sbin/metalog, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-journald, /usr/sbin/syslogd, /usr/sbin/minilogd, /sbin/rsyslogd, /sbin/syslogd, /sbin/syslog-ng, /sbin/minilogd, /lib/systemd/systemd-journald + +.EX +.PP +.B syslogd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the syslogd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the syslogd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B syslogd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the syslogd_tmp_t type, if you want to store syslogd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B syslogd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the syslogd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the syslogd files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/syslog-ng.persist, /var/lib/r?syslog(/.*)?, /var/lib/syslog-ng(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B syslogd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the syslogd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the syslogd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/syslog-ng(/.*)?, /var/run/syslog-ng(/.*)?, /var/run/metalog\.pid, /var/run/syslogd\.pid, /var/run/log(/.*)?, /var/run/syslog-ng.ctl + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux syslogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their syslogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for syslogd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B syslogd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux syslogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their syslogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for syslogd: + +.EX +.B syslogd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), syslogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/sysstat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/sysstat_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..79ea311 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/sysstat_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.TH "sysstat_selinux" "8" "sysstat" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "sysstat SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +sysstat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the sysstat processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B sysstat +(Policy for sysstat. Reports on various system states) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux sysstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sysstat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for sysstat: + + +.EX +.PP +.B sysstat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sysstat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the sysstat_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/sa/sa.*, /usr/lib/sysstat/sa.*, /usr/lib/atsar/atsa.* + +.EX +.PP +.B sysstat_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the sysstat_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as sysstat log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/sysstat(/.*)?, /var/log/sa(/.*)?, /var/log/atsar(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux sysstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their sysstat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for sysstat: + +.EX +.B sysstat_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), sysstat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/system_selinux.8 b/man/man8/system_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a08a3e0 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/system_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ +.TH "system_selinux" "8" "system" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "system SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +system_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the system processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. system policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run system with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow Git daemon system to access cifs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_cifs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P git_system_use_cifs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Git daemon system to search home directories, you must turn on the git_system_enable_homedirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P git_system_enable_homedirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Git daemon system to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to enable support for systemd as the init program, you must turn on the init_systemd boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P init_systemd 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux system policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their system processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for system: + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as system configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/sysctl\.conf(\.old)?, /etc/sysconfig/ipvsadm.*, /etc/sysconfig/ebtables.*, /etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.*, /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.* + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cron_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cron_spool_t type, if you want to store the system cron files under the /var/spool directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/crontab, /var/spool/anacron(/.*)?, /etc/cron\.d(/.*)?, /var/spool/fcron/systab\.orig, /var/spool/fcron/new\.systab, /var/spool/fcron/systab + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cronjob_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cronjob_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as system cronjob lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cronjob_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cronjob_tmp_t type, if you want to store system cronjob temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cronjob_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cronjob_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the system cronjob files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cronjob_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cronjob_var_run_t type, if you want to store the system cronjob files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_dbusd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_dbusd_tmp_t type, if you want to store system dbusd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_dbusd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_dbusd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the system dbusd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_dbusd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_dbusd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the system dbusd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/named/chroot/var/run/dbus(/.*)?, /var/run/dbus(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B system_mail_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store system mail temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_map_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_map_t type, if you want to treat the files as system map data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/boot/System\.map(-.*)?, /boot/efi(/.*)?/System\.map(-.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B system_munin_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the system_munin_plugin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/munin/plugins/proc_pri, /usr/share/munin/plugins/swap, /usr/share/munin/plugins/interrupts, /usr/share/munin/plugins/cpu.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/yum, /usr/share/munin/plugins/load, /usr/share/munin/plugins/irqstats, /usr/share/munin/plugins/processes, /usr/share/munin/plugins/iostat.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/nfs.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/munin_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/threads, /usr/share/munin/plugins/netstat, /usr/share/munin/plugins/acpi, /usr/share/munin/plugins/forks, /usr/share/munin/plugins/uptime, /usr/share/munin/plugins/users, /usr/share/munin/plugins/memory, /usr/share/munin/plugins/if_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/open_files + +.EX +.PP +.B system_munin_plugin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store system munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_logger_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_logger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logger_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/systemd-logger, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logger + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_logind_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_logind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logind_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/systemd-logind, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logind + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_logind_sessions_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_logind_sessions_t type, if you want to treat the files as systemd logind sessions data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_logind_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_logind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd logind files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/systemd/users(/.*)?, /var/run/systemd/seats(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_notify_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_notify_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_notify_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/systemd-notify, /bin/systemd-notify + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_passwd_agent_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-gnome-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_passwd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd passwd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?, /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_systemctl_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_systemctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_systemctl_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/systemctl, /bin/systemctl + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_tmpfiles_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-tmpfiles, /lib/systemd/systemd-tmpfiles + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as systemd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system(/.*)?, /lib/systemd/system(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux system policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their system processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for system: + +.EX +.B system_munin_plugin_t, systemd_logger_t, systemd_logind_t, system_cronjob_t, systemd_notify_t, system_mail_t, systemd_passwd_agent_t, system_dbusd_t, systemd_tmpfiles_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), system(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/systemd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/systemd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..93fe832 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/systemd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,345 @@ +.TH "systemd_selinux" "8" "systemd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "systemd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +systemd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the systemd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B systemd +(SELinux policy for systemd components) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. systemd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run systemd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow Git daemon system to access cifs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_cifs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P git_system_use_cifs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Git daemon system to search home directories, you must turn on the git_system_enable_homedirs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P git_system_enable_homedirs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow Git daemon system to access nfs file systems, you must turn on the git_system_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P git_system_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to enable support for systemd as the init program, you must turn on the init_systemd boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P init_systemd 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux systemd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for systemd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as system configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/sysctl\.conf(\.old)?, /etc/sysconfig/ipvsadm.*, /etc/sysconfig/ebtables.*, /etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.*, /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.* + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cron_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cron_spool_t type, if you want to store the system cron files under the /var/spool directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/crontab, /var/spool/anacron(/.*)?, /etc/cron\.d(/.*)?, /var/spool/fcron/systab\.orig, /var/spool/fcron/new\.systab, /var/spool/fcron/systab + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cronjob_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cronjob_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as system cronjob lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cronjob_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cronjob_tmp_t type, if you want to store system cronjob temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cronjob_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cronjob_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the system cronjob files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_cronjob_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_cronjob_var_run_t type, if you want to store the system cronjob files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_dbusd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_dbusd_tmp_t type, if you want to store system dbusd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_dbusd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_dbusd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the system dbusd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_dbusd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_dbusd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the system dbusd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/named/chroot/var/run/dbus(/.*)?, /var/run/dbus(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B system_mail_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_mail_tmp_t type, if you want to store system mail temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B system_map_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_map_t type, if you want to treat the files as system map data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/boot/System\.map(-.*)?, /boot/efi(/.*)?/System\.map(-.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B system_munin_plugin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_munin_plugin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the system_munin_plugin_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/share/munin/plugins/proc_pri, /usr/share/munin/plugins/swap, /usr/share/munin/plugins/interrupts, /usr/share/munin/plugins/cpu.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/yum, /usr/share/munin/plugins/load, /usr/share/munin/plugins/irqstats, /usr/share/munin/plugins/processes, /usr/share/munin/plugins/iostat.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/nfs.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/munin_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/threads, /usr/share/munin/plugins/netstat, /usr/share/munin/plugins/acpi, /usr/share/munin/plugins/forks, /usr/share/munin/plugins/uptime, /usr/share/munin/plugins/users, /usr/share/munin/plugins/memory, /usr/share/munin/plugins/if_.*, /usr/share/munin/plugins/open_files + +.EX +.PP +.B system_munin_plugin_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the system_munin_plugin_tmp_t type, if you want to store system munin plugin temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_logger_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_logger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logger_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/systemd-logger, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logger + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_logind_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_logind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_logind_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/systemd/systemd-logind, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logind + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_logind_sessions_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_logind_sessions_t type, if you want to treat the files as systemd logind sessions data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_logind_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_logind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd logind files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/systemd/users(/.*)?, /var/run/systemd/seats(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_notify_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_notify_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_notify_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/systemd-notify, /bin/systemd-notify + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_passwd_agent_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-gnome-ask-password-agent, /usr/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_passwd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_passwd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the systemd passwd files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)?, /var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_systemctl_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_systemctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_systemctl_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/systemctl, /bin/systemctl + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the systemd_tmpfiles_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /bin/systemd-tmpfiles, /usr/lib/systemd/systemd-tmpfiles, /lib/systemd/systemd-tmpfiles + +.EX +.PP +.B systemd_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the systemd_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as systemd unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system(/.*)?, /lib/systemd/system(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux systemd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their systemd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for systemd: + +.EX +.B system_munin_plugin_t, systemd_logger_t, systemd_logind_t, system_cronjob_t, systemd_notify_t, system_mail_t, systemd_passwd_agent_t, system_dbusd_t, systemd_tmpfiles_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), systemd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/tcpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tcpd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5543123 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/tcpd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +.TH "tcpd_selinux" "8" "tcpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "tcpd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +tcpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tcpd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B tcpd +(Policy for TCP daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. tcpd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run tcpd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow the Telepathy connection managers to connect to any generic TCP port, you must turn on the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow all daemons to use tcp wrappers, you must turn on the allow_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux tcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for tcpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B tcpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tcpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tcpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tcpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tcpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store tcpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux tcpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for tcpd: + +.EX +.B tcpd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), tcpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/tcsd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tcsd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..514ced5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/tcsd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,119 @@ +.TH "tcsd_selinux" "8" "tcsd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "tcsd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +tcsd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tcsd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B tcsd +(TSS Core Services (TCS) daemon (tcsd) policy) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux tcsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for tcsd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B tcsd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tcsd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tcsd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tcsd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tcsd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tcsd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tcsd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tcsd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tcsd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux tcsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for tcsd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B tcs_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux tcsd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tcsd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for tcsd: + +.EX +.B tcsd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), tcsd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/telepathy_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telepathy_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..996878a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/telepathy_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,311 @@ +.TH "telepathy_selinux" "8" "telepathy" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "telepathy SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +telepathy_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telepathy processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B telepathy +(Telepathy communications framework) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. telepathy policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run telepathy with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow the Telepathy connection managers to connect to any generic TCP port, you must turn on the telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow the Telepathy connection managers to connect to any network port, you must turn on the telepathy_connect_all_ports boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P telepathy_connect_all_ports 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux telepathy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for telepathy: + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_cache_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy cache files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_data_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_data_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy data files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy gabble cache files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_gabble_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_gabble_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_gabble_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_gabble_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_gabble_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy gabble temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_idle_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_idle_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_idle_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_idle_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_idle_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy idle temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_logger_cache_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_logger_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy logger cache files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_logger_data_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_logger_data_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy logger data files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_logger_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_logger_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_logger_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_logger_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_logger_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy logger temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control cache files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control data files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_mission_control_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_mission_control_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_mission_control_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_mission_control_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_mission_control_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy mission control temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_msn_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_msn_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_msn_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/libexec/telepathy-butterfly, /usr/libexec/telepathy-haze + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_msn_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_msn_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy msn temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_salut_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_salut_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_salut_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_salut_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_salut_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy salut temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_sofiasip_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_sofiasip_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_sofiasip_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_sofiasip_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_sofiasip_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy sofiasip temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_stream_engine_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_stream_engine_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_stream_engine_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_stream_engine_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_stream_engine_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy stream engine temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_sunshine_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_sunshine_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telepathy_sunshine_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_sunshine_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_sunshine_home_t type, if you want to store telepathy sunshine files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telepathy_sunshine_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telepathy_sunshine_tmp_t type, if you want to store telepathy sunshine temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux telepathy policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telepathy processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for telepathy: + +.EX +.B telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_sofiasip_t, telepathy_idle_t, telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_salut_t, telepathy_sunshine_t, telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_stream_engine_t, telepathy_msn_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), telepathy(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/telnetd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/telnetd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34d5d8c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/telnetd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "telnetd_selinux" "8" "telnetd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "telnetd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +telnetd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the telnetd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux telnetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telnetd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for telnetd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B telnetd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telnetd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the telnetd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/kerberos/sbin/telnetd, /usr/sbin/in\.telnetd + +.EX +.PP +.B telnetd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telnetd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telnetd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telnetd_tmp_t type, if you want to store telnetd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B telnetd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the telnetd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the telnetd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux telnetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telnetd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for telnetd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B telnetd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux telnetd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their telnetd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for telnetd: + +.EX +.B telnetd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), telnetd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/tftpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tftpd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7bdb6b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/tftpd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,155 @@ +.TH "tftpd_selinux" "8" "tftpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "tftpd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +tftpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tftpd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. +.TP +Allow tftpd servers to read the /var/tftpd directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/tftpd(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/tftpd +.pp +.TP +Allow tftpd servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_tftpd_anon_write boolean to be set. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/tftpd/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/tftpd/incoming + + +.PP +If you want to allow tftp to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the tftp_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P tftp_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux tftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tftpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for tftpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B tftpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tftpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tftpd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/in\.tftpd, /usr/sbin/atftpd + +.EX +.PP +.B tftpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tftpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tftpd files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tftpdir_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tftpdir_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as tftpdir read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tftpdir_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tftpdir_t type, if you want to treat the files as tftpdir data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/tftpboot/.*, /tftpboot + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux tftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tftpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for tftpd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B tftp_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux tftpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tftpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for tftpd: + +.EX +.B tftpd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), tftpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/tgtd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tgtd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ed0f28a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/tgtd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "tgtd_selinux" "8" "tgtd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "tgtd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +tgtd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tgtd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B tgtd +(Linux Target Framework Daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux tgtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tgtd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for tgtd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B tgtd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tgtd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tgtd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tgtd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tgtd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tgtd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tgtd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tgtd_tmp_t type, if you want to store tgtd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tgtd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tgtd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store tgtd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tgtd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tgtd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tgtd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tgtd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tgtd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tgtd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux tgtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tgtd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for tgtd: + +.EX +.B tgtd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), tgtd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/thin_selinux.8 b/man/man8/thin_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c7f6423 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/thin_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +.TH "thin_selinux" "8" "thin" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "thin SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +thin_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the thin processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux thin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thin processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for thin: + + +.EX +.PP +.B thin_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the thin_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the thin_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B thin_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the thin_var_run_t type, if you want to store the thin files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux thin policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thin processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for thin: + +.EX +.B thin_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), thin(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/thumb_selinux.8 b/man/man8/thumb_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b03036c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/thumb_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,89 @@ +.TH "thumb_selinux" "8" "thumb" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "thumb SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +thumb_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the thumb processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B thumb +(policy for thumb) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux thumb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thumb processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for thumb: + + +.EX +.PP +.B thumb_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the thumb_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the thumb_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/whaaw-thumbnailer, /usr/lib/tumbler[^/]*/tumblerd, /usr/bin/raw-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/evince-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/[^/]*thumbnailer, /usr/bin/ffmpegthumbnailer, /usr/bin/shotwell-video-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/gsf-office-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/gnome-thumbnail-font, /usr/bin/totem-video-thumbnailer, /usr/bin/gnome-[^/]*-thumbnailer(.sh)? + +.EX +.PP +.B thumb_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the thumb_tmp_t type, if you want to store thumb temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux thumb policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their thumb processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for thumb: + +.EX +.B thumb_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), thumb(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/tmpreaper_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tmpreaper_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53468d0 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/tmpreaper_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "tmpreaper_selinux" "8" "tmpreaper" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "tmpreaper SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +tmpreaper_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tmpreaper processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B tmpreaper +(Manage temporary directory sizes and file ages) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux tmpreaper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tmpreaper processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for tmpreaper: + + +.EX +.PP +.B tmpreaper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tmpreaper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tmpreaper_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/tmpwatch, /usr/sbin/tmpreaper + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux tmpreaper policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tmpreaper processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for tmpreaper: + +.EX +.B tmpreaper_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), tmpreaper(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/tor_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tor_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ec79ef --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/tor_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,177 @@ +.TH "tor_selinux" "8" "tor" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "tor SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +tor_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tor processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B tor +(TOR, the onion router) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. tor policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run tor with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow tor daemon to bind tcp sockets to all unreserved ports, you must turn on the tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P tor_bind_all_unreserved_ports 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux tor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tor processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for tor: + + +.EX +.PP +.B tor_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tor_etc_t type, if you want to store tor files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tor_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tor_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tor_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/tor, /usr/bin/tor + +.EX +.PP +.B tor_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tor_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tor_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tor_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tor_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the tor files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/tor(/.*)?, /var/lib/tor-data(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B tor_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tor_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as tor var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tor_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tor_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tor files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux tor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tor processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for tor: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B tor_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B tor_socks_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux tor policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tor processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for tor: + +.EX +.B tor_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), tor(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/traceroute_selinux.8 b/man/man8/traceroute_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4ea5dd --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/traceroute_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "traceroute_selinux" "8" "traceroute" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "traceroute SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +traceroute_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the traceroute processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux traceroute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their traceroute processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for traceroute: + + +.EX +.PP +.B traceroute_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the traceroute_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the traceroute_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/bin/tracepath.*, /usr/bin/traceroute.*, /usr/bin/nmap, /usr/bin/lft, /bin/traceroute.*, /usr/bin/tracepath.*, /usr/sbin/traceroute.*, /usr/bin/mtr + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux traceroute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their traceroute processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for traceroute: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B traceroute_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux traceroute policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their traceroute processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for traceroute: + +.EX +.B traceroute_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), traceroute(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/tuned_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tuned_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..824c519 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/tuned_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +.TH "tuned_selinux" "8" "tuned" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "tuned SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +tuned_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tuned processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B tuned +(Dynamic adaptive system tuning daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux tuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tuned processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for tuned: + + +.EX +.PP +.B tuned_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tuned_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tuned_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tuned_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tuned_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tuned_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tuned_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tuned_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as tuned log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/tuned(/.*)?, /var/log/tuned\.log + +.EX +.PP +.B tuned_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tuned_var_run_t type, if you want to store the tuned files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux tuned policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tuned processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for tuned: + +.EX +.B tuned_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), tuned(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/tvtime_selinux.8 b/man/man8/tvtime_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0694cf9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/tvtime_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "tvtime_selinux" "8" "tvtime" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "tvtime SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +tvtime_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the tvtime processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B tvtime +( tvtime - a high quality television application ) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux tvtime policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tvtime processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for tvtime: + + +.EX +.PP +.B tvtime_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tvtime_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the tvtime_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tvtime_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tvtime_home_t type, if you want to store tvtime files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tvtime_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tvtime_tmp_t type, if you want to store tvtime temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B tvtime_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the tvtime_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store tvtime files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux tvtime policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their tvtime processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for tvtime: + +.EX +.B tvtime_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), tvtime(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/udev_selinux.8 b/man/man8/udev_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e90dada --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/udev_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,121 @@ +.TH "udev_selinux" "8" "udev" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "udev SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +udev_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the udev processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B udev +(Policy for udev) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux udev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their udev processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for udev: + + +.EX +.PP +.B udev_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the udev_etc_t type, if you want to store udev files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B udev_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the udev_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the udev_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/lib/udev/udevd, /sbin/udevd, /sbin/udev, /usr/sbin/wait_for_sysfs, /sbin/udevsend, /usr/sbin/udevadm, /usr/bin/udevadm, /usr/bin/udevinfo, /usr/sbin/start_udev, /usr/sbin/udev, /usr/sbin/udevsend, /sbin/start_udev, /sbin/udevstart, /bin/udevadm, /sbin/wait_for_sysfs, /lib/udev/udev-acl, /sbin/udevadm, /usr/sbin/udevd, /usr/sbin/udevstart, /usr/lib/udev/udev-acl, /usr/lib/udev/udevd + +.EX +.PP +.B udev_helper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the udev_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the udev_helper_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/udev/scripts/.+, /etc/hotplug\.d/default/udev.*, /etc/dev\.d/.+ + +.EX +.PP +.B udev_rules_t +.EE + +- Set files with the udev_rules_t type, if you want to treat the files as udev rules data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B udev_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the udev_var_run_t type, if you want to store the udev files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/udev(/.*)?, /dev/\.udevdb, /var/run/PackageKit/udev(/.*)?, /dev/\.udev(/.*)?, /dev/udev\.tbl, /var/run/libgpod(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux udev policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their udev processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for udev: + +.EX +.B udev_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), udev(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ulogd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ulogd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3ab14e4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ulogd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +.TH "ulogd_selinux" "8" "ulogd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ulogd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ulogd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ulogd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B ulogd +(Iptables/netfilter userspace logging daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ulogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ulogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ulogd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ulogd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ulogd_etc_t type, if you want to store ulogd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ulogd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ulogd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ulogd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ulogd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ulogd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ulogd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ulogd_modules_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ulogd_modules_t type, if you want to treat the files as ulogd modules. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ulogd_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ulogd_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as ulogd var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ulogd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ulogd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ulogd: + +.EX +.B ulogd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ulogd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/uml_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uml_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..34355cf --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/uml_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ +.TH "uml_selinux" "8" "uml" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "uml SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +uml_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uml processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B uml +(Policy for UML) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux uml policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uml processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for uml: + + +.EX +.PP +.B uml_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uml_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uml_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uml_ro_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uml_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as uml read/only content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uml_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uml_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as uml read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uml_switch_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uml_switch_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uml_switch_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uml_switch_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uml_switch_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uml switch files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uml_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uml_tmp_t type, if you want to store uml temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uml_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uml_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store uml files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux uml policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uml processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for uml: + +.EX +.B uml_switch_t, uml_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), uml(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/unconfined_selinux.8 b/man/man8/unconfined_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..49f0e32 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/unconfined_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,131 @@ +.TH "unconfined_selinux" "8" "unconfined" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "unconfined SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +unconfined_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the unconfined processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B unconfined +(The unconfined domain) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. unconfined policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run unconfined with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow database admins to execute DML statemen, you must turn on the sepgsql_unconfined_dbadm boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P sepgsql_unconfined_dbadm 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container, you must turn on the unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow a user to login as an unconfined domai, you must turn on the unconfined_login boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P unconfined_login 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbo, you must turn on the unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow samba to run unconfined script, you must turn on the samba_run_unconfined boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P samba_run_unconfined 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow video playing tools to run unconfine, you must turn on the unconfined_mplayer boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P unconfined_mplayer 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux unconfined policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their unconfined processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for unconfined: + + +.EX +.PP +.B unconfined_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the unconfined_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the unconfined_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/vncserver, /usr/sbin/xrdp, /usr/sbin/xrdp-sesman + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux unconfined policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their unconfined processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for unconfined: + +.EX +.B unconfined_cronjob_t, unconfined_dbusd_t, unconfined_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), unconfined(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/update_selinux.8 b/man/man8/update_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df3a1eb --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/update_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "update_selinux" "8" "update" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "update SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +update_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the update processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux update policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their update processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for update: + + +.EX +.PP +.B update_modules_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the update_modules_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the update_modules_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/modules-update, /usr/sbin/update-modules, /sbin/modules-update, /sbin/generate-modprobe\.conf, /sbin/update-modules, /usr/sbin/generate-modprobe\.conf + +.EX +.PP +.B update_modules_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the update_modules_tmp_t type, if you want to store update modules temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux update policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their update processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for update: + +.EX +.B update_modules_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), update(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/updfstab_selinux.8 b/man/man8/updfstab_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..17c099b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/updfstab_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "updfstab_selinux" "8" "updfstab" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "updfstab SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +updfstab_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the updfstab processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B updfstab +(Red Hat utility to change /etc/fstab) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux updfstab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updfstab processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for updfstab: + + +.EX +.PP +.B updfstab_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the updfstab_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the updfstab_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/updfstab, /usr/sbin/fstab-sync + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux updfstab policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updfstab processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for updfstab: + +.EX +.B updfstab_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), updfstab(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/updpwd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/updpwd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b48fb1b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/updpwd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "updpwd_selinux" "8" "updpwd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "updpwd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +updpwd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the updpwd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux updpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updpwd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for updpwd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B updpwd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the updpwd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the updpwd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/unix_update, /usr/sbin/unix_update + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux updpwd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their updpwd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for updpwd: + +.EX +.B updpwd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), updpwd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/usbmodules_selinux.8 b/man/man8/usbmodules_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83e61e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/usbmodules_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "usbmodules_selinux" "8" "usbmodules" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "usbmodules SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +usbmodules_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the usbmodules processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B usbmodules +(List kernel modules of USB devices) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux usbmodules policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmodules processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for usbmodules: + + +.EX +.PP +.B usbmodules_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the usbmodules_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the usbmodules_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/usbmodules, /sbin/usbmodules + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux usbmodules policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmodules processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for usbmodules: + +.EX +.B usbmodules_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), usbmodules(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/usbmuxd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/usbmuxd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a8d74de --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/usbmuxd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +.TH "usbmuxd_selinux" "8" "usbmuxd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "usbmuxd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +usbmuxd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the usbmuxd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B usbmuxd +(USB multiplexing daemon for communicating with Apple iPod Touch and iPhone) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux usbmuxd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmuxd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for usbmuxd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B usbmuxd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the usbmuxd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the usbmuxd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B usbmuxd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the usbmuxd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the usbmuxd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux usbmuxd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usbmuxd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for usbmuxd: + +.EX +.B usbmuxd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), usbmuxd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/user_selinux.8 b/man/man8/user_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a2082e9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/user_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +.TH "user_selinux" "8" "user" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "user SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +user_u \- \fBGeneric unprivileged user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +\fBuser_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux +policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBuser_r\fP. The +default role has a default type, \fBuser_t\fP, associated with it. + +The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like: + +.B user_u:user_r:user_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023 + +Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login. +Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell. + +SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access. + +By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag + +On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user. + +You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using: + +.B semanage login -l + +If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the user_u user, you would execute: + +.B semanage login -m -s user_u __default__ + + +If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user user, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage login -a -s user_u joe + + +.SH USER DESCRIPTION + +The SELinux user user_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role. + +.SH SUDO + +The SELinux type user_t is not allowed to execute sudo. + +.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN + +The SELinux user user_u is able to X Windows login. + +.SH TERMINAL LOGIN + +The SELinux user user_u is able to terminal login. + +.SH NETWORK + +.TP +The SELinux user user_u is able to listen on the following tcp ports. + +.B xserver_port_t: 6000-6020 + +.TP +The SELinux user user_u is able to listen on the following udp ports. + +.B all ports with out defined types + +.TP +The SELinux user user_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports. + +.B all ports + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. user_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run user_t with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ping 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1 +.EE + +.SH HOME_EXEC + +The SELinux user user_u is able execute home content files. + +.SH TRANSITIONS + +Three things can happen when user_t attempts to execute a program. + +\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny user_t from executing the program. + +.TP + +\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow user_t to execute the program in the current user type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user user_t can execute without transitioning: + +.B sesearch -A -s user_t -c file -p execute_no_trans + +.TP + +\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow user_t to execute the program and transition to a new type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user user_t can execute and transition: + +.B $ sesearch -A -s user_t -c process -p transition + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/useradd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/useradd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8ad5cf6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/useradd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "useradd_selinux" "8" "useradd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "useradd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +useradd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the useradd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux useradd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their useradd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for useradd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B useradd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the useradd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the useradd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/useradd, /usr/sbin/usermod, /usr/sbin/userdel + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux useradd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their useradd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for useradd: + +.EX +.B useradd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), useradd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/usernetctl_selinux.8 b/man/man8/usernetctl_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8789d75 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/usernetctl_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "usernetctl_selinux" "8" "usernetctl" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "usernetctl SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +usernetctl_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the usernetctl processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B usernetctl +(User network interface configuration helper) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux usernetctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usernetctl processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for usernetctl: + + +.EX +.PP +.B usernetctl_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the usernetctl_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the usernetctl_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux usernetctl policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their usernetctl processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for usernetctl: + +.EX +.B usernetctl_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), usernetctl(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/utempter_selinux.8 b/man/man8/utempter_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a311394 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/utempter_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "utempter_selinux" "8" "utempter" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "utempter SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +utempter_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the utempter processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux utempter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their utempter processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for utempter: + + +.EX +.PP +.B utempter_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the utempter_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the utempter_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux utempter policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their utempter processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for utempter: + +.EX +.B utempter_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), utempter(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/uucpd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uucpd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..10de0a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/uucpd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,157 @@ +.TH "uucpd_selinux" "8" "uucpd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "uucpd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +uucpd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uucpd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux uucpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uucpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for uucpd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B uucpd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uucpd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uucpd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uucpd_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uucpd_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as uucpd lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B uucpd_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uucpd_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as uucpd log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uucpd_ro_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uucpd_ro_t type, if you want to treat the files as uucpd read/only content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uucpd_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uucpd_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as uucpd read/write content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uucpd_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uucpd_spool_t type, if you want to store the uucpd files under the /var/spool directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/spool/uucppublic(/.*)?, /var/spool/uucp(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B uucpd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uucpd_tmp_t type, if you want to store uucpd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uucpd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uucpd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uucpd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux uucpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uucpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for uucpd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B uucpd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux uucpd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uucpd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for uucpd: + +.EX +.B uucpd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), uucpd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/uuidd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uuidd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..82a5e37 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/uuidd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "uuidd_selinux" "8" "uuidd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "uuidd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +uuidd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uuidd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B uuidd +(policy for uuidd) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux uuidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uuidd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for uuidd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B uuidd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uuidd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uuidd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uuidd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uuidd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uuidd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uuidd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uuidd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the uuidd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B uuidd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uuidd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the uuidd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux uuidd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uuidd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for uuidd: + +.EX +.B uuidd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), uuidd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/uux_selinux.8 b/man/man8/uux_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c1913bf --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/uux_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "uux_selinux" "8" "uux" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "uux SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +uux_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the uux processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux uux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uux processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for uux: + + +.EX +.PP +.B uux_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the uux_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the uux_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux uux policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their uux processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for uux: + +.EX +.B uux_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), uux(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/varnishd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/varnishd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..97d1ed5 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/varnishd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,158 @@ +.TH "varnishd_selinux" "8" "varnishd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "varnishd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +varnishd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the varnishd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B varnishd +(Varnishd http accelerator daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. varnishd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run varnishd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow varnishd to connect to all ports, not just HTTP, you must turn on the varnishd_connect_any boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P varnishd_connect_any 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux varnishd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for varnishd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishd_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishd_etc_t type, if you want to store varnishd files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishd_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishd_tmp_t type, if you want to store varnishd temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the varnishd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the varnishd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux varnishd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for varnishd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B varnishd_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux varnishd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for varnishd: + +.EX +.B varnishd_t, varnishlog_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), varnishd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/varnishlog_selinux.8 b/man/man8/varnishlog_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a761366 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/varnishlog_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +.TH "varnishlog_selinux" "8" "varnishlog" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "varnishlog SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +varnishlog_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the varnishlog processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux varnishlog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishlog processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for varnishlog: + + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishlog_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishlog_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishlog_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/varnisncsa, /usr/bin/varnishlog + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishlog_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishlog_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the varnishlog_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/varnishlog, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/varnishncsa + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishlog_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishlog_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as varnishlog log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B varnishlog_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the varnishlog_var_run_t type, if you want to store the varnishlog files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/varnishncsa\.pid, /var/run/varnishlog\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux varnishlog policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their varnishlog processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for varnishlog: + +.EX +.B varnishlog_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), varnishlog(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/vbetool_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vbetool_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..690e094 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/vbetool_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,92 @@ +.TH "vbetool_selinux" "8" "vbetool" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "vbetool SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +vbetool_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vbetool processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B vbetool +(run real-mode video BIOS code to alter hardware state) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. vbetool policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run vbetool with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to ignore vbetool mmap_zero errors, you must turn on the vbetool_mmap_zero_ignore boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P vbetool_mmap_zero_ignore 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux vbetool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vbetool processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for vbetool: + + +.EX +.PP +.B vbetool_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vbetool_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vbetool_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux vbetool policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vbetool processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for vbetool: + +.EX +.B vbetool_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), vbetool(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/vdagent_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vdagent_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef8444d --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/vdagent_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "vdagent_selinux" "8" "vdagent" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "vdagent SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +vdagent_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vdagent processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B vdagent +(policy for vdagent) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux vdagent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vdagent processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for vdagent: + + +.EX +.PP +.B vdagent_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vdagent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vdagent_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vdagent_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vdagent_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as vdagent log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/spice-vdagentd(/.*)?, /var/log/spice-vdagentd\.log + +.EX +.PP +.B vdagent_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vdagent_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vdagent files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/spice-vdagentd.\pid, /var/run/spice-vdagentd(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux vdagent policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vdagent processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for vdagent: + +.EX +.B vdagent_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), vdagent(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/vhostmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vhostmd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1800dc6 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/vhostmd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "vhostmd_selinux" "8" "vhostmd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "vhostmd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +vhostmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vhostmd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B vhostmd +(Virtual host metrics daemon) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux vhostmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vhostmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for vhostmd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B vhostmd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vhostmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vhostmd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vhostmd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vhostmd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vhostmd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vhostmd_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vhostmd_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store vhostmd files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vhostmd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vhostmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vhostmd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux vhostmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vhostmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for vhostmd: + +.EX +.B vhostmd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), vhostmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/virsh_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virsh_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..97dc9a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/virsh_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,71 @@ +.TH "virsh_selinux" "8" "virsh" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "virsh SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +virsh_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virsh processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux virsh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virsh processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for virsh: + + +.EX +.PP +.B virsh_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virsh_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virsh_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux virsh policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virsh processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for virsh: + +.EX +.B virsh_ssh_t, virsh_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), virsh(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/virt_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virt_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bc4a520 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/virt_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,349 @@ +.TH "virt_selinux" "8" "virt" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "virt SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +virt_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virt processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B virt +(Libvirt virtualization API) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. virt policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run virt with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to read fuse file, you must turn on the virt_use_fusefs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_fusefs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs file, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use serial/parallel communication port, you must turn on the virt_use_comm boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_comm 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserve, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage device configuration, (pci, you must turn on the virt_use_sysfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_sysfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use executable memory and executable stac, you must turn on the virt_use_execmem boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_execmem 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanloc, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use usb device, you must turn on the virt_use_usb boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_usb 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs file, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux virt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for virt: + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_bridgehelper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_bridgehelper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virt_bridgehelper_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/oz(/.*)?, /var/cache/libvirt(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/lib/oz/isos(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/boot(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/isos(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/libvirt/.*/.*, /etc/xen/.*/.*, /etc/xen/[^/]*, /etc/libvirt/[^/]* + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_etc_t type, if you want to store virt files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/libvirt/[^/]*, /etc/libvirt, /etc/xen/[^/]*, /etc/xen + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_home_t type, if you want to store virt files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_image_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_image_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt image data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/imagefactory/images(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/images(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as virt log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/log(/.*)?, /var/log/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/log/libvirt(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_qmf_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_qmf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virt_qmf_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_tmp_t type, if you want to store virt temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the virt files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/oz(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the virt files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/run/libvirt(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/condor_vm-gahp, /usr/bin/imagefactory, /usr/bin/imgfac\.py, /usr/bin/nova-compute, /usr/sbin/libvirtd + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_lxc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_lxc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_lxc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_lxc_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_lxc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the virtd lxc files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux virt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for virt: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B virt_migration_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B virt_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux virt policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virt processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for virt: + +.EX +.B virtd_lxc_t, virt_qmf_t, virt_bridgehelper_t, virtd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), virt(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/virtd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/virtd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..40dfb33 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/virtd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,343 @@ +.TH "virtd_selinux" "8" "virtd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "virtd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +virtd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the virtd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. virtd policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run virtd with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to read fuse file, you must turn on the virt_use_fusefs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_fusefs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs file, you must turn on the virt_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use serial/parallel communication port, you must turn on the virt_use_comm boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_comm 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserve, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage device configuration, (pci, you must turn on the virt_use_sysfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_sysfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use executable memory and executable stac, you must turn on the virt_use_execmem boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_execmem 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanloc, you must turn on the virt_use_sanlock boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_sanlock 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to use usb device, you must turn on the virt_use_usb boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_usb 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs file, you must turn on the virt_use_samba boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_samba 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux virtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for virtd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_bridgehelper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_bridgehelper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virt_bridgehelper_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_cache_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_cache_t type, if you want to store the files under the /var/cache directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/oz(/.*)?, /var/cache/libvirt(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_content_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_content_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/lib/oz/isos(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/boot(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/isos(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_etc_rw_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_etc_rw_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt etc read/write content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/libvirt/.*/.*, /etc/xen/.*/.*, /etc/xen/[^/]*, /etc/libvirt/[^/]* + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_etc_t type, if you want to store virt files in the /etc directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/libvirt/[^/]*, /etc/libvirt, /etc/xen/[^/]*, /etc/xen + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_home_t type, if you want to store virt files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_image_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_image_t type, if you want to treat the files as virt image data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/imagefactory/images(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt/images(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as virt log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/log(/.*)?, /var/log/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/log/libvirt(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_qmf_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_qmf_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virt_qmf_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_tmp_t type, if you want to store virt temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the virt files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/oz(/.*)?, /var/lib/libvirt(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virt_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virt_var_run_t type, if you want to store the virt files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/vdsm(/.*)?, /var/run/libvirt(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/condor_vm-gahp, /usr/bin/imagefactory, /usr/bin/imgfac\.py, /usr/bin/nova-compute, /usr/sbin/libvirtd + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_keytab_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_keytab_t type, if you want to treat the files as kerberos keytab files. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_lxc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_lxc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the virtd_lxc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B virtd_lxc_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the virtd_lxc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the virtd lxc files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux virtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for virtd: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B virt_migration_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B virt_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux virtd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their virtd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for virtd: + +.EX +.B virtd_lxc_t, virt_qmf_t, virt_bridgehelper_t, virtd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), virtd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/vlock_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vlock_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c8e2a9e --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/vlock_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +.TH "vlock_selinux" "8" "vlock" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "vlock SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +vlock_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vlock processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B vlock +(Lock one or more sessions on the Linux console) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux vlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vlock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for vlock: + + +.EX +.PP +.B vlock_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vlock_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vlock_t domain. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux vlock policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vlock processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for vlock: + +.EX +.B vlock_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), vlock(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/vmware_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vmware_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..735cd42 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/vmware_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,173 @@ +.TH "vmware_selinux" "8" "vmware" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "vmware SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +vmware_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vmware processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B vmware +(VMWare Workstation virtual machines) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux vmware policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vmware processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for vmware: + + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as vmware configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vmware_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/vmware-serverd, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmware-mks, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmplayer, /usr/bin/vmware-ping, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmware-ui, /usr/bin/vmware, /usr/bin/vmware-wizard + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as vmware content. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_host_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_host_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vmware_host_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/vmware-smbpasswd\.bin, /usr/bin/vmware-smbd, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/sbin64/vmware.*, /usr/bin/vmnet-dhcpd, /usr/bin/vmnet-bridge, /usr/bin/vmware-nmbd, /usr/bin/vmnet-netifup, /usr/sbin/vmware-guest.*, /usr/lib/vmware/bin/vmware-vmx, /usr/bin/vmnet-natd, /usr/bin/vmware-vmx, /usr/bin/vmware-network, /usr/bin/vmnet-sniffer, /usr/bin/vmware-smbpasswd, /usr/lib/vmware-tools/sbin32/vmware.* + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_host_pid_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_host_pid_t type, if you want to store the vmware host files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_host_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_host_tmp_t type, if you want to store vmware host temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as vmware log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/vmware.*, /var/log/vnetlib.* + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_pid_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_pid_t type, if you want to store the vmware files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_sys_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_sys_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as vmware sys configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/vmware/config, /etc/vmware.*(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_tmp_t type, if you want to store vmware temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vmware_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vmware_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store vmware files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux vmware policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vmware processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for vmware: + +.EX +.B vmware_t, vmware_host_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), vmware(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/vnstat_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vnstat_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..254d3d4 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/vnstat_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "vnstat_selinux" "8" "vnstat" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "vnstat SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +vnstat_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vnstat processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux vnstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for vnstat: + + +.EX +.PP +.B vnstat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vnstat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vnstatd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vnstatd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstatd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vnstatd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vnstatd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vnstatd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vnstatd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux vnstat policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstat processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for vnstat: + +.EX +.B vnstat_t, vnstatd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), vnstat(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/vnstatd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vnstatd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1589eb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/vnstatd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "vnstatd_selinux" "8" "vnstatd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "vnstatd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +vnstatd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vnstatd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B vnstatd +(Console network traffic monitor) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux vnstatd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstatd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for vnstatd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B vnstat_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vnstat_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstat_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vnstatd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vnstatd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vnstatd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vnstatd_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vnstatd_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vnstatd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vnstatd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vnstatd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux vnstatd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vnstatd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for vnstatd: + +.EX +.B vnstat_t, vnstatd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), vnstatd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/vpnc_selinux.8 b/man/man8/vpnc_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..41a5246 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/vpnc_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ +.TH "vpnc_selinux" "8" "vpnc" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "vpnc SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +vpnc_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the vpnc processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux vpnc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vpnc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for vpnc: + + +.EX +.PP +.B vpnc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vpnc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the vpnc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/vpnc, /usr/bin/openconnect, /sbin/vpnc + +.EX +.PP +.B vpnc_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vpnc_tmp_t type, if you want to store vpnc temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B vpnc_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the vpnc_var_run_t type, if you want to store the vpnc files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux vpnc policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their vpnc processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for vpnc: + +.EX +.B vpnc_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), vpnc(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/wdmd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wdmd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a060bdb --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/wdmd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,93 @@ +.TH "wdmd_selinux" "8" "wdmd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "wdmd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +wdmd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wdmd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B wdmd +(policy for wdmd) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux wdmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wdmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for wdmd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B wdmd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wdmd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wdmd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B wdmd_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wdmd_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wdmd_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B wdmd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wdmd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the wdmd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux wdmd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wdmd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for wdmd: + +.EX +.B wdmd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), wdmd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/webadm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/webadm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..072a0c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/webadm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,65 @@ +.TH "webadm_selinux" "8" "webadm" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "webadm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +webadm_r \- \fBWeb administrator role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +SELinux supports Roles Based Access Control, some Linux roles are login roles, while other roles need to be transition to. + +Note: The examples in the man page will user the staff_u user. + +Non login roles are usually used for administrative tasks. + +Roles usually have default types assigned to them. + +The default type for the webadm_r role is webadm_t. + +You can use the +.B newrole +program to transition directly to this role. + +.B newrole -r webadm_r -t webadm_t + +.B sudo +can also be setup to transition to this role using the visudo command. + +USERNAME ALL=(ALL) ROLE=webadm_r TYPE=webadm_t COMMAND +.br +sudo will run COMMAND as staff_u:webadm_r:webadm_t:LEVEL + +If you want to use a non login role, you need to make sure the SELinux user you are using can reach this role. + +You can see all of the assigned SELinux roles using the following + +.B semanage user -l + +If you wanted to add webadm_r to the staff_u user, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage user -m -R 'staff_r webadm_r' staff_u + + + +SELinux policy also controls which roles can transition to a different role. +You can list these rules using the following command. + +.B sesearch --role_allow + +SELinux policy allows the staff_r role can transition to the webadm_r role. + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/webalizer_selinux.8 b/man/man8/webalizer_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ba0eb02 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/webalizer_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,117 @@ +.TH "webalizer_selinux" "8" "webalizer" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "webalizer SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +webalizer_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the webalizer processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B webalizer +(Web server log analysis) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux webalizer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their webalizer processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for webalizer: + + +.EX +.PP +.B webalizer_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the webalizer_etc_t type, if you want to store webalizer files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B webalizer_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the webalizer_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the webalizer_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B webalizer_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the webalizer_tmp_t type, if you want to store webalizer temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B webalizer_usage_t +.EE + +- Set files with the webalizer_usage_t type, if you want to treat the files as webalizer usage data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B webalizer_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the webalizer_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the webalizer files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B webalizer_write_t +.EE + +- Set files with the webalizer_write_t type, if you want to treat the files as webalizer read/write content. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux webalizer policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their webalizer processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for webalizer: + +.EX +.B webalizer_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), webalizer(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/winbind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/winbind_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df63d07 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/winbind_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +.TH "winbind_selinux" "8" "winbind" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "winbind SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +winbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the winbind processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. winbind policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run winbind with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow Apache to use mod_auth_ntlm_winbin, you must turn on the allow_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux winbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their winbind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for winbind: + + +.EX +.PP +.B winbind_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the winbind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the winbind_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B winbind_helper_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the winbind_helper_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the winbind_helper_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B winbind_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the winbind_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as winbind log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B winbind_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the winbind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the winbind files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/cache/samba/winbindd_privileged(/.*)?, /var/lib/samba/winbindd_privileged(/.*)?, /var/run/winbindd(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux winbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their winbind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for winbind: + +.EX +.B winbind_helper_t, winbind_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), winbind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/wine_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wine_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2107f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/wine_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +.TH "wine_selinux" "8" "wine" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "wine SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +wine_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wine processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B wine +(Wine Is Not an Emulator. Run Windows programs in Linux) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. wine policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run wine with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to ignore wine mmap_zero errors, you must turn on the wine_mmap_zero_ignore boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P wine_mmap_zero_ignore 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux wine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wine processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for wine: + + +.EX +.PP +.B wine_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wine_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wine_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/msiexec, /usr/bin/regedit, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/wine.*, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/notepad, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/regedit, /usr/bin/regsvr32, /usr/bin/uninstaller, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/uninstaller, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/wdi, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/regsvr32, /usr/bin/msiexec, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/Picasa3/.*exe, /opt/teamviewer(/.*)?/bin/wine.*, /usr/bin/wine.*, /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/progman, /opt/picasa/wine/bin/wine.*, /usr/bin/notepad, /opt/cxoffice/bin/wine.* + +.EX +.PP +.B wine_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wine_tmp_t type, if you want to store wine temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux wine policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wine processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for wine: + +.EX +.B wine_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), wine(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/wireshark_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wireshark_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4536946 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/wireshark_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +.TH "wireshark_selinux" "8" "wireshark" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "wireshark SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +wireshark_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wireshark processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B wireshark +(Wireshark packet capture tool) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux wireshark policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wireshark processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for wireshark: + + +.EX +.PP +.B wireshark_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wireshark_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wireshark_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B wireshark_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wireshark_home_t type, if you want to store wireshark files in the users home directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B wireshark_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wireshark_tmp_t type, if you want to store wireshark temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B wireshark_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wireshark_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store wireshark files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux wireshark policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wireshark processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for wireshark: + +.EX +.B wireshark_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), wireshark(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/wpa_selinux.8 b/man/man8/wpa_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e8a5a9f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/wpa_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +.TH "wpa_selinux" "8" "wpa" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "wpa SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +wpa_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the wpa processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux wpa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wpa processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for wpa: + + +.EX +.PP +.B wpa_cli_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the wpa_cli_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the wpa_cli_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/wpa_cli, /sbin/wpa_cli + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux wpa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their wpa processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for wpa: + +.EX +.B wpa_cli_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), wpa(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/xauth_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xauth_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..85c91f3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/xauth_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ +.TH "xauth_selinux" "8" "xauth" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "xauth SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +xauth_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xauth processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux xauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xauth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for xauth: + + +.EX +.PP +.B xauth_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xauth_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xauth_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/xauth, /usr/X11R6/bin/xauth + +.EX +.PP +.B xauth_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xauth_home_t type, if you want to store xauth files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/nxserver/home/\.xauth.*, /root/\.Xauth.*, /var/lib/nxserver/home/\.Xauthority.*, /root/\.Xauthority.*, /root/\.serverauth.*, /var/lib/pqsql/\.Xauthority.*, /root/\.xauth.*, /var/lib/pqsql/\.xauth.* + +.EX +.PP +.B xauth_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xauth_tmp_t type, if you want to store xauth temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux xauth policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xauth processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for xauth: + +.EX +.B xauth_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), xauth(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/xdm_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xdm_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e377b25 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/xdm_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,223 @@ +.TH "xdm_selinux" "8" "xdm" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "xdm SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +xdm_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xdm processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xdm policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xdm with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow the graphical login program to login directly as sysadm_r:sysadm_, you must turn on the xdm_sysadm_login boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xdm_sysadm_login 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow the graphical login program to execute bootloade, you must turn on the xdm_exec_bootloader boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xdm_exec_bootloader 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux xdm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xdm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for xdm: + + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_etc_t type, if you want to store xdm files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xdm_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/[xgkw]dm, /usr/bin/slim, /usr/sbin/[xgkw]dm, /usr/X11R6/bin/[xgkw]dm, /usr/sbin/lxdm, /usr/sbin/lxdm-binary, /usr/bin/lxdm-binary, /usr/bin/gpe-dm, /usr/bin/gdm-binary, /usr/bin/lxdm, /opt/kde3/bin/kdm, /usr/sbin/gdm-binary + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_home_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_home_t type, if you want to store xdm files in the users home directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/root/\.xsession-errors.*, /root/\.dmrc.* + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_lock_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_lock_t type, if you want to treat the files as xdm lock data, stored under the /var/lock directory + + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xdm log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/slim\.log.*, /var/log/(l)?xdm\.log.*, /var/log/gdm(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_rw_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_rw_etc_t type, if you want to store xdm rw files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_spool_t type, if you want to store the xdm files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_tmp_t type, if you want to store xdm temporary files in the /tmp directories. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/tmp/\.X0-lock, /tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)?, /tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store xdm files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xdm files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/[gxkw]dm(/.*)?, /var/cache/gdm(/.*)?, /var/lib/lxdm(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B xdm_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xdm_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xdm files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/kdm(/.*)?, /var/run/slim.*, /var/run/lxdm(/.*)?, /var/run/gdm(/.*)?, /usr/lib/qt-.*/etc/settings(/.*)?, /var/run/lxdm\.auth, /var/run/xauth(/.*)?, /var/run/xdmctl(/.*)?, /var/run/[gx]dm\.pid, /var/run/slim(/.*)?, /var/run/gdm_socket, /etc/kde3?/kdm/backgroundrc, /var/run/lxdm\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux xdm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xdm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for xdm: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B xdmcp_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux xdm policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xdm processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for xdm: + +.EX +.B xdm_t, xdm_dbusd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), xdm(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/xenconsoled_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xenconsoled_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..94ba970 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/xenconsoled_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +.TH "xenconsoled_selinux" "8" "xenconsoled" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "xenconsoled SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +xenconsoled_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xenconsoled processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux xenconsoled policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenconsoled processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for xenconsoled: + + +.EX +.PP +.B xenconsoled_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xenconsoled_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xenconsoled_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xenconsoled_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xenconsoled_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xenconsoled files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux xenconsoled policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenconsoled processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for xenconsoled: + +.EX +.B xenconsoled_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), xenconsoled(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/xend_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xend_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ef97b9c --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/xend_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +.TH "xend_selinux" "8" "xend" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "xend SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +xend_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xend processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xend policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xend with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow xen to manage nfs file, you must turn on the xen_use_nfs boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xen_use_nfs 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow xend to run qemu-dm. Not required if using paravirt and no vfb, you must turn on the xend_run_qemu boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xend_run_qemu 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow xend to run blktapctrl/tapdisk. Not required if using dedicated logical volumes for disk images, you must turn on the xend_run_blktap boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xend_run_blktap 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux xend policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xend processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for xend: + + +.EX +.PP +.B xen_devpts_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xen_devpts_t type, if you want to treat the files as xen devpts data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xen_image_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xen_image_t type, if you want to treat the files as xen image data. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/xen(/.*)?, /var/lib/xen/images(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B xend_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xend_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xend_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xend_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xend_tmp_t type, if you want to store xend temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xend_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xend_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xend files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/xen(/.*)?, /var/lib/xend(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B xend_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xend_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xend var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/xen(/.*)?, /var/log/xen-hotplug\.log, /var/log/xend\.log, /var/log/xend-debug\.log + +.EX +.PP +.B xend_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xend_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xend files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/xenner(/.*)?, /var/run/xend(/.*)?, /var/run/xend\.pid + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux xend policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xend processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for xend: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B xen_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux xend policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xend processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for xend: + +.EX +.B xend_t, xenstored_t, xenconsoled_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), xend(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/xenstored_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xenstored_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0cf576a --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/xenstored_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,107 @@ +.TH "xenstored_selinux" "8" "xenstored" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "xenstored SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +xenstored_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xenstored processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux xenstored policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenstored processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for xenstored: + + +.EX +.PP +.B xenstored_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xenstored_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xenstored_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xenstored_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xenstored_tmp_t type, if you want to store xenstored temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xenstored_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xenstored_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xenstored files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xenstored_var_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xenstored_var_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xenstored var log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xenstored_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xenstored_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xenstored files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/xenstore\.pid, /var/run/xenstored(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux xenstored policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xenstored processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for xenstored: + +.EX +.B xenstored_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), xenstored(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/xguest_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xguest_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2478817 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/xguest_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +.TH "xguest_selinux" "8" "xguest" "mgrepl@redhat.com" "xguest SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +xguest_u \- \fBLeast privledge xwindows user role\fP - Security Enhanced Linux Policy + +.SH DESCRIPTION + +\fBxguest_u\fP is an SELinux User defined in the SELinux +policy. SELinux users have default roles, \fBxguest_r\fP. The +default role has a default type, \fBxguest_t\fP, associated with it. + +The SELinux user will usually login to a system with a context that looks like: + +.B xguest_u:xguest_r:xguest_u:s0-s0:c0.c1023 + +Linux users are automatically assigned an SELinux users at login. +Login programs use the SELinux User to assign initial context to the user's shell. + +SELinux policy uses the context to control the user's access. + +By default all users are assigned to the SELinux user via the \fB__default__\fP flag + +On Targeted policy systems the \fB__default__\fP user is assigned to the \fBunconfined_u\fP SELinux user. + +You can list all Linux User to SELinux user mapping using: + +.B semanage login -l + +If you wanted to change the default user mapping to use the xguest_u user, you would execute: + +.B semanage login -m -s xguest_u __default__ + + +If you want to map the one Linux user (joe) to the SELinux user xguest, you would execute: + +.B $ semanage login -a -s xguest_u joe + + +.SH USER DESCRIPTION + +The SELinux user xguest_u is defined in policy as a unprivileged user. SELinux prevents unprivileged users from doing administration tasks without transitioning to a different role. + +.SH SUDO + +The SELinux type xguest_t is not allowed to execute sudo. + +.SH X WINDOWS LOGIN + +The SELinux user xguest_u is able to X Windows login. + +.SH TERMINAL LOGIN + +The SELinux user xguest_u is able to terminal login. + +.SH NETWORK + +.TP +The SELinux user xguest_u is able to connect to the following tcp ports. + +.B dns_port_t: 53 + +.B ipp_port_t: 631,8610-8614 + +.B transproxy_port_t: 8081 + +.B ocsp_port_t: 9080 + +.B kerberos_port_t: 88,750,4444 + +.B all ports with out defined types + +.B ftp_port_t: 21,990 + +.B speech_port_t: 8036 + +.B squid_port_t: 3128,3401,4827 + +.B http_cache_port_t: 8080,8118,8123,10001-10010 + +.B http_port_t: 80,443,488,8008,8009,8443 + +.B flash_port_t: 843,1935 + +.B pulseaudio_port_t: 4713 + +.B soundd_port_t: 8000,9433,16001 + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xguest_t policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xguest_t with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow xguest users to configure Network Manager and connect to apache ports, you must turn on the xguest_connect_network boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xguest_connect_network 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to the local mysql server, you must turn on the allow_user_mysql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_mysql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to control users use of ping and traceroute, you must turn on the user_ping boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ping 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow w to display everyone, you must turn on the user_ttyfile_stat boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_ttyfile_stat 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user music sharing, you must turn on the user_share_music boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_share_music 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct dri device access, you must turn on the user_direct_dri boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_dri 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow xguest users to use blue tooth devices, you must turn on the xguest_use_bluetooth boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xguest_use_bluetooth 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user to r/w files on filesystems that do not have extended attributes (FAT, CDROM, FLOPPY), you must turn on the user_rw_noexattrfile boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_rw_noexattrfile 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode and may change other protocols, you must turn on the user_tcp_server boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_tcp_server 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow regular users direct mouse access, you must turn on the user_direct_mouse boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_direct_mouse 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow user processes to change their priority, you must turn on the user_setrlimit boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_setrlimit 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to connect to PostgreSQL, you must turn on the allow_user_postgresql_connect boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_user_postgresql_connect 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow xguest users to mount removable media, you must turn on the xguest_mount_media boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xguest_mount_media 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow users to read system messages, you must turn on the user_dmesg boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P user_dmesg 1 +.EE + +.SH HOME_EXEC + +The SELinux user xguest_u is able execute home content files. + +.SH TRANSITIONS + +Three things can happen when xguest_t attempts to execute a program. + +\fB1.\fP SELinux Policy can deny xguest_t from executing the program. + +.TP + +\fB2.\fP SELinux Policy can allow xguest_t to execute the program in the current user type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user xguest_t can execute without transitioning: + +.B sesearch -A -s xguest_t -c file -p execute_no_trans + +.TP + +\fB3.\fP SELinux can allow xguest_t to execute the program and transition to a new type. + +Execute the following to see the types that the SELinux user xguest_t can execute and transition: + +.B $ sesearch -A -s xguest_t -c process -p transition + + +.SH "COMMANDS" + +.B semanage login +can also be used to manipulate the Linux User to SELinux User mappings + +.B semanage user +can also be used to manipulate SELinux user definitions. + +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genuserman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), semanage(8). diff --git a/man/man8/xserver_selinux.8 b/man/man8/xserver_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..868120f --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/xserver_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,176 @@ +.TH "xserver_selinux" "8" "xserver" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "xserver SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +xserver_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the xserver processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B xserver +(X Windows Server) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. xserver policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run xserver with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserve, you must turn on the virt_use_xserver boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P virt_use_xserver 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to support X userspace object manage, you must turn on the xserver_object_manager boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P xserver_object_manager 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allows XServer to execute writable memor, you must turn on the allow_xserver_execmem boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_xserver_execmem 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux xserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xserver processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for xserver: + + +.EX +.PP +.B xserver_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xserver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the xserver_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/Xair, /usr/bin/Xephyr, /usr/X11R6/bin/Xwrapper, /usr/X11R6/bin/XFree86, /etc/init\.d/xfree86-common, /usr/X11R6/bin/Xorg, /usr/X11R6/bin/Xipaq, /usr/bin/Xorg, /usr/X11R6/bin/X + +.EX +.PP +.B xserver_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xserver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as xserver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/var/[xgkw]dm(/.*)?, /var/[xgk]dm(/.*)?, /var/log/nvidia-installer\.log.*, /var/log/XFree86.*, /var/log/Xorg.*, /var/log/[kw]dm\.log.* + +.EX +.PP +.B xserver_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xserver_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store xserver files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xserver_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xserver_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the xserver files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B xserver_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the xserver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the xserver files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/xorg(/.*)?, /var/run/video.rom + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux xserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xserver processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for xserver: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B xserver_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux xserver policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their xserver processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for xserver: + +.EX +.B xserver_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), xserver(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8 index 5061a5f..22c9968 100644 --- a/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8 +++ b/man/man8/ypbind_selinux.8 @@ -1,19 +1,118 @@ -.TH "ypbind_selinux" "8" "17 Jan 2005" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ypbind Selinux Policy documentation" +.TH "ypbind_selinux" "8" "ypbind" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ypbind SELinux Policy documentation" .SH "NAME" -ypbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for NIS. +ypbind_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ypbind processes .SH "DESCRIPTION" -Security-Enhanced Linux secures the system via flexible mandatory access -control. SELinux can be setup deny NIS from working, since it requires daemons to be allowed greater access to the network. + + + .SH BOOLEANS -.TP -You must set the allow_ypbind boolean to allow your system to work properly in a NIS environment. -.TP -setsebool -P allow_ypbind 1 -.TP -system-config-selinux is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. ypbind policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run ypbind with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow system to run with NI, you must turn on the allow_ypbind boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_ypbind 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ypbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypbind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ypbind: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ypbind_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ypbind_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypbind_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/ypbind, /sbin/ypbind + +.EX +.PP +.B ypbind_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ypbind_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypbind_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ypbind_unit_file_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ypbind_unit_file_t type, if you want to treat the files as ypbind unit content. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ypbind\.service, /lib/systemd/system/ypbind\.service + +.EX +.PP +.B ypbind_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ypbind_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ypbind files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ypbind policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypbind processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ypbind: + +.EX +.B ypbind_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + .SH AUTHOR -This manual page was written by Dan Walsh . +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. .SH "SEE ALSO" -selinux(8), ypbind(8), chcon(1), setsebool(8) +selinux(8), ypbind(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/yppasswdd_selinux.8 b/man/man8/yppasswdd_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4b570b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/yppasswdd_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,79 @@ +.TH "yppasswdd_selinux" "8" "yppasswdd" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "yppasswdd SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +yppasswdd_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the yppasswdd processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux yppasswdd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their yppasswdd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for yppasswdd: + + +.EX +.PP +.B yppasswdd_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the yppasswdd_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the yppasswdd_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B yppasswdd_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the yppasswdd_var_run_t type, if you want to store the yppasswdd files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux yppasswdd policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their yppasswdd processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for yppasswdd: + +.EX +.B yppasswdd_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), yppasswdd(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ypserv_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ypserv_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b5da81b --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ypserv_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +.TH "ypserv_selinux" "8" "ypserv" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ypserv SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ypserv_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ypserv processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ypserv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypserv processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ypserv: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ypserv_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ypserv_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as ypserv configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ypserv_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ypserv_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypserv_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B ypserv_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ypserv_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ypserv files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ypserv policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypserv processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ypserv: + +.EX +.B ypserv_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ypserv(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/ypxfr_selinux.8 b/man/man8/ypxfr_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e761eb --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/ypxfr_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +.TH "ypxfr_selinux" "8" "ypxfr" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "ypxfr SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +ypxfr_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the ypxfr processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux ypxfr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypxfr processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for ypxfr: + + +.EX +.PP +.B ypxfr_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ypxfr_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the ypxfr_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/lib/yp/ypxfr, /usr/sbin/rpc\.ypxfrd + +.EX +.PP +.B ypxfr_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the ypxfr_var_run_t type, if you want to store the ypxfr files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux ypxfr policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their ypxfr processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for ypxfr: + +.EX +.B ypxfr_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), ypxfr(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/zabbix_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zabbix_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6f79276 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/zabbix_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,200 @@ +.TH "zabbix_selinux" "8" "zabbix" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "zabbix SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +zabbix_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zabbix processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B zabbix +(Distributed infrastructure monitoring) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. zabbix policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run zabbix with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow zabbix to connect to unreserved port, you must turn on the zabbix_can_network boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P zabbix_can_network 1 +.EE + +.PP +If you want to allow http daemon to connect to zabbi, you must turn on the httpd_can_connect_zabbix boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P httpd_can_connect_zabbix 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux zabbix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for zabbix: + + +.EX +.PP +.B zabbix_agent_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zabbix_agent_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_agent_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_agent_initrc_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zabbix_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zabbix_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/zabbix_server_sqlite3, /usr/sbin/zabbix_server_mysql, /usr/sbin/zabbix_server_pgsql, /usr/sbin/zabbix_server + +.EX +.PP +.B zabbix_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zabbix_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zabbix_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix-server, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix + +.EX +.PP +.B zabbix_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zabbix_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zabbix log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zabbix_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zabbix_tmp_t type, if you want to store zabbix temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zabbix_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zabbix_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store zabbix files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zabbix_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zabbix_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zabbix files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux zabbix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for zabbix: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B zabbix_agent_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B zabbix_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux zabbix policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zabbix processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for zabbix: + +.EX +.B zabbix_agent_t, zabbix_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), zabbix(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/zarafa_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zarafa_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..928b3c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/zarafa_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,319 @@ +.TH "zarafa_selinux" "8" "zarafa" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "zarafa SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +zarafa_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zarafa processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B zarafa +(Zarafa collaboration platform) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux zarafa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for zarafa: + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_deliver_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_deliver_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_deliver_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_deliver_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_deliver_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa deliver log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_deliver_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_deliver_tmp_t type, if you want to store zarafa deliver temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_deliver_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_deliver_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa deliver files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_etc_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_etc_t type, if you want to store zarafa files in the /etc directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_gateway_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_gateway_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_gateway_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_gateway_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_gateway_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa gateway log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_gateway_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_gateway_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa gateway files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_ical_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_ical_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_ical_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_ical_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_ical_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa ical log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_ical_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_ical_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa ical files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_indexer_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_indexer_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_indexer_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_indexer_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_indexer_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa indexer log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_indexer_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_indexer_tmp_t type, if you want to store zarafa indexer temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_indexer_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_indexer_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa indexer files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_monitor_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_monitor_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_monitor_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa monitor log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_monitor_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_monitor_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa monitor files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_server_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_server_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_server_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_server_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_server_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa server log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_server_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_server_tmp_t type, if you want to store zarafa server temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_server_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_server_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa server files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/zarafa, /var/run/zarafa-server\.pid + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_share_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_share_t type, if you want to treat the files as zarafa share data. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_spooler_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_spooler_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zarafa_spooler_t domain. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_spooler_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_spooler_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zarafa spooler log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_spooler_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_spooler_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zarafa spooler files under the /run directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zarafa_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zarafa_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the zarafa files under the /var/lib directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/lib/zarafa-webaccess(/.*)?, /var/lib/zarafa(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux zarafa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for zarafa: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B zarafa_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux zarafa policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zarafa processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for zarafa: + +.EX +.B zarafa_gateway_t, zarafa_spooler_t, zarafa_deliver_t, zarafa_monitor_t, zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_server_t, zarafa_ical_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), zarafa(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/zebra_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zebra_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..705cdbc --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/zebra_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +.TH "zebra_selinux" "8" "zebra" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "zebra SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +zebra_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zebra processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B zebra +(Zebra border gateway protocol network routing service) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH BOOLEANS +SELinux policy is customizable based on least access required. zebra policy is extremely flexible and has several booleans that allow you to manipulate the policy and run zebra with the tightest access possible. + + +.PP +If you want to allow zebra daemon to write it configuration file, you must turn on the allow_zebra_write_config boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P allow_zebra_write_config 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux zebra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zebra processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for zebra: + + +.EX +.PP +.B zebra_conf_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zebra_conf_t type, if you want to treat the files as zebra configuration data, usually stored under the /etc directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/zebra(/.*)?, /etc/quagga(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B zebra_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zebra_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zebra_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/sbin/zebra, /usr/sbin/rip.*, /usr/sbin/bgpd, /usr/sbin/ospf.* + +.EX +.PP +.B zebra_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zebra_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zebra_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ripngd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zebra, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ripd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bgpd, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ospf6d, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ospfd + +.EX +.PP +.B zebra_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zebra_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zebra log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/quagga(/.*)?, /var/log/zebra(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B zebra_tmp_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zebra_tmp_t type, if you want to store zebra temporary files in the /tmp directories. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zebra_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zebra_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zebra files under the /run directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/run/\.zserv, /var/run/\.zebra, /var/run/quagga(/.*)? + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PORT TYPES +SELinux defines port types to represent TCP and UDP ports. +.PP +You can see the types associated with a port by using the following command: + +.B semanage port -l + +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these ports. +SELinux zebra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zebra processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following port types are defined for zebra: + +.EX +.TP 5 +.B zebra_port_t +.TP 10 +.EE + + +Default Defined Ports: +tcp 8021 +.EE +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux zebra policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zebra processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for zebra: + +.EX +.B zebra_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.B semanage port +can also be used to manipulate the port definitions + +.B semanage boolean +can also be used to manipulate the booleans + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), zebra(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) +, setsebool(8) \ No newline at end of file diff --git a/man/man8/zoneminder_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zoneminder_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f71f64 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/zoneminder_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,163 @@ +.TH "zoneminder_selinux" "8" "zoneminder" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "zoneminder SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +zoneminder_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zoneminder processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B zoneminder +(policy for zoneminder) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH SHARING FILES +If you want to share files with multiple domains (Apache, FTP, rsync, Samba), you can set a file context of public_content_t and public_content_rw_t. These context allow any of the above domains to read the content. If you want a particular domain to write to the public_content_rw_t domain, you must set the appropriate boolean. +.TP +Allow zoneminder servers to read the /var/zoneminder directory by adding the public_content_t file type to the directory and by restoring the file type. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_t "/var/zoneminder(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/zoneminder +.pp +.TP +Allow zoneminder servers to read and write /var/tmp/incoming by adding the public_content_rw_t type to the directory and by restoring the file type. This also requires the allow_zoneminder_anon_write boolean to be set. +.PP +.B +semanage fcontext -a -t public_content_rw_t "/var/zoneminder/incoming(/.*)?" +.br +.B restorecon -F -R -v /var/zoneminder/incoming + + +.PP +If you want to allow ZoneMinder to modify public files used for public file transfer services., you must turn on the zoneminder_anon_write boolean. + +.EX +.B setsebool -P zoneminder_anon_write 1 +.EE + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux zoneminder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zoneminder processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for zoneminder: + + +.EX +.PP +.B zoneminder_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zoneminder_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zoneminder_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/usr/bin/zmpkg.pl, /usr/bin/motion + +.EX +.PP +.B zoneminder_initrc_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zoneminder_initrc_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zoneminder_initrc_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/motion, /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zoneminder + +.EX +.PP +.B zoneminder_log_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zoneminder_log_t type, if you want to treat the data as zoneminder log data, usually stored under the /var/log directory. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/var/log/motion\.log, /var/log/zoneminder(/.*)? + +.EX +.PP +.B zoneminder_spool_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zoneminder_spool_t type, if you want to store the zoneminder files under the /var/spool directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zoneminder_tmpfs_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zoneminder_tmpfs_t type, if you want to store zoneminder files on a tmpfs file system. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zoneminder_var_lib_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zoneminder_var_lib_t type, if you want to store the zoneminder files under the /var/lib directory. + + +.EX +.PP +.B zoneminder_var_run_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zoneminder_var_run_t type, if you want to store the zoneminder files under the /run directory. + + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux zoneminder policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zoneminder processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for zoneminder: + +.EX +.B zoneminder_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), zoneminder(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/man/man8/zos_selinux.8 b/man/man8/zos_selinux.8 new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b9eb5b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/man/man8/zos_selinux.8 @@ -0,0 +1,81 @@ +.TH "zos_selinux" "8" "zos" "dwalsh@redhat.com" "zos SELinux Policy documentation" +.SH "NAME" +zos_selinux \- Security Enhanced Linux Policy for the zos processes +.SH "DESCRIPTION" + + +SELinux Linux secures +.B zos +(policy for z/OS Remote-services Audit dispatcher plugin) +processes via flexible mandatory access +control. + + + +.SH FILE CONTEXTS +SELinux requires files to have an extended attribute to define the file type. +.PP +You can see the context of a file using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBls\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to these files. +SELinux zos policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zos processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following file types are defined for zos: + + +.EX +.PP +.B zos_remote_exec_t +.EE + +- Set files with the zos_remote_exec_t type, if you want to transition an executable to the zos_remote_t domain. + +.br +.TP 5 +Paths: +/sbin/audispd-zos-remote, /usr/sbin/audispd-zos-remote + +.PP +Note: File context can be temporarily modified with the chcon command. If you want to permanently change the file context you need to use the +.B semanage fcontext +command. This will modify the SELinux labeling database. You will need to use +.B restorecon +to apply the labels. + +.SH PROCESS TYPES +SELinux defines process types (domains) for each process running on the system +.PP +You can see the context of a process using the \fB\-Z\fP option to \fBps\bP +.PP +Policy governs the access confined processes have to files. +SELinux zos policy is very flexible allowing users to setup their zos processes in as secure a method as possible. +.PP +The following process types are defined for zos: + +.EX +.B zos_remote_t +.EE +.PP +Note: +.B semanage permissive -a PROCESS_TYPE +can be used to make a process type permissive. Permissive process types are not denied access by SELinux. AVC messages will still be generated. + +.SH "COMMANDS" +.B semanage fcontext +can also be used to manipulate default file context mappings. +.PP +.B semanage permissive +can also be used to manipulate whether or not a process type is permissive. +.PP +.B semanage module +can also be used to enable/disable/install/remove policy modules. + +.PP +.B system-config-selinux +is a GUI tool available to customize SELinux policy settings. + +.SH AUTHOR +This manual page was autogenerated by genman.py. + +.SH "SEE ALSO" +selinux(8), zos(8), semanage(8), restorecon(8), chcon(1) diff --git a/policy/constraints b/policy/constraints index 1308871..c994c93 100644 --- a/policy/constraints +++ b/policy/constraints @@ -107,9 +107,17 @@ constrain process { transition noatsecure siginh rlimitinh } constrain process dyntransition ( - u1 == u2 and r1 == r2 + u1 == u2 + or ( t1 == can_change_process_identity and t2 == process_user_target ) +); + +constrain process dyntransition +( + r1 == r2 + or ( t1 == can_change_process_identity and t2 == process_user_target ) ); + # These permissions do not have ubac constraints: # fork # setexec diff --git a/policy/flask/access_vectors b/policy/flask/access_vectors index bf24160..4d0bdca 100644 --- a/policy/flask/access_vectors +++ b/policy/flask/access_vectors @@ -393,6 +393,10 @@ class system syslog_mod syslog_console module_request + halt + reboot + status + undefined } # @@ -862,3 +866,20 @@ inherits database implement execute } + +class service +{ + start + stop + status + reload + kill + load + enable + disable +} + +class proxy +{ + read +} diff --git a/policy/flask/security_classes b/policy/flask/security_classes index 14a4799..db2e4a0 100644 --- a/policy/flask/security_classes +++ b/policy/flask/security_classes @@ -131,4 +131,11 @@ class db_view # userspace class db_sequence # userspace class db_language # userspace +# systemd services +class service + +# gssd services +class proxy + + # FLASK diff --git a/policy/global_booleans b/policy/global_booleans index 111d004..c90e80d 100644 --- a/policy/global_booleans +++ b/policy/global_booleans @@ -6,25 +6,10 @@ ## ##

-## Enabling secure mode disallows programs, such as +## disallow programs, such as ## newrole, from transitioning to administrative ## user domains. ##

## gen_bool(secure_mode,false) -## -##

-## Disable transitions to insmod. -##

-## -gen_bool(secure_mode_insmod,false) - -## -##

-## boolean to determine whether the system permits loading policy, setting -## enforcing mode, and changing boolean values. Set this to true and you -## have to reboot to set it back -##

-## -gen_bool(secure_mode_policyload,false) diff --git a/policy/global_tunables b/policy/global_tunables index 4705ab6..0f0bb47 100644 --- a/policy/global_tunables +++ b/policy/global_tunables @@ -6,6 +6,13 @@ ## ##

+## Allow sysadm to debug or ptrace all processes. +##

+## +gen_tunable(deny_ptrace, false) + +## +##

## Allow unconfined executables to make their heap memory executable. Doing this is a really bad idea. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla ##

## @@ -13,21 +20,21 @@ gen_tunable(allow_execheap,false) ## ##

-## Allow unconfined executables to map a memory region as both executable and writable, this is dangerous and the executable should be reported in bugzilla") +## Deny user domains applications to map a memory region as both executable and writable, this is dangerous and the executable should be reported in bugzilla ##

## -gen_tunable(allow_execmem,false) +gen_tunable(deny_execmem,false) ## ##

-## Allow all unconfined executables to use libraries requiring text relocation that are not labeled textrel_shlib_t") +## Allow all unconfined executables to use libraries requiring text relocation that are not labeled textrel_shlib_t ##

## gen_tunable(allow_execmod,false) ## ##

-## Allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla") +## Allow unconfined executables to make their stack executable. This should never, ever be necessary. Probably indicates a badly coded executable, but could indicate an attack. This executable should be reported in bugzilla ##

## gen_tunable(allow_execstack,false) @@ -68,15 +75,6 @@ gen_tunable(global_ssp,false) ## ##

-## Allow email client to various content. -## nfs, samba, removable devices, and user temp -## files -##

-## -gen_tunable(mail_read_content,false) - -## -##

## Allow any files/directories to be exported read/write via NFS. ##

## @@ -105,9 +103,24 @@ gen_tunable(use_samba_home_dirs,false) ## ##

+## Support fusefs home directories +##

+## +gen_tunable(use_fusefs_home_dirs,false) + +## +##

## Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from ## the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode ## and may change other protocols. ##

## gen_tunable(user_tcp_server,false) + +## +##

+## Allow direct login to the console device. Required for System 390 +##

+## +gen_tunable(allow_console_login,false) + diff --git a/policy/mcs b/policy/mcs index df8e0fa..38146ed 100644 --- a/policy/mcs +++ b/policy/mcs @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',` +default_range dir_file_class_set target low; + # # Define sensitivities # @@ -69,16 +71,32 @@ gen_levels(1,mcs_num_cats) # - /proc/pid operations are not constrained. mlsconstrain file { read ioctl lock execute execute_no_trans } - (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsreadall ) or ( t2 == domain )); + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsreadall ) or + (( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc ) and (t2 == domain))); mlsconstrain file { write setattr append unlink link rename } - (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcswriteall ) or ( t2 == domain )); + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcswriteall ) or + (( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc ) and (t2 == domain))); mlsconstrain dir { search read ioctl lock } - (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsreadall ) or ( t2 == domain )); + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsreadall ) or + (( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc ) and (t2 == domain))); mlsconstrain dir { write setattr append unlink link rename add_name remove_name } - (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcswriteall ) or ( t2 == domain )); + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcswriteall ) or + (( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc ) and (t2 == domain))); + +mlsconstrain fifo_file { open } + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsreadall ) or + (( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc ) and ( t2 == domain ))); + +mlsconstrain { lnk_file chr_file blk_file sock_file } { getattr read ioctl } + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsreadall ) or + (( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc ) and (t2 == domain))); + +mlsconstrain { lnk_file chr_file blk_file sock_file } { write setattr } + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcswriteall ) or + (( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc ) and (t2 == domain))); # New filesystem object labels must be dominated by the relabeling subject # clearance, also the objects are single-level. @@ -87,10 +105,13 @@ mlsconstrain file { create relabelto } # new file labels must be dominated by the relabeling subject clearance mlsconstrain { dir file lnk_file chr_file blk_file sock_file fifo_file } { relabelfrom } - ( h1 dom h2 ); + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcswriteall )); + +mlsconstrain { file lnk_file fifo_file } { create relabelto } + ( l2 eq h2 ); mlsconstrain { dir file lnk_file chr_file blk_file sock_file fifo_file } { create relabelto } - (( h1 dom h2 ) and ( l2 eq h2 )); + ( h1 dom h2 ); mlsconstrain process { transition dyntransition } (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcssetcats )); @@ -101,6 +122,9 @@ mlsconstrain process { ptrace } mlsconstrain process { sigkill sigstop } (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcskillall )); +mlsconstrain process { signal } + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 != mcsuntrustedproc )); + # # MCS policy for SELinux-enabled databases # @@ -144,4 +168,21 @@ mlsconstrain db_language { drop getattr setattr relabelfrom execute } mlsconstrain db_blob { drop getattr setattr relabelfrom read write import export } ( h1 dom h2 ); +mlsconstrain { tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } node_bind + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetwrite )); + +# the node recvfrom/sendto ops, the recvfrom permission is a "write" operation +# because the subject in this particular case is the remote domain which is +# writing data out the network node which is acting as the object +mlsconstrain { node } { recvfrom } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mcsnetwrite ) or + ( t1 == unlabeled_t )); +mlsconstrain { node } { sendto } + ((( l1 dom l2 ) and ( l1 domby h2 )) or + ( t1 == mcsnetwrite )); + +mlsconstrain packet { send recv } + (( h1 dom h2 ) or ( t1 == mcsnetwrite )); + ') dnl end enable_mcs diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/acct.if b/policy/modules/admin/acct.if index e66c296..993a1e9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/acct.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/acct.if @@ -78,3 +78,21 @@ interface(`acct_manage_data',` manage_files_pattern($1, acct_data_t, acct_data_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, acct_data_t, acct_data_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit Attempts to list acct_data directory +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`acct_dontaudit_list_data',` + gen_require(` + type acct_data_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 acct_data_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/acct.te b/policy/modules/admin/acct.te index 63ef90e..a535b31 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/acct.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/acct.te @@ -55,6 +55,8 @@ files_list_usr(acct_t) # for nscd files_dontaudit_search_pids(acct_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(acct_t) + init_use_fds(acct_t) init_use_script_ptys(acct_t) init_exec_script_files(acct_t) @@ -77,10 +79,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(acct_t) -') - -optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(acct_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc b/policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc index d362d9c..230a2f6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/alsa.fc @@ -11,10 +11,14 @@ HOME_DIR/\.asoundrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_home_t,s0) /sbin/salsa -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/ainit -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/alsaunmute -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/alsactl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/salsa -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/alsa/alsa\.conf gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_etc_rw_t,s0) /usr/share/alsa/pcm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_etc_rw_t,s0) /var/lib/alsa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_var_lib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/alsa.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:alsa_unit_file_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/alsa.if b/policy/modules/admin/alsa.if index 1392679..25e02df 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/alsa.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/alsa.if @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ interface(`alsa_manage_home_files',` userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) allow $1 alsa_home_t:file manage_file_perms; + alsa_filetrans_home_content(unpriv_userdomain) ') ######################################## @@ -206,3 +207,69 @@ interface(`alsa_read_lib',` files_search_var_lib($1) read_files_pattern($1, alsa_var_lib_t, alsa_var_lib_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to alsa named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`alsa_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type alsa_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, alsa_home_t, file, ".asoundrc") +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to alsa named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`alsa_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type alsa_home_t; + type alsa_etc_rw_t; + type alsa_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_etc_filetrans($1, alsa_etc_rw_t, file, "asound.state") + files_etc_filetrans($1, alsa_etc_rw_t, dir, "pcm") + files_etc_filetrans($1, alsa_etc_rw_t, dir, "asound") + files_usr_filetrans($1, alsa_etc_rw_t, file, "alsa.conf") + files_usr_filetrans($1, alsa_etc_rw_t, dir, "pcm") + files_var_lib_filetrans($1, alsa_var_lib_t, dir, "alsa") +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute alsa server in the alsa domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`alsa_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type alsa_t; + type alsa_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 alsa_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 alsa_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, alsa_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/alsa.te b/policy/modules/admin/alsa.te index 54d0f14..413b6b6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/alsa.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/alsa.te @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ files_type(alsa_var_lib_t) type alsa_home_t; userdom_user_home_content(alsa_home_t) +type alsa_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(alsa_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/amanda.fc b/policy/modules/admin/amanda.fc index e3e0701..3fd0282 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/amanda.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/amanda.fc @@ -7,11 +7,11 @@ /root/restore -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_recover_dir_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/amanda -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_usr_lib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/amanda/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/amanda/amandad -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_inetd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/amanda/amidxtaped -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_inetd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/amanda/amindexd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_inetd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/amanda -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_usr_lib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/amanda/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/amanda/amandad -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_inetd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/amanda/amidxtaped -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_inetd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/amanda/amindexd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_inetd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/amrecover -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amanda_recover_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/amanda.te b/policy/modules/admin/amanda.te index 46d467c..53c116c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/amanda.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/amanda.te @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ optional_policy(` # allow amanda_t self:capability { chown dac_override setuid kill }; -allow amanda_t self:process { setpgid signal }; +allow amanda_t self:process { getsched setsched setpgid signal }; allow amanda_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow amanda_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow amanda_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ allow amanda_t amanda_config_t:file read_file_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(amanda_t, amanda_data_t, amanda_data_t) manage_files_pattern(amanda_t, amanda_data_t, amanda_data_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(amanda_t, amanda_data_t, amanda_data_t) filetrans_pattern(amanda_t, amanda_config_t, amanda_data_t, { file dir }) allow amanda_t amanda_dumpdates_t:file rw_file_perms; @@ -200,12 +201,14 @@ files_search_pids(amanda_recover_t) auth_use_nsswitch(amanda_recover_t) -fstools_domtrans(amanda_t) -fstools_signal(amanda_t) - logging_search_logs(amanda_recover_t) miscfiles_read_localization(amanda_recover_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(amanda_recover_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(amanda_recover_t) userdom_search_user_home_content(amanda_recover_t) + +optional_policy(` + fstools_domtrans(amanda_t) + fstools_signal(amanda_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/amtu.te b/policy/modules/admin/amtu.te index 057abb0..c75e9e9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/amtu.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/amtu.te @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(amtu_t) logging_send_audit_msgs(amtu_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(amtu_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(amtu_t) optional_policy(` nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(amtu_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/anaconda.te b/policy/modules/admin/anaconda.te index e81bdbd..c3328eb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/anaconda.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/anaconda.te @@ -22,14 +22,10 @@ kernel_domtrans_to(anaconda_t, anaconda_exec_t) init_domtrans_script(anaconda_t) -libs_domtrans_ldconfig(anaconda_t) - logging_send_syslog_msg(anaconda_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(anaconda_t) -modutils_domtrans_depmod(anaconda_t) - seutil_domtrans_semanage(anaconda_t) +seutil_domtrans_setsebool(anaconda_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(anaconda_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file }) @@ -38,6 +34,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(anaconda_t) + modutils_domtrans_depmod(anaconda_t) +') +optional_policy(` rpm_domtrans(anaconda_t) rpm_domtrans_script(anaconda_t) ') @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(anaconda_t) + unconfined_domain_noaudit(anaconda_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/apt.te b/policy/modules/admin/apt.te index 4044710..3491c7f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/apt.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/apt.te @@ -121,7 +121,7 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(apt_t) term_create_pty(apt_t, apt_devpts_t) term_list_ptys(apt_t) -term_use_all_terms(apt_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(apt_t) libs_exec_ld_so(apt_t) libs_exec_lib_files(apt_t) @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ seutil_use_newrole_fds(apt_t) sysnet_read_config(apt_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(apt_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(apt_t) # with boolean, for cron-apt and such? #optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/backup.te b/policy/modules/admin/backup.te index 0bfc958..af95b7a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/backup.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/backup.te @@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(backup_t) sysnet_read_config(backup_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(backup_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(backup_t) optional_policy(` cron_system_entry(backup_t, backup_exec_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.fc b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.fc index 7a6f06f..530d2df 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.fc @@ -1,9 +1,14 @@ - +/etc/default/grub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_etc_t,s0) /etc/lilo\.conf.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_etc_t,s0) /etc/yaboot\.conf.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_etc_t,s0) +/etc/zipl\.conf.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_etc_t,s0) -/sbin/grub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/grub.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lilo.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) /sbin/ybin.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/zipl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/grub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/grub.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lilo.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ybin.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/zipl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bootloader_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.if b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.if index 63eb96b..d7a6063 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.if @@ -19,6 +19,24 @@ interface(`bootloader_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, bootloader_exec_t, bootloader_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Execute bootloader in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`bootloader_exec',` + gen_require(` + type bootloader_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, bootloader_exec_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute bootloader interactively and do @@ -106,7 +124,7 @@ interface(`bootloader_rw_tmp_files',` ') files_search_tmp($1) - allow $1 bootloader_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms; + allow $1 bootloader_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -128,3 +146,22 @@ interface(`bootloader_create_runtime_file',` allow $1 boot_runtime_t:file { create_file_perms rw_file_perms }; files_boot_filetrans($1, boot_runtime_t, file) ') + +######################################## +## +## Type transition files created in /etc +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`bootloader_filetrans_config',` + gen_require(` + type bootloader_etc_t; + ') + + files_etc_filetrans($1,bootloader_etc_t,file, "lilo.conf") + files_etc_filetrans($1,bootloader_etc_t,file, "yaboot.conf") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te index d3da8f2..a10844b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/bootloader.te @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ role system_r types bootloader_t; # grub.conf, lilo.conf, etc. # type bootloader_etc_t alias etc_bootloader_t; -files_type(bootloader_etc_t) +files_config_file(bootloader_etc_t) # # The temp file is used for initrd creation; @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ dev_node(bootloader_tmp_t) # bootloader local policy # -allow bootloader_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fsetid sys_rawio sys_admin mknod chown }; +allow bootloader_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fsetid sys_rawio sys_admin sys_chroot mknod chown }; allow bootloader_t self:process { signal_perms execmem }; allow bootloader_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -78,6 +78,7 @@ dev_rw_nvram(bootloader_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(bootloader_t) fs_getattr_tmpfs(bootloader_t) +fs_list_hugetlbfs(bootloader_t) fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(bootloader_t) #Needed for ia64 fs_manage_dos_files(bootloader_t) @@ -86,6 +87,7 @@ mls_file_read_all_levels(bootloader_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(bootloader_t) term_getattr_all_ttys(bootloader_t) +term_getattr_all_ptys(bootloader_t) term_dontaudit_manage_pty_dirs(bootloader_t) corecmd_exec_all_executables(bootloader_t) @@ -95,12 +97,14 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(bootloader_t) files_create_boot_dirs(bootloader_t) files_manage_boot_files(bootloader_t) files_manage_boot_symlinks(bootloader_t) +files_manage_kernel_modules(bootloader_t) files_read_etc_files(bootloader_t) files_exec_etc_files(bootloader_t) files_read_usr_src_files(bootloader_t) files_read_usr_files(bootloader_t) files_read_var_files(bootloader_t) files_read_kernel_modules(bootloader_t) +files_read_kernel_symbol_table(bootloader_t) # for nscd files_dontaudit_search_pids(bootloader_t) # for blkid.tab @@ -108,6 +112,7 @@ files_manage_etc_runtime_files(bootloader_t) files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(bootloader_t, file) files_dontaudit_search_home(bootloader_t) + init_getattr_initctl(bootloader_t) init_use_script_ptys(bootloader_t) init_use_script_fds(bootloader_t) @@ -115,19 +120,21 @@ init_rw_script_pipes(bootloader_t) libs_read_lib_files(bootloader_t) libs_exec_lib_files(bootloader_t) +libs_exec_ld_so(bootloader_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(bootloader_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(bootloader_t) logging_rw_generic_logs(bootloader_t) miscfiles_read_localization(bootloader_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod_uncond(bootloader_t) - seutil_read_bin_policy(bootloader_t) seutil_read_loadpolicy(bootloader_t) seutil_dontaudit_search_config(bootloader_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(bootloader_t) +userdom_getattr_user_tmpfs_files(bootloader_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(bootloader_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(bootloader_t) ifdef(`distro_debian',` @@ -162,8 +169,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` files_manage_isid_type_blk_files(bootloader_t) files_manage_isid_type_chr_files(bootloader_t) - # for mke2fs - mount_domtrans(bootloader_t) + optional_policy(` + # for mke2fs + mount_domtrans(bootloader_t) + ') optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(bootloader_t) @@ -171,6 +180,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + devicekit_dontaudit_read_pid_files(bootloader_t) +') + +optional_policy(` fstools_exec(bootloader_t) ') @@ -180,6 +193,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gpm_getattr_gpmctl(bootloader_t) +') + +optional_policy(` kudzu_domtrans(bootloader_t) ') @@ -192,15 +209,13 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` modutils_exec_insmod(bootloader_t) + modutils_list_module_config(bootloader_t) modutils_read_module_deps(bootloader_t) modutils_read_module_config(bootloader_t) modutils_exec_insmod(bootloader_t) modutils_exec_depmod(bootloader_t) modutils_exec_update_mods(bootloader_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(bootloader_t) + modutils_domtrans_insmod_uncond(bootloader_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/brctl.if b/policy/modules/admin/brctl.if index 2c2cdb6..73b3814 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/brctl.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/brctl.if @@ -18,3 +18,28 @@ interface(`brctl_domtrans',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, brctl_exec_t, brctl_t) ') + +##################################### +## +## Execute brctl in the brctl domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`brctl_run',` + gen_require(` + type brctl_t, brctl_exec_t; + ') + + brctl_domtrans($1) + role $2 types brctl_t; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/brctl.te b/policy/modules/admin/brctl.te index 9a62a1d..eb017ef 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/brctl.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/brctl.te @@ -20,6 +20,11 @@ allow brctl_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow brctl_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow brctl_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + # caused by some bogus kernel code + dontaudit brctl_t self:capability sys_module; +') + kernel_request_load_module(brctl_t) kernel_read_network_state(brctl_t) kernel_read_sysctl(brctl_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/certwatch.te b/policy/modules/admin/certwatch.te index 6b02433..575a8d2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/certwatch.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/certwatch.te @@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ files_list_tmp(certwatch_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(certwatch_t) auth_manage_cache(certwatch_t) +auth_read_passwd(certwatch_t) auth_var_filetrans_cache(certwatch_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(certwatch_t) @@ -34,8 +35,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(certwatch_t) miscfiles_read_all_certs(certwatch_t) miscfiles_read_localization(certwatch_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(certwatch_t) -userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(certwatch_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(certwatch_t) +userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(certwatch_t) optional_policy(` apache_exec_modules(certwatch_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.fc b/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.fc index b7f053b..5d4fc31 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.fc @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ /sbin/consoletype -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:consoletype_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/consoletype -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:consoletype_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.if b/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.if index 0f57d3b..655d07f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.if @@ -19,10 +19,6 @@ interface(`consoletype_domtrans',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, consoletype_exec_t, consoletype_t) - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - dontaudit consoletype_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; - ') ') ######################################## diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.te b/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.te index cd5e005..72417f5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/consoletype.te @@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ policy_module(consoletype, 1.10.0) type consoletype_t; type consoletype_exec_t; -init_domain(consoletype_t, consoletype_exec_t) -init_system_domain(consoletype_t, consoletype_exec_t) +application_domain(consoletype_t, consoletype_exec_t) +role system_r types consoletype_t; ######################################## # @@ -47,14 +47,16 @@ fs_list_inotifyfs(consoletype_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(consoletype_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(consoletype_t) -term_use_all_terms(consoletype_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(consoletype_t) +term_use_ptmx(consoletype_t) init_use_fds(consoletype_t) init_use_script_ptys(consoletype_t) init_use_script_fds(consoletype_t) init_rw_script_pipes(consoletype_t) +init_rw_inherited_script_tmp_files(consoletype_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(consoletype_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(consoletype_t) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(consoletype_t) @@ -79,16 +81,18 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + devicekit_dontaudit_read_pid_files(consoletype_t) + devicekit_dontaudit_rw_log(consoletype_t) +') + +optional_policy(` files_read_etc_files(consoletype_t) firstboot_use_fds(consoletype_t) firstboot_rw_pipes(consoletype_t) ') optional_policy(` - hal_dontaudit_use_fds(consoletype_t) - hal_dontaudit_rw_pipes(consoletype_t) - hal_dontaudit_rw_dgram_sockets(consoletype_t) - hal_dontaudit_write_log(consoletype_t) + hal_dontaudit_leaks(consoletype_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -114,6 +118,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(consoletype_t) + userdom_dontaudit_rw_dgram_socket(consoletype_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/ddcprobe.te b/policy/modules/admin/ddcprobe.te index 5e062bc..3cbfffb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/ddcprobe.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/ddcprobe.te @@ -42,10 +42,14 @@ libs_read_lib_files(ddcprobe_t) miscfiles_read_localization(ddcprobe_t) -modutils_read_module_deps(ddcprobe_t) - -userdom_use_user_terminals(ddcprobe_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ddcprobe_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(ddcprobe_t) -#reh why? this does not seem even necessary to function properly -kudzu_getattr_exec_files(ddcprobe_t) +optional_policy(` + #reh why? this does not seem even necessary to function properly + kudzu_getattr_exec_files(ddcprobe_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_read_module_deps(ddcprobe_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.fc b/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.fc index d6cc2d9..0685b19 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.fc @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ /bin/dmesg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dmesg_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/dmesg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dmesg_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.te b/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.te index 72bc6d8..1f55eba 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/dmesg.te @@ -19,6 +19,7 @@ dontaudit dmesg_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow dmesg_t self:process signal_perms; +kernel_read_system_state(dmesg_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dmesg_t) kernel_read_ring_buffer(dmesg_t) kernel_clear_ring_buffer(dmesg_t) @@ -47,7 +48,11 @@ logging_write_generic_logs(dmesg_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dmesg_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dmesg_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(dmesg_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(dmesg_t) + +optional_policy(` + abrt_manage_pid_files(dmesg_t) +') optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(dmesg_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/dmidecode.te b/policy/modules/admin/dmidecode.te index d6356b5..5db989e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/dmidecode.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/dmidecode.te @@ -27,4 +27,4 @@ files_list_usr(dmidecode_t) locallogin_use_fds(dmidecode_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(dmidecode_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(dmidecode_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/dpkg.te b/policy/modules/admin/dpkg.te index 6776b69..cae6e96 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/dpkg.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/dpkg.te @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ role system_r types dpkg_t; # lockfile type dpkg_lock_t; -files_type(dpkg_lock_t) +files_lock_file(dpkg_lock_t) type dpkg_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(dpkg_tmp_t) @@ -161,7 +161,7 @@ seutil_manage_bin_policy(dpkg_t) sysnet_read_config(dpkg_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(dpkg_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(dpkg_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(dpkg_t) # transition to dpkg script: @@ -193,14 +193,19 @@ domain_signull_all_domains(dpkg_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(dpkg_t) files_exec_usr_files(dpkg_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dpkg_t) -modutils_domtrans_depmod(dpkg_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(dpkg_t) seutil_domtrans_loadpolicy(dpkg_t) seutil_domtrans_setfiles(dpkg_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(dpkg_t) + optional_policy(` mta_send_mail(dpkg_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_depmod(dpkg_t) + modutils_domtrans_insmod(dpkg_t) +') + optional_policy(` usermanage_domtrans_groupadd(dpkg_t) usermanage_domtrans_useradd(dpkg_t) @@ -282,7 +287,7 @@ selinux_compute_user_contexts(dpkg_script_t) storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(dpkg_script_t) storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(dpkg_script_t) -term_use_all_terms(dpkg_script_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(dpkg_script_t) auth_dontaudit_getattr_shadow(dpkg_script_t) # ideally we would not need this @@ -299,9 +304,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(dpkg_script_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dpkg_script_t) -modutils_domtrans_depmod(dpkg_script_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(dpkg_script_t) - seutil_domtrans_loadpolicy(dpkg_script_t) seutil_domtrans_setfiles(dpkg_script_t) @@ -321,6 +323,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_depmod(dpkg_script_t) + modutils_domtrans_insmod(dpkg_script_t) +') + +optional_policy(` mta_send_mail(dpkg_script_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/firstboot.if b/policy/modules/admin/firstboot.if index 8fa451c..f3a67c9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/firstboot.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/firstboot.if @@ -85,6 +85,25 @@ interface(`firstboot_dontaudit_use_fds',` ######################################## ## +## dontaudit read and write an leaked file descriptors +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`firstboot_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type firstboot_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 firstboot_t:socket_class_set { read write }; + dontaudit $1 firstboot_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Write to a firstboot unnamed pipe. ## ## @@ -98,6 +117,7 @@ interface(`firstboot_write_pipes',` type firstboot_t; ') + allow $1 firstboot_t:fd use; allow $1 firstboot_t:fifo_file write; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/firstboot.te b/policy/modules/admin/firstboot.te index c4d8998..bd59f2e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/firstboot.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/firstboot.te @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ role system_r types firstboot_t; type firstboot_etc_t; files_config_file(firstboot_etc_t) +type firstboot_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(firstboot_tmp_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy @@ -33,6 +36,10 @@ allow firstboot_t self:passwd rootok; allow firstboot_t firstboot_etc_t:file read_file_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(firstboot_t, firstboot_tmp_t, firstboot_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(firstboot_t, firstboot_tmp_t, firstboot_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(firstboot_t, firstboot_tmp_t, { dir file }) + kernel_read_system_state(firstboot_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(firstboot_t) @@ -62,6 +69,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(firstboot_t) files_manage_var_dirs(firstboot_t) files_manage_var_files(firstboot_t) files_manage_var_symlinks(firstboot_t) +files_create_boot_flag(firstboot_t) +files_delete_boot_flag(firstboot_t) init_domtrans_script(firstboot_t) init_rw_utmp(firstboot_t) @@ -75,12 +84,9 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(firstboot_t) miscfiles_read_localization(firstboot_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(firstboot_t) -modutils_domtrans_depmod(firstboot_t) -modutils_read_module_config(firstboot_t) -modutils_read_module_deps(firstboot_t) +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(firstboot_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(firstboot_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(firstboot_t) # Add/remove user home directories userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(firstboot_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(firstboot_t) @@ -91,10 +97,6 @@ userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(firstboot_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(firstboot_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file }) optional_policy(` - consoletype_domtrans(firstboot_t) -') - -optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(firstboot_t) optional_policy(` @@ -103,8 +105,18 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + iptables_domtrans(firstboot_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nis_use_ypbind(firstboot_t) ') +optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(firstboot_t) + modutils_domtrans_depmod(firstboot_t) + modutils_read_module_config(firstboot_t) + modutils_read_module_deps(firstboot_t) +') optional_policy(` samba_rw_config(firstboot_t) @@ -113,7 +125,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` unconfined_domtrans(firstboot_t) # The big hammer - unconfined_domain(firstboot_t) + unconfined_domain_noaudit(firstboot_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -125,6 +137,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_admin_home_gconf_filetrans(firstboot_t, dir) gnome_manage_config(firstboot_t) ') @@ -132,4 +145,5 @@ optional_policy(` xserver_domtrans(firstboot_t) xserver_rw_shm(firstboot_t) xserver_unconfined(firstboot_t) + xserver_stream_connect(firstboot_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/kdump.fc b/policy/modules/admin/kdump.fc index c66934f..9f05409 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/kdump.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/kdump.fc @@ -3,3 +3,9 @@ /sbin/kdump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdump_exec_t,s0) /sbin/kexec -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdump_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/kdump.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_unit_file_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/kdump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdump_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/kexec -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdump_exec_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/kdump.if b/policy/modules/admin/kdump.if index 4198ff5..9bf4898 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/kdump.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/kdump.if @@ -37,6 +37,30 @@ interface(`kdump_initrc_domtrans',` init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, kdump_initrc_exec_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Execute kdump server in the kdump domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`kdump_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type kdump_unit_file_t; + type kdump_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_search_unit_dirs($1) + allow $1 kdump_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 kdump_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, kdump_t) +') + ##################################### ## ## Read kdump configuration file. @@ -56,6 +80,24 @@ interface(`kdump_read_config',` allow $1 kdump_etc_t:file read_file_perms; ') +##################################### +## +## Dontaudit read kdump configuration file. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`kdump_dontaudit_read_config',` + gen_require(` + type kdump_etc_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 kdump_etc_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + #################################### ## ## Manage kdump configuration file. @@ -96,10 +138,14 @@ interface(`kdump_admin',` gen_require(` type kdump_t, kdump_etc_t; type kdump_initrc_exec_t; + type kdump_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 kdump_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 kdump_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, kdump_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 kdump_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, kdump_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -108,4 +154,8 @@ interface(`kdump_admin',` files_search_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, kdump_etc_t) + + kdump_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, kdump_unit_file_t) + allow $1 kdump_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/kdump.te b/policy/modules/admin/kdump.te index b29d8e2..ed79499 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/kdump.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/kdump.te @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ files_config_file(kdump_etc_t) type kdump_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(kdump_initrc_exec_t) +type kdump_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(kdump_unit_file_t) + ##################################### # # kdump local policy @@ -24,6 +27,7 @@ allow kdump_t self:capability { sys_boot dac_override }; read_files_pattern(kdump_t, kdump_etc_t, kdump_etc_t) +files_read_etc_files(kdump_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(kdump_t) files_read_kernel_img(kdump_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/kismet.if b/policy/modules/admin/kismet.if index c18c920..582f7f3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/kismet.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/kismet.if @@ -239,7 +239,10 @@ interface(`kismet_admin',` ') ps_process_pattern($1, kismet_t) - allow $1 kismet_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 kismet_t:process signal_perms; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 kismet_t:process ptrace; + ') kismet_manage_pid_files($1) kismet_manage_lib($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/kismet.te b/policy/modules/admin/kismet.te index 9dd6880..4b7fa27 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/kismet.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/kismet.te @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ files_read_usr_files(kismet_t) miscfiles_read_localization(kismet_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(kismet_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(kismet_t) userdom_read_user_tmpfs_files(kismet_t) optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/kudzu.fc b/policy/modules/admin/kudzu.fc index dd88f74..3317a0c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/kudzu.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/kudzu.fc @@ -2,4 +2,5 @@ /sbin/kmodule -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kudzu_exec_t,s0) /sbin/kudzu -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kudzu_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/kmodule -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kudzu_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/kudzu -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kudzu_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/kudzu.te b/policy/modules/admin/kudzu.te index 4f7bd3c..9143343 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/kudzu.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/kudzu.te @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ files_pid_file(kudzu_var_run_t) # Local policy # -allow kudzu_t self:capability { dac_override sys_admin sys_ptrace sys_rawio net_admin sys_tty_config mknod }; +allow kudzu_t self:capability { dac_override sys_admin sys_rawio net_admin sys_tty_config mknod }; dontaudit kudzu_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow kudzu_t self:process { signal_perms execmem }; allow kudzu_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -111,15 +111,10 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(kudzu_t) miscfiles_read_hwdata(kudzu_t) miscfiles_read_localization(kudzu_t) -modutils_read_module_config(kudzu_t) -modutils_read_module_deps(kudzu_t) -modutils_rename_module_config(kudzu_t) -modutils_delete_module_config(kudzu_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(kudzu_t) sysnet_read_config(kudzu_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(kudzu_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(kudzu_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(kudzu_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(kudzu_t) @@ -128,7 +123,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(kudzu_t) + modutils_read_module_config(kudzu_t) + modutils_read_module_deps(kudzu_t) + modutils_rename_module_config(kudzu_t) + modutils_delete_module_config(kudzu_t) + modutils_domtrans_insmod(kudzu_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -141,5 +140,4 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` unconfined_domtrans(kudzu_t) - unconfined_domain(kudzu_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te b/policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te index 7090dae..51123b2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/logrotate.te @@ -29,9 +29,7 @@ files_type(logrotate_var_lib_t) # # Change ownership on log files. -allow logrotate_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search kill fsetid fowner sys_resource sys_nice }; -# for mailx -dontaudit logrotate_t self:capability { setuid setgid sys_ptrace }; +allow logrotate_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search kill fsetid fowner setuid setgid sys_resource sys_nice }; allow logrotate_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; @@ -39,6 +37,7 @@ allow logrotate_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimi allow logrotate_t self:process setfscreate; allow logrotate_t self:fd use; +allow logrotate_t self:key manage_key_perms; allow logrotate_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow logrotate_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow logrotate_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -61,6 +60,7 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(logrotate_t, logrotate_tmp_t, { file dir }) # for /var/lib/logrotate.status and /var/lib/logcheck create_dirs_pattern(logrotate_t, logrotate_var_lib_t, logrotate_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(logrotate_t, logrotate_var_lib_t, logrotate_var_lib_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(logrotate_t, logrotate_var_lib_t, logrotate_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(logrotate_t, logrotate_var_lib_t, file) kernel_read_system_state(logrotate_t) @@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ fs_list_inotifyfs(logrotate_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(logrotate_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(logrotate_t) mls_file_upgrade(logrotate_t) +mls_process_write_to_clearance(logrotate_t) selinux_get_fs_mount(logrotate_t) selinux_get_enforce_mode(logrotate_t) @@ -85,6 +86,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(logrotate_t) # Run helper programs. corecmd_exec_bin(logrotate_t) corecmd_exec_shell(logrotate_t) +corecmd_getattr_all_executables(logrotate_t) domain_signal_all_domains(logrotate_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(logrotate_t) @@ -102,6 +104,7 @@ files_read_var_lib_files(logrotate_t) files_manage_generic_spool(logrotate_t) files_manage_generic_spool_dirs(logrotate_t) files_getattr_generic_locks(logrotate_t) +files_dontaudit_list_mnt(logrotate_t) # cjp: why is this needed? init_domtrans_script(logrotate_t) @@ -116,17 +119,17 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(logrotate_t) seutil_dontaudit_read_config(logrotate_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(logrotate_t) +systemd_exec_systemctl(logrotate_t) +init_stream_connect(logrotate_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(logrotate_t) userdom_list_user_home_dirs(logrotate_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(logrotate_t) - -cron_system_entry(logrotate_t, logrotate_exec_t) -cron_search_spool(logrotate_t) - -mta_send_mail(logrotate_t) +userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(logrotate_t) +userdom_dontaudit_getattr_user_home_content(logrotate_t) ifdef(`distro_debian', ` - allow logrotate_t logrotate_tmp_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; + allow logrotate_t logrotate_tmp_t:file relabel_file_perms; # for savelog can_exec(logrotate_t, logrotate_exec_t) @@ -138,7 +141,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian', ` ') optional_policy(` - abrt_cache_manage(logrotate_t) + abrt_manage_cache(logrotate_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -154,6 +157,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + awstats_domtrans(logrotate_t) +') + +optional_policy(` asterisk_domtrans(logrotate_t) ') @@ -162,10 +169,20 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + callweaver_exec(logrotate_t) + callweaver_stream_connect(logrotate_t) +') + +optional_policy(` consoletype_exec(logrotate_t) ') optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(logrotate_t, logrotate_exec_t) + cron_search_spool(logrotate_t) +') + +optional_policy(` cups_domtrans(logrotate_t) ') @@ -178,6 +195,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + chronyd_read_keys(logrotate_t) +') + +optional_policy(` icecast_signal(logrotate_t) ') @@ -194,15 +215,19 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + mysql_read_home_content(logrotate_t) mysql_read_config(logrotate_t) mysql_search_db(logrotate_t) mysql_stream_connect(logrotate_t) ') optional_policy(` - psad_domtrans(logrotate_t) + polipo_named_filetrans_log_files(logrotate_t) ') +optional_policy(` + psad_domtrans(logrotate_t) +') optional_policy(` samba_exec_log(logrotate_t) @@ -228,3 +253,14 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` varnishd_manage_log(logrotate_t) ') + +####################################### +# +# logrotate_mail local policy +# + +mta_base_mail_template(logrotate) +mta_sendmail_domtrans(logrotate_t, logrotate_mail_t) +role system_r types logrotate_mail_t; +logging_read_all_logs(logrotate_mail_t) +manage_files_pattern(logrotate_mail_t, logrotate_tmp_t, logrotate_tmp_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/logwatch.fc b/policy/modules/admin/logwatch.fc index 3c7b1e8..1e155f5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/logwatch.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/logwatch.fc @@ -1,7 +1,11 @@ /usr/sbin/logcheck -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:logwatch_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/epylog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:logwatch_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/logwatch/scripts/logwatch\.pl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:logwatch_exec_t, s0) /var/cache/logwatch(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:logwatch_cache_t, s0) /var/lib/logcheck(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:logwatch_cache_t,s0) +/var/lib/epylog(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:logwatch_cache_t,s0) /var/log/logcheck/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:logwatch_lock_t,s0) + +/var/run/epylog\.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:logwatch_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/logwatch.te b/policy/modules/admin/logwatch.te index 75ce30f..671d4e1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/logwatch.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/logwatch.te @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ policy_module(logwatch, 1.11.0) type logwatch_t; type logwatch_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(logwatch_t, logwatch_exec_t) application_domain(logwatch_t, logwatch_exec_t) role system_r types logwatch_t; @@ -19,6 +20,12 @@ files_lock_file(logwatch_lock_t) type logwatch_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(logwatch_tmp_t) +type logwatch_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(logwatch_var_run_t) + +mta_base_mail_template(logwatch) +role system_r types logwatch_mail_t; + ######################################## # # Local policy @@ -39,6 +46,9 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(logwatch_t, logwatch_tmp_t, logwatch_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(logwatch_t, logwatch_tmp_t, logwatch_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(logwatch_t, logwatch_tmp_t, { file dir }) +allow logwatch_t logwatch_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; +files_pid_filetrans(logwatch_t, logwatch_var_run_t, file) + kernel_read_fs_sysctls(logwatch_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(logwatch_t) kernel_read_system_state(logwatch_t) @@ -58,6 +68,7 @@ files_list_var(logwatch_t) files_read_var_symlinks(logwatch_t) files_read_etc_files(logwatch_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(logwatch_t) +files_read_system_conf_files(logwatch_t) files_read_usr_files(logwatch_t) files_search_spool(logwatch_t) files_search_mnt(logwatch_t) @@ -70,6 +81,8 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(logwatch_t) fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints(logwatch_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(logwatch_t) +mls_file_read_to_clearance(logwatch_t) + term_dontaudit_getattr_pty_dirs(logwatch_t) term_dontaudit_list_ptys(logwatch_t) @@ -92,11 +105,14 @@ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(logwatch_t) sysnet_exec_ifconfig(logwatch_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(logwatch_t) +userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(logwatch_t) -mta_send_mail(logwatch_t) +#mta_send_mail(logwatch_t) +mta_sendmail_domtrans(logwatch_t, logwatch_mail_t) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` files_search_all(logwatch_t) + files_getattr_all_files(logwatch_t) files_getattr_all_file_type_fs(logwatch_t) ') @@ -145,3 +161,24 @@ optional_policy(` samba_read_log(logwatch_t) samba_read_share_files(logwatch_t) ') + +######################################## +# +# Logwatch mail Local policy +# + +allow logwatch_mail_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override }; + +manage_files_pattern(logwatch_mail_t, logwatch_tmp_t, logwatch_tmp_t) + +dev_read_rand(logwatch_mail_t) +dev_read_urand(logwatch_mail_t) +dev_read_sysfs(logwatch_mail_t) + +logging_read_all_logs(logwatch_mail_t) + +mta_read_home(logwatch_mail_t) + +optional_policy(` + cron_use_system_job_fds(logwatch_mail_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/mcelog.fc b/policy/modules/admin/mcelog.fc index 56c43c0..409bbfc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/mcelog.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/mcelog.fc @@ -1 +1,5 @@ /usr/sbin/mcelog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mcelog_exec_t,s0) + +/var/log/mcelog.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mcelog_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/mcelog.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:mcelog_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/mcelog.te b/policy/modules/admin/mcelog.te index 5671977..a4a5f20 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/mcelog.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/mcelog.te @@ -7,8 +7,14 @@ policy_module(mcelog, 1.1.0) type mcelog_t; type mcelog_exec_t; +init_system_domain(mcelog_t, mcelog_exec_t) application_domain(mcelog_t, mcelog_exec_t) -cron_system_entry(mcelog_t, mcelog_exec_t) + +type mcelog_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(mcelog_var_run_t) + +type mcelog_log_t; +logging_log_file(mcelog_log_t) ######################################## # @@ -17,16 +23,35 @@ cron_system_entry(mcelog_t, mcelog_exec_t) allow mcelog_t self:capability sys_admin; +manage_files_pattern(mcelog_t, mcelog_log_t, mcelog_log_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(mcelog_t, mcelog_log_t, mcelog_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(mcelog_t, mcelog_log_t, { file dir }) + +manage_files_pattern(mcelog_t, mcelog_var_run_t, mcelog_var_run_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(mcelog_t, mcelog_var_run_t, mcelog_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(mcelog_t, mcelog_var_run_t, mcelog_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(mcelog_t, mcelog_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file } ) + kernel_read_system_state(mcelog_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(mcelog_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(mcelog_t) + dev_read_raw_memory(mcelog_t) dev_read_kmsg(mcelog_t) +dev_rw_sysfs(mcelog_t) files_read_etc_files(mcelog_t) # for /dev/mem access mls_file_read_all_levels(mcelog_t) +auth_read_passwd(mcelog_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(mcelog_t) miscfiles_read_localization(mcelog_t) + +optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(mcelog_t, mcelog_exec_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/mrtg.te b/policy/modules/admin/mrtg.te index 0e19d80..a3a38b1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/mrtg.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/mrtg.te @@ -43,9 +43,12 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(mrtg_t, mrtg_etc_t, mrtg_etc_t) dontaudit mrtg_t mrtg_etc_t:dir write; dontaudit mrtg_t mrtg_etc_t:file { write ioctl }; +manage_dirs_pattern(mrtg_t, mrtg_lock_t, mrtg_lock_t) manage_files_pattern(mrtg_t, mrtg_lock_t, mrtg_lock_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(mrtg_t, mrtg_lock_t, mrtg_lock_t) +files_lock_filetrans(mrtg_t, mrtg_lock_t, { dir file }) +manage_dirs_pattern(mrtg_t, mrtg_log_t, mrtg_log_t) manage_files_pattern(mrtg_t, mrtg_log_t, mrtg_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(mrtg_t, mrtg_log_t, { file dir }) @@ -112,9 +115,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(mrtg_t) selinux_dontaudit_getattr_dir(mrtg_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(mrtg_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(mrtg_t) userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(mrtg_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(mrtg_t) +userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(mrtg_t) netutils_domtrans_ping(mrtg_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/ncftool.if b/policy/modules/admin/ncftool.if index 75ee31d..a28ab46 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/ncftool.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/ncftool.if @@ -46,3 +46,31 @@ interface(`ncftool_run',` brctl_run(ncftool_t, $2) ') ') + +######################################## +## +## Role access for ncftool +## +## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +# +interface(`ncftool_role',` + gen_require(` + type ncftool_t; + ') + + role $1 types ncftool_t; + + ncftool_domtrans($2) + + ps_process_pattern($2, ncftool_t) + allow $2 ncftool_t:process signal; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/ncftool.te b/policy/modules/admin/ncftool.te index ec29391..28c9672 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/ncftool.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/ncftool.te @@ -17,10 +17,13 @@ role system_r types ncftool_t; # ncftool local policy # -allow ncftool_t self:capability { net_admin sys_ptrace }; +allow ncftool_t self:capability net_admin; allow ncftool_t self:process signal; + allow ncftool_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; allow ncftool_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +allow ncftool_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; allow ncftool_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow ncftool_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; @@ -38,10 +41,14 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(ncftool_t) dev_read_sysfs(ncftool_t) +files_manage_system_conf_files(ncftool_t) +files_relabelto_system_conf_files(ncftool_t) files_read_etc_files(ncftool_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(ncftool_t) files_read_usr_files(ncftool_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(ncftool_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(ncftool_t) sysnet_delete_dhcpc_pid(ncftool_t) @@ -50,6 +57,8 @@ sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(ncftool_t) sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(ncftool_t) sysnet_manage_config(ncftool_t) sysnet_read_dhcpc_state(ncftool_t) +sysnet_relabelfrom_net_conf(ncftool_t) +sysnet_relabelto_net_conf(ncftool_t) sysnet_read_dhcpc_pid(ncftool_t) sysnet_signal_dhcpc(ncftool_t) @@ -66,6 +75,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` iptables_initrc_domtrans(ncftool_t) + iptables_systemctl(ncftool_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.fc b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.fc index 407078f..56cc947 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.fc @@ -1,15 +1,20 @@ /bin/ping.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0) -/bin/tracepath.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) +/bin/tracepath.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) /bin/traceroute.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) /sbin/arping -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:netutils_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/lft -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/mtr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/nmap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/ping.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/tracepath.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/traceroute.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/fping -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/arping -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:netutils_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/fping.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/traceroute.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/hping2 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mtr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:traceroute_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/send_arp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ping_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/tcpdump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:netutils_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.if b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.if index c6ca761..46e0767 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.if @@ -42,6 +42,7 @@ interface(`netutils_run',` ') netutils_domtrans($1) + allow $1 netutils_t:process { signal sigkill }; role $2 types netutils_t; ') @@ -161,6 +162,7 @@ interface(`netutils_run_ping',` netutils_domtrans_ping($1) role $2 types ping_t; + allow $1 ping_t:process { signal sigkill }; ') ######################################## @@ -190,6 +192,7 @@ interface(`netutils_run_ping_cond',` if ( user_ping ) { netutils_domtrans_ping($1) + allow $1 ping_t:process { signal sigkill }; } ') @@ -254,6 +257,7 @@ interface(`netutils_run_traceroute',` ') netutils_domtrans_traceroute($1) + allow $1 traceroute_t:process { signal sigkill }; role $2 types traceroute_t; ') @@ -284,6 +288,7 @@ interface(`netutils_run_traceroute_cond',` if( user_ping ) { netutils_domtrans_traceroute($1) + allow $1 traceroute_t:process { signal sigkill }; } ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.te b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.te index e0791b9..9f49d01 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/netutils.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/netutils.te @@ -48,6 +48,8 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(netutils_t, netutils_tmp_t, { file dir }) kernel_search_proc(netutils_t) kernel_read_all_sysctls(netutils_t) +kernel_read_network_state(netutils_t) +kernel_request_load_module(netutils_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(netutils_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(netutils_t) @@ -64,6 +66,9 @@ corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(netutils_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(netutils_t) dev_read_sysfs(netutils_t) +dev_read_usbmon_dev(netutils_t) +dev_write_usbmon_dev(netutils_t) +dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(netutils_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(netutils_t) @@ -83,7 +88,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(netutils_t) miscfiles_read_localization(netutils_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(netutils_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(netutils_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(netutils_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(netutils_t) optional_policy(` @@ -104,6 +109,8 @@ optional_policy(` # allow ping_t self:capability { setuid net_raw }; +allow ping_t self:process setcap; + dontaudit ping_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow ping_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; allow ping_t self:rawip_socket { create ioctl read write bind getopt setopt }; @@ -134,8 +141,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(ping_t) miscfiles_read_localization(ping_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(ping_t) - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` init_dontaudit_use_fds(ping_t) @@ -145,11 +150,25 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` ') ') +term_use_all_inherited_terms(ping_t) + +tunable_policy(`user_ping',` + term_use_all_ttys(ping_t) + term_use_all_ptys(ping_t) +',` + term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(ping_t) + term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(ping_t) +') + optional_policy(` munin_append_log(ping_t) ') optional_policy(` + nagios_rw_inerited_tmp_files(ping_t) +') + +optional_policy(` pcmcia_use_cardmgr_fds(ping_t) ') @@ -157,6 +176,10 @@ optional_policy(` hotplug_use_fds(ping_t) ') +optional_policy(` + zabbix_read_tmp(ping_t) +') + ######################################## # # Traceroute local policy @@ -194,6 +217,7 @@ fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(traceroute_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(traceroute_t) files_read_etc_files(traceroute_t) +files_read_usr_files(traceroute_t) files_dontaudit_search_var(traceroute_t) init_use_fds(traceroute_t) @@ -204,9 +228,16 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(traceroute_t) miscfiles_read_localization(traceroute_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(traceroute_t) - #rules needed for nmap dev_read_rand(traceroute_t) dev_read_urand(traceroute_t) -files_read_usr_files(traceroute_t) + +term_use_all_inherited_terms(traceroute_t) + +tunable_policy(`user_ping',` + term_use_all_ttys(traceroute_t) + term_use_all_ptys(traceroute_t) +',` + term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(traceroute_t) + term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(traceroute_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/passenger.if b/policy/modules/admin/passenger.if index f68b573..30b3188 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/passenger.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/passenger.if @@ -18,6 +18,24 @@ interface(`passenger_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, passenger_exec_t, passenger_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Execute passenger in the current domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`passenger_exec',` + gen_require(` + type passenger_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, passenger_exec_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Read passenger lib files @@ -37,3 +55,46 @@ interface(`passenger_read_lib_files',` read_lnk_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib($1) ') + +######################################## +## +## Manage passenger lib files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`passenger_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type passenger_var_lib_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_lib_t, passenger_var_lib_t) + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +##################################### +## +## Manage passenger var_run content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`passenger_manage_pid_content',` + gen_require(` + type passenger_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t) + manage_fifo_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t) + manage_sock_files_pattern($1, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/passenger.te b/policy/modules/admin/passenger.te index 3470036..41f736e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/passenger.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/passenger.te @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -policy_module(passanger, 1.0.0) +policy_module(passenger, 1.0.0) ######################################## # @@ -49,6 +49,11 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_var_run_t, passenger_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(passenger_t, passenger_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file }) +#needed by puppet +manage_dirs_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, passenger_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, passenger_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(passenger_t, passenger_tmp_t, { file dir }) + kernel_read_system_state(passenger_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(passenger_t) @@ -64,9 +69,12 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(passenger_t) dev_read_urand(passenger_t) files_read_etc_files(passenger_t) +files_read_usr_files(passenger_t) auth_use_nsswitch(passenger_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(passenger_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(passenger_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(passenger_t) @@ -75,3 +83,9 @@ optional_policy(` apache_append_log(passenger_t) apache_read_sys_content(passenger_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + puppet_manage_lib(passenger_t) + puppet_search_log(passenger_t) + puppet_search_pid(passenger_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/portage.fc b/policy/modules/admin/portage.fc index db46387..b665b08 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/portage.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/portage.fc @@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ /usr/bin/gcc-config -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gcc_config_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/portage/bin/ebuild -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/portage/bin/emerge -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/portage/bin/quickpkg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/portage/bin/ebuild\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/portage/bin/regenworld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/portage/bin/sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/portage/bin/ebuild -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/portage/bin/emerge -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/portage/bin/quickpkg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/portage/bin/ebuild\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/portage/bin/regenworld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/portage/bin/sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_exec_t,s0) /usr/portage(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:portage_ebuild_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/portage.if b/policy/modules/admin/portage.if index 9a2c2a1..adde889 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/portage.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/portage.if @@ -183,7 +183,7 @@ interface(`portage_compile_domain',` logging_send_syslog_msg($1) - userdom_use_user_terminals($1) + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals($1) # SELinux-enabled programs running in the sandbox seutil_libselinux_linked($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/portage.te b/policy/modules/admin/portage.te index 7f1d18e..a68d519 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/portage.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/portage.te @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ type portage_db_t; files_type(portage_db_t) type portage_conf_t; -files_type(portage_conf_t) +files_config_file(portage_conf_t) type portage_cache_t; files_type(portage_cache_t) @@ -105,9 +105,11 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(gcc_config_t) miscfiles_read_localization(gcc_config_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(gcc_config_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gcc_config_t) -consoletype_exec(gcc_config_t) +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(gcc_config_t) +') optional_policy(` seutil_use_newrole_fds(gcc_config_t) @@ -255,7 +257,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(portage_fetch_t) sysnet_read_config(portage_fetch_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(portage_fetch_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(portage_fetch_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(portage_fetch_t) userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(portage_fetch_t) ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/prelink.if b/policy/modules/admin/prelink.if index 93ec175..0e42018 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/prelink.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/prelink.if @@ -19,7 +19,6 @@ interface(`prelink_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, prelink_exec_t, prelink_t) ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - dontaudit prelink_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; dontaudit prelink_t $1:fifo_file setattr; ') ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/prelink.te b/policy/modules/admin/prelink.te index af55369..437026a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/prelink.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/prelink.te @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ files_type(prelink_var_lib_t) # Local policy # -allow prelink_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid sys_resource }; +allow prelink_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid setfcap sys_resource }; allow prelink_t self:process { execheap execmem execstack signal }; allow prelink_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -59,10 +59,11 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(prelink_t, prelink_var_lib_t, prelink_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(prelink_t, prelink_var_lib_t, prelink_var_lib_t) relabel_files_pattern(prelink_t, prelink_var_lib_t, prelink_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(prelink_t, prelink_var_lib_t, { dir file }) +files_search_var_lib(prelink_t) # prelink misc objects that are not system # libraries or entrypoints -allow prelink_t prelink_object:file { manage_file_perms execute relabelto relabelfrom }; +allow prelink_t prelink_object:file { manage_file_perms execute relabel_file_perms }; kernel_read_system_state(prelink_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(prelink_t) @@ -73,6 +74,7 @@ corecmd_mmap_all_executables(prelink_t) corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(prelink_t) dev_read_urand(prelink_t) +dev_getattr_all_chr_files(prelink_t) files_list_all(prelink_t) files_getattr_all_files(prelink_t) @@ -86,6 +88,8 @@ files_relabelfrom_usr_files(prelink_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(prelink_t) +storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(prelink_t) + selinux_get_enforce_mode(prelink_t) libs_exec_ld_so(prelink_t) @@ -98,7 +102,15 @@ libs_delete_lib_symlinks(prelink_t) miscfiles_read_localization(prelink_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(prelink_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(prelink_t) +userdom_manage_user_home_content(prelink_t) +userdom_relabel_user_home_files(prelink_t) +userdom_execmod_user_home_files(prelink_t) +userdom_exec_user_home_content_files(prelink_t) + +systemd_read_unit_files(prelink_t) + +term_use_all_inherited_terms(prelink_t) optional_policy(` amanda_manage_lib(prelink_t) @@ -109,6 +121,15 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_read_config(prelink_t) + gnome_dontaudit_read_inherited_gconf_config_files(prelink_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_plugin_manage_rw_files(prelink_t) +') + +optional_policy(` rpm_manage_tmp_files(prelink_t) ') @@ -129,6 +150,7 @@ optional_policy(` read_files_pattern(prelink_cron_system_t, prelink_cache_t, prelink_cache_t) allow prelink_cron_system_t prelink_cache_t:file unlink; + files_delete_etc_dir_entry(prelink_cron_system_t) domtrans_pattern(prelink_cron_system_t, prelink_exec_t, prelink_t) allow prelink_cron_system_t prelink_t:process noatsecure; @@ -148,17 +170,31 @@ optional_policy(` files_read_etc_files(prelink_cron_system_t) files_search_var_lib(prelink_cron_system_t) - init_exec(prelink_cron_system_t) + fs_search_cgroup_dirs(prelink_cron_system_t) + + auth_use_nsswitch(prelink_cron_system_t) + + init_telinit(prelink_cron_system_t) libs_exec_ld_so(prelink_cron_system_t) logging_search_logs(prelink_cron_system_t) + init_stream_connect(prelink_cron_system_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(prelink_cron_system_t) cron_system_entry(prelink_cron_system_t, prelink_cron_system_exec_t) + userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(prelink_cron_system_t) + optional_policy(` rpm_read_db(prelink_cron_system_t) ') ') +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` + optional_policy(` + dbus_read_config(prelink_t) + ') + miscfiles_read_man_pages(prelink_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/quota.fc b/policy/modules/admin/quota.fc index f387230..e63f9c6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/quota.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/quota.fc @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ HOME_ROOT/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0) /a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0) @@ -8,12 +9,18 @@ HOME_ROOT/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0) /sbin/quota(check|on) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/quota(check|on) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_exec_t,s0) + /var/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0) /var/lib/quota(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_flag_t,s0) -/var/spool/a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0) +/var/spool/(.*/)?a?quota\.(user|group) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_db_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /usr/sbin/convertquota -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_exec_t,s0) ',` /sbin/convertquota -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_exec_t,s0) ') + +/usr/sbin/quota_nld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_nld_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/quota_nld\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quota_nld_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/quota.if b/policy/modules/admin/quota.if index bf75d99..3fb8575 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/quota.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/quota.if @@ -45,6 +45,24 @@ interface(`quota_run',` role $2 types quota_t; ') +####################################### +## +## Alow to read of filesystem quota data files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`quota_read_db',` + gen_require(` + type quota_db_t; + ') + + allow $1 quota_db_t:file read_file_perms; +') + ######################################## ## ## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes @@ -67,6 +85,25 @@ interface(`quota_dontaudit_getattr_db',` ######################################## ## ## Create, read, write, and delete quota +## db files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`quota_manage_db',` + gen_require(` + type quota_db_t; + ') + + allow $1 quota_db_t:file manage_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete quota ## flag files. ## ## @@ -83,3 +120,59 @@ interface(`quota_manage_flags',` files_search_var_lib($1) manage_files_pattern($1, quota_flag_t, quota_flag_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to quota named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`quota_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type quota_db_t; + ') + + files_root_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + files_root_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") + files_boot_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + files_boot_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") + files_etc_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + files_etc_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") + files_tmp_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + files_tmp_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") + files_home_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + files_home_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") + files_usr_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + files_usr_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") + files_var_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + files_var_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") + files_spool_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + files_spool_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") + mta_spool_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + mta_spool_filetrans($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") + mta_spool_filetrans_queue($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.user") + mta_spool_filetrans_queue($1, quota_db_t, file, "aquota.group") +') + +####################################### +## +## Transition to quota_nld. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`quota_domtrans_nld',` + gen_require(` + type quota_nld_t, quota_nld_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, quota_nld_exec_t, quota_nld_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/quota.te b/policy/modules/admin/quota.te index 5dd42f5..b4ebb85 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/quota.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/quota.te @@ -7,7 +7,8 @@ policy_module(quota, 1.5.0) type quota_t; type quota_exec_t; -init_system_domain(quota_t, quota_exec_t) +application_domain(quota_t, quota_exec_t) +#init_system_domain(quota_t, quota_exec_t) type quota_db_t; files_type(quota_db_t) @@ -15,6 +16,13 @@ files_type(quota_db_t) type quota_flag_t; files_type(quota_flag_t) +type quota_nld_t; +type quota_nld_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(quota_nld_t, quota_nld_exec_t) + +type quota_nld_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(quota_nld_var_run_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy @@ -34,6 +42,13 @@ files_home_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file) files_usr_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file) files_var_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file) files_spool_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file) + +optional_policy(` + mta_spool_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file) + mta_spool_filetrans(quota_t, quota_db_t, file) + mta_spool_filetrans_queue(quota_t, quota_db_t, file) +') kernel_list_proc(quota_t) kernel_read_proc_symlinks(quota_t) @@ -72,7 +87,7 @@ init_use_script_ptys(quota_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(quota_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(quota_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(quota_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(quota_t) optional_policy(` @@ -82,3 +97,34 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` udev_read_db(quota_t) ') + +####################################### +# +# Local policy +# + +allow quota_nld_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow quota_nld_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; +allow quota_nld_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(quota_nld_t, quota_nld_var_run_t, quota_nld_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(quota_nld_t, quota_nld_var_run_t, { file }) + +kernel_read_network_state(quota_nld_t) + +files_read_etc_files(quota_nld_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(quota_nld_t) + +init_read_utmp(quota_nld_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(quota_nld_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(quota_nld_t) + +userdom_use_user_terminals(quota_nld_t) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(quota_nld_t) + dbus_connect_system_bus(quota_nld_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/readahead.fc b/policy/modules/admin/readahead.fc index 7077413..0428aee 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/readahead.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/readahead.fc @@ -1,3 +1,10 @@ -/usr/sbin/readahead.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:readahead_exec_t,s0) +/dev/\.systemd/readahead(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:readahead_var_run_t,s0) + /sbin/readahead.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:readahead_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/readahead.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:readahead_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-readahead.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:readahead_exec_t,s0) + /var/lib/readahead(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:readahead_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/run/systemd/readahead(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:readahead_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/readahead.if b/policy/modules/admin/readahead.if index 47c4723..64c8889 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/readahead.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/readahead.if @@ -1 +1,44 @@ ## Readahead, read files into page cache for improved performance + +######################################## +## +## Transition to the readahead domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`readahead_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type readahead_t, readahead_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, readahead_exec_t, readahead_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage readahead var_run files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`readahead_manage_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type readahead_var_run_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, readahead_var_run_t, readahead_var_run_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, readahead_var_run_t, readahead_var_run_t) + dev_filetrans($1, readahead_var_run_t, { dir file }) + init_pid_filetrans($1, readahead_var_run_t, { dir file }) + files_search_pids($1) + init_search_pid_dirs($1) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/readahead.te b/policy/modules/admin/readahead.te index b4ac57e..ef944a4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/readahead.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/readahead.te @@ -16,13 +16,14 @@ typealias readahead_var_lib_t alias readahead_etc_rw_t; type readahead_var_run_t; files_pid_file(readahead_var_run_t) +dev_associate(readahead_var_run_t) ######################################## # # Local policy # -allow readahead_t self:capability { fowner dac_override dac_read_search }; +allow readahead_t self:capability { sys_admin fowner dac_override dac_read_search }; dontaudit readahead_t self:capability { net_admin sys_tty_config }; allow readahead_t self:process { setsched signal_perms }; @@ -31,13 +32,18 @@ manage_files_pattern(readahead_t, readahead_var_lib_t, readahead_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib(readahead_t) manage_files_pattern(readahead_t, readahead_var_run_t, readahead_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(readahead_t, readahead_var_run_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(readahead_t, readahead_var_run_t, readahead_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(readahead_t, readahead_var_run_t, { dir file }) +dev_filetrans(readahead_t, readahead_var_run_t, { dir file }) +init_pid_filetrans(readahead_t, readahead_var_run_t, { dir file }) kernel_read_all_sysctls(readahead_t) kernel_read_system_state(readahead_t) kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(readahead_t) dev_read_sysfs(readahead_t) +dev_read_kmsg(readahead_t) +dev_write_kmsg(readahead_t) dev_getattr_generic_chr_files(readahead_t) dev_getattr_generic_blk_files(readahead_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(readahead_t) @@ -53,10 +59,18 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(readahead_t) files_list_non_security(readahead_t) files_read_non_security_files(readahead_t) +files_dontaudit_read_security_files(readahead_t) files_create_boot_flag(readahead_t) files_getattr_all_pipes(readahead_t) files_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(readahead_t) files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_blk_files(readahead_t) +files_dontaudit_all_access_check(readahead_t) + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` + files_dontaudit_write_all_files(readahead_t) + dev_dontaudit_write_all_chr_files(readahead_t) + dev_dontaudit_write_all_blk_files(readahead_t) +') fs_getattr_all_fs(readahead_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(readahead_t) @@ -66,12 +80,14 @@ fs_read_cgroup_files(readahead_t) fs_read_tmpfs_files(readahead_t) fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(readahead_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(readahead_t) +fs_dontaudit_read_tmpfs_blk_dev(readahead_t) fs_dontaudit_search_ramfs(readahead_t) fs_dontaudit_read_ramfs_pipes(readahead_t) fs_dontaudit_read_ramfs_files(readahead_t) fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev(readahead_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(readahead_t) +mcs_file_read_all(readahead_t) storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(readahead_t) @@ -82,6 +98,8 @@ auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(readahead_t) init_use_fds(readahead_t) init_use_script_ptys(readahead_t) init_getattr_initctl(readahead_t) +# needs to write to /run/systemd/notify +init_write_pid_socket(readahead_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(readahead_t) logging_set_audit_parameters(readahead_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/rpm.fc b/policy/modules/admin/rpm.fc index b206bf6..3d5caa1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/rpm.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/rpm.fc @@ -6,7 +6,9 @@ /usr/bin/smart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/yum -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/zif -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/packagekitd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/yumDBUSBackend.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/yum-complete-transaction -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) @@ -19,23 +21,31 @@ /usr/share/yumex/yum_childtask\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` +/usr/sbin/bcfg2 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/package-cleanup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/fedora-rmdevelrpms -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/rpmdev-rmdevelrpms -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/pirut -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/pup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rhn_check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/rhnreg_ks -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/up2date -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/synaptic -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/apt-get -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/apt-shell -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_exec_t,s0) ') +/var/cache/PackageKit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_cache_t,s0) /var/cache/yum(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_cache_t,s0) /var/lib/alternatives(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/rpm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/yum(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_lib_t,s0) -/var/log/rpmpkgs.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_log_t,s0) /var/log/yum\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_log_t,s0) +/var/spool/up2date(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_cache_t,s0) + /var/run/yum.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/PackageKit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpm_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/rpm.if b/policy/modules/admin/rpm.if index d33daa8..8ba0f86 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/rpm.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/rpm.if @@ -13,10 +13,13 @@ interface(`rpm_domtrans',` gen_require(` type rpm_t, rpm_exec_t; + attribute rpm_transition_domain; ') corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, rpm_exec_t, rpm_t) + typeattribute $1 rpm_transition_domain; + rpm_debuginfo_domtrans($1) ') ######################################## @@ -83,6 +86,11 @@ interface(`rpm_run',` rpm_domtrans($1) role $2 types { rpm_t rpm_script_t }; + + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 rpm_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + seutil_run_loadpolicy(rpm_script_t, $2) seutil_run_semanage(rpm_script_t, $2) seutil_run_setfiles(rpm_script_t, $2) @@ -181,6 +189,41 @@ interface(`rpm_rw_pipes',` ######################################## ## +## dontaudit read and write an leaked file descriptors +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`rpm_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type rpm_t, rpm_var_cache_t; + type rpm_script_t, rpm_var_run_t, rpm_tmp_t; + type rpm_tmpfs_t, rpm_script_tmp_t, rpm_var_lib_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 rpm_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 rpm_t:tcp_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 rpm_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 rpm_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + + dontaudit $1 rpm_script_t:fd use; + dontaudit $1 rpm_script_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + + dontaudit $1 rpm_var_run_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + + dontaudit $1 rpm_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 rpm_tmpfs_t:dir rw_dir_perms; + dontaudit $1 rpm_tmpfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 rpm_script_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 rpm_var_lib_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 rpm_var_cache_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Send and receive messages from ## rpm over dbus. ## @@ -277,8 +320,7 @@ interface(`rpm_append_log',` type rpm_log_t; ') - logging_search_logs($1) - append_files_pattern($1, rpm_log_t, rpm_log_t) + allow $1 rpm_log_t:file append_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -335,7 +377,9 @@ interface(`rpm_manage_script_tmp_files',` ') files_search_tmp($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, rpm_script_tmp_t, rpm_script_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern($1, rpm_script_tmp_t, rpm_script_tmp_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, rpm_script_tmp_t, rpm_script_tmp_t) ') ##################################### @@ -354,8 +398,7 @@ interface(`rpm_append_tmp_files',` type rpm_tmp_t; ') - files_search_tmp($1) - append_files_pattern($1, rpm_tmp_t, rpm_tmp_t) + allow $1 rpm_tmp_t:file append_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -375,7 +418,9 @@ interface(`rpm_manage_tmp_files',` ') files_search_tmp($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, rpm_tmp_t, rpm_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern($1, rpm_tmp_t, rpm_tmp_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, rpm_tmp_t, rpm_tmp_t) ') ######################################## @@ -459,6 +504,7 @@ interface(`rpm_read_db',` allow $1 rpm_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern($1, rpm_var_lib_t, rpm_var_lib_t) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, rpm_var_lib_t, rpm_var_lib_t) + rpm_read_cache($1) ') ######################################## @@ -516,7 +562,7 @@ interface(`rpm_dontaudit_manage_db',` type rpm_var_lib_t; ') - dontaudit $1 rpm_var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms; + dontaudit $1 rpm_var_lib_t:dir manage_dir_perms; dontaudit $1 rpm_var_lib_t:file manage_file_perms; dontaudit $1 rpm_var_lib_t:lnk_file manage_lnk_file_perms; ') @@ -576,3 +622,66 @@ interface(`rpm_pid_filetrans',` files_pid_filetrans($1, rpm_var_run_t, file) ') + +######################################## +## +## Send a null signal to rpm. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rpm_inherited_fifo',` + gen_require(` + attribute rpm_transition_domain; + ') + + allow $1 rpm_transition_domain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## Make rpm_exec_t an entry point for +## the specified domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rpm_entry_type',` + gen_require(` + type rpm_exec_t; + ') + + domain_entry_file($1, rpm_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow application to transition to rpm_script domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rpm_transition_script',` + gen_require(` + type rpm_script_t; + attribute rpm_transition_domain; + ') + + typeattribute $1 rpm_transition_domain; + allow $1 rpm_script_t:process transition; + + allow $1 rpm_script_t:fd use; + allow rpm_script_t $1:fd use; + allow rpm_script_t $1:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + allow rpm_script_t $1:process sigchld; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/rpm.te b/policy/modules/admin/rpm.te index 47a8f7d..a609a22 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/rpm.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/rpm.te @@ -1,10 +1,11 @@ policy_module(rpm, 1.12.0) +attribute rpm_transition_domain; + ######################################## # # Declarations # - type debuginfo_exec_t; domain_entry_file(rpm_t, debuginfo_exec_t) @@ -76,6 +77,9 @@ allow rpm_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow rpm_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow rpm_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; allow rpm_t self:msg { send receive }; +allow rpm_t self:dir search; +allow rpm_t self:file rw_file_perms;; +allow rpm_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; allow rpm_t rpm_log_t:file manage_file_perms; logging_log_filetrans(rpm_t, rpm_log_t, file) @@ -101,13 +105,16 @@ files_var_filetrans(rpm_t, rpm_var_cache_t, dir) manage_files_pattern(rpm_t, rpm_var_lib_t, rpm_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(rpm_t, rpm_var_lib_t, dir) +manage_dirs_pattern(rpm_t, rpm_var_run_t, rpm_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(rpm_t, rpm_var_run_t, rpm_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(rpm_t, rpm_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(rpm_t, rpm_var_run_t, { file dir }) kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(rpm_t) kernel_read_network_state(rpm_t) kernel_read_system_state(rpm_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(rpm_t) +kernel_read_network_state_symlinks(rpm_t) +kernel_rw_irq_sysctls(rpm_t) corecmd_exec_all_executables(rpm_t) @@ -127,6 +134,19 @@ corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(rpm_t) dev_list_sysfs(rpm_t) dev_list_usbfs(rpm_t) dev_read_urand(rpm_t) +dev_read_raw_memory(rpm_t) +dev_manage_all_dev_nodes(rpm_t) + +#devices_manage_all_device_types(rpm_t) +dev_create_generic_blk_files(rpm_t) +dev_create_generic_chr_files(rpm_t) +dev_delete_all_blk_files(rpm_t) +dev_delete_all_chr_files(rpm_t) +dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(rpm_t) +dev_rename_generic_blk_files(rpm_t) +dev_rename_generic_chr_files(rpm_t) +dev_setattr_all_blk_files(rpm_t) +dev_setattr_all_chr_files(rpm_t) fs_getattr_all_dirs(rpm_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(rpm_t) @@ -154,8 +174,8 @@ storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(rpm_t) term_list_ptys(rpm_t) -auth_relabel_all_files_except_shadow(rpm_t) -auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(rpm_t) +files_relabel_all_files(rpm_t) +files_manage_all_files(rpm_t) auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(rpm_t) auth_use_nsswitch(rpm_t) @@ -164,7 +184,6 @@ rpm_domtrans_script(rpm_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(rpm_t) domain_getattr_all_domains(rpm_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(rpm_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(rpm_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(rpm_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_tcp_sockets(rpm_t) @@ -173,23 +192,26 @@ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_packet_sockets(rpm_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_raw_sockets(rpm_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_stream_sockets(rpm_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_dgram_sockets(rpm_t) +domain_signull_all_domains(rpm_t) files_exec_etc_files(rpm_t) init_domtrans_script(rpm_t) init_use_script_ptys(rpm_t) +init_signull_script(rpm_t) libs_exec_ld_so(rpm_t) libs_exec_lib_files(rpm_t) -libs_domtrans_ldconfig(rpm_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(rpm_t) +miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(rpm_t) + # allow compiling and loading new policy seutil_manage_src_policy(rpm_t) seutil_manage_bin_policy(rpm_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(rpm_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(rpm_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(rpm_t) optional_policy(` @@ -207,6 +229,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` networkmanager_dbus_chat(rpm_t) ') + ') optional_policy(` @@ -214,7 +237,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(rpm_t) + unconfined_domain_noaudit(rpm_t) # yum-updatesd requires this unconfined_dbus_chat(rpm_t) unconfined_dbus_chat(rpm_script_t) @@ -225,7 +248,8 @@ optional_policy(` # rpm-script Local policy # -allow rpm_script_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid setgid setuid ipc_lock sys_admin sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_rawio sys_nice mknod kill net_admin }; +allow rpm_script_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid setgid setuid ipc_lock sys_admin sys_chroot sys_rawio sys_nice mknod kill net_admin }; + allow rpm_script_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execheap }; allow rpm_script_t self:fd use; allow rpm_script_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -257,12 +281,18 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(rpm_script_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t) fs_tmpfs_filetrans(rpm_script_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) can_exec(rpm_script_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t) +allow rpm_script_t rpm_t:netlink_route_socket { read write }; + kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(rpm_script_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(rpm_script_t) kernel_read_system_state(rpm_script_t) kernel_read_network_state(rpm_script_t) +kernel_list_all_proc(rpm_script_t) kernel_read_software_raid_state(rpm_script_t) +# needed by rhn_check +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(rpm_script_t) + dev_list_sysfs(rpm_script_t) # ideally we would not need this @@ -282,7 +312,6 @@ fs_unmount_xattr_fs(rpm_script_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(rpm_script_t) mcs_killall(rpm_script_t) -mcs_ptrace_all(rpm_script_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(rpm_script_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(rpm_script_t) @@ -299,19 +328,20 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(rpm_script_t) term_getattr_unallocated_ttys(rpm_script_t) term_list_ptys(rpm_script_t) -term_use_all_terms(rpm_script_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(rpm_script_t) auth_dontaudit_getattr_shadow(rpm_script_t) auth_use_nsswitch(rpm_script_t) # ideally we would not need this -auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(rpm_script_t) -auth_relabel_shadow(rpm_script_t) +files_manage_all_files(rpm_script_t) +files_relabel_all_files(rpm_script_t) corecmd_exec_all_executables(rpm_script_t) +can_exec(rpm_script_t, rpm_script_tmp_t) +can_exec(rpm_script_t, rpm_script_tmpfs_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(rpm_script_t) domain_getattr_all_domains(rpm_script_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(rpm_script_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(rpm_script_t) domain_signal_all_domains(rpm_script_t) domain_signull_all_domains(rpm_script_t) @@ -326,28 +356,28 @@ init_telinit(rpm_script_t) libs_exec_ld_so(rpm_script_t) libs_exec_lib_files(rpm_script_t) -libs_domtrans_ldconfig(rpm_script_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(rpm_script_t) miscfiles_read_localization(rpm_script_t) - -modutils_domtrans_depmod(rpm_script_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(rpm_script_t) +miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(rpm_script_t) seutil_domtrans_loadpolicy(rpm_script_t) seutil_domtrans_setfiles(rpm_script_t) seutil_domtrans_semanage(rpm_script_t) +seutil_domtrans_setsebool(rpm_script_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(rpm_script_t) +userdom_exec_admin_home_files(rpm_script_t) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` optional_policy(` mta_send_mail(rpm_script_t) + mta_system_content(rpm_var_run_t) ') ') -tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',` +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` allow rpm_script_t self:process execmem; ') @@ -356,6 +386,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + cups_filetrans_named_content(rpm_script_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(rpm_script_t) ') @@ -368,6 +402,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_depmod(rpm_script_t) + modutils_domtrans_insmod(rpm_script_t) +') + +optional_policy(` tzdata_domtrans(rpm_t) tzdata_domtrans(rpm_script_t) ') @@ -377,7 +416,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(rpm_script_t) + unconfined_domain_noaudit(rpm_script_t) unconfined_domtrans(rpm_script_t) optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sectoolm.te b/policy/modules/admin/sectoolm.te index c8ef84b..c761721 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/sectoolm.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/sectoolm.te @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ policy_module(sectoolm, 1.0.0) type sectoolm_t; type sectoolm_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(sectoolm_t, sectoolm_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(sectoolm_t, sectoolm_exec_t) type sectool_var_lib_t; files_type(sectool_var_lib_t) @@ -23,7 +24,7 @@ files_tmp_file(sectool_tmp_t) # sectool local policy # -allow sectoolm_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin sys_nice sys_ptrace }; +allow sectoolm_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin sys_nice }; allow sectoolm_t self:process { getcap getsched signull setsched }; dontaudit sectoolm_t self:process { execstack execmem }; allow sectoolm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -70,12 +71,6 @@ application_exec_all(sectoolm_t) auth_use_nsswitch(sectoolm_t) -# tests related to network -hostname_exec(sectoolm_t) - -# tests related to network -iptables_domtrans(sectoolm_t) - libs_exec_ld_so(sectoolm_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(sectoolm_t) @@ -84,6 +79,17 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(sectoolm_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(sectoolm_t) userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(sectoolm_t) +userdom_dgram_send(sectoolm_t) + +optional_policy(` + # tests related to network + hostname_exec(sectoolm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + # tests related to network + iptables_domtrans(sectoolm_t) +') optional_policy(` mount_exec(sectoolm_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.fc b/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.fc index 48d1363..4a5b930 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.fc @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ /sbin/shorewall6? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shorewall_exec_t,s0) /sbin/shorewall-lite -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shorewall_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/shorewall6? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shorewall_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/shorewall-lite -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shorewall_exec_t,s0) + /var/lib/shorewall(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:shorewall_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/shorewall6(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:shorewall_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/shorewall-lite(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:shorewall_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.if b/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.if index 781ad7e..f7b8881 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.if @@ -55,28 +55,9 @@ interface(`shorewall_read_config',` read_files_pattern($1, shorewall_etc_t, shorewall_etc_t) ') -####################################### -## -## Read shorewall PID files. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`shorewall_read_pid_files',` - gen_require(` - type shorewall_var_run_t; - ') - - files_search_pids($1) - read_files_pattern($1, shorewall_var_run_t, shorewall_var_run_t) -') - -####################################### +###################################### ## -## Read and write shorewall PID files. +## Read shorewall /var/lib files. ## ## ## @@ -84,28 +65,9 @@ interface(`shorewall_read_pid_files',` ## ## # -interface(`shorewall_rw_pid_files',` - gen_require(` - type shorewall_var_run_t; - ') - - files_search_pids($1) - rw_files_pattern($1, shorewall_var_run_t, shorewall_var_run_t) -') - -###################################### -## -## Read shorewall /var/lib files. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# interface(`shorewall_read_lib_files',` gen_require(` - type shorewall_t; + type shorewall_var_lib_t; ') files_search_var_lib($1) @@ -115,12 +77,12 @@ interface(`shorewall_read_lib_files',` ####################################### ## -## Read and write shorewall /var/lib files. +## Read and write shorewall /var/lib files. ## ## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## ## # interface(`shorewall_rw_lib_files',` @@ -177,8 +139,11 @@ interface(`shorewall_admin',` type shorewall_tmp_t, shorewall_etc_t; ') - allow $1 shorewall_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 shorewall_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, shorewall_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 shorewall_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, shorewall_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.te b/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.te index 95bce88..95065c3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/shorewall.te @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ logging_log_file(shorewall_log_t) # shorewall local policy # -allow shorewall_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin net_raw setuid setgid sys_nice sys_ptrace }; +allow shorewall_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin net_raw setuid setgid sys_nice }; dontaudit shorewall_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow shorewall_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -59,6 +59,9 @@ exec_files_pattern(shorewall_t, shorewall_var_lib_t, shorewall_var_lib_t) manage_dirs_pattern(shorewall_t, shorewall_var_lib_t, shorewall_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(shorewall_t, shorewall_var_lib_t, shorewall_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(shorewall_t, shorewall_var_lib_t, { dir file }) +allow shorewall_t shorewall_var_lib_t:file entrypoint; + +allow shorewall_t shorewall_initrc_exec_t:file read_file_perms; allow shorewall_t shorewall_initrc_exec_t:file read_file_perms; @@ -83,13 +86,22 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(shorewall_t) init_rw_utmp(shorewall_t) +logging_read_generic_logs(shorewall_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(shorewall_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(shorewall_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(shorewall_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(shorewall_t) -userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(shorewall_t) +userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(shorewall_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_ttys(shorewall_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(shorewall_t) + +optional_policy(` + brctl_domtrans(shorewall_t) +') optional_policy(` hostname_exec(shorewall_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.fc b/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.fc index 97671a3..eb84cd0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.fc @@ -2,6 +2,11 @@ /lib/upstart/shutdown -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shutdown_exec_t,s0) -/sbin/shutdown -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shutdown_exec_t,s0) -/var/run/shutdown\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shutdown_var_run_t,s0) +/sbin/shutdown -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shutdown_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/upstart/shutdown -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shutdown_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/shutdown -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shutdown_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/shutdown\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shutdown_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.if b/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.if index d0604cf..b66057c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.if @@ -18,9 +18,18 @@ interface(`shutdown_domtrans',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, shutdown_exec_t, shutdown_t) + init_reboot($1) + init_halt($1) + + optional_policy(` + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + init_stream_connect($1) + systemd_login_reboot($1) + systemd_login_halt($1) + ') + ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - dontaudit shutdown_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; - dontaudit shutdown_t $1:fifo_file { read write }; + dontaudit shutdown_t $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; ') ') @@ -51,6 +60,73 @@ interface(`shutdown_run',` ######################################## ## +## Role access for shutdown +## +## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +# +interface(`shutdown_role',` + gen_require(` + type shutdown_t; + ') + + role $1 types shutdown_t; + + shutdown_domtrans($2) + + ps_process_pattern($2, shutdown_t) + allow $2 shutdown_t:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Recieve sigchld from shutdown +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`shutdown_send_sigchld',` + gen_require(` + type shutdown_t; + ') + + allow shutdown_t $1:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## shutdown over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`shutdown_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type shutdown_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 shutdown_t:dbus send_msg; + allow shutdown_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## ## Get attributes of shutdown executable. ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.te b/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.te index 8966ec9..d3528a0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/shutdown.te @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ policy_module(shutdown, 1.1.0) type shutdown_t; type shutdown_exec_t; +init_system_domain(shutdown_t, shutdown_exec_t) application_domain(shutdown_t, shutdown_exec_t) role system_r types shutdown_t; @@ -21,8 +22,8 @@ files_pid_file(shutdown_var_run_t) # shutdown local policy # -allow shutdown_t self:capability { dac_override kill setuid sys_tty_config }; -allow shutdown_t self:process { fork signal signull }; +allow shutdown_t self:capability { dac_override kill setuid sys_nice sys_tty_config }; +allow shutdown_t self:process { fork setsched signal signull }; allow shutdown_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; allow shutdown_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -33,18 +34,22 @@ files_etc_filetrans(shutdown_t, shutdown_etc_t, file) manage_files_pattern(shutdown_t, shutdown_var_run_t, shutdown_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(shutdown_t, shutdown_var_run_t, file) +kernel_read_system_state(shutdown_t) + domain_use_interactive_fds(shutdown_t) files_read_etc_files(shutdown_t) files_read_generic_pids(shutdown_t) +files_delete_boot_flag(shutdown_t) + +mls_file_write_to_clearance(shutdown_t) -term_use_all_terms(shutdown_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(shutdown_t) auth_use_nsswitch(shutdown_t) auth_write_login_records(shutdown_t) -init_dontaudit_write_utmp(shutdown_t) -init_read_utmp(shutdown_t) +init_rw_utmp(shutdown_t) init_stream_connect(shutdown_t) init_telinit(shutdown_t) @@ -54,10 +59,24 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(shutdown_t) miscfiles_read_localization(shutdown_t) optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(shutdown_t, shutdown_exec_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(shutdown_t) dbus_connect_system_bus(shutdown_t) ') optional_policy(` + oddjob_dontaudit_rw_fifo_file(shutdown_t) + oddjob_sigchld(shutdown_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rhev_sigchld_agentd(shutdown_t) +') + +optional_policy(` xserver_dontaudit_write_log(shutdown_t) + xserver_xdm_append_log(shutdown_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/smoltclient.te b/policy/modules/admin/smoltclient.te index bc00875..2efc0d7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/smoltclient.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/smoltclient.te @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ policy_module(smoltclient, 1.1.0) type smoltclient_t; type smoltclient_exec_t; application_domain(smoltclient_t, smoltclient_exec_t) -cron_system_entry(smoltclient_t, smoltclient_exec_t) type smoltclient_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(smoltclient_tmp_t) @@ -39,6 +38,7 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(smoltclient_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(smoltclient_t) dev_read_sysfs(smoltclient_t) +dev_read_urand(smoltclient_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(smoltclient_t) fs_getattr_all_dirs(smoltclient_t) @@ -46,15 +46,25 @@ fs_list_auto_mountpoints(smoltclient_t) files_getattr_generic_locks(smoltclient_t) files_read_etc_files(smoltclient_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(smoltclient_t) files_read_usr_files(smoltclient_t) auth_use_nsswitch(smoltclient_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(smoltclient_t) +miscfiles_read_hwdata(smoltclient_t) miscfiles_read_localization(smoltclient_t) optional_policy(` + abrt_stream_connect(smoltclient_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(smoltclient_t, smoltclient_exec_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(smoltclient_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.fc b/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.fc index a40478e..050f521 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.fc @@ -1 +1,3 @@ /usr/sbin/sosreport -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sosreport_exec_t,s0) + +/.ismount-test-file -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sosreport_tmp_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.if b/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.if index 94c01b5..f64bd93 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.if @@ -106,7 +106,7 @@ interface(`sosreport_append_tmp_files',` type sosreport_tmp_t; ') - append_files_pattern($1, sosreport_tmp_t, sosreport_tmp_t) + allow $1 sosreport_tmp_t:file append_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.te b/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.te index fe1c377..724df48 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/sosreport.te @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ files_tmpfs_file(sosreport_tmpfs_t) # sosreport local policy # -allow sosreport_t self:capability { kill net_admin net_raw setuid sys_admin sys_nice sys_ptrace dac_override }; +allow sosreport_t self:capability { kill net_admin net_raw setuid sys_admin sys_nice dac_override }; allow sosreport_t self:process { setsched signull }; allow sosreport_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow sosreport_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -74,13 +74,17 @@ files_read_all_symlinks(sosreport_t) # for blkid.tab files_manage_etc_runtime_files(sosreport_t) files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(sosreport_t, file) +files_root_filetrans(sosreport_t, sosreport_tmp_t, file, ".ismount-test-file") fs_getattr_all_fs(sosreport_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(sosreport_t) +storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk(sosreport_t) +storage_dontaudit_read_removable_device(sosreport_t) + # some config files do not have configfile attribute # sosreport needs to read various files on system -auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(sosreport_t) +files_read_non_security_files(sosreport_t) auth_use_nsswitch(sosreport_t) init_domtrans_script(sosreport_t) @@ -92,13 +96,11 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(sosreport_t) miscfiles_read_localization(sosreport_t) -# needed by modinfo -modutils_read_module_deps(sosreport_t) - sysnet_read_config(sosreport_t) optional_policy(` abrt_manage_pid_files(sosreport_t) + abrt_manage_cache(sosreport_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -110,6 +112,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + # needed by modinfo + modutils_read_module_deps(sosreport_t) +') + +optional_policy(` fstools_domtrans(sosreport_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/su.fc b/policy/modules/admin/su.fc index 688abc2..3d89250 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/su.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/su.fc @@ -3,3 +3,4 @@ /usr/(local/)?bin/ksu -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:su_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/kdesu -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:su_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/su -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:su_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/su.if b/policy/modules/admin/su.if index 8c5fa3c..ce3d33a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/su.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/su.if @@ -119,11 +119,6 @@ template(`su_restricted_domain_template', ` userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_su_t) ') - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - # dontaudit leaked sockets from parent - dontaudit $1_su_t $2:socket_class_set { read write }; - ') - optional_policy(` cron_read_pipes($1_su_t) ') @@ -210,7 +205,7 @@ template(`su_role_template',` auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_su_t) auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_su_t) - auth_use_nsswitch($1_su_t) + auth_use_pam($1_su_t) auth_rw_faillog($1_su_t) corecmd_search_bin($1_su_t) @@ -234,6 +229,7 @@ template(`su_role_template',` userdom_use_user_terminals($1_su_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1_su_t) + userdom_search_admin_dir($1_su_t) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # RHEL5 and possibly newer releases incl. Fedora @@ -279,11 +275,6 @@ template(`su_role_template',` ') ') - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - # dontaudit leaked sockets from parent - dontaudit $1_su_t $3:socket_class_set { read write }; - ') - tunable_policy(`allow_polyinstantiation',` fs_mount_xattr_fs($1_su_t) fs_unmount_xattr_fs($1_su_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.fc b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.fc index 7bddc02..2b59ed0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.fc @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ /usr/bin/sudo(edit)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sudo_exec_t,s0) + +/var/db/sudo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sudo_db_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.if b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.if index 975af1a..0ae7660 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.if @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ template(`sudo_role_template',` gen_require(` type sudo_exec_t; + type sudo_db_t; attribute sudodomain; ') @@ -46,27 +47,13 @@ template(`sudo_role_template',` domain_role_change_exemption($1_sudo_t) ubac_constrained($1_sudo_t) role $2 types $1_sudo_t; + userdom_home_manager($1_sudo_t) - ############################## - # - # Local Policy - # + type $1_sudo_tmp_t; + files_tmp_file($1_sudo_tmp_t) - # Use capabilities. - allow $1_sudo_t self:capability { fowner setuid setgid dac_override sys_nice sys_resource }; - allow $1_sudo_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; - allow $1_sudo_t self:process { setexec setrlimit }; - allow $1_sudo_t self:fd use; - allow $1_sudo_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - allow $1_sudo_t self:shm create_shm_perms; - allow $1_sudo_t self:sem create_sem_perms; - allow $1_sudo_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; - allow $1_sudo_t self:msg { send receive }; - allow $1_sudo_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; - allow $1_sudo_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - allow $1_sudo_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; - allow $1_sudo_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; - allow $1_sudo_t self:key manage_key_perms; + allow $1_sudo_t $1_sudo_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; + files_tmp_filetrans($1_sudo_t, $1_sudo_tmp_t, file) allow $1_sudo_t $3:key search; @@ -76,86 +63,25 @@ template(`sudo_role_template',` # By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed. corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_sudo_t, $3) corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_sudo_t, $3) + userdom_domtrans_user_home($1_sudo_t, $3) + userdom_domtrans_user_tmp($1_sudo_t, $3) + domain_entry_file($3, sudo_exec_t) + domain_auto_transition_pattern($1_sudo_t, sudo_exec_t, $3) + allow $3 $1_sudo_t:fd use; allow $3 $1_sudo_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow $3 $1_sudo_t:process signal_perms; - kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_sudo_t) - kernel_read_system_state($1_sudo_t) - kernel_link_key($1_sudo_t) - - corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1_sudo_t) - corecmd_exec_all_executables($1_sudo_t) - - dev_getattr_fs($1_sudo_t) - dev_read_urand($1_sudo_t) - dev_rw_generic_usb_dev($1_sudo_t) - dev_read_sysfs($1_sudo_t) - - domain_use_interactive_fds($1_sudo_t) - domain_sigchld_interactive_fds($1_sudo_t) - domain_getattr_all_entry_files($1_sudo_t) - - files_read_etc_files($1_sudo_t) - files_read_var_files($1_sudo_t) - files_read_usr_symlinks($1_sudo_t) - files_getattr_usr_files($1_sudo_t) - # for some PAM modules and for cwd - files_dontaudit_search_home($1_sudo_t) - files_list_tmp($1_sudo_t) - - fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_sudo_t) - fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_sudo_t) - - selinux_validate_context($1_sudo_t) - selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_sudo_t) - - term_getattr_pty_fs($1_sudo_t) - term_relabel_all_ttys($1_sudo_t) - term_relabel_all_ptys($1_sudo_t) - auth_run_chk_passwd($1_sudo_t, $2) - # sudo stores a token in the pam_pid directory - auth_manage_pam_pid($1_sudo_t) auth_use_nsswitch($1_sudo_t) - init_rw_utmp($1_sudo_t) - - logging_send_audit_msgs($1_sudo_t) - logging_send_syslog_msg($1_sudo_t) - - miscfiles_read_localization($1_sudo_t) - - seutil_search_default_contexts($1_sudo_t) - seutil_libselinux_linked($1_sudo_t) - - userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users($1_sudo_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_files($1_sudo_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks($1_sudo_t) - userdom_manage_user_tmp_files($1_sudo_t) - userdom_manage_user_tmp_symlinks($1_sudo_t) - userdom_use_user_terminals($1_sudo_t) - # for some PAM modules and for cwd - userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content($1_sudo_t) - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - dontaudit $1_sudo_t $3:socket_class_set { read write }; - ') - - tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_files($1_sudo_t) - ') - - tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_files($1_sudo_t) - ') - optional_policy(` - dbus_system_bus_client($1_sudo_t) + mta_role($2, $1_sudo_t) ') optional_policy(` - fprintd_dbus_chat($1_sudo_t) + kerberos_manage_host_rcache($1_sudo_t) + kerberos_read_config($1_sudo_t) ') ') @@ -177,3 +103,22 @@ interface(`sudo_sigchld',` allow $1 sudodomain:process sigchld; ') + +####################################### +## +## Allow execute sudo in called domain. +## This interfaces is added for nova-stack policy. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sudo_exec',` + gen_require(` + type sudo_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, sudo_exec_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.te b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.te index 2731fa1..43d1362 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/sudo.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/sudo.te @@ -7,3 +7,104 @@ attribute sudodomain; type sudo_exec_t; application_executable_file(sudo_exec_t) + +type sudo_db_t; +files_type(sudo_db_t) +mls_trusted_object(sudo_db_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(sudodomain, sudo_db_t, sudo_db_t) +manage_files_pattern(sudodomain, sudo_db_t, sudo_db_t) + +############################## +# +# Local Policy +# + +# Use capabilities. +allow sudodomain self:capability { chown fowner setuid setgid dac_override sys_nice sys_resource }; +allow sudodomain self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; +allow sudodomain self:process { setexec setrlimit }; +allow sudodomain self:fd use; +allow sudodomain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow sudodomain self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow sudodomain self:sem create_sem_perms; +allow sudodomain self:msgq create_msgq_perms; +allow sudodomain self:msg { send receive }; +allow sudodomain self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; +allow sudodomain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow sudodomain self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +allow sudodomain self:unix_stream_socket connectto; +allow sudodomain self:key manage_key_perms; + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(sudodomain) +kernel_read_system_state(sudodomain) +kernel_link_key(sudodomain) + +corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(sudodomain) +corecmd_exec_all_executables(sudodomain) + +dev_getattr_fs(sudodomain) +dev_read_urand(sudodomain) +dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(sudodomain) +dev_read_sysfs(sudodomain) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(sudodomain) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(sudodomain) +domain_sigchld_interactive_fds(sudodomain) +domain_getattr_all_entry_files(sudodomain) + +files_read_etc_files(sudodomain) +files_read_var_files(sudodomain) +files_read_usr_files(sudodomain) +# for some PAM modules and for cwd +files_dontaudit_search_home(sudodomain) +files_list_tmp(sudodomain) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sudodomain) +fs_getattr_all_fs(sudodomain) + +selinux_validate_context(sudodomain) +selinux_compute_relabel_context(sudodomain) + +term_getattr_pty_fs(sudodomain) +term_relabel_all_ttys(sudodomain) +term_relabel_all_ptys(sudodomain) +term_getattr_pty_fs(sudodomain) + +#auth_run_chk_passwd(sudodomain) +# sudo stores a token in the pam_pid directory +auth_manage_pam_pid(sudodomain) +#auth_use_nsswitch(sudodomain) + +application_signal(sudodomain) + +init_rw_utmp(sudodomain) + +logging_send_audit_msgs(sudodomain) +logging_send_syslog_msg(sudodomain) +logging_set_audit_parameters(sudodomain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(sudodomain) + +seutil_read_default_contexts(sudodomain) +seutil_libselinux_linked(sudodomain) + +userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users(sudodomain) +userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(sudodomain) +userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks(sudodomain) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(sudodomain) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_symlinks(sudodomain) +userdom_use_user_terminals(sudodomain) +userdom_signal_all_users(sudodomain) +# for some PAM modules and for cwd +userdom_search_user_home_content(sudodomain) +userdom_search_admin_dir(sudodomain) +userdom_manage_all_users_keys(sudodomain) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(sudodomain) +') + +optional_policy(` + fprintd_dbus_chat(sudodomain) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/sxid.te b/policy/modules/admin/sxid.te index d5aaf0e..6b16aef 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/sxid.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/sxid.te @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ fs_list_all(sxid_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(sxid_t) -auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(sxid_t) +files_read_non_security_files(sxid_t) auth_dontaudit_getattr_shadow(sxid_t) init_use_fds(sxid_t) @@ -76,13 +76,17 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(sxid_t) miscfiles_read_localization(sxid_t) -mount_exec(sxid_t) - sysnet_read_config(sxid_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(sxid_t) -cron_system_entry(sxid_t, sxid_exec_t) +optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(sxid_t, sxid_exec_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_exec(sxid_t) +') optional_policy(` mta_send_mail(sxid_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/tmpreaper.te b/policy/modules/admin/tmpreaper.te index 6a5004b..5f12852 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/tmpreaper.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/tmpreaper.te @@ -7,6 +7,7 @@ policy_module(tmpreaper, 1.5.0) type tmpreaper_t; type tmpreaper_exec_t; +init_system_domain(tmpreaper_t, tmpreaper_exec_t) application_domain(tmpreaper_t, tmpreaper_exec_t) role system_r types tmpreaper_t; @@ -18,33 +19,46 @@ role system_r types tmpreaper_t; allow tmpreaper_t self:process { fork sigchld }; allow tmpreaper_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner }; +kernel_read_system_state(tmpreaper_t) + dev_read_urand(tmpreaper_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(tmpreaper_t) +fs_list_all(tmpreaper_t) files_read_etc_files(tmpreaper_t) files_read_var_lib_files(tmpreaper_t) files_purge_tmp(tmpreaper_t) +files_delete_all_non_security_files(tmpreaper_t) # why does it need setattr? files_setattr_all_tmp_dirs(tmpreaper_t) +files_setattr_usr_dirs(tmpreaper_t) files_getattr_all_dirs(tmpreaper_t) files_getattr_all_files(tmpreaper_t) +mcs_file_read_all(tmpreaper_t) +mcs_file_write_all(tmpreaper_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(tmpreaper_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(tmpreaper_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(tmpreaper_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(tmpreaper_t) miscfiles_read_localization(tmpreaper_t) miscfiles_delete_man_pages(tmpreaper_t) -cron_system_entry(tmpreaper_t, tmpreaper_exec_t) +optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(tmpreaper_t, tmpreaper_exec_t) +') ifdef(`distro_redhat',` userdom_list_user_home_content(tmpreaper_t) - userdom_delete_user_home_content_dirs(tmpreaper_t) - userdom_delete_user_home_content_files(tmpreaper_t) - userdom_delete_user_home_content_symlinks(tmpreaper_t) + userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_dirs(tmpreaper_t) + userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_files(tmpreaper_t) + userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_sock_files(tmpreaper_t) + userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_symlinks(tmpreaper_t) + userdom_setattr_all_user_home_content_dirs(tmpreaper_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -52,7 +66,9 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + apache_delete_sys_content_rw(tmpreaper_t) apache_list_cache(tmpreaper_t) + apache_delete_cache_dirs(tmpreaper_t) apache_delete_cache_files(tmpreaper_t) apache_setattr_cache_dirs(tmpreaper_t) ') @@ -66,9 +82,13 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - rpm_manage_cache(tmpreaper_t) + sandbox_list(tmpreaper_t) + sandbox_delete_dirs(tmpreaper_t) + sandbox_delete_files(tmpreaper_t) + sandbox_delete_sock_files(tmpreaper_t) + sandbox_setattr_dirs(tmpreaper_t) ') optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(tmpreaper_t) + rpm_manage_cache(tmpreaper_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/tripwire.te b/policy/modules/admin/tripwire.te index 2ae8b62..a8e786b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/tripwire.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/tripwire.te @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ files_getattr_all_sockets(tripwire_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(tripwire_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(tripwire_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(tripwire_t) optional_policy(` cron_system_entry(tripwire_t, tripwire_exec_t) @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(twadmin_t) miscfiles_read_localization(twadmin_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(twadmin_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(twadmin_t) ######################################## # @@ -127,7 +127,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(twprint_t) miscfiles_read_localization(twprint_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(twprint_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(twprint_t) ######################################## # @@ -143,4 +143,4 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(siggen_t) miscfiles_read_localization(siggen_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(siggen_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(siggen_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/tzdata.te b/policy/modules/admin/tzdata.te index d0f2a64..834a56d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/tzdata.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/tzdata.te @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ application_domain(tzdata_t, tzdata_exec_t) # tzdata local policy # -files_read_etc_files(tzdata_t) +files_read_config_files(tzdata_t) files_search_spool(tzdata_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(tzdata_t) @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(tzdata_t) miscfiles_manage_localization(tzdata_t) miscfiles_etc_filetrans_localization(tzdata_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(tzdata_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(tzdata_t) # tzdata looks for /var/spool/postfix/etc/localtime. optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/updfstab.te b/policy/modules/admin/updfstab.te index ef12ed5..2c013c4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/updfstab.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/updfstab.te @@ -78,9 +78,8 @@ seutil_read_file_contexts(updfstab_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(updfstab_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(updfstab_t) -optional_policy(` - auth_domtrans_pam_console(updfstab_t) -') +auth_use_nsswitch(updfstab_t) +auth_domtrans_pam_console(updfstab_t) optional_policy(` init_dbus_chat_script(updfstab_t) @@ -104,10 +103,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(updfstab_t) -') - -optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(updfstab_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/usbmodules.te b/policy/modules/admin/usbmodules.te index 74354da..f04565f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/usbmodules.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/usbmodules.te @@ -34,9 +34,7 @@ init_use_fds(usbmodules_t) miscfiles_read_hwdata(usbmodules_t) -modutils_read_module_deps(usbmodules_t) - -userdom_use_user_terminals(usbmodules_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(usbmodules_t) optional_policy(` hotplug_read_config(usbmodules_t) @@ -45,3 +43,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` logging_send_syslog_msg(usbmodules_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_read_module_deps(usbmodules_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.fc b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.fc index c467144..fb794f9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.fc +++ b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.fc @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /usr/bin/vigr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:admin_passwd_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/vipw -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:admin_passwd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/cracklib_dict.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crack_db_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cracklib_dict.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crack_db_t,s0) /usr/sbin/crack_[a-z]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crack_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/cracklib-[a-z]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crack_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.if b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.if index 81fb26f..66cf96c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.if +++ b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.if @@ -17,10 +17,6 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_chfn',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, chfn_exec_t, chfn_t) - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - dontaudit chfn_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; - ') ') ######################################## @@ -65,10 +61,25 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_groupadd',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, groupadd_exec_t, groupadd_t) +') - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - dontaudit groupadd_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; +######################################## +## +## Check access to the groupadd executable. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`usermanage_access_check_groupadd',` + gen_require(` + type groupadd_exec_t; ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + allow $1 groupadd_exec_t:file { getattr_file_perms execute }; ') ######################################## @@ -118,10 +129,6 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_passwd',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, passwd_exec_t, passwd_t) - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - dontaudit passwd_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; - ') ') ######################################## @@ -170,6 +177,25 @@ interface(`usermanage_run_passwd',` ######################################## ## +## Check access to the passwd executable +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`usermanage_access_check_passwd',` + gen_require(` + type passwd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + allow $1 passwd_exec_t:file { getattr_file_perms execute }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute password admin functions in ## the admin passwd domain. ## @@ -254,10 +280,6 @@ interface(`usermanage_domtrans_useradd',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, useradd_exec_t, useradd_t) - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - dontaudit useradd_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; - ') ') ######################################## @@ -285,6 +307,9 @@ interface(`usermanage_run_useradd',` usermanage_domtrans_useradd($1) role $2 types useradd_t; + # Add/remove user home directories + userdom_manage_home_role($2, useradd_t) + seutil_run_semanage(useradd_t, $2) optional_policy(` @@ -294,6 +319,25 @@ interface(`usermanage_run_useradd',` ######################################## ## +## Check access to the useradd executable. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`usermanage_access_check_useradd',` + gen_require(` + type useradd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + allow $1 useradd_exec_t:file { getattr_file_perms execute }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read the crack database. ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te index 441cf22..968fdbe 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/usermanage.te @@ -71,6 +71,7 @@ allow chfn_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; kernel_read_system_state(chfn_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chfn_t) +kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(chfn_t) selinux_get_fs_mount(chfn_t) selinux_validate_context(chfn_t) @@ -79,25 +80,26 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(chfn_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context(chfn_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts(chfn_t) -term_use_all_ttys(chfn_t) -term_use_all_ptys(chfn_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ttys(chfn_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ptys(chfn_t) +term_getattr_all_ptys(chfn_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(chfn_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(chfn_t) # for SSP dev_read_urand(chfn_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(chfn_t) -auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(chfn_t) -auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(chfn_t) -auth_use_nsswitch(chfn_t) +auth_manage_passwd(chfn_t) +auth_use_pam(chfn_t) # allow checking if a shell is executable corecmd_check_exec_shell(chfn_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(chfn_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(chfn_t) -files_manage_etc_files(chfn_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(chfn_t) files_dontaudit_search_var(chfn_t) files_dontaudit_search_home(chfn_t) @@ -105,6 +107,7 @@ files_dontaudit_search_home(chfn_t) # /usr/bin/passwd asks for w access to utmp, but it will operate # correctly without it. Do not audit write denials to utmp. init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(chfn_t) +init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(chfn_t) miscfiles_read_localization(chfn_t) @@ -113,11 +116,18 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(chfn_t) # uses unix_chkpwd for checking passwords seutil_dontaudit_search_config(chfn_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(chfn_t) +userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp(chfn_t, { file }) + userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(chfn_t) # user generally runs this from their home directory, so do not audit a search # on user home dir userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(chfn_t) +optional_policy(` + rssh_exec(chfn_t) +') + ######################################## # # Crack local policy @@ -194,8 +204,8 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(groupadd_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context(groupadd_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts(groupadd_t) -term_use_all_ttys(groupadd_t) -term_use_all_ptys(groupadd_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(groupadd_t) +term_getattr_all_ptys(groupadd_t) init_use_fds(groupadd_t) init_read_utmp(groupadd_t) @@ -203,8 +213,8 @@ init_dontaudit_write_utmp(groupadd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(groupadd_t) -files_manage_etc_files(groupadd_t) files_relabel_etc_files(groupadd_t) +files_read_etc_files(groupadd_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(groupadd_t) files_read_usr_symlinks(groupadd_t) @@ -219,9 +229,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(groupadd_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(groupadd_t) auth_rw_lastlog(groupadd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(groupadd_t) +auth_manage_passwd(groupadd_t) +auth_manage_shadow(groupadd_t) # these may be unnecessary due to the above # domtrans_chk_passwd() call. -auth_manage_shadow(groupadd_t) auth_relabel_shadow(groupadd_t) auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(groupadd_t) @@ -269,6 +280,7 @@ allow passwd_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow passwd_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow passwd_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; allow passwd_t self:msg { send receive }; +allow passwd_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms; allow passwd_t crack_db_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern(passwd_t, crack_db_t, crack_db_t) @@ -277,6 +289,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(passwd_t) # for SSP dev_read_urand(passwd_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(passwd_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(passwd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(passwd_t) @@ -291,26 +304,30 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(passwd_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context(passwd_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts(passwd_t) -term_use_all_ttys(passwd_t) -term_use_all_ptys(passwd_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(passwd_t) +term_getattr_all_ptys(passwd_t) -auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(passwd_t) +auth_manage_passwd(passwd_t) auth_manage_shadow(passwd_t) auth_relabel_shadow(passwd_t) auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(passwd_t) -auth_use_nsswitch(passwd_t) +auth_use_pam(passwd_t) # allow checking if a shell is executable corecmd_check_exec_shell(passwd_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(passwd_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_kerberos_password_port(passwd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(passwd_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(passwd_t) -files_manage_etc_files(passwd_t) files_search_var(passwd_t) files_dontaudit_search_pids(passwd_t) files_relabel_etc_files(passwd_t) +term_search_ptys(passwd_t) + # /usr/bin/passwd asks for w access to utmp, but it will operate # correctly without it. Do not audit write denials to utmp. init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(passwd_t) @@ -323,7 +340,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(passwd_t) seutil_dontaudit_search_config(passwd_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(passwd_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(passwd_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(passwd_t) # make sure that getcon succeeds userdom_getattr_all_users(passwd_t) @@ -332,6 +349,7 @@ userdom_read_user_tmp_files(passwd_t) # user generally runs this from their home directory, so do not audit a search # on user home dir userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(passwd_t) +userdom_stream_connect(passwd_t) optional_policy(` nscd_domtrans(passwd_t) @@ -381,9 +399,10 @@ dev_read_urand(sysadm_passwd_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(sysadm_passwd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sysadm_passwd_t) -term_use_all_ttys(sysadm_passwd_t) -term_use_all_ptys(sysadm_passwd_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(sysadm_passwd_t) +term_getattr_all_ptys(sysadm_passwd_t) +auth_manage_passwd(sysadm_passwd_t) auth_manage_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t) auth_relabel_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t) auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(sysadm_passwd_t) @@ -396,7 +415,6 @@ files_read_usr_files(sysadm_passwd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(sysadm_passwd_t) -files_manage_etc_files(sysadm_passwd_t) files_relabel_etc_files(sysadm_passwd_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(sysadm_passwd_t) # for nscd lookups @@ -426,7 +444,8 @@ optional_policy(` # Useradd local policy # -allow useradd_t self:capability { dac_override chown kill fowner fsetid setuid sys_resource }; +allow useradd_t self:capability { dac_override chown kill fowner fsetid setuid sys_ptrace sys_resource }; + dontaudit useradd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow useradd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; allow useradd_t self:process setfscreate; @@ -448,10 +467,13 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(useradd_t) # Execute /usr/bin/{passwd,chfn,chsh} and /usr/sbin/{useradd,vipw}. corecmd_exec_bin(useradd_t) +kernel_getattr_core_if(useradd_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(useradd_t) + domain_use_interactive_fds(useradd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(useradd_t) +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(useradd_t) -files_manage_etc_files(useradd_t) files_search_var_lib(useradd_t) files_relabel_etc_files(useradd_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(useradd_t) @@ -460,17 +482,15 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(useradd_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(useradd_t) mls_file_upgrade(useradd_t) +mls_process_read_to_clearance(useradd_t) -# Allow access to context for shadow file -selinux_get_fs_mount(useradd_t) -selinux_validate_context(useradd_t) -selinux_compute_access_vector(useradd_t) -selinux_compute_create_context(useradd_t) -selinux_compute_relabel_context(useradd_t) -selinux_compute_user_contexts(useradd_t) +seutil_semanage_policy(useradd_t) +seutil_manage_file_contexts(useradd_t) +seutil_manage_config(useradd_t) +seutil_manage_default_contexts(useradd_t) -term_use_all_ttys(useradd_t) -term_use_all_ptys(useradd_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(useradd_t) +term_getattr_all_ptys(useradd_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(useradd_t) auth_rw_lastlog(useradd_t) @@ -478,6 +498,7 @@ auth_rw_faillog(useradd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(useradd_t) # these may be unnecessary due to the above # domtrans_chk_passwd() call. +auth_manage_passwd(useradd_t) auth_manage_shadow(useradd_t) auth_relabel_shadow(useradd_t) auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(useradd_t) @@ -495,24 +516,19 @@ seutil_read_file_contexts(useradd_t) seutil_read_default_contexts(useradd_t) seutil_domtrans_semanage(useradd_t) seutil_domtrans_setfiles(useradd_t) +seutil_domtrans_loadpolicy(useradd_t) +seutil_manage_bin_policy(useradd_t) +seutil_manage_module_store(useradd_t) +seutil_get_semanage_trans_lock(useradd_t) +seutil_get_semanage_read_lock(useradd_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(useradd_t) # Add/remove user home directories -userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(useradd_t) -userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(useradd_t) -userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(useradd_t) -userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(useradd_t) userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(useradd_t) -userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(useradd_t, notdevfile_class_set) +userdom_manage_home_role(system_r, useradd_t) mta_manage_spool(useradd_t) -ifdef(`distro_redhat',` - optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(useradd_t) - ') -') - optional_policy(` apache_manage_all_user_content(useradd_t) ') @@ -531,6 +547,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + rpc_list_nfs_state_data(useradd_t) + rpc_read_nfs_state_data(useradd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` tunable_policy(`samba_domain_controller',` samba_append_log(useradd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/admin/vpn.te b/policy/modules/admin/vpn.te index ebf4b26..b58c822 100644 --- a/policy/modules/admin/vpn.te +++ b/policy/modules/admin/vpn.te @@ -7,8 +7,8 @@ policy_module(vpn, 1.14.0) type vpnc_t; type vpnc_exec_t; +init_system_domain(vpnc_t, vpnc_exec_t) application_domain(vpnc_t, vpnc_exec_t) -role system_r types vpnc_t; type vpnc_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(vpnc_tmp_t) @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ files_pid_file(vpnc_var_run_t) # Local policy # -allow vpnc_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override net_admin ipc_lock net_raw }; +allow vpnc_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override net_admin ipc_lock net_raw setuid }; allow vpnc_t self:process { getsched signal }; allow vpnc_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow vpnc_t self:netlink_route_socket rw_netlink_socket_perms; @@ -77,8 +77,8 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(vpnc_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(vpnc_t) fs_getattr_tmpfs(vpnc_t) -term_use_all_ptys(vpnc_t) -term_use_all_ttys(vpnc_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ptys(vpnc_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ttys(vpnc_t) corecmd_exec_all_executables(vpnc_t) @@ -89,6 +89,8 @@ files_dontaudit_search_home(vpnc_t) auth_use_nsswitch(vpnc_t) +init_dontaudit_use_fds(vpnc_t) + libs_exec_ld_so(vpnc_t) libs_exec_lib_files(vpnc_t) @@ -106,7 +108,8 @@ sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(vpnc_t) sysnet_manage_config(vpnc_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(vpnc_t) -userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(vpnc_t) +userdom_read_home_certs(vpnc_t) +userdom_search_admin_dir(vpnc_t) optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(vpnc_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/ada.te b/policy/modules/apps/ada.te index 39c75fb..057d8b1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/ada.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/ada.te @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ role system_r types ada_t; allow ada_t self:process { execstack execmem }; -userdom_use_user_terminals(ada_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ada_t) optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(ada_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/authbind.fc b/policy/modules/apps/authbind.fc index 48cf11b..9787bd4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/authbind.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/authbind.fc @@ -1,3 +1,3 @@ /etc/authbind(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:authbind_etc_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/authbind/helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:authbind_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/authbind/helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:authbind_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/awstats.if b/policy/modules/apps/awstats.if index 283ff0d..53f9ba1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/awstats.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/awstats.if @@ -5,6 +5,25 @@ ######################################## ## +## Execute the awstats program in the awstats domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`awstats_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type awstats_t, awstats_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, awstats_exec_t, awstats_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write awstats unnamed pipes. ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/cdrecord.te b/policy/modules/apps/cdrecord.te index 46ea44f..49ce279 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/cdrecord.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/cdrecord.te @@ -56,7 +56,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(cdrecord_t) miscfiles_read_localization(cdrecord_t) # write to the user domain tty. -userdom_use_user_terminals(cdrecord_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(cdrecord_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(cdrecord_t) # Handle nfs home dirs @@ -109,11 +109,7 @@ tunable_policy(`cdrecord_read_content',` userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(cdrecord_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - files_search_mnt(cdrecord_t) - fs_read_nfs_files(cdrecord_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(cdrecord_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(cdrecord_t) optional_policy(` resmgr_stream_connect(cdrecord_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/chrome.fc b/policy/modules/apps/chrome.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5901e21 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/chrome.fc @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + /opt/google/chrome/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chrome_sandbox_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/chromium-browser/chrome-sandbox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chrome_sandbox_exec_t,s0) + +/opt/google/chrome/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/chromium-browser/nacl_helper_bootstrap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/chrome.if b/policy/modules/apps/chrome.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..efebae7 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/chrome.if @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ + +## policy for chrome + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run chrome_sandbox. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`chrome_domtrans_sandbox',` + gen_require(` + type chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, chrome_sandbox_exec_t, chrome_sandbox_t) + ps_process_pattern(chrome_sandbox_t, $1) + + allow $1 chrome_sandbox_t:fd use; + + ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + ') +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute chrome_sandbox in the chrome_sandbox domain, and +## allow the specified role the chrome_sandbox domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the chrome_sandbox domain. +## +## +# +interface(`chrome_run_sandbox',` + gen_require(` + type chrome_sandbox_t; + type chrome_sandbox_nacl_t; + ') + + chrome_domtrans_sandbox($1) + role $2 types chrome_sandbox_t; + role $2 types chrome_sandbox_nacl_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Role access for chrome sandbox +## +## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +# +interface(`chrome_role_notrans',` + gen_require(` + type chrome_sandbox_t; + type chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t; + type chrome_sandbox_nacl_t; + ') + + role $1 types chrome_sandbox_t; + role $1 types chrome_sandbox_nacl_t; + + ps_process_pattern($2, chrome_sandbox_t) + allow $2 chrome_sandbox_t:process signal_perms; + + allow chrome_sandbox_t $2:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; + allow $2 chrome_sandbox_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; + allow chrome_sandbox_t $2:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; + dontaudit chrome_sandbox_t $2:unix_stream_socket shutdown; + allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t $2:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; + allow $2 chrome_sandbox_nacl_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; + allow $2 chrome_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; + + allow $2 chrome_sandbox_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + + allow $2 chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Role access for chrome sandbox +## +## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +# +interface(`chrome_role',` + chrome_role_notrans($1, $2) + chrome_domtrans_sandbox($2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit read/write to a chrome_sandbox leaks +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`chrome_dontaudit_sandbox_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type chrome_sandbox_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 chrome_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/chrome.te b/policy/modules/apps/chrome.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..da7bbf7 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/chrome.te @@ -0,0 +1,184 @@ +policy_module(chrome,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type chrome_sandbox_t; +type chrome_sandbox_exec_t; +application_domain(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_exec_t) +role system_r types chrome_sandbox_t; +ubac_constrained(chrome_sandbox_t) + +type chrome_sandbox_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(chrome_sandbox_tmp_t) + +type chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t) +ubac_constrained(chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t) + +type chrome_sandbox_nacl_t; +type chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t; +application_domain(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t) +role system_r types chrome_sandbox_nacl_t; +ubac_constrained(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) + +######################################## +# +# chrome_sandbox local policy +# +allow chrome_sandbox_t self:capability { chown dac_override fsetid setgid setuid sys_admin sys_chroot sys_ptrace }; +allow chrome_sandbox_t self:process { signal_perms setrlimit execmem execstack }; +allow chrome_sandbox_t self:process setsched; +allow chrome_sandbox_t self:fifo_file manage_file_perms; +allow chrome_sandbox_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow chrome_sandbox_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; +allow chrome_sandbox_t self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow chrome_sandbox_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +dontaudit chrome_sandbox_t self:memprotect mmap_zero; + +manage_dirs_pattern(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_tmp_t, chrome_sandbox_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_tmp_t, chrome_sandbox_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_tmp_t, { dir file }) + +manage_files_pattern(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t, chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t, file) + +kernel_read_system_state(chrome_sandbox_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(chrome_sandbox_t) + +fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(chrome_sandbox_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(chrome_sandbox_t) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_flash_port(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_streaming_port(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(chrome_sandbox_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_speech_port(chrome_sandbox_t) + +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(chrome_sandbox_t) + +dev_read_urand(chrome_sandbox_t) +dev_read_sysfs(chrome_sandbox_t) +dev_rwx_zero(chrome_sandbox_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + +files_read_etc_files(chrome_sandbox_t) +files_read_usr_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + +fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs(chrome_sandbox_t) + +userdom_rw_inherited_user_tmpfs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) +userdom_execute_user_tmpfs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + +userdom_use_user_ptys(chrome_sandbox_t) +userdom_write_inherited_user_tmp_files(chrome_sandbox_t) +userdom_read_inherited_user_home_content_files(chrome_sandbox_t) +userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(chrome_sandbox_t) +userdom_search_user_home_content(chrome_sandbox_t) +# This one we should figure a way to make it more secure +userdom_manage_home_certs(chrome_sandbox_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(chrome_sandbox_t) +miscfiles_read_fonts(chrome_sandbox_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(chrome_sandbox_t) + +optional_policy(` + gnome_rw_inherited_config(chrome_sandbox_t) + gnome_read_home_config(chrome_sandbox_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_use_user_fonts(chrome_sandbox_t) + xserver_user_x_domain_template(chrome_sandbox, chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_search_nfs(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_exec_nfs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_read_nfs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_rw_inherited_nfs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_read_nfs_symlinks(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_dontaudit_append_nfs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_search_cifs(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_exec_cifs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_rw_inherited_cifs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_read_cifs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_read_cifs_symlinks(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_dontaudit_append_cifs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_fusefs_home_dirs',` + fs_search_fusefs(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_read_fusefs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_exec_fusefs_files(chrome_sandbox_t) + fs_read_fusefs_symlinks(chrome_sandbox_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sandbox_use_ptys(chrome_sandbox_t) +') + + +######################################## +# +# chrome_sandbox_nacl local policy +# + +allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:process { execmem setsched }; +allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; +allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t chrome_sandbox_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr write read }; +allow chrome_sandbox_t chrome_sandbox_nacl_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr write read }; + +allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t chrome_sandbox_t:shm rw_shm_perms; +allow chrome_sandbox_nacl_t chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +allow chrome_sandbox_t chrome_sandbox_nacl_t:process { sigkill sigstop signull signal share }; + +manage_files_pattern(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t, chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t, chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t, chrome_sandbox_tmpfs_t, file) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) + +dontaudit chrome_sandbox_nacl_t self:memprotect mmap_zero; + +domtrans_pattern(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_exec_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) +ps_process_pattern(chrome_sandbox_t, chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) + +dev_read_urand(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) +dev_read_sysfs(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) + +files_read_etc_files(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) + +corecmd_sbin_entry_type(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) +userdom_rw_inherited_user_tmpfs_files(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) +userdom_execute_user_tmpfs_files(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) +userdom_rw_inherited_user_tmp_files(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) +userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) + +optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_write_config_files(chrome_sandbox_nacl_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/cpufreqselector.te b/policy/modules/apps/cpufreqselector.te index 37475dd..130f87c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/cpufreqselector.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/cpufreqselector.te @@ -14,9 +14,10 @@ application_domain(cpufreqselector_t, cpufreqselector_exec_t) # cpufreq-selector local policy # -allow cpufreqselector_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_ptrace }; +allow cpufreqselector_t self:capability sys_nice; allow cpufreqselector_t self:process getsched; allow cpufreqselector_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow cpufreqselector_t self:process getsched; kernel_read_system_state(cpufreqselector_t) @@ -27,13 +28,16 @@ corecmd_search_bin(cpufreqselector_t) dev_rw_sysfs(cpufreqselector_t) +kernel_read_system_state(cpufreqselector_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(cpufreqselector_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(cpufreqselector_t) -userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(cpufreqselector_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(cpufreqselector_t) optional_policy(` dbus_system_domain(cpufreqselector_t, cpufreqselector_exec_t) + init_daemon_domain(cpufreqselector_t, cpufreqselector_exec_t) optional_policy(` consolekit_dbus_chat(cpufreqselector_t) @@ -53,3 +57,7 @@ optional_policy(` policykit_read_lib(cpufreqselector_t) policykit_read_reload(cpufreqselector_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_dbus_chat_xdm(cpufreqselector_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te b/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te index cd70958..e8c94b1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/evolution.te @@ -202,6 +202,8 @@ files_read_var_files(evolution_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(evolution_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(evolution_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(evolution_t) miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_t) @@ -215,7 +217,7 @@ userdom_rw_user_tmp_files(evolution_t) userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(evolution_t) userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(evolution_t) userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(evolution_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(evolution_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(evolution_t) # FIXME: suppress access to .local/.icons/.themes until properly implemented # FIXME: suppress access to .gaim/blist.xml (buddy list synchronization) # until properly implemented @@ -319,15 +321,6 @@ optional_policy(` mozilla_domtrans(evolution_t) ') -# Allow POP/IMAP/SMTP/NNTP/LDAP/IPP(printing) -optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(evolution_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(evolution_t) -') - ### Junk mail filtering (start spamd) optional_policy(` spamassassin_exec_spamd(evolution_t) @@ -376,6 +369,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(evolution_alarm_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(evolution_alarm_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(evolution_alarm_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_alarm_t) # Access evolution home @@ -404,10 +399,6 @@ optional_policy(` gnome_stream_connect_gconf(evolution_alarm_t) ') -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(evolution_alarm_t) -') - ######################################## # # Evolution exchange connector local policy @@ -459,6 +450,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(evolution_exchange_t) # Access evolution home fs_search_auto_mountpoints(evolution_exchange_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(evolution_exchange_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_exchange_t) userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(evolution_exchange_t) @@ -484,10 +477,6 @@ optional_policy(` gnome_stream_connect_gconf(evolution_exchange_t) ') -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(evolution_exchange_t) -') - ######################################## # # Evolution data server local policy @@ -539,6 +528,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(evolution_server_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(evolution_server_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(evolution_server_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(evolution_server_t) # Look in /etc/pki miscfiles_read_generic_certs(evolution_server_t) @@ -568,10 +559,6 @@ optional_policy(` gnome_stream_connect_gconf(evolution_server_t) ') -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(evolution_server_t) -') - ######################################## # # Evolution webcal local policy @@ -600,6 +587,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(evolution_webcal_t) corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(evolution_webcal_t) corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(evolution_webcal_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(evolution_webcal_t) + # Networking capability - connect to website and handle ics link sysnet_read_config(evolution_webcal_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(evolution_webcal_t) @@ -612,7 +601,3 @@ userdom_search_user_home_dirs(evolution_webcal_t) userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(evolution_webcal_t) xserver_user_x_domain_template(evolution_webcal, evolution_webcal_t, evolution_webcal_tmpfs_t) - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(evolution_webcal_t) -') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/firewallgui.fc b/policy/modules/apps/firewallgui.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce498b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/firewallgui.fc @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + +/usr/share/system-config-firewall/system-config-firewall-mechanism.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:firewallgui_exec_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/firewallgui.if b/policy/modules/apps/firewallgui.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2bd5790 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/firewallgui.if @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ + +## policy for firewallgui + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## firewallgui over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`firewallgui_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type firewallgui_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 firewallgui_t:dbus send_msg; + allow firewallgui_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write firewallgui unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`firewallgui_dontaudit_rw_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type firewallgui_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 firewallgui_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/firewallgui.te b/policy/modules/apps/firewallgui.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c97a6ea --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/firewallgui.te @@ -0,0 +1,75 @@ +policy_module(firewallgui,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type firewallgui_t; +type firewallgui_exec_t; +dbus_system_domain(firewallgui_t, firewallgui_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(firewallgui_t, firewallgui_exec_t) + +type firewallgui_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(firewallgui_tmp_t) + +######################################## +# +# firewallgui local policy +# + +allow firewallgui_t self:capability { net_admin sys_rawio } ; +allow firewallgui_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(firewallgui_t,firewallgui_tmp_t,firewallgui_tmp_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(firewallgui_t,firewallgui_tmp_t,firewallgui_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(firewallgui_t,firewallgui_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +kernel_read_system_state(firewallgui_t) +kernel_read_network_state(firewallgui_t) +kernel_rw_net_sysctls(firewallgui_t) +kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(firewallgui_t) +kernel_rw_vm_sysctls(firewallgui_t) + +corecmd_exec_shell(firewallgui_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(firewallgui_t) + +dev_read_urand(firewallgui_t) +dev_read_sysfs(firewallgui_t) + +files_manage_system_conf_files(firewallgui_t) +files_etc_filetrans_system_conf(firewallgui_t) +files_read_etc_files(firewallgui_t) +files_read_usr_files(firewallgui_t) +files_search_kernel_modules(firewallgui_t) +files_list_kernel_modules(firewallgui_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(firewallgui_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(firewallgui_t) + +seutil_read_config(firewallgui_t) + +userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(firewallgui_t) + +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(firewallgui_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_gconf_home_files(firewallgui_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + iptables_domtrans(firewallgui_t) + iptables_initrc_domtrans(firewallgui_t) + iptables_systemctl(firewallgui_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_getattr_module_deps(firewallgui_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + policykit_dbus_chat(firewallgui_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/games.te b/policy/modules/apps/games.te index ac4f509..4b7b763 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/games.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/games.te @@ -166,7 +166,7 @@ userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(games_t) # Suppress .icons denial until properly implemented userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(games_t) -tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',` +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`', ` allow games_t self:process execmem; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/gift.te b/policy/modules/apps/gift.te index 6e4add5..5c81832 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/gift.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/gift.te @@ -70,17 +70,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(gift_t) # giftui looks in .icons, .themes. userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(gift_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(gift_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(gift_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(gift_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(gift_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(gift_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(gift_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(gift_t) optional_policy(` nscd_socket_use(gift_t) @@ -132,16 +122,5 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(giftd_t) sysnet_read_config(giftd_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(giftd_t) - -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(giftd_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(giftd_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(giftd_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(giftd_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(giftd_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(giftd_t) -') +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(giftd_t) +userdom_home_manager(gitd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/gitosis.te b/policy/modules/apps/gitosis.te index 4a2e63b..e964f12 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/gitosis.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/gitosis.te @@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ policy_module(gitosis, 1.2.0) # Declarations # +## +##

+## Allow gitisis daemon to send mail +##

+## +gen_tunable(gitosis_can_sendmail, false) + type gitosis_t; type gitosis_exec_t; application_domain(gitosis_t, gitosis_exec_t) @@ -39,3 +46,9 @@ files_search_var_lib(gitosis_t) miscfiles_read_localization(gitosis_t) sysnet_read_config(gitosis_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(gitosis_t) + +tunable_policy(`gitosis_can_sendmail',` + mta_send_mail(gitosis_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/gnome.fc b/policy/modules/apps/gnome.fc index 00a19e3..d776f66 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/gnome.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/gnome.fc @@ -1,9 +1,53 @@ -HOME_DIR/\.config/gtk-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnome_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.cache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cache_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.color/icc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:icc_data_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.dbus(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dbus_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.config(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.kde(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconf_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.gnome2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnome_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gnome2/keyrings(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gkeyringd_gnome_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.grl-bookmarks gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.grl-metadata-store gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.grl-bookmarks gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gstreamer-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.orc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.local.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconf_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.local/share(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:data_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.local/share/icc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:icc_data_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.Xdefaults gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.xine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0) + +/var/run/user/[^/]*/\.orc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0) +/var/run/user/[^/]*/dconf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0) +/var/run/user/[^/]*/keyring.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gkeyringd_tmp_t,s0) + +/root/\.cache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cache_home_t,s0) +/root/\.color/icc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:icc_data_home_t,s0) +/root/\.config(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0) +/root/\.kde(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0) +/root/\.gconf(d)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconf_home_t,s0) +/root/\.dbus(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dbus_home_t,s0) +/root/\.gnome2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnome_home_t,s0) +/root/\.gnome2/keyrings(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gkeyringd_gnome_home_t,s0) +/root/\.gstreamer-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gstreamer_home_t,s0) +/root/\.local.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconf_home_t,s0) +/root/\.local/share(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:data_home_t,s0) +/root/\.local/share/icc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:icc_data_home_t,s0) +/root/\.Xdefaults gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0) +/root/\.xine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_home_t,s0) /etc/gconf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconf_etc_t,s0) /tmp/gconfd-USER/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconf_tmp_t,s0) -/usr/libexec/gconfd-2 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconfd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/share/config(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:config_usr_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/gnome-keyring-daemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gkeyringd_exec_t,s0) + +# Don't use because toolchain is broken +#/usr/libexec/gconfd-2 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconfd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/libexec/gconf-defaults-mechanism -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gconfdefaultsm_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/libexec/gnome-system-monitor-mechanism -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnomesystemmm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/ksysguardprocesslist_helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnomesystemmm_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/gnome.if b/policy/modules/apps/gnome.if index f5afe78..581c9dd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/gnome.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/gnome.if @@ -1,44 +1,937 @@ ## GNU network object model environment (GNOME) -############################################################ +########################################################### ## -## Role access for gnome +## Role access for gnome ## ## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_role',` + gen_require(` + type gconfd_t, gconfd_exec_t; + type gconf_tmp_t; + ') + + role $1 types gconfd_t; + + domain_auto_trans($2, gconfd_exec_t, gconfd_t) + allow gconfd_t $2:fd use; + allow gconfd_t $2:fifo_file write; + allow gconfd_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; + + ps_process_pattern($2, gconfd_t) + + #gnome_stream_connect_gconf_template($1, $2) + read_files_pattern($2, gconf_tmp_t, gconf_tmp_t) + allow $2 gconfd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; +') + +###################################### +## +## The role template for the gnome-keyring-daemon. +## +## +## +## The user prefix. +## +## +## +## +## The user role. +## +## +## +## +## The user domain associated with the role. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_role_gkeyringd',` + gen_require(` + attribute gkeyringd_domain; + attribute gnomedomain; + type gnome_home_t; + type gkeyringd_exec_t, gkeyringd_tmp_t, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + type $1_gkeyringd_t, gnomedomain, gkeyringd_domain; + typealias $1_gkeyringd_t alias gkeyringd_$1_t; + application_domain($1_gkeyringd_t, gkeyringd_exec_t) + ubac_constrained($1_gkeyringd_t) + domain_user_exemption_target($1_gkeyringd_t) + + userdom_home_manager($1_gkeyringd_t) + + role $2 types $1_gkeyringd_t; + + domtrans_pattern($3, gkeyringd_exec_t, $1_gkeyringd_t) + + allow $3 gkeyringd_gnome_home_t:dir { relabel_dir_perms manage_dir_perms }; + allow $3 gkeyringd_gnome_home_t:file { relabel_file_perms manage_file_perms }; + + allow $3 gkeyringd_tmp_t:dir { relabel_dir_perms manage_dir_perms }; + allow $3 gkeyringd_tmp_t:sock_file { relabel_sock_file_perms manage_sock_file_perms }; + + corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_gkeyringd_t, $1_t) + corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_gkeyringd_t, $1_t) + allow $1_gkeyringd_t $3:process sigkill; + allow $3 $1_gkeyringd_t:fd use; + allow $3 $1_gkeyringd_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1_gkeyringd_t, $3) + + auth_use_nsswitch($1_gkeyringd_t) + + ps_process_pattern($3, $1_gkeyringd_t) + allow $3 $1_gkeyringd_t:process signal_perms; + dontaudit $3 gkeyringd_exec_t:file entrypoint; + + stream_connect_pattern($3, gkeyringd_tmp_t, gkeyringd_tmp_t, $1_gkeyringd_t) + + allow $1_gkeyringd_t $3:dbus send_msg; + allow $3 $1_gkeyringd_t:dbus send_msg; + optional_policy(` + dbus_session_domain($1, gkeyringd_exec_t, $1_gkeyringd_t) + dbus_session_bus_client($1_gkeyringd_t) + gnome_home_dir_filetrans($1_gkeyringd_t) + gnome_manage_generic_home_dirs($1_gkeyringd_t) + gnome_read_generic_data_home_files($1_gkeyringd_t) + + optional_policy(` + telepathy_mission_control_read_state($1_gkeyringd_t) + ') + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## gconf connection template. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_stream_connect_gconf',` + gen_require(` + type gconfd_t, gconf_tmp_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, gconf_tmp_t, gconf_tmp_t) + allow $1 gconfd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to gkeyringd with a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_stream_connect_gkeyringd',` + gen_require(` + attribute gkeyringd_domain; + type gkeyringd_tmp_t; + type gconf_tmp_t; + type cache_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 gconf_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms; + userdom_search_user_tmp_dirs($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, gkeyringd_tmp_t, gkeyringd_tmp_t, gkeyringd_domain) + stream_connect_pattern($1, cache_home_t, cache_home_t, gkeyringd_domain) +') + +######################################## +## +## Run gconfd in gconfd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_domtrans_gconfd',` + gen_require(` + type gconfd_t, gconfd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, gconfd_exec_t, gconfd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit read gnome homedir content (.config) +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_dontaudit_read_config',` + gen_require(` + attribute gnome_home_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 gnome_home_type:dir read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit search gnome homedir content (.config) +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_dontaudit_search_config',` + gen_require(` + attribute gnome_home_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 gnome_home_type:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit write gnome homedir content (.config) +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_dontaudit_write_config_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute gnome_home_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 gnome_home_type:file write; +') + +######################################## +## +## manage gnome homedir content (.config) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_manage_config',` + gen_require(` + attribute gnome_home_type; + ') + + allow $1 gnome_home_type:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1 gnome_home_type:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1 gnome_home_type:lnk_file manage_lnk_file_perms; + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send general signals to all gconf domains. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_signal_all',` + gen_require(` + attribute gnomedomain; + ') + + allow $1 gnomedomain:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in a Gnome cache home directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## a specified private type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the object to create. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_cache_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type cache_home_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, cache_home_t, $2, $3, $4) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in a Gnome cache home directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## a specified private type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the object to create. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_config_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type config_home_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, config_home_t, $2, $3, $4) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read generic cache home files (.cache) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_read_generic_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type cache_home_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, cache_home_t, cache_home_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Set attributes of cache home dir (.cache) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_setattr_cache_home_dir',` + gen_require(` + type cache_home_t; + ') + + setattr_dirs_pattern($1, cache_home_t, cache_home_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage cache home dir (.cache) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_manage_cache_home_dir',` + gen_require(` + type cache_home_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, cache_home_t, cache_home_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## append to generic cache home files (.cache) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_append_generic_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type cache_home_t; + ') + + append_files_pattern($1, cache_home_t, cache_home_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## write to generic cache home files (.cache) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_write_generic_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type cache_home_t; + ') + + write_files_pattern($1, cache_home_t, cache_home_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage a sock_file in the generic cache home files (.cache) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_manage_generic_cache_sockets',` + gen_require(` + type cache_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + manage_sock_files_pattern($1, cache_home_t, cache_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit read/write to generic cache home files (.cache) +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_dontaudit_rw_generic_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type cache_home_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 cache_home_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## read gnome homedir content (.config) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_read_config',` + gen_require(` + attribute gnome_home_type; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, gnome_home_type, gnome_home_type) + read_files_pattern($1, gnome_home_type, gnome_home_type) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, gnome_home_type, gnome_home_type) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in a Gnome gconf home directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## a specified private type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the object to create. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_data_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type data_home_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, data_home_t, $2, $3, $4) + gnome_search_gconf($1) +') + +####################################### +## +## Read generic data home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_read_generic_data_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type data_home_t, gconf_home_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, { gconf_home_t data_home_t }, data_home_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Manage gconf data home files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_manage_data',` + gen_require(` + type data_home_t; + type gconf_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 gconf_home_t:dir search_dir_perms; + manage_dirs_pattern($1, data_home_t, data_home_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, data_home_t, data_home_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, data_home_t, data_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read icc data home content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_read_home_icc_data_content',` + gen_require(` + type icc_data_home_t, gconf_home_t, data_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + allow $1 { gconf_home_t data_home_t }:dir search_dir_perms; + list_dirs_pattern($1, icc_data_home_t, icc_data_home_t) + read_files_pattern($1, icc_data_home_t, icc_data_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, icc_data_home_t, icc_data_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read inherited icc data home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_read_inherited_home_icc_data_files',` + gen_require(` + type icc_data_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 icc_data_home_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create gconf_home_t objects in the /root directory +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_admin_home_gconf_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type gconf_home_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, $2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read +## inherited gconf config files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_dontaudit_read_inherited_gconf_config_files',` + gen_require(` + type gconf_etc_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 gconf_etc_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## read gconf config files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_read_gconf_config',` + gen_require(` + type gconf_etc_t; + ') + + allow $1 gconf_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, gconf_etc_t, gconf_etc_t) + files_search_etc($1) +') + +####################################### +## +## Manage gconf config files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_manage_gconf_config',` + gen_require(` + type gconf_etc_t; + ') + + allow $1 gconf_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; + manage_files_pattern($1, gconf_etc_t, gconf_etc_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute gconf programs in +## in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_exec_gconf',` + gen_require(` + type gconfd_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, gconfd_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute gnome keyringd in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_exec_keyringd',` + gen_require(` + type gkeyringd_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, gkeyringd_exec_t) + corecmd_search_bin($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read gconf home files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_read_gconf_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type gconf_home_t; + type data_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + allow $1 gconf_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow $1 data_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, gconf_home_t) + read_files_pattern($1, data_home_t, data_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, gconf_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, data_home_t, data_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search gkeyringd temporary directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_search_gkeyringd_tmp_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type gkeyringd_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + allow $1 gkeyringd_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## List gkeyringd temporary directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_list_gkeyringd_tmp_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type gkeyringd_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + allow $1 gkeyringd_tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## search gconf homedir (.local) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_search_gconf',` + gen_require(` + type gconf_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 gconf_home_t:dir search_dir_perms; + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Set attributes of Gnome config dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_setattr_config_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type gnome_home_t; + ') + + setattr_dirs_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t) + files_search_home($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage generic gnome home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_manage_generic_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type gnome_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage generic gnome home directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_manage_generic_home_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type gnome_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + allow $1 gnome_home_t:dir manage_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Append gconf home files +## +## ## -## Role allowed access +## Domain allowed access. ## ## +# +interface(`gnome_append_gconf_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type gconf_home_t; + ') + + append_files_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, gconf_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## manage gconf home files +## ## ## -## User domain for the role +## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`gnome_role',` +interface(`gnome_manage_gconf_home_files',` gen_require(` - type gconfd_t, gconfd_exec_t; - type gconf_tmp_t; + type gconf_home_t; ') - role $1 types gconfd_t; + allow $1 gconf_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; + manage_files_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, gconf_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to gnome over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the user domain. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + attribute gnome_home_type; + ') - domain_auto_trans($2, gconfd_exec_t, gconfd_t) - allow gconfd_t $2:fd use; - allow gconfd_t $2:fifo_file write; - allow gconfd_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; + # Connect to pulseaudit server + stream_connect_pattern($1, gnome_home_type, gnome_home_type, $2) +') - ps_process_pattern($2, gconfd_t) +######################################## +## +## list gnome homedir content (.config) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_list_home_config',` + gen_require(` + type config_home_t; + ') - #gnome_stream_connect_gconf_template($1, $2) - read_files_pattern($2, gconf_tmp_t, gconf_tmp_t) - allow $2 gconfd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1 config_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## Execute gconf programs in -## in the caller domain. +## Set attributes of gnome homedir content (.config) ## ## ## @@ -46,37 +939,74 @@ interface(`gnome_role',` ## ## # -interface(`gnome_exec_gconf',` +interface(`gnome_setattr_home_config',` gen_require(` - type gconfd_exec_t; + type config_home_t; ') - can_exec($1, gconfd_exec_t) + setattr_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) ') ######################################## ## -## Read gconf config files. +## read gnome homedir content (.config) ## -## +## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -template(`gnome_read_gconf_config',` +interface(`gnome_read_home_config',` gen_require(` - type gconf_etc_t; + type config_home_t; ') - allow $1 gconf_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; - read_files_pattern($1, gconf_etc_t, gconf_etc_t) - files_search_etc($1) + list_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t) + read_files_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## delete gnome homedir content (.config) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_delete_home_config',` + gen_require(` + type config_home_t; + ') + + delete_files_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t) ') ####################################### ## -## Create, read, write, and delete gconf config files. +## setattr gnome homedir content (.config) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_setattr_home_config_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type config_home_t; + ') + + setattr_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## manage gnome homedir content (.config) ## ## ## @@ -84,37 +1014,53 @@ template(`gnome_read_gconf_config',` ## ## # -interface(`gnome_manage_gconf_config',` +interface(`gnome_manage_home_config',` gen_require(` - type gconf_etc_t; + type config_home_t; ') - manage_files_pattern($1, gconf_etc_t, gconf_etc_t) - files_search_etc($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## delete gnome homedir content (.config) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_delete_home_config_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type config_home_t; + ') + + delete_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t) ') ######################################## ## -## gconf connection template. +## manage gnome homedir content (.config) ## -## +## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`gnome_stream_connect_gconf',` +interface(`gnome_manage_home_config_dirs',` gen_require(` - type gconfd_t, gconf_tmp_t; + type config_home_t; ') - read_files_pattern($1, gconf_tmp_t, gconf_tmp_t) - allow $1 gconfd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + manage_dirs_pattern($1, config_home_t, config_home_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Run gconfd in gconfd domain. +## manage gstreamer home content files. ## ## ## @@ -122,17 +1068,62 @@ interface(`gnome_stream_connect_gconf',` ## ## # -interface(`gnome_domtrans_gconfd',` +interface(`gnome_manage_gstreamer_home_files',` gen_require(` - type gconfd_t, gconfd_exec_t; + type gstreamer_home_t; ') - domtrans_pattern($1, gconfd_exec_t, gconfd_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, gstreamer_home_t, gstreamer_home_t) + gnome_filetrans_gstreamer_home_content($1) +') + +####################################### +## +## file name transition gstreamer home content files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_filetrans_gstreamer_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type gstreamer_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, file, ".grl-bookmarks") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, file, ".grl-metadata-store") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, file, ".grl-podcasts") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-0.12") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-0.10") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-10") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-12") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".orc") + userdom_user_tmp_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".orc") +') + +####################################### +## +## manage gstreamer home content files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_manage_gstreamer_home_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type gstreamer_home_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, gstreamer_home_t, gstreamer_home_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Set attributes of Gnome config dirs. +## Read/Write all inherited gnome home config ## ## ## @@ -140,51 +1131,306 @@ interface(`gnome_domtrans_gconfd',` ## ## # -interface(`gnome_setattr_config_dirs',` +interface(`gnome_rw_inherited_config',` gen_require(` - type gnome_home_t; + attribute gnome_home_type; ') - setattr_dirs_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t) - files_search_home($1) + allow $1 gnome_home_type:file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## Read gnome homedir content (.config) +## Send and receive messages from +## gconf system service over dbus. ## -## +## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -template(`gnome_read_config',` +interface(`gnome_dbus_chat_gconfdefault',` gen_require(` - type gnome_home_t; + type gconfdefaultsm_t; + class dbus send_msg; ') - list_dirs_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t) - read_files_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gnome_home_t) + allow $1 gconfdefaultsm_t:dbus send_msg; + allow gconfdefaultsm_t $1:dbus send_msg; ') ######################################## ## -## manage gnome homedir content (.config) +## Send and receive messages from +## gkeyringd over dbus. ## -## +## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`gnome_manage_config',` +interface(`gnome_dbus_chat_gkeyringd',` + gen_require(` + attribute gkeyringd_domain; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 gkeyringd_domain:dbus send_msg; + allow gkeyringd_domain $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send signull signal to gkeyringd processes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_signull_gkeyringd',` + gen_require(` + attribute gkeyringd_domain; + ') + + allow $1 gkeyringd_domain:process signull; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the domain to read gkeyringd state files in /proc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_read_gkeyringd_state',` + gen_require(` + attribute gkeyringd_domain; + ') + + ps_process_pattern($1, gkeyringd_domain) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create directories in user home directories +## with the gnome home file type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_home_dir_filetrans',` gen_require(` type gnome_home_t; ') - allow $1 gnome_home_t:dir manage_dir_perms; - allow $1 gnome_home_t:file manage_file_perms; + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gnome_home_t, dir) userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) ') + +###################################### +## +## Allow read kde config content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_read_usr_config',` + gen_require(` + type config_usr_t; + ') + + files_search_usr($1) + list_dirs_pattern($1, config_usr_t, config_usr_t) + read_files_pattern($1, config_usr_t, config_usr_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, config_usr_t, config_usr_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow manage kde config content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_manage_usr_config',` + gen_require(` + type config_usr_t; + ') + + files_search_usr($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, config_usr_t, config_usr_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, config_usr_t, config_usr_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, config_usr_t, config_usr_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute gnome-keyring in the user gkeyring domain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the gkeyring domain. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_transition_gkeyringd',` + gen_require(` + attribute gkeyringd_domain; + ') + + allow $1 gkeyringd_domain:process transition; + dontaudit $1 gkeyringd_domain:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; + allow gkeyringd_domain $1:process { sigchld signull }; + allow gkeyringd_domain $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create gnome content in the user home directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_filetrans_home_content',` + +gen_require(` + type config_home_t; + type cache_home_t; + type gstreamer_home_t; + type gconf_home_t; + type gnome_home_t; + type data_home_t, icc_data_home_t; + type gkeyringd_gnome_home_t; +') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".config") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, file, ".Xdefaults") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".xine") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, cache_home_t, dir, ".cache") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".kde") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconf") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconfd") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".local") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gnome_home_t, dir, ".gnome2") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".orc") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-0.12") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-0.10") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-10") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".gstreamer-12") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".grl-bookmarks") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".grl-metadata-store") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, file, ".grl-podcasts") + + # ~/.color/icc: legacy + userdom_user_home_content_filetrans($1, icc_data_home_t, dir, "icc") + filetrans_pattern($1, gnome_home_t, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t, dir, "keyrings") + filetrans_pattern($1, gconf_home_t, data_home_t, dir, "share") + filetrans_pattern($1, data_home_t, icc_data_home_t, dir, "icc") + userdom_user_tmp_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, "dconf") + userdom_user_tmp_filetrans($1, gstreamer_home_t, dir, ".orc") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create gnome directory in the /root directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_filetrans_admin_home_content',` + +gen_require(` + type config_home_t; + type cache_home_t; + type gstreamer_home_t; + type gconf_home_t; + type gnome_home_t; + type icc_data_home_t; +') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".config") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, file, ".Xdefaults") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".xine") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, cache_home_t, dir, ".cache") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, config_home_t, dir, ".kde") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconf") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".gconfd") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, gconf_home_t, dir, ".local") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, gnome_home_t, dir, ".gnome2") + gnome_filetrans_gstreamer_home_content($1) + # /root/.color/icc: legacy + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, icc_data_home_t, dir, "icc") +') + +###################################### +## +## Execute gnome-keyring executable +## in the specified domain. +## +## +##

+## Execute a telepathy executable +## in the specified domain. This allows +## the specified domain to execute any file +## on these filesystems in the specified +## domain. +##

+##

+## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

+##

+## This interface was added to handle +## the ssh-agent policy. +##

+## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +## +# +interface(`gnome_command_domtrans_gkeyringd', ` + gen_require(` + type gkeyringd_exec_t; + ') + + allow $2 gkeyringd_exec_t:file entrypoint; + domain_transition_pattern($1, gkeyringd_exec_t, $2) + type_transition $1 gkeyringd_exec_t:process $2; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/gnome.te b/policy/modules/apps/gnome.te index 2505654..6e75a73 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/gnome.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/gnome.te @@ -6,11 +6,31 @@ policy_module(gnome, 2.1.0) # attribute gnomedomain; +attribute gnome_home_type; +attribute gkeyringd_domain; type gconf_etc_t; files_config_file(gconf_etc_t) -type gconf_home_t; +type data_home_t, gnome_home_type; +userdom_user_home_content(data_home_t) + +type config_home_t, gnome_home_type; +userdom_user_home_content(config_home_t) + +type cache_home_t, gnome_home_type; +userdom_user_home_content(cache_home_t) + +type gstreamer_home_t, gnome_home_type; +userdom_user_home_content(gstreamer_home_t) + +type dbus_home_t, gnome_home_type; +userdom_user_home_content(dbus_home_t) + +type icc_data_home_t, gnome_home_type; +userdom_user_home_content(icc_data_home_t) + +type gconf_home_t, gnome_home_type; typealias gconf_home_t alias { user_gconf_home_t staff_gconf_home_t sysadm_gconf_home_t }; typealias gconf_home_t alias { auditadm_gconf_home_t secadm_gconf_home_t }; typealias gconf_home_t alias unconfined_gconf_home_t; @@ -30,12 +50,35 @@ typealias gconfd_t alias { auditadm_gconfd_t secadm_gconfd_t }; application_domain(gconfd_t, gconfd_exec_t) ubac_constrained(gconfd_t) -type gnome_home_t; +type gnome_home_t, gnome_home_type; typealias gnome_home_t alias { user_gnome_home_t staff_gnome_home_t sysadm_gnome_home_t }; typealias gnome_home_t alias { auditadm_gnome_home_t secadm_gnome_home_t }; typealias gnome_home_t alias unconfined_gnome_home_t; userdom_user_home_content(gnome_home_t) +# type KDE /usr/share/config files +type config_usr_t; +files_type(config_usr_t) + +type gkeyringd_exec_t; +corecmd_executable_file(gkeyringd_exec_t) + +type gkeyringd_gnome_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(gkeyringd_gnome_home_t) + +type gkeyringd_tmp_t; +userdom_user_tmp_content(gkeyringd_tmp_t) + +type gconfdefaultsm_t; +type gconfdefaultsm_exec_t; +dbus_system_domain(gconfdefaultsm_t, gconfdefaultsm_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(gconfdefaultsm_t, gconfdefaultsm_exec_t) + +type gnomesystemmm_t; +type gnomesystemmm_exec_t; +dbus_system_domain(gnomesystemmm_t, gnomesystemmm_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(gnomesystemmm_t, gnomesystemmm_exec_t) + ############################## # # Local Policy @@ -75,3 +118,157 @@ optional_policy(` xserver_use_xdm_fds(gconfd_t) xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(gconfd_t) ') + +####################################### +# +# gconf-defaults-mechanisms local policy +# + +allow gconfdefaultsm_t self:capability { dac_override sys_nice }; +allow gconfdefaultsm_t self:process getsched; +allow gconfdefaultsm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +corecmd_search_bin(gconfdefaultsm_t) + +files_read_etc_files(gconfdefaultsm_t) +files_read_usr_files(gconfdefaultsm_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(gconfdefaultsm_t) + +gnome_manage_gconf_home_files(gconfdefaultsm_t) +gnome_manage_gconf_config(gconfdefaultsm_t) + +userdom_read_all_users_state(gconfdefaultsm_t) +userdom_search_user_home_dirs(gconfdefaultsm_t) + +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(gconfdefaultsm_t) + +optional_policy(` + consolekit_dbus_chat(gconfdefaultsm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(gconfdefaultsm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + policykit_domtrans_auth(gconfdefaultsm_t) + policykit_dbus_chat(gconfdefaultsm_t) + policykit_read_lib(gconfdefaultsm_t) + policykit_read_reload(gconfdefaultsm_t) +') + +userdom_home_manager(gconfdefaultsm_t) + +####################################### +# +# gnome-system-monitor-mechanisms local policy +# + +allow gnomesystemmm_t self:capability sys_nice; +allow gnomesystemmm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(gnomesystemmm_t) + +corecmd_search_bin(gnomesystemmm_t) + +domain_kill_all_domains(gnomesystemmm_t) +domain_search_all_domains_state(gnomesystemmm_t) +domain_setpriority_all_domains(gnomesystemmm_t) +domain_signal_all_domains(gnomesystemmm_t) +domain_sigstop_all_domains(gnomesystemmm_t) + +files_read_etc_files(gnomesystemmm_t) +files_read_usr_files(gnomesystemmm_t) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(gnomesystemmm_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(gnomesystemmm_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(gnomesystemmm_t) + +userdom_read_all_users_state(gnomesystemmm_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(gnomesystemmm_t) + +optional_policy(` + consolekit_dbus_chat(gnomesystemmm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(gnomesystemmm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + policykit_dbus_chat(gnomesystemmm_t) + policykit_domtrans_auth(gnomesystemmm_t) + policykit_read_lib(gnomesystemmm_t) + policykit_read_reload(gnomesystemmm_t) +') + +###################################### +# +# gnome-keyring-daemon local policy +# + +allow gkeyringd_domain self:capability ipc_lock; +allow gkeyringd_domain self:process { getcap getsched setcap signal }; +allow gkeyringd_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow gkeyringd_domain self:unix_stream_socket { connectto accept listen }; + +dontaudit gkeyringd_domain config_home_t:file write; + +manage_dirs_pattern(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t) +filetrans_pattern(gkeyringd_domain, gnome_home_t, gkeyringd_gnome_home_t, dir) + +manage_dirs_pattern(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_tmp_t, gkeyringd_tmp_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_tmp_t, gkeyringd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_tmp_t, dir) +userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(gkeyringd_domain, gkeyringd_tmp_t, { sock_file dir }) + +kernel_read_system_state(gkeyringd_domain) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(gkeyringd_domain) + +corecmd_search_bin(gkeyringd_domain) + +dev_read_rand(gkeyringd_domain) +dev_read_urand(gkeyringd_domain) +dev_read_sysfs(gkeyringd_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(gkeyringd_domain) +files_read_usr_files(gkeyringd_domain) +# for nscd? +files_search_pids(gkeyringd_domain) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(gkeyringd_domain) +fs_getattr_tmpfs(gkeyringd_domain) + +selinux_getattr_fs(gkeyringd_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(gkeyringd_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(gkeyringd_domain) + +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(gkeyringd_domain, gnome_home_t, dir) + +optional_policy(` + xserver_append_xdm_home_files(gkeyringd_domain) + xserver_read_xdm_home_files(gkeyringd_domain) + xserver_use_xdm_fds(gkeyringd_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_home_config(gkeyringd_domain) + gnome_read_generic_cache_files(gkeyringd_domain) + gnome_write_generic_cache_files(gkeyringd_domain) + gnome_manage_cache_home_dir(gkeyringd_domain) + gnome_manage_generic_cache_sockets(gkeyringd_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_read_user_home_files(gkeyringd_domain) +') + +domain_use_interactive_fds(gnomedomain) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gnomedomain) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/gpg.fc b/policy/modules/apps/gpg.fc index e9853d4..6864b58 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/gpg.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/gpg.fc @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ HOME_DIR/\.gnupg(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_secret_t,s0) +/root/\.gnupg(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_secret_t,s0) /usr/bin/gpg(2)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/gpg-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_agent_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/kgpg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/pinentry.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pinentry_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/gnupg/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/gnupg/gpgkeys.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_helper_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/gnupg/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/gnupg/gpgkeys.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gpg_helper_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if b/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if index 40e0a2a..46cc164 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/gpg.if @@ -54,15 +54,16 @@ interface(`gpg_role',` manage_sock_files_pattern($2, gpg_pinentry_tmp_t, gpg_pinentry_tmp_t) relabel_sock_files_pattern($2, gpg_pinentry_tmp_t, gpg_pinentry_tmp_t) + allow gpg_pinentry_t $2:fifo_file { read write }; + optional_policy(` gpg_pinentry_dbus_chat($2) ') + allow $2 gpg_agent_t:unix_stream_socket { rw_socket_perms connectto }; ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` #Leaked File Descriptors - dontaudit gpg_t $2:socket_class_set { getattr read write }; dontaudit gpg_t $2:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - dontaudit gpg_agent_t $2:socket_class_set { getattr read write }; dontaudit gpg_agent_t $2:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; ') ') @@ -85,6 +86,62 @@ interface(`gpg_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, gpg_exec_t, gpg_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Execute gpg in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gpg_exec',` + gen_require(` + type gpg_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + can_exec($1, gpg_exec_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Transition to a gpg web domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`gpg_domtrans_web',` + gen_require(` + type gpg_web_t, gpg_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, gpg_exec_t, gpg_web_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Make gpg an entrypoint for +## the specified domain. +## +## +## +## The domain for which cifs_t is an entrypoint. +## +## +# +interface(`gpg_entry_type',` + gen_require(` + type gpg_exec_t; + ') + + domain_entry_file($1, gpg_exec_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Send generic signals to user gpg processes. diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te b/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te index 9050e8c..9cbbfd4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/gpg.te @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(gpg, 2.4.0) # # Declarations # +attribute gpgdomain; ## ##

@@ -13,7 +14,15 @@ policy_module(gpg, 2.4.0) ## gen_tunable(gpg_agent_env_file, false) -type gpg_t; +## +##

+## Allow gpg web domain to modify public files +## used for public file transfer services. +##

+## +gen_tunable(gpg_web_anon_write, false) + +type gpg_t, gpgdomain; type gpg_exec_t; typealias gpg_t alias { user_gpg_t staff_gpg_t sysadm_gpg_t }; typealias gpg_t alias { auditadm_gpg_t secadm_gpg_t }; @@ -62,17 +71,24 @@ type gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t; files_tmpfs_file(gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t) ubac_constrained(gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t) +type gpg_web_t; +domain_type(gpg_web_t) +gpg_entry_type(gpg_web_t) +role system_r types gpg_web_t; + ######################################## # # GPG local policy # -allow gpg_t self:capability { ipc_lock setuid }; -# setrlimit is for ulimit -c 0 -allow gpg_t self:process { signal signull setrlimit getcap setcap setpgid }; +allow gpgdomain self:capability { ipc_lock setuid }; +allow gpgdomain self:process { getsched setsched }; +#at setrlimit is for ulimit -c 0 +allow gpgdomain self:process { signal signull setrlimit getcap setcap setpgid }; +dontaudit gpgdomain self:netlink_audit_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; -allow gpg_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -allow gpg_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow gpgdomain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow gpgdomain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t, gpg_agent_tmp_t) @@ -84,6 +100,7 @@ domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_exec_t, gpg_agent_t) domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_helper_exec_t, gpg_helper_t) allow gpg_t gpg_secret_t:dir create_dir_perms; +manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) manage_files_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(gpg_t, gpg_secret_t, dir) @@ -123,22 +140,26 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(gpg_t) miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(gpg_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gpg_t) # sign/encrypt user files -userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(gpg_t) +userdom_manage_all_user_tmp_content(gpg_t) +#userdom_manage_user_home_content(gpg_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(gpg_t) +userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(gpg_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(gpg_t, file) +userdom_stream_connect(gpg_t) mta_write_config(gpg_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(gpg_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(gpg_t) +userdom_home_manager(gpg_t) + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_config(gpg_t) + gnome_stream_connect_gkeyringd(gpg_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(gpg_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(gpg_t) +optional_policy(` + mta_read_spool(gpg_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -147,15 +168,19 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - xserver_use_xdm_fds(gpg_t) - xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(gpg_t) + spamassassin_read_spamd_tmp_files(gpg_t) ') optional_policy(` - cron_system_entry(gpg_t, gpg_exec_t) - cron_read_system_job_tmp_files(gpg_t) + xserver_use_xdm_fds(gpg_t) + xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(gpg_t) ') +#optional_policy(` +# cron_system_entry(gpg_t, gpg_exec_t) +# cron_read_system_job_tmp_files(gpg_t) +#') + ######################################## # # GPG helper local policy @@ -191,7 +216,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(gpg_helper_t) auth_use_nsswitch(gpg_helper_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(gpg_helper_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gpg_helper_t) tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` fs_dontaudit_rw_nfs_files(gpg_helper_t) @@ -205,15 +230,17 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` # # GPG agent local policy # +domtrans_pattern(gpg_t, gpg_agent_exec_t, gpg_agent_t) # rlimit: gpg-agent wants to prevent coredumps allow gpg_agent_t self:process setrlimit; -allow gpg_agent_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms ; +allow gpg_agent_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto } ; allow gpg_agent_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; # read and write ~/.gnupg (gpg-agent stores secret keys in ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d ) manage_dirs_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) manage_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(gpg_agent_t, gpg_secret_t, gpg_secret_t) @@ -239,34 +266,25 @@ fs_dontaudit_list_inotifyfs(gpg_agent_t) miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_agent_t) # Write to the user domain tty. -userdom_use_user_terminals(gpg_agent_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gpg_agent_t) # read and write ~/.gnupg (gpg-agent stores secret keys in ~/.gnupg/private-keys-v1.d ) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(gpg_agent_t) ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files(gpg_agent_t) + userdom_dontaudit_write_user_tmp_files(gpg_agent_t) ') tunable_policy(`gpg_agent_env_file',` # write ~/.gpg-agent-info or a similar to the users home dir # or subdir (gpg-agent --write-env-file option) # - userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(gpg_agent_t, file) + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(gpg_agent_t, { dir file }) userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(gpg_agent_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(gpg_agent_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(gpg_agent_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(gpg_agent_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(gpg_agent_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(gpg_agent_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(gpg_agent_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(gpg_agent_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(gpg_agent_t) optional_policy(` mozilla_dontaudit_rw_user_home_files(gpg_agent_t) @@ -301,6 +319,7 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(gpg_pinentry_t, gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t, { file dir }) # read /proc/meminfo kernel_read_system_state(gpg_pinentry_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(gpg_pinentry_t) corecmd_exec_bin(gpg_pinentry_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(gpg_pinentry_t) @@ -332,13 +351,15 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_pinentry_t) # for .Xauthority userdom_read_user_home_content_files(gpg_pinentry_t) userdom_read_user_tmpfs_files(gpg_pinentry_t) +# Bug: user pulseaudio files need open,read and unlink: +allow gpg_pinentry_t user_tmpfs_t:file unlink; +userdom_signull_unpriv_users(gpg_pinentry_t) +userdom_use_user_terminals(gpg_pinentry_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_read_nfs_files(gpg_pinentry_t) -') +userdom_home_reader(gpg_pinentry_t) -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_read_cifs_files(gpg_pinentry_t) +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_home_config(gpg_pinentry_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -347,6 +368,12 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_write_generic_cache_files(gpg_pinentry_t) + gnome_read_generic_cache_files(gpg_pinentry_t) + gnome_read_gconf_home_files(gpg_pinentry_t) +') + +optional_policy(` pulseaudio_exec(gpg_pinentry_t) pulseaudio_rw_home_files(gpg_pinentry_t) pulseaudio_setattr_home_dir(gpg_pinentry_t) @@ -356,4 +383,28 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` xserver_user_x_domain_template(gpg_pinentry, gpg_pinentry_t, gpg_pinentry_tmpfs_t) + +') + +############################# +# +# gpg web local policy +# + +allow gpg_web_t self:process setrlimit; + +dev_read_rand(gpg_web_t) +dev_read_urand(gpg_web_t) + +can_exec(gpg_web_t, gpg_exec_t) + +files_read_usr_files(gpg_web_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(gpg_web_t) + +apache_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files(gpg_web_t) +apache_manage_sys_content_rw(gpg_web_t) + +tunable_policy(`gpg_web_anon_write',` + miscfiles_manage_public_files(gpg_web_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/irc.fc b/policy/modules/apps/irc.fc index 65ece18..6bfdfd3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/irc.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/irc.fc @@ -2,10 +2,14 @@ # /home # HOME_DIR/\.ircmotd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irc_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.irssi(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:irssi_home_t,s0) + +/etc/irssi\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irssi_etc_t,s0) # # /usr # /usr/bin/[st]irc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irc_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/ircII -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/irssi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irssi_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/tinyirc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:irc_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/irc.if b/policy/modules/apps/irc.if index 4f9dc90..81a0fc6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/irc.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/irc.if @@ -18,9 +18,11 @@ interface(`irc_role',` gen_require(` type irc_t, irc_exec_t; + type irssi_t, irssi_exec_t, irssi_home_t; ') role $1 types irc_t; + role $1 types irssi_t; # Transition from the user domain to the derived domain. domtrans_pattern($2, irc_exec_t, irc_t) @@ -28,4 +30,17 @@ interface(`irc_role',` # allow ps to show irc ps_process_pattern($2, irc_t) allow $2 irc_t:process signal; + + domtrans_pattern($2, irssi_exec_t, irssi_t) + + allow $2 irssi_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($2, irssi_t) + + manage_dirs_pattern($2, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t) + manage_files_pattern($2, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t) + + relabel_dirs_pattern($2, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t) + relabel_files_pattern($2, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t) + relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/irc.te b/policy/modules/apps/irc.te index 66beb80..4bc18b6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/irc.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/irc.te @@ -24,6 +24,30 @@ userdom_user_home_content(irc_tmp_t) ######################################## # +# Irssi personal declarations. +# + +## +##

+## Allow the Irssi IRC Client to connect to any port, +## and to bind to any unreserved port. +##

+## +gen_tunable(irssi_use_full_network, false) + +type irssi_t; +type irssi_exec_t; +application_domain(irssi_t, irssi_exec_t) +ubac_constrained(irssi_t) + +type irssi_etc_t; +files_config_file(irssi_etc_t) + +type irssi_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(irssi_home_t) + +######################################## +# # Local policy # @@ -84,20 +108,75 @@ seutil_use_newrole_fds(irc_t) sysnet_read_config(irc_t) # Write to the user domain tty. -userdom_use_user_terminals(irc_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(irc_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(irc_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(irc_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(irc_t) +userdom_home_manager(irc_t) + +optional_policy(` + nis_use_ypbind(irc_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(irc_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(irc_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(irc_t) +######################################## +# +# Irssi personal declarations. +# + +allow irssi_t self:process { signal sigkill }; +allow irssi_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow irssi_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +read_files_pattern(irssi_t, irssi_etc_t, irssi_etc_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(irssi_t, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(irssi_t, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(irssi_t, irssi_home_t, irssi_home_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(irssi_t, irssi_home_t, { dir file lnk_file }) +userdom_search_user_home_dirs(irssi_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(irssi_t) + +corecmd_search_bin(irssi_t) +corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(irssi_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_ircd_port(irssi_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ircd_port(irssi_t) +corenet_sendrecv_ircd_client_packets(irssi_t) + +# tcp:7000 is often used for SSL irc +corenet_tcp_connect_gatekeeper_port(irssi_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_gatekeeper_port(irssi_t) +corenet_sendrecv_gatekeeper_client_packets(irssi_t) + +# Privoxy +corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(irssi_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(irssi_t) +corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(irssi_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(irssi_t) + +dev_read_urand(irssi_t) +# irssi-otr genkey. +dev_read_rand(irssi_t) + +files_read_usr_files(irssi_t) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(irssi_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(irssi_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(irssi_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(irssi_t) + +tunable_policy(`irssi_use_full_network', ` + corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(irssi_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(irssi_t) + corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets(irssi_t) + corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(irssi_t) ') +userdom_home_manager(irssi_t) + optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(irc_t) + automount_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs(irssi_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/jockey.fc b/policy/modules/apps/jockey.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..274cdec --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/jockey.fc @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ +/usr/share/jockey/jockey-backend -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:jockey_exec_t,s0) + +/var/cache/jockey(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:jockey_cache_t,s0) + +/var/log/jockey(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:jockey_var_log_t,s0) +/var/log/jockey\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:jockey_var_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/jockey.if b/policy/modules/apps/jockey.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fb58f33 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/jockey.if @@ -0,0 +1,132 @@ + +## policy for jockey + +######################################## +## +## Transition to jockey. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`jockey_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type jockey_t, jockey_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, jockey_exec_t, jockey_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search jockey cache directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jockey_search_cache',` + gen_require(` + type jockey_cache_t; + ') + + allow $1 jockey_cache_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read jockey cache files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jockey_read_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type jockey_cache_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + read_files_pattern($1, jockey_cache_t, jockey_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## jockey cache files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jockey_manage_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type jockey_cache_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, jockey_cache_t, jockey_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage jockey cache dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jockey_manage_cache_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type jockey_cache_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, jockey_cache_t, jockey_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an jockey environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`jockey_admin',` + gen_require(` + type jockey_t; + type jockey_cache_t; + ') + + allow $1 jockey_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, jockey_t) + + files_search_var($1) + admin_pattern($1, jockey_cache_t) + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/jockey.te b/policy/modules/apps/jockey.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b60050f --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/jockey.te @@ -0,0 +1,38 @@ +policy_module(jockey, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type jockey_t; +type jockey_exec_t; +dbus_system_domain(jockey_t, jockey_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(jockey_t, jockey_exec_t) + +type jockey_cache_t; +files_type(jockey_cache_t) + +type jockey_var_log_t; +logging_log_file(jockey_var_log_t) + +######################################## +# +# jockey local policy +# +allow jockey_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(jockey_t, jockey_cache_t, jockey_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(jockey_t, jockey_cache_t, jockey_cache_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(jockey_t, jockey_cache_t, jockey_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(jockey_t, jockey_cache_t, { dir file }) + +manage_files_pattern(jockey_t, jockey_var_log_t, jockey_var_log_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(jockey_t, jockey_var_log_t, jockey_var_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(jockey_t, jockey_var_log_t, { file dir }) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(jockey_t) + +files_read_etc_files(jockey_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(jockey_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/kde.fc b/policy/modules/apps/kde.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..25e4b68 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/kde.fc @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +#/usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/backlighthelper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kdebacklighthelper_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/kde.if b/policy/modules/apps/kde.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cf65577 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/kde.if @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +## Policy for KDE components + +####################################### +## +## Send and receive messages from +## firewallgui over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kde_dbus_chat_backlighthelper',` + gen_require(` + type kdebacklighthelper_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 kdebacklighthelper_t:dbus send_msg; + allow kdebacklighthelper_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/kde.te b/policy/modules/apps/kde.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f9b9c0f --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/kde.te @@ -0,0 +1,41 @@ +policy_module(kde,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type kdebacklighthelper_t; +type kdebacklighthelper_exec_t; +dbus_system_domain(kdebacklighthelper_t, kdebacklighthelper_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(kdebacklighthelper_t, kdebacklighthelper_exec_t) + +######################################## +# +# backlighthelper local policy +# +allow kdebacklighthelper_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(kdebacklighthelper_t) + +# r/w brightness values +dev_rw_sysfs(kdebacklighthelper_t) + +files_read_etc_files(kdebacklighthelper_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(kdebacklighthelper_t) +files_read_usr_files(kdebacklighthelper_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(kdebacklighthelper_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(kdebacklighthelper_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(kdebacklighthelper_t) + +optional_policy(` + consolekit_dbus_chat(kdebacklighthelper_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + policykit_dbus_chat(kdebacklighthelper_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/kdumpgui.te b/policy/modules/apps/kdumpgui.te index 2dde73a..6096f4d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/kdumpgui.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/kdumpgui.te @@ -8,6 +8,10 @@ policy_module(kdumpgui, 1.0.1) type kdumpgui_t; type kdumpgui_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(kdumpgui_t, kdumpgui_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(kdumpgui_t, kdumpgui_exec_t) + +type kdumpgui_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(kdumpgui_tmp_t) ###################################### # @@ -18,6 +22,10 @@ allow kdumpgui_t self:capability { net_admin sys_admin sys_rawio }; allow kdumpgui_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow kdumpgui_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(kdumpgui_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(kdumpgui_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(kdumpgui_t, kdumpgui_tmp_t, { dir file }) + kernel_read_system_state(kdumpgui_t) kernel_read_network_state(kdumpgui_t) @@ -36,6 +44,8 @@ files_manage_etc_runtime_files(kdumpgui_t) files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(kdumpgui_t, file) files_read_usr_files(kdumpgui_t) +fs_read_dos_files(kdumpgui_t) + storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(kdumpgui_t) storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(kdumpgui_t) @@ -45,8 +55,20 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(kdumpgui_t) miscfiles_read_localization(kdumpgui_t) +mount_exec(kdumpgui_t) + init_dontaudit_read_all_script_files(kdumpgui_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(kdumpgui_t) + +optional_policy(` + bootloader_exec(kdumpgui_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(kdumpgui_t) +') + optional_policy(` consoletype_exec(kdumpgui_t) ') @@ -58,6 +80,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` kdump_manage_config(kdumpgui_t) kdump_initrc_domtrans(kdumpgui_t) + kdump_systemctl(kdumpgui_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/livecd.if b/policy/modules/apps/livecd.if index b2e27ec..c324f94 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/livecd.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/livecd.if @@ -37,10 +37,14 @@ interface(`livecd_domtrans',` interface(`livecd_run',` gen_require(` type livecd_t; + type livecd_exec_t; ') livecd_domtrans($1) role $2 types livecd_t; + role_transition $2 livecd_exec_t system_r; + + seutil_run_setfiles_mac(livecd_t, system_r) optional_policy(` mount_run(livecd_t, $2) @@ -49,6 +53,24 @@ interface(`livecd_run',` ######################################## ## +## Dontaudit read/write to a livecd leaks +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`livecd_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type livecd_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 livecd_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read livecd temporary files. ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/livecd.te b/policy/modules/apps/livecd.te index a0be4ef..2c088f5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/livecd.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/livecd.te @@ -20,16 +20,32 @@ files_tmp_file(livecd_tmp_t) dontaudit livecd_t self:capability2 mac_admin; -domain_ptrace_all_domains(livecd_t) +domain_interactive_fd(livecd_t) manage_dirs_pattern(livecd_t, livecd_tmp_t, livecd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(livecd_t, livecd_tmp_t, livecd_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(livecd_t, livecd_tmp_t, { dir file }) +dev_filetrans_all_named_dev(livecd_t) +storage_filetrans_all_named_dev(livecd_t) +term_filetrans_all_named_dev(livecd_t) + +sysnet_filetrans_named_content(livecd_t) + +optional_policy(` + ssh_filetrans_admin_home_content(livecd_t) +') + optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(livecd_t) + unconfined_domain_noaudit(livecd_t) ') optional_policy(` hal_dbus_chat(livecd_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + # Allow SELinux aware applications to request rpm_script execution + rpm_transition_script(livecd_t) + rpm_domtrans(livecd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.fc b/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.fc index 8549f9f..c475618 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.fc @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ /bin/loadkeys -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:loadkeys_exec_t,s0) /bin/unikeys -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:loadkeys_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/loadkeys -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:loadkeys_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/unikeys -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:loadkeys_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.if b/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.if index b55edd0..7b8d952 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.if @@ -17,10 +17,6 @@ interface(`loadkeys_domtrans',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, loadkeys_exec_t, loadkeys_t) - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - dontaudit loadkeys_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; - ') ') ######################################## diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.te b/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.te index 2523758..09669b6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/loadkeys.te @@ -31,6 +31,8 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(loadkeys_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(loadkeys_t) term_use_unallocated_ttys(loadkeys_t) +auth_read_passwd(loadkeys_t) + init_dontaudit_use_fds(loadkeys_t) init_dontaudit_use_script_ptys(loadkeys_t) @@ -38,7 +40,7 @@ locallogin_use_fds(loadkeys_t) miscfiles_read_localization(loadkeys_t) -userdom_use_user_ttys(loadkeys_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_ttys(loadkeys_t) userdom_list_user_home_content(loadkeys_t) ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` @@ -46,5 +48,9 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` ') optional_policy(` + keyboardd_read_pipes(loadkeys_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(loadkeys_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/lockdev.te b/policy/modules/apps/lockdev.te index 0bac996..ca2388d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/lockdev.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/lockdev.te @@ -35,5 +35,5 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(lockdev_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(lockdev_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(lockdev_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(lockdev_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/man2html.fc b/policy/modules/apps/man2html.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2907017 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/man2html.fc @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ +/usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/man2html -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_man2html_script_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/mansec -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_man2html_script_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/man2html/cgi-bin/man/manwhatis -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_man2html_script_exec_t,s0) + +/var/cache/man2html(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_man2html_script_cache_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/man2html.if b/policy/modules/apps/man2html.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..68fddff --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/man2html.if @@ -0,0 +1,133 @@ + +## policy for httpd_man2html_script + +######################################## +## +## Transition to httpd_man2html_script. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`httpd_man2html_script_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, httpd_man2html_script_exec_t, httpd_man2html_script_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search httpd_man2html_script cache directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`httpd_man2html_script_search_cache',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_man2html_script_cache_t; + ') + + allow $1 httpd_man2html_script_cache_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read httpd_man2html_script cache files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`httpd_man2html_script_read_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_man2html_script_cache_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + read_files_pattern($1, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## httpd_man2html_script cache files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`httpd_man2html_script_manage_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_man2html_script_cache_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage httpd_man2html_script cache dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`httpd_man2html_script_manage_cache_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_man2html_script_cache_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an httpd_man2html_script environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`httpd_man2html_script_admin',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_man2html_script_t; + type httpd_man2html_script_cache_t; + ') + + allow $1 httpd_man2html_script_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, httpd_man2html_script_t) + + files_search_var($1) + admin_pattern($1, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t) + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/man2html.te b/policy/modules/apps/man2html.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..863c57c --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/man2html.te @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +policy_module(man2html, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +apache_content_template(man2html) + +type httpd_man2html_script_cache_t; +files_type(httpd_man2html_script_cache_t) + +######################################## +# +# httpd_man2html_script local policy +# + +allow httpd_man2html_script_t self:process { fork }; + + +manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(httpd_man2html_script_t, httpd_man2html_script_cache_t, { dir file }) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(httpd_man2html_script_t) + +files_read_etc_files(httpd_man2html_script_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_man2html_script_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/mono.te b/policy/modules/apps/mono.te index dff0f12..ecab36d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/mono.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/mono.te @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ init_system_domain(mono_t, mono_exec_t) # Local policy # -allow mono_t self:process { ptrace signal getsched execheap execmem execstack }; +allow mono_t self:process { signal getsched execheap execmem execstack }; init_dbus_chat_script(mono_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.fc b/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.fc index 93ac529..6e03a8c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.fc @@ -1,8 +1,16 @@ HOME_DIR/\.galeon(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.java(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.mozilla(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.thunderbird(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.netscape(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.phoenix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.adobe(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.macromedia(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gnash(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.spicec(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.ICAClient(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) # # /bin @@ -14,16 +22,28 @@ HOME_DIR/\.phoenix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_home_t,s0) /usr/bin/epiphany -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/mozilla-[0-9].* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/mozilla-bin-[0-9].* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` +/usr/bin/nspluginscan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nspluginviewer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/npviewer.bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_plugin_exec_t,s0) +') # # /lib # -/usr/lib(64)?/galeon/galeon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/netscape/.+/communicator/communicator-smotif\.real -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/netscape/base-4/wrapper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/mozilla[^/]*/reg.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/mozilla[^/]*/mozilla-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/firefox[^/]*/mozilla-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox-bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/galeon/galeon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/netscape/.+/communicator/communicator-smotif\.real -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/netscape/base-4/wrapper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mozilla[^/]*/reg.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mozilla[^/]*/mozilla-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/firefox[^/]*/mozilla-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox-bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/plugin-container -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_plugin_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/mozilla/plugins-wrapped(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_plugin_rw_t,s0) + +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` +/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/plugin-config -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t,s0) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.if b/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.if index fbb5c5a..ce9aee0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.if @@ -29,6 +29,8 @@ interface(`mozilla_role',` allow mozilla_t $2:process { sigchld signull }; allow mozilla_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; + mozilla_run_plugin(mozilla_t, $1) + # Allow the user domain to signal/ps. ps_process_pattern($2, mozilla_t) allow $2 mozilla_t:process signal_perms; @@ -49,9 +51,19 @@ interface(`mozilla_role',` mozilla_run_plugin(mozilla_t, $1) mozilla_dbus_chat($2) + userdom_manage_tmp_role($1, mozilla_t) + + optional_policy(` + nsplugin_role($1, mozilla_t) + ') + optional_policy(` pulseaudio_role($1, mozilla_t) + pulseaudio_filetrans_admin_home_content(mozilla_t) + pulseaudio_filetrans_home_content(mozilla_t) ') + + mozilla_filetrans_home_content($2) ') ######################################## @@ -109,7 +121,7 @@ interface(`mozilla_dontaudit_rw_user_home_files',` type mozilla_home_t; ') - dontaudit $1 mozilla_home_t:file rw_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 mozilla_home_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -197,12 +209,35 @@ interface(`mozilla_domtrans',` # interface(`mozilla_domtrans_plugin',` gen_require(` - type mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_exec_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t; + type mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_exec_t; + type mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t; + type mozilla_plugin_rw_t; class dbus send_msg; ') domtrans_pattern($1, mozilla_plugin_exec_t, mozilla_plugin_t) + domtrans_pattern($1, mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t, mozilla_plugin_config_t) allow mozilla_plugin_t $1:process signull; + allow $1 mozilla_plugin_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms }; + allow $1 mozilla_plugin_t:fd use; + + allow mozilla_plugin_t $1:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; + allow mozilla_plugin_t $1:unix_dgram_socket { sendto rw_socket_perms }; + allow mozilla_plugin_t $1:shm { rw_shm_perms destroy }; + allow mozilla_plugin_t $1:sem create_sem_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, mozilla_plugin_t) + allow $1 mozilla_plugin_t:process signal_perms; + + list_dirs_pattern($1, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) + read_files_pattern($1, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) + can_exec($1, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) + + allow $1 mozilla_plugin_t:dbus send_msg; + allow mozilla_plugin_t $1:dbus send_msg; + + #mozilla_filetrans_home_content($1) ') ######################################## @@ -228,6 +263,35 @@ interface(`mozilla_run_plugin',` mozilla_domtrans_plugin($1) role $2 types mozilla_plugin_t; + role $2 types mozilla_plugin_config_t; + + optional_policy(` + lpd_run_lpr(mozilla_plugin_t, $2) + ') +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute qemu unconfined programs in the role. +## +## +## +## The role to allow the mozilla_plugin domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`mozilla_role_plugin',` + gen_require(` + type mozilla_plugin_t; + ') + + role $1 types mozilla_plugin_t; + role $1 types mozilla_plugin_config_t; + + optional_policy(` + lpd_run_lpr(mozilla_plugin_t, $1) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -269,9 +333,27 @@ interface(`mozilla_rw_tcp_sockets',` allow $1 mozilla_t:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms; ') +####################################### +## +## Read mozilla_plugin tmpfs files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`mozilla_plugin_read_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms; +') + ######################################## ## -## Read mozilla_plugin tmpfs files +## Delete mozilla_plugin tmpfs files ## ## ## @@ -279,28 +361,98 @@ interface(`mozilla_rw_tcp_sockets',` ## ## # -interface(`mozilla_plugin_read_tmpfs_files',` +interface(`mozilla_plugin_delete_tmpfs_files',` gen_require(` type mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t; ') - allow $1 mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t:file delete_file_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## Delete mozilla_plugin tmpfs files +## Dontaudit read/write to a mozilla_plugin leaks ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # -interface(`mozilla_plugin_delete_tmpfs_files',` +interface(`mozilla_plugin_dontaudit_leaks',` gen_require(` - type mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t; + type mozilla_plugin_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 mozilla_plugin_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; +') + +####################################### +## +## Dontaudit read/write to a mozilla_plugin tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`mozilla_plugin_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type mozilla_plugin_tmp_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 mozilla_plugin_tmp_t:file { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## mozilla_plugin rw files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mozilla_plugin_manage_rw_files',` + gen_require(` + type mozilla_plugin_rw_t; + ') + + allow $1 mozilla_plugin_rw_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1 mozilla_plugin_rw_t:dir rw_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create mozilla content in the user home directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mozilla_filetrans_home_content',` + + gen_require(` + type mozilla_home_t; ') - allow $1 mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t:file unlink; + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".galeon") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".java") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".mozilla") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".thunderbird") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".netscape") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".phoenix") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".adobe") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".macromedia") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".gnash") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".gcjwebplugin") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".icedteaplugin") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mozilla_home_t, dir, ".spicec") ') + diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.te b/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.te index 2e9318b..c5f9431 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/mozilla.te @@ -12,6 +12,13 @@ policy_module(mozilla, 2.3.3) ## gen_tunable(mozilla_read_content, false) +## +##

+## Allow mozilla_plugins to create random content in the users home directory +##

+## +gen_tunable(mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs, false) + type mozilla_t; type mozilla_exec_t; typealias mozilla_t alias { user_mozilla_t staff_mozilla_t sysadm_mozilla_t }; @@ -25,6 +32,7 @@ files_config_file(mozilla_conf_t) type mozilla_home_t; typealias mozilla_home_t alias { user_mozilla_home_t staff_mozilla_home_t sysadm_mozilla_home_t }; typealias mozilla_home_t alias { auditadm_mozilla_home_t secadm_mozilla_home_t }; +files_poly_member(mozilla_home_t) userdom_user_home_content(mozilla_home_t) type mozilla_plugin_t; @@ -33,13 +41,22 @@ application_domain(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_exec_t) role system_r types mozilla_plugin_t; type mozilla_plugin_tmp_t; +userdom_user_tmp_content(mozilla_plugin_tmp_t) files_tmp_file(mozilla_plugin_tmp_t) ubac_constrained(mozilla_plugin_tmp_t) type mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t; +userdom_user_tmpfs_content(mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t) files_tmpfs_file(mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t) ubac_constrained(mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t) +type mozilla_plugin_rw_t; +files_type(mozilla_plugin_rw_t) + +type mozilla_plugin_config_t; +type mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t; +application_domain(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t) + type mozilla_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(mozilla_tmp_t) ubac_constrained(mozilla_tmp_t) @@ -111,7 +128,9 @@ corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(mozilla_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(mozilla_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(mozilla_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_squid_port(mozilla_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_flash_port(mozilla_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ftp_port(mozilla_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(mozilla_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ipp_port(mozilla_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(mozilla_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(mozilla_t) @@ -156,6 +175,8 @@ fs_rw_tmpfs_files(mozilla_t) term_dontaudit_getattr_pty_dirs(mozilla_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(mozilla_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(mozilla_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(mozilla_t) @@ -165,27 +186,21 @@ miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_dirs(mozilla_t) # Browse the web, connect to printer sysnet_dns_name_resolve(mozilla_t) -userdom_use_user_ptys(mozilla_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(mozilla_t) xserver_user_x_domain_template(mozilla, mozilla_t, mozilla_tmpfs_t) xserver_dontaudit_read_xdm_tmp_files(mozilla_t) xserver_dontaudit_getattr_xdm_tmp_sockets(mozilla_t) -tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',` - allow mozilla_t self:process { execmem execstack }; +tunable_policy(`allow_execstack',` + allow mozilla_t self:process execstack; ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(mozilla_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(mozilla_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(mozilla_t) +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` + allow mozilla_t self:process execmem; ') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(mozilla_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(mozilla_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(mozilla_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(mozilla_t) # Uploads, local html tunable_policy(`mozilla_read_content && use_nfs_home_dirs',` @@ -262,6 +277,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` gnome_stream_connect_gconf(mozilla_t) gnome_manage_config(mozilla_t) + gnome_manage_gconf_home_files(mozilla_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -278,10 +294,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(mozilla_t) -') - -optional_policy(` pulseaudio_exec(mozilla_t) pulseaudio_stream_connect(mozilla_t) pulseaudio_manage_home_files(mozilla_t) @@ -296,25 +308,34 @@ optional_policy(` # mozilla_plugin local policy # -dontaudit mozilla_plugin_t self:capability { sys_ptrace }; -allow mozilla_plugin_t self:process { setsched signal_perms execmem }; -allow mozilla_plugin_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; -allow mozilla_plugin_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; +dontaudit mozilla_plugin_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_tty_config }; + +allow mozilla_plugin_t self:process { setpgid getsched setsched signal_perms execmem execstack setrlimit }; +allow mozilla_plugin_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; allow mozilla_plugin_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow mozilla_plugin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; -allow mozilla_plugin_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; allow mozilla_plugin_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; + allow mozilla_plugin_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow mozilla_plugin_t self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow mozilla_plugin_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow mozilla_plugin_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +allow mozilla_plugin_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; can_exec(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_home_t) -read_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_home_t, mozilla_home_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_home_t, mozilla_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_home_t, mozilla_home_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_home_t, mozilla_home_t) +mozilla_filetrans_home_content(mozilla_plugin_t) manage_dirs_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file }) -userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file }) +manage_sock_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file sock_file }) +userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file sock_file }) +xserver_xdm_tmp_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file fifo_file sock_file }) +can_exec(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t) @@ -322,6 +343,10 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, mozilla_plug manage_sock_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t) fs_tmpfs_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_tmpfs_t, { file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) +allow mozilla_plugin_t mozilla_plugin_rw_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_lnk_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) +read_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) + can_exec(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_exec_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mozilla_plugin_t) @@ -331,22 +356,31 @@ kernel_request_load_module(mozilla_plugin_t) corecmd_exec_bin(mozilla_plugin_t) corecmd_exec_shell(mozilla_plugin_t) +corecmd_dontaudit_access_all_executables(mozilla_plugin_t) -corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(mozilla_plugin_t) -corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(mozilla_plugin_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(mozilla_plugin_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(mozilla_plugin_t) corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(mozilla_plugin_t) -corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_flash_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(mozilla_plugin_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(mozilla_plugin_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(mozilla_plugin_t) -corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(mozilla_plugin_t) corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_jabber_client_port(mozilla_plugin_t) corenet_tcp_connect_mmcc_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(mozilla_plugin_t) corenet_tcp_connect_speech_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_streaming_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_vnc_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_couchdb_port(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(mozilla_plugin_t) +corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_ssdp_port(mozilla_plugin_t) dev_read_rand(mozilla_plugin_t) dev_read_urand(mozilla_plugin_t) +dev_read_generic_usb_dev(mozilla_plugin_t) dev_read_video_dev(mozilla_plugin_t) dev_write_video_dev(mozilla_plugin_t) dev_read_sysfs(mozilla_plugin_t) @@ -355,6 +389,7 @@ dev_write_sound(mozilla_plugin_t) # for nvidia driver dev_rw_xserver_misc(mozilla_plugin_t) dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(mozilla_plugin_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(mozilla_plugin_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(mozilla_plugin_t) domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(mozilla_plugin_t) @@ -362,11 +397,14 @@ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(mozilla_plugin_t) files_read_config_files(mozilla_plugin_t) files_read_usr_files(mozilla_plugin_t) files_list_mnt(mozilla_plugin_t) +files_exec_usr_files(mozilla_plugin_t) +fs_dontaudit_read_tmpfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(mozilla_plugin_t) fs_list_dos(mozilla_plugin_t) fs_read_dos_files(mozilla_plugin_t) +application_exec(mozilla_plugin_t) application_dontaudit_signull(mozilla_plugin_t) auth_use_nsswitch(mozilla_plugin_t) @@ -383,35 +421,26 @@ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(mozilla_plugin_t) term_getattr_all_ttys(mozilla_plugin_t) term_getattr_all_ptys(mozilla_plugin_t) +term_getattr_ptmx(mozilla_plugin_t) userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t) +userdom_delete_user_tmpfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mozilla_plugin_t) userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(mozilla_plugin_t) userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(mozilla_plugin_t) -userdom_read_user_tmp_files(mozilla_plugin_t) +userdom_rw_inherited_user_tmp_files(mozilla_plugin_t) +userdom_rw_inherited_user_home_sock_files(mozilla_plugin_t) +userdom_manage_home_certs(mozilla_plugin_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks(mozilla_plugin_t) +userdom_stream_connect(mozilla_plugin_t) +userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes(mozilla_plugin_t) + userdom_read_user_home_content_files(mozilla_plugin_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(mozilla_plugin_t) +userdom_read_home_certs(mozilla_plugin_t) +userdom_read_home_audio_files(mozilla_plugin_t) -tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',` - allow mozilla_plugin_t self:process { execmem execstack }; -') - -tunable_policy(`allow_execstack',` - allow mozilla_plugin_t self:process { execstack }; -') - -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(mozilla_plugin_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(mozilla_plugin_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(mozilla_plugin_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(mozilla_plugin_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(mozilla_plugin_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(mozilla_plugin_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(mozilla_plugin_t) optional_policy(` alsa_read_rw_config(mozilla_plugin_t) @@ -421,11 +450,19 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(mozilla_plugin_t) dbus_session_bus_client(mozilla_plugin_t) + dbus_connect_session_bus(mozilla_plugin_t) dbus_read_lib_files(mozilla_plugin_t) ') optional_policy(` + git_dontaudit_read_session_content_files(mozilla_plugin_t) +') + + +optional_policy(` gnome_manage_config(mozilla_plugin_t) + gnome_read_usr_config(mozilla_plugin_t) + gnome_filetrans_home_content(mozilla_plugin_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -438,18 +475,103 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - pcscd_stream_connect(mozilla_plugin_t) -') - -optional_policy(` pulseaudio_exec(mozilla_plugin_t) pulseaudio_stream_connect(mozilla_plugin_t) pulseaudio_setattr_home_dir(mozilla_plugin_t) pulseaudio_manage_home_files(mozilla_plugin_t) + pulseaudio_manage_home_symlinks(mozilla_plugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + pcscd_stream_connect(mozilla_plugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rtkit_scheduled(mozilla_plugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + udev_read_db(mozilla_plugin_t) ') optional_policy(` xserver_read_xdm_pid(mozilla_plugin_t) xserver_stream_connect(mozilla_plugin_t) xserver_use_user_fonts(mozilla_plugin_t) + xserver_read_user_iceauth(mozilla_plugin_t) + xserver_read_user_xauth(mozilla_plugin_t) + xserver_append_xdm_home_files(mozilla_plugin_t); ') + +######################################## +# +# mozilla_plugin_config local policy +# + +allow mozilla_plugin_config_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search sys_nice setuid setgid }; +allow mozilla_plugin_config_t self:process { setsched signal_perms getsched execmem execstack }; + +allow mozilla_plugin_config_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow mozilla_plugin_config_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +dev_search_sysfs(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +dev_read_urand(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +dev_dontaudit_read_rand(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(mozilla_plugin_config_t) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +fs_list_inotifyfs(mozilla_plugin_config_t) + +can_exec(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) +manage_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t, mozilla_plugin_rw_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_home_t, mozilla_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_home_t, mozilla_home_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_home_t, mozilla_home_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(mozilla_plugin_config_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +kernel_request_load_module(mozilla_plugin_config_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(mozilla_plugin_config_t) + +files_read_etc_files(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +files_read_usr_files(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +files_dontaudit_search_home(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +files_list_tmp(mozilla_plugin_config_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(mozilla_plugin_config_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +miscfiles_read_fonts(mozilla_plugin_config_t) + +userdom_search_user_home_content(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mozilla_plugin_config_t) + +domtrans_pattern(mozilla_plugin_config_t, mozilla_plugin_exec_t, mozilla_plugin_t) + +optional_policy(` + xserver_use_user_fonts(mozilla_plugin_config_t) +') +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + typealias mozilla_plugin_t alias nsplugin_t; + typealias mozilla_plugin_exec_t alias nsplugin_exec_t; + typealias mozilla_plugin_rw_t alias nsplugin_rw_t; + typealias mozilla_plugin_tmp_t alias nsplugin_tmp_t; + typealias mozilla_home_t alias nsplugin_home_t; + typealias mozilla_plugin_config_t alias nsplugin_config_t; + typealias mozilla_plugin_config_exec_t alias nsplugin_config_exec_t; +') + +tunable_policy(`mozilla_plugin_enable_homedirs',` + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(mozilla_plugin_t, mozilla_home_t, { dir file }) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/mplayer.if b/policy/modules/apps/mplayer.if index d8ea41d..8bdc526 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/mplayer.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/mplayer.if @@ -102,3 +102,39 @@ interface(`mplayer_read_user_home_files',` read_files_pattern($1, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) ') + +######################################## +## +## Execute mplayer_exec_t +## in the specified domain. +## +## +##

+## Execute a mplayer_exec_t +## in the specified domain. +##

+##

+## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

+## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +## +# +interface(`mplayer_exec_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type mplayer_exec_t; + ') + + allow $2 mplayer_exec_t:file entrypoint; + domtrans_pattern($1, mplayer_exec_t, $2) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/mplayer.te b/policy/modules/apps/mplayer.te index 072a210..320963b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/mplayer.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/mplayer.te @@ -32,6 +32,7 @@ files_config_file(mplayer_etc_t) type mplayer_home_t; typealias mplayer_home_t alias { user_mplayer_home_t staff_mplayer_home_t sysadm_mplayer_home_t }; typealias mplayer_home_t alias { auditadm_mplayer_home_t secadm_mplayer_home_t }; +files_poly_member(mplayer_home_t) userdom_user_home_content(mplayer_home_t) type mplayer_tmpfs_t; @@ -76,13 +77,14 @@ storage_raw_read_removable_device(mencoder_t) miscfiles_read_localization(mencoder_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(mencoder_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(mencoder_t) # Handle removable media, /tmp, and /home userdom_list_user_tmp(mencoder_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_files(mencoder_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks(mencoder_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(mencoder_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(mencoder_t) +userdom_home_manager(mencoder_t) # Read content to encode ifndef(`enable_mls',` @@ -91,7 +93,7 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',` fs_read_removable_symlinks(mencoder_t) ') -tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',` +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` allow mencoder_t self:process execmem; ') @@ -103,46 +105,6 @@ tunable_policy(`allow_mplayer_execstack',` allow mencoder_t self:process { execmem execstack }; ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(mencoder_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(mencoder_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(mencoder_t) - -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(mencoder_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(mencoder_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(mencoder_t) - -') - -# Read content to encode -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_list_auto_mountpoints(mencoder_t) - files_list_home(mencoder_t) - fs_read_nfs_files(mencoder_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(mencoder_t) - -',` - files_dontaudit_list_home(mencoder_t) - fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints(mencoder_t) - fs_dontaudit_read_nfs_files(mencoder_t) - fs_dontaudit_list_nfs(mencoder_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_list_auto_mountpoints(mencoder_t) - files_list_home(mencoder_t) - fs_read_cifs_files(mencoder_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(mencoder_t) -',` - files_dontaudit_list_home(mencoder_t) - fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints(mencoder_t) - fs_dontaudit_read_cifs_files(mencoder_t) - fs_dontaudit_list_cifs(mencoder_t) -') - ######################################## # # mplayer local policy @@ -159,6 +121,7 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t) manage_files_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_home_t, mplayer_home_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(mplayer_t, mplayer_home_t, dir) +userdom_search_user_home_dirs(mplayer_t) manage_files_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(mplayer_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t) @@ -225,10 +188,14 @@ fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs(mplayer_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(mplayer_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(mplayer_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(mplayer_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(mplayer_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(mplayer_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(mplayer_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(mplayer_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(mplayer_t) # Read media files userdom_list_user_tmp(mplayer_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_files(mplayer_t) @@ -236,6 +203,7 @@ userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks(mplayer_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(mplayer_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(mplayer_t) userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(mplayer_t) +userdom_home_manager(mplayer_t) xserver_user_x_domain_template(mplayer, mplayer_t, mplayer_tmpfs_t) @@ -246,7 +214,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',`',` fs_read_removable_symlinks(mplayer_t) ') -tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',` +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` allow mplayer_t self:process execmem; ') @@ -258,54 +226,19 @@ tunable_policy(`allow_mplayer_execstack',` allow mplayer_t self:process { execmem execstack }; ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(mplayer_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(mplayer_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(mplayer_t) -') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(mplayer_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(mplayer_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(mplayer_t) -') - # Legacy domain issues tunable_policy(`allow_mplayer_execstack',` allow mplayer_t mplayer_tmpfs_t:file execute; ') -# Read songs -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_list_auto_mountpoints(mplayer_t) - files_list_home(mplayer_t) - fs_read_nfs_files(mplayer_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(mplayer_t) - -',` - files_dontaudit_list_home(mplayer_t) - fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints(mplayer_t) - fs_dontaudit_read_nfs_files(mplayer_t) - fs_dontaudit_list_nfs(mplayer_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_list_auto_mountpoints(mplayer_t) - files_list_home(mplayer_t) - fs_read_cifs_files(mplayer_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(mplayer_t) -',` - files_dontaudit_list_home(mplayer_t) - fs_dontaudit_list_auto_mountpoints(mplayer_t) - fs_dontaudit_read_cifs_files(mplayer_t) - fs_dontaudit_list_cifs(mplayer_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(mplayer_t) optional_policy(` alsa_read_rw_config(mplayer_t) ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(mplayer_t) + gnome_setattr_config_dirs(mplayer_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/namespace.fc b/policy/modules/apps/namespace.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ce51c8d --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/namespace.fc @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + +/etc/security/namespace.init -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:namespace_init_exec_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/namespace.if b/policy/modules/apps/namespace.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d7c751 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/namespace.if @@ -0,0 +1,48 @@ + +## policy for namespace + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run namespace_init. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`namespace_init_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type namespace_init_t, namespace_init_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, namespace_init_exec_t, namespace_init_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute namespace_init in the namespace_init domain, and +## allow the specified role the namespace_init domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the namespace_init domain. +## +## +# +interface(`namespace_init_run',` + gen_require(` + type namespace_init_t; + ') + + namespace_init_domtrans($1) + role $2 types namespace_init_t; + + seutil_run_setfiles(namespace_init_t, $2) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/namespace.te b/policy/modules/apps/namespace.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2f7149c --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/namespace.te @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +policy_module(namespace,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type namespace_init_t; +type namespace_init_exec_t; +init_system_domain(namespace_init_t, namespace_init_exec_t) +role system_r types namespace_init_t; + +######################################## +# +# namespace_init local policy +# + +allow namespace_init_t self:capability dac_override; + +allow namespace_init_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow namespace_init_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(namespace_init_t) + +corecmd_exec_shell(namespace_init_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(namespace_init_t) +domain_obj_id_change_exemption(namespace_init_t) + +files_read_etc_files(namespace_init_t) +files_polyinstantiate_all(namespace_init_t) + +mcs_file_write_all(namespace_init_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(namespace_init_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(namespace_init_t) + +term_use_console(namespace_init_t) + +userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(namespace_init_t) +userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(namespace_init_t) +userdom_relabelto_user_home_dirs(namespace_init_t) +userdom_relabelto_user_home_files(namespace_init_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(namespace_init_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file }) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/nsplugin.fc b/policy/modules/apps/nsplugin.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..22e6c96 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/nsplugin.fc @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +HOME_DIR/\.adobe(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.macromedia(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gnash(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gcjwebplugin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.icedteaplugin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_home_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/nspluginscan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nspluginviewer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/npviewer.bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/plugin-config -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_config_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mozilla/plugins-wrapped(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsplugin_rw_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/nsplugin.if b/policy/modules/apps/nsplugin.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fce899a --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/nsplugin.if @@ -0,0 +1,472 @@ + +## policy for nsplugin + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## nsplugin rw files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_manage_rw_files',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_rw_t; + ') + + allow $1 nsplugin_rw_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1 nsplugin_rw_t:dir rw_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage nsplugin rw files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_manage_rw',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_rw_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## The per role template for the nsplugin module. +## +## +## +## The role associated with the user domain. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the user domain. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_role_notrans',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_rw_t; + type nsplugin_home_t; + type nsplugin_exec_t; + type nsplugin_config_exec_t; + type nsplugin_t; + type nsplugin_config_t; + class x_drawable all_x_drawable_perms; + class x_resource all_x_resource_perms; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + role $1 types nsplugin_t; + role $1 types nsplugin_config_t; + + allow nsplugin_t $2:process signull; + allow nsplugin_t $2:dbus send_msg; + allow $2 nsplugin_t:dbus send_msg; + + list_dirs_pattern($2, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) + read_files_pattern($2, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($2, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) + can_exec($2, nsplugin_rw_t) + + #Leaked File Descriptors +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` + dontaudit nsplugin_t $2:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + dontaudit nsplugin_config_t $2:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') + allow nsplugin_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; + dontaudit nsplugin_t $2:process ptrace; + allow nsplugin_t $2:sem rw_sem_perms; + allow nsplugin_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms; + dontaudit nsplugin_t $2:shm destroy; + allow $2 nsplugin_t:sem rw_sem_perms; + + allow $2 nsplugin_t:process { getattr signal_perms }; + allow $2 nsplugin_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + + # Connect to pulseaudit server + stream_connect_pattern(nsplugin_t, user_home_t, user_home_t, $2) + gnome_stream_connect(nsplugin_t, $2) + + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(nsplugin_t) + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(nsplugin_config_t) + userdom_dontaudit_setattr_user_home_content_files(nsplugin_t) + userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($1, nsplugin_t) + + optional_policy(` + pulseaudio_role($1, nsplugin_t) + ') +') + +####################################### +## +## Role access for nsplugin +## +## +## +## The role associated with the user domain. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the user domain. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_role',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_exec_t; + type nsplugin_config_exec_t; + type nsplugin_t; + type nsplugin_config_t; + ') + + nsplugin_role_notrans($1, $2) + + domtrans_pattern($2, nsplugin_exec_t, nsplugin_t) + domtrans_pattern($2, nsplugin_config_exec_t, nsplugin_config_t) + +') + +####################################### +## +## The per role template for the nsplugin module. +## +## +## +## The type of the user domain. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_exec_t; + type nsplugin_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, nsplugin_exec_t, nsplugin_t) + allow $1 nsplugin_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow nsplugin_t $1:process signal; +') + +####################################### +## +## The per role template for the nsplugin module. +## +## +## +## The type of the user domain. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_domtrans_config',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_config_exec_t; + type nsplugin_config_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, nsplugin_config_exec_t, nsplugin_config_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search nsplugin rw directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_search_rw_dir',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_rw_t; + ') + + allow $1 nsplugin_rw_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read nsplugin rw files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_read_rw_files',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_rw_t; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) + read_files_pattern($1, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read nsplugin home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_read_home',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_home_t; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) + read_files_pattern($1, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Exec nsplugin rw files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_rw_exec',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_rw_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, nsplugin_rw_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## nsplugin home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_manage_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_home_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## manage nnsplugin home dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_manage_home_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_home_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow attempts to read and write to +## nsplugin named pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_rw_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 nsplugin_home_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write to nsplugin shared memory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_rw_shm',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_t; + ') + + allow $1 nsplugin_t:shm rw_shm_perms; +') + +##################################### +## +## Allow read and write access to nsplugin semaphores. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_rw_semaphores',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_t; + ') + + allow $1 nsplugin_t:sem rw_sem_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute nsplugin_exec_t +## in the specified domain. +## +## +##

+## Execute a nsplugin_exec_t +## in the specified domain. +##

+##

+## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

+## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_exec_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_exec_t; + ') + + allow $2 nsplugin_exec_t:file entrypoint; + domtrans_pattern($1, nsplugin_exec_t, $2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send generic signals to user nsplugin processes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_signal',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_t; + ') + + allow $1 nsplugin_t:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in a user home directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## the nsplugin home file type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_user_home_dir_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, nsplugin_home_t, $2) +') + +####################################### +## +## Create objects in a user home directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## the nsplugin home file type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_user_home_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_content_filetrans($1, nsplugin_home_t, $2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send signull signal to nsplugin +## processes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nsplugin_signull',` + gen_require(` + type nsplugin_t; + ') + + allow $1 nsplugin_t:process signull; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/nsplugin.te b/policy/modules/apps/nsplugin.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..eeb5955 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/nsplugin.te @@ -0,0 +1,328 @@ +policy_module(nsplugin, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +## +##

+## Allow nsplugin code to execmem/execstack +##

+## +gen_tunable(allow_nsplugin_execmem, false) + +## +##

+## Allow nsplugin code to connect to unreserved ports +##

+## +gen_tunable(nsplugin_can_network, true) + +type nsplugin_exec_t; +application_executable_file(nsplugin_exec_t) + +type nsplugin_config_exec_t; +application_executable_file(nsplugin_config_exec_t) + +type nsplugin_rw_t; +files_poly_member(nsplugin_rw_t) +files_type(nsplugin_rw_t) + +type nsplugin_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(nsplugin_tmp_t) + +type nsplugin_home_t; +files_poly_member(nsplugin_home_t) +userdom_user_home_content(nsplugin_home_t) +typealias nsplugin_home_t alias user_nsplugin_home_t; + +type nsplugin_t; +application_domain(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_exec_t) + +type nsplugin_config_t; +domain_type(nsplugin_config_t) +domain_entry_file(nsplugin_config_t, nsplugin_config_exec_t) + +application_executable_file(nsplugin_exec_t) +application_executable_file(nsplugin_config_exec_t) + + +######################################## +# +# nsplugin local policy +# +dontaudit nsplugin_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_tty_config }; +allow nsplugin_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow nsplugin_t self:process { setpgid getsched setsched signal_perms }; + +allow nsplugin_t self:sem create_sem_perms; +allow nsplugin_t self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow nsplugin_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; +allow nsplugin_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +allow nsplugin_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; +allow nsplugin_t self:unix_dgram_socket { sendto create_socket_perms }; +allow nsplugin_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow nsplugin_t nsplugin_rw_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_lnk_files_pattern(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) +read_files_pattern(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) + +tunable_policy(`allow_nsplugin_execmem',` + allow nsplugin_t self:process { execstack execmem }; + allow nsplugin_config_t self:process { execstack execmem }; +') + +tunable_policy(`nsplugin_can_network',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_unreserved_ports(nsplugin_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(nsplugin_t) +') + +manage_dirs_pattern(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +exec_files_pattern(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_home_t, {file dir}) +userdom_user_home_content_filetrans(nsplugin_t, nsplugin_home_t, {file dir}) +userdom_dontaudit_getattr_user_home_content(nsplugin_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_user_bin_dirs(nsplugin_t) +userdom_dontaudit_write_user_home_content_files(nsplugin_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(nsplugin_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(nsplugin_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(nsplugin_t) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(nsplugin_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_flash_port(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_streaming_port(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(nsplugin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_speech_port(nsplugin_t) + +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(nsplugin_t) + +dev_read_urand(nsplugin_t) +dev_read_rand(nsplugin_t) +dev_read_sound(nsplugin_t) +dev_write_sound(nsplugin_t) +dev_read_video_dev(nsplugin_t) +dev_write_video_dev(nsplugin_t) +dev_getattr_dri_dev(nsplugin_t) +dev_getattr_mouse_dev(nsplugin_t) +dev_rwx_zero(nsplugin_t) +dev_read_sysfs(nsplugin_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(nsplugin_t) + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nsplugin_t) +kernel_read_system_state(nsplugin_t) +kernel_read_network_state(nsplugin_t) + +files_dontaudit_getattr_lost_found_dirs(nsplugin_t) +files_dontaudit_list_home(nsplugin_t) +files_read_etc_files(nsplugin_t) +files_read_usr_files(nsplugin_t) +files_read_config_files(nsplugin_t) + +fs_getattr_tmpfs(nsplugin_t) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(nsplugin_t) +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nsplugin_t) +fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(nsplugin_t) +fs_list_inotifyfs(nsplugin_t) +fs_dontaudit_list_fusefs(nsplugin_t) + +storage_dontaudit_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(nsplugin_t) +storage_dontaudit_getattr_removable_dev(nsplugin_t) + +term_dontaudit_getattr_all_ptys(nsplugin_t) +term_dontaudit_getattr_all_ttys(nsplugin_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(nsplugin_t) + +libs_exec_ld_so(nsplugin_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(nsplugin_t) +miscfiles_read_fonts(nsplugin_t) +miscfiles_dontaudit_write_fonts(nsplugin_t) +miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(nsplugin_t) + +userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(nsplugin_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(nsplugin_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(nsplugin_t) +userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp(nsplugin_t, { file dir sock_file }) +userdom_rw_semaphores(nsplugin_t) +userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes(nsplugin_t) + +userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(nsplugin_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(nsplugin_t) +userdom_read_user_tmp_files(nsplugin_t) +userdom_write_user_tmp_sockets(nsplugin_t) +userdom_dontaudit_append_user_home_content_files(nsplugin_t) +userdom_read_home_audio_files(nsplugin_t) + +optional_policy(` + alsa_read_rw_config(nsplugin_t) + alsa_read_home_files(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + chrome_dontaudit_sandbox_leaks(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + cups_stream_connect(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_session_bus_client(nsplugin_t) + dbus_connect_session_bus(nsplugin_t) + dbus_system_bus_client(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_exec_gconf(nsplugin_t) + gnome_manage_config(nsplugin_t) + gnome_read_gconf_home_files(nsplugin_t) + gnome_read_usr_config(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gpm_getattr_gpmctl(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_exec_user_home_files(nsplugin_t) + mozilla_read_user_home_files(nsplugin_t) + mozilla_write_user_home_files(nsplugin_t) + mozilla_plugin_delete_tmpfs_files(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mplayer_exec(nsplugin_t) + mplayer_read_user_home_files(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sandbox_read_tmpfs_files(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gen_require(` + type user_tmpfs_t; + ') + xserver_user_x_domain_template(nsplugin, nsplugin_t, user_tmpfs_t) + xserver_rw_shm(nsplugin_t) + xserver_read_xdm_pid(nsplugin_t) + xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files(nsplugin_t) + xserver_read_user_xauth(nsplugin_t) + xserver_read_user_iceauth(nsplugin_t) + xserver_use_user_fonts(nsplugin_t) + xserver_rw_inherited_user_fonts(nsplugin_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# nsplugin_config local policy +# + +allow nsplugin_config_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search sys_nice setuid setgid }; +allow nsplugin_config_t self:process { setsched signal_perms getsched execmem }; +#execing pulseaudio +dontaudit nsplugin_t self:process { getcap setcap }; + +allow nsplugin_config_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow nsplugin_config_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +dev_search_sysfs(nsplugin_config_t) +dev_read_urand(nsplugin_config_t) +dev_dontaudit_read_rand(nsplugin_config_t) +dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(nsplugin_config_t) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nsplugin_config_t) +fs_list_inotifyfs(nsplugin_config_t) + +can_exec(nsplugin_config_t, nsplugin_rw_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(nsplugin_config_t, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) +manage_files_pattern(nsplugin_config_t, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(nsplugin_config_t, nsplugin_rw_t, nsplugin_rw_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(nsplugin_config_t, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(nsplugin_config_t, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(nsplugin_config_t, nsplugin_home_t, nsplugin_home_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(nsplugin_config_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(nsplugin_config_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(nsplugin_config_t) +kernel_request_load_module(nsplugin_config_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(nsplugin_config_t) + +files_read_etc_files(nsplugin_config_t) +files_read_usr_files(nsplugin_config_t) +files_dontaudit_search_home(nsplugin_config_t) +files_list_tmp(nsplugin_config_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(nsplugin_config_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(nsplugin_config_t) +miscfiles_read_fonts(nsplugin_config_t) + +userdom_search_user_home_content(nsplugin_config_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(nsplugin_config_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(nsplugin_config_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(nsplugin_config_t) + +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_getattr_nfs(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_nfs_named_pipes(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(nsplugin_config_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(nsplugin_config_t) + fs_manage_nfs_named_pipes(nsplugin_config_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(nsplugin_config_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_getattr_cifs(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_cifs_named_pipes(nsplugin_t) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(nsplugin_config_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(nsplugin_config_t) + fs_manage_cifs_named_pipes(nsplugin_config_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(nsplugin_config_t) +') + +domtrans_pattern(nsplugin_config_t, nsplugin_exec_t, nsplugin_t) + +optional_policy(` + xserver_use_user_fonts(nsplugin_config_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_read_user_home_files(nsplugin_config_t) + mozilla_write_user_home_files(nsplugin_config_t) +') + +application_signull(nsplugin_t) + +optional_policy(` + devicekit_dbus_chat_power(nsplugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + pulseaudio_exec(nsplugin_t) + pulseaudio_stream_connect(nsplugin_t) + pulseaudio_manage_home_files(nsplugin_t) + pulseaudio_setattr_home_dir(nsplugin_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/podsleuth.te b/policy/modules/apps/podsleuth.te index ccc15ab..9f88c3a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/podsleuth.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/podsleuth.te @@ -27,7 +27,8 @@ ubac_constrained(podsleuth_tmpfs_t) # podsleuth local policy # allow podsleuth_t self:capability { kill dac_override sys_admin sys_rawio }; -allow podsleuth_t self:process { ptrace signal signull getsched execheap execmem execstack }; +allow podsleuth_t self:process { signal signull getsched execheap execmem execstack }; + allow podsleuth_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow podsleuth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow podsleuth_t self:sem create_sem_perms; diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.fc b/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.fc index 84f23dc..5be2738 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.fc @@ -1,6 +1,11 @@ -HOME_DIR/\.pulse-cookie gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.esd_auth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.pulse-cookie -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.pulse(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_home_t,s0) +/root/\.esd_auth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_home_t,s0) +/root/\.pulse-cookie -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_home_t,s0) +/root/\.pulse(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_home_t,s0) + /usr/bin/pulseaudio -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/pulse(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pulseaudio_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.if b/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.if index f40c64d..a3352d3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.if @@ -35,6 +35,9 @@ interface(`pulseaudio_role',` allow pulseaudio_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow $2 pulseaudio_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + userdom_manage_tmp_role($1, pulseaudio_t) + userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($1, pulseaudio_t) + allow $2 pulseaudio_t:dbus send_msg; allow pulseaudio_t $2:dbus { acquire_svc send_msg }; ') @@ -151,12 +154,14 @@ interface(`pulseaudio_signull',` interface(`pulseaudio_stream_connect',` gen_require(` type pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t; + type pulseaudio_home_t; ') files_search_pids($1) allow $1 pulseaudio_t:process signull; allow pulseaudio_t $1:process signull; stream_connect_pattern($1, pulseaudio_var_run_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t, pulseaudio_t) + stream_connect_pattern($1, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_t) ') ######################################## @@ -257,4 +262,68 @@ interface(`pulseaudio_manage_home_files',` userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) manage_files_pattern($1, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_home_t) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_home_t) + pulseaudio_filetrans_home_content($1) + pulseaudio_filetrans_admin_home_content($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete pulseaudio +## home directory symlinks. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`pulseaudio_manage_home_symlinks',` + gen_require(` + type pulseaudio_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create pulseaudio content in the user home directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`pulseaudio_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type pulseaudio_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, pulseaudio_home_t, dir, ".pulse") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, pulseaudio_home_t, file, ".pulse-cookie") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, pulseaudio_home_t, file, ".esd_auth") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create pulseaudio content in the admin home directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`pulseaudio_filetrans_admin_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type pulseaudio_home_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, pulseaudio_home_t, dir, ".pulse") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, pulseaudio_home_t, file, ".pulse-cookie") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, pulseaudio_home_t, file, ".esd_auth") ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te b/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te index d1eace5..10be05f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/pulseaudio.te @@ -43,7 +43,13 @@ allow pulseaudio_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_home_t) manage_files_pattern(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_home_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_home_t, pulseaudio_home_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(pulseaudio_t) +pulseaudio_filetrans_home_content(pulseaudio_t) + +# ~/.esd_auth - maybe we should label this pulseaudit_home_t? +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(pulseaudio_t) +userdom_search_admin_dir(pulseaudio_t) manage_dirs_pattern(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_var_lib_t, pulseaudio_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_var_lib_t, pulseaudio_var_lib_t) @@ -53,7 +59,7 @@ files_var_lib_filetrans(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_var_lib_t, { dir file }) manage_dirs_pattern(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t, { dir file }) +files_pid_filetrans(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_var_run_t, { file dir }) can_exec(pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_exec_t) @@ -85,8 +91,8 @@ fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(pulseaudio_t) fs_getattr_tmpfs(pulseaudio_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(pulseaudio_t) -term_use_all_ttys(pulseaudio_t) -term_use_all_ptys(pulseaudio_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ttys(pulseaudio_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ptys(pulseaudio_t) auth_use_nsswitch(pulseaudio_t) @@ -94,10 +100,29 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(pulseaudio_t) miscfiles_read_localization(pulseaudio_t) -# cjp: this seems excessive. need to confirm -userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(pulseaudio_t) -userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(pulseaudio_t) -userdom_manage_user_tmpfs_files(pulseaudio_t) +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_mount_nfs(pulseaudio_t) + fs_mounton_nfs(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_nfs_named_sockets(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_nfs_named_pipes(pulseaudio_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_mount_cifs(pulseaudio_t) + fs_mounton_cifs(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_cifs_named_sockets(pulseaudio_t) + fs_manage_cifs_named_pipes(pulseaudio_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + alsa_read_rw_config(pulseaudio_t) +') optional_policy(` bluetooth_stream_connect(pulseaudio_t) @@ -127,16 +152,35 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_read_gkeyringd_state(pulseaudio_t) + gnome_signull_gkeyringd(pulseaudio_t) +') + +optional_policy(` rtkit_scheduled(pulseaudio_t) ') optional_policy(` + mozilla_plugin_delete_tmpfs_files(pulseaudio_t) + mozilla_plugin_read_tmpfs_files(pulseaudio_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mpd_read_tmpfs_files(pulseaudio_t) +') + +optional_policy(` policykit_domtrans_auth(pulseaudio_t) policykit_read_lib(pulseaudio_t) policykit_read_reload(pulseaudio_t) ') optional_policy(` + systemd_read_logind_sessions_files(pulseaudio_t) + systemd_login_read_pid_files(pulseaudio_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_read_state(pulseaudio_t) udev_read_db(pulseaudio_t) ') @@ -148,3 +192,7 @@ optional_policy(` xserver_read_xdm_pid(pulseaudio_t) xserver_user_x_domain_template(pulseaudio, pulseaudio_t, pulseaudio_tmpfs_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + virt_manage_tmpfs_files(pulseaudio_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/pwauth.fc b/policy/modules/apps/pwauth.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e2f8687 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/pwauth.fc @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +/usr/bin/pwauth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pwauth_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/pwauth.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pwauth_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/pwauth.if b/policy/modules/apps/pwauth.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..86d25ea --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/pwauth.if @@ -0,0 +1,74 @@ + +## policy for pwauth + +######################################## +## +## Transition to pwauth. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`pwauth_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type pwauth_t, pwauth_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, pwauth_exec_t, pwauth_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute pwauth in the pwauth domain, and +## allow the specified role the pwauth domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the pwauth domain. +## +## +# +interface(`pwauth_run',` + gen_require(` + type pwauth_t; + ') + + pwauth_domtrans($1) + role $2 types pwauth_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Role access for pwauth +## +## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +# +interface(`pwauth_role',` + gen_require(` + type pwauth_t; + ') + + role $1 types pwauth_t; + + pwauth_domtrans($2) + + ps_process_pattern($2, pwauth_t) + allow $2 pwauth_t:process signal; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/pwauth.te b/policy/modules/apps/pwauth.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11bb8e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/pwauth.te @@ -0,0 +1,42 @@ +policy_module(pwauth, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type pwauth_t; +type pwauth_exec_t; +application_domain(pwauth_t, pwauth_exec_t) +role system_r types pwauth_t; + +type pwauth_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(pwauth_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# pwauth local policy +# +allow pwauth_t self:capability setuid; +allow pwauth_t self:process setrlimit; + +allow pwauth_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow pwauth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(pwauth_t, pwauth_var_run_t, pwauth_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(pwauth_t, pwauth_var_run_t, file) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(pwauth_t) + +files_read_etc_files(pwauth_t) + +auth_domtrans_chkpwd(pwauth_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(pwauth_t) +auth_read_shadow(pwauth_t) + +init_read_utmp(pwauth_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(pwauth_t) +logging_send_audit_msgs(pwauth_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(pwauth_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/qemu.if b/policy/modules/apps/qemu.if index 268d691..da3a26d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/qemu.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/qemu.if @@ -76,7 +76,7 @@ template(`qemu_domain_template',` sysnet_read_config($1_t) - userdom_use_user_terminals($1_t) + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals($1_t) userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface($1_t) optional_policy(` @@ -98,61 +98,40 @@ template(`qemu_domain_template',` ') ') -####################################### +######################################## ## -## The per role template for the qemu module. +## Execute a domain transition to run qemu. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. ## -## -##

-## This template creates a derived domains which are used -## for qemu web browser. -##

-##

-## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and -## generally does not need to be invoked directly -## by policy writers. -##

-## -## -## -## The role associated with the user domain. -## -## -## -## -## The type of the user domain. -## ## # -template(`qemu_role',` +interface(`qemu_domtrans',` gen_require(` type qemu_t, qemu_exec_t; - type qemu_config_t, qemu_config_exec_t; ') - role $1 types { qemu_t qemu_config_t }; - - domtrans_pattern($2, qemu_exec_t, qemu_t) - domtrans_pattern($2, qemu_config_exec_t, qemu_config_t) - allow qemu_t $2:process signull; + domtrans_pattern($1, qemu_exec_t, qemu_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Execute a domain transition to run qemu. +## Execute a qemu in the callers domain ## ## ## -## Domain allowed to transition. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`qemu_domtrans',` +interface(`qemu_exec',` gen_require(` - type qemu_t, qemu_exec_t; + type qemu_exec_t; ') - domtrans_pattern($1, qemu_exec_t, qemu_t) + can_exec($1, qemu_exec_t) ') ######################################## @@ -256,20 +235,63 @@ interface(`qemu_kill',` ######################################## ## -## Execute a domain transition to run qemu unconfined. +## Execute qemu_exec_t +## in the specified domain but do not +## do it automatically. This is an explicit +## transition, requiring the caller to use setexeccon(). ## +## +##

+## Execute qemu_exec_t +## in the specified domain. This allows +## the specified domain to qemu programs +## on these filesystems in the specified +## domain. +##

+## ## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +## +# +interface(`qemu_spec_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type qemu_exec_t; + ') + + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, qemu_exec_t, qemu_exec_t) + domain_transition_pattern($1, qemu_exec_t, $2) + domain_entry_file($2,qemu_exec_t) + can_exec($1,qemu_exec_t) + + allow $2 $1:fd use; + allow $2 $1:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + allow $2 $1:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## ## -## Domain allowed to transition. +## Execute qemu unconfined programs in the role. ## +## +## +## The role to allow the qemu unconfined domain. +## ## # -interface(`qemu_domtrans_unconfined',` +interface(`qemu_unconfined_role',` gen_require(` - type unconfined_qemu_t, qemu_exec_t; + type unconfined_qemu_t; + type qemu_t; ') - - domtrans_pattern($1, qemu_exec_t, unconfined_qemu_t) + role $1 types unconfined_qemu_t; + role $1 types qemu_t; ') ######################################## @@ -307,3 +329,22 @@ interface(`qemu_manage_tmp_files',` manage_files_pattern($1, qemu_tmp_t, qemu_tmp_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Make qemu_exec_t an entrypoint for +## the specified domain. +## +## +## +## The domain for which qemu_exec_t is an entrypoint. +## +## +# +interface(`qemu_entry_type',` + gen_require(` + type qemu_exec_t; + ') + + domain_entry_file($1, qemu_exec_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/qemu.te b/policy/modules/apps/qemu.te index 1813e16..abee89e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/qemu.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/qemu.te @@ -40,9 +40,7 @@ gen_tunable(qemu_use_nfs, true) ## gen_tunable(qemu_use_usb, true) -type qemu_exec_t; virt_domain_template(qemu) -application_domain(qemu_t, qemu_exec_t) role system_r types qemu_t; ######################################## @@ -55,6 +53,7 @@ storage_raw_read_removable_device(qemu_t) userdom_search_user_home_content(qemu_t) userdom_read_user_tmpfs_files(qemu_t) +userdom_stream_connect(qemu_t) tunable_policy(`qemu_full_network',` allow qemu_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -99,6 +98,17 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`qemu_use_cifs',` + samba_domtrans_smbd(qemu_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_domtrans_bridgehelper(qemu_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_manage_home_files(qemu_t) virt_manage_images(qemu_t) virt_append_log(qemu_t) ') @@ -111,18 +121,3 @@ optional_policy(` xserver_read_xdm_pid(qemu_t) xserver_stream_connect(qemu_t) ') - -######################################## -# -# Unconfined qemu local policy -# - -optional_policy(` - type unconfined_qemu_t; - typealias unconfined_qemu_t alias qemu_unconfined_t; - application_type(unconfined_qemu_t) - unconfined_domain(unconfined_qemu_t) - - allow unconfined_qemu_t self:process { execstack execmem }; - allow unconfined_qemu_t qemu_exec_t:file execmod; -') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/rssh.fc b/policy/modules/apps/rssh.fc index 4c091ca..a58f123 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/rssh.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/rssh.fc @@ -1 +1,3 @@ /usr/bin/rssh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rssh_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/libexec/rssh_chroot_helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rssh_chroot_helper_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/sambagui.te b/policy/modules/apps/sambagui.te index f594e12..e8f731d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/sambagui.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/sambagui.te @@ -27,16 +27,20 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(sambagui_t) dev_dontaudit_read_urand(sambagui_t) +files_read_usr_files(sambagui_t) files_read_etc_files(sambagui_t) files_search_var_lib(sambagui_t) files_read_usr_files(sambagui_t) auth_use_nsswitch(sambagui_t) +auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(sambagui_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(sambagui_t) miscfiles_read_localization(sambagui_t) +sysnet_use_ldap(sambagui_t) + optional_policy(` consoletype_exec(sambagui_t) ') @@ -56,6 +60,7 @@ optional_policy(` samba_manage_var_files(sambagui_t) samba_read_secrets(sambagui_t) samba_initrc_domtrans(sambagui_t) + samba_systemctl(sambagui_t) samba_domtrans_smbd(sambagui_t) samba_domtrans_nmbd(sambagui_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/sandbox.fc b/policy/modules/apps/sandbox.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6caef63 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/sandbox.fc @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ + +/usr/share/sandbox/start -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sandbox_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/sandbox.if b/policy/modules/apps/sandbox.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..809784d --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/sandbox.if @@ -0,0 +1,364 @@ + +## policy for sandbox + +######################################## +## +## Execute sandbox in the sandbox domain, and +## allow the specified role the sandbox domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the sandbox domain. +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_transition',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_xserver_t; + type sandbox_file_t; + attribute sandbox_domain; + attribute sandbox_x_domain; + attribute sandbox_tmpfs_type; + ') + + allow $1 sandbox_domain:process transition; + dontaudit $1 sandbox_domain:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; + role $2 types sandbox_domain; + allow sandbox_domain $1:process { sigchld signull }; + allow sandbox_domain $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + + allow $1 sandbox_x_domain:process { signal_perms transition }; + dontaudit $1 sandbox_x_domain:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; + allow sandbox_x_domain $1:process { sigchld signull }; + allow { sandbox_x_domain sandbox_xserver_t } $1:fd use; + dontaudit sandbox_domain $1:process signal; + role $2 types sandbox_x_domain; + role $2 types sandbox_xserver_t; + allow $1 sandbox_xserver_t:process signal_perms; + dontaudit sandbox_xserver_t $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + dontaudit sandbox_xserver_t $1:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms; + dontaudit sandbox_xserver_t $1:udp_socket rw_socket_perms; + allow sandbox_xserver_t $1:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms }; + allow sandbox_x_domain sandbox_x_domain:process signal; + # Dontaudit leaked file descriptors + dontaudit sandbox_x_domain $1:fifo_file { read write }; + dontaudit sandbox_x_domain $1:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms; + dontaudit sandbox_x_domain $1:udp_socket rw_socket_perms; + dontaudit sandbox_x_domain $1:unix_stream_socket { read write }; + dontaudit sandbox_x_domain $1:process { signal sigkill }; + + allow $1 sandbox_tmpfs_type:file manage_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 sandbox_tmpfs_type:file manage_file_perms; + + can_exec($1, sandbox_file_t) + allow $1 sandbox_file_t:filesystem getattr; + manage_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); + manage_dirs_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); + manage_sock_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); + manage_fifo_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) + relabel_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) + relabel_lnk_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) + relabel_fifo_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) + relabel_sock_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## sandbox process domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`sandbox_domain_template',` + + gen_require(` + attribute sandbox_domain; + type sandbox_file_t; + attribute sandbox_type; + ') + type $1_t, sandbox_domain, sandbox_type; + + application_type($1_t) + + mls_rangetrans_target($1_t) + mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## sandbox process domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`sandbox_x_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + type xserver_exec_t, sandbox_devpts_t; + type sandbox_xserver_t; + type sandbox_exec_t; + attribute sandbox_domain, sandbox_x_domain; + attribute sandbox_tmpfs_type; + attribute sandbox_type; + ') + + type $1_t, sandbox_x_domain, sandbox_type; + application_type($1_t) + mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t) + + auth_use_nsswitch($1_t) + + # window manager + miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs($1_t) + allow $1_t self:capability setuid; + + type $1_client_t, sandbox_x_domain; + application_type($1_client_t) + mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t) + + type $1_client_tmpfs_t, sandbox_tmpfs_type; + files_tmpfs_file($1_client_tmpfs_t) + + manage_files_pattern($1_client_t, $1_client_tmpfs_t, $1_client_tmpfs_t) + manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_client_tmpfs_t, $1_client_tmpfs_t) + fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_client_t, $1_client_tmpfs_t, file ) + fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_t, $1_client_tmpfs_t, file ) + # Pulseaudio tmpfs files with different MCS labels + dontaudit $1_client_t $1_client_tmpfs_t:file { read write }; + dontaudit $1_t $1_client_tmpfs_t:file { read write }; + allow sandbox_xserver_t $1_client_tmpfs_t:file { read write }; + + domtrans_pattern($1_t, xserver_exec_t, sandbox_xserver_t) + allow $1_t sandbox_xserver_t:process signal_perms; + + domtrans_pattern($1_t, sandbox_exec_t, $1_client_t) + domain_entry_file($1_client_t, sandbox_exec_t) + + # Random tmpfs_t that gets created when you run X. + fs_rw_tmpfs_files($1_t) + + ps_process_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, $1_client_t) + ps_process_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, $1_t) + allow sandbox_xserver_t $1_client_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + allow sandbox_xserver_t $1_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + allow $1_client_t $1_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow $1_t $1_client_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + + fs_get_xattr_fs_quotas($1_client_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## allow domain to read, +## write sandbox_xserver tmp files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_rw_xserver_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## allow domain to read +## sandbox tmpfs files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_read_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute sandbox_tmpfs_type; + ') + + allow $1 sandbox_tmpfs_type:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## allow domain to manage +## sandbox tmpfs files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_manage_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute sandbox_tmpfs_type; + ') + + allow $1 sandbox_tmpfs_type:file manage_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete sandbox files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_delete_files',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_file_t; + ') + + delete_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete sandbox symbolic links +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_delete_lnk_files',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_file_t; + ') + + delete_lnk_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete sandbox fifo files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_delete_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_file_t; + ') + + delete_fifo_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete sandbox sock files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_delete_sock_files',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_file_t; + ') + + delete_sock_files_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow domain to set the attributes +## of the sandbox directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_setattr_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 sandbox_file_t:dir setattr; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete sandbox directories +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_delete_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_file_t; + ') + + delete_dirs_pattern($1, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## allow domain to list sandbox dirs +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_list',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 sandbox_file_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write a sandbox domain pty. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sandbox_use_ptys',` + gen_require(` + type sandbox_devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 sandbox_devpts_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/sandbox.te b/policy/modules/apps/sandbox.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3203ede --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/sandbox.te @@ -0,0 +1,509 @@ +policy_module(sandbox,1.0.0) + +dbus_stub() +attribute sandbox_domain; +attribute sandbox_x_domain; +attribute sandbox_web_type; +attribute sandbox_file_type; +attribute sandbox_tmpfs_type; +attribute sandbox_type; + +type sandbox_exec_t; +files_type(sandbox_exec_t) + +type sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_type; +files_type(sandbox_file_t) +typealias sandbox_file_t alias { sandbox_x_file_t sandbox_web_file_t sandbox_net_file_t sandbox_min_file_t }; + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +sandbox_domain_template(sandbox) +sandbox_x_domain_template(sandbox_min) +sandbox_x_domain_template(sandbox_x) +sandbox_x_domain_template(sandbox_web) +sandbox_x_domain_template(sandbox_net) + +type sandbox_xserver_t; +domain_type(sandbox_xserver_t) +xserver_user_x_domain_template(sandbox_xserver, sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t) + +type sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t) + +type sandbox_devpts_t; +term_pty(sandbox_devpts_t) +files_type(sandbox_devpts_t) + +######################################## +# +# sandbox xserver policy +# +allow sandbox_xserver_t self:process { signal_perms execstack }; + +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` + allow sandbox_xserver_t self:process execmem; +') + +allow sandbox_xserver_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow sandbox_xserver_t self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow sandbox_xserver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) +manage_files_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t) +allow sandbox_xserver_t sandbox_file_t:sock_file create_sock_file_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t) +manage_files_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(sandbox_xserver_t, sandbox_xserver_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + +kernel_dontaudit_request_load_module(sandbox_xserver_t) +kernel_read_system_state(sandbox_xserver_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(sandbox_xserver_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(sandbox_xserver_t) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_xserver_port(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_sendrecv_xserver_server_packets(sandbox_xserver_t) +corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(sandbox_xserver_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(sandbox_xserver_t) +dev_rwx_zero(sandbox_xserver_t) +dev_read_urand(sandbox_xserver_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(sandbox_xserver_t) + +files_read_config_files(sandbox_xserver_t) +files_read_usr_files(sandbox_xserver_t) +files_search_home(sandbox_xserver_t) +fs_dontaudit_rw_tmpfs_files(sandbox_xserver_t) +fs_list_inotifyfs(sandbox_xserver_t) +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sandbox_xserver_t) + +miscfiles_read_fonts(sandbox_xserver_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(sandbox_xserver_t) + +selinux_validate_context(sandbox_xserver_t) +selinux_compute_access_vector(sandbox_xserver_t) +selinux_compute_create_context(sandbox_xserver_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(sandbox_xserver_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(sandbox_xserver_t) +logging_send_audit_msgs(sandbox_xserver_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(sandbox_xserver_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(sandbox_xserver_t) +userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes(sandbox_xserver_t) + +xserver_entry_type(sandbox_xserver_t) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(sandbox_xserver_t) + + optional_policy(` + hal_dbus_chat(sandbox_xserver_t) + ') +') + +######################################## +# +# sandbox local policy +# + +allow sandbox_domain self:process { getattr signal_perms getsched setsched setpgid execstack }; +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` + allow sandbox_domain self:process execmem; +') + +allow sandbox_domain self:fifo_file manage_file_perms; +allow sandbox_domain self:sem create_sem_perms; +allow sandbox_domain self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow sandbox_domain self:msgq create_msgq_perms; +allow sandbox_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow sandbox_domain self:unix_dgram_socket { sendto create_socket_perms }; +dontaudit sandbox_domain self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay }; + +dev_rw_all_inherited_chr_files(sandbox_domain) +dev_rw_all_inherited_blk_files(sandbox_domain) + +can_exec(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t) +allow sandbox_domain sandbox_file_t:filesystem getattr; +manage_files_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +manage_dirs_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +manage_sock_files_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +manage_fifo_files_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +manage_lnk_files_pattern(sandbox_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +dontaudit sandbox_domain sandbox_file_t:dir mounton; + +gen_require(` + type usr_t, lib_t, locale_t; + type var_t, var_run_t, rpm_log_t, locale_t; + attribute exec_type, configfile; +') + +kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(sandbox_domain) + +corecmd_exec_all_executables(sandbox_domain) + +files_rw_all_inherited_files(sandbox_domain, -exec_type -configfile -usr_t -lib_t -locale_t -var_t -var_run_t -device_t -rpm_log_t ) +files_entrypoint_all_files(sandbox_domain) + +files_read_config_files(sandbox_domain) +files_read_usr_files(sandbox_domain) +files_read_var_files(sandbox_domain) +files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(sandbox_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(sandbox_domain) + +userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(sandbox_domain) + +mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(sandbox_domain) + +######################################## +# +# sandbox_x_domain local policy +# +allow sandbox_x_domain self:process { getattr signal_perms getsched setsched setpgid execstack }; +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` + allow sandbox_x_domain self:process execmem; +') + +allow sandbox_x_domain self:fifo_file manage_file_perms; +allow sandbox_x_domain self:sem create_sem_perms; +allow sandbox_x_domain self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow sandbox_x_domain self:msgq create_msgq_perms; +allow sandbox_x_domain self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms; +allow sandbox_x_domain self:unix_dgram_socket { sendto create_socket_perms }; +allow sandbox_x_domain self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; + +dontaudit sandbox_x_domain sandbox_x_domain:process signal; +dontaudit sandbox_x_domain sandbox_xserver_t:process signal; +dontaudit sandbox_x_domain self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay }; + +allow sandbox_x_domain sandbox_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + +allow sandbox_x_domain sandbox_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_term_perms setattr }; +term_create_pty(sandbox_x_domain,sandbox_devpts_t) + +can_exec(sandbox_x_domain, sandbox_file_t) +allow sandbox_x_domain sandbox_file_t:filesystem getattr; +manage_files_pattern(sandbox_x_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +manage_dirs_pattern(sandbox_x_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +manage_sock_files_pattern(sandbox_x_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +manage_fifo_files_pattern(sandbox_x_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +manage_lnk_files_pattern(sandbox_x_domain, sandbox_file_t, sandbox_file_t); +dontaudit sandbox_x_domain sandbox_file_t:dir mounton; + +kernel_getattr_proc(sandbox_x_domain) +kernel_read_network_state(sandbox_x_domain) +kernel_read_system_state(sandbox_x_domain) +kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(sandbox_x_domain) + +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(sandbox_x_domain) + +corecmd_exec_all_executables(sandbox_x_domain) + +dev_read_urand(sandbox_x_domain) +dev_dontaudit_read_rand(sandbox_x_domain) +dev_read_sysfs(sandbox_x_domain) +dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(sandbox_x_domain) + +files_search_home(sandbox_x_domain) +files_dontaudit_list_all_mountpoints(sandbox_x_domain) +files_entrypoint_all_files(sandbox_x_domain) +files_read_config_files(sandbox_x_domain) +files_read_usr_files(sandbox_x_domain) +files_read_usr_symlinks(sandbox_x_domain) + +fs_getattr_tmpfs(sandbox_x_domain) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(sandbox_x_domain) +fs_list_inotifyfs(sandbox_x_domain) +fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(sandbox_x_domain) + +auth_dontaudit_read_login_records(sandbox_x_domain) +auth_dontaudit_write_login_records(sandbox_x_domain) +auth_search_pam_console_data(sandbox_x_domain) + +init_read_utmp(sandbox_x_domain) +init_dontaudit_write_utmp(sandbox_x_domain) + +libs_dontaudit_setattr_lib_files(sandbox_x_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(sandbox_x_domain) +miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(sandbox_x_domain) + +mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(sandbox_x_domain) + +selinux_get_fs_mount(sandbox_x_domain) +selinux_validate_context(sandbox_x_domain) +selinux_compute_access_vector(sandbox_x_domain) +selinux_compute_create_context(sandbox_x_domain) +selinux_compute_relabel_context(sandbox_x_domain) +selinux_compute_user_contexts(sandbox_x_domain) +seutil_read_default_contexts(sandbox_x_domain) + +term_getattr_pty_fs(sandbox_x_domain) +term_use_ptmx(sandbox_x_domain) +term_search_ptys(sandbox_x_domain) + +application_dontaudit_signal(sandbox_x_domain) +application_dontaudit_sigkill(sandbox_x_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(sandbox_x_domain) +logging_dontaudit_search_logs(sandbox_x_domain) + +miscfiles_read_fonts(sandbox_x_domain) + +storage_dontaudit_rw_fuse(sandbox_x_domain) + +optional_policy(` + consolekit_dbus_chat(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + cups_stream_connect(sandbox_x_domain) + cups_read_rw_config(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + devicekit_dontaudit_dbus_chat_disk(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_gconf_config(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + sssd_dontaudit_search_lib(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + udev_read_db(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(sandbox_x_domain) +userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(sandbox_x_domain) +userdom_search_user_home_content(sandbox_x_domain) +userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes(sandbox_x_domain) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sandbox_x_domain) + +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sandbox_x_domain) + fs_search_nfs(sandbox_xserver_t) + fs_read_nfs_files(sandbox_xserver_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(sandbox_x_domain) + fs_manage_nfs_files(sandbox_x_domain) + fs_exec_nfs_files(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_search_cifs(sandbox_xserver_t) + fs_read_cifs_files(sandbox_xserver_t) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(sandbox_x_domain) + fs_manage_cifs_files(sandbox_x_domain) + fs_exec_cifs_files(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_fusefs_home_dirs',` + fs_search_fusefs(sandbox_xserver_t) + fs_read_fusefs_files(sandbox_xserver_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(sandbox_x_domain) + fs_manage_fusefs_files(sandbox_x_domain) + fs_exec_fusefs_files(sandbox_x_domain) +') + +files_search_home(sandbox_x_t) +userdom_use_user_ptys(sandbox_x_t) + +######################################## +# +# sandbox_x_client_t local policy +# +allow sandbox_x_client_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow sandbox_x_client_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow sandbox_x_client_t self:dbus { acquire_svc send_msg }; + +dev_read_rand(sandbox_x_client_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(sandbox_x_client_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(sandbox_x_client_t) + +optional_policy(` + colord_dbus_chat(sandbox_x_client_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + hal_dbus_chat(sandbox_x_client_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + nsplugin_read_rw_files(sandbox_x_client_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# sandbox_web_client_t local policy +# +typeattribute sandbox_web_client_t sandbox_web_type; + +auth_use_nsswitch(sandbox_web_client_t) + +allow sandbox_web_type self:capability { setuid setgid }; +allow sandbox_web_type self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_relay; +dontaudit sandbox_web_type self:process setrlimit; + +allow sandbox_web_type self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow sandbox_web_type self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow sandbox_web_type self:dbus { acquire_svc send_msg }; + +kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(sandbox_web_type) +kernel_request_load_module(sandbox_web_type) + +dev_read_rand(sandbox_web_type) +dev_write_sound(sandbox_web_type) +dev_read_sound(sandbox_web_type) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_squid_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ftp_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ipp_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_flash_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_streaming_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_speech_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_tcp_connect_speech_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_sendrecv_squid_client_packets(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_sendrecv_ftp_client_packets(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_sendrecv_ipp_client_packets(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_sendrecv_generic_client_packets(sandbox_web_type) + +corenet_dontaudit_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port(sandbox_web_type) +corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_generic_port(sandbox_web_type) + +files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(sandbox_web_type) + +fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(sandbox_web_type) +fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs(sandbox_web_type) + +storage_dontaudit_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(sandbox_web_type) + +dbus_system_bus_client(sandbox_web_type) +dbus_read_config(sandbox_web_type) +selinux_get_fs_mount(sandbox_web_type) +selinux_validate_context(sandbox_web_type) +selinux_compute_access_vector(sandbox_web_type) +selinux_compute_create_context(sandbox_web_type) +selinux_compute_relabel_context(sandbox_web_type) +selinux_compute_user_contexts(sandbox_web_type) +seutil_read_default_contexts(sandbox_web_type) + +userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files(sandbox_web_type) +userdom_delete_user_tmpfs_files(sandbox_web_type) + +optional_policy(` + alsa_read_rw_config(sandbox_web_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + bluetooth_dontaudit_dbus_chat(sandbox_web_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + hal_dbus_chat(sandbox_web_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + chrome_domtrans_sandbox(sandbox_web_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + nsplugin_manage_rw(sandbox_web_type) + nsplugin_read_rw_files(sandbox_web_type) + nsplugin_rw_exec(sandbox_web_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + pulseaudio_stream_connect(sandbox_web_type) + allow sandbox_web_type self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +') + +optional_policy(` + rtkit_daemon_dontaudit_dbus_chat(sandbox_web_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + networkmanager_dontaudit_dbus_chat(sandbox_web_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + udev_read_state(sandbox_web_type) +') + +######################################## +# +# sandbox_net_client_t local policy +# +typeattribute sandbox_net_client_t sandbox_web_type; + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(sandbox_net_client_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(sandbox_net_client_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_net_client_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(sandbox_net_client_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(sandbox_net_client_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(sandbox_net_client_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(sandbox_net_client_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(sandbox_net_client_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(sandbox_net_client_t) +corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(sandbox_net_client_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(sandbox_net_client_t) + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_dontaudit_rw_user_home_files(sandbox_x_t) + mozilla_dontaudit_rw_user_home_files(sandbox_xserver_t) + mozilla_dontaudit_rw_user_home_files(sandbox_x_domain) + mozilla_plugin_dontaudit_leaks(sandbox_x_domain) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/screen.fc b/policy/modules/apps/screen.fc index c8254dd..340a2d7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/screen.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/screen.fc @@ -3,13 +3,18 @@ # HOME_DIR/\.screen(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.screenrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.screen(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_home_t,s0) + +/root/\.screen(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_home_t,s0) # # /usr # /usr/bin/screen -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/tmux -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_exec_t,s0) # # /var # /var/run/screen(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/tmux(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:screen_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/screen.if b/policy/modules/apps/screen.if index a57e81e..b0b3ce6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/screen.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/screen.if @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ template(`screen_role_template',` gen_require(` type screen_exec_t, screen_tmp_t; type screen_home_t, screen_var_run_t; + attribute screen_domain; ') ######################################## @@ -32,51 +33,20 @@ template(`screen_role_template',` # Declarations # - type $1_screen_t; + type $1_screen_t, screen_domain; application_domain($1_screen_t, screen_exec_t) domain_interactive_fd($1_screen_t) ubac_constrained($1_screen_t) role $2 types $1_screen_t; - ######################################## - # - # Local policy - # - - allow $1_screen_t self:capability { setuid setgid fsetid }; - allow $1_screen_t self:process signal_perms; - allow $1_screen_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - allow $1_screen_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - allow $1_screen_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; - # Internal screen networking - allow $1_screen_t self:fd use; - allow $1_screen_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_socket_perms connectto }; - allow $1_screen_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; - - manage_dirs_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_tmp_t, screen_tmp_t) - manage_files_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_tmp_t, screen_tmp_t) - manage_fifo_files_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_tmp_t, screen_tmp_t) - files_tmp_filetrans($1_screen_t, screen_tmp_t, { file dir }) - - # Create fifo - manage_fifo_files_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) - manage_dirs_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) - manage_sock_files_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) - files_pid_filetrans($1_screen_t, screen_var_run_t, dir) - - allow $1_screen_t screen_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; - manage_dirs_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) - manage_fifo_files_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) - userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1_screen_t, screen_home_t, dir) - read_files_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern($1_screen_t, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) - - allow $1_screen_t $3:process signal; + userdom_home_reader($1_screen_t) domtrans_pattern($3, screen_exec_t, $1_screen_t) allow $3 $1_screen_t:process { signal sigchld }; dontaudit $3 $1_screen_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; + allow $1_screen_t $3:unix_stream_socket { connectto }; allow $1_screen_t $3:process signal; + ps_process_pattern($1_screen_t, $3) manage_fifo_files_pattern($3, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) manage_dirs_pattern($3, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) @@ -87,77 +57,22 @@ template(`screen_role_template',` relabel_lnk_files_pattern($3, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) manage_dirs_pattern($3, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) - manage_files_pattern($3, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) - manage_lnk_files_pattern($3, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern($3, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) - kernel_read_system_state($1_screen_t) - kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_screen_t) - - corecmd_list_bin($1_screen_t) - corecmd_read_bin_files($1_screen_t) - corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1_screen_t) - corecmd_read_bin_pipes($1_screen_t) - corecmd_read_bin_sockets($1_screen_t) # Revert to the user domain when a shell is executed. corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_screen_t, $3) corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_screen_t, $3) - corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1_screen_t) - corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_screen_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_screen_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_screen_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1_screen_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node($1_screen_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_screen_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_screen_t) - corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_screen_t) - - dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files($1_screen_t) - dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files($1_screen_t) - # for SSP - dev_read_urand($1_screen_t) - - domain_use_interactive_fds($1_screen_t) - - files_search_tmp($1_screen_t) - files_search_home($1_screen_t) - files_list_home($1_screen_t) - files_read_usr_files($1_screen_t) - files_read_etc_files($1_screen_t) - - fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_screen_t) - fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_screen_t) - auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_screen_t) auth_use_nsswitch($1_screen_t) - auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_screen_t) - auth_dontaudit_exec_utempter($1_screen_t) - - # Write to utmp. - init_rw_utmp($1_screen_t) - - logging_send_syslog_msg($1_screen_t) - - miscfiles_read_localization($1_screen_t) - - seutil_read_config($1_screen_t) - userdom_use_user_terminals($1_screen_t) - userdom_create_user_pty($1_screen_t) userdom_user_home_domtrans($1_screen_t, $3) - userdom_setattr_user_ptys($1_screen_t) - userdom_setattr_user_ttys($1_screen_t) tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` fs_cifs_domtrans($1_screen_t, $3) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks($1_screen_t) - fs_list_cifs($1_screen_t) ') tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` fs_nfs_domtrans($1_screen_t, $3) - fs_list_nfs($1_screen_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks($1_screen_t) ') ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/screen.te b/policy/modules/apps/screen.te index 553bc73..0bd13e3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/screen.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/screen.te @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ policy_module(screen, 2.3.1) # Declarations # +attribute screen_domain; + type screen_exec_t; application_executable_file(screen_exec_t) @@ -24,3 +26,92 @@ typealias screen_var_run_t alias { user_screen_var_run_t staff_screen_var_run_t typealias screen_var_run_t alias { auditadm_screen_var_run_t secadm_screen_var_run_t screen_dir_t }; files_pid_file(screen_var_run_t) ubac_constrained(screen_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# Local policy +# + +allow screen_domain self:capability { setuid setgid fsetid }; +allow screen_domain self:process signal_perms; +allow screen_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow screen_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow screen_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +# Internal screen networking +allow screen_domain self:fd use; +allow screen_domain self:unix_stream_socket { create_socket_perms connectto }; +allow screen_domain self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(screen_domain, screen_tmp_t, screen_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_tmp_t, screen_tmp_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_tmp_t, screen_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(screen_domain, screen_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +# Create fifo +manage_fifo_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(screen_domain, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_var_run_t, screen_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(screen_domain, screen_var_run_t, dir) + +allow screen_domain screen_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(screen_domain, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(screen_domain, screen_home_t, dir) +userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(screen_domain, screen_home_t, dir) +read_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(screen_domain, screen_home_t, screen_home_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(screen_domain) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(screen_domain) + +corecmd_list_bin(screen_domain) +corecmd_read_bin_files(screen_domain) +corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(screen_domain) +corecmd_read_bin_pipes(screen_domain) +corecmd_read_bin_sockets(screen_domain) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(screen_domain) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(screen_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(screen_domain) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(screen_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(screen_domain) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(screen_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(screen_domain) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(screen_domain) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(screen_domain) + +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(screen_domain) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files(screen_domain) +# for SSP +dev_read_urand(screen_domain) + +domain_sigchld_interactive_fds(screen_domain) +domain_use_interactive_fds(screen_domain) +domain_read_all_domains_state(screen_domain) + +files_search_tmp(screen_domain) +files_search_home(screen_domain) +files_list_home(screen_domain) +files_read_usr_files(screen_domain) +files_read_etc_files(screen_domain) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(screen_domain) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(screen_domain) + +auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(screen_domain) +auth_dontaudit_exec_utempter(screen_domain) + +# Write to utmp. +init_rw_utmp(screen_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(screen_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(screen_domain) + +seutil_read_config(screen_domain) + +userdom_use_user_terminals(screen_domain) +userdom_create_user_pty(screen_domain) +userdom_setattr_user_ptys(screen_domain) +userdom_setattr_user_ttys(screen_domain) + diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.if b/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.if index 1dc7a85..a01511f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.if @@ -43,18 +43,18 @@ interface(`seunshare_run',` role $2 types seunshare_t; allow $1 seunshare_t:process signal_perms; - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - dontaudit seunshare_t $1:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms; - dontaudit seunshare_t $1:udp_socket rw_socket_perms; - dontaudit seunshare_t $1:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; - ') ') ######################################## ## -## Role access for seunshare +## The role template for the seunshare module. ## +## +## +## The prefix of the user role (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_r). +## +## ## ## ## Role allowed access. @@ -66,15 +66,30 @@ interface(`seunshare_run',` ## ## # -interface(`seunshare_role',` +interface(`seunshare_role_template',` gen_require(` - type seunshare_t; + attribute seunshare_domain; + type seunshare_exec_t; ') - role $2 types seunshare_t; + type $1_seunshare_t, seunshare_domain; + application_domain($1_seunshare_t, seunshare_exec_t) + role $2 types $1_seunshare_t; - seunshare_domtrans($1) + auth_use_nsswitch($1_seunshare_t) + + mls_process_set_level($1_seunshare_t) + + domtrans_pattern($3, seunshare_exec_t, $1_seunshare_t) + sandbox_transition($1_seunshare_t, $2) + + ps_process_pattern($3, $1_seunshare_t) + allow $3 $1_seunshare_t:process signal_perms; + allow $3 $1_seunshare_t:fd use; + + allow $1_seunshare_t $3:process transition; + dontaudit $1_seunshare_t $3:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; - ps_process_pattern($2, seunshare_t) - allow $2 seunshare_t:process signal; + corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_seunshare_t, $1_t) + corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_seunshare_t, $1_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.te b/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.te index 7590165..59539e8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/seunshare.te @@ -5,40 +5,63 @@ policy_module(seunshare, 1.1.0) # Declarations # -type seunshare_t; +attribute seunshare_domain; type seunshare_exec_t; -application_domain(seunshare_t, seunshare_exec_t) -role system_r types seunshare_t; ######################################## # # seunshare local policy # +allow seunshare_domain self:capability { fowner setgid setuid dac_override setpcap sys_admin sys_nice }; +allow seunshare_domain self:process { fork setexec signal getcap setcap setsched }; -allow seunshare_t self:capability { setuid dac_override setpcap sys_admin }; -allow seunshare_t self:process { setexec signal getcap setcap }; +allow seunshare_domain self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow seunshare_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -allow seunshare_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; -allow seunshare_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +kernel_read_system_state(seunshare_domain) -corecmd_exec_shell(seunshare_t) -corecmd_exec_bin(seunshare_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(seunshare_domain) +corecmd_exec_bin(seunshare_domain) -files_read_etc_files(seunshare_t) -files_mounton_all_poly_members(seunshare_t) +dev_read_urand(seunshare_domain) +dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(seunshare_domain) -auth_use_nsswitch(seunshare_t) +files_search_all(seunshare_domain) +files_read_etc_files(seunshare_domain) +files_mounton_all_poly_members(seunshare_domain) +files_mounton_rootfs(seunshare_domain) +files_manage_generic_tmp_dirs(seunshare_domain) +files_relabelfrom_tmp_dirs(seunshare_domain) -logging_send_syslog_msg(seunshare_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(seunshare_domain) +fs_manage_cgroup_files(seunshare_domain) +fs_unmount_all_fs(seunshare_domain) -miscfiles_read_localization(seunshare_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(seunshare_domain) -userdom_use_user_terminals(seunshare_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(seunshare_domain) +userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes(seunshare_domain) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(seunshare_domain) +userdom_list_user_home_content(seunshare_domain) ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(seunshare_t) + fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(seunshare_domain) + fs_dontaudit_list_inotifyfs(seunshare_domain) optional_policy(` - mozilla_dontaudit_manage_user_home_files(seunshare_t) + mozilla_dontaudit_manage_user_home_files(seunshare_domain) + mozilla_plugin_dontaudit_leaks(seunshare_domain) ') ') + +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_mounton_nfs(seunshare_domain) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_mounton_cifs(seunshare_domain) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_fusefs_home_dirs',` + fs_mounton_fusefs(seunshare_domain) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.fc b/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.fc index b07ee19..a275bd6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.fc @@ -1,8 +1,11 @@ HOME_DIR/\.cache/\.mc_connections -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t, s0) -HOME_DIR/\.cache/telepathy/logger/sqlite-data-journal -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_logger_cache_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.cache/telepathy(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_cache_home_t, s0) +HOME_DIR/\.cache/telepathy/logger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_logger_cache_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.cache/telepathy/gabble(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t, s0) HOME_DIR/\.cache/wocky(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t, s0) HOME_DIR/\.mission-control(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_mission_control_home_t, s0) +HOME_DIR/\.local/share/telepathy(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_data_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.local/share/telepathy/mission-control(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t, s0) HOME_DIR/\.telepathy-sunshine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_sunshine_home_t, s0) HOME_DIR/\.local/share/TpLogger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:telepathy_logger_data_home_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.if b/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.if index 3cfb128..d49274d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.if @@ -11,9 +11,7 @@ ## ## # -# template(`telepathy_domain_template',` - gen_require(` attribute telepathy_domain; attribute telepathy_executable; @@ -23,16 +21,18 @@ template(`telepathy_domain_template',` type telepathy_$1_exec_t, telepathy_executable; application_domain(telepathy_$1_t, telepathy_$1_exec_t) ubac_constrained(telepathy_$1_t) + auth_use_nsswitch(telepathy_$1_t) type telepathy_$1_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(telepathy_$1_tmp_t) ubac_constrained(telepathy_$1_tmp_t) + ') ####################################### ## -## Role access for telepathy domains -### that executes via dbus-session +## Role access for telepathy domains +## that executes via dbus-session ## ## ## @@ -44,8 +44,13 @@ template(`telepathy_domain_template',` ## The type of the user domain. ## ## +## +## +## User domain prefix to be used. +## +## # -template(`telepathy_role', ` +template(`telepathy_role',` gen_require(` attribute telepathy_domain; type telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_sofiasip_t, telepathy_idle_t; @@ -76,6 +81,8 @@ template(`telepathy_role', ` dbus_session_domain($3, telepathy_sunshine_exec_t, telepathy_sunshine_t) dbus_session_domain($3, telepathy_stream_engine_exec_t, telepathy_stream_engine_t) dbus_session_domain($3, telepathy_msn_exec_t, telepathy_msn_t) + + telepathy_dbus_chat($2) ') ######################################## @@ -122,11 +129,6 @@ interface(`telepathy_gabble_dbus_chat', ` ## ## Read telepathy mission control state. ## -## -## -## Prefix to be used. -## -## ## ## ## Domain allowed access. @@ -166,7 +168,7 @@ interface(`telepathy_msn_stream_connect', ` ## Stream connect to Telepathy Salut ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## @@ -179,3 +181,111 @@ interface(`telepathy_salut_stream_connect', ` stream_connect_pattern($1, telepathy_salut_tmp_t, telepathy_salut_tmp_t, telepathy_salut_t) files_search_tmp($1) ') + +####################################### +## +## Send DBus messages to and from +## all Telepathy domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`telepathy_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + attribute telepathy_domain; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 telepathy_domain:dbus send_msg; + allow telepathy_domain $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +###################################### +## +## Execute telepathy executable +## in the specified domain. +## +## +##

+## Execute a telepathy executable +## in the specified domain. This allows +## the specified domain to execute any file +## on these filesystems in the specified +## domain. +##

+##

+## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

+## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +## +# +interface(`telepathy_command_domtrans', ` + gen_require(` + attribute telepathy_executable; + ') + + allow $2 telepathy_executable:file entrypoint; + domain_transition_pattern($1, telepathy_executable, $2) + type_transition $1 telepathy_executable:process $2; + + # needs to dbus chat with unconfined_t and unconfined_dbusd_t + optional_policy(` + telepathy_dbus_chat($1) + telepathy_dbus_chat($2) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Create telepathy content in the user home directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`telepathy_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t; + type telepathy_mission_control_home_t; + type telepathy_logger_cache_home_t; + type telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t; + type telepathy_sunshine_home_t; + type telepathy_logger_data_home_t; + type telepathy_cache_home_t, telepathy_data_home_t; + type telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, telepathy_cache_home_t, telepathy_logger_cache_home_t, dir, "logger") + filetrans_pattern($1, telepathy_cache_home_t, telepathy_logger_cache_home_t, file, "sqlite-data-journal") + filetrans_pattern($1, telepathy_cache_home_t, telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t, dir, "gabble") + + filetrans_pattern($1, telepathy_data_home_t, telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t, dir, "mission-control") + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, telepathy_mission_control_home_t, dir, ".mission-control") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, telepathy_sunshine_home_t, dir, ".telepathy-sunshine") + + gnome_cache_filetrans($1, telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t, file, ".mc_connections") + gnome_cache_filetrans($1, telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t, dir, "gabble") + gnome_cache_filetrans($1, telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t, dir, "wocky") + gnome_cache_filetrans($1, telepathy_cache_home_t, dir, "telepathy") + + gnome_data_filetrans($1, telepathy_logger_data_home_t, dir, "TpLogger") + gnome_data_filetrans($1, telepathy_data_home_t, dir, "telepathy") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.te b/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.te index 2533ea0..92f0ecb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/telepathy.te @@ -26,12 +26,18 @@ attribute telepathy_executable; telepathy_domain_template(gabble) +type telepathy_cache_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(telepathy_cache_home_t) + type telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t; userdom_user_home_content(telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t) telepathy_domain_template(idle) telepathy_domain_template(logger) +type telepathy_data_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(telepathy_data_home_t) + type telepathy_logger_cache_home_t; userdom_user_home_content(telepathy_logger_cache_home_t) @@ -43,6 +49,9 @@ telepathy_domain_template(mission_control) type telepathy_mission_control_home_t; userdom_user_home_content(telepathy_mission_control_home_t) +type telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t) + type telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t; userdom_user_home_content(telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t) @@ -67,6 +76,15 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_gabble_tmp_t, telepathy_gabble manage_sock_files_pattern(telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_gabble_tmp_t, telepathy_gabble_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_gabble_tmp_t, { dir sock_file }) +# ~/.cache/telepathy/gabble/caps-cache.db-journal +optional_policy(` + manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t, telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t) + manage_files_pattern(telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t, telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t) + filetrans_pattern(telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_cache_home_t, telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t, dir) + # ~/.cache/wocky + gnome_cache_filetrans(telepathy_gabble_t, telepathy_gabble_cache_home_t, dir) +') + corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(telepathy_gabble_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(telepathy_gabble_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(telepathy_gabble_t) @@ -98,18 +116,14 @@ tunable_policy(`telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports',` corenet_sendrecv_generic_client_packets(telepathy_gabble_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(telepathy_gabble_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(telepathy_gabble_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(telepathy_gabble_t) -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(telepathy_gabble_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(telepathy_gabble_t) +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(telepathy_gabble_t) ') optional_policy(` - dbus_system_bus_client(telepathy_gabble_t) + gnome_manage_home_config(telepathy_gabble_t) ') ####################################### @@ -147,10 +161,13 @@ tunable_policy(`telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports',` allow telepathy_logger_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_logger_cache_home_t, telepathy_logger_cache_home_t) manage_files_pattern(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_logger_cache_home_t, telepathy_logger_cache_home_t) +filetrans_pattern(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_cache_home_t, telepathy_logger_cache_home_t, dir) manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t) manage_files_pattern(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t) +gnome_data_filetrans(telepathy_logger_t, telepathy_logger_data_home_t, dir) files_read_etc_files(telepathy_logger_t) files_read_usr_files(telepathy_logger_t) @@ -158,40 +175,58 @@ files_search_pids(telepathy_logger_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(telepathy_logger_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(telepathy_logger_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(telepathy_logger_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(telepathy_logger_t) -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(telepathy_logger_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(telepathy_logger_t) +optional_policy(` + # ~/.config/dconf/user + gnome_manage_home_config(telepathy_logger_t) ') ####################################### # # Telepathy Mission-Control local policy. # +allow telepathy_mission_control_t self:process setsched; manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_mission_control_home_t, telepathy_mission_control_home_t) manage_files_pattern(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_mission_control_home_t, telepathy_mission_control_home_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_mission_control_home_t, { dir file }) +userdom_search_user_home_dirs(telepathy_mission_control_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_mission_control_t, { telepathy_data_home_t telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t }, { telepathy_data_home_t telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t }) +manage_files_pattern(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t, telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t) +filetrans_pattern(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_data_home_t, telepathy_mission_control_data_home_t, { dir file }) +gnome_data_filetrans(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_data_home_t, dir) +gnome_manage_home_config(telepathy_mission_control_t) dev_read_rand(telepathy_mission_control_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(telepathy_mission_control_t) +files_list_tmp(telepathy_mission_control_t) files_read_etc_files(telepathy_mission_control_t) files_read_usr_files(telepathy_mission_control_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(telepathy_mission_control_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(telepathy_mission_control_t) +userdom_home_manager(telepathy_mission_control_t) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(telepathy_mission_control_t) + + optional_policy(` + devicekit_dbus_chat_power(telepathy_mission_control_t) + ') + optional_policy(` + gnome_dbus_chat_gkeyringd(telepathy_mission_control_t) + ') + optional_policy(` + networkmanager_dbus_chat(telepathy_mission_control_t) + ') ') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(telepathy_mission_control_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(telepathy_mission_control_t) +# ~/.cache/.mc_connections. +optional_policy(` + manage_files_pattern(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t, telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t) + gnome_cache_filetrans(telepathy_mission_control_t, telepathy_mission_control_cache_home_t, file) ') ####################################### @@ -205,8 +240,11 @@ allow telepathy_msn_t self:unix_dgram_socket { write create connect }; manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_msn_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(telepathy_msn_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(telepathy_msn_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t) +exec_files_pattern(telepathy_msn_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(telepathy_msn_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t, { dir file sock_file }) userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(telepathy_msn_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t, { dir file sock_file }) +userdom_dontaudit_setattr_user_tmp(telepathy_msn_t) +can_exec(telepathy_msn_t, telepathy_msn_tmp_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(telepathy_msn_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(telepathy_msn_t) @@ -228,6 +266,8 @@ corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(telepathy_msn_t) files_read_etc_files(telepathy_msn_t) files_read_usr_files(telepathy_msn_t) +init_read_state(telepathy_msn_t) + libs_exec_ldconfig(telepathy_msn_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(telepathy_msn_t) @@ -246,6 +286,10 @@ tunable_policy(`telepathy_tcp_connect_generic_network_ports',` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_read_gconf_home_files(telepathy_msn_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(telepathy_msn_t) optional_policy(` @@ -361,14 +405,16 @@ allow telepathy_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow telepathy_domain self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; allow telepathy_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(telepathy_domain, telepathy_cache_home_t, telepathy_cache_home_t) +gnome_cache_filetrans(telepathy_domain, telepathy_cache_home_t, dir, "telepathy") + dev_read_urand(telepathy_domain) kernel_read_system_state(telepathy_domain) +fs_getattr_all_fs(telepathy_domain) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(telepathy_domain) -auth_use_nsswitch(telepathy_domain) - miscfiles_read_localization(telepathy_domain) optional_policy(` @@ -376,5 +422,23 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_read_generic_cache_files(telepathy_domain) + gnome_write_generic_cache_files(telepathy_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + telepathy_dbus_chat(telepathy_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(telepathy_domain) ') + +# Just for F15 +optional_policy(` + gen_require(` + role unconfined_r; + ') + + role unconfined_r types telepathy_domain; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/thumb.fc b/policy/modules/apps/thumb.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3a7c395 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/thumb.fc @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +HOME_DIR/\.thumbnails(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/missfont\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_home_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/evince-thumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/gsf-office-thumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/gnome-thumbnail-font -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/gnome-[^/]*-thumbnailer(.sh)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/raw-thumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/shotwell-video-thumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/totem-video-thumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/whaaw-thumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/[^/]*thumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/ffmpegthumbnailer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/tumbler[^/]*/tumblerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thumb_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/thumb.if b/policy/modules/apps/thumb.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9127cec --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/thumb.if @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ + +## policy for thumb + +######################################## +## +## Transition to thumb. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`thumb_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type thumb_t, thumb_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, thumb_exec_t, thumb_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute thumb in the thumb domain, and +## allow the specified role the thumb domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the thumb domain. +## +## +# +interface(`thumb_run',` + gen_require(` + type thumb_t; + ') + + thumb_domtrans($1) + role $2 types thumb_t; + + allow $1 thumb_t:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Role access for thumb +## +## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +# +interface(`thumb_role',` + gen_require(` + type thumb_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + role $1 types thumb_t; + + thumb_domtrans($2) + + ps_process_pattern($2, thumb_t) + allow $2 thumb_t:process signal; + allow thumb_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; + + allow $2 thumb_t:dbus send_msg; + allow thumb_t $2:dbus send_msg; + thumb_filetrans_home_content($2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## thumb over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`thumb_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type thumb_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 thumb_t:dbus send_msg; + allow thumb_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create thumb content in the user home directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`thumb_filetrans_home_content',` + + gen_require(` + type thumb_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, thumb_home_t, dir, ".thumbnails") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, thumb_home_t, file, "missfont.log") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/thumb.te b/policy/modules/apps/thumb.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a84da4 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/apps/thumb.te @@ -0,0 +1,104 @@ +policy_module(thumb, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type thumb_t; +type thumb_exec_t; +application_domain(thumb_t, thumb_exec_t) +ubac_constrained(thumb_t) +userdom_home_manager(thumb_t) + +type thumb_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(thumb_tmp_t) +ubac_constrained(thumb_tmp_t) + +type thumb_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(thumb_home_t) + +######################################## +# +# thumb local policy +# + +allow thumb_t self:process { setsched signal setrlimit }; + +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` + allow thumb_t self:process execmem; +') + +allow thumb_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow thumb_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow thumb_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow thumb_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow thumb_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_home_t, thumb_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_home_t, thumb_home_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_home_t, dir, ".thumbnails") +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_home_t, file, "missfont.log") + +manage_files_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_tmp_t, thumb_tmp_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_tmp_t, thumb_tmp_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_tmp_t, thumb_tmp_t) +exec_files_pattern(thumb_t, thumb_tmp_t, thumb_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file }) +userdom_user_tmp_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file }) +xserver_xdm_tmp_filetrans(thumb_t, thumb_tmp_t, sock_file) + +can_exec(thumb_t, thumb_exec_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(thumb_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(thumb_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(thumb_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(thumb_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(thumb_t) +dev_read_urand(thumb_t) +dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(thumb_t) +dev_rw_xserver_misc(thumb_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(thumb_t) + +files_read_etc_files(thumb_t) +files_read_usr_files(thumb_t) +files_read_non_security_files(thumb_t) + +fs_read_dos_files(thumb_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(thumb_t) + +miscfiles_read_fonts(thumb_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(thumb_t) + +sysnet_read_config(thumb_t) + +userdom_read_user_tmp_files(thumb_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(thumb_t) +userdom_write_user_tmp_files(thumb_t) +userdom_read_home_audio_files(thumb_t) +userdom_home_reader(thumb_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(thumb_t) + +xserver_read_xdm_home_files(thumb_t) +xserver_append_xdm_home_files(thumb_t) +xserver_dontaudit_read_xdm_pid(thumb_t) +xserver_stream_connect(thumb_t) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_dontaudit_stream_connect_session_bus(thumb_t) + dbus_dontaudit_chat_session_bus(thumb_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + # .config + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(thumb_t) + gnome_read_generic_data_home_files(thumb_t) + gnome_manage_gstreamer_home_files(thumb_t) + gnome_manage_gstreamer_home_dirs(thumb_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/thunderbird.te b/policy/modules/apps/thunderbird.te index f50789e..9ba6da8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/thunderbird.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/thunderbird.te @@ -114,17 +114,7 @@ xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files(thunderbird_t) xserver_dontaudit_getattr_xdm_tmp_sockets(thunderbird_t) # Access ~/.thunderbird -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(thunderbird_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(thunderbird_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(thunderbird_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(thunderbird_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(thunderbird_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(thunderbird_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(thunderbird_t) tunable_policy(`mail_read_content && use_nfs_home_dirs',` files_list_home(thunderbird_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/tvtime.te b/policy/modules/apps/tvtime.te index 11fe4f2..38318b9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/tvtime.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/tvtime.te @@ -73,20 +73,11 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(tvtime_t) miscfiles_read_localization(tvtime_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(tvtime_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(tvtime_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(tvtime_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(tvtime_t) # X access, Home files -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(tvtime_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(tvtime_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(tvtime_t) -') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(tvtime_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(tvtime_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(tvtime_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(tvtime_t) optional_policy(` xserver_user_x_domain_template(tvtime, tvtime_t, tvtime_tmpfs_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/uml.if b/policy/modules/apps/uml.if index d2ab7cb..ddb34f1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/uml.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/uml.if @@ -31,9 +31,9 @@ interface(`uml_role',` allow $2 uml_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; allow uml_t $2:unix_dgram_socket sendto; - # allow ps, ptrace, signal + # allow ps, signal ps_process_pattern($2, uml_t) - allow $2 uml_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $2 uml_t:process signal_perms; allow $2 uml_ro_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern($2, uml_ro_t, uml_ro_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/uml.te b/policy/modules/apps/uml.te index 2df1343..c716960 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/uml.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/uml.te @@ -53,7 +53,7 @@ files_pid_file(uml_switch_var_run_t) # allow uml_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -allow uml_t self:process { signal_perms ptrace }; +allow uml_t self:process signal_perms; allow uml_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow uml_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; # Use the network. @@ -134,7 +134,7 @@ seutil_use_newrole_fds(uml_t) # Use the network. sysnet_read_config(uml_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(uml_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(uml_t) userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface(uml_t) optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.fc b/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.fc index e70b0e8..cd83b89 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.fc @@ -7,3 +7,4 @@ # /usr # /usr/sbin/userhelper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:userhelper_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/consolehelper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:consolehelper_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.if b/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.if index ced285a..d2e2ce8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.if @@ -25,6 +25,7 @@ template(`userhelper_role_template',` gen_require(` attribute userhelper_type; type userhelper_exec_t, userhelper_conf_t; + class dbus send_msg; ') ######################################## @@ -122,6 +123,9 @@ template(`userhelper_role_template',` auth_manage_pam_pid($1_userhelper_t) auth_manage_var_auth($1_userhelper_t) auth_search_pam_console_data($1_userhelper_t) + auth_use_nsswitch($1_userhelper_t) + + logging_send_syslog_msg($1_userhelper_t) # Inherit descriptors from the current session. init_use_fds($1_userhelper_t) @@ -146,18 +150,6 @@ template(`userhelper_role_template',` ') optional_policy(` - logging_send_syslog_msg($1_userhelper_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind($1_userhelper_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use($1_userhelper_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` tunable_policy(`! secure_mode',` #if we are not in secure mode then we can transition to sysadm_t sysadm_bin_spec_domtrans($1_userhelper_t) @@ -256,3 +248,88 @@ interface(`userhelper_exec',` can_exec($1, userhelper_exec_t) ') + +####################################### +## +## The role template for the consolehelper module. +## +## +##

+## This template creates a derived domains which are used +## for consolehelper applications. +##

+## +## +## +## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## +## +## +## +## The role associated with the user domain. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the user domain. +## +## +# +template(`userhelper_console_role_template',` + gen_require(` + type consolehelper_exec_t; + attribute consolehelper_domain; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + type $1_consolehelper_t, consolehelper_domain; + domain_type($1_consolehelper_t) + domain_entry_file($1_consolehelper_t, consolehelper_exec_t) + role $2 types $1_consolehelper_t; + + domtrans_pattern($3, consolehelper_exec_t, $1_consolehelper_t) + + allow $3 $1_consolehelper_t:process signal; + allow $3 $1_consolehelper_t:dbus send_msg; + allow $1_consolehelper_t $3:dbus send_msg; + + auth_use_pam($1_consolehelper_t) + + userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($2, $1_consolehelper_t) + + optional_policy(` + dbus_connect_session_bus($1_consolehelper_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + shutdown_run($1_consolehelper_t, $2) + shutdown_send_sigchld($3) + ') + + optional_policy(` + mock_run($1_consolehelper_t, $2) + ') + + optional_policy(` + xserver_run_xauth($1_consolehelper_t, $2) + xserver_read_xdm_pid($1_consolehelper_t) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute the consolehelper program in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userhelper_exec_console',` + gen_require(` + type consolehelper_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, consolehelper_exec_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.te b/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.te index 13b2cea..8ce8577 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/userhelper.te @@ -6,9 +6,81 @@ policy_module(userhelper, 1.6.0) # attribute userhelper_type; +attribute consolehelper_domain; type userhelper_conf_t; files_type(userhelper_conf_t) type userhelper_exec_t; application_executable_file(userhelper_exec_t) + +type consolehelper_exec_t; +application_executable_file(consolehelper_exec_t) + +######################################## +# +# consolehelper local policy +# + +allow consolehelper_domain self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow consolehelper_domain self:capability { setgid setuid }; + +allow consolehelper_domain userhelper_conf_t:file audit_access; +dontaudit consolehelper_domain userhelper_conf_t:file write; +read_files_pattern(consolehelper_domain, userhelper_conf_t, userhelper_conf_t) + +# Init script handling +domain_use_interactive_fds(consolehelper_domain) + +# internal communication is often done using fifo and unix sockets. +allow consolehelper_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow consolehelper_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(consolehelper_domain) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(consolehelper_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(consolehelper_domain) + +dev_getattr_all_chr_files(consolehelper_domain) +dev_dontaudit_list_all_dev_nodes(consolehelper_domain) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(consolehelper_domain) +fs_getattr_all_dirs(consolehelper_domain) + +files_read_config_files(consolehelper_domain) +files_read_usr_files(consolehelper_domain) + +term_list_ptys(consolehelper_domain) + +auth_search_pam_console_data(consolehelper_domain) +auth_read_pam_pid(consolehelper_domain) + +init_read_utmp(consolehelper_domain) +init_telinit(consolehelper_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(consolehelper_domain) +miscfiles_read_fonts(consolehelper_domain) + +userhelper_exec(consolehelper_domain) + +userdom_use_user_ptys(consolehelper_domain) +userdom_use_user_ttys(consolehelper_domain) +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(consolehelper_domain) + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_gconf_home_files(consolehelper_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_read_home_fonts(consolehelper_domain) + xserver_stream_connect(consolehelper_domain) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + files_search_mnt(consolehelper_domain) + fs_search_nfs(consolehelper_domain) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + files_search_mnt(consolehelper_domain) + fs_search_cifs(consolehelper_domain) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/usernetctl.if b/policy/modules/apps/usernetctl.if index ba9b9d6..09ae47c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/usernetctl.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/usernetctl.if @@ -47,10 +47,6 @@ interface(`usernetctl_run',` sysnet_run_dhcpc(usernetctl_t, $2) optional_policy(` - consoletype_run(usernetctl_t, $2) - ') - - optional_policy(` iptables_run(usernetctl_t, $2) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/usernetctl.te b/policy/modules/apps/usernetctl.te index 9586818..93edd6b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/usernetctl.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/usernetctl.te @@ -58,7 +58,11 @@ seutil_read_config(usernetctl_t) sysnet_read_config(usernetctl_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(usernetctl_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(usernetctl_t) + +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(usernetctl_t) +') optional_policy(` hostname_exec(usernetctl_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/vlock.te b/policy/modules/apps/vlock.te index 03fc701..f58654e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/vlock.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/vlock.te @@ -50,4 +50,4 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(vlock_t) miscfiles_read_localization(vlock_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(vlock_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(vlock_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(vlock_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/vmware.fc b/policy/modules/apps/vmware.fc index f647c7e..252468a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/vmware.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/vmware.fc @@ -39,12 +39,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /usr/lib/vmware-tools/sbin64/vmware.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vmware_host_exec_t,s0) ') -/usr/lib64/vmware/config -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vmware_sys_conf_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/vmware/bin/vmware-mks -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vmware_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/vmware/bin/vmware-ui -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vmware_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/vmware/bin/vmplayer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vmware_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/vmware/bin/vmware-vmx -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vmware_host_exec_t,s0) - /usr/sbin/vmware-guest.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vmware_host_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/vmware-serverd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vmware_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/vmware.te b/policy/modules/apps/vmware.te index 23066a1..dc73652 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/vmware.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/vmware.te @@ -72,7 +72,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',` # VMWare host local policy # -allow vmware_host_t self:capability { setgid setuid net_raw sys_nice sys_time sys_ptrace kill dac_override }; +allow vmware_host_t self:capability { setgid setuid net_raw sys_nice sys_time kill dac_override }; dontaudit vmware_host_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow vmware_host_t self:process { execstack execmem signal_perms }; allow vmware_host_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -126,6 +126,7 @@ dev_getattr_all_blk_files(vmware_host_t) dev_read_sysfs(vmware_host_t) dev_read_urand(vmware_host_t) dev_rw_vmware(vmware_host_t) +dev_rw_generic_chr_files(vmware_host_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(vmware_host_t) domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(vmware_host_t) @@ -133,7 +134,7 @@ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(vmware_host_t) files_list_tmp(vmware_host_t) files_read_etc_files(vmware_host_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(vmware_host_t) -files_read_usr_files(vmware_host_t) +files_read_usr_files(vmware_host_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(vmware_host_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(vmware_host_t) @@ -152,7 +153,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(vmware_host_t) miscfiles_read_localization(vmware_host_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(vmware_host_t) -sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(vmware_host_t) +sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(vmware_host_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(vmware_host_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(vmware_host_t) @@ -161,10 +162,22 @@ netutils_domtrans_ping(vmware_host_t) optional_policy(` hostname_exec(vmware_host_t) -') +') optional_policy(` modutils_domtrans_insmod(vmware_host_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + samba_read_config(vmware_host_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + seutil_sigchld_newrole(vmware_host_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + shutdown_domtrans(vmware_host_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -275,7 +288,7 @@ libs_read_lib_files(vmware_t) miscfiles_read_localization(vmware_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(vmware_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(vmware_t) userdom_list_user_home_dirs(vmware_t) # cjp: why? userdom_read_user_home_content_files(vmware_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/webalizer.te b/policy/modules/apps/webalizer.te index b11941a..181c808 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/webalizer.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/webalizer.te @@ -75,33 +75,29 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(webalizer_t) logging_list_logs(webalizer_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(webalizer_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(webalizer_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(webalizer_t) miscfiles_read_public_files(webalizer_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(webalizer_t) sysnet_read_config(webalizer_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(webalizer_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(webalizer_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(webalizer_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(webalizer_t) -apache_read_log(webalizer_t) -apache_manage_sys_content(webalizer_t) - optional_policy(` - cron_system_entry(webalizer_t, webalizer_exec_t) + apache_read_log(webalizer_t) + apache_manage_sys_content(webalizer_t) ') optional_policy(` - ftp_read_log(webalizer_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(webalizer_t) + cron_system_entry(webalizer_t, webalizer_exec_t) ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(webalizer_t) + ftp_read_log(webalizer_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/wine.fc b/policy/modules/apps/wine.fc index 9d24449..2666317 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/wine.fc +++ b/policy/modules/apps/wine.fc @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ HOME_DIR/cxoffice/bin/wine.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) /opt/cxoffice/bin/wine.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) +/opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/Picasa3/.*exe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/msiexec -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/notepad -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/progman -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) @@ -10,6 +11,7 @@ HOME_DIR/cxoffice/bin/wine.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/uninstaller -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/wdi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) /opt/google/picasa(/.*)?/bin/wine.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) +/opt/teamviewer(/.*)?/bin/wine.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) /opt/picasa/wine/bin/wine.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wine_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/wine.if b/policy/modules/apps/wine.if index f9a73d0..00a98f1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/wine.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/wine.if @@ -29,12 +29,16 @@ # template(`wine_role',` gen_require(` + type wine_t; + type wine_home_t; type wine_exec_t; ') role $1 types wine_t; domain_auto_trans($2, wine_exec_t, wine_t) + # Unrestricted inheritance from the caller. + allow $2 wine_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; allow wine_t $2:fd use; allow wine_t $2:process { sigchld signull }; allow wine_t $2:unix_stream_socket connectto; @@ -44,8 +48,7 @@ template(`wine_role',` allow $2 wine_t:process signal_perms; allow $2 wine_t:fd use; - allow $2 wine_t:shm { associate getattr }; - allow $2 wine_t:shm { unix_read unix_write }; + allow $2 wine_t:shm { associate getattr unix_read unix_write }; allow $2 wine_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; # X access, Home files @@ -86,6 +89,7 @@ template(`wine_role',` # template(`wine_role_template',` gen_require(` + type wine_t; type wine_exec_t; ') @@ -96,12 +100,12 @@ template(`wine_role_template',` role $2 types $1_wine_t; allow $1_wine_t self:process { execmem execstack }; - allow $3 $1_wine_t:process { getattr ptrace noatsecure signal_perms }; + allow $3 $1_wine_t:process { getattr noatsecure signal_perms }; domtrans_pattern($3, wine_exec_t, $1_wine_t) corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_wine_t, $1_t) userdom_unpriv_usertype($1, $1_wine_t) - userdom_manage_user_tmpfs_files($1_wine_t) + userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($2, $1_wine_t) domain_mmap_low($1_wine_t) @@ -109,6 +113,10 @@ template(`wine_role_template',` dontaudit $1_wine_t self:memprotect mmap_zero; ') + tunable_policy(`wine_mmap_zero_ignore',` + dontaudit $1_wine_t self:memprotect mmap_zero; + ') + optional_policy(` xserver_role($1_r, $1_wine_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/wine.te b/policy/modules/apps/wine.te index be9246b..90848c7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/wine.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/wine.te @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ domain_mmap_low(wine_t) files_execmod_all_files(wine_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(wine_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(wine_t) tunable_policy(`wine_mmap_zero_ignore',` dontaudit wine_t self:memprotect mmap_zero; @@ -55,6 +55,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + rtkit_scheduled(wine_t) +') + +optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(wine_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/wireshark.te b/policy/modules/apps/wireshark.te index 8bfe97d..356e2a1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/wireshark.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/wireshark.te @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ ubac_constrained(wireshark_t) type wireshark_home_t; typealias wireshark_home_t alias { user_wireshark_home_t staff_wireshark_home_t sysadm_wireshark_home_t }; typealias wireshark_home_t alias { auditadm_wireshark_home_t secadm_wireshark_home_t }; +files_poly_member(wireshark_home_t) userdom_user_home_content(wireshark_home_t) type wireshark_tmp_t; @@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ ubac_constrained(wireshark_tmpfs_t) # Local Policy # -allow wireshark_t self:capability { net_admin net_raw setgid }; +allow wireshark_t self:capability { net_admin net_raw }; allow wireshark_t self:process { signal getsched }; allow wireshark_t self:fifo_file { getattr read write }; allow wireshark_t self:shm destroy; @@ -85,6 +86,8 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(wireshark_t) libs_read_lib_files(wireshark_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(wireshark_t) + miscfiles_read_fonts(wireshark_t) miscfiles_read_localization(wireshark_t) @@ -94,21 +97,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(wireshark_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(wireshark_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(wireshark_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(wireshark_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(wireshark_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(wireshark_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(wireshark_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(wireshark_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(wireshark_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(wireshark_t) # Manual transition from userhelper optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/wm.if b/policy/modules/apps/wm.if index b3efef7..50c1a74 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/wm.if +++ b/policy/modules/apps/wm.if @@ -77,6 +77,11 @@ template(`wm_role_template',` miscfiles_read_fonts($1_wm_t) miscfiles_read_localization($1_wm_t) + userdom_manage_home_role($2, $1_wm_t) + userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($2, $1_wm_t) + userdom_manage_tmp_role($2, $1_wm_t) + userdom_exec_user_tmp_files($1_wm_t) + optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client($1_wm_t) dbus_session_bus_client($1_wm_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/xscreensaver.te b/policy/modules/apps/xscreensaver.te index 1bdeb16..775f788 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/xscreensaver.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/xscreensaver.te @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(xscreensaver_t) miscfiles_read_localization(xscreensaver_t) -userdom_use_user_ptys(xscreensaver_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(xscreensaver_t) #access to .icons and ~/.xscreensaver userdom_read_user_home_content_files(xscreensaver_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/apps/yam.te b/policy/modules/apps/yam.te index 223ad43..d95e720 100644 --- a/policy/modules/apps/yam.te +++ b/policy/modules/apps/yam.te @@ -83,6 +83,8 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(yam_t) # Content can also be on ISO image files. fs_read_iso9660_files(yam_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(yam_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(yam_t) miscfiles_read_localization(yam_t) @@ -92,7 +94,7 @@ seutil_read_config(yam_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(yam_t) sysnet_read_config(yam_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(yam_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(yam_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(yam_t) # Reading dotfiles... # cjp: ? @@ -112,13 +114,5 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(yam_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(yam_t) -') - -optional_policy(` rsync_exec(yam_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc index 3fae11a..f55e193 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.fc @@ -1,9 +1,10 @@ # # /bin # -/bin -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/bin gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /bin/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /bin/d?ash -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/bin/esh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) /bin/bash -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) /bin/bash2 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) /bin/fish -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) @@ -46,6 +47,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /etc/apcupsd/offbattery -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/apcupsd/onbattery -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/etc/auto\.[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/avahi/.*\.action -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/cipe/ip-up.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -71,10 +73,18 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /etc/kde/env(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/kde/shutdown(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/etc/redhat-lsb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) + +/etc/lxdm/LoginReady -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/etc/lxdm/Post.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/etc/lxdm/Pre.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/etc/lxdm/Xsession -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) + /etc/mail/make -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/mcelog/cache-error-trigger -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/mcelog/triggers(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/mgetty\+sendfax/new_fax -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/etc/munin/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/netplug\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -97,8 +107,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/functions -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/etc/security/namespace.init -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) - /etc/sysconfig/crond -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/sysconfig/init -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/sysconfig/libvirtd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -130,18 +138,14 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',` /lib/readahead(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/lib/systemd/systemd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /lib/udev/[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /lib/udev/scsi_id -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /lib/upstart(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) - -/lib64/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/lib64/udev/[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) - ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /lib/dhcpcd/dhcpcd-run-hooks -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/lib64/dhcpcd/dhcpcd-run-hooks -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/lib/dhcpcd/dhcpcd-run-hooks -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /lib/rcscripts/addons(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /lib/rcscripts/sh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -152,7 +156,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` # # /sbin # -/sbin -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/sbin gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /sbin/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /sbin/mkfs\.cramfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -168,6 +172,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /opt/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /opt/google/talkplugin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/opt/google/chrome(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /opt/gutenprint/cups/lib/filter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -179,67 +184,93 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /opt/vmware/workstation/lib/lib/wrapper-gtk24\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) ') +/root/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) + # # /usr # +/usr/bin -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/(.*/)?Bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/(.*/)?bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/bin/git-shell -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/bin/d?ash -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/esh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/bash -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/bash2 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/fish -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) -/usr/bin/scponly -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/ksh.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/mksh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/mountpoint -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/bin/sash -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/tcsh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/yash -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/zsh.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(.*/)?bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/bin/git-shell -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/scponly -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) /usr/(.*/)?sbin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib(.*/)?sbin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib(.*/)?bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/ccache/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/fence(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/.*\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/qt.*/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/wicd/monitor\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t, s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/[^/]*firefox[^/]*/firefox -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/apt/methods.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ConsoleKit/scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ConsoleKit/run-session.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/cups(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/cyrus/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/cyrus-imapd/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/dpkg/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/emacsen-common/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/gimp/.*/plug-ins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ipsec/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/mailman/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/mailman/mail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/mediawiki/math/texvc.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/misc/sftp-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/netsaint/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nspluginwrapper/np.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/portage/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/pm-utils(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/rpm/rpmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/rpm/rpmk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/rpm/rpmq -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/rpm/rpmv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/sftp-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/vte/gnome-pty-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) - -/usr/lib(64)?/debug/bin(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/debug/sbin(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/debug/usr/bin(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/debug/usr/sbin(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) - -/usr/lib(64)?/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird-bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/open-browser\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/[^/]*/run-mozilla\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/[^/]*/mozilla-xremote-client -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/thunderbird.*/mozilla-xremote-client -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) - -/usr/lib(64)?/xen/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/apt/methods.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/chromium-browser(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ConsoleKit/scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ConsoleKit/run-session\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cups(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/dpkg/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/emacsen-common/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/gimp/.*/plug-ins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ipsec/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mailman.*/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mailman.*/mail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/MailScanner(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mediawiki/math/texvc.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/misc/sftp-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/netsaint/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/portage/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/pm-utils(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/readahead(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/rpm/rpmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/rpm/rpmk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/rpm/rpmq -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/rpm/rpmv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/tumbler-[^/]*/tumblerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/security/pam_krb5/pam_krb5_storetmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/sftp-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/vte/gnome-pty-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/yaboot/addnote -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/debug/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/debug/sbin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/debug/usr/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/debug/usr/sbin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/debug/usr/libexec(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/devices/MAKEDEV -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/scsi_id -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/upstart(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/thunderbird-bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/[^/]*thunderbird[^/]*/open-browser\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/xulrunner[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/updater -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xulrunner[^/]*/crashreporter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/[^/]*/run-mozilla\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/[^/]*/mozilla-xremote-client -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/thunderbird.*/mozilla-xremote-client -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/xen/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/libexec(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/libexec/git-core/git-shell -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) @@ -247,11 +278,18 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /usr/libexec/openssh/sftp-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/local/lib(64)?/ipsec/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xfce4(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) + +/usr/local/lib/ipsec/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/local/Brother(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/local/Printer(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/local/Brother/(.*/)?inf/brprintconf.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/local/Brother/(.*/)?inf/setup.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/local/linuxprinter/filters(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/insmod_ksymoops_clean -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mkfs\.cramfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/nologin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/scponlyc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/sesh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/smrsh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shell_exec_t,s0) @@ -267,6 +305,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /usr/share/cluster/.*\.sh gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/cluster/ocf-shellfuncs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/cluster/svclib_nfslock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/cluster/SAPDatabase -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/cluster/SAPInstance -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/cluster/fence_scsi_check\.pl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/cluster/checkquorum -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/e16/misc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/gedit-2/plugins/externaltools/tools(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/gitolite/hooks/common/update -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -286,15 +328,19 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /usr/share/smolt/client(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/shorewall/compiler\.pl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/shorewall/configpath -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/shorewall/getparams -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/shorewall-perl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/shorewall-shell(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/shorewall-lite(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/shorewall6-lite(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/spamassassin/sa-update\.cron gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/turboprint/lib(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/tucan.*/tucan.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/vhostmd/scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/virtualbox/.*\.sh gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/wicd/daemon(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/X11R6/lib(64)?/X11/xkb/xkbcomp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/X11R6/lib/X11/xkb/xkbcomp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` /usr/.*-.*-linux-gnu/gcc-bin/.*(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -306,10 +352,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` /etc/gdm/[^/]+ -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /etc/gdm/[^/]+/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/.*/program(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/.*/program(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/bluetooth(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/bluetooth(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nfs-utils/scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/oracle/xe/apps(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/tuned/.*/.*\.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin32(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/vmware-tools/(s)?bin64(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/authconfig/authconfig-gtk\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -319,9 +367,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` /usr/share/clamav/clamd-gen -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/clamav/freshclam-sleep -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/createrepo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/doc/ghc/html/libraries/gen_contents_index -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/fedora-usermgmt/wrapper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/hplip/[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/hwbrowser/hwbrowser -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/share/kde4/apps/kajongg/kajongg.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/pwlib/make/ptlib-config -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/pydict/pydict\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/rhn/rhn_applet/applet\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -363,20 +413,21 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /usr/lib/cron/run-crons -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/lib/samba/classic/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ssh/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ssh/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /usr/share/apache2/[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) ') # # /var # -/var/mailman/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/var/mailman.*/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /var/ftp/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /var/lib/asterisk/agi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib/yp/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/yp/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/var/lib/iscan/interpreter gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ruby/gems(/.*)?/helper-scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) + /var/qmail/bin -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) /var/qmail/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) @@ -385,3 +436,13 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` ifdef(`distro_suse',` /var/lib/samba/bin/.+ gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) ') + +# +# /usr/lib +# + +/usr/lib/dracut(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/iscan/network -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ruby/gems/.*/agents(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/virtualbox/VBoxManage -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) +/usr/lib/yp/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bin_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if index 9e9263a..ba59ffd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.if @@ -122,6 +122,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_search_bin',` type bin_t; ') + corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1) search_dirs_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t) ') @@ -158,6 +159,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_list_bin',` type bin_t; ') + corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1) list_dirs_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t) ') @@ -203,7 +205,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_getattr_bin_files',` ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -231,6 +233,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_read_bin_files',` type bin_t; ') + corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1) read_files_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t) ') @@ -254,6 +257,24 @@ interface(`corecmd_dontaudit_write_bin_files',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to access check bin files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corecmd_dontaudit_access_check_bin',` + gen_require(` + type bin_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 bin_t:file audit_access; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read symbolic links in bin directories. ## ## @@ -285,6 +306,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_read_bin_pipes',` type bin_t; ') + corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(bin_t) read_fifo_files_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t) ') @@ -303,6 +325,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_read_bin_sockets',` type bin_t; ') + corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1) read_sock_files_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t) ') @@ -362,6 +385,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_manage_bin_files',` type bin_t; ') + corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1) manage_files_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t) ') @@ -398,6 +422,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_mmap_bin_files',` type bin_t; ') + corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1) mmap_files_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t) ') @@ -954,6 +979,24 @@ interface(`corecmd_exec_chroot',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to access check executable files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corecmd_dontaudit_access_all_executables',` + gen_require(` + attribute exec_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 exec_type:file audit_access; +') + +######################################## +## ## Get the attributes of all executable files. ## ## @@ -1049,6 +1092,7 @@ interface(`corecmd_manage_all_executables',` type bin_t; ') + manage_dirs_pattern($1, bin_t, exec_type) manage_files_pattern($1, bin_t, exec_type) manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, bin_t, bin_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te index 23a1c3c..e7f6216 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corecommands.te @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ attribute exec_type; # # bin_t is the type of files in the system bin/sbin directories. # -type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t }; +type bin_t alias { ls_exec_t sbin_t unconfined_execmem_exec_t execmem_exec_t java_exec_t mono_exec_t }; corecmd_executable_file(bin_t) dev_associate(bin_t) #For /dev/MAKEDEV diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.fc index f9b25c1..9af1f7a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.fc +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.fc @@ -8,3 +8,6 @@ /lib/udev/devices/ppp -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:ppp_device_t,s0) /lib/udev/devices/net/.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/udev/devices/ppp -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:ppp_device_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/devices/net/.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tun_tap_device_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in index 4f3b542..0ebac89 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.in @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ interface(`corenet_reserved_port',` ') typeattribute $1 reserved_port_type; + corenet_port($1) ') ######################################## @@ -82,6 +83,7 @@ interface(`corenet_rpc_port',` ') typeattribute $1 rpc_port_type; + corenet_port($1) ') ######################################## @@ -615,6 +617,24 @@ interface(`corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if',` ######################################## ## +## Send and receive DCCP network traffic on generic nodes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_sendrecv_generic_node',` + gen_require(` + type node_t; + ') + + allow $1 node_t:node { dccp_send dccp_recv sendto recvfrom }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Send and receive TCP network traffic on generic nodes. ## ## @@ -789,6 +809,24 @@ interface(`corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node',` ######################################## ## +## Bind DCCP sockets to generic nodes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_bind_generic_node',` + gen_require(` + type node_t; + ') + + allow $1 node_t:dccp_socket node_bind; +') + +######################################## +## ## Bind TCP sockets to generic nodes. ## ## @@ -928,6 +966,24 @@ interface(`corenet_inout_generic_node',` ######################################## ## +## Send and receive DCCP network traffic on all nodes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_sendrecv_all_nodes',` + gen_require(` + attribute node_type; + ') + + allow $1 node_type:node { dccp_send dccp_recv sendto recvfrom }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Send and receive TCP network traffic on all nodes. ## ## @@ -1102,6 +1158,24 @@ interface(`corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes',` ######################################## ## +## Bind DCCP sockets to all nodes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_bind_all_nodes',` + gen_require(` + attribute node_type; + ') + + allow $1 node_type:dccp_socket node_bind; +') + +######################################## +## ## Bind TCP sockets to all nodes. ## ## @@ -1157,6 +1231,24 @@ interface(`corenet_raw_bind_all_nodes',` ######################################## ## +## Send and receive DCCP network traffic on generic ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_sendrecv_generic_port',` + gen_require(` + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; + ') + + allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Send and receive TCP network traffic on generic ports. ## ## @@ -1167,10 +1259,30 @@ interface(`corenet_raw_bind_all_nodes',` # interface(`corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port',` gen_require(` - type port_t; + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; + ') + + allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to send and +## receive DCCP network traffic on +## generic ports. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_sendrecv_generic_port',` + gen_require(` + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; ') - allow $1 port_t:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; + dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; ') ######################################## @@ -1185,10 +1297,10 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port',` # interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port',` gen_require(` - type port_t; + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; ') - dontaudit $1 port_t:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; + dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; ') ######################################## @@ -1203,10 +1315,10 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port',` # interface(`corenet_udp_send_generic_port',` gen_require(` - type port_t; + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; ') - allow $1 port_t:udp_socket send_msg; + allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:udp_socket send_msg; ') ######################################## @@ -1221,10 +1333,10 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_send_generic_port',` # interface(`corenet_udp_receive_generic_port',` gen_require(` - type port_t; + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; ') - allow $1 port_t:udp_socket recv_msg; + allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:udp_socket recv_msg; ') ######################################## @@ -1244,6 +1356,26 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_port',` ######################################## ## +## Bind DCCP sockets to generic ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_bind_generic_port',` + gen_require(` + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; + attribute defined_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket name_bind; + dontaudit $1 defined_port_type:dccp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## ## Bind TCP sockets to generic ports. ## ## @@ -1254,12 +1386,31 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_port',` # interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port',` gen_require(` - type port_t; - attribute port_type; + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; + attribute defined_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket name_bind; + dontaudit $1 defined_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to bind DCCP +## sockets to generic ports. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_bind_generic_port',` + gen_require(` + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; ') - allow $1 port_t:tcp_socket name_bind; - dontaudit $1 { port_type -port_t }:tcp_socket name_bind; + dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket name_bind; ') ######################################## @@ -1274,10 +1425,10 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port',` # interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_generic_port',` gen_require(` - type port_t; + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; ') - dontaudit $1 port_t:tcp_socket name_bind; + dontaudit $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket name_bind; ') ######################################## @@ -1292,12 +1443,30 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_generic_port',` # interface(`corenet_udp_bind_generic_port',` gen_require(` - type port_t; - attribute port_type; + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; + attribute defined_port_type; ') - allow $1 port_t:udp_socket name_bind; - dontaudit $1 { port_type -port_t }:udp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:udp_socket name_bind; + dontaudit $1 defined_port_type:udp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect DCCP sockets to generic ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_connect_generic_port',` + gen_require(` + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; + ') + + allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:dccp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## @@ -1312,10 +1481,28 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_bind_generic_port',` # interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port',` gen_require(` - type port_t; + type port_t, unreserved_port_t; ') - allow $1 port_t:tcp_socket name_connect; + allow $1 { port_t unreserved_port_t }:tcp_socket name_connect; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive DCCP network traffic on all ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_sendrecv_all_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute port_type; + ') + + allow $1 port_type:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; ') ######################################## @@ -1439,6 +1626,25 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports',` ######################################## ## +## Bind DCCP sockets to all ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_bind_all_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute port_type; + ') + + allow $1 port_type:dccp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 self:capability net_bind_service; +') + +######################################## +## ## Bind TCP sockets to all ports. ## ## @@ -1458,6 +1664,24 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attepts to bind DCCP sockets to any ports. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_bind_all_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute port_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 port_type:dccp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attepts to bind TCP sockets to any ports. ## ## @@ -1513,6 +1737,24 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_ports',` ######################################## ## +## Connect DCCP sockets to all ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_connect_all_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute port_type; + ') + + allow $1 port_type:dccp_socket name_connect; +') + +######################################## +## ## Connect TCP sockets to all ports. ## ## @@ -1559,6 +1801,25 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to connect DCCP sockets +## to all ports. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_connect_all_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute port_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 port_type:dccp_socket name_connect; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to connect TCP sockets ## to all ports. ## @@ -1578,6 +1839,24 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_connect_all_ports',` ######################################## ## +## Send and receive DCCP network traffic on generic reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_sendrecv_reserved_port',` + gen_require(` + type reserved_port_t; + ') + + allow $1 reserved_port_t:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Send and receive TCP network traffic on generic reserved ports. ## ## @@ -1647,6 +1926,25 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_sendrecv_reserved_port',` ######################################## ## +## Bind DCCP sockets to generic reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_bind_reserved_port',` + gen_require(` + type reserved_port_t; + ') + + allow $1 reserved_port_t:dccp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 self:capability net_bind_service; +') + +######################################## +## ## Bind TCP sockets to generic reserved ports. ## ## @@ -1685,6 +1983,24 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_bind_reserved_port',` ######################################## ## +## Connect DCCP sockets to generic reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_connect_reserved_port',` + gen_require(` + type reserved_port_t; + ') + + allow $1 reserved_port_t:dccp_socket name_connect; +') + +######################################## +## ## Connect TCP sockets to generic reserved ports. ## ## @@ -1703,6 +2019,24 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_reserved_port',` ######################################## ## +## Send and receive DCCP network traffic on all reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_sendrecv_all_reserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute reserved_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 reserved_port_type:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Send and receive TCP network traffic on all reserved ports. ## ## @@ -1749,15 +2083,213 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_send_all_reserved_ports',` # interface(`corenet_udp_receive_all_reserved_ports',` gen_require(` - attribute reserved_port_type; + attribute reserved_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 reserved_port_type:udp_socket recv_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive UDP network traffic on all reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_reserved_ports',` + corenet_udp_send_all_reserved_ports($1) + corenet_udp_receive_all_reserved_ports($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Bind DCCP sockets to all reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute reserved_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 reserved_port_type:dccp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 self:capability net_bind_service; +') + +######################################## +## +## Bind TCP sockets to all reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute reserved_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 self:capability net_bind_service; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to bind DCCP sockets to all reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute reserved_port_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 reserved_port_type:dccp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to bind TCP sockets to all reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute reserved_port_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## +## Bind UDP sockets to all reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_udp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute reserved_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 reserved_port_type:udp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 self:capability net_bind_service; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to bind UDP sockets to all reserved ports. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute reserved_port_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 reserved_port_type:udp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## +## Bind DCCP sockets to all ports > 1024. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_bind_all_unreserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute unreserved_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 unreserved_port_type:dccp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## +## Bind TCP sockets to all ports > 1024. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute unreserved_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 unreserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## +## Bind UDP sockets to all ports > 1024. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_udp_bind_all_unreserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute unreserved_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 unreserved_port_type:udp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## +## Bind TCP sockets to all ports > 32768. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_all_ephemeral_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute ephemeral_port_type; ') - allow $1 reserved_port_type:udp_socket recv_msg; + allow $1 ephemeral_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind; ') ######################################## ## -## Send and receive UDP network traffic on all reserved ports. +## Bind UDP sockets to all ports > 32768. ## ## ## @@ -1765,14 +2297,17 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_receive_all_reserved_ports',` ## ## # -interface(`corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_reserved_ports',` - corenet_udp_send_all_reserved_ports($1) - corenet_udp_receive_all_reserved_ports($1) +interface(`corenet_udp_bind_all_ephemeral_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute ephemeral_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 ephemeral_port_type:udp_socket name_bind; ') ######################################## ## -## Bind TCP sockets to all reserved ports. +## Connect DCCP sockets to reserved ports. ## ## ## @@ -1780,36 +2315,35 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_reserved_ports',` ## ## # -interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` +interface(`corenet_dccp_connect_all_reserved_ports',` gen_require(` attribute reserved_port_type; ') - allow $1 reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind; - allow $1 self:capability net_bind_service; + allow $1 reserved_port_type:dccp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## ## -## Do not audit attempts to bind TCP sockets to all reserved ports. +## Connect TCP sockets to reserved ports. ## ## ## -## Domain to not audit. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` +interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports',` gen_require(` attribute reserved_port_type; ') - dontaudit $1 reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## ## -## Bind UDP sockets to all reserved ports. +## Connect DCCP sockets to all ports > 1024. ## ## ## @@ -1817,36 +2351,53 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` ## ## # -interface(`corenet_udp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` +interface(`corenet_dccp_connect_all_unreserved_ports',` gen_require(` - attribute reserved_port_type; + attribute unreserved_port_type; ') - allow $1 reserved_port_type:udp_socket name_bind; - allow $1 self:capability net_bind_service; + allow $1 unreserved_port_type:dccp_socket name_connect; +') + +####################################### +## +## Connect TCP sockets to ports > 1024. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_unreserved_ports',` + gen_require(` + type unreserved_port_t; + ') + + allow $1 unreserved_port_t:tcp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## ## -## Do not audit attempts to bind UDP sockets to all reserved ports. +## Connect TCP sockets to all ports > 1024. ## ## ## -## Domain to not audit. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` +interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_all_unreserved_ports',` gen_require(` - attribute reserved_port_type; + attribute unreserved_port_type; ') - dontaudit $1 reserved_port_type:udp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 unreserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## ## -## Bind TCP sockets to all ports > 1024. +## Connect TCP sockets to all ports > 32768. ## ## ## @@ -1854,53 +2405,55 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_reserved_ports',` ## ## # -interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports',` +interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports',` gen_require(` - attribute port_type, reserved_port_type; + attribute ephemeral_port_type; ') - allow $1 { port_type -reserved_port_type }:tcp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 ephemeral_port_type:tcp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## ## -## Bind UDP sockets to all ports > 1024. +## Do not audit attempts to connect DCCP sockets +## all reserved ports. ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # -interface(`corenet_udp_bind_all_unreserved_ports',` +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_connect_all_reserved_ports',` gen_require(` - attribute port_type, reserved_port_type; + attribute reserved_port_type; ') - allow $1 { port_type -reserved_port_type }:udp_socket name_bind; + dontaudit $1 reserved_port_type:dccp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## ## -## Connect TCP sockets to reserved ports. +## Do not audit attempts to connect TCP sockets +## all reserved ports. ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # -interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports',` +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports',` gen_require(` attribute reserved_port_type; ') - allow $1 reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_connect; + dontaudit $1 reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## ## -## Connect TCP sockets to all ports > 1024. +## Connect DCCP sockets to rpc ports. ## ## ## @@ -1908,49 +2461,49 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports',` ## ## # -interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_all_unreserved_ports',` +interface(`corenet_dccp_connect_all_rpc_ports',` gen_require(` - attribute port_type, reserved_port_type; + attribute rpc_port_type; ') - allow $1 { port_type -reserved_port_type }:tcp_socket name_connect; + allow $1 rpc_port_type:dccp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## ## -## Do not audit attempts to connect TCP sockets -## all reserved ports. +## Connect TCP sockets to rpc ports. ## ## ## -## Domain to not audit. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports',` +interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_all_rpc_ports',` gen_require(` - attribute reserved_port_type; + attribute rpc_port_type; ') - dontaudit $1 reserved_port_type:tcp_socket name_connect; + allow $1 rpc_port_type:tcp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## ## -## Connect TCP sockets to rpc ports. +## Do not audit attempts to connect DCCP sockets +## all rpc ports. ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # -interface(`corenet_tcp_connect_all_rpc_ports',` +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_connect_all_rpc_ports',` gen_require(` attribute rpc_port_type; ') - allow $1 rpc_port_type:tcp_socket name_connect; + dontaudit $1 rpc_port_type:dccp_socket name_connect; ') ######################################## @@ -1993,6 +2546,24 @@ interface(`corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev',` ######################################## ## +## Read and write inherited TUN/TAP virtual network device. +## +## +## +## The domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_rw_inherited_tun_tap_dev',` + gen_require(` + type tun_tap_device_t; + ') + + allow $1 tun_tap_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_chr_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read or write the TUN/TAP ## virtual network device. ## @@ -2049,6 +2620,25 @@ interface(`corenet_rw_ppp_dev',` ######################################## ## +## Bind DCCP sockets to all RPC ports. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_bind_all_rpc_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute rpc_port_type; + ') + + allow $1 rpc_port_type:dccp_socket name_bind; + allow $1 self:capability net_bind_service; +') + +######################################## +## ## Bind TCP sockets to all RPC ports. ## ## @@ -2068,6 +2658,24 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_bind_all_rpc_ports',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to bind DCCP sockets to all RPC ports. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_bind_all_rpc_ports',` + gen_require(` + attribute rpc_port_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 rpc_port_type:dccp_socket name_bind; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to bind TCP sockets to all RPC ports. ## ## @@ -2194,6 +2802,25 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_recv_netlabel',` ######################################## ## +## Receive DCCP packets from a NetLabel connection. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_recvfrom_netlabel',` + gen_require(` + type netlabel_peer_t; + ') + + allow $1 netlabel_peer_t:peer recv; + allow $1 netlabel_peer_t:dccp_socket recvfrom; +') + +######################################## +## ## Receive TCP packets from a NetLabel connection. ## ## @@ -2213,6 +2840,31 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_recvfrom_netlabel',` ######################################## ## +## Receive DCCP packets from an unlabled connection. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_recvfrom_unlabeled',` + gen_require(` + attribute corenet_unlabeled_type; + ') + + kernel_dccp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) + kernel_recvfrom_unlabeled_peer($1) + + typeattribute $1 corenet_unlabeled_type; + # XXX - at some point the oubound/send access check will be removed + # but for right now we need to keep this in place so as not to break + # older systems + kernel_sendrecv_unlabeled_association($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Receive TCP packets from an unlabled connection. ## ## @@ -2222,9 +2874,14 @@ interface(`corenet_tcp_recvfrom_netlabel',` ## # interface(`corenet_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled',` + gen_require(` + attribute corenet_unlabeled_type; + ') + kernel_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) kernel_recvfrom_unlabeled_peer($1) + typeattribute $1 corenet_unlabeled_type; # XXX - at some point the oubound/send access check will be removed # but for right now we need to keep this in place so as not to break # older systems @@ -2249,6 +2906,26 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_recv_netlabel',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to receive DCCP packets from a NetLabel +## connection. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_recvfrom_netlabel',` + gen_require(` + type netlabel_peer_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 netlabel_peer_t:peer recv; + dontaudit $1 netlabel_peer_t:dccp_socket recvfrom; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to receive TCP packets from a NetLabel ## connection. ## @@ -2269,6 +2946,27 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_tcp_recvfrom_netlabel',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to receive DCCP packets from an unlabeled +## connection. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_dccp_recvfrom_unlabeled',` + kernel_dontaudit_dccp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) + kernel_dontaudit_recvfrom_unlabeled_peer($1) + + # XXX - at some point the oubound/send access check will be removed + # but for right now we need to keep this in place so as not to break + # older systems + kernel_dontaudit_sendrecv_unlabeled_association($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to receive TCP packets from an unlabeled ## connection. ## @@ -2533,6 +3231,7 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_raw_recvfrom_unlabeled',` ## # interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled',` + kernel_dccp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) kernel_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) kernel_udp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) kernel_raw_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) @@ -2571,7 +3270,31 @@ interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel',` ') allow $1 netlabel_peer_t:peer recv; - allow $1 netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom; + allow $1 netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket dccp_socket } recvfrom; +') + +######################################## +## +## Enable unlabeled net packets +## +## +##

+## Allow unlabeled_packet_t to be used by all domains that use the network +##

+## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_enable_unlabeled_packets',` + gen_require(` + attribute corenet_unlabeled_type; + ') + + kernel_sendrecv_unlabeled_association(corenet_unlabeled_type) ') ######################################## @@ -2585,6 +3308,7 @@ interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel',` ## # interface(`corenet_dontaudit_all_recvfrom_unlabeled',` + kernel_dontaudit_dccp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) kernel_dontaudit_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) kernel_dontaudit_udp_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) kernel_dontaudit_raw_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) @@ -2613,7 +3337,35 @@ interface(`corenet_dontaudit_all_recvfrom_netlabel',` ') dontaudit $1 netlabel_peer_t:peer recv; - dontaudit $1 netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } recvfrom; + dontaudit $1 netlabel_peer_t:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket dccp_socket } recvfrom; +') + +######################################## +## +## Rules for receiving labeled DCCP packets. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Peer domain. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dccp_recvfrom_labeled',` + allow { $1 $2 } self:association sendto; + allow $1 $2:{ association dccp_socket } recvfrom; + allow $2 $1:{ association dccp_socket } recvfrom; + + allow $1 $2:peer recv; + allow $2 $1:peer recv; + + # allow receiving packets from MLS-only peers using NetLabel + corenet_dccp_recvfrom_netlabel($1) + corenet_dccp_recvfrom_netlabel($2) ') ######################################## @@ -2727,6 +3479,7 @@ interface(`corenet_raw_recvfrom_labeled',` ## # interface(`corenet_all_recvfrom_labeled',` + corenet_dccp_recvfrom_labeled($1, $2) corenet_tcp_recvfrom_labeled($1, $2) corenet_udp_recvfrom_labeled($1, $2) corenet_raw_recvfrom_labeled($1, $2) @@ -3134,3 +3887,53 @@ interface(`corenet_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 corenet_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## +## Create all network named devices with the correct label +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_filetrans_all_named_dev',` + + gen_require(` + type tun_tap_device_t; + type ppp_device_t; + ') + + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap0") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap1") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap2") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap3") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap4") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap5") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap6") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap7") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap8") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap9") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap10") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap11") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap12") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap13") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap14") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap15") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap16") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap17") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap18") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap19") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap20") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap21") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap22") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap23") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap24") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap25") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap26") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap27") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap28") + dev_filetrans($1, tun_tap_device_t, chr_file, "tap29") + dev_filetrans($1, ppp_device_t, chr_file, "ppp") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.m4 b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.m4 index 8e0f9cd..da3b374 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.m4 +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.if.m4 @@ -631,6 +631,26 @@ interface(`corenet_udp_bind_$1_port',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to sbind to $1 port. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +## +# +interface(`corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_$1_port',` + gen_require(` + $3 $1_$2; + ') + + dontaudit dollarsone $1_$2:udp_socket name_bind; + $4 +') + +######################################## +## ## Make a TCP connection to the $1 port. ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in index 99b71cb..c4af8e2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.in @@ -11,11 +11,15 @@ attribute netif_type; attribute node_type; attribute packet_type; attribute port_type; +attribute defined_port_type; attribute reserved_port_type; +attribute unreserved_port_type; +attribute ephemeral_port_type; attribute rpc_port_type; attribute server_packet_type; attribute corenet_unconfined_type; +attribute corenet_unlabeled_type; type ppp_device_t; dev_node(ppp_device_t) @@ -25,6 +29,7 @@ dev_node(ppp_device_t) # type tun_tap_device_t; dev_node(tun_tap_device_t) +mls_trusted_object(tun_tap_device_t) ######################################## # @@ -34,6 +39,18 @@ dev_node(tun_tap_device_t) # # client_packet_t is the default type of IPv4 and IPv6 client packets. # +type intranet_packet_t; +corenet_packet(intranet_packet_t) + +# +# client_packet_t is the default type of IPv4 and IPv6 client packets. +# +type internet_packet_t; +corenet_packet(internet_packet_t) + +# +# client_packet_t is the default type of IPv4 and IPv6 client packets. +# type client_packet_t, packet_type, client_packet_type; # @@ -50,6 +67,17 @@ type port_t, port_type; sid port gen_context(system_u:object_r:port_t,s0) # +# unreserved_port_t is the default type of port numbers > 1024 and non ephemeral +# +type unreserved_port_t, port_type, unreserved_port_type; + +# +# ephemeral_port_t is the default type of ephemeral port numbers. +# cat /proc/sys/net/ipv4/ip_local_port_range +# +type ephemeral_port_t, port_type, ephemeral_port_type; + +# # reserved_port_t is the type of INET port numbers below 1024. # type reserved_port_t, port_type, reserved_port_type; @@ -65,30 +93,39 @@ type hi_reserved_port_t, port_type, reserved_port_type, rpc_port_type; type server_packet_t, packet_type, server_packet_type; network_port(afs_bos, udp,7007,s0) +network_port(afs_client, udp,7001,s0) network_port(afs_fs, tcp,2040,s0, udp,7000,s0, udp,7005,s0) network_port(afs_ka, udp,7004,s0) network_port(afs_pt, udp,7002,s0) network_port(afs_vl, udp,7003,s0) network_port(agentx, udp,705,s0, tcp,705,s0) +network_port(ajaxterm, tcp,8022,s0) network_port(amanda, udp,10080-10082,s0, tcp,10080-10083,s0) network_port(amavisd_recv, tcp,10024,s0) network_port(amavisd_send, tcp,10025,s0) network_port(amqp, udp,5671-5672,s0, tcp,5671-5672,s0) -network_port(aol, udp,5190-5193,s0, tcp,5190-5193,s0) +network_port(aol, udp,5190-5193,s0, tcp,5190-5193,s0) network_port(apcupsd, tcp,3551,s0, udp,3551,s0) +network_port(apertus_ldp, tcp,539,s0, udp,539,s0) network_port(asterisk, tcp,1720,s0, udp,2427,s0, udp,2727,s0, udp,4569,s0) network_port(audit, tcp,60,s0) network_port(auth, tcp,113,s0) network_port(bgp, tcp,179,s0, udp,179,s0, tcp,2605,s0, udp,2605,s0) network_port(boinc, tcp,31416,s0) +network_port(boinc_client_ctrl, tcp,1043,s0) type biff_port_t, port_type, reserved_port_type; dnl network_port(biff) # no defined portcon in current strict network_port(certmaster, tcp,51235,s0) network_port(chronyd, udp,323,s0) network_port(clamd, tcp,3310,s0) network_port(clockspeed, udp,4041,s0) network_port(cluster, tcp,5149,s0, udp,5149,s0, tcp,40040,s0, tcp,50006-50008,s0, udp,50006-50008,s0) +network_port(cma, tcp,1050,s0, udp,1050,s0) network_port(cobbler, tcp,25151,s0) +network_port(commplex, tcp,5001,s0, udp,5001,s0) network_port(comsat, udp,512,s0) +network_port(condor, tcp, 9618,s0, udp, 9618,s0) +network_port(couchdb, tcp,5984,s0, udp,5984,s0) +network_port(ctdb, tcp,4379,s0, udp,4379,s0) network_port(cvs, tcp,2401,s0, udp,2401,s0) network_port(cyphesis, tcp,6767,s0, tcp,6769,s0, tcp,6780-6799,s0, udp,32771,s0) network_port(daap, tcp,3689,s0, udp,3689,s0) @@ -99,27 +136,39 @@ network_port(dhcpc, udp,68,s0, tcp,68,s0, udp,546,s0, tcp, 546,s0) network_port(dhcpd, udp,67,s0, udp,547,s0, tcp, 547,s0, udp,548,s0, tcp, 548,s0, tcp,647,s0, udp,647,s0, tcp,847,s0, udp,847,s0, tcp,7911,s0) network_port(dict, tcp,2628,s0) network_port(distccd, tcp,3632,s0) +network_port(dogtag, tcp,7390,s0) network_port(dns, udp,53,s0, tcp,53,s0) +network_port(dnssec, tcp,8955,s0) +network_port(echo, tcp,7,s0, udp,7,s0) network_port(epmap, tcp,135,s0, udp,135,s0) +network_port(epmd, tcp,4369,s0, udp,4369,s0) +network_port(festival, tcp,1314,s0) network_port(fingerd, tcp,79,s0) +network_port(firebird, tcp,3050,s0, udp,3050,s0) +network_port(flash, tcp,843,s0, tcp,1935,s0, udp,1935,s0) +network_port(fprot, tcp,10200,s0) network_port(ftp, tcp,21,s0, tcp,990,s0, udp,990,s0) network_port(ftp_data, tcp,20,s0) network_port(gatekeeper, udp,1718,s0, udp,1719,s0, tcp,1721,s0, tcp,7000,s0) network_port(giftd, tcp,1213,s0) network_port(git, tcp,9418,s0, udp,9418,s0) +network_port(glance, tcp,9292,s0, udp,9292,s0) +network_port(glance_registry, tcp,9191,s0, udp,9191,s0) network_port(gopher, tcp,70,s0, udp,70,s0) network_port(gpsd, tcp,2947,s0) network_port(hadoop_datanode, tcp,50010,s0) network_port(hadoop_namenode, tcp,8020,s0) network_port(hddtemp, tcp,7634,s0) network_port(howl, tcp,5335,s0, udp,5353,s0) -network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0, tcp,9292,s0) +network_port(hplip, tcp,1782,s0, tcp,2207,s0, tcp,2208,s0, tcp, 8290,s0, tcp,50000,s0, tcp,50002,s0, tcp,8292,s0, tcp,9100,s0, tcp,9101,s0, tcp,9102,s0, tcp,9220,s0, tcp,9221,s0, tcp,9222,s0, tcp,9280,s0, tcp,9281,s0, tcp,9282,s0, tcp,9290,s0, tcp,9291,s0) network_port(http, tcp,80,s0, tcp,443,s0, tcp,488,s0, tcp,8008,s0, tcp,8009,s0, tcp,8443,s0) #8443 is mod_nss default port -network_port(http_cache, udp,3130,s0, tcp,8080,s0, tcp,8118,s0, tcp,10001-10010,s0) # 8118 is for privoxy +network_port(http_cache, udp,3130,s0, tcp,8080,s0, tcp,8118,s0, tcp,8123,s0, tcp,10001-10010,s0) # 8118 is for privoxy network_port(i18n_input, tcp,9010,s0) network_port(imaze, tcp,5323,s0, udp,5323,s0) -network_port(inetd_child, tcp,1,s0, udp,1,s0, tcp,7,s0, udp,7,s0, tcp,9,s0, udp,9,s0, tcp,13,s0, udp,13,s0, tcp,19,s0, udp,19,s0, tcp,37,s0, udp,37,s0, tcp,512,s0, tcp,543,s0, tcp,544,s0, tcp,891,s0, udp,891,s0, tcp,892,s0, udp,892,s0, tcp,2105,s0, tcp,5666,s0) +network_port(inetd_child, tcp,1,s0, udp,1,s0, tcp,9,s0, udp,9,s0, tcp,13,s0, udp,13,s0, tcp,19,s0, udp,19,s0, tcp,512,s0, tcp,543,s0, tcp,544,s0, tcp,891,s0, udp,891,s0, tcp,892,s0, udp,892,s0, tcp,2105,s0, tcp,5666,s0) network_port(innd, tcp,119,s0) +network_port(interwise, tcp,7778,s0, udp,7778,s0) +network_port(ionixnetmon, tcp,7410,s0, udp,7410,s0) network_port(ipmi, udp,623,s0, udp,664,s0) network_port(ipp, tcp,631,s0, udp,631,s0, tcp,8610-8614,s0, udp,8610-8614,s0) network_port(ipsecnat, tcp,4500,s0, udp,4500,s0) @@ -129,20 +178,31 @@ network_port(iscsi, tcp,3260,s0) network_port(isns, tcp,3205,s0, udp,3205,s0) network_port(jabber_client, tcp,5222,s0, tcp,5223,s0) network_port(jabber_interserver, tcp,5269,s0) -network_port(kerberos, tcp,88,s0, udp,88,s0, tcp,750,s0, udp,750,s0) -network_port(kerberos_admin, tcp,464,s0, udp,464,s0, tcp,749,s0) -network_port(kerberos_master, tcp,4444,s0, udp,4444,s0) +network_port(jabber_router, tcp,5347,s0) +network_port(jacorb, tcp,3528,s0, tcp,3529,s0) +network_port(jboss_debug, tcp,8787,s0) +network_port(jboss_messaging, tcp,5445,s0, tcp,5455,s0) +network_port(jboss_management, tcp,4712,s0, udp,4712,s0, tcp,4447,s0, tcp,7600,s0, tcp,9123,s0, udp,9123,s0, tcp, 9990, s0, tcp, 9999, s0, tcp, 18001, s0) +network_port(kerberos, tcp,88,s0, udp,88,s0, tcp,750,s0, udp,750,s0, tcp,4444,s0, udp,4444,s0) +network_port(kerberos_admin, tcp,749,s0) +network_port(kerberos_password, tcp,464,s0, udp,464,s0) +network_port(keystone, tcp,5000,s0, udp,5000,s0) network_port(kismet, tcp,2501,s0) network_port(kprop, tcp,754,s0) network_port(ktalkd, udp,517,s0, udp,518,s0) network_port(ldap, tcp,389,s0, udp,389,s0, tcp,636,s0, udp,636,s0, tcp,3268,s0) network_port(lirc, tcp,8765,s0) +network_port(luci, tcp,8084,s0) network_port(lmtp, tcp,24,s0, udp,24,s0) type lrrd_port_t, port_type; dnl network_port(lrrd_port_t) # no defined portcon +network_port(l2tp, tcp,1701,s0, udp,1701,s0) network_port(mail, tcp,2000,s0, tcp,3905,s0) +network_port(matahari, tcp,49000,s0, udp,49000,s0) network_port(memcache, tcp,11211,s0, udp,11211,s0) network_port(mmcc, tcp,5050,s0, udp,5050,s0) +network_port(mongod, tcp,27017,s0) network_port(monopd, tcp,1234,s0) +network_port(movaz_ssc, tcp,5252,s0) network_port(mpd, tcp,6600,s0) network_port(msnp, tcp,1863,s0, udp,1863,s0) network_port(mssql, tcp,1433-1434,s0, udp,1433-1434,s0) @@ -152,61 +212,82 @@ network_port(mysqlmanagerd, tcp,2273,s0) network_port(nessus, tcp,1241,s0) network_port(netport, tcp,3129,s0, udp,3129,s0) network_port(netsupport, tcp,5404,s0, udp,5404,s0, tcp,5405,s0, udp,5405,s0) +network_port(nfs, tcp,2049,s0, udp,2049,s0, tcp,20048-20049,s0, udp,20048-20049,s0) network_port(nmbd, udp,137,s0, udp,138,s0) +network_port(nodejs_debug, tcp,5858,s0, udp,5858,s0) network_port(ntop, tcp,3000-3001,s0, udp,3000-3001,s0) network_port(ntp, udp,123,s0) -network_port(oracledb, tcp, 1521,s0,udp, 1521,s0, tcp,2483,s0,udp,2483,s0, tcp,2484,s0, udp,2484,s0) +network_port(oracle, tcp, 1521,s0,udp, 1521,s0, tcp,2483,s0,udp,2483,s0, tcp,2484,s0, udp,2484,s0) network_port(ocsp, tcp,9080,s0) network_port(openvpn, tcp,1194,s0, udp,1194,s0) +network_port(openhpid, tcp,4743,s0, udp,4743,s0) +network_port(pktcable, tcp,2126,s0, udp,2126,s0, tcp,3198,s0, udp,3198,s0) network_port(pegasus_http, tcp,5988,s0) network_port(pegasus_https, tcp,5989,s0) network_port(pgpkeyserver, udp, 11371,s0, tcp,11371,s0) network_port(pingd, tcp,9125,s0) +network_port(piranha, tcp,3636,s0) +network_port(pki_ca, tcp, 9180, s0, tcp, 9701, s0, tcp, 9443-9447, s0) +network_port(pki_kra, tcp, 10180, s0, tcp, 10701, s0, tcp, 10443-10446, s0) +network_port(pki_ocsp, tcp, 11180, s0, tcp, 11701, s0, tcp, 11443-11446, s0) +network_port(pki_tks, tcp, 13180, s0, tcp, 13701, s0, tcp, 13443-13446, s0) +network_port(pki_ra, tcp,12888-12889,s0) +network_port(pki_tps, tcp,7888-7889,s0) network_port(pop, tcp,106,s0, tcp,109,s0, tcp,110,s0, tcp,143,s0, tcp,220,s0, tcp,993,s0, tcp,995,s0, tcp,1109,s0) network_port(portmap, udp,111,s0, tcp,111,s0) network_port(postfix_policyd, tcp,10031,s0) network_port(postgresql, tcp,5432,s0) network_port(postgrey, tcp,60000,s0) +network_port(pptp, tcp, 1723,s0, udp, 1723, s0) network_port(prelude, tcp,4690,s0, udp,4690,s0) network_port(presence, tcp,5298-5299,s0, udp,5298-5299,s0) network_port(printer, tcp,515,s0) network_port(ptal, tcp,5703,s0) -network_port(pulseaudio, tcp,4713,s0) +network_port(pulseaudio, tcp,4713,s0, udp,4713,s0) network_port(puppet, tcp, 8140, s0) network_port(pxe, udp,4011,s0) network_port(pyzor, udp,24441,s0) +network_port(quantum, tcp,9696,s0) network_port(radacct, udp,1646,s0, udp,1813,s0) network_port(radius, udp,1645,s0, udp,1812,s0) network_port(radsec, tcp,2083,s0) network_port(razor, tcp,2703,s0) +network_port(time, tcp,37,s0, udp,37,s0) +network_port(repository, tcp, 6363, s0) network_port(ricci, tcp,11111,s0, udp,11111,s0) network_port(ricci_modcluster, tcp,16851,s0, udp,16851,s0) network_port(rlogind, tcp,513,s0) -network_port(rndc, tcp,953,s0) -network_port(router, udp,520,s0, udp,521,s0, tcp,521,s0) +network_port(rndc, tcp,953,s0, tcp,8953,s0) +network_port(router, udp,520-521,s0, tcp,521,s0) network_port(rsh, tcp,514,s0) network_port(rsync, tcp,873,s0, udp,873,s0) network_port(rwho, udp,513,s0) network_port(sap, tcp,9875,s0, udp,9875,s0) +network_port(sametime, tcp,1533,s0, udp,1533,s0) network_port(sieve, tcp,4190,s0) network_port(sip, tcp,5060,s0, udp,5060,s0, tcp,5061,s0, udp,5061,s0) network_port(sixxsconfig, tcp,3874,s0, udp,3874,s0) network_port(smbd, tcp,137-139,s0, tcp,445,s0) network_port(smtp, tcp,25,s0, tcp,465,s0, tcp,587,s0) -network_port(snmp, udp,161,s0, udp,162,s0, tcp,199,s0, tcp, 1161, s0) +network_port(snmp, tcp,161-162,s0, udp,161-162,s0, tcp,199,s0, tcp, 1161, s0) type socks_port_t, port_type; dnl network_port(socks) # no defined portcon network_port(soundd, tcp,8000,s0, tcp,9433,s0, tcp, 16001, s0) network_port(spamd, tcp,783,s0) network_port(speech, tcp,8036,s0) -network_port(squid, udp,3401,s0, tcp,3401,s0, udp,4827,s0, tcp,4827,s0) # snmp and htcp +network_port(squid, tcp,3128,s0, udp,3401,s0, tcp,3401,s0, udp,4827,s0, tcp,4827,s0) # snmp and htcp +network_port(ssdp, tcp,1900,s0, udp, 1900, s0) network_port(ssh, tcp,22,s0) +network_port(streaming, tcp, 554, s0, udp, 554, s0, tcp, 1755, s0, udp, 1755, s0) type stunnel_port_t, port_type; dnl network_port(stunnel) # no defined portcon in current strict +network_port(svn, tcp,3690,s0, udp,3690,s0) network_port(swat, tcp,901,s0) -network_port(syslogd, udp,514,s0) +network_port(sype, tcp,9911,s0, udp,9911,s0) +network_port(syslogd, udp,514,s0, tcp,6514,s0, udp,6514,s0) network_port(tcs, tcp, 30003, s0) network_port(telnetd, tcp,23,s0) network_port(tftp, udp,69,s0) -network_port(tor, tcp, 6969, s0, tcp,9001,s0, tcp,9030,s0, tcp,9050,s0, tcp,9051,s0) +network_port(tor, tcp, 6969, s0, tcp,9001,s0, tcp,9030,s0, tcp,9051,s0) +network_port(tor_socks, tcp,9050,s0) network_port(traceroute, udp,64000-64010,s0) network_port(transproxy, tcp,8081,s0) network_port(ups, tcp,3493,s0) @@ -215,9 +296,12 @@ network_port(uucpd, tcp,540,s0) network_port(varnishd, tcp,6081-6082,s0) network_port(virt, tcp,16509,s0, udp,16509,s0, tcp,16514,s0, udp,16514,s0) network_port(virt_migration, tcp,49152-49216,s0) -network_port(vnc, tcp,5900,s0) +network_port(vnc, tcp,5900-5983,s0, tcp,5985-5999,s0) network_port(wccp, udp,2048,s0) +network_port(websm, tcp,9090,s0, udp,9090,s0) network_port(whois, tcp,43,s0, udp,43,s0, tcp, 4321, s0 , udp, 4321, s0 ) +network_port(winshadow, tcp, 3261, s0, udp, 3261,s0) +network_port(wsicopy, tcp, 3378, s0, udp, 3378,s0) network_port(xdmcp, udp,177,s0, tcp,177,s0) network_port(xen, tcp,8002,s0) network_port(xfs, tcp,7100,s0) @@ -229,6 +313,7 @@ network_port(zookeeper_client, tcp,2181,s0) network_port(zookeeper_election, tcp,3888,s0) network_port(zookeeper_leader, tcp,2888,s0) network_port(zebra, tcp,2600-2604,s0, tcp,2606,s0, udp,2600-2604,s0, udp,2606,s0) +network_port(zented, tcp,1229,s0, udp,1229,s0) network_port(zope, tcp,8021,s0) # Defaults for reserved ports. Earlier portcon entries take precedence; @@ -238,6 +323,12 @@ portcon tcp 512-1023 gen_context(system_u:object_r:hi_reserved_port_t, s0) portcon udp 512-1023 gen_context(system_u:object_r:hi_reserved_port_t, s0) portcon tcp 1-511 gen_context(system_u:object_r:reserved_port_t, s0) portcon udp 1-511 gen_context(system_u:object_r:reserved_port_t, s0) +portcon tcp 1024-32767 gen_context(system_u:object_r:unreserved_port_t, s0) +portcon tcp 32768-61000 gen_context(system_u:object_r:ephemeral_port_t, s0) +portcon tcp 61001-65535 gen_context(system_u:object_r:unreserved_port_t, s0) +portcon udp 1024-32767 gen_context(system_u:object_r:unreserved_port_t, s0) +portcon udp 32768-61000 gen_context(system_u:object_r:ephemeral_port_t, s0) +portcon udp 61001-65535 gen_context(system_u:object_r:unreserved_port_t, s0) ######################################## # @@ -282,9 +373,10 @@ typealias netif_t alias { lo_netif_t netif_lo_t }; allow corenet_unconfined_type node_type:node *; allow corenet_unconfined_type netif_type:netif *; allow corenet_unconfined_type packet_type:packet *; +allow corenet_unconfined_type port_type:dccp_socket { send_msg recv_msg name_connect }; allow corenet_unconfined_type port_type:tcp_socket { send_msg recv_msg name_connect }; allow corenet_unconfined_type port_type:udp_socket { send_msg recv_msg }; # Bind to any network address. -allow corenet_unconfined_type port_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } name_bind; -allow corenet_unconfined_type node_type:{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } node_bind; +allow corenet_unconfined_type port_type:{ dccp_socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } name_bind; +allow corenet_unconfined_type node_type:{ dccp_socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket } node_bind; diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.m4 b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.m4 index 35fed4f..51ad69a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.m4 +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/corenetwork.te.m4 @@ -77,23 +77,37 @@ type $1_node_t alias node_$1_t, node_type; declare_nodes($1_node_t,shift($*)) ') -# bindresvport in glibc starts searching for reserved ports at 512 -define(`declare_ports',`dnl -ifelse(eval(range_start($3) < 1024),1,`typeattribute $1 reserved_port_type; -ifelse(eval(range_start($3) >= 512),1,`typeattribute $1 rpc_port_type;',`dnl') -',`dnl') +define(`declare_portcons',`dnl portcon $2 $3 gen_context(system_u:object_r:$1,$4) -ifelse(`$5',`',`',`declare_ports($1,shiftn(4,$*))')dnl +ifelse(`$5',`',`',`declare_portcons($1,shiftn(4,$*))')dnl +') + +define(`add_port_attribute',`dnl +ifelse(eval(range_start($2) < 1024),1,`typeattribute $1 reserved_port_type;',`typeattribute $1 unreserved_port_type;') +') + +define(`add_ephemeral_attribute',`dnl +ifelse(eval(range_start($3) >= 32768 && range_start($3) < 61001),1,`typeattribute $1 ephemeral_port_type; +',`ifelse(`$5',`',`',`add_ephemeral_attribute($1,shiftn(4,$*))')')dnl +') + +# bindresvport in glibc starts searching for reserved ports at 512 +define(`add_rpc_attribute',`dnl +ifelse(eval(range_start($3) >= 512 && range_start($3) < 1024),1,`typeattribute $1 rpc_port_type; +',`ifelse(`$5',`',`',`add_rpc_attribute($1,shiftn(4,$*))')')dnl ') # # network_port(port_name,protocol portnum mls_sensitivity [,protocol portnum mls_sensitivity[,...]]) # define(`network_port',` -type $1_port_t, port_type; +type $1_port_t, port_type, defined_port_type; type $1_client_packet_t, packet_type, client_packet_type; type $1_server_packet_t, packet_type, server_packet_type; -declare_ports($1_port_t,shift($*))dnl +ifelse(`$2',`',`',`add_port_attribute($1_port_t,$3)')dnl +ifelse(`$2',`',`',`add_rpc_attribute($1_port_t,shift($*))')dnl +ifelse(`$2',`',`',`add_ephemeral_attribute($1_port_t,shift($*))')dnl +ifelse(`$2',`',`',`declare_portcons($1_port_t,shift($*))')dnl ') # diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.fc index 6cf8784..21a5923 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.fc +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.fc @@ -15,12 +15,14 @@ /dev/atibm -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:mouse_device_t,s0) /dev/audio.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:sound_device_t,s0) /dev/autofs.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:autofs_device_t,s0) +/dev/bsr.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:cpu_device_t,s0) /dev/beep -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:sound_device_t,s0) /dev/btrfs-control -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_control_t,s0) /dev/controlD64 -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_misc_device_t,s0) /dev/crash -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:crash_device_t,mls_systemhigh) /dev/dahdi/.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:sound_device_t,s0) -/dev/dmfm -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:sound_device_t,s0) +/dev/dlm.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:dlm_control_device_t,s0) +/dev/dmfm.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:sound_device_t,s0) /dev/dmmidi.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:sound_device_t,s0) /dev/dsp.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:sound_device_t,s0) /dev/efirtc -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:clock_device_t,s0) @@ -57,8 +59,10 @@ /dev/lirc[0-9]+ -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:lirc_device_t,s0) /dev/lircm -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:mouse_device_t,s0) /dev/logibm -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:mouse_device_t,s0) +/dev/loop-control -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:loop_control_device_t,s0) /dev/lp.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:printer_device_t,s0) /dev/mcelog -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:kmsg_device_t,mls_systemhigh) +/dev/media.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:v4l_device_t,s0) /dev/mem -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:memory_device_t,mls_systemhigh) /dev/mergemem -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:memory_device_t,mls_systemhigh) /dev/mga_vid.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_misc_device_t,s0) @@ -126,12 +130,14 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /dev/vttuner -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:v4l_device_t,s0) /dev/vtx.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:v4l_device_t,s0) /dev/watchdog -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:watchdog_device_t,s0) +/dev/cdc-wdm[0-1] -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:modem_device_t,s0) /dev/winradio. -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:v4l_device_t,s0) /dev/z90crypt -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:crypt_device_t,s0) /dev/zero -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:zero_device_t,s0) /dev/bus/usb/.*/[0-9]+ -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:usb_device_t,s0) +/dev/ati/card.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_misc_device_t,s0) /dev/card.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_misc_device_t,s0) /dev/cmx.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:smartcard_device_t,s0) @@ -187,12 +193,22 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /lib/udev/devices/null -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:null_device_t,s0) /lib/udev/devices/zero -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:zero_device_t,s0) -/sys(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysfs_t,s0) - ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # originally from named.fc /var/named/chroot/dev -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:device_t,s0) /var/named/chroot/dev/null -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:null_device_t,s0) /var/named/chroot/dev/random -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:random_device_t,s0) /var/named/chroot/dev/zero -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:zero_device_t,s0) +/var/spool/postfix/dev -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:device_t,s0) ') + +# +# /sys +# +/sys(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysfs_t,s0) +/sys/devices/system/cpu/online gen_context(system_u:object_r:cpu_online_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/udev/devices(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:device_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/devices/lp.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:printer_device_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/devices/null -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:null_device_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/devices/zero -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:zero_device_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if index f820f3b..36ef4e2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.if @@ -143,13 +143,32 @@ interface(`dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes',` type device_t; ') - relabelfrom_dirs_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) - relabelfrom_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) - relabelfrom_lnk_files_pattern($1, device_t, { device_t device_node }) - relabelfrom_fifo_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) - relabelfrom_sock_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) - relabel_blk_files_pattern($1, device_t, { device_t device_node }) - relabel_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, { device_t device_node }) + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) + relabel_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) + relabel_lnk_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) + relabel_fifo_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) + relabel_sock_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) + relabel_blk_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) + relabel_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow full relabeling (to and from) of all device files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`dev_relabel_all_dev_files',` + gen_require(` + type device_t; + ') + + relabel_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_t) ') ######################################## @@ -209,6 +228,24 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_list_all_dev_nodes',` ######################################## ## +## Dontaudit attempts to list all device nodes. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_dontaudit_all_access_check',` + gen_require(` + attribute device_node; + ') + + dontaudit $1 device_node:file_class_set audit_access; +') + +######################################## +## ## Add entries to directories in /dev. ## ## @@ -352,6 +389,24 @@ interface(`dev_read_generic_files',` read_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_t) ') +####################################### +## +## Read generic files in /dev. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_dontaudit_read_generic_files',` + gen_require(` + type device_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 device_t:file { read getattr }; +') + ######################################## ## ## Read and write generic files in /dev. @@ -462,6 +517,42 @@ interface(`dev_getattr_generic_blk_files',` ######################################## ## +## Rename generic block device nodes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_rename_generic_blk_files',` + gen_require(` + type device_t; + ') + + rename_blk_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## write generic sock files in /dev. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_write_generic_sock_files',` + gen_require(` + type device_t; + ') + + write_sock_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Dontaudit getattr on generic block devices. ## ## @@ -570,6 +661,24 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_chr_files',` ######################################## ## +## Rename generic character device nodes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_rename_generic_chr_files',` + gen_require(` + type device_t; + ') + + rename_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Dontaudit setattr for generic character device files. ## ## @@ -646,7 +755,7 @@ interface(`dev_rw_generic_blk_files',` ## ## ## -## Domain to dontaudit access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -733,7 +842,7 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_setattr_generic_symlinks',` ######################################## ## -## Read symbolic links in device directories. +## Create symbolic links in device directories. ## ## ## @@ -741,17 +850,17 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_setattr_generic_symlinks',` ## ## # -interface(`dev_read_generic_symlinks',` +interface(`dev_create_generic_symlinks',` gen_require(` type device_t; ') - allow $1 device_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + create_lnk_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Create symbolic links in device directories. +## Delete symbolic links in device directories. ## ## ## @@ -759,17 +868,17 @@ interface(`dev_read_generic_symlinks',` ## ## # -interface(`dev_create_generic_symlinks',` +interface(`dev_delete_generic_symlinks',` gen_require(` type device_t; ') - create_lnk_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_t) + delete_lnk_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Delete symbolic links in device directories. +## Read symbolic links in device directories. ## ## ## @@ -777,12 +886,12 @@ interface(`dev_create_generic_symlinks',` ## ## # -interface(`dev_delete_generic_symlinks',` +interface(`dev_read_generic_symlinks',` gen_require(` type device_t; ') - delete_lnk_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_t) + allow $1 device_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -938,7 +1047,7 @@ interface(`dev_filetrans',` type device_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, $2, $3, $4) dev_associate($2) files_associate_tmp($2) @@ -1024,6 +1133,7 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files',` interface(`dev_getattr_all_chr_files',` gen_require(` attribute device_node; + type device_t; ') getattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, device_node) @@ -1196,6 +1306,42 @@ interface(`dev_create_all_chr_files',` ######################################## ## +## rw all inherited character device files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_rw_all_inherited_chr_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute device_node; + ') + + allow $1 device_node:chr_file rw_inherited_chr_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## rw all inherited blk device files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_rw_all_inherited_blk_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute device_node; + ') + + allow $1 device_node:blk_file rw_inherited_blk_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Delete all block device files. ## ## @@ -1648,6 +1794,26 @@ interface(`dev_filetrans_cardmgr',` ######################################## ## +## Automatic type transition to the type +## for xserver misc device nodes when +## created in /dev. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_filetrans_xserver_misc',` + gen_require(` + type device_t, xserver_misc_device_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file ) +') + +######################################## +## ## Get the attributes of the CPU ## microcode and id interfaces. ## @@ -2358,7 +2524,97 @@ interface(`dev_filetrans_lirc',` ######################################## ## -## Get the attributes of the lvm comtrol device. +## Get the attributes of the loop comtrol device. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_getattr_loop_control',` + gen_require(` + type device_t, loop_control_device_t; + ') + + getattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read the loop comtrol device. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_read_loop_control',` + gen_require(` + type device_t, loop_control_device_t; + ') + + read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write the loop control device. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_rw_loop_control',` + gen_require(` + type device_t, loop_control_device_t; + ') + + rw_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read and write loop control device. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_dontaudit_rw_loop_control',` + gen_require(` + type loop_control_device_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 loop_control_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete the loop control device. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_delete_loop_control_dev',` + gen_require(` + type device_t, loop_control_device_t; + ') + + delete_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, loop_control_device_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Get the attributes of the loop comtrol device. ## ## ## @@ -2681,7 +2937,7 @@ interface(`dev_write_misc',` ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -2931,8 +3187,8 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_write_mtrr',` type mtrr_device_t; ') - dontaudit $1 mtrr_device_t:file write; - dontaudit $1 mtrr_device_t:chr_file write; + dontaudit $1 mtrr_device_t:file write_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 mtrr_device_t:chr_file write_chr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -3210,7 +3466,7 @@ interface(`dev_rw_printer',` ######################################## ## -## Read printk devices (e.g., /dev/kmsg /dev/mcelog) +## Relabel the printer device node. ## ## ## @@ -3218,12 +3474,31 @@ interface(`dev_rw_printer',` ## ## # -interface(`dev_read_printk',` +interface(`dev_relabel_printer',` gen_require(` - type device_t, printk_device_t; + type printer_device_t; ') - read_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, printk_device_t) + allow $1 printer_device_t:chr_file relabel_chr_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write the printer device. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_manage_printer',` + gen_require(` + type device_t, printer_device_t; + ') + + manage_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t) + dev_filetrans_printer_named_dev($1) ') ######################################## @@ -3811,6 +4086,42 @@ interface(`dev_getattr_sysfs_dirs',` ######################################## ## +## Set the attributes of sysfs directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_setattr_sysfs_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type sysfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 sysfs_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Get attributes of sysfs filesystems. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_getattr_sysfs_fs',` + gen_require(` + type sysfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 sysfs_t:filesystem getattr; +') + +######################################## +## ## Search the sysfs directories. ## ## @@ -3860,6 +4171,7 @@ interface(`dev_list_sysfs',` type sysfs_t; ') + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, sysfs_t, sysfs_t) list_dirs_pattern($1, sysfs_t, sysfs_t) ') @@ -3902,23 +4214,49 @@ interface(`dev_dontaudit_write_sysfs_dirs',` ######################################## ## -## Create, read, write, and delete sysfs -## directories. +## Read cpu online hardware state information. ## +## +##

+## Allow the specified domain to read /sys/devices/system/cpu/online file. +##

+## ## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`dev_manage_sysfs_dirs',` +interface(`dev_read_cpu_online',` gen_require(` + type cpu_online_t; + ') + + dev_search_sysfs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, cpu_online_t, cpu_online_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Relabel cpu online hardware state information. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_relabel_cpu_online',` + gen_require(` + type cpu_online_t; type sysfs_t; ') - manage_dirs_pattern($1, sysfs_t, sysfs_t) + dev_search_sysfs($1) + allow $1 cpu_online_t:file relabel_file_perms; ') + ######################################## ## ## Read hardware state information. @@ -3972,6 +4310,62 @@ interface(`dev_rw_sysfs',` ######################################## ## +## Relabel hardware state directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_relabel_sysfs_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type sysfs_t; + ') + + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, sysfs_t, sysfs_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Relabel hardware state files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_relabel_all_sysfs',` + gen_require(` + type sysfs_t; + ') + + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, sysfs_t, sysfs_t) + relabel_files_pattern($1, sysfs_t, sysfs_t) + relabel_lnk_files_pattern($1, sysfs_t, sysfs_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow caller to modify hardware state information. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_manage_sysfs_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type sysfs_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, sysfs_t, sysfs_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write the TPM device. ## ## @@ -4069,6 +4463,25 @@ interface(`dev_write_urand',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to write to pseudo +## random devices (e.g., /dev/urandom) +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_dontaudit_write_urand',` + gen_require(` + type urandom_device_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 urandom_device_t:chr_file write; +') + +######################################## +## ## Getattr generic the USB devices. ## ## @@ -4103,6 +4516,24 @@ interface(`dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev',` setattr_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Allow relabeling (to and from) of generic usb device +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to relabel. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_relabel_generic_usb_dev',` + gen_require(` + type usb_device_t; + ') + + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, usb_device_t, usb_device_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Read generic the USB devices. @@ -4495,6 +4926,24 @@ interface(`dev_rw_vhost',` ######################################## ## +## Allow read/write inheretid the vhost net device +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_rw_inherited_vhost',` + gen_require(` + type device_t, vhost_device_t; + ') + + allow $1 vhost_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_chr_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write VMWare devices. ## ## @@ -4695,6 +5144,26 @@ interface(`dev_rw_xserver_misc',` ######################################## ## +## Read and write X server miscellaneous devices. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_manage_xserver_misc',` + gen_require(` + type device_t, xserver_misc_device_t; + ') + + manage_chr_files_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t) + + dev_filetrans_xserver_named_dev($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write to the zero device (/dev/zero). ## ## @@ -4784,3 +5253,861 @@ interface(`dev_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 devices_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit getattr on all device nodes. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_dontaudit_getattr_all',` + gen_require(` + attribute device_node; + type device_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 { device_t device_node }:dir_file_class_set getattr; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create all named devices with the correct label +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_filetrans_printer_named_dev',` + + gen_require(` + type printer_device_t; + + ') + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "irlpt9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "lp9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "par9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, printer_device_t, chr_file, "usblp9") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create all named devices with the correct label +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_filetrans_all_named_dev',` + +gen_require(` + type device_t; + type usb_device_t; + type sound_device_t; + type apm_bios_t; + type mouse_device_t; + type autofs_device_t; + type lvm_control_t; + type crash_device_t; + type dlm_control_device_t; + type clock_device_t; + type v4l_device_t; + type event_device_t; + type xen_device_t; + type framebuf_device_t; + type null_device_t; + type random_device_t; + type dri_device_t; + type ipmi_device_t; + type memory_device_t; + type kmsg_device_t; + type qemu_device_t; + type ksm_device_t; + type kvm_device_t; + type lirc_device_t; + type cpu_device_t; + type scanner_device_t; + type modem_device_t; + type vhost_device_t; + type netcontrol_device_t; + type nvram_device_t; + type power_device_t; + type wireless_device_t; + type tpm_device_t; + type userio_device_t; + type urandom_device_t; + type usbmon_device_t; + type vmware_device_t; + type watchdog_device_t; + type crypt_device_t; + type zero_device_t; + type smartcard_device_t; + type mtrr_device_t; +') + + dev_filetrans_printer_named_dev($1) + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "admmidi9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "adsp9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "aload9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amidi9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "amixer9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, apm_bios_t, chr_file, "apm_bios") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "atibm") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "audio9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, autofs_device_t, chr_file, "autofs9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "beep") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t, chr_file, "btrfs-control") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, crash_device_t, chr_file, "crash") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dlm_control_device_t, chr_file, "dlm9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmfm") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dmmidi9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "dsp9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "efirtc") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "e2201") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83000") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83001") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83002") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83003") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83004") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83005") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83006") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83007") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83008") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "em83009") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event10") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event11") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event12") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event13") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event14") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event15") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event16") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event17") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event18") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event19") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "event20") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "evtchn") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, framebuf_device_t, chr_file, "fb9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, null_device_t, chr_file, "full") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "fw9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "000") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "001") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "002") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "003") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "004") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "005") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "006") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "007") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "008") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "009") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "010") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "011") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "012") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "013") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "014") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "015") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "016") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "017") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "018") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "019") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "020") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "021") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "022") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "023") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "024") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "025") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "026") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "027") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "028") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "029") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "gtrsc9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "hfmodem") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hiddev9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "hidraw9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "hpet") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, random_device_t, chr_file, "hw_random") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, random_device_t, chr_file, "hwrng") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dri_device_t, chr_file, "i915") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "inportbm") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ipmi_device_t, chr_file, "ipmi9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "jbm") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "js9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mouse9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, memory_device_t, chr_file, "kmem") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, kmsg_device_t, chr_file, "kmsg") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, qemu_device_t, chr_file, "kqemu") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, ksm_device_t, chr_file, "ksm") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, kvm_device_t, chr_file, "kvm") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "lik9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lirc_device_t, chr_file, "lirc9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "lircm") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "logibm") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, kmsg_device_t, chr_file, "mcelog") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, memory_device_t, chr_file, "mem") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, memory_device_t, chr_file, "mergemem") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mice") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "microcode") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "midi9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mixer9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mmetfgrab") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "modem") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4010") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4011") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4012") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4013") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4014") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4015") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4016") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4017") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4018") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "mpu4019") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "msr9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vhost_device_t, chr_file, "vhost") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, netcontrol_device_t, chr_file, "network_latency") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, netcontrol_device_t, chr_file, "network_throughput") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "noz9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, null_device_t, chr_file, "null") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, nvram_device_t, chr_file, "nvram") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, memory_device_t, chr_file, "oldmem") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "pc110pad") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pcfclock9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, power_device_t, chr_file, "pmu") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, memory_device_t, chr_file, "port") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, clock_device_t, chr_file, "pps9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "rmidi9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, dri_device_t, chr_file, "radeon") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "radio9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, random_device_t, chr_file, "random") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13940") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13941") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13942") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13943") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13944") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13945") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13946") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13947") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13948") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "raw13949") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "cdc-wdm0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, modem_device_t, chr_file, "cdc-wdm1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, wireless_device_t, chr_file, "rfkill") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "sequencer") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "sequencer2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "smpte9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, power_device_t, chr_file, "smu") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, apm_bios_t, chr_file, "snapshot") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "sndstat") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "sonypi") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, tpm_device_t, chr_file, "tpm9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "uinput") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, userio_device_t, chr_file, "uio9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, urandom_device_t, chr_file, "urandom") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "usb0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "usb1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "usb2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "usb3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "usb4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "usb5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "usb6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "usb7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "usb8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usbmon_device_t, chr_file, "usbmon9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "usbscanner") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vhost_device_t, chr_file, "vhost-net") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vbi9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmmon") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, vmware_device_t, chr_file, "vmnet9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "media9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "video9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "vrtpanel") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vttuner") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "vtx9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, watchdog_device_t, chr_file, "watchdog") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "winradio9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, crypt_device_t, chr_file, "z90crypt") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, zero_device_t, chr_file, "zero") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, smartcard_device_t, chr_file, "cmx9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, netcontrol_device_t, chr_file, "cpu_dma_latency") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, cpu_device_t, chr_file, "cpu9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mtrr_device_t, chr_file, "mtrr") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "sensor9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "m9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, event_device_t, chr_file, "keyboard9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, lvm_control_t, chr_file, "control") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "ucb1x00") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, mouse_device_t, chr_file, "mk712") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "dc2xx9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8000") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8001") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8002") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8003") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8004") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8005") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8006") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8007") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8008") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "mdc8009") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, scanner_device_t, chr_file, "scanner9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "blktap9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "gntdev") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xen_device_t, chr_file, "gntalloc") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "controlC9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "patmgr0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "patmgr1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "srnd0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "srnd1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "srnd2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "srnd3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "srnd4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "srnd5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "srnd6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, sound_device_t, chr_file, "srnd7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "tlk0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "tlk1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "tlk2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, v4l_device_t, chr_file, "tlk3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "uba") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "ubb") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, usb_device_t, chr_file, "ubc") + dev_filetrans_xserver_named_dev($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create all named devices with the correct label +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dev_filetrans_xserver_named_dev',` + + gen_require(` + type xserver_misc_device_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "3dfx") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "controlD64") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "gfx") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "graphics") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "mga_vid9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidia9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "nvidiactl") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "opengl") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vbox9") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "vga_arbiter") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card0") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card1") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card2") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card3") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card4") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card5") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card6") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card7") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card8") + filetrans_pattern($1, device_t, xserver_misc_device_t, chr_file, "card9") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.te b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.te index 08f01e7..d8c1d48 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/devices.te +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/devices.te @@ -20,6 +20,7 @@ files_mountpoint(device_t) files_associate_tmp(device_t) fs_type(device_t) fs_use_trans devtmpfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:device_t,s0); +dev_node(device_t) # # Type for /dev/agpgart @@ -108,6 +109,7 @@ dev_node(ksm_device_t) # type kvm_device_t; dev_node(kvm_device_t) +mls_trusted_object(kvm_device_t) # # Type for /dev/lirc @@ -118,6 +120,12 @@ dev_node(lirc_device_t) # # Type for /dev/mapper/control # +type loop_control_device_t; +dev_node(loop_control_device_t) + +# +# Type for /dev/mapper/control +# type lvm_control_t; dev_node(lvm_control_t) @@ -218,6 +226,10 @@ files_mountpoint(sysfs_t) fs_type(sysfs_t) genfscon sysfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysfs_t,s0) +type cpu_online_t; +files_type(cpu_online_t) +dev_associate_sysfs(cpu_online_t) + # # Type for /dev/tpm # @@ -265,6 +277,7 @@ dev_node(v4l_device_t) # type vhost_device_t; dev_node(vhost_device_t) +mls_trusted_object(vhost_device_t) # Type for vmware devices. type vmware_device_t; @@ -310,5 +323,5 @@ files_associate_tmp(device_node) # allow devices_unconfined_type self:capability sys_rawio; -allow devices_unconfined_type device_node:{ blk_file chr_file } *; +allow devices_unconfined_type device_node:{ blk_file chr_file lnk_file } *; allow devices_unconfined_type mtrr_device_t:file *; diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if b/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if index 6a1e4d1..ffaa90a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/domain.if @@ -75,34 +75,6 @@ interface(`domain_base_type',` interface(`domain_type',` # start with basic domain domain_base_type($1) - - ifdef(`distro_redhat',` - optional_policy(` - unconfined_use_fds($1) - ') - ') - - # send init a sigchld and signull - optional_policy(` - init_sigchld($1) - init_signull($1) - ') - - # these seem questionable: - - optional_policy(` - rpm_use_fds($1) - rpm_read_pipes($1) - ') - - optional_policy(` - selinux_dontaudit_getattr_fs($1) - selinux_dontaudit_read_fs($1) - ') - - optional_policy(` - seutil_dontaudit_read_config($1) - ') ') ######################################## @@ -631,7 +603,7 @@ interface(`domain_read_all_domains_state',` ######################################## ## -## Get the attributes of all domains of all domains. +## Get the attributes of all domains. ## ## ## @@ -655,7 +627,7 @@ interface(`domain_getattr_all_domains',` ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -1356,6 +1328,24 @@ interface(`domain_manage_all_entry_files',` ######################################## ## +## Relabel from domain types on files if a user managed to mislable +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`domain_relabelfrom',` + gen_require(` + attribute domain; + ') + + allow $1 domain:dir_file_class_set relabelfrom_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Relabel to and from all entry point ## file types. ## @@ -1530,4 +1520,29 @@ interface(`domain_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 can_change_object_identity; typeattribute $1 set_curr_context; typeattribute $1 process_uncond_exempt; + + mcs_file_read_all($1) + mcs_file_write_all($1) + mcs_killall($1) + mcs_ptrace_all($1) + mcs_socket_write_all_levels($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read or write +## all leaked sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`domain_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + attribute domain; + ') + + dontaudit $1 domain:socket_class_set { read write }; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/domain.te b/policy/modules/kernel/domain.te index fae1ab1..0a5271f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/domain.te +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/domain.te @@ -4,6 +4,21 @@ policy_module(domain, 1.9.1) # # Declarations # +## +##

+## Allow all domains to use other domains file descriptors +##

+## +# +gen_tunable(allow_domain_fd_use, true) + +## +##

+## Allow all domains to have the kernel load modules +##

+## +# +gen_tunable(domain_kernel_load_modules, false) ## ##

@@ -86,23 +101,39 @@ neverallow ~{ domain unlabeled_t } *:process *; allow domain self:dir list_dir_perms; allow domain self:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms lock ioctl }; allow domain self:file rw_file_perms; +allow domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + kernel_read_proc_symlinks(domain) +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(domain) + # Every domain gets the key ring, so we should default # to no one allowed to look at it; afs kernel support creates # a keyring kernel_dontaudit_search_key(domain) kernel_dontaudit_link_key(domain) +kernel_dontaudit_search_debugfs(domain) # create child processes in the domain -allow domain self:process { fork sigchld }; +allow domain self:process { getcap fork getsched sigchld }; # Use trusted objects in /dev +dev_read_cpu_online(domain) dev_rw_null(domain) dev_rw_zero(domain) term_use_controlling_term(domain) # list the root directory files_list_root(domain) +# allow all domains to search through default_t directory, since users sometimes +# place labels within these directories. (samba_share_t) for example. +files_search_default(domain) + +# All executables should be able to search the directory they are in +corecmd_search_bin(domain) + +tunable_policy(`domain_kernel_load_modules',` + kernel_request_load_module(domain) +') tunable_policy(`global_ssp',` # enable reading of urandom for all domains: @@ -113,8 +144,13 @@ tunable_policy(`global_ssp',` ') optional_policy(` + afs_rw_cache(domain) +') + +optional_policy(` libs_use_ld_so(domain) libs_use_shared_libs(domain) + libs_read_lib_files(domain) ') optional_policy(` @@ -125,6 +161,8 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` xserver_dontaudit_use_xdm_fds(domain) xserver_dontaudit_rw_xdm_pipes(domain) + xserver_dontaudit_append_xdm_home_files(domain) + xserver_dontaudit_write_log(domain) ') ######################################## @@ -143,8 +181,13 @@ allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ socket_class_set socket key_socket } *; allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fd use; allow unconfined_domain_type domain:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow unconfined_domain_type unconfined_domain_type:dbus send_msg; + # Act upon any other process. -allow unconfined_domain_type domain:process ~{ transition dyntransition execmem execstack execheap }; +allow unconfined_domain_type domain:process ~{ ptrace transition dyntransition execmem execstack execheap }; +tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow unconfined_domain_type domain:process ptrace; +') # Create/access any System V IPC objects. allow unconfined_domain_type domain:{ sem msgq shm } *; @@ -158,5 +201,263 @@ allow unconfined_domain_type domain:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms ioctl lock }; # act on all domains keys allow unconfined_domain_type domain:key *; +corenet_filetrans_all_named_dev(unconfined_domain_type) + +dev_filetrans_all_named_dev(unconfined_domain_type) + # receive from all domains over labeled networking domain_all_recvfrom_all_domains(unconfined_domain_type) + +files_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +files_filetrans_system_conf_named_files(unconfined_domain_type) + +storage_filetrans_all_named_dev(unconfined_domain_type) + +term_filetrans_all_named_dev(unconfined_domain_type) + +optional_policy(` + init_status(unconfined_domain_type) + init_reboot(unconfined_domain_type) + init_halt(unconfined_domain_type) + init_undefined(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + auth_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) + auth_filetrans_admin_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) + auth_filetrans_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + libs_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + logging_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + alsa_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + apache_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + bootloader_filetrans_config(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + cups_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_filetrans_admin_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + devicekit_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + dnsmasq_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + kerberos_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + mta_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + modules_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_filetrans_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + mysql_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + networkmanager_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + nx_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + postfix_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + pulseaudio_filetrans_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) + pulseaudio_filetrans_admin_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + quota_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + systemd_login_status(unconfined_domain_type) + systemd_login_reboot(unconfined_domain_type) + systemd_login_halt(unconfined_domain_type) + systemd_login_undefined(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + thumb_filetrans_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + tftp_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(unconfined_domain_type, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file }) + userdom_filetrans_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_filetrans_named_content(unconfined_domain_type) + virt_filetrans_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_filetrans_admin_home_content(unconfined_domain_type) +') + +selinux_getattr_fs(domain) +selinux_search_fs(domain) +selinux_dontaudit_read_fs(domain) + +optional_policy(` + seutil_dontaudit_read_config(domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + init_sigchld(domain) + init_signull(domain) + init_read_machineid(domain) +') + +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + files_search_mnt(domain) + optional_policy(` + unconfined_use_fds(domain) + ') +') + +# these seem questionable: + +optional_policy(` + abrt_domtrans_helper(domain) + abrt_read_pid_files(domain) + abrt_read_state(domain) + abrt_signull(domain) + abrt_append_cache(domain) + abrt_rw_fifo_file(domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpm_use_fds(domain) + rpm_read_pipes(domain) + rpm_search_log(domain) + rpm_append_tmp_files(domain) + rpm_dontaudit_leaks(domain) + rpm_read_script_tmp_files(domain) + rpm_inherited_fifo(domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + sosreport_append_tmp_files(domain) +') + +tunable_policy(`allow_domain_fd_use',` + # Allow all domains to use fds past to them + allow domain domain:fd use; +') + +optional_policy(` + cron_dontaudit_write_system_job_tmp_files(domain) + cron_rw_pipes(domain) + cron_rw_system_job_pipes(domain) +') + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + dontaudit domain self:udp_socket listen; + allow domain domain:key { link search }; + dontaudit domain domain:socket_class_set { read write }; + dontaudit domain self:capability sys_module; +') + +optional_policy(` + hal_dontaudit_read_pid_files(domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + ipsec_match_default_spd(domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + afs_rw_udp_sockets(domain) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_rw_pipes(domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_dontaudit_rw_pipes(domain) + unconfined_sigchld(domain) +') + +# broken kernel +dontaudit can_change_object_identity can_change_object_identity:key link; + +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + optional_policy(` + unconfined_use_fds(domain) + ') +') + +# send init a sigchld and signull +optional_policy(` + init_sigchld(domain) + init_signull(domain) +') + +# these seem questionable: + +optional_policy(` + rpm_use_fds(domain) + rpm_read_pipes(domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + selinux_dontaudit_getattr_fs(domain) + selinux_dontaudit_read_fs(domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + seutil_dontaudit_read_config(domain) +') + +dontaudit domain domain:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh } ; diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/files.fc index c19518a..7ace2f2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.fc +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.fc @@ -18,6 +18,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /fsckoptions -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) /halt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) /poweroff -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) +/[^/]+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) ') ifdef(`distro_suse',` @@ -53,10 +54,16 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',` /etc/ioctl\.save -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) /etc/killpower -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) /etc/localtime -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0) -/etc/mtab -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) -/etc/mtab\.fuselock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) +/etc/mtab.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) /etc/nohotplug -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) /etc/nologin.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) +/etc/securetty -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) + +/etc/sysctl\.conf(\.old)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_conf_t,s0) +/etc/sysconfig/ebtables.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_conf_t,s0) +/etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_conf_t,s0) +/etc/sysconfig/ipvsadm.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_conf_t,s0) +/etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_conf_t,s0) /etc/cups/client\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0) @@ -68,7 +75,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',` /etc/sysconfig/hwconf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) /etc/sysconfig/iptables\.save -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) -/etc/sysconfig/firstboot -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) + +/etc/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) +/etc/X11/xorg\.conf\.d/00-system-setup-keyboard\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) + ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` /etc/profile\.env -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) @@ -102,10 +112,9 @@ HOME_ROOT/lost\+found/.* <> /initrd -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:root_t,s0) # -# /lib(64)? +# /lib # /lib/modules(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_object_t,s0) -/lib64/modules(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_object_t,s0) # # /lost+found @@ -146,7 +155,7 @@ HOME_ROOT/lost\+found/.* <> /opt -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0) /opt/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0) -/opt/(.*/)?var/lib(64)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_lib_t,s0) +/opt/(.*/)?var/lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_lib_t,s0) # # /proc @@ -154,6 +163,12 @@ HOME_ROOT/lost\+found/.* <> /proc -d <> /proc/.* <> +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` +/rhev -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:mnt_t,s0) +/rhev(/[^/]*)? -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:mnt_t,s0) +/rhev/[^/]*/.* <> +') + # # /run # @@ -190,6 +205,7 @@ HOME_ROOT/lost\+found/.* <> /usr -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0) /usr/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0) /usr/\.journal <> +/export(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0) /usr/doc(/.*)?/lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0) @@ -206,6 +222,7 @@ HOME_ROOT/lost\+found/.* <> /usr/lost\+found -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:lost_found_t,mls_systemhigh) /usr/lost\+found/.* <> +/usr/lib/modules(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_object_t,s0) /usr/share/doc(/.*)?/README.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0) @@ -214,7 +231,6 @@ HOME_ROOT/lost\+found/.* <> ifndef(`distro_redhat',` /usr/local/src(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:src_t,s0) - /usr/src(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:src_t,s0) /usr/src/kernels/.+/lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:usr_t,s0) ') @@ -230,17 +246,20 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` /var/ftp/etc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0) +/var/named/chroot/etc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_t,s0) + /var/lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/nfs/rpc_pipefs(/.*)? <> /var/lock(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_lock_t,s0) +/var/lock -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_lock_t,s0) /var/lost\+found -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:lost_found_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/lost\+found/.* <> /var/run -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_run_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) -/var/run -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_run_t,s0) +/var/run -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_run_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) /var/run/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_run_t,s0) /var/run/.*\.*pid <> @@ -257,3 +276,5 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ifdef(`distro_debian',` /var/run/motd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_runtime_t,s0) ') +/nsr(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_t,s0) +/nsr/logs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.if b/policy/modules/kernel/files.if index ff006ea..95fcd54 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.if @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ ##

  • files_pid_file()
    • ##
  • files_security_file()
    • ##
  • files_security_mountpoint()
    • +##
  • files_spool_file()
    • ##
  • files_tmp_file()
    • ##
  • files_tmpfs_file()
    • ##
  • logging_log_file()
    • @@ -663,12 +664,82 @@ interface(`files_read_non_security_files',` attribute non_security_file_type; ') + list_dirs_pattern($1, non_security_file_type, non_security_file_type) read_files_pattern($1, non_security_file_type, non_security_file_type) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, non_security_file_type, non_security_file_type) ') ######################################## ## +## Read/Write all inherited non-security files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`files_rw_inherited_non_security_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute non_security_file_type; + ') + + allow $1 non_security_file_type:file { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage all non-security files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`files_manage_non_security_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute non_security_file_type; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, non_security_file_type, non_security_file_type) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, non_security_file_type, non_security_file_type) +') + +######################################## +## +## Relabel all non-security files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`files_relabel_non_security_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute non_security_file_type; + ') + + relabel_files_pattern($1, non_security_file_type, non_security_file_type) + allow $1 { non_security_file_type }:dir list_dir_perms; + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, { non_security_file_type }, { non_security_file_type }) + relabel_files_pattern($1, { non_security_file_type }, { non_security_file_type }) + relabel_lnk_files_pattern($1, { non_security_file_type }, { non_security_file_type }) + relabel_fifo_files_pattern($1, { non_security_file_type }, { non_security_file_type }) + relabel_sock_files_pattern($1, { non_security_file_type }, { non_security_file_type }) + relabel_blk_files_pattern($1, { non_security_file_type }, { non_security_file_type }) + relabel_chr_files_pattern($1, { non_security_file_type }, { non_security_file_type }) + + # satisfy the assertions: + seutil_relabelto_bin_policy($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read all directories on the filesystem, except ## the listed exceptions. ## @@ -1053,10 +1124,8 @@ interface(`files_relabel_all_files',` relabel_lnk_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 }) relabel_fifo_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 }) relabel_sock_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 }) - # this is only relabelfrom since there should be no - # device nodes with file types. - relabelfrom_blk_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 }) - relabelfrom_chr_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 }) + relabel_blk_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 }) + relabel_chr_files_pattern($1, { file_type $2 }, { file_type $2 }) # satisfy the assertions: seutil_relabelto_bin_policy($1) @@ -1482,6 +1551,42 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_list_all_mountpoints',` ######################################## ## +## Write all mount points. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_write_all_mountpoints',` + gen_require(` + attribute mountpoint; + ') + + allow $1 mountpoint:dir write; +') + +######################################## +## +## Write all file type directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_write_all_dirs',` + gen_require(` + attribute file_type; + ') + + allow $1 file_type:dir write; +') + +######################################## +## ## List the contents of the root directory. ## ## @@ -1562,7 +1667,7 @@ interface(`files_root_filetrans',` type root_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, root_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, root_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -1660,6 +1765,42 @@ interface(`files_delete_root_dir_entry',` ######################################## ## +## Set attributes of the root directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_setattr_root_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type root_t; + ') + + allow $1 root_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Relabel a rootfs filesystem. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_relabel_rootfs',` + gen_require(` + type root_t; + ') + + allow $1 root_t:filesystem relabel_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Unmount a rootfs filesystem. ## ## @@ -1678,6 +1819,24 @@ interface(`files_unmount_rootfs',` ######################################## ## +## Mount a filesystem on the root file system +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_mounton_rootfs',` + gen_require(` + type root_t; + ') + + allow $1 root_t:dir { search_dir_perms mounton }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Get attributes of the /boot directory. ## ## @@ -1848,7 +2007,7 @@ interface(`files_boot_filetrans',` type boot_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, boot_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, boot_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -2372,6 +2531,24 @@ interface(`files_rw_etc_dirs',` allow $1 etc_t:dir rw_dir_perms; ') +####################################### +## +## Dontaudit remove dir /etc directories. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_remove_etc_dir',` + gen_require(` + type etc_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 etc_t:dir rmdir; +') + ########################################## ## ## Manage generic directories in /etc @@ -2451,7 +2628,7 @@ interface(`files_read_etc_files',` ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -2507,6 +2684,25 @@ interface(`files_manage_etc_files',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to check the +## access on etc files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_access_check_etc',` + gen_require(` + type etc_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 etc_t:file_class_set audit_access; +') + +######################################## +## ## Delete system configuration files in /etc. ## ## @@ -2525,6 +2721,24 @@ interface(`files_delete_etc_files',` ######################################## ## +## Remove entries from the etc directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_delete_etc_dir_entry',` + gen_require(` + type etc_t; + ') + + allow $1 etc_t:dir del_entry_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute generic files in /etc. ## ## @@ -2624,7 +2838,7 @@ interface(`files_etc_filetrans',` type etc_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -2680,24 +2894,6 @@ interface(`files_delete_boot_flag',` ######################################## ## -## Do not audit attempts to set the attributes of the etc_runtime files -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`files_dontaudit_setattr_etc_runtime_files',` - gen_require(` - type etc_runtime_t; - ') - - dontaudit $1 etc_runtime_t:file setattr; -') - -######################################## -## ## Read files in /etc that are dynamically ## created on boot, such as mtab. ## @@ -2738,6 +2934,42 @@ interface(`files_read_etc_runtime_files',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to set the attributes of the etc_runtime files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_setattr_etc_runtime_files',` + gen_require(` + type etc_runtime_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 etc_runtime_t:file setattr; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to write etc_runtime files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_write_etc_runtime_files',` + gen_require(` + type etc_runtime_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 etc_runtime_t:file write; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read files ## in /etc that are dynamically ## created on boot, such as mtab. @@ -2775,6 +3007,7 @@ interface(`files_rw_etc_runtime_files',` allow $1 etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; rw_files_pattern($1, etc_t, etc_runtime_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, etc_t, etc_t) ') ######################################## @@ -2796,6 +3029,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_etc_runtime_files',` ') manage_files_pattern($1, { etc_t etc_runtime_t }, etc_runtime_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, etc_t, etc_runtime_t) ') ######################################## @@ -3166,6 +3400,25 @@ interface(`files_rw_isid_type_blk_files',` ######################################## ## +## rw any files inherited from another process +## on new filesystems that have not yet been labeled. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_rw_inherited_isid_type_files',` + gen_require(` + type file_t; + ') + + allow $1 file_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Create, read, write, and delete block device nodes ## on new filesystems that have not yet been labeled. ## @@ -3364,7 +3617,7 @@ interface(`files_home_filetrans',` type home_root_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, home_root_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, home_root_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -3502,20 +3755,38 @@ interface(`files_list_mnt',` ###################################### ## -## Do not audit attempts to list the contents of /mnt. +## dontaudit List the contents of /mnt. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_list_mnt',` + gen_require(` + type mnt_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 mnt_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to check the +## write access on mnt files ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # -interface(`files_dontaudit_list_mnt',` +interface(`files_dontaudit_access_check_mnt',` gen_require(` type mnt_t; ') - - dontaudit $1 mnt_t:dir list_dir_perms; + dontaudit $1 mnt_t:file_class_set audit_access; ') ######################################## @@ -3804,7 +4075,7 @@ interface(`files_kernel_modules_filetrans',` type modules_object_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, modules_object_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, modules_object_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -3900,9 +4171,130 @@ interface(`files_read_world_readable_sockets',` allow $1 readable_t:sock_file read_sock_file_perms; ') -######################################## +####################################### ## -## Allow the specified type to associate +## Read manageable system configuration files in /etc +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_read_system_conf_files',` + gen_require(` + type etc_t, system_conf_t; + ') + + allow $1 etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Manage manageable system configuration files in /etc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_manage_system_conf_files',` + gen_require(` + type etc_t, system_conf_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, { etc_t system_conf_t }, system_conf_t) + files_filetrans_system_conf_named_files($1) +') + +##################################### +## +## File name transition for system configuration files in /etc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_filetrans_system_conf_named_files',` + gen_require(` + type etc_t, system_conf_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "sysctl.conf") + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "sysctl.conf.old") + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ebtables.old") + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ebtables-config") + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "ebtables-config.old") + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "iptables.old") + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "iptables-config") + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "iptables-config.old") + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "system-config-firewall") + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file, "system-config-firewall.old") +') + +###################################### +## +## Relabel manageable system configuration files in /etc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_relabelto_system_conf_files',` + gen_require(` + type usr_t; + ') + + relabelto_files_pattern($1, system_conf_t, system_conf_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Relabel manageable system configuration files in /etc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_relabelfrom_system_conf_files',` + gen_require(` + type usr_t; + ') + + relabelfrom_files_pattern($1, system_conf_t, system_conf_t) +') + +################################### +## +## Create files in /etc with the type used for +## the manageable system config files. +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +interface(`files_etc_filetrans_system_conf',` + gen_require(` + type etc_t, system_conf_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_t, system_conf_t, file) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified type to associate ## to a filesystem with the type of the ## temporary directory (/tmp). ## @@ -3922,6 +4314,26 @@ interface(`files_associate_tmp',` ######################################## ## +## Allow the specified type to associate +## to a filesystem with the type of the +## / file system +## +## +## +## Type of the file to associate. +## +## +# +interface(`files_associate_rootfs',` + gen_require(` + type root_t; + ') + + allow $1 root_t:filesystem associate; +') + +######################################## +## ## Get the attributes of the tmp directory (/tmp). ## ## @@ -3945,7 +4357,7 @@ interface(`files_getattr_tmp_dirs',` ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -4017,7 +4429,7 @@ interface(`files_list_tmp',` ##     ## ## -## Domain not to audit. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -4029,6 +4441,24 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_list_tmp',` dontaudit $1 tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms; ') +####################################### +## +## Allow read and write to the tmp directory (/tmp). +## +## +## +## Domain not to audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_rw_generic_tmp_dir',` + gen_require(` + type tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms; +') + ######################################## ## ## Remove entries from the tmp directory. @@ -4085,6 +4515,32 @@ interface(`files_manage_generic_tmp_dirs',` ######################################## ## +## Allow shared library text relocations in tmp files. +## +## +##

    +## Allow shared library text relocations in tmp files. +##

    +##

    +## This is added to support java policy. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_execmod_tmp',` + gen_require(` + attribute tmpfile; + ') + + allow $1 tmpfile:file execmod; +') + +######################################## +## ## Manage temporary files and directories in /tmp. ## ## @@ -4139,6 +4595,42 @@ interface(`files_rw_generic_tmp_sockets',` ######################################## ## +## Relabel a dir from the type used in /tmp. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_relabelfrom_tmp_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type tmp_t; + ') + + relabelfrom_dirs_pattern($1, tmp_t, tmp_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Relabel a file from the type used in /tmp. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_relabelfrom_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type tmp_t; + ') + + relabelfrom_files_pattern($1, tmp_t, tmp_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Set the attributes of all tmp directories. ## ## @@ -4202,7 +4694,7 @@ interface(`files_relabel_all_tmp_dirs',` ##     ## ## -## Domain not to audit. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -4262,7 +4754,7 @@ interface(`files_relabel_all_tmp_files',` ##     ## ## -## Domain not to audit. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -4318,7 +4810,7 @@ interface(`files_tmp_filetrans',` type tmp_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, tmp_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, tmp_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -4342,6 +4834,16 @@ interface(`files_purge_tmp',` delete_lnk_files_pattern($1, tmpfile, tmpfile) delete_fifo_files_pattern($1, tmpfile, tmpfile) delete_sock_files_pattern($1, tmpfile, tmpfile) + delete_chr_files_pattern($1, tmpfile, tmpfile) + delete_blk_files_pattern($1, tmpfile, tmpfile) + files_list_isid_type_dirs($1) + files_delete_isid_type_dirs($1) + files_delete_isid_type_files($1) + files_delete_isid_type_symlinks($1) + files_delete_isid_type_fifo_files($1) + files_delete_isid_type_sock_files($1) + files_delete_isid_type_blk_files($1) + files_delete_isid_type_chr_files($1) ') ######################################## @@ -4681,7 +5183,7 @@ interface(`files_usr_filetrans',` type usr_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, usr_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, usr_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -4914,6 +5416,24 @@ interface(`files_list_var',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit listing of the var directory (/var). +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_list_var',` + gen_require(` + type var_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 var_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Create, read, write, and delete directories ## in the /var directory. ## @@ -5084,7 +5604,7 @@ interface(`files_var_filetrans',` type var_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, var_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, var_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -5219,7 +5739,7 @@ interface(`files_var_lib_filetrans',` ') allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms; - filetrans_pattern($1, var_lib_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, var_lib_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -5259,6 +5779,25 @@ interface(`files_read_var_lib_symlinks',` read_lnk_files_pattern($1, { var_t var_lib_t }, var_lib_t) ') +######################################## +## +## manage generic symbolic links +## in the /var/lib directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_manage_var_lib_symlinks',` + gen_require(` + type var_lib_t; + ') + + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1,var_lib_t,var_lib_t) +') + # cjp: the next two interfaces really need to be fixed # in some way. They really neeed their own types. @@ -5304,6 +5843,25 @@ interface(`files_manage_mounttab',` ######################################## ## +## List generic lock directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_list_locks',` + gen_require(` + type var_t, var_lock_t; + ') + + files_search_locks($1) + list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_lock_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Search the locks directory (/var/lock). ## ## @@ -5317,6 +5875,8 @@ interface(`files_search_locks',` type var_t, var_lock_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 var_lock_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; search_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_lock_t) ') @@ -5336,12 +5896,14 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_search_locks',` type var_lock_t; ') + dontaudit $1 var_lock_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; dontaudit $1 var_lock_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## List generic lock directories. +## create a directory in the /var/lock +## directories. ## ## ## @@ -5349,12 +5911,30 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_search_locks',` ## ## # -interface(`files_list_locks',` +interface(`files_create_lock_dirs',` gen_require(` type var_t, var_lock_t; ') + files_search_locks($1) + allow $1 var_lock_t:dir create_dir_perms; +') - list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_lock_t) +######################################## +## +## Set the attributes of the /var/lock directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_setattr_lock_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type var_lock_t; + ') + + allow $1 var_lock_t:dir setattr; ') ######################################## @@ -5373,6 +5953,7 @@ interface(`files_rw_lock_dirs',` type var_t, var_lock_t; ') + files_search_locks($1) rw_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_lock_t) ') @@ -5385,7 +5966,6 @@ interface(`files_rw_lock_dirs',` ## Domain allowed access. ##     ## -## # interface(`files_relabel_all_lock_dirs',` gen_require(` @@ -5412,7 +5992,7 @@ interface(`files_getattr_generic_locks',` type var_t, var_lock_t; ') - allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_locks($1) allow $1 var_lock_t:dir list_dir_perms; getattr_files_pattern($1, var_lock_t, var_lock_t) ') @@ -5428,12 +6008,12 @@ interface(`files_getattr_generic_locks',` ## # interface(`files_delete_generic_locks',` - gen_require(` + gen_require(` type var_t, var_lock_t; - ') + ') - allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms; - delete_files_pattern($1, var_lock_t, var_lock_t) + files_search_locks($1) + delete_files_pattern($1, var_lock_t, var_lock_t) ') ######################################## @@ -5452,7 +6032,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_generic_locks',` type var_t, var_lock_t; ') - allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_locks($1) manage_files_pattern($1, var_lock_t, var_lock_t) ') @@ -5493,7 +6073,7 @@ interface(`files_read_all_locks',` type var_t, var_lock_t; ') - allow $1 { var_t var_lock_t }:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_locks($1) allow $1 lockfile:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile) @@ -5515,7 +6095,7 @@ interface(`files_manage_all_locks',` type var_t, var_lock_t; ') - allow $1 { var_t var_lock_t }:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_locks($1) manage_dirs_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile) manage_files_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile) manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, lockfile, lockfile) @@ -5547,8 +6127,8 @@ interface(`files_lock_filetrans',` type var_t, var_lock_t; ') - allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms; - filetrans_pattern($1, var_lock_t, $2, $3) + files_search_locks($1) + filetrans_pattern($1, var_lock_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -5608,6 +6188,43 @@ interface(`files_search_pids',` search_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, var_run_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Add and remove entries from pid directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_rw_pid_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Create generic pid directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_create_var_run_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type var_t, var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $1 var_run_t:dir create_dir_perms; +') + ######################################## ## ## Do not audit attempts to search @@ -5629,6 +6246,25 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_search_pids',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to search +## the all /var/run directory. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_search_all_pids',` + gen_require(` + attribute pidfile; + ') + + dontaudit $1 pidfile:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## List the contents of the runtime process ## ID directories (/var/run). ## @@ -5736,7 +6372,7 @@ interface(`files_pid_filetrans',` ') allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms; - filetrans_pattern($1, var_run_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, var_run_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -5815,29 +6451,25 @@ interface(`files_dontaudit_ioctl_all_pids',` ######################################## ## -## Read all process ID files. +## Relable all pid directories ## ## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## -## # -interface(`files_read_all_pids',` +interface(`files_relabel_all_pid_dirs',` gen_require(` attribute pidfile; - type var_t; ') - list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, pidfile) - read_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile) + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile) ') ######################################## ## -## Mount filesystems on all polyinstantiation -## member directories. +## Delete all pid sockets ## ## ## @@ -5845,12 +6477,182 @@ interface(`files_read_all_pids',` ## ## # -interface(`files_mounton_all_poly_members',` +interface(`files_delete_all_pid_sockets',` gen_require(` - attribute polymember; + attribute pidfile; ') - allow $1 polymember:dir mounton; + allow $1 pidfile:sock_file delete_sock_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create all pid sockets +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_create_all_pid_sockets',` + gen_require(` + attribute pidfile; + ') + + allow $1 pidfile:sock_file create_sock_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create all pid named pipes +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_create_all_pid_pipes',` + gen_require(` + attribute pidfile; + ') + + allow $1 pidfile:fifo_file create_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete all pid named pipes +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_delete_all_pid_pipes',` + gen_require(` + attribute pidfile; + ') + + allow $1 pidfile:fifo_file delete_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## manage all pidfile directories +## in the /var/run directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_manage_all_pid_dirs',` + gen_require(` + attribute pidfile; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1,pidfile,pidfile) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read all process ID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`files_read_all_pids',` + gen_require(` + attribute pidfile; + type var_t; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, var_t, pidfile) + read_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile) +') + +######################################## +## +## Relable all pid files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_relabel_all_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute pidfile; + ') + + relabel_files_pattern($1, pidfile, pidfile) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute generic programs in /var/run in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_exec_generic_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type var_run_t; + ') + + exec_files_pattern($1, var_run_t, var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## manage all pidfiles +## in the /var/run directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_manage_all_pids',` + gen_require(` + attribute pidfile; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1,pidfile,pidfile) +') + +######################################## +## +## Mount filesystems on all polyinstantiation +## member directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_mounton_all_poly_members',` + gen_require(` + attribute polymember; + ') + + allow $1 polymember:dir mounton; ') ######################################## @@ -5900,6 +6702,90 @@ interface(`files_delete_all_pid_dirs',` ######################################## ## +## Make the specified type a file +## used for spool files. +## +## +##

    +## Make the specified type usable for spool files. +## This will also make the type usable for files, making +## calls to files_type() redundant. Failure to use this interface +## for a spool file may result in problems with +## purging spool files. +##

    +##

    +## Related interfaces: +##

    +##
      +##
    • files_spool_filetrans()
      • +##
    +##

    +## Example usage with a domain that can create and +## write its spool file in the system spool file +## directories (/var/spool): +##

    +##

    +## type myspoolfile_t; +## files_spool_file(myfile_spool_t) +## allow mydomain_t myfile_spool_t:file { create_file_perms write_file_perms }; +## files_spool_filetrans(mydomain_t, myfile_spool_t, file) +##

    +##     +## +## +## Type of the file to be used as a +## spool file. +## +## +## +# +interface(`files_spool_file',` + gen_require(` + attribute spoolfile; + ') + + files_type($1) + typeattribute $1 spoolfile; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create all spool sockets +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_create_all_spool_sockets',` + gen_require(` + attribute spoolfile; + ') + + allow $1 spoolfile:sock_file create_sock_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete all spool sockets +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_delete_all_spool_sockets',` + gen_require(` + attribute spoolfile; + ') + + allow $1 spoolfile:sock_file delete_sock_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Search the contents of generic spool ## directories (/var/spool). ## @@ -6042,7 +6928,7 @@ interface(`files_spool_filetrans',` ') allow $1 var_t:dir search_dir_perms; - filetrans_pattern($1, var_spool_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, var_spool_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -6117,3 +7003,332 @@ interface(`files_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 files_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## +## Create a core files in / +## +## +##

    +## Create a core file in /, +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`files_manage_root_files',` + gen_require(` + type root_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, root_t, root_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create a default directory +## +## +##

    +## Create a default_t direcrory +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`files_create_default_dir',` + gen_require(` + type default_t; + ') + + allow $1 default_t:dir create; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, default_t objects with an automatic +## type transition. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object being created. +## +## +# +interface(`files_root_filetrans_default',` + gen_require(` + type root_t, default_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, root_t, default_t, $2) +') + +######################################## +## +## manage generic symbolic links +## in the /var/run directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_manage_generic_pids_symlinks',` + gen_require(` + type var_run_t; + ') + + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1,var_run_t,var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to getattr +## all tmpfs files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_getattr_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute tmpfsfile; + ') + + allow $1 tmpfsfile:file getattr; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow read write all tmpfs files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_rw_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute tmpfsfile; + ') + + allow $1 tmpfsfile:file { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read security files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_read_security_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute security_file_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 security_file_type:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## rw any files inherited from another process +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Object type. +## +## +# +interface(`files_rw_all_inherited_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute file_type; + ') + + allow $1 { file_type $2 }:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + allow $1 { file_type $2 }:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + allow $1 { file_type $2 }:sock_file rw_inherited_sock_file_perms; + allow $1 { file_type $2 }:chr_file rw_inherited_chr_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow any file point to be the entrypoint of this domain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`files_entrypoint_all_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute file_type; + ') + allow $1 file_type:file entrypoint; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to rw inherited file perms +## of non security files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_all_non_security_leaks',` + gen_require(` + attribute non_security_file_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 non_security_file_type:file_class_set rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read or write +## all leaked files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + attribute file_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 file_type:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 file_type:lnk_file { read }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow domain to create_file_ass all types +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_create_as_is_all_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute file_type; + class kernel_service create_files_as; + ') + + allow $1 file_type:kernel_service create_files_as; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to check the +## write access on all files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_all_access_check',` + gen_require(` + attribute file_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 file_type:file_class_set audit_access; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to write to all files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_dontaudit_write_all_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute file_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 file_type:dir_file_class_set write; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow domain to delete to all files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`files_delete_all_non_security_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute non_security_file_type; + ') + + allow $1 non_security_file_type:file_class_set unlink; +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition named content in the var_run_t directory +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`files_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type mnt_t; + type usr_t; + type var_t; + ') + + files_pid_filetrans($1, mnt_t, dir, "media") + files_root_filetrans($1, mnt_t, dir, "afs") + files_root_filetrans($1, mnt_t, dir, "misc") + files_root_filetrans($1, mnt_t, dir, "net") + files_root_filetrans($1, usr_t, dir, "export") + files_root_filetrans($1, usr_t, dir, "emul") + files_root_filetrans($1, var_t, dir, "nsr") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/files.te b/policy/modules/kernel/files.te index 22821ff..2765a15 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/files.te +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/files.te @@ -10,7 +10,9 @@ attribute files_unconfined_type; attribute lockfile; attribute mountpoint; attribute pidfile; +attribute spoolfile; attribute configfile; +attribute etcfile; # For labeling types that are to be polyinstantiated attribute polydir; @@ -58,12 +60,21 @@ files_type(etc_t) typealias etc_t alias automount_etc_t; typealias etc_t alias snmpd_etc_t; +# system_conf_t is a new type of various +# files in /etc/ that can be managed and +# created by several domains. +# +type system_conf_t, configfile; +files_type(system_conf_t) +# compatibility aliases for removed type: +typealias system_conf_t alias iptables_conf_t; + # # etc_runtime_t is the type of various # files in /etc that are automatically # generated during initialization. # -type etc_runtime_t; +type etc_runtime_t, configfile; files_type(etc_runtime_t) #Temporarily in policy until FC5 dissappears typealias etc_runtime_t alias firstboot_rw_t; @@ -133,6 +144,7 @@ files_mountpoint(src_t) # type system_map_t; files_type(system_map_t) +kernel_proc_type(system_map_t) genfscon proc /kallsyms gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_map_t,s0) # @@ -161,12 +173,14 @@ files_mountpoint(var_t) # type var_lib_t; files_mountpoint(var_lib_t) +files_poly(var_lib_t) # # var_lock_t is tye type of /var/lock # type var_lock_t; files_lock_file(var_lock_t) +files_mountpoint(var_lock_t) # # var_run_t is the type of /var/run, usually @@ -181,6 +195,7 @@ files_mountpoint(var_run_t) # type var_spool_t; files_tmp_file(var_spool_t) +files_spool_file(var_spool_t) ######################################## # diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.fc index cda5588..e89e4bf 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.fc +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.fc @@ -14,3 +14,8 @@ # for systemd systems: /sys/fs/cgroup -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgroup_t,s0) /sys/fs/cgroup/.* <> + +/usr/lib/udev/devices/hugepages -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:hugetlbfs_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/devices/hugepages/.* <> +/usr/lib/udev/devices/shm -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:tmpfs_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/devices/shm/.* <> diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if index 97fcdac..aa54b2c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.if @@ -631,6 +631,27 @@ interface(`fs_getattr_cgroup',` ######################################## ## +## Get attributes of cgroup files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_getattr_cgroup_files',` + gen_require(` + type cgroup_t; + + ') + + getattr_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Search cgroup directories. ## ## @@ -646,11 +667,31 @@ interface(`fs_search_cgroup_dirs',` ') search_dirs_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) dev_search_sysfs($1) ') ######################################## ## +## Relabel cgroup directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_relabel_cgroup_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type cgroup_t; + + ') + + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## list cgroup directories. ## ## @@ -665,9 +706,29 @@ interface(`fs_list_cgroup_dirs', ` ') list_dirs_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) dev_search_sysfs($1) ') +####################################### +## +## Do not audit attempts to search cgroup directories. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_dontaudit_search_cgroup_dirs', ` + gen_require(` + type cgroup_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 cgroup_t:dir search_dir_perms; + dev_dontaudit_search_sysfs($1) +') + ######################################## ## ## Delete cgroup directories. @@ -684,6 +745,7 @@ interface(`fs_delete_cgroup_dirs', ` ') delete_dirs_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) dev_search_sysfs($1) ') @@ -704,6 +766,7 @@ interface(`fs_manage_cgroup_dirs',` ') manage_dirs_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) dev_search_sysfs($1) ') @@ -724,6 +787,8 @@ interface(`fs_read_cgroup_files',` ') read_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) dev_search_sysfs($1) ') @@ -743,6 +808,7 @@ interface(`fs_write_cgroup_files', ` ') write_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) dev_search_sysfs($1) ') @@ -763,6 +829,7 @@ interface(`fs_rw_cgroup_files',` ') rw_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) dev_search_sysfs($1) ') @@ -803,6 +870,8 @@ interface(`fs_manage_cgroup_files',` ') manage_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, cgroup_t, cgroup_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) dev_search_sysfs($1) ') @@ -1107,6 +1176,24 @@ interface(`fs_read_noxattr_fs_files',` ######################################## ## +## Read/Write all inherited noxattrfs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_rw_inherited_noxattr_fs_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute noxattrfs; + ') + + allow $1 noxattrfs:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read all ## noxattrfs files. ## @@ -1245,7 +1332,7 @@ interface(`fs_append_cifs_files',` ######################################## ## -## dontaudit Append files +## Do not audit attempts to append files ## on a CIFS filesystem. ## ## @@ -1265,6 +1352,42 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_append_cifs_files',` ######################################## ## +## Read inherited files on a CIFS or SMB filesystem. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_read_inherited_cifs_files',` + gen_require(` + type cifs_t; + ') + + allow $1 cifs_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read/Write inherited files on a CIFS or SMB filesystem. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_rw_inherited_cifs_files',` + gen_require(` + type cifs_t; + ') + + allow $1 cifs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read or ## write files on a CIFS or SMB filesystem. ## @@ -1279,7 +1402,7 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_rw_cifs_files',` type cifs_t; ') - dontaudit $1 cifs_t:file rw_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 cifs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1542,6 +1665,25 @@ interface(`fs_cifs_domtrans',` domain_auto_transition_pattern($1, cifs_t, $2) ') +######################################## +## +## Make general progams in cifs an entrypoint for +## the specified domain. +## +## +## +## The domain for which cifs_t is an entrypoint. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_cifs_entry_type',` + gen_require(` + type cifs_t; + ') + + domain_entry_file($1, cifs_t) +') + ####################################### ## ## Create, read, write, and delete dirs @@ -1582,6 +1724,24 @@ interface(`fs_manage_configfs_files',` ######################################## ## +## Unmount a configfs filesystem +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_unmount_configfs',` + gen_require(` + type configfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 configfs_t:filesystem unmount; +') + +######################################## +## ## Mount a DOS filesystem, such as ## FAT32 or NTFS. ## @@ -1679,6 +1839,25 @@ interface(`fs_relabelfrom_dos_fs',` ######################################## ## +## Allow changing of the label of a +## tmpfs filesystem using the context= mount option. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_relabelfrom_tmpfs',` + gen_require(` + type tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 tmpfs_t:filesystem relabelfrom; +') + +######################################## +## ## Search dosfs filesystem. ## ## @@ -2025,6 +2204,68 @@ interface(`fs_read_fusefs_symlinks',` ######################################## ## +## Manage symbolic links on a FUSEFS filesystem. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_manage_fusefs_symlinks',` + gen_require(` + type fusefs_t; + ') + + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, fusefs_t, fusefs_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a file on a FUSE filesystem +## in the specified domain. +## +## +##

    +## Execute a file on a FUSE filesystem +## in the specified domain. This allows +## the specified domain to execute any file +## on these filesystems in the specified +## domain. This is not suggested. +##

    +##

    +## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

    +##

    +## This interface was added to handle +## home directories on FUSE filesystems, +## in particular used by the ssh-agent policy. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_fusefs_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type fusefs_t; + ') + + allow $1 fusefs_t:dir search_dir_perms; + domain_auto_transition_pattern($1, fusefs_t, $2) +') + +######################################## +## ## Get the attributes of an hugetlbfs ## filesystem. ## @@ -2080,6 +2321,24 @@ interface(`fs_manage_hugetlbfs_dirs',` ######################################## ## +## Read hugetlbfs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_read_hugetlbfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type hugetlbfs_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, hugetlbfs_t, hugetlbfs_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write hugetlbfs files. ## ## @@ -2148,11 +2407,12 @@ interface(`fs_list_inotifyfs',` ') allow $1 inotifyfs_t:dir list_dir_perms; + fs_read_anon_inodefs_files($1) ') ######################################## ## -## Dontaudit List inotifyfs filesystem. +## Do not audit attempts to list inotifyfs filesystem. ## ## ## @@ -2480,6 +2740,7 @@ interface(`fs_read_nfs_files',` type nfs_t; ') + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1) allow $1 nfs_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t) ') @@ -2518,6 +2779,7 @@ interface(`fs_write_nfs_files',` type nfs_t; ') + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1) allow $1 nfs_t:dir list_dir_perms; write_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t) ') @@ -2544,6 +2806,25 @@ interface(`fs_exec_nfs_files',` ######################################## ## +## Make general progams in nfs an entrypoint for +## the specified domain. +## +## +## +## The domain for which nfs_t is an entrypoint. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_nfs_entry_type',` + gen_require(` + type nfs_t; + ') + + domain_entry_file($1, nfs_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Append files ## on a NFS filesystem. ## @@ -2564,7 +2845,7 @@ interface(`fs_append_nfs_files',` ######################################## ## -## dontaudit Append files +## Do not audit attempts to append files ## on a NFS filesystem. ## ## @@ -2584,6 +2865,42 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_append_nfs_files',` ######################################## ## +## Read inherited files on a NFS filesystem. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_read_inherited_nfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type nfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 nfs_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read/write inherited files on a NFS filesystem. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_rw_inherited_nfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type nfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 nfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read or ## write files on a NFS filesystem. ## @@ -2598,7 +2915,7 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_rw_nfs_files',` type nfs_t; ') - dontaudit $1 nfs_t:file rw_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 nfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -2622,7 +2939,7 @@ interface(`fs_read_nfs_symlinks',` ######################################## ## -## Dontaudit read symbolic links on a NFS filesystem. +## Do not audit attempts to read symbolic links on a NFS filesystem. ## ## ## @@ -2736,7 +3053,7 @@ interface(`fs_search_removable',` ## ## ## -## Domain not to audit. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -2772,7 +3089,7 @@ interface(`fs_read_removable_files',` ## ## ## -## Domain not to audit. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -2965,6 +3282,7 @@ interface(`fs_manage_nfs_dirs',` type nfs_t; ') + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1) allow $1 nfs_t:dir manage_dir_perms; ') @@ -3005,6 +3323,7 @@ interface(`fs_manage_nfs_files',` type nfs_t; ') + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1) manage_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t) ') @@ -3045,6 +3364,7 @@ interface(`fs_manage_nfs_symlinks',` type nfs_t; ') + fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1) manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, nfs_t, nfs_t) ') @@ -3258,6 +3578,24 @@ interface(`fs_getattr_nfsd_files',` getattr_files_pattern($1, nfsd_fs_t, nfsd_fs_t) ') +####################################### +## +## read files on an nfsd filesystem +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_read_nfsd_files',` + gen_require(` + type nfsd_fs_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, nfsd_fs_t, nfsd_fs_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Read and write NFS server files. @@ -3278,6 +3616,24 @@ interface(`fs_rw_nfsd_fs',` ######################################## ## +## Manage NFS server files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_manage_nfsd_fs',` + gen_require(` + type nfsd_fs_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, nfsd_fs_t, nfsd_fs_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Allow the type to associate to ramfs filesystems. ## ## @@ -3387,7 +3743,7 @@ interface(`fs_search_ramfs',` ######################################## ## -## Dontaudit Search directories on a ramfs +## Do not audit attempts to search directories on a ramfs ## ## ## @@ -3424,7 +3780,7 @@ interface(`fs_manage_ramfs_dirs',` ######################################## ## -## Dontaudit read on a ramfs files. +## Do not audit attempts to read on a ramfs files. ## ## ## @@ -3442,7 +3798,7 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_read_ramfs_files',` ######################################## ## -## Dontaudit read on a ramfs fifo_files. +## Do not audit attempts to read on a ramfs fifo_files. ## ## ## @@ -3810,6 +4166,24 @@ interface(`fs_unmount_tmpfs',` ######################################## ## +## Mount on tmpfs directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_mounton_tmpfs', ` + gen_require(` + type tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 tmpfs_t:dir mounton; +') + +######################################## +## ## Get the attributes of a tmpfs ## filesystem. ## @@ -3958,6 +4332,42 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_list_tmpfs',` ######################################## ## +## Relabel directory on tmpfs filesystems. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_relabel_tmpfs_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type tmpfs_t; + ') + + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, tmpfs_t, tmpfs_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Relabel files on tmpfs filesystems. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_relabel_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type tmpfs_t; + ') + + relabel_files_pattern($1, tmpfs_t, tmpfs_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Create, read, write, and delete ## tmpfs directories ## @@ -4059,7 +4469,7 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_rw_tmpfs_files',` type tmpfs_t; ') - dontaudit $1 tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 tmpfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -4119,6 +4529,24 @@ interface(`fs_rw_tmpfs_files',` ######################################## ## +## Read and write generic tmpfs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_rw_inherited_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 tmpfs_t:file { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read tmpfs link files. ## ## @@ -4156,7 +4584,7 @@ interface(`fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files',` ######################################## ## -## dontaudit Read and write character nodes on tmpfs filesystems. +## Do not audit attempts to read and write character nodes on tmpfs filesystems. ## ## ## @@ -4175,6 +4603,42 @@ interface(`fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to dontaudit read block nodes on tmpfs filesystems. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_dontaudit_read_tmpfs_blk_dev',` + gen_require(` + type tmpfs_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 tmpfs_t:blk_file read_blk_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read files on tmpfs filesystems. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_dontaudit_read_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type tmpfs_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 tmpfs_t:blk_file read; +') + +######################################## +## ## Relabel character nodes on tmpfs filesystems. ## ## @@ -4232,6 +4696,24 @@ interface(`fs_relabel_tmpfs_blk_file',` ######################################## ## +## Delete generic files in tmpfs directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_delete_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 tmpfs_t:file unlink; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write, create and delete generic ## files on tmpfs filesystems. ## @@ -4251,6 +4733,25 @@ interface(`fs_manage_tmpfs_files',` ######################################## ## +## Execute files on a tmpfs filesystem. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`fs_exec_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type tmpfs_t; + ') + + exec_files_pattern($1, tmpfs_t, tmpfs_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write, create and delete symbolic ## links on tmpfs filesystems. ## @@ -4457,6 +4958,8 @@ interface(`fs_mount_all_fs',` ') allow $1 filesystem_type:filesystem mount; +# Mount checks write access on the dir + allow $1 filesystem_type:dir write; ') ######################################## @@ -4503,7 +5006,7 @@ interface(`fs_unmount_all_fs',` ## ##

    ## Allow the specified domain to -## et the attributes of all filesystems. +## get the attributes of all filesystems. ## Example attributes: ##

    ##
      @@ -4866,3 +5369,24 @@ interface(`fs_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 filesystem_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read or write +## all leaked filesystems files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`fs_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + attribute filesystem_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 filesystem_type:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 filesystem_type:lnk_file { read }; +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.te b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.te index f125dc2..20c042d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.te +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/filesystem.te @@ -33,6 +33,8 @@ fs_use_xattr jffs2 gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0); fs_use_xattr jfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0); fs_use_xattr lustre gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0); fs_use_xattr xfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0); +fs_use_xattr squashfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0); +fs_use_xattr zfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:fs_t,s0); # Use the allocating task SID to label inodes in the following filesystem # types, and label the filesystem itself with the specified context. @@ -52,6 +54,7 @@ type anon_inodefs_t; fs_type(anon_inodefs_t) files_mountpoint(anon_inodefs_t) genfscon anon_inodefs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:anon_inodefs_t,s0) +mls_trusted_object(anon_inodefs_t) type bdev_t; fs_type(bdev_t) @@ -67,7 +70,7 @@ fs_type(capifs_t) files_mountpoint(capifs_t) genfscon capifs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:capifs_t,s0) -type cgroup_t; +type cgroup_t alias cgroupfs_t; fs_type(cgroup_t) files_type(cgroup_t) files_mountpoint(cgroup_t) @@ -96,6 +99,7 @@ type hugetlbfs_t; fs_type(hugetlbfs_t) files_mountpoint(hugetlbfs_t) fs_use_trans hugetlbfs gen_context(system_u:object_r:hugetlbfs_t,s0); +dev_associate(hugetlbfs_t) type ibmasmfs_t; fs_type(ibmasmfs_t) @@ -144,11 +148,6 @@ fs_type(spufs_t) genfscon spufs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:spufs_t,s0) files_mountpoint(spufs_t) -type squash_t; -fs_type(squash_t) -genfscon squash / gen_context(system_u:object_r:squash_t,s0) -files_mountpoint(squash_t) - type sysv_t; fs_noxattr_type(sysv_t) files_mountpoint(sysv_t) @@ -175,6 +174,7 @@ fs_type(tmpfs_t) files_type(tmpfs_t) files_mountpoint(tmpfs_t) files_poly_parent(tmpfs_t) +dev_associate(tmpfs_t) # Use a transition SID based on the allocating task SID and the # filesystem SID to label inodes in the following filesystem types, @@ -254,6 +254,8 @@ genfscon udf / gen_context(system_u:object_r:iso9660_t,s0) type removable_t; allow removable_t noxattrfs:filesystem associate; fs_noxattr_type(removable_t) +files_type(removable_t) +dev_node(removable_t) files_mountpoint(removable_t) # @@ -273,6 +275,7 @@ genfscon ncpfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0) genfscon reiserfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0) genfscon panfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0) genfscon gadgetfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0) +genfscon 9p / gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfs_t,s0) ######################################## # diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.fc index 7be4ddf..f7021a0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.fc +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.fc @@ -1 +1,2 @@ -# This module currently does not have any file contexts. + +/sys/class/net/ib.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if index 6346378..4221c9d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.if @@ -345,13 +345,8 @@ interface(`kernel_load_module',` attribute can_load_kernmodule; ') - allow $1 self:capability sys_module; typeattribute $1 can_load_kernmodule; - # load_module() calls stop_machine() which - # calls sched_setscheduler() - allow $1 self:capability sys_nice; - kernel_setsched($1) ') ######################################## @@ -791,6 +786,24 @@ interface(`kernel_unmount_proc',` ######################################## ## +## Mounton a proc filesystem. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kernel_mounton_proc',` + gen_require(` + type proc_t; + ') + + allow $1 proc_t:dir mounton; +') + +######################################## +## ## Get the attributes of the proc filesystem. ## ## @@ -1464,6 +1477,24 @@ interface(`kernel_dontaudit_list_all_proc',` ######################################## ## +## Allow attempts to read all proc types. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kernel_read_all_proc',` + gen_require(` + attribute proc_type; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, proc_type, proc_type) +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts by caller to search ## the base directory of sysctls. ## @@ -2072,7 +2103,7 @@ interface(`kernel_dontaudit_list_all_sysctls',` ') dontaudit $1 sysctl_type:dir list_dir_perms; - dontaudit $1 sysctl_type:file getattr; + dontaudit $1 sysctl_type:file read_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -2293,7 +2324,7 @@ interface(`kernel_read_unlabeled_state',` ##
    ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -2475,6 +2506,24 @@ interface(`kernel_rw_unlabeled_blk_files',` ######################################## ## +## Read and write unlabeled sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kernel_rw_unlabeled_socket',` + gen_require(` + type unlabeled_t; + ') + + allow $1 unlabeled_t:socket rw_socket_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts by caller to get attributes for ## unlabeled character devices. ## @@ -2619,7 +2668,7 @@ interface(`kernel_sendrecv_unlabeled_association',` allow $1 unlabeled_t:association { sendto recvfrom }; # temporary hack until labeling on packets is supported - allow $1 unlabeled_t:packet { send recv }; +# allow $1 unlabeled_t:packet { send recv }; ') ######################################## @@ -2657,6 +2706,24 @@ interface(`kernel_dontaudit_sendrecv_unlabeled_association',` ######################################## ## +## Receive DCCP packets from an unlabeled connection. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kernel_dccp_recvfrom_unlabeled',` + gen_require(` + type unlabeled_t; + ') + + allow $1 unlabeled_t:dccp_socket recvfrom; +') + +######################################## +## ## Receive TCP packets from an unlabeled connection. ## ## @@ -2684,6 +2751,25 @@ interface(`kernel_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to receive DCCP packets from an unlabeled +## connection. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`kernel_dontaudit_dccp_recvfrom_unlabeled',` + gen_require(` + type unlabeled_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 unlabeled_t:dccp_socket recvfrom; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to receive TCP packets from an unlabeled ## connection. ## @@ -2793,6 +2879,33 @@ interface(`kernel_raw_recvfrom_unlabeled',` allow $1 unlabeled_t:rawip_socket recvfrom; ') +######################################## +## +## Read/Write Raw IP packets from an unlabeled connection. +## +## +##

    +## Receive Raw IP packets from an unlabeled connection. +##

    +##

    +## The corenetwork interface corenet_raw_recv_unlabeled() should +## be used instead of this one. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kernel_rw_unlabeled_rawip_socket',` + gen_require(` + type unlabeled_t; + ') + + allow $1 unlabeled_t:rawip_socket rw_socket_perms; +') + ######################################## ## @@ -2948,6 +3061,24 @@ interface(`kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_database',` ######################################## ## +## Relabel to unlabeled context . +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kernel_relabelto_unlabeled',` + gen_require(` + type unlabeled_t; + ') + + allow $1 unlabeled_t:dir_file_class_set relabelto; +') + +######################################## +## ## Unconfined access to kernel module resources. ## ## @@ -2962,4 +3093,43 @@ interface(`kernel_unconfined',` ') typeattribute $1 kern_unconfined; + kernel_load_module($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to connect to +## the kernel with a unix socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kernel_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type kernel_t; + ') + + allow $1 kernel_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; +') + +######################################## +## +## Make the specified type usable for regular entries in proc +## +## +## +## Type to be used for /proc entries. +## +## +# +interface(`kernel_proc_type',` + gen_require(` + attribute proc_type; + ') + + typeattribute $1 proc_type; ') + diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te index d91c62f..e6f3965 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/kernel.te @@ -1,5 +1,12 @@ policy_module(kernel, 1.13.3) +## +##

    +## disallow programs and users from transitioning to insmod domain. +##

    +##     +gen_bool(secure_mode_insmod,false) + ######################################## # # Declarations @@ -50,6 +57,8 @@ sid kernel gen_context(system_u:system_r:kernel_t,mls_systemhigh) type debugfs_t; fs_type(debugfs_t) +files_mountpoint(debugfs_t) + allow debugfs_t self:filesystem associate; genfscon debugfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:debugfs_t,s0) @@ -157,6 +166,7 @@ genfscon proc /sys/dev gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t,s0) type unlabeled_t; fs_associate(unlabeled_t) sid unlabeled gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh) +fs_associate(unlabeled_t) # These initial sids are no longer used, and can be removed: sid any_socket gen_context(system_u:object_r:unlabeled_t,mls_systemhigh) @@ -236,17 +246,21 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(kernel_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(kernel_t) corenet_raw_send_generic_node(kernel_t) corenet_send_all_packets(kernel_t) +corenet_filetrans_all_named_dev(kernel_t) dev_read_sysfs(kernel_t) dev_search_usbfs(kernel_t) # devtmpfs handling: dev_create_generic_dirs(kernel_t) dev_delete_generic_dirs(kernel_t) -dev_create_generic_blk_files(kernel_t) -dev_delete_generic_blk_files(kernel_t) -dev_create_generic_chr_files(kernel_t) -dev_delete_generic_chr_files(kernel_t) +dev_create_all_blk_files(kernel_t) +dev_delete_all_blk_files(kernel_t) +dev_create_all_chr_files(kernel_t) +dev_delete_all_chr_files(kernel_t) dev_mounton(kernel_t) +dev_filetrans_all_named_dev(kernel_t) +storage_filetrans_all_named_dev(kernel_t) +term_filetrans_all_named_dev(kernel_t) # Mount root file system. Used when loading a policy # from initrd, then mounting the root filesystem @@ -255,7 +269,8 @@ fs_unmount_all_fs(kernel_t) selinux_load_policy(kernel_t) -term_use_console(kernel_t) +term_use_all_terms(kernel_t) +term_use_ptmx(kernel_t) corecmd_exec_shell(kernel_t) corecmd_list_bin(kernel_t) @@ -269,25 +284,47 @@ files_list_root(kernel_t) files_list_etc(kernel_t) files_list_home(kernel_t) files_read_usr_files(kernel_t) +files_manage_mounttab(kernel_t) +files_manage_generic_spool_dirs(kernel_t) mcs_process_set_categories(kernel_t) +mcs_file_read_all(kernel_t) +mcs_file_write_all(kernel_t) +mcs_socket_write_all_levels(kernel_t) mls_process_read_up(kernel_t) mls_process_write_down(kernel_t) +mls_file_downgrade(kernel_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(kernel_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(kernel_t) +mls_socket_write_all_levels(kernel_t) +mls_fd_share_all_levels(kernel_t) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # Bugzilla 222337 fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(kernel_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + apache_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + kerberos_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t) +') + optional_policy(` hotplug_search_config(kernel_t) ') optional_policy(` init_sigchld(kernel_t) + init_dyntrans(kernel_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -297,6 +334,19 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` logging_send_syslog_msg(kernel_t) + logging_manage_generic_logs(kernel_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mta_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(kernel_t, { file dir }) ') optional_policy(` @@ -334,9 +384,7 @@ optional_policy(` fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(kernel_t) fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(kernel_t) - auth_read_all_dirs_except_shadow(kernel_t) - auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(kernel_t) - auth_read_all_symlinks_except_shadow(kernel_t) + files_read_non_security_files(kernel_t) ') tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_rw',` @@ -345,7 +393,7 @@ optional_policy(` fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(kernel_t) fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(kernel_t) - auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(kernel_t) + files_manage_non_security_files(kernel_t) ') ') @@ -358,6 +406,15 @@ optional_policy(` unconfined_domain_noaudit(kernel_t) ') +optional_policy(` + virt_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_xdm_manage_spool(kernel_t) + xserver_filetrans_home_content(kernel_t) +') + ######################################## # # Unlabeled process local policy @@ -386,4 +443,17 @@ allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:dir_file_class_set *; allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:filesystem *; allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:association *; allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:packet *; -allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:process ~{ transition dyntransition execmem execstack execheap }; +allow kern_unconfined unlabeled_t:process ~{ ptrace transition dyntransition execmem execstack execheap }; + +gen_require(` + bool secure_mode_insmod; +') + +if( ! secure_mode_insmod ) { + allow can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_module; + # load_module() calls stop_machine() which + # calls sched_setscheduler() + allow can_load_kernmodule self:capability sys_nice; + kernel_setsched(can_load_kernmodule) +} + diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.if b/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.if index f52faaf..6bb6529 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.if @@ -102,3 +102,49 @@ interface(`mcs_process_set_categories',` typeattribute $1 mcssetcats; ') + +######################################## +## +## Make specified process type MCS untrusted. +## +## +##

    +## Make specified process type MCS untrusted. This +## prevents this process from sending signals to other processes +## with different mcs labels +## object. +##

    +##     +## +## +## The type of the process. +## +## +# +interface(`mcs_untrusted_proc',` + gen_require(` + attribute mcsuntrustedproc; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mcsuntrustedproc; +') + +######################################## +## +## Make specified domain MCS trusted +## for writing to sockets at any level. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`mcs_socket_write_all_levels',` + gen_require(` + attribute mcsnetwrite; + ') + + typeattribute $1 mcsnetwrite; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.te b/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.te index 0e5b661..3168d72 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.te +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/mcs.te @@ -10,3 +10,5 @@ attribute mcsptraceall; attribute mcssetcats; attribute mcswriteall; attribute mcsreadall; +attribute mcsuntrustedproc; +attribute mcsnetwrite; diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.fc index 7be4ddf..4d4c577 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.fc +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.fc @@ -1 +1 @@ -# This module currently does not have any file contexts. +/selinux -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if b/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if index ca7e808..ccb32a0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.if @@ -40,7 +40,7 @@ interface(`selinux_labeled_boolean',` # because of this statement, any module which # calls this interface must be in the base module: - genfscon selinuxfs /booleans/$2 gen_context(system_u:object_r:$1,s0) +# genfscon selinuxfs /booleans/$2 gen_context(system_u:object_r:$1,s0) ') ######################################## @@ -58,6 +58,8 @@ interface(`selinux_get_fs_mount',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) # starting in libselinux 2.0.5, init_selinuxmnt() will # attempt to short circuit by checking if SELINUXMNT # (/selinux) is already a selinuxfs @@ -87,6 +89,7 @@ interface(`selinux_dontaudit_get_fs_mount',` # starting in libselinux 2.0.5, init_selinuxmnt() will # attempt to short circuit by checking if SELINUXMNT # (/selinux) is already a selinuxfs + dev_dontaudit_search_sysfs($1) dontaudit $1 security_t:filesystem getattr; # read /proc/filesystems to see if selinuxfs is supported @@ -109,6 +112,8 @@ interface(`selinux_mount_fs',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:filesystem mount; ') @@ -128,6 +133,8 @@ interface(`selinux_remount_fs',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:filesystem remount; ') @@ -146,6 +153,8 @@ interface(`selinux_unmount_fs',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:filesystem unmount; ') @@ -220,6 +229,8 @@ interface(`selinux_search_fs',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') @@ -243,6 +254,27 @@ interface(`selinux_dontaudit_search_fs',` ######################################## ## +## Mount on selinuxfs directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`selinux_mounton_fs',` + gen_require(` + type security_t; + ') + + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) + allow $1 security_t:dir mounton; +') + + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read ## generic selinuxfs entries ## @@ -257,6 +289,7 @@ interface(`selinux_dontaudit_read_fs',` type security_t; ') + selinux_dontaudit_getattr_fs($1) dontaudit $1 security_t:dir search_dir_perms; dontaudit $1 security_t:file read_file_perms; ') @@ -278,6 +311,7 @@ interface(`selinux_get_enforce_mode',` type security_t; ') + selinux_get_fs_mount($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file read_file_perms; ') @@ -308,21 +342,9 @@ interface(`selinux_set_enforce_mode',` gen_require(` type security_t; attribute can_setenforce; - bool secure_mode_policyload; ') - allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; - allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; typeattribute $1 can_setenforce; - - if(!secure_mode_policyload) { - allow $1 security_t:security setenforce; - - ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` - # needed for systems without audit support - auditallow $1 security_t:security setenforce; - ') - } ') ######################################## @@ -339,21 +361,13 @@ interface(`selinux_load_policy',` gen_require(` type security_t; attribute can_load_policy; - bool secure_mode_policyload; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; typeattribute $1 can_load_policy; - - if(!secure_mode_policyload) { - allow $1 security_t:security load_policy; - - ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` - # needed for systems without audit support - auditallow $1 security_t:security load_policy; - ') - } ') ######################################## @@ -371,6 +385,8 @@ interface(`selinux_read_policy',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file read_file_perms; allow $1 security_t:security read_policy; @@ -433,20 +449,14 @@ interface(`selinux_set_boolean',` interface(`selinux_set_generic_booleans',` gen_require(` type security_t; - bool secure_mode_policyload; + attribute can_setbool; ') + typeattribute $1 can_setbool; + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; - - if(!secure_mode_policyload) { - allow $1 security_t:security setbool; - - ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` - # needed for systems without audit support - auditallow $1 security_t:security setbool; - ') - } ') ######################################## @@ -475,20 +485,15 @@ interface(`selinux_set_all_booleans',` gen_require(` type security_t; attribute boolean_type; - bool secure_mode_policyload; + attribute can_setbool; ') + typeattribute $1 can_setbool; + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow $1 boolean_type:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 boolean_type:file rw_file_perms; - - if(!secure_mode_policyload) { - allow $1 security_t:security setbool; - - ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` - # needed for systems without audit support - auditallow $1 security_t:security setbool; - ') - } ') ######################################## @@ -519,6 +524,8 @@ interface(`selinux_set_parameters',` attribute can_setsecparam; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; allow $1 security_t:security setsecparam; @@ -542,6 +549,8 @@ interface(`selinux_validate_context',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; allow $1 security_t:security check_context; @@ -584,6 +593,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_access_vector',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; allow $1 security_t:security compute_av; @@ -605,6 +616,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_create_context',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; allow $1 security_t:security compute_create; @@ -626,6 +639,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_member',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; allow $1 security_t:security compute_member; @@ -655,6 +670,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_relabel_context',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; allow $1 security_t:security compute_relabel; @@ -675,6 +692,8 @@ interface(`selinux_compute_user_contexts',` type security_t; ') + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs($1) + dev_search_sysfs($1) allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 security_t:file rw_file_perms; allow $1 security_t:security compute_user; @@ -696,4 +715,29 @@ interface(`selinux_unconfined',` ') typeattribute $1 selinux_unconfined_type; + selinux_set_all_booleans($1) + selinux_load_policy($1) + selinux_set_parameters($1) + selinux_set_enforce_mode($1) ') + +######################################## +## +## Generate a file context for a boolean type +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`selinux_genbool',` + gen_require(` + attribute boolean_type; + ') + + type $1, boolean_type; + fs_type($1) + mls_trusted_object($1) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.te b/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.te index d70e0b3..99ff2ac 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.te +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/selinux.te @@ -1,5 +1,14 @@ policy_module(selinux, 1.9.1) +## +##

    +## prevent all confined domains from loading policy, setting +## enforcing mode, and changing boolean values. Set this to true and you +## have to reboot to set it back +##

    +##     +gen_bool(secure_mode_policyload,false) + ######################################## # # Declarations @@ -8,6 +17,7 @@ policy_module(selinux, 1.9.1) attribute boolean_type; attribute can_load_policy; attribute can_setenforce; +attribute can_setbool; attribute can_setsecparam; attribute selinux_unconfined_type; @@ -18,14 +28,15 @@ attribute selinux_unconfined_type; # type security_t, boolean_type; fs_type(security_t) +files_mountpoint(security_t) mls_trusted_object(security_t) sid security gen_context(system_u:object_r:security_t,mls_systemhigh) genfscon selinuxfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0) genfscon securityfs / gen_context(system_u:object_r:security_t,s0) -neverallow ~{ selinux_unconfined_type can_load_policy } security_t:security load_policy; -neverallow ~{ selinux_unconfined_type can_setenforce } security_t:security setenforce; -neverallow ~{ selinux_unconfined_type can_setsecparam } security_t:security setsecparam; +neverallow ~{ can_load_policy } security_t:security load_policy; +neverallow ~{ can_setenforce } security_t:security setenforce; +neverallow ~{ can_setsecparam } security_t:security setsecparam; ######################################## # @@ -41,11 +52,28 @@ allow selinux_unconfined_type boolean_type:file read_file_perms; allow selinux_unconfined_type security_t:security ~{ load_policy setenforce setbool }; if(!secure_mode_policyload) { - allow selinux_unconfined_type boolean_type:file rw_file_perms; - allow selinux_unconfined_type security_t:security { load_policy setenforce setbool }; + allow can_setenforce security_t:security setenforce; + dev_getattr_sysfs_fs(can_setenforce) + dev_search_sysfs(can_setenforce) + allow can_setenforce security_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow can_setenforce security_t:file rw_file_perms; + + ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` + # needed for systems without audit support + auditallow can_setenforce security_t:security setenforce; + ') + + allow can_load_policy security_t:security load_policy; + + ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` + # needed for systems without audit support + auditallow can_load_policy security_t:security load_policy; + ') + + allow can_setbool boolean_type:security setbool; ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` # needed for systems without audit support - auditallow selinux_unconfined_type security_t:security { load_policy setenforce setbool }; + auditallow can_setbool boolean_type:security setbool; ') } diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.fc index 57c4a6a..d323c74 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.fc +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.fc @@ -28,7 +28,8 @@ /dev/loop.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh) /dev/lvm -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh) /dev/mcdx? -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:removable_device_t,s0) -/dev/megadev.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:removable_device_t,s0) +/dev/megaraid_sas_ioctl_node -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh) +/dev/megadev.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh) /dev/mmcblk.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:removable_device_t,s0) /dev/mspblk.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:removable_device_t,s0) /dev/mtd.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh) @@ -81,3 +82,6 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` /lib/udev/devices/loop.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh) /lib/udev/devices/fuse -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:fuse_device_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/udev/devices/loop.* -b gen_context(system_u:object_r:fixed_disk_device_t,mls_systemhigh) +/usr/lib/udev/devices/fuse -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:fuse_device_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if index 1700ef2..9282b84 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/storage.if @@ -101,6 +101,8 @@ interface(`storage_raw_read_fixed_disk',` dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file read_blk_file_perms; allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:chr_file read_chr_file_perms; + #577012 + allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; typeattribute $1 fixed_disk_raw_read; ') @@ -205,6 +207,7 @@ interface(`storage_create_fixed_disk_dev',` allow $1 self:capability mknod; allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:blk_file create_blk_file_perms; + allow $1 fixed_disk_device_t:chr_file create_chr_file_perms; dev_add_entry_generic_dirs($1) ') @@ -269,6 +272,48 @@ interface(`storage_dev_filetrans_fixed_disk',` dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file) ') +####################################### +## +## Create block devices in /dev with the fixed disk type +## via an automatic type transition. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`storage_dev_filetrans_named_fixed_disk',` + gen_require(` + type fixed_disk_device_t; + ') + + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "jsflash") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "lvm") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megaraid_sas_ioctl_node") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "device-mapper") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw9") +') + ######################################## ## ## Create block devices in on a tmpfs filesystem with the @@ -808,3 +853,369 @@ interface(`storage_unconfined',` typeattribute $1 storage_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## +## Create all named devices with the correct label +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`storage_filetrans_all_named_dev',` + + gen_require(` + type tape_device_t; + type fixed_disk_device_t; + type removable_device_t; + type scsi_generic_device_t; + type fuse_device_t; + ') + + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht00") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht01") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht02") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht03") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht04") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht05") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht06") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht07") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht08") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "ht09") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st00") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st01") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st02") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st03") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st04") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st05") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st06") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st07") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st08") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "st09") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "qft0") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "qft1") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "qft2") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "qft3") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst00") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst01") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst02") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst03") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst04") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst05") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst06") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst07") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst08") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "osst09") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt0") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt1") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt2") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt3") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt4") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt5") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt6") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt7") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt8") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "pt9") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic0") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic1") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic2") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic3") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic4") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic5") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic6") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic7") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic8") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tpqic9") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "aztcd") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "bpcd") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu0") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu2") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu3") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu4") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu5") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu6") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu7") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu8") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cdu9") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm200") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm201") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm202") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm203") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm204") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm205") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm206") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm207") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm208") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "cm209") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "md9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sda9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdb9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdc9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdd9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sde9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdf9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "sdg9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "dm-9") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "gscd") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "hitcd") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, blk_file, "ht0") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, blk_file, "ht1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "hwcdrom") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "initrd") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "jsfd") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "jsflash") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "loop9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "lvm") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mcd") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mcdx") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megaraid_sas_ioctl_node") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "megadev9") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk0") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk2") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk3") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk4") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk5") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk6") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk7") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk8") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mmcblk9") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk0") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk2") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk3") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk4") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk5") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk6") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk7") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk8") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "mspblk9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "mtd9") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "optcd") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pf0") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pf1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pf2") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pf3") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pg0") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pg1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pg2") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pg3") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pcd0") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pcd1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pcd2") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "pcd3") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, chr_file, "pg0") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, chr_file, "pg1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, chr_file, "pg2") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, chr_file, "pg3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ps3d9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram10") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram11") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram12") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram13") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram14") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "ram15") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "rd9") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, blk_file, "root") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd0") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd2") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd3") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd4") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd5") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd6") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd7") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd8") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sbpcd9") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg0") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg1") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg2") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg3") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg4") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg5") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg6") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg7") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg8") + dev_filetrans($1, scsi_generic_device_t, chr_file, "sg9") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr0") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr1") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr2") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr3") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr4") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr5") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr6") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr7") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr8") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sr9") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sjcd") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, blk_file, "sonycd") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape0") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape1") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape2") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape3") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape4") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape5") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape6") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape7") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape8") + dev_filetrans($1, tape_device_t, chr_file, "tape9") + dev_filetrans($1, fuse_device_t, chr_file, "fuse") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "device-mapper") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw0") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw1") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw2") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw3") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw4") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw5") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw6") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw7") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw8") + dev_filetrans($1, fixed_disk_device_t, chr_file, "raw9") + dev_filetrans($1, removable_device_t, chr_file, "rio500") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.fc index 7d45d15..22c9cfe 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.fc +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.fc @@ -14,11 +14,12 @@ /dev/ip2[^/]* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tty_device_t,s0) /dev/isdn.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tty_device_t,s0) /dev/ptmx -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:ptmx_t,s0) -/dev/pts/ptmx -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:ptmx_t,s0) /dev/rfcomm[0-9]+ -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tty_device_t,s0) /dev/slamr[0-9]+ -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tty_device_t,s0) /dev/tty -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:devtty_t,s0) /dev/ttySG.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tty_device_t,s0) +/dev/ttyUSB[0-9]+ -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:usbtty_device_t,s0) +/dev/vport[0-9]p[0-9]+ -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtio_device_t,s0) /dev/xvc[^/]* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:tty_device_t,s0) /dev/pty/.* -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:bsdpty_device_t,s0) @@ -41,3 +42,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` # used by init scripts to initally populate udev /dev /lib/udev/devices/console -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:console_device_t,s0) ') + +/lib/udev/devices/pts -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:devpts_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) + +/usr/lib/udev/devices/pts -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:devpts_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.if b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.if index 01dd2f1..c9ac6c7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.if +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.if @@ -208,6 +208,27 @@ interface(`term_use_all_terms',` ######################################## ## +## Read and write the inherited console, all inherited +## ttys and ptys. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`term_use_all_inherited_terms',` + gen_require(` + attribute ttynode, ptynode; + type console_device_t, devpts_t, tty_device_t; + ') + + allow $1 { devpts_t console_device_t tty_device_t ttynode ptynode }:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Write to the console. ## ## @@ -274,7 +295,6 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_read_console',` ## Domain allowed access. ## ## -## # interface(`term_use_console',` gen_require(` @@ -299,9 +319,12 @@ interface(`term_use_console',` interface(`term_dontaudit_use_console',` gen_require(` type console_device_t; + type tty_device_t; ') - dontaudit $1 console_device_t:chr_file rw_chr_file_perms; + init_dontaudit_use_fds($1) + dontaudit $1 console_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_chr_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 tty_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_chr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -384,6 +407,24 @@ interface(`term_getattr_pty_fs',` ######################################## ## +## Relabel a pty filesystem. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`term_relabel_pty_fs',` + gen_require(` + type devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 devpts_t:filesystem relabel_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to get the ## attributes of the /dev/pts directory. ## @@ -462,6 +503,24 @@ interface(`term_list_ptys',` ######################################## ## +## Relabel the /dev/pts directory +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`term_relabel_ptys_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 devpts_t:dir relabel_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read the ## /dev/pts directory. ## @@ -616,6 +675,7 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys',` type devpts_t; ') + init_dontaudit_use_fds($1) dontaudit $1 devpts_t:chr_file { getattr read write ioctl }; ') @@ -860,6 +920,26 @@ interface(`term_use_all_ptys',` ######################################## ## +## Read and write all inherited ptys. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`term_use_all_inherited_ptys',` + gen_require(` + attribute ptynode; + type devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 ptynode:chr_file { rw_inherited_term_perms lock }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read or write any ptys. ## ## @@ -873,7 +953,7 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys',` attribute ptynode; ') - dontaudit $1 ptynode:chr_file { rw_term_perms lock append }; + dontaudit $1 ptynode:chr_file { rw_inherited_term_perms lock append }; ') ######################################## @@ -921,7 +1001,7 @@ interface(`term_getattr_all_user_ptys',` ##     ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -1240,7 +1320,28 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys',` type tty_device_t; ') - dontaudit $1 tty_device_t:chr_file rw_chr_file_perms; + init_dontaudit_use_fds($1) + dontaudit $1 tty_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_chr_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write USB tty character +## device nodes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`term_use_usb_ttys',` + gen_require(` + type usbtty_device_t; + ') + + dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) + allow $1 usbtty_device_t:chr_file rw_chr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1256,11 +1357,13 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys',` # interface(`term_getattr_all_ttys',` gen_require(` + type tty_device_t; attribute ttynode; ') dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) allow $1 ttynode:chr_file getattr; + allow $1 tty_device_t:chr_file getattr; ') ######################################## @@ -1277,10 +1380,12 @@ interface(`term_getattr_all_ttys',` interface(`term_dontaudit_getattr_all_ttys',` gen_require(` attribute ttynode; + type tty_device_t; ') dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) dontaudit $1 ttynode:chr_file getattr; + dontaudit $1 tty_device_t:chr_file getattr; ') ######################################## @@ -1358,7 +1463,27 @@ interface(`term_use_all_ttys',` ') dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) - allow $1 ttynode:chr_file rw_chr_file_perms; + allow $1 ttynode:chr_file rw_term_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write all inherited ttys. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`term_use_all_inherited_ttys',` + gen_require(` + attribute ttynode; + ') + + dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) + allow $1 ttynode:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1377,7 +1502,7 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys',` attribute ttynode; ') - dontaudit $1 ttynode:chr_file rw_chr_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 ttynode:chr_file rw_inherited_chr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1485,7 +1610,7 @@ interface(`term_use_all_user_ttys',` ##     ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -1493,3 +1618,426 @@ interface(`term_dontaudit_use_all_user_ttys',` refpolicywarn(`$0() is deprecated, use term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys() instead.') term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys($1) ') + +#################################### +## +## Getattr on the virtio console. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`term_getattr_virtio_console',` + gen_require(` + type virtio_device_t; + ') + + allow $1 virtio_device_t:chr_file getattr_chr_file_perms; +') + +##################################### +## +## Read from and write to the virtio console. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`term_use_virtio_console',` + gen_require(` + type virtio_device_t; + ') + + dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) + allow $1 virtio_device_t:chr_file rw_chr_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create all named term devices with the correct label +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`term_filetrans_all_named_dev',` + +gen_require(` + type tty_device_t; + type bsdpty_device_t; + type console_device_t; + type ptmx_t; + type devtty_t; + type virtio_device_t; + type devpts_t; + type usbtty_device_t; +') + + dev_filetrans($1, devtty_t, chr_file, "tty") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty10") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty11") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty12") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty13") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty14") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty15") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty16") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty17") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty18") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty19") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty20") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty21") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty22") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty23") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty24") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty25") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty26") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty27") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty28") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty29") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty30") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty31") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty32") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty33") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty34") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty35") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty36") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty37") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty38") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty39") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty40") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty41") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty42") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty43") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty44") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty45") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty46") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty47") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty48") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty49") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty50") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty51") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty52") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty53") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty54") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty55") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty56") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty57") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty58") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty59") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty60") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty61") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty62") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty63") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty64") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty65") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty66") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty67") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty68") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty69") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty70") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty71") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty72") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty73") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty74") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty75") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty76") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty77") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty78") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty79") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty80") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty81") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty82") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty83") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty84") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty85") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty86") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty87") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty88") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty89") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty90") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty91") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty92") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty93") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty94") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty95") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty96") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty97") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty98") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "tty99") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty10") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty11") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty12") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty13") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty14") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty15") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty16") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty17") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty18") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty19") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty20") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty21") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty22") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty23") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty24") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty25") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty26") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty27") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty28") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty29") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty30") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty31") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty32") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty33") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty34") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty35") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty36") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty37") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty38") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty39") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty40") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty41") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty42") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty43") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty44") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty45") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty46") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty47") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty48") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty49") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty50") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty51") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty52") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty53") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty54") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty55") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty56") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty57") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty58") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty59") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty60") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty61") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty62") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty63") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty64") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty65") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty66") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty67") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty68") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty69") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty70") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty71") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty72") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty73") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty74") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty75") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty76") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty77") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty78") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty79") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty80") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty81") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty82") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty83") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty84") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty85") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty86") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty87") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty88") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty89") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty90") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty91") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty92") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty93") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty94") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty95") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty96") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty97") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty98") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "pty99") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "adb9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "capi9") + dev_filetrans($1, console_device_t, chr_file, "console") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "cu9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "dcbri9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "vcsa") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "vcsb") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "vcsc") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "vcsd") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "vcse") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvc9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "hvsi9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ircomm9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "isdn9") + filetrans_pattern($1, devpts_t, ptmx_t, chr_file, "ptmx") + dev_filetrans($1, ptmx_t, chr_file, "ptmx") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "rfcomm9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "slamr9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyS9") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "ttySG9") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB0") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB1") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB2") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB3") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB4") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB5") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB6") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB7") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB8") + dev_filetrans($1, usbtty_device_t, chr_file, "ttyUSB9") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p0") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p1") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p2") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p3") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p4") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p5") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p6") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p7") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p8") + dev_filetrans($1, virtio_device_t, chr_file, "vport0p9") + dev_filetrans($1, devpts_t, dir, "pts") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc0") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc1") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc2") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc3") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc4") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc5") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc6") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc7") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc8") + dev_filetrans($1, tty_device_t, chr_file, "xvc9") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te index 2241b7d..b0ab494 100644 --- a/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/terminal.te @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ files_mountpoint(devpts_t) fs_associate_tmpfs(devpts_t) fs_type(devpts_t) fs_use_trans devpts gen_context(system_u:object_r:devpts_t,s0); +dev_associate(devpts_t) # # devtty_t is the type of /dev/tty. @@ -56,3 +57,9 @@ dev_node(tty_device_t) # type usbtty_device_t, serial_device; dev_node(usbtty_device_t) + +# +# virtio_device_t is the type of /dev/vport[0-9]p[0-9] +# +type virtio_device_t, serial_device; +dev_node(virtio_device_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.fc b/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f310b9d --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.fc @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +# No unlabelednet file contexts. diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.if b/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0ce0470 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.if @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +## Policy for allowing confined domains to use unlabeled_t packets diff --git a/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.te b/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e1ebd1a --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/kernel/unlabelednet.te @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +policy_module(unlabelednet, 1.0) + +corenet_enable_unlabeled_packets() diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/auditadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/auditadm.te index 0faef68..4264c9c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/auditadm.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/auditadm.te @@ -22,16 +22,21 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(auditadm_t) domain_kill_all_domains(auditadm_t) +selinux_read_policy(auditadm_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(auditadm_t) logging_read_generic_logs(auditadm_t) logging_manage_audit_log(auditadm_t) logging_manage_audit_config(auditadm_t) logging_run_auditctl(auditadm_t, auditadm_r) logging_run_auditd(auditadm_t, auditadm_r) +logging_stream_connect_syslog(auditadm_t) seutil_run_runinit(auditadm_t, auditadm_r) seutil_read_bin_policy(auditadm_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(auditadm_t) + optional_policy(` consoletype_exec(auditadm_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/dbadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/dbadm.te index 1875064..2adc35f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/dbadm.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/dbadm.te @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ userdom_base_user_template(dbadm) # database admin local policy # -allow dbadm_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search sys_ptrace }; +allow dbadm_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search }; files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(dbadm_t) files_delete_generic_locks(dbadm_t) @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ files_list_var(dbadm_t) selinux_get_enforce_mode(dbadm_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(dbadm_t) +logging_send_audit_msgs(dbadm_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(dbadm_t) @@ -58,3 +59,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` postgresql_admin(dbadm_t, dbadm_r) ') + +optional_policy(` + sudo_role_template(dbadm, dbadm_r, dbadm_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/guest.if b/policy/modules/roles/guest.if index 8906a32..9defca0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/guest.if +++ b/policy/modules/roles/guest.if @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## Least privledge terminal user role +## Least privileged terminal user ######################################## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/guest.te b/policy/modules/roles/guest.te index 1cb7311..1de82b2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/guest.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/guest.te @@ -9,9 +9,15 @@ role guest_r; userdom_restricted_user_template(guest) +kernel_read_system_state(guest_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy # -#gen_user(guest_u,, guest_r, s0, s0) +optional_policy(` + apache_role(guest_r, guest_t) +') + +gen_user(guest_u, user, guest_r, s0, s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/logadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/logadm.te index 3a45a3e..6b08160 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/logadm.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/logadm.te @@ -14,6 +14,5 @@ userdom_base_user_template(logadm) # logadmin local policy # -allow logadm_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search kill sys_ptrace sys_nice }; - +allow logadm_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search kill sys_nice }; logging_admin(logadm_t, logadm_r) diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/secadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/secadm.te index be4de58..7e8b6ec 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/secadm.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/secadm.te @@ -9,6 +9,8 @@ role secadm_r; userdom_unpriv_user_template(secadm) userdom_security_admin_template(secadm_t, secadm_r) +userdom_inherit_append_admin_home_files(secadm_t) +userdom_read_admin_home_files(secadm_t) ######################################## # @@ -30,8 +32,7 @@ mls_file_upgrade(secadm_t) mls_file_downgrade(secadm_t) auth_role(secadm_r, secadm_t) -auth_relabel_all_files_except_shadow(secadm_t) -auth_relabel_shadow(secadm_t) +files_relabel_all_files(secadm_t) init_exec(secadm_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/staff.if b/policy/modules/roles/staff.if index 234a940..d340f20 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/staff.if +++ b/policy/modules/roles/staff.if @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## Administrator's unprivileged user role +## Administrator's unprivileged user ######################################## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/staff.te b/policy/modules/roles/staff.te index 2be17d2..9c21943 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/staff.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/staff.te @@ -8,12 +8,52 @@ policy_module(staff, 2.2.0) role staff_r; userdom_unpriv_user_template(staff) +fs_exec_noxattr(staff_t) ######################################## # # Local policy # +kernel_read_ring_buffer(staff_t) +kernel_getattr_core_if(staff_t) +kernel_getattr_message_if(staff_t) +kernel_read_software_raid_state(staff_t) +kernel_read_fs_sysctls(staff_t) + +fs_read_hugetlbfs_files(staff_t) + +dev_read_cpuid(staff_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(staff_t) +domain_getattr_all_domains(staff_t) +domain_obj_id_change_exemption(staff_t) + +files_read_kernel_modules(staff_t) + +seutil_read_module_store(staff_t) +seutil_run_newrole(staff_t, staff_r) + +storage_read_scsi_generic(staff_t) +storage_write_scsi_generic(staff_t) + +term_use_unallocated_ttys(staff_t) + +auth_domtrans_pam_console(staff_t) + +init_dbus_chat(staff_t) +init_dbus_chat_script(staff_t) + +miscfiles_read_hwdata(staff_t) + +ifndef(`enable_mls',` + selinux_read_policy(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + abrt_read_cache(staff_t) +') + optional_policy(` apache_role(staff_r, staff_t) ') @@ -23,23 +63,119 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + blueman_dbus_chat(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + bluetooth_role(staff_r, staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbadm_role_change(staff_r) ') optional_policy(` + accountsd_dbus_chat(staff_t) + accountsd_read_lib_files(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + chrome_role(staff_r, staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + colord_dbus_chat(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnomeclock_dbus_chat(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + firewallgui_dbus_chat(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_role(staff_r, staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + irc_role(staff_r, staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + lpd_list_spool(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mock_role(staff_r, staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + kerneloops_dbus_chat(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + logadm_role_change(staff_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_run_plugin(staff_t, staff_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_read_module_config(staff_t) + modutils_read_module_deps(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + netutils_run_ping(staff_t, staff_r) + netutils_run_traceroute(staff_t, staff_r) + netutils_signal_ping(staff_t) + netutils_kill_ping(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + oident_manage_user_content(staff_t) + oident_relabel_user_content(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mta_role(staff_r, staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mysql_exec(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + polipo_role(staff_r, staff_t) + polipo_named_filetrans_cache_home_dirs(staff_t) + polipo_named_filetrans_config_home_files(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` postgresql_role(staff_r, staff_t) ') optional_policy(` + rtkit_scheduled(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpm_dbus_chat(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` secadm_role_change(staff_r) ') optional_policy(` - ssh_role_template(staff, staff_r, staff_t) + sandbox_transition(staff_t, staff_r) ') optional_policy(` - sudo_role_template(staff, staff_r, staff_t) + screen_role_template(staff, staff_r, staff_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -48,10 +184,59 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + systemd_read_unit_files(staff_t) + systemd_exec_systemctl(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + setroubleshoot_stream_connect(staff_t) + setroubleshoot_dbus_chat(staff_t) + setroubleshoot_dbus_chat_fixit(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_role_template(staff, staff_r, staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sudo_role_template(staff, staff_r, staff_t) +') + +#optional_policy(` +# telepathy_dbus_session_role(staff_r, staff_t) +#') + +optional_policy(` + userhelper_console_role_template(staff, staff_r, staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_role_change(staff_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + usbmuxd_stream_connect(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_getattr_exec(staff_t) + virt_search_images(staff_t) + virt_stream_connect(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` vlock_run(staff_t, staff_r) ') optional_policy(` + vnstatd_read_lib_files(staff_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + webadm_role_change(staff_r) +') + +optional_policy(` xserver_role(staff_r, staff_t) ') @@ -61,10 +246,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` - bluetooth_role(staff_r, staff_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` cdrecord_role(staff_r, staff_t) ') @@ -89,18 +270,10 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` - gnome_role(staff_r, staff_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` gpg_role(staff_r, staff_t) ') optional_policy(` - irc_role(staff_r, staff_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` java_role(staff_r, staff_t) ') @@ -121,10 +294,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` - mta_role(staff_r, staff_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` pyzor_role(staff_r, staff_t) ') @@ -137,10 +306,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` - screen_role_template(staff, staff_r, staff_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` spamassassin_role(staff_r, staff_t) ') @@ -172,3 +337,7 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` wireshark_role(staff_r, staff_t) ') ') + +tunable_policy(`allow_execmod',` + userdom_execmod_user_home_files(staff_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.if b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.if index ff92430..36740ea 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.if +++ b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.if @@ -70,6 +70,23 @@ interface(`sysadm_shell_domtrans',` allow sysadm_t $1:process sigchld; ') +####################################### +## +## sysadm stub interface. No access allowed. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`sysadm_stub',` + gen_require(` + type sysadm_t; + role sysadm_r; + ') +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute a generic bin program in the sysadm domain. diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te index e14b961..34d3702 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm.te @@ -5,39 +5,69 @@ policy_module(sysadm, 2.2.1) # Declarations # -## -##

    -## Allow sysadm to debug or ptrace all processes. -##

    -##     -gen_tunable(allow_ptrace, false) - role sysadm_r; userdom_admin_user_template(sysadm) -ifndef(`enable_mls',` - userdom_security_admin_template(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) -') - ######################################## # # Local policy # +kernel_read_fs_sysctls(sysadm_t) corecmd_exec_shell(sysadm_t) +dev_filetrans_all_named_dev(sysadm_t) + +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(sysadm_t) + +files_read_kernel_modules(sysadm_t) +files_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) + +storage_filetrans_all_named_dev(sysadm_t) + +term_filetrans_all_named_dev(sysadm_t) + mls_process_read_up(sysadm_t) +mls_file_read_to_clearance(sysadm_t) +mls_process_write_to_clearance(sysadm_t) + +storage_setattr_fixed_disk_dev(sysadm_t) ubac_process_exempt(sysadm_t) ubac_file_exempt(sysadm_t) ubac_fd_exempt(sysadm_t) +application_exec(sysadm_t) + init_exec(sysadm_t) +init_exec_script_files(sysadm_t) +init_dbus_chat(sysadm_t) +init_script_role_transition(sysadm_r) +init_status(sysadm_t) +init_reboot(sysadm_t) +init_halt(sysadm_t) +init_undefined(sysadm_t) + +logging_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) + +miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) +miscfiles_read_hwdata(sysadm_t) + +sysnet_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) # Add/remove user home directories userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(sysadm_t) userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(sysadm_t) +userdom_manage_tmp_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + +optional_policy(` + alsa_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_filetrans_admin_home_content(sysadm_t) +') ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',` optional_policy(` @@ -51,13 +81,8 @@ ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',` ') ') -ifndef(`enable_mls',` - logging_manage_audit_log(sysadm_t) - logging_manage_audit_config(sysadm_t) - logging_run_auditctl(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) -') -tunable_policy(`allow_ptrace',` +tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` domain_ptrace_all_domains(sysadm_t) ') @@ -67,9 +92,9 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` apache_run_helper(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + apache_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) #apache_run_all_scripts(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) #apache_domtrans_sys_script(sysadm_t) - apache_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -98,6 +123,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + certmonger_dbus_chat(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` certwatch_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') @@ -110,11 +139,20 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - consoletype_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + cron_admin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + #cron_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + daemonstools_run_start(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` - cvs_exec(sysadm_t) + dbus_role_template(sysadm, sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -128,6 +166,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + devicekit_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dmesg_exec(sysadm_t) ') @@ -144,6 +186,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + firewalld_dbus_chat(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` fstools_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') @@ -163,6 +209,13 @@ optional_policy(` ipsec_stream_connect(sysadm_t) # for lsof ipsec_getattr_key_sockets(sysadm_t) + ipsec_run_setkey(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + ipsec_run_racoon(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + ipsec_stream_connect_racoon(sysadm_t) + + optional_policy(` + ipsec_mgmt_dbus_chat(sysadm_t) + ') ') optional_policy(` @@ -170,15 +223,20 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - kudzu_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + irc_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - libs_run_ldconfig(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + kerberos_exec_kadmind(sysadm_t) + kerberos_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - lockdev_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + kudzu_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + libs_run_ldconfig(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` @@ -198,22 +256,20 @@ optional_policy(` modutils_run_depmod(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) modutils_run_insmod(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) modutils_run_update_mods(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + modutils_read_module_deps(sysadm_t) + modules_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` mount_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - mozilla_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - mplayer_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + mount_run_showmount(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` mta_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + # this is defined in userdom_common_user_template + #mta_filetrans_home_content(sysadm_t) + mta_filetrans_admin_home_content(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -225,25 +281,47 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + ncftool_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) +') + +optional_policy(` netutils_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) netutils_run_ping(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) netutils_run_traceroute(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` + networkmanager_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` ntp_stub() corenet_udp_bind_ntp_port(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` + nx_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` oav_run_update(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` + openvpn_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) +') + +optional_policy(` pcmcia_run_cardctl(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` + polipo_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + polipo_named_filetrans_admin_cache_home_dirs(sysadm_t) + polipo_named_filetrans_admin_config_home_files(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` portage_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) portage_run_gcc_config(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') @@ -253,31 +331,32 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - pyzor_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + postfix_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - quota_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + prelink_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` - raid_run_mdadm(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + puppet_run_puppetca(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` - razor_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + quota_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - rpc_domtrans_nfsd(sysadm_t) + raid_domtrans_mdadm(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - rpm_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + rpc_domtrans_nfsd(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - rssh_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + rpm_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + rpm_dbus_chat(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` @@ -302,12 +381,18 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + setroubleshoot_stream_connect(sysadm_t) + setroubleshoot_dbus_chat(sysadm_t) + setroubleshoot_dbus_chat_fixit(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` seutil_run_setfiles(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) seutil_run_runinit(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` - spamassassin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + shutdown_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` @@ -332,7 +417,18 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - thunderbird_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + systemd_passwd_agent_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + systemd_config_all_services(sysadm_t) + systemd_manage_all_unit_files(sysadm_t) + systemd_manage_all_unit_lnk_files(sysadm_t) + systemd_login_status(sysadm_t) + systemd_login_reboot(sysadm_t) + systemd_login_halt(sysadm_t) + systemd_login_undefined(sysadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + tftp_filetrans_named_content(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -343,19 +439,15 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - tvtime_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) -') - -optional_policy(` tzdata_domtrans(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - uml_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + unconfined_domtrans(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - unconfined_domtrans(sysadm_t) + udev_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` @@ -367,45 +459,46 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - userhelper_role_template(sysadm, sysadm_r, sysadm_t) -') - -optional_policy(` usermanage_run_admin_passwd(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) usermanage_run_groupadd(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) usermanage_run_useradd(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` - vmware_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + virt_stream_connect(sysadm_t) + virt_filetrans_home_content(sysadm_t) + virt_manage_pid_dirs(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - vpn_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + vlock_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` - webalizer_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + vpn_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` - wireshark_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + webalizer_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` - vlock_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + xserver_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - xserver_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + yam_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) ') optional_policy(` - yam_run(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + zebra_stream_connect(sysadm_t) ') ifndef(`distro_redhat',` optional_policy(` + apache_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + optional_policy(` auth_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') @@ -418,10 +511,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` - cron_admin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` dbus_role_template(sysadm, sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') @@ -439,6 +528,7 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` optional_policy(` gnome_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + gnome_filetrans_admin_home_content(sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -446,11 +536,66 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` - irc_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + java_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') optional_policy(` - java_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + lockdev_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + mock_admin(sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + mozilla_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) ') -') + optional_policy(` + mplayer_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + pyzor_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + razor_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + rssh_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + spamassassin_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + thunderbird_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + tvtime_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + uml_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + userhelper_role_template(sysadm, sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + vmware_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + wireshark_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + xserver_role(sysadm_r, sysadm_t) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.fc b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ae3b6db --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.fc @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +# No context diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.if b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd83148 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.if @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +## No Interfaces diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e45e8b0 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/roles/sysadm_secadm.te @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +policy_module(sysadm_secadm, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +gen_require(` + type sysadm_t; + role sysadm_r; +') + +userdom_security_admin_template(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) + +####################################### +# +# Local policy +# + +logging_manage_audit_log(sysadm_t) +logging_manage_audit_config(sysadm_t) +logging_run_auditctl(sysadm_t, sysadm_r) +logging_stream_connect_syslog(sysadm_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.fc b/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0e8654b --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.fc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# Add programs here which should not be confined by SELinux +# e.g.: +# /usr/local/bin/appsrv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_exec_t,s0) +# For the time being until someone writes a sane policy, we need initrc to transition to unconfined_t +/usr/bin/vncserver -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/xrdp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/xrdp-sesman -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.if b/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bac0dc0 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.if @@ -0,0 +1,595 @@ +## Unconfiend user role + +######################################## +## +## Change from the unconfineduser role. +## +## +##

    +## Change from the unconfineduser role to +## the specified role. +##

    +##

    +## This is an interface to support third party modules +## and its use is not allowed in upstream reference +## policy. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_role_change_to',` + gen_require(` + role unconfined_r; + ') + + allow unconfined_r $1; +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to the unconfined domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t, unconfined_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1,unconfined_exec_t,unconfined_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute specified programs in the unconfined domain. +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +## +## +## The role to allow the unconfined domain. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_run',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + unconfined_domtrans($1) + role $2 types unconfined_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to the unconfined domain by executing a shell. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_shell_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + attribute unconfined_login_domain; + ') + typeattribute $1 unconfined_login_domain; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow unconfined to execute the specified program in +## the specified domain. +## +## +##

    +## Allow unconfined to execute the specified program in +## the specified domain. +##

    +##

    +## This is a interface to support third party modules +## and its use is not allowed in upstream reference +## policy. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain to execute in. +## +## +## +## +## Domain entry point file. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_domtrans_to',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern(unconfined_t,$2,$1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow unconfined to execute the specified program in +## the specified domain. Allow the specified domain the +## unconfined role and use of unconfined user terminals. +## +## +##

    +## Allow unconfined to execute the specified program in +## the specified domain. Allow the specified domain the +## unconfined role and use of unconfined user terminals. +##

    +##

    +## This is a interface to support third party modules +## and its use is not allowed in upstream reference +## policy. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain to execute in. +## +## +## +## +## Domain entry point file. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_run_to',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + role unconfined_r; + ') + + domtrans_pattern(unconfined_t,$2,$1) + role unconfined_r types $1; + userdom_use_user_terminals($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Inherit file descriptors from the unconfined domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_use_fds',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:fd use; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send a SIGCHLD signal to the unconfined domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_sigchld',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:process sigchld; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send a SIGNULL signal to the unconfined domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_signull',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:process signull; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send generic signals to the unconfined domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_signal',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read unconfined domain unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_read_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:fifo_file read_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read unconfined domain unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_dontaudit_read_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 unconfined_t:fifo_file read; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write unconfined domain unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_rw_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read and write +## unconfined domain unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_dontaudit_rw_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 unconfined_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read and write +## unconfined domain stream. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_dontaudit_rw_stream',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 unconfined_t:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to the unconfined domain using +## a unix domain stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read or write +## unconfined domain tcp sockets. +## +## +##

    +## Do not audit attempts to read or write +## unconfined domain tcp sockets. +##

    +##

    +## This interface was added due to a broken +## symptom in ldconfig. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 unconfined_t:tcp_socket { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read or write +## unconfined domain packet sockets. +## +## +##

    +## Do not audit attempts to read or write +## unconfined domain packet sockets. +##

    +##

    +## This interface was added due to a broken +## symptom. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_dontaudit_rw_packet_sockets',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 unconfined_t:packet_socket { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create keys for the unconfined domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_create_keys',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:key create; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send messages to the unconfined domain over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_dbus_send',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## unconfined_t over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:dbus send_msg; + allow unconfined_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to the the unconfined DBUS +## for service (acquire_svc). +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_dbus_connect',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + class dbus acquire_svc; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:dbus acquire_svc; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow ptrace of unconfined domain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_ptrace',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:process ptrace; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write to unconfined shared memory. +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_rw_shm',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:shm rw_shm_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow apps to set rlimits on userdomain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_set_rlimitnh',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:process rlimitinh; +') + +######################################## +## +## Get the process group of unconfined. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_getpgid',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:process getpgid; +') + +######################################## +## +## Change to the unconfined role. +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_role_change',` + gen_require(` + role unconfined_r; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_r; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow domain to attach to TUN devices created by unconfined_t users. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`unconfined_attach_tun_iface',` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_t:tun_socket relabelfrom; + allow $1 self:tun_socket relabelto; +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.te b/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..07b26fb --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/roles/unconfineduser.te @@ -0,0 +1,392 @@ +policy_module(unconfineduser, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# +attribute unconfined_login_domain; + +## +##

    +## allow unconfined users to transition to the chrome sandbox domains when running chrome-sandbox +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow unconfined users to transition to the Mozilla plugin domain when running xulrunner plugin-container. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow video playing tools to run unconfined +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(unconfined_mplayer, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow a user to login as an unconfined domain +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(unconfined_login, true) + +# usage in this module of types created by these +# calls is not correct, however we dont currently +# have another method to add access to these types +userdom_base_user_template(unconfined) +userdom_manage_home_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) +userdom_manage_tmp_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) +userdom_manage_tmpfs_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) +userdom_unpriv_type(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) + +type unconfined_exec_t; +init_system_domain(unconfined_t, unconfined_exec_t) +role unconfined_r types unconfined_t; +role_transition system_r unconfined_exec_t unconfined_r; +allow system_r unconfined_r; + +domain_user_exemption_target(unconfined_t) +allow system_r unconfined_r; +allow unconfined_r system_r; +init_script_role_transition(unconfined_r) +role system_r types unconfined_t; +typealias unconfined_t alias unconfined_crontab_t; + +######################################## +# +# Local policy +# + +dontaudit unconfined_t self:dir write; +dontaudit unconfined_t self:file setattr; + +allow unconfined_t self:system syslog_read; +dontaudit unconfined_t self:capability sys_module; + +kernel_rw_unlabeled_socket(unconfined_t) +kernel_rw_unlabeled_rawip_socket(unconfined_t) + +files_create_boot_flag(unconfined_t) +files_create_default_dir(unconfined_t) +files_root_filetrans_default(unconfined_t, dir) + +mcs_killall(unconfined_t) +mcs_ptrace_all(unconfined_t) +mls_file_write_all_levels(unconfined_t) + +init_run_daemon(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +init_domtrans_script(unconfined_t) +init_telinit(unconfined_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(unconfined_t) +logging_run_auditctl(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + +systemd_config_all_services(unconfined_t) + +seutil_run_loadpolicy(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +seutil_run_setsebool(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +seutil_run_setfiles(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +seutil_run_semanage(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + +unconfined_domain_noaudit(unconfined_t) + +usermanage_run_passwd(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +usermanage_run_chfn(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` + allow unconfined_t self:process execmem; +') + +tunable_policy(`allow_execstack',` + allow unconfined_t self:process execstack; +') + +tunable_policy(`allow_execmod',` + userdom_execmod_user_home_files(unconfined_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`unconfined_login',` + corecmd_shell_domtrans(unconfined_login_domain,unconfined_t) + allow unconfined_t unconfined_login_domain:fd use; + allow unconfined_t unconfined_login_domain:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow unconfined_t unconfined_login_domain:process sigchld; +') + +optional_policy(` + gen_require(` + type unconfined_t; + ') + + optional_policy(` + abrt_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + abrt_run_helper(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + ') + + optional_policy(` + avahi_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + blueman_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + certmonger_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + devicekit_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + devicekit_dbus_chat_disk(unconfined_t) + devicekit_dbus_chat_power(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + hal_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + networkmanager_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + policykit_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + rtkit_scheduled(unconfined_t) + ') + + # Might remove later if this proves to be problematic, but would like to gather AVCs + optional_policy(` + thumb_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + setroubleshoot_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + setroubleshoot_dbus_chat_fixit(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + sandbox_transition(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + ') + + optional_policy(` + shutdown_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + ') + + optional_policy(` + gen_require(` + type user_tmpfs_t; + ') + + xserver_rw_session(unconfined_t, user_tmpfs_t) + xserver_run_xauth(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + xserver_dbus_chat_xdm(unconfined_t) + ') +') + +ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` + seutil_run_runinit(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + seutil_init_script_run_runinit(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + accountsd_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + apache_run_helper(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + bind_run_ndc(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + chrome_role_notrans(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) + + tunable_policy(`unconfined_chrome_sandbox_transition',` + chrome_domtrans_sandbox(unconfined_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_role_template(unconfined, unconfined_r, unconfined_t) + + optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(unconfined_dbusd_t) + + optional_policy(` + xserver_rw_shm(unconfined_dbusd_t) + ') + ') + + init_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + init_dbus_chat_script(unconfined_t) + + dbus_stub(unconfined_t) + + optional_policy(` + bluetooth_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + consolekit_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + cups_dbus_chat_config(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + fprintd_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + gnomeclock_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + gnome_dbus_chat_gconfdefault(unconfined_t) + gnome_command_domtrans_gkeyringd(unconfined_dbusd_t,unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + ipsec_mgmt_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + kerneloops_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + telepathy_command_domtrans(unconfined_dbusd_t, unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + oddjob_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + vpn_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + firewalld_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + firewallgui_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + firstboot_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + ftp_run_ftpdctl(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + gpsd_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + java_run_unconfined(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + livecd_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + lpd_run_checkpc(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +#optional_policy(` +# mock_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) +#') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_run_update_mods(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_role_plugin(unconfined_r) + + tunable_policy(`unconfined_mozilla_plugin_transition', ` + mozilla_domtrans_plugin(unconfined_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + ncftool_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + oddjob_run_mkhomedir(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + prelink_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + portmap_run_helper(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpm_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + # Allow SELinux aware applications to request rpm_script execution + rpm_transition_script(unconfined_t) + rpm_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + optional_policy(` + samba_run_unconfined_net(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + ') + + samba_role_notrans(unconfined_r) + samba_run_smbcontrol(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_run_dhcpc(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + sysnet_dbus_chat_dhcpc(unconfined_t) + sysnet_role_transition_dhcpc(unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + usermanage_run_useradd(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + vbetool_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_transition_svirt(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + vpn_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + webalizer_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + wine_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) + xserver_manage_home_fonts(unconfined_t) +') + +gen_user(unconfined_u, user, unconfined_r system_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) + diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.if b/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.if index 3835596..fbca2be 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.if +++ b/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.if @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## Generic unprivileged user role +## Generic unprivileged user ######################################## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te b/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te index e5bfdd4..7e0ea58 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/unprivuser.te @@ -12,15 +12,105 @@ role user_r; userdom_unpriv_user_template(user) +fs_exec_noxattr(user_t) +fs_read_hugetlbfs_files(user_t) + +storage_read_scsi_generic(user_t) +storage_write_scsi_generic(user_t) + +tunable_policy(`allow_execmod',` + userdom_execmod_user_home_files(user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + abrt_read_cache(user_t) +') + optional_policy(` apache_role(user_r, user_t) ') optional_policy(` + blueman_dbus_chat(user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + bluetooth_role(user_r, user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + colord_dbus_chat(user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + chrome_role(user_r, user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_role(user_r, user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + irc_role(user_r, user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + oident_manage_user_content(user_t) + oident_relabel_user_content(user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_run_plugin(user_t, user_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + mta_role(user_r, user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + netutils_run_ping_cond(user_t, user_r) + netutils_run_traceroute_cond(user_t, user_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + polipo_role(user_r, user_t) + polipo_named_filetrans_cache_home_dirs(user_t) + polipo_named_filetrans_config_home_files(user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpm_dontaudit_dbus_chat(user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rtkit_scheduled(user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sandbox_transition(user_t, user_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_role_template(user, user_r, user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` screen_role_template(user, user_r, user_t) ') optional_policy(` + setroubleshoot_dontaudit_stream_connect(user_t) +') + +#optional_policy(` +# telepathy_dbus_session_role(user_r, user_t) +#') + +optional_policy(` + usbmuxd_stream_connect(user_t) +') + +optional_policy(` vlock_run(user_t, user_r) ') @@ -62,19 +152,11 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` - gnome_role(user_r, user_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` gpg_role(user_r, user_t) ') optional_policy(` - hadoop_role(user_r, user_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - irc_role(user_r, user_t) + hadoop_role(user_r, user_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -98,10 +180,6 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` - mta_role(user_r, user_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` postgresql_role(user_r, user_t) ') @@ -118,11 +196,7 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` - spamassassin_role(user_r, user_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - ssh_role_template(user, user_r, user_t) + spamassassin_role(user_r, user_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -157,3 +231,4 @@ ifndef(`distro_redhat',` wireshark_role(user_r, user_t) ') ') + diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/webadm.te b/policy/modules/roles/webadm.te index 0ecc786..3e7e984 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/webadm.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/webadm.te @@ -28,7 +28,7 @@ userdom_base_user_template(webadm) # webadmin local policy # -allow webadm_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search kill sys_ptrace sys_nice }; +allow webadm_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search kill sys_nice }; files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(webadm_t) files_manage_generic_locks(webadm_t) @@ -38,6 +38,7 @@ selinux_get_enforce_mode(webadm_t) seutil_domtrans_setfiles(webadm_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(webadm_t) +logging_send_audit_msgs(webadm_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(webadm_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/xguest.if b/policy/modules/roles/xguest.if index d2234e3..030e845 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/xguest.if +++ b/policy/modules/roles/xguest.if @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## Least privledge xwindows user role +## Least privileged X user ######################################## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/roles/xguest.te b/policy/modules/roles/xguest.te index e88b95f..9b6536a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/roles/xguest.te +++ b/policy/modules/roles/xguest.te @@ -14,14 +14,14 @@ gen_tunable(xguest_mount_media, true) ## ##

    -## Allow xguest to configure Network Manager +## Allow xguest users to configure Network Manager and connect to apache ports ##

    ##     gen_tunable(xguest_connect_network, true) ## ##

    -## Allow xguest to use blue tooth devices +## Allow xguest users to use blue tooth devices ##

    ##     gen_tunable(xguest_use_bluetooth, true) @@ -29,12 +29,12 @@ gen_tunable(xguest_use_bluetooth, true) role xguest_r; userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template(xguest) +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(xguest_t) ######################################## # # Local policy # - ifndef(`enable_mls',` fs_exec_noxattr(xguest_t) @@ -49,11 +49,22 @@ ifndef(`enable_mls',` ') ') +optional_policy(` + # Dontaudit fusermount + mount_dontaudit_exec_fusermount(xguest_t) +') + +kernel_dontaudit_request_load_module(xguest_t) + +tunable_policy(`allow_execstack',` + allow xguest_t self:process execstack; +') + # Allow mounting of file systems optional_policy(` tunable_policy(`xguest_mount_media',` kernel_read_fs_sysctls(xguest_t) - + kernel_request_load_module(xguest_t) files_dontaudit_getattr_boot_dirs(xguest_t) files_search_mnt(xguest_t) @@ -62,10 +73,9 @@ optional_policy(` fs_manage_noxattr_fs_dirs(xguest_t) fs_getattr_noxattr_fs(xguest_t) fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks(xguest_t) + fs_mount_fusefs(xguest_t) auth_list_pam_console_data(xguest_t) - - init_read_utmp(xguest_t) ') ') @@ -76,23 +86,97 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`xguest_use_bluetooth',` + blueman_dbus_chat(xguest_t) + ') +') + + +optional_policy(` + chrome_role(xguest_r, xguest_t) +') + +optional_policy(` hal_dbus_chat(xguest_t) ') optional_policy(` - java_role(xguest_r, xguest_t) + apache_role(xguest_r, xguest_t) ') optional_policy(` - mozilla_role(xguest_r, xguest_t) + gnome_role(xguest_r, xguest_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnomeclock_dontaudit_dbus_chat(xguest_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_run_plugin(xguest_t, xguest_r) +') + +optional_policy(` + pcscd_read_pub_files(xguest_t) + pcscd_stream_connect(xguest_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rhsmcertd_dontaudit_dbus_chat(xguest_t) ') optional_policy(` tunable_policy(`xguest_connect_network',` + kernel_read_network_state(xguest_t) + networkmanager_dbus_chat(xguest_t) + networkmanager_read_lib_files(xguest_t) corenet_tcp_connect_pulseaudio_port(xguest_t) + corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(xguest_t) + corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(xguest_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(xguest_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_squid_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ftp_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ipp_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_flash_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(xguest_t) corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(xguest_t) + corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(xguest_t) + corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(xguest_t) + corenet_sendrecv_squid_client_packets(xguest_t) + corenet_sendrecv_ftp_client_packets(xguest_t) + corenet_sendrecv_ipp_client_packets(xguest_t) + corenet_sendrecv_generic_client_packets(xguest_t) + # Should not need other ports + corenet_dontaudit_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port(xguest_t) + corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_generic_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_speech_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_transproxy_port(xguest_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_transproxy_port(xguest_t) ') + + #optional_policy(` + # telepathy_dbus_session_role(xguest_r, xguest_t) + #') +') + +optional_policy(` + gen_require(` + type mozilla_t; + ') + + allow xguest_t mozilla_t:process transition; + role xguest_r types mozilla_t; ') -#gen_user(xguest_u,, xguest_r, s0, s0) +gen_user(xguest_u, user, xguest_r, s0, s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/abrt.fc b/policy/modules/services/abrt.fc index 1bd5812..196cfc9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/abrt.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/abrt.fc @@ -1,13 +1,16 @@ /etc/abrt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_etc_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/abrt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/usr/bin/abrt-pyhook-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_helper_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/abrt.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_unit_file_t,s0) -/usr/libexec/abrt-pyhook-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_helper_exec_t,s0) -/usr/libexec/abrt-hook-python -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_helper_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/abrt-dump-oops -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_dump_oops_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/abrt-pyhook-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_helper_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/abrt-watch-log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_watch_log_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/abrtd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/abrt-handle-event -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_handle_event_exec_t,s0) + /var/cache/abrt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_cache_t,s0) /var/cache/abrt-di(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_cache_t,s0) @@ -15,6 +18,19 @@ /var/run/abrt\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/abrtd?\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/abrtd?\.socket -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/abrt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_run_t,s0) /var/spool/abrt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_var_cache_t,s0) + +# ABRT retrace server +/usr/bin/abrt-retrace-worker -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/coredump2packages -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t,s0) + +/var/cache/abrt-retrace(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_retrace_cache_t,s0) +/var/spool/abrt-retrace(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_retrace_spool_t,s0) + +# cjp: new version +/usr/bin/retrace-server-worker -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t,s0) +/var/cache/retrace-server(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_retrace_cache_t,s0) +/var/spool/retrace-server(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:abrt_retrace_spool_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/abrt.if b/policy/modules/services/abrt.if index 0b827c5..ac79ca6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/abrt.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/abrt.if @@ -71,12 +71,13 @@ interface(`abrt_read_state',` type abrt_t; ') + kernel_search_proc($1) ps_process_pattern($1, abrt_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Connect to abrt over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to abrt over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -160,8 +161,26 @@ interface(`abrt_run_helper',` ######################################## ## -## Send and receive messages from -## abrt over dbus. +## Read abrt cache +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`abrt_read_cache',` + gen_require(` + type abrt_var_cache_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append abrt cache ## ## ## @@ -169,12 +188,33 @@ interface(`abrt_run_helper',` ## ## # -interface(`abrt_cache_manage',` +interface(`abrt_append_cache',` + gen_require(` + type abrt_var_cache_t; + ') + + + allow $1 abrt_var_cache_t:file append_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage abrt cache +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`abrt_manage_cache',` gen_require(` type abrt_var_cache_t; ') manage_files_pattern($1, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t) ') #################################### @@ -253,6 +293,47 @@ interface(`abrt_manage_pid_files',` manage_files_pattern($1, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Read and write abrt fifo files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`abrt_rw_fifo_file',` + gen_require(` + type abrt_t; + ') + + allow $1 abrt_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute abrt server in the abrt domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`abrt_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type abrt_t; + type abrt_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 abrt_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 abrt_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, abrt_t) +') + ##################################### ## ## All of the rules required to administrate @@ -276,28 +357,135 @@ interface(`abrt_admin',` type abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_log_t; type abrt_var_run_t, abrt_tmp_t; type abrt_initrc_exec_t; + type abrt_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 abrt_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 abrt_t:process { signal_perms }; ps_process_pattern($1, abrt_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 abrt_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, abrt_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 abrt_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - files_search_etc($1) + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, abrt_etc_t) - logging_search_logs($1) + logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, abrt_var_log_t) - files_search_var($1) + files_list_var($1) admin_pattern($1, abrt_var_cache_t) - files_search_pids($1) + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, abrt_var_run_t) - files_search_tmp($1) + files_list_tmp($1) admin_pattern($1, abrt_tmp_t) + + abrt_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, abrt_unit_file_t) + allow $1 abrt_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; +') + +#################################### +## +## Execute abrt-retrace in the abrt-retrace domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`abrt_domtrans_retrace_worker',` + gen_require(` + type abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t, abrt_retrace_worker_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Manage abrt retrace server cache +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`abrt_manage_spool_retrace',` + gen_require(` + type abrt_retrace_spool_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) +') + +##################################### +## +## Read abrt retrace server cache +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`abrt_read_spool_retrace',` + gen_require(` + type abrt_retrace_spool_t; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) + read_files_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) +') + + +##################################### +## +## Read abrt retrace server cache +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`abrt_read_cache_retrace',` + gen_require(` + type abrt_retrace_cache_t; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_cache_t, abrt_retrace_cache_t) + read_files_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_cache_t, abrt_retrace_cache_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, abrt_retrace_cache_t, abrt_retrace_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to write abrt sock files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`abrt_dontaudit_write_sock_file',` + gen_require(` + type abrt_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 abrt_t:sock_file write; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/abrt.te b/policy/modules/services/abrt.te index 30861ec..c872f94 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/abrt.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/abrt.te @@ -5,13 +5,34 @@ policy_module(abrt, 1.2.0) # Declarations # -type abrt_t; +## +##

    +## Allow ABRT to modify public files +## used for public file transfer services. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(abrt_anon_write, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow ABRT to run in abrt_handle_event_t domain +## to handle ABRT event scripts +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(abrt_handle_event, false) + +attribute abrt_domain; + +type abrt_t, abrt_domain; type abrt_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(abrt_t, abrt_exec_t) type abrt_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(abrt_initrc_exec_t) +type abrt_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(abrt_unit_file_t) + # etc files type abrt_etc_t; files_config_file(abrt_etc_t) @@ -32,9 +53,20 @@ files_type(abrt_var_cache_t) type abrt_var_run_t; files_pid_file(abrt_var_run_t) +type abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_domain; +type abrt_dump_oops_exec_t; +init_system_domain(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_dump_oops_exec_t) + +# type for abrt-handle-event to handle +# ABRT event scripts +type abrt_handle_event_t, abrt_domain; +type abrt_handle_event_exec_t; +application_domain(abrt_handle_event_t, abrt_handle_event_exec_t) +role system_r types abrt_handle_event_t; + # type needed to allow all domains # to handle /var/cache/abrt -type abrt_helper_t; +type abrt_helper_t, abrt_domain; type abrt_helper_exec_t; application_domain(abrt_helper_t, abrt_helper_exec_t) role system_r types abrt_helper_t; @@ -43,22 +75,48 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',` init_ranged_daemon_domain(abrt_t, abrt_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) ') +# +# Support for ABRT retrace server +# + +type abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_domain; +type abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t; +application_domain(abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t) +role system_r types abrt_retrace_worker_t; + +type abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_domain; +type abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t; +application_domain(abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t) +role system_r types abrt_retrace_coredump_t; + +type abrt_retrace_cache_t; +files_type(abrt_retrace_cache_t) + +type abrt_retrace_spool_t; +files_spool_file(abrt_retrace_spool_t) + +# Support abrt-watch log + +type abrt_watch_log_t; +type abrt_watch_log_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(abrt_watch_log_t, abrt_watch_log_exec_t) + ######################################## # # abrt local policy # -allow abrt_t self:capability { chown kill setuid setgid sys_nice dac_override }; +allow abrt_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_nice }; dontaudit abrt_t self:capability sys_rawio; -allow abrt_t self:process { signal signull setsched getsched }; +allow abrt_t self:process { setpgid sigkill signal signull setsched getsched }; allow abrt_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow abrt_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow abrt_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow abrt_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; -allow abrt_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; # abrt etc files +list_dirs_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_etc_t, abrt_etc_t) rw_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_etc_t, abrt_etc_t) # log file @@ -68,7 +126,9 @@ logging_log_filetrans(abrt_t, abrt_var_log_t, file) # abrt tmp files manage_dirs_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_tmp_t, abrt_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_tmp_t, abrt_tmp_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_tmp_t, abrt_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(abrt_t, abrt_tmp_t, { file dir }) +can_exec(abrt_t, abrt_tmp_t) # abrt var/cache files manage_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t) @@ -82,10 +142,10 @@ manage_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t) manage_dirs_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, { file dir }) +files_pid_filetrans(abrt_t, abrt_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file }) kernel_read_ring_buffer(abrt_t) -kernel_read_system_state(abrt_t) +kernel_request_load_module(abrt_t) kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(abrt_t) corecmd_exec_bin(abrt_t) @@ -104,6 +164,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(abrt_t) corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(abrt_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(abrt_t) +dev_getattr_all_blk_files(abrt_t) +dev_read_rand(abrt_t) dev_read_urand(abrt_t) dev_rw_sysfs(abrt_t) dev_dontaudit_read_raw_memory(abrt_t) @@ -113,7 +175,8 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(abrt_t) domain_signull_all_domains(abrt_t) files_getattr_all_files(abrt_t) -files_read_etc_files(abrt_t) +files_read_config_files(abrt_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(abrt_t) files_read_var_symlinks(abrt_t) files_read_var_lib_files(abrt_t) files_read_usr_files(abrt_t) @@ -121,6 +184,9 @@ files_read_generic_tmp_files(abrt_t) files_read_kernel_modules(abrt_t) files_dontaudit_list_default(abrt_t) files_dontaudit_read_default_files(abrt_t) +files_dontaudit_read_all_symlinks(abrt_t) +files_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(abrt_t) +files_list_mnt(abrt_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(abrt_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(abrt_t) @@ -131,22 +197,26 @@ fs_read_nfs_files(abrt_t) fs_read_nfs_symlinks(abrt_t) fs_search_all(abrt_t) -sysnet_read_config(abrt_t) - logging_read_generic_logs(abrt_t) -logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(abrt_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs(abrt_t) -miscfiles_read_localization(abrt_t) userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(abrt_t) +userdom_dontaudit_read_admin_home_files(abrt_t) + +tunable_policy(`abrt_anon_write',` + miscfiles_manage_public_files(abrt_t) +') optional_policy(` - dbus_system_domain(abrt_t, abrt_exec_t) + apache_list_modules(abrt_t) + apache_read_modules(abrt_t) ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(abrt_t) + dbus_system_domain(abrt_t, abrt_exec_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -167,6 +237,7 @@ optional_policy(` rpm_exec(abrt_t) rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(abrt_t) rpm_manage_cache(abrt_t) + rpm_manage_log(abrt_t) rpm_manage_pid_files(abrt_t) rpm_read_db(abrt_t) rpm_signull(abrt_t) @@ -178,12 +249,35 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + sosreport_domtrans(abrt_t) + sosreport_read_tmp_files(abrt_t) + sosreport_delete_tmp_files(abrt_t) +') + +optional_policy(` sssd_stream_connect(abrt_t) ') +####################################### +# +# abrt-handle-event local policy +# + +allow abrt_handle_event_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +tunable_policy(`abrt_handle_event',` + domtrans_pattern(abrt_t, abrt_handle_event_exec_t, abrt_handle_event_t) +',` + can_exec(abrt_t, abrt_handle_event_exec_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(abrt_handle_event_t) +') + ######################################## # -# abrt--helper local policy +# abrt-helper local policy # allow abrt_helper_t self:capability { chown setgid sys_nice }; @@ -200,23 +294,22 @@ files_var_filetrans(abrt_helper_t, abrt_var_cache_t, { file dir }) read_files_pattern(abrt_helper_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_helper_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t) +corecmd_read_all_executables(abrt_helper_t) + domain_read_all_domains_state(abrt_helper_t) -files_read_etc_files(abrt_helper_t) +files_dontaudit_all_non_security_leaks(abrt_helper_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(abrt_helper_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(abrt_helper_t) auth_use_nsswitch(abrt_helper_t) -logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_helper_t) - -miscfiles_read_localization(abrt_helper_t) - term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(abrt_helper_t) term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(abrt_helper_t) -ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + domain_dontaudit_leaks(abrt_helper_t) userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(abrt_helper_t) userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files(abrt_helper_t) dev_dontaudit_read_all_blk_files(abrt_helper_t) @@ -224,4 +317,146 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` dev_dontaudit_write_all_chr_files(abrt_helper_t) dev_dontaudit_write_all_blk_files(abrt_helper_t) fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(abrt_helper_t) + + optional_policy(` + rpm_dontaudit_leaks(abrt_helper_t) + ') +') + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + gen_require(` + attribute domain; + ') + + allow abrt_t self:capability sys_resource; + allow abrt_t domain:file write; + allow abrt_t domain:process setrlimit; +') + +####################################### +# +# abrt retrace coredump policy +# + +allow abrt_retrace_coredump_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +list_dirs_pattern(abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_retrace_cache_t, abrt_retrace_cache_t) +read_files_pattern(abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_retrace_cache_t, abrt_retrace_cache_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_retrace_cache_t, abrt_retrace_cache_t) + +list_dirs_pattern(abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) +read_files_pattern(abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_retrace_coredump_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + +dev_read_urand(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + +files_read_usr_files(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + +# to install debuginfo packages +optional_policy(` + rpm_exec(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + rpm_manage_cache(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + rpm_manage_log(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + rpm_manage_pid_files(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + rpm_read_db(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) + rpm_signull(abrt_retrace_coredump_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# abrt retrace worker policy +# + +allow abrt_retrace_worker_t self:capability { setuid }; + +allow abrt_retrace_worker_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +domtrans_pattern(abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t, abrt_retrace_coredump_t) +allow abrt_retrace_worker_t abrt_retrace_coredump_exec_t:file ioctl; + +manage_dirs_pattern(abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) +manage_files_pattern(abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t, abrt_retrace_spool_t) + +allow abrt_retrace_worker_t abrt_etc_t:file read_file_perms; + +can_exec(abrt_retrace_worker_t, abrt_retrace_worker_exec_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(abrt_retrace_worker_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(abrt_retrace_worker_t) + +dev_read_urand(abrt_retrace_worker_t) + +files_read_usr_files(abrt_retrace_worker_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(abrt_retrace_worker_t) + +optional_policy(` + mock_domtrans(abrt_retrace_worker_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# abrt_dump_oops local policy +# + +allow abrt_dump_oops_t self:capability dac_override; +allow abrt_dump_oops_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow abrt_dump_oops_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +files_search_spool(abrt_dump_oops_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_var_cache_t, abrt_var_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_var_cache_t, { file dir }) + +read_files_pattern(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_var_run_t, abrt_var_run_t) + +read_files_pattern(abrt_dump_oops_t, abrt_etc_t, abrt_etc_t) + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(abrt_dump_oops_t) +kernel_read_ring_buffer(abrt_dump_oops_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(abrt_dump_oops_t) + +fs_list_inotifyfs(abrt_dump_oops_t) + +logging_read_generic_logs(abrt_dump_oops_t) + +####################################### +# +# abrt_watch_log local policy +# + +allow abrt_watch_log_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow abrt_watch_log_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +read_files_pattern(abrt_watch_log_t, abrt_etc_t, abrt_etc_t) + +domtrans_pattern(abrt_watch_log_t, abrt_dump_oops_exec_t, abrt_dump_oops_t) + +logging_read_all_logs(abrt_watch_log_t) + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(abrt_watch_log_t) ') + +####################################### +# +# Local policy for all abrt domain +# + +kernel_read_system_state(abrt_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(abrt_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(abrt_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(abrt_domain) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/accountsd.fc b/policy/modules/services/accountsd.fc index 1adca53..18e0e41 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/accountsd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/accountsd.fc @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +/usr/lib/systemd/system/accountsd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:accountsd_unit_file_t,s0) + /usr/libexec/accounts-daemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:accountsd_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/AccountsService(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:accountsd_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/accountsd.if b/policy/modules/services/accountsd.if index c0f858d..10a0cd6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/accountsd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/accountsd.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run accountsd. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`accountsd_domtrans',` @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ interface(`accountsd_domtrans',` ##     ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -118,6 +118,29 @@ interface(`accountsd_manage_lib_files',` ######################################## ## +## Execute accountsd server in the accountsd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`accountsd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type accountsd_t; + type accountsd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 accountsd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 accountsd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, accountsd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an accountsd environment ## @@ -136,10 +159,19 @@ interface(`accountsd_manage_lib_files',` interface(`accountsd_admin',` gen_require(` type accountsd_t; + type accountsd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 accountsd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 accountsd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, accountsd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 acountsd_t:process ptrace; + ') + accountsd_manage_lib_files($1) + + accountsd_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, accountsd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 accountsd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/accountsd.te b/policy/modules/services/accountsd.te index 1632f10..67cd103 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/accountsd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/accountsd.te @@ -1,5 +1,9 @@ policy_module(accountsd, 1.0.0) +gen_require(` + class passwd { passwd chfn chsh rootok crontab }; +') + ######################################## # # Declarations @@ -8,34 +12,46 @@ policy_module(accountsd, 1.0.0) type accountsd_t; type accountsd_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(accountsd_t, accountsd_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(accountsd_t, accountsd_exec_t) +role system_r types accountsd_t; type accountsd_var_lib_t; files_type(accountsd_var_lib_t) +type accountsd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(accountsd_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # accountsd local policy # -allow accountsd_t self:capability { dac_override setuid setgid sys_ptrace }; +allow accountsd_t self:capability { dac_override setuid setgid }; +allow accountsd_t self:process signal; allow accountsd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow accountsd_t self:passwd { rootok passwd chfn chsh }; manage_dirs_pattern(accountsd_t, accountsd_var_lib_t, accountsd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(accountsd_t, accountsd_var_lib_t, accountsd_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(accountsd_t, accountsd_var_lib_t, { file dir }) +kernel_read_system_state(accountsd_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(accountsd_t) corecmd_exec_bin(accountsd_t) +dev_read_sysfs(accountsd_t) + files_read_usr_files(accountsd_t) files_read_mnt_files(accountsd_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(accountsd_t) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(accountsd_t) fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(accountsd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(accountsd_t) auth_read_shadow(accountsd_t) +auth_read_login_records(accountsd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(accountsd_t) @@ -50,8 +66,15 @@ usermanage_domtrans_passwd(accountsd_t) optional_policy(` consolekit_read_log(accountsd_t) + consolekit_dbus_chat(accountsd_t) ') optional_policy(` policykit_dbus_chat(accountsd_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_read_state_xdm(accountsd_t) + xserver_dbus_chat_xdm(accountsd_t) + xserver_manage_xdm_etc_files(accountsd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/afs.if b/policy/modules/services/afs.if index 8559cdc..641044e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/afs.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/afs.if @@ -97,8 +97,12 @@ interface(`afs_admin',` type afs_t, afs_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 afs_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; - read_files_pattern($1, afs_t, afs_t) + allow $1 afs_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, afs_t) + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 afs_t:process ptrace; + ') # Allow afs_admin to restart the afs service afs_initrc_domtrans($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/afs.te b/policy/modules/services/afs.te index a496fde..847609a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/afs.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/afs.te @@ -107,6 +107,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(afs_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(afs_t) +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + kernel_rw_unlabeled_files(afs_t) +') + ######################################## # # AFS bossserver local policy diff --git a/policy/modules/services/aiccu.if b/policy/modules/services/aiccu.if index 184c9a8..8f77bf5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/aiccu.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/aiccu.if @@ -79,9 +79,13 @@ interface(`aiccu_admin',` type aiccu_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 aiccu_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 aiccu_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, aiccu_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 aiccu_t:process ptrace; + ') + aiccu_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 aiccu_initrc_exec_t system_r; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/aiccu.te b/policy/modules/services/aiccu.te index 6d685ba..4114d9b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/aiccu.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/aiccu.te @@ -45,9 +45,11 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(aiccu_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(aiccu_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(aiccu_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(aiccu_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(aiccu_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(aiccu_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port(aiccu_t) +corenet_sendrecv_sixxsconfig_client_packets(aiccu_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_sixxsconfig_port(aiccu_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(aiccu_t) corenet_tcp_connect_sixxsconfig_port(aiccu_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/aide.fc b/policy/modules/services/aide.fc index 7798464..ff76db7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/aide.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/aide.fc @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ -/usr/sbin/aide -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:aide_exec_t,mls_systemhigh) +/usr/sbin/aide -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:aide_exec_t,s0) -/var/lib/aide(/.*) gen_context(system_u:object_r:aide_db_t,mls_systemhigh) +/var/lib/aide(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:aide_db_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/log/aide(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:aide_log_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/log/aide\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:aide_log_t,mls_systemhigh) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/aide.if b/policy/modules/services/aide.if index 838d25b..b84d045 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/aide.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/aide.if @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ interface(`aide_domtrans',` ## The role to allow the AIDE domain. ##     ## +## # interface(`aide_run',` gen_require(` @@ -60,9 +61,13 @@ interface(`aide_admin',` type aide_t, aide_db_t, aide_log_t; ') - allow $1 aide_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 aide_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, aide_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 aide_t:process ptrace; + ') + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, aide_db_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/aide.te b/policy/modules/services/aide.te index 2509dd2..7ada82f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/aide.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/aide.te @@ -32,6 +32,13 @@ manage_files_pattern(aide_t, aide_log_t, aide_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(aide_t, aide_log_t, file) files_read_all_files(aide_t) +files_read_boot_symlinks(aide_t) +files_read_all_symlinks(aide_t) +files_getattr_all_pipes(aide_t) +files_getattr_all_sockets(aide_t) + +mls_file_read_to_clearance(aide_t) +mls_file_write_to_clearance(aide_t) logging_send_audit_msgs(aide_t) # AIDE can be configured to log to syslog @@ -39,4 +46,4 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(aide_t) seutil_use_newrole_fds(aide_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(aide_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(aide_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/aisexec.if b/policy/modules/services/aisexec.if index 0370dba..feea7e5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/aisexec.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/aisexec.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run aisexec. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`aisexec_domtrans',` @@ -82,9 +82,13 @@ interface(`aisexecd_admin',` type aisexec_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 aisexec_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 aisexec_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, aisexec_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 aisexec_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, aisexec_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 aisexec_initrc_exec_t system_r; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/aisexec.te b/policy/modules/services/aisexec.te index 64953f7..244259f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/aisexec.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/aisexec.te @@ -64,6 +64,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(aisexec_t, aisexec_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) kernel_read_system_state(aisexec_t) corecmd_exec_bin(aisexec_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(aisexec_t) corenet_udp_bind_netsupport_port(aisexec_t) corenet_tcp_bind_reserved_port(aisexec_t) @@ -89,6 +90,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + corosync_domtrans(aisexec_t) +') + +optional_policy(` # to communication with RHCS rhcs_rw_dlm_controld_semaphores(aisexec_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ajaxterm.fc b/policy/modules/services/ajaxterm.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..aeb1888 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/ajaxterm.fc @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ajaxterm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/share/ajaxterm/ajaxterm\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ajaxterm_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/ajaxterm\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ajaxterm_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ajaxterm.if b/policy/modules/services/ajaxterm.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7abe946 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/ajaxterm.if @@ -0,0 +1,90 @@ +## policy for ajaxterm + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run ajaxterm. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ajaxterm_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type ajaxterm_t, ajaxterm_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, ajaxterm_exec_t, ajaxterm_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute ajaxterm server in the ajaxterm domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`ajaxterm_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Read and write the ajaxterm pty type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ajaxterm_rw_ptys',` + gen_require(` + type ajaxterm_devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 ajaxterm_devpts_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an ajaxterm environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`ajaxterm_admin',` + gen_require(` + type ajaxterm_t, ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 ajaxterm_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, ajaxterm_t) + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ajaxterm_t:process ptrace; + ') + + ajaxterm_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ajaxterm.te b/policy/modules/services/ajaxterm.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3d0fd88 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/ajaxterm.te @@ -0,0 +1,64 @@ +policy_module(ajaxterm, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type ajaxterm_t; +type ajaxterm_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(ajaxterm_t, ajaxterm_exec_t) + +type ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(ajaxterm_initrc_exec_t) + +type ajaxterm_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(ajaxterm_var_run_t) + +type ajaxterm_devpts_t; +term_login_pty(ajaxterm_devpts_t) + +######################################## +# +# ajaxterm local policy +# +allow ajaxterm_t self:capability setuid; +allow ajaxterm_t self:process { setpgid signal }; +allow ajaxterm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow ajaxterm_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow ajaxterm_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +allow ajaxterm_t ajaxterm_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms relabelfrom }; +term_create_pty(ajaxterm_t, ajaxterm_devpts_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(ajaxterm_t, ajaxterm_var_run_t, ajaxterm_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(ajaxterm_t, ajaxterm_var_run_t, ajaxterm_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(ajaxterm_t, ajaxterm_var_run_t, { file dir }) + +kernel_read_system_state(ajaxterm_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(ajaxterm_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ajaxterm_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_ajaxterm_port(ajaxterm_t) + +dev_read_urand(ajaxterm_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(ajaxterm_t) + +files_read_etc_files(ajaxterm_t) +files_read_usr_files(ajaxterm_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(ajaxterm_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(ajaxterm_t) + +####################################### +# +# SSH component local policy +# + +optional_policy(` + ssh_basic_client_template(ajaxterm, ajaxterm_t, system_r) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/amavis.fc b/policy/modules/services/amavis.fc index d96fdfa..e07158f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/amavis.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/amavis.fc @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/amavis -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_initrc_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/amavisd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/AntiVir/antivir -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/AntiVir/antivir -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_exec_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_debian',` /usr/sbin/amavisd-new-cronjob -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:amavis_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/amavis.if b/policy/modules/services/amavis.if index e31d92a..e515cb8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/amavis.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/amavis.if @@ -231,9 +231,13 @@ interface(`amavis_admin',` type amavis_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 amavis_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 amavis_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, amavis_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 amavis_t:process ptrace; + ') + amavis_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 amavis_initrc_exec_t system_r; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/amavis.te b/policy/modules/services/amavis.te index deca9d3..ac92fce 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/amavis.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/amavis.te @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ type amavis_quarantine_t; files_type(amavis_quarantine_t) type amavis_spool_t; -files_type(amavis_spool_t) +files_spool_file(amavis_spool_t) ######################################## # @@ -128,6 +128,7 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_razor_port(amavis_t) dev_read_rand(amavis_t) dev_read_urand(amavis_t) +dev_read_sysfs(amavis_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(amavis_t) @@ -137,6 +138,7 @@ files_read_usr_files(amavis_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(amavis_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(amavis_t) auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(amavis_t) # uses uptime which reads utmp - redhat bug 561383 @@ -153,24 +155,28 @@ sysnet_use_ldap(amavis_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(amavis_t) -# Cron handling -cron_use_fds(amavis_t) -cron_use_system_job_fds(amavis_t) -cron_rw_pipes(amavis_t) - -mta_read_config(amavis_t) - optional_policy(` clamav_stream_connect(amavis_t) clamav_domtrans_clamscan(amavis_t) ') optional_policy(` + #Cron handling + cron_use_fds(amavis_t) + cron_use_system_job_fds(amavis_t) + cron_rw_pipes(amavis_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dcc_domtrans_client(amavis_t) dcc_stream_connect_dccifd(amavis_t) ') optional_policy(` + mta_read_config(amavis_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nslcd_stream_connect(amavis_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/apache.fc b/policy/modules/services/apache.fc index 9e39aa5..8281bc3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/apache.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/apache.fc @@ -1,39 +1,54 @@ HOME_DIR/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_user_content_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/((www)|(web)|(public_html))/cgi-bin(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_user_script_exec_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/\.htaccess -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_user_htaccess_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/((www)|(web)|(public_html))(/.*)?/logs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_user_ra_content_t,s0) /etc/apache(2)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0) /etc/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0) -/etc/drupal(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) +/etc/cherokee(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0) +/etc/drupal.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) /etc/htdig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /etc/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0) /etc/httpd/conf/keytab -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_keytab_t,s0) /etc/httpd/logs gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) /etc/httpd/modules gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) +/etc/init\.d/cherokee -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0) /etc/mock/koji(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/httpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lighttpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/vhosts -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_config_t,s0) +/etc/WebCalendar(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) /etc/zabbix/web(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/httpd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/jetty.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_unit_file_t,s0) + +/usr/libexec/httpd-ssl-pass-dialog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_passwd_exec_t,s0) + /srv/([^/]*/)?www(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /srv/gallery2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /usr/bin/htsslpass -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_helper_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/mongrel_rails -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/share/jetty/bin/jetty.sh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) + /usr/lib/apache-ssl/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/apache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/apache2/modules(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/apache(2)?/suexec(2)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_suexec_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/cgi-bin/(nph-)?cgiwrap(d)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_suexec_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) +/usr/lib/apache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) +/usr/lib/apache2/modules(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) +/usr/lib/apache(2)?/suexec(2)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_suexec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cgi-bin/(nph-)?cgiwrap(d)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_suexec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cherokee(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) +/usr/lib/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) +/usr/lib/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_modules_t,s0) /usr/sbin/apache(2)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/apache-ssl(2)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cherokee -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/httpd\.event -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/httpd(\.worker)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/lighttpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rotatelogs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t,s0) @@ -43,8 +58,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /usr/sbin/httpd2-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_exec_t,s0) ') -/usr/share/dirsrv(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) -/usr/share/drupal(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) +/usr/share/drupal.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) +/usr/share/doc/ghc/html(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) + /usr/share/htdig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /usr/share/icecast(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /usr/share/mythweb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) @@ -54,9 +70,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /usr/share/ntop/html(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /usr/share/openca/htdocs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /usr/share/selinux-policy[^/]*/html(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) +/usr/share/wordpress/.*\.php -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-config\.php -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/wordpress-mu/wp-content(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) /usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/uploads(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) +/usr/share/wordpress/wp-content/upgrade(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) +/usr/share/wordpress/wp-includes/.*\.php -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) /var/cache/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_cache_t,s0) /var/cache/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_cache_t,s0) @@ -73,25 +92,36 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /var/cache/ssl.*\.sem -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_cache_t,s0) /var/lib/cacti/rra(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) +/var/lib/cherokee(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/dav(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0) -/var/lib/drupal(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) +/var/lib/dokuwiki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) +/var/lib/drupal.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) /var/lib/htdig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /var/lib/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/php/session(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0) /var/lib/squirrelmail/prefs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_squirrelmail_t,s0) +/var/lib/svn(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) +/var/lib/trac(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /var/log/apache(2)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) /var/log/apache-ssl(2)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) /var/log/cacti(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) /var/log/cgiwrap\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) -/var/log/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) -/var/log/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) -/var/log/piranha(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/cherokee(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/httpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/lighttpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/php-fpm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/roundcubemail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/suphp\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_debian', ` /var/log/horde2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) ') +/var/lib/pootle/po(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) +/var/lib/rt3/data/RT-Shredder(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_lib_t,s0) + /var/run/apache.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/gcache_port -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/httpd.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0) @@ -104,8 +134,29 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian', ` /var/spool/viewvc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t, s0) /var/www(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) -/var/www(/.*)?/logs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) /var/www/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) /var/www/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) /var/www/icons(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) /var/www/perl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) + +/var/www/html/[^/]*/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) + +/var/www/html/[^/]*/sites/default/settings\.php -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t, s0) +/var/www/html/[^/]*/sites/default/files(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t, s0) + +/var/www/html/configuration\.php gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) + +/var/www/html/wp-content(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) + +/var/www/gallery/albums(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) + +/var/www/moodledata(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) + +/var/www/svn(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_rw_content_t,s0) +/var/www/svn/hooks(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_script_exec_t,s0) +/var/www/svn/conf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_sys_content_t,s0) + +/var/log/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/dirsrv/admin-serv.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0) +/opt/dirsrv/var/run/dirsrv/dsgw/cookies(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/apache.if b/policy/modules/services/apache.if index 6480167..d0bf548 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/apache.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/apache.if @@ -13,62 +13,46 @@ # template(`apache_content_template',` gen_require(` - attribute httpdcontent; - attribute httpd_exec_scripts; - attribute httpd_script_exec_type; + attribute httpd_exec_scripts, httpd_script_exec_type; type httpd_t, httpd_suexec_t, httpd_log_t; + type httpd_sys_content_t; + attribute httpd_script_type, httpd_content_type; ') - # allow write access to public file transfer - # services files. - gen_tunable(allow_httpd_$1_script_anon_write, false) #This type is for webpages - type httpd_$1_content_t, httpdcontent; # customizable + type httpd_$1_content_t; # customizable; + typeattribute httpd_$1_content_t httpd_content_type; typealias httpd_$1_content_t alias httpd_$1_script_ro_t; files_type(httpd_$1_content_t) # This type is used for .htaccess files - type httpd_$1_htaccess_t; # customizable; + type httpd_$1_htaccess_t, httpd_content_type; # customizable; + typeattribute httpd_$1_htaccess_t httpd_content_type; files_type(httpd_$1_htaccess_t) # Type that CGI scripts run as - type httpd_$1_script_t; + type httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_script_type; domain_type(httpd_$1_script_t) role system_r types httpd_$1_script_t; # This type is used for executable scripts files type httpd_$1_script_exec_t, httpd_script_exec_type; # customizable; - corecmd_shell_entry_type(httpd_$1_script_t) + typeattribute httpd_$1_script_exec_t httpd_content_type; domain_entry_file(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_script_exec_t) - type httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpdcontent; # customizable + type httpd_$1_rw_content_t; # customizable + typeattribute httpd_$1_rw_content_t httpd_content_type; typealias httpd_$1_rw_content_t alias { httpd_$1_script_rw_t httpd_$1_content_rw_t }; files_type(httpd_$1_rw_content_t) - type httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpdcontent; # customizable + type httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_content_type; # customizable + typeattribute httpd_$1_ra_content_t httpd_content_type; typealias httpd_$1_ra_content_t alias { httpd_$1_script_ra_t httpd_$1_content_ra_t }; files_type(httpd_$1_ra_content_t) - read_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_content_t, httpd_$1_htaccess_t) - - domtrans_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_$1_script_exec_t, httpd_$1_script_t) - - allow httpd_t { httpd_$1_content_t httpd_$1_rw_content_t httpd_$1_script_exec_t }:dir search_dir_perms; - allow httpd_suexec_t { httpd_$1_content_t httpd_$1_content_t httpd_$1_rw_content_t httpd_$1_script_exec_t }:dir search_dir_perms; - - allow httpd_$1_script_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; - allow httpd_$1_script_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; - - allow httpd_$1_script_t httpd_t:fifo_file write; - # apache should set close-on-exec - dontaudit httpd_$1_script_t httpd_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; - # Allow the script process to search the cgi directory, and users directory allow httpd_$1_script_t httpd_$1_content_t:dir search_dir_perms; - append_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_log_t, httpd_log_t) - logging_search_logs(httpd_$1_script_t) - can_exec(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_script_exec_t) allow httpd_$1_script_t httpd_$1_script_exec_t:dir list_dir_perms; @@ -86,40 +70,6 @@ template(`apache_content_template',` manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t) - files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_$1_script_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) - - kernel_dontaudit_search_sysctl(httpd_$1_script_t) - kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(httpd_$1_script_t) - - dev_read_rand(httpd_$1_script_t) - dev_read_urand(httpd_$1_script_t) - - corecmd_exec_all_executables(httpd_$1_script_t) - - files_exec_etc_files(httpd_$1_script_t) - files_read_etc_files(httpd_$1_script_t) - files_search_home(httpd_$1_script_t) - - libs_exec_ld_so(httpd_$1_script_t) - libs_exec_lib_files(httpd_$1_script_t) - - miscfiles_read_fonts(httpd_$1_script_t) - miscfiles_read_public_files(httpd_$1_script_t) - - seutil_dontaudit_search_config(httpd_$1_script_t) - - tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified',` - allow httpd_$1_script_t httpdcontent:file entrypoint; - - manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) - manage_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) - manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_$1_script_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) - can_exec(httpd_$1_script_t, httpdcontent) - ') - - tunable_policy(`allow_httpd_$1_script_anon_write',` - miscfiles_manage_public_files(httpd_$1_script_t) - ') # Allow the web server to run scripts and serve pages tunable_policy(`httpd_builtin_scripting',` @@ -128,68 +78,25 @@ template(`apache_content_template',` manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t) rw_sock_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t, httpd_$1_rw_content_t) - allow httpd_t httpd_$1_ra_content_t:dir { list_dir_perms add_entry_dir_perms }; + allow httpd_t httpd_$1_ra_content_t:dir { add_entry_dir_perms }; read_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t) append_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t, httpd_$1_ra_content_t) - allow httpd_t httpd_$1_content_t:dir list_dir_perms; - read_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_content_t, httpd_$1_content_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_content_t, httpd_$1_content_t) - - allow httpd_t httpd_$1_content_t:dir list_dir_perms; - read_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_content_t, httpd_$1_content_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_content_t, httpd_$1_content_t) ') tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi',` allow httpd_$1_script_t httpd_$1_script_exec_t:file entrypoint; + domtrans_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_$1_script_exec_t, httpd_$1_script_t) + # privileged users run the script: domtrans_pattern(httpd_exec_scripts, httpd_$1_script_exec_t, httpd_$1_script_t) + allow httpd_exec_scripts httpd_$1_script_exec_t:file read_file_perms; + # apache runs the script: domtrans_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_$1_script_exec_t, httpd_$1_script_t) - - allow httpd_t httpd_$1_script_t:process { signal sigkill sigstop }; - allow httpd_t httpd_$1_script_exec_t:dir list_dir_perms; - - allow httpd_$1_script_t self:process { setsched signal_perms }; - allow httpd_$1_script_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - - allow httpd_$1_script_t httpd_t:fd use; - allow httpd_$1_script_t httpd_t:process sigchld; - - kernel_read_system_state(httpd_$1_script_t) - - dev_read_urand(httpd_$1_script_t) - - fs_getattr_xattr_fs(httpd_$1_script_t) - - files_read_etc_runtime_files(httpd_$1_script_t) - files_read_usr_files(httpd_$1_script_t) - - libs_read_lib_files(httpd_$1_script_t) - - miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_$1_script_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && allow_ypbind',` - nis_use_ypbind_uncond(httpd_$1_script_t) - ') - ') - - optional_policy(` - postgresql_unpriv_client(httpd_$1_script_t) - - tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_can_network_connect_db',` - postgresql_tcp_connect(httpd_$1_script_t) - ') - ') - - optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(httpd_$1_script_t) ') ') @@ -211,9 +118,8 @@ template(`apache_content_template',` interface(`apache_role',` gen_require(` attribute httpdcontent; - type httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_htaccess_t; - type httpd_user_script_t, httpd_user_script_exec_t; - type httpd_user_ra_content_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t; + type httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_htaccess_t, httpd_user_script_t; + type httpd_user_ra_content_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t, httpd_user_script_exec_t; ') role $1 types httpd_user_script_t; @@ -234,6 +140,13 @@ interface(`apache_role',` relabel_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_ra_content_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t) relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_ra_content_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($2, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_t) + manage_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_t) + relabel_dirs_pattern($2, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_t) + relabel_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_t) + relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($2, httpd_user_rw_content_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t) manage_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_rw_content_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_rw_content_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t) @@ -248,6 +161,9 @@ interface(`apache_role',` relabel_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_script_exec_t, httpd_user_script_exec_t) relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, httpd_user_script_exec_t, httpd_user_script_exec_t) + apache_exec_modules($2) + apache_filetrans_home_content($2) + tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi',` # If a user starts a script by hand it gets the proper context domtrans_pattern($2, httpd_user_script_exec_t, httpd_user_script_t) @@ -317,6 +233,25 @@ interface(`apache_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, httpd_exec_t, httpd_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to execute apache +## in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_exec',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, httpd_exec_t) +') + ####################################### ## ## Send a generic signal to apache. @@ -405,7 +340,7 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_rw_fifo_file',` type httpd_t; ') - dontaudit $1 httpd_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 httpd_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -487,7 +422,7 @@ interface(`apache_setattr_cache_dirs',` type httpd_cache_t; ') - allow $1 httpd_cache_t:dir setattr; + allow $1 httpd_cache_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -531,6 +466,25 @@ interface(`apache_rw_cache_files',` ######################################## ## ## Allow the specified domain to delete +## Apache cache dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_delete_cache_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_cache_t; + ') + + delete_dirs_pattern($1, httpd_cache_t, httpd_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to delete ## Apache cache. ## ## @@ -549,6 +503,26 @@ interface(`apache_delete_cache_files',` ######################################## ## +## Allow the specified domain to search +## apache configuration dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_search_config',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_config_t; + ') + + files_search_etc($1) + allow $1 httpd_config_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Allow the specified domain to read ## apache configuration files. ## @@ -699,7 +673,7 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_append_log',` type httpd_log_t; ') - dontaudit $1 httpd_log_t:file { getattr append }; + dontaudit $1 httpd_log_t:file append_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -745,6 +719,25 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_search_modules',` ######################################## ## +## Allow the specified domain to read +## the apache module directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_read_modules',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_modules_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, httpd_modules_t, httpd_modules_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Allow the specified domain to list ## the contents of the apache modules ## directory. @@ -761,6 +754,7 @@ interface(`apache_list_modules',` ') allow $1 httpd_modules_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, httpd_modules_t, httpd_modules_t) ') ######################################## @@ -802,6 +796,43 @@ interface(`apache_domtrans_rotatelogs',` domtrans_pattern($1, httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t, httpd_rotatelogs_t) ') +####################################### +## +## Execute httpd_rotatelogs in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_exec_rotatelogs',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, httpd_rotatelogs_exec_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute httpd system scripts in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_exec_sys_script',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_sys_script_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 httpd_sys_script_exec_t:dir search_dir_perms; + can_exec($1, httpd_sys_script_exec_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Allow the specified domain to list @@ -819,6 +850,7 @@ interface(`apache_list_sys_content',` ') list_dirs_pattern($1, httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_sys_content_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_sys_content_t) files_search_var($1) ') @@ -846,6 +878,74 @@ interface(`apache_manage_sys_content',` manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_sys_content_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to read +## apache system content rw files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`apache_read_sys_content_rw_files',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_sys_rw_content_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to manage +## apache system content rw files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`apache_manage_sys_content_rw',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_sys_rw_content_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to delete +## apache system content rw files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`apache_delete_sys_content_rw',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_sys_rw_content_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + delete_dirs_pattern($1, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) + delete_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) + delete_lnk_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) + delete_fifo_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) + delete_sock_files_pattern($1, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute all web scripts in the system @@ -862,7 +962,12 @@ interface(`apache_manage_sys_content',` interface(`apache_domtrans_sys_script',` gen_require(` attribute httpdcontent; - type httpd_sys_script_t; + type httpd_sys_script_exec_t; + type httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_sys_content_t; + ') + + tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi',` + domtrans_pattern($1, httpd_sys_script_exec_t, httpd_sys_script_t) ') tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified',` @@ -921,9 +1026,10 @@ interface(`apache_domtrans_all_scripts',` ## ## ## -## Role allowed access.. +## Role allowed access. ## ## +## # interface(`apache_run_all_scripts',` gen_require(` @@ -950,7 +1056,7 @@ interface(`apache_read_squirrelmail_data',` type httpd_squirrelmail_t; ') - allow $1 httpd_squirrelmail_t:file read_file_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, httpd_squirrelmail_t, httpd_squirrelmail_t) ') ######################################## @@ -1091,6 +1197,25 @@ interface(`apache_read_tmp_files',` read_files_pattern($1, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Dontaudit attempts to read and write +## apache tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_tmp_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 httpd_tmp_t:file { read write }; +') + ######################################## ## ## Dontaudit attempts to write @@ -1107,7 +1232,7 @@ interface(`apache_dontaudit_write_tmp_files',` type httpd_tmp_t; ') - dontaudit $1 httpd_tmp_t:file write_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 httpd_tmp_t:file write; ') ######################################## @@ -1148,14 +1273,31 @@ interface(`apache_cgi_domain',` ######################################## ## -## All of the rules required to administrate an apache environment +## Execute httpd server in the httpd domain. ## -## +## ## -## Prefix of the domain. Example, user would be -## the prefix for the uder_t domain. +## Domain allowed to transition. ## ## +# +interface(`httpd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_t; + type httpd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 httpd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 httpd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, httpd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate an apache environment +## ## ## ## Domain allowed access. @@ -1170,19 +1312,21 @@ interface(`apache_cgi_domain',` # interface(`apache_admin',` gen_require(` - attribute httpdcontent; - attribute httpd_script_exec_type; - + attribute httpdcontent, httpd_script_exec_type; type httpd_t, httpd_config_t, httpd_log_t; - type httpd_modules_t, httpd_lock_t; - type httpd_var_run_t, httpd_php_tmp_t; + type httpd_modules_t, httpd_lock_t, httpd_bool_t; + type httpd_var_run_t, httpd_php_tmp_t, httpd_initrc_exec_t; type httpd_suexec_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t; - type httpd_initrc_exec_t; + type httpd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 httpd_t:process { getattr ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 httpd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, httpd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 httpd_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, httpd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 httpd_initrc_exec_t system_r; @@ -1191,10 +1335,10 @@ interface(`apache_admin',` apache_manage_all_content($1) miscfiles_manage_public_files($1) - files_search_etc($1) + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, httpd_config_t) - logging_search_logs($1) + logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, httpd_log_t) admin_pattern($1, httpd_modules_t) @@ -1205,14 +1349,93 @@ interface(`apache_admin',` admin_pattern($1, httpd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans($1, httpd_var_run_t, file) - kernel_search_proc($1) - allow $1 httpd_t:dir list_dir_perms; - - read_lnk_files_pattern($1, httpd_t, httpd_t) - admin_pattern($1, httpdcontent) admin_pattern($1, httpd_script_exec_type) + + seutil_domtrans_setfiles($1) + + files_list_tmp($1) admin_pattern($1, httpd_tmp_t) admin_pattern($1, httpd_php_tmp_t) admin_pattern($1, httpd_suexec_tmp_t) + + httpd_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, httpd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 httpd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + + ifdef(`TODO',` + apache_set_booleans($1, $2, $3, httpd_bool_t) + seutil_setsebool_role_template($1, $3, $2) + allow httpd_setsebool_t httpd_bool_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow httpd_setsebool_t httpd_bool_t:file rw_file_perms; + ') + + apache_filetrans_named_content($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## dontaudit read and write an leaked file descriptors +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_t; + type httpd_tmp_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 httpd_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 httpd_t:tcp_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 httpd_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 httpd_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 httpd_tmp_t:file { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to apache named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t; + ') + + + apache_filetrans_home_content($1) + filetrans_pattern($1, httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, file, "settings.php") +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to apache home content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`apache_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_script_exec_t, httpd_user_htaccess_t; + type httpd_user_content_ra_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, httpd_user_content_t, dir, "public_html") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, httpd_user_content_t, dir, "www") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, httpd_user_content_t, dir, "web") + filetrans_pattern($1, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_script_exec_t, dir, "cgi-bin") + filetrans_pattern($1, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_ra_t, dir, "logs") + filetrans_pattern($1, { httpd_user_content_t httpd_user_script_exec_t }, httpd_user_htaccess_t, file, ".htaccess") ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/apache.te b/policy/modules/services/apache.te index 3136c6a..6aa4bdc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/apache.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/apache.te @@ -18,136 +18,268 @@ policy_module(apache, 2.2.1) # Declarations # +selinux_genbool(httpd_bool_t) + ## -##

    -## Allow Apache to modify public files -## used for public file transfer services. Directories/Files must -## be labeled public_content_rw_t. -##

    +##

    +## Allow Apache to modify public files +## used for public file transfer services, directories/files must +## be labeled public_content_rw_t. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(allow_httpd_anon_write, false) ## -##

    -## Allow Apache to use mod_auth_pam -##

    +##

    +## Allow Apache to use mod_auth_pam +##

    ##     gen_tunable(allow_httpd_mod_auth_pam, false) ## -##

    -## Allow httpd to use built in scripting (usually php) -##

    +##

    +## Allow Apache to use mod_auth_ntlm_winbind +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(allow_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd scripts and modules execmem/execstack +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_execmem, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd processes to manage IPA content +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_manage_ipa, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd daemon to change system limits +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_setrlimit, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd to use built in scripting (usually php) +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_builtin_scripting, false) ## -##

    -## Allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to the network using TCP. -##

    +##

    +## Allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to the network using any TCP port. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_can_network_connect, false) ## -##

    -## Allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to databases over the network. -##

    +##

    +## Allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to cobbler over the network. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow HTTPD to connect to port 80 for graceful shutdown +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_graceful_shutdown, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow HTTPD scripts and modules to connect to databases over the network. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_can_network_connect_db, false) ## -##

    -## Allow httpd to act as a relay -##

    +##

    +## Allow httpd to connect to memcache server +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_can_network_memcache, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd to act as a relay +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_can_network_relay, false) ## -##

    -## Allow http daemon to send mail -##

    +##

    +## Allow http daemon to send mail +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_can_sendmail, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow http daemon to connect to zabbix +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_can_connect_zabbix, false) + ## -##

    -## Allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbus -##

    +##

    +## Allow http daemon to check spam +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_can_check_spam, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow Apache to communicate with avahi service via dbus +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_dbus_avahi, false) ## -##

    -## Allow httpd cgi support -##

    +##

    +## Allow httpd to execute cgi scripts +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_enable_cgi, false) ## -##

    -## Allow httpd to act as a FTP server by -## listening on the ftp port. -##

    +##

    +## Allow httpd to act as a FTP server by +## listening on the ftp port. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_enable_ftp_server, false) ## -##

    -## Allow httpd to read home directories -##

    +##

    +## Allow httpd to act as a FTP client +## connecting to the ftp port and ephemeral ports +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_can_connect_ftp, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd to connect to the ldap port +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_can_connect_ldap, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd to read home directories +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_enable_homedirs, false) ## -##

    -## Allow HTTPD to run SSI executables in the same domain as system CGI scripts. -##

    +##

    +## Allow httpd to read user content +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_read_user_content, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow Apache to run in stickshift mode, not transition to passenger +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_run_stickshift, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow HTTPD to run SSI executables in the same domain as system CGI scripts. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_ssi_exec, false) ## -##

    -## Unify HTTPD to communicate with the terminal. -## Needed for entering the passphrase for certificates at -## the terminal. -##

    +##

    +## Allow Apache to execute tmp content. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_tmp_exec, false) + +## +##

    +## Unify HTTPD to communicate with the terminal. +## Needed for entering the passphrase for certificates at +## the terminal. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_tty_comm, false) ## -##

    -## Unify HTTPD handling of all content files. -##

    +##

    +## Unify HTTPD handling of all content files. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_unified, false) ## -##

    -## Allow httpd to access cifs file systems -##

    +##

    +## Allow httpd to access openstack ports +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_use_openstack, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd to access cifs file systems +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_use_cifs, false) ## -##

    -## Allow httpd to run gpg -##

    +##

    +## Allow httpd to access cifs file systems +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_use_fusefs, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd to run gpg in gpg-web domain +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_use_gpg, false) ## -##

    -## Allow httpd to access nfs file systems -##

    +##

    +## Allow httpd to access nfs file systems +##

    ##     gen_tunable(httpd_use_nfs, false) +## +##

    +## Allow apache scripts to write to public content, directories/files must be labeled public_rw_content_t. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(allow_httpd_sys_script_anon_write, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow httpd to communicate with oddjob to start up a service +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(httpd_use_oddjob, false) + attribute httpdcontent; attribute httpd_user_content_type; +attribute httpd_content_type; # domains that can exec all users scripts attribute httpd_exec_scripts; +attribute httpd_script_type; attribute httpd_script_exec_type; attribute httpd_user_script_exec_type; @@ -166,7 +298,7 @@ files_type(httpd_cache_t) # httpd_config_t is the type given to the configuration files type httpd_config_t; -files_type(httpd_config_t) +files_config_file(httpd_config_t) type httpd_helper_t; type httpd_helper_exec_t; @@ -177,6 +309,9 @@ role system_r types httpd_helper_t; type httpd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(httpd_initrc_exec_t) +type httpd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(httpd_unit_file_t) + type httpd_lock_t; files_lock_file(httpd_lock_t) @@ -216,7 +351,21 @@ files_tmp_file(httpd_suexec_tmp_t) # setup the system domain for system CGI scripts apache_content_template(sys) -typealias httpd_sys_content_t alias ntop_http_content_t; + +optional_policy(` + postgresql_unpriv_client(httpd_sys_script_t) +') + +typeattribute httpd_sys_content_t httpdcontent; # customizable +typeattribute httpd_sys_rw_content_t httpdcontent; # customizable +typeattribute httpd_sys_ra_content_t httpdcontent; # customizable + +# Removal of fastcgi, will cause problems without the following +typealias httpd_sys_script_exec_t alias httpd_fastcgi_script_exec_t; +typealias httpd_sys_content_t alias { httpd_fastcgi_content_t httpd_fastcgi_script_ro_t }; +typealias httpd_sys_rw_content_t alias { httpd_fastcgi_rw_content_t httpd_fastcgi_script_rw_t }; +typealias httpd_sys_ra_content_t alias httpd_fastcgi_script_ra_t; +typealias httpd_sys_script_t alias httpd_fastcgi_script_t; type httpd_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(httpd_tmp_t) @@ -226,6 +375,10 @@ files_tmpfs_file(httpd_tmpfs_t) apache_content_template(user) ubac_constrained(httpd_user_script_t) +typeattribute httpd_user_content_t httpdcontent; +typeattribute httpd_user_rw_content_t httpdcontent; +typeattribute httpd_user_ra_content_t httpdcontent; + userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_content_t) userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_htaccess_t) userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_script_exec_t) @@ -233,6 +386,7 @@ userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_ra_content_t) userdom_user_home_content(httpd_user_rw_content_t) typeattribute httpd_user_script_t httpd_script_domains; typealias httpd_user_content_t alias { httpd_staff_content_t httpd_sysadm_content_t }; +typealias httpd_user_content_t alias httpd_unconfined_content_t; typealias httpd_user_content_t alias { httpd_auditadm_content_t httpd_secadm_content_t }; typealias httpd_user_content_t alias { httpd_staff_script_ro_t httpd_sysadm_script_ro_t }; typealias httpd_user_content_t alias { httpd_auditadm_script_ro_t httpd_secadm_script_ro_t }; @@ -254,14 +408,23 @@ files_type(httpd_var_lib_t) type httpd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(httpd_var_run_t) +# Removal of fastcgi, will cause problems without the following +typealias httpd_var_run_t alias httpd_fastcgi_var_run_t; + # File Type of squirrelmail attachments type squirrelmail_spool_t; files_tmp_file(squirrelmail_spool_t) +files_spool_file(squirrelmail_spool_t) optional_policy(` prelink_object_file(httpd_modules_t) ') +type httpd_passwd_t; +type httpd_passwd_exec_t; +application_domain(httpd_passwd_t, httpd_passwd_exec_t) +role system_r types httpd_passwd_t; + ######################################## # # Apache server local policy @@ -281,11 +444,13 @@ allow httpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow httpd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; allow httpd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow httpd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +dontaudit httpd_t self:netlink_audit_socket create_socket_perms; # Allow httpd_t to put files in /var/cache/httpd etc manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_cache_t, httpd_cache_t) manage_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_cache_t, httpd_cache_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_cache_t, httpd_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(httpd_t, httpd_cache_t, { file dir }) # Allow the httpd_t to read the web servers config files allow httpd_t httpd_config_t:dir list_dir_perms; @@ -329,8 +494,9 @@ allow httpd_t httpd_sys_script_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_t, httpd_tmp_t, { file dir lnk_file }) +files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_t, httpd_tmp_t, { file dir lnk_file sock_file }) manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, httpd_tmpfs_t) manage_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, httpd_tmpfs_t) @@ -339,8 +505,9 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, httpd_tmpfs_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, httpd_tmpfs_t) fs_tmpfs_filetrans(httpd_t, httpd_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) +manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_var_lib_t, httpd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_var_lib_t, httpd_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(httpd_t, httpd_var_lib_t, file) +files_var_lib_filetrans(httpd_t, httpd_var_lib_t, { dir file }) setattr_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_var_run_t, httpd_var_run_t) manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_var_run_t, httpd_var_run_t) @@ -355,6 +522,9 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, squirrelmail_spool_t, squirrelmail_spool_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(httpd_t) # for modules that want to access /proc/meminfo kernel_read_system_state(httpd_t) +kernel_read_network_state(httpd_t) +kernel_read_network_state(httpd_t) +kernel_search_network_sysctl(httpd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(httpd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_t) @@ -365,11 +535,19 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(httpd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(httpd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(httpd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_http_port(httpd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_http_port(httpd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_http_cache_port(httpd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_ntop_port(httpd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_jboss_management_port(httpd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_jboss_messaging_port(httpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_http_server_packets(httpd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_puppet_port(httpd_t) # Signal self for shutdown -corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(httpd_t) +tunable_policy(`httpd_graceful_shutdown',` + corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(httpd_t) +') dev_read_sysfs(httpd_t) dev_read_rand(httpd_t) @@ -378,12 +556,13 @@ dev_rw_crypto(httpd_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(httpd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(httpd_t) +fs_read_iso9660_files(httpd_t) +fs_read_anon_inodefs_files(httpd_t) +fs_read_hugetlbfs_files(httpd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(httpd_t) -# execute perl -corecmd_exec_bin(httpd_t) -corecmd_exec_shell(httpd_t) +application_exec_all(httpd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(httpd_t) @@ -391,6 +570,7 @@ files_dontaudit_getattr_all_pids(httpd_t) files_read_usr_files(httpd_t) files_list_mnt(httpd_t) files_search_spool(httpd_t) +files_read_var_symlinks(httpd_t) files_read_var_lib_files(httpd_t) files_search_home(httpd_t) files_getattr_home_dir(httpd_t) @@ -402,48 +582,101 @@ files_read_etc_files(httpd_t) files_read_var_lib_symlinks(httpd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(httpd_sys_script_t) +# php uploads a file to /tmp and then execs programs to acton them +manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_tmp_t, httpd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) libs_read_lib_files(httpd_t) +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + libs_exec_lib_files(httpd_t) +') + logging_send_syslog_msg(httpd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(httpd_t) miscfiles_read_public_files(httpd_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs(httpd_t) +miscfiles_read_tetex_data(httpd_t) seutil_dontaudit_search_config(httpd_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(httpd_t) +tunable_policy(`httpd_setrlimit',` + allow httpd_t self:process setrlimit; + allow httpd_t self:capability sys_resource; +') + tunable_policy(`allow_httpd_anon_write',` miscfiles_manage_public_files(httpd_t) ') -ifdef(`TODO', ` # # We need optionals to be able to be within booleans to make this work # tunable_policy(`allow_httpd_mod_auth_pam',` - auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(httpd_t) + auth_domtrans_chkpwd(httpd_t) + logging_send_audit_msgs(httpd_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`allow_httpd_mod_auth_ntlm_winbind',` + samba_domtrans_winbind_helper(httpd_t) + ') ') tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect',` corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(httpd_t) ') +tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` + corenet_tcp_connect_firebird_port(httpd_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_mssql_port(httpd_t) + corenet_sendrecv_mssql_client_packets(httpd_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_oracle_port(httpd_t) + corenet_sendrecv_oracle_client_packets(httpd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_memcache',` + corenet_tcp_connect_memcache_port(httpd_t) +') + tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_relay',` # allow httpd to work as a relay corenet_tcp_connect_gopher_port(httpd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(httpd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(httpd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(httpd_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(httpd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_memcache_port(httpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_gopher_client_packets(httpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_ftp_client_packets(httpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(httpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(httpd_t) + corenet_sendrecv_squid_client_packets(httpd_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(httpd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_execmem',` + allow httpd_t self:process { execmem execstack }; + allow httpd_sys_script_t self:process { execmem execstack }; + allow httpd_suexec_t self:process { execmem execstack }; +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified',` + allow httpd_sys_script_t httpd_sys_content_t:file entrypoint; + filetrans_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, { file dir lnk_file }) + can_exec(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_sys_content_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`allow_httpd_sys_script_anon_write',` + miscfiles_manage_public_files(httpd_sys_script_t) ') tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_use_nfs',` @@ -454,27 +687,61 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_use_cifs',` fs_cifs_domtrans(httpd_t, httpd_sys_script_t) ') +tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_use_fusefs',` + fs_fusefs_domtrans(httpd_t, httpd_sys_script_t) +') + tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified && httpd_builtin_scripting',` domtrans_pattern(httpd_t, httpdcontent, httpd_sys_script_t) + filetrans_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_sys_rw_content_t, { file dir lnk_file }) + manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpdcontent, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) + manage_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpdcontent, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpdcontent, httpd_sys_rw_content_t) manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) manage_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) ') +tunable_policy(`httpd_can_connect_ftp',` + corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(httpd_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(httpd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_can_connect_ldap',` + corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port(httpd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_can_connect_zabbix',` + corenet_tcp_connect_zabbix_port(httpd_t) +') + tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_ftp_server',` corenet_tcp_bind_ftp_port(httpd_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_ephemeral_ports(httpd_t) ') -tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs',` - userdom_read_user_home_content_files(httpd_t) +tunable_policy(`httpd_tmp_exec && httpd_builtin_scripting',` + can_exec(httpd_t, httpd_tmp_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_tmp_exec && httpd_enable_cgi',` + can_exec(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_tmp_t) ') tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(httpd_t) fs_read_nfs_files(httpd_t) fs_read_nfs_symlinks(httpd_t) ') +tunable_policy(`httpd_use_nfs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(httpd_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(httpd_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(httpd_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(httpd_t) +') + tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',` fs_read_cifs_files(httpd_t) fs_read_cifs_symlinks(httpd_t) @@ -484,7 +751,22 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_sendmail',` # allow httpd to connect to mail servers corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(httpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_smtp_client_packets(httpd_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_pop_port(httpd_t) + corenet_sendrecv_pop_client_packets(httpd_t) mta_send_mail(httpd_t) + mta_signal_system_mail(httpd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_use_cifs',` + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(httpd_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(httpd_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(httpd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_use_fusefs',` + fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(httpd_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_files(httpd_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_symlinks(httpd_t) ') tunable_policy(`httpd_ssi_exec',` @@ -499,9 +781,19 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_ssi_exec',` # to run correctly without this permission, so the permission # are dontaudited here. tunable_policy(`httpd_tty_comm',` - userdom_use_user_terminals(httpd_t) + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(httpd_t) + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(httpd_suexec_t) ',` userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(httpd_t) + userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(httpd_suexec_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + # Support for ABRT retrace server + # mod_wsgi + abrt_manage_spool_retrace(httpd_t) + abrt_domtrans_retrace_worker(httpd_t) + abrt_read_config(httpd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -513,7 +805,13 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - cobbler_search_lib(httpd_t) + cobbler_list_config(httpd_t) + cobbler_read_config(httpd_t) + cobbler_read_lib_files(httpd_t) + + tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_cobbler',` + corenet_tcp_connect_cobbler_port(httpd_t) + ') ') optional_policy(` @@ -528,7 +826,19 @@ optional_policy(` daemontools_service_domain(httpd_t, httpd_exec_t) ') - optional_policy(` +optional_policy(` + dirsrv_manage_config(httpd_t) + dirsrv_manage_log(httpd_t) + dirsrv_manage_var_run(httpd_t) + dirsrv_read_share(httpd_t) + dirsrv_signal(httpd_t) + dirsrv_signull(httpd_t) + dirsrvadmin_manage_config(httpd_t) + dirsrvadmin_manage_tmp(httpd_t) + dirsrvadmin_domtrans_unconfined_script_t(httpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(httpd_t) tunable_policy(`httpd_dbus_avahi',` @@ -537,12 +847,21 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + git_read_generic_system_content_files(httpd_t) + gitosis_read_lib_files(httpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_use_gpg',` - gpg_domtrans(httpd_t) + gpg_domtrans_web(httpd_t) ') ') optional_policy(` + jetty_admin(httpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` kerberos_keytab_template(httpd, httpd_t) ') @@ -556,7 +875,21 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + mediawiki_read_tmp_files(httpd_t) + mediawiki_delete_tmp_files(httpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + memcached_stream_connect(httpd_t) + + tunable_policy(`httpd_manage_ipa',` + memcached_manage_pid_files(httpd_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` # Allow httpd to work with mysql + mysql_read_config(httpd_t) mysql_stream_connect(httpd_t) mysql_rw_db_sockets(httpd_t) @@ -567,6 +900,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` nagios_read_config(httpd_t) + nagios_read_log(httpd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -577,6 +911,33 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + pwauth_domtrans(httpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`httpd_run_stickshift', ` + allow httpd_t self:capability sys_resource; + allow httpd_t self:capability { fowner fsetid }; + allow httpd_t self:process setexec; + passenger_exec(httpd_t) + passenger_manage_pid_content(httpd_t) + passenger_manage_lib_files(httpd_t) + ',` + passenger_domtrans(httpd_t) + passenger_manage_pid_content(httpd_t) + passenger_read_lib_files(httpd_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + puppet_read_lib(httpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpc_search_nfs_state_data(httpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` # Allow httpd to work with postgresql postgresql_stream_connect(httpd_t) postgresql_unpriv_client(httpd_t) @@ -591,6 +952,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + smokeping_read_lib_files(httpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + files_dontaudit_rw_usr_dirs(httpd_t) snmp_dontaudit_read_snmp_var_lib_files(httpd_t) snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files(httpd_t) ') @@ -603,6 +969,12 @@ optional_policy(` yam_read_content(httpd_t) ') +optional_policy(` + zarafa_manage_lib_files(httpd_t) + zarafa_stream_connect_server(httpd_t) + zarafa_search_config(httpd_t) +') + ######################################## # # Apache helper local policy @@ -616,7 +988,11 @@ allow httpd_helper_t httpd_log_t:file append_file_perms; logging_send_syslog_msg(httpd_helper_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(httpd_helper_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(httpd_helper_t) + +tunable_policy(`httpd_tty_comm',` + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(httpd_helper_t) +') ######################################## # @@ -654,28 +1030,30 @@ libs_exec_lib_files(httpd_php_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(httpd_php_t) tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` - corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(httpd_t) - corenet_sendrecv_mysqld_client_packets(httpd_t) - corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(httpd_sys_script_t) - corenet_sendrecv_mysqld_client_packets(httpd_sys_script_t) - corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(httpd_suexec_t) - corenet_sendrecv_mysqld_client_packets(httpd_suexec_t) - - corenet_tcp_connect_mssql_port(httpd_t) - corenet_sendrecv_mssql_client_packets(httpd_t) - corenet_tcp_connect_mssql_port(httpd_sys_script_t) - corenet_sendrecv_mssql_client_packets(httpd_sys_script_t) - corenet_tcp_connect_mssql_port(httpd_suexec_t) - corenet_sendrecv_mssql_client_packets(httpd_suexec_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_firebird_port(httpd_php_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_mssql_port(httpd_php_t) + corenet_sendrecv_mssql_client_packets(httpd_php_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_oracle_port(httpd_php_t) + corenet_sendrecv_oracle_client_packets(httpd_php_t) ') optional_policy(` mysql_stream_connect(httpd_php_t) + mysql_rw_db_sockets(httpd_php_t) mysql_read_config(httpd_php_t) + + tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` + mysql_tcp_connect(httpd_php_t) + ') ') optional_policy(` postgresql_stream_connect(httpd_php_t) + postgresql_unpriv_client(httpd_php_t) + + tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` + postgresql_tcp_connect(httpd_php_t) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -685,6 +1063,8 @@ optional_policy(` allow httpd_suexec_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; allow httpd_suexec_t self:process signal_perms; + +allow httpd_suexec_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow httpd_suexec_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; domtrans_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_suexec_exec_t, httpd_suexec_t) @@ -699,17 +1079,22 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_suexec_tmp_t, { file dir }) +can_exec(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_sys_script_exec_t) + +read_files_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_t) +read_files_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t, httpd_user_rw_content_t) +read_files_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t) + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(httpd_suexec_t) kernel_list_proc(httpd_suexec_t) kernel_read_proc_symlinks(httpd_suexec_t) dev_read_urand(httpd_suexec_t) +fs_read_iso9660_files(httpd_suexec_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(httpd_suexec_t) -# for shell scripts -corecmd_exec_bin(httpd_suexec_t) -corecmd_exec_shell(httpd_suexec_t) +application_exec_all(httpd_suexec_t) files_read_etc_files(httpd_suexec_t) files_read_usr_files(httpd_suexec_t) @@ -740,13 +1125,31 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect',` corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(httpd_suexec_t) ') +tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` + corenet_tcp_connect_firebird_port(httpd_suexec_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_mssql_port(httpd_suexec_t) + corenet_sendrecv_mssql_client_packets(httpd_suexec_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_oracle_port(httpd_suexec_t) + corenet_sendrecv_oracle_client_packets(httpd_suexec_t) +') + +domain_entry_file(httpd_sys_script_t, httpd_sys_content_t) + +tunable_policy(`httpd_can_sendmail',` + mta_send_mail(httpd_suexec_t) +') + tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified',` allow httpd_sys_script_t httpdcontent:file entrypoint; domtrans_pattern(httpd_suexec_t, httpdcontent, httpd_sys_script_t) - + manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) + manage_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) + manage_sock_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) + manage_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, httpdcontent, httpdcontent) ') tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(httpd_suexec_t) fs_read_nfs_files(httpd_suexec_t) fs_read_nfs_symlinks(httpd_suexec_t) fs_exec_nfs_files(httpd_suexec_t) @@ -769,6 +1172,25 @@ optional_policy(` dontaudit httpd_suexec_t httpd_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; ') +optional_policy(` + mysql_stream_connect(httpd_suexec_t) + mysql_rw_db_sockets(httpd_suexec_t) + mysql_read_config(httpd_suexec_t) + + tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` + mysql_tcp_connect(httpd_suexec_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + postgresql_stream_connect(httpd_suexec_t) + postgresql_unpriv_client(httpd_suexec_t) + + tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` + postgresql_tcp_connect(httpd_suexec_t) + ') +') + ######################################## # # Apache system script local policy @@ -789,12 +1211,17 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_sys_script_t, squirrelmail_spool_t, squirrelmail_sp kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(httpd_sys_script_t) +files_read_var_symlinks(httpd_sys_script_t) files_search_var_lib(httpd_sys_script_t) files_search_spool(httpd_sys_script_t) +logging_inherit_append_all_logs(httpd_sys_script_t) + # Should we add a boolean? apache_domtrans_rotatelogs(httpd_sys_script_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(httpd_sys_script_t) + ifdef(`distro_redhat',` allow httpd_sys_script_t httpd_log_t:file append_file_perms; ') @@ -803,18 +1230,50 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_can_sendmail',` mta_send_mail(httpd_sys_script_t) ') +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`httpd_can_sendmail && httpd_can_check_spam',` + spamassassin_domtrans_client(httpd_t) + ') +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` + corenet_tcp_connect_firebird_port(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_mssql_port(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_sendrecv_mssql_client_packets(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_oracle_port(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_sendrecv_oracle_client_packets(httpd_sys_script_t) +') + +fs_cifs_entry_type(httpd_sys_script_t) +fs_read_iso9660_files(httpd_sys_script_t) +fs_nfs_entry_type(httpd_sys_script_t) + +tunable_policy(`httpd_use_nfs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_exec_nfs_files(httpd_sys_script_t) + + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_exec_nfs_files(httpd_suexec_t) +') + tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_can_network_connect',` allow httpd_sys_script_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow httpd_sys_script_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; - corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(httpd_sys_script_t) - corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(httpd_sys_script_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(httpd_sys_script_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_sys_script_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(httpd_sys_script_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if(httpd_sys_script_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(httpd_sys_script_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(httpd_sys_script_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_sys_script_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(httpd_sys_script_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(httpd_sys_script_t) @@ -822,14 +1281,39 @@ tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_can_network_connect',` ') tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs',` - userdom_read_user_home_content_files(httpd_sys_script_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs(httpd_sys_script_t) ') tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(httpd_sys_script_t) fs_read_nfs_files(httpd_sys_script_t) fs_read_nfs_symlinks(httpd_sys_script_t) ') +tunable_policy(`httpd_read_user_content',` + userdom_read_user_home_content_files(httpd_sys_script_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_use_cifs',` + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_exec_cifs_files(httpd_suexec_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_use_fusefs',` + fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_files(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_symlinks(httpd_sys_script_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_files(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_symlinks(httpd_suexec_t) + fs_exec_fusefs_files(httpd_suexec_t) +') + tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',` fs_read_cifs_files(httpd_sys_script_t) fs_read_cifs_symlinks(httpd_sys_script_t) @@ -842,10 +1326,20 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` mysql_stream_connect(httpd_sys_script_t) mysql_rw_db_sockets(httpd_sys_script_t) + mysql_read_config(httpd_sys_script_t) + + tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` + mysql_tcp_connect(httpd_sys_script_t) + ') ') optional_policy(` postgresql_stream_connect(httpd_sys_script_t) + postgresql_unpriv_client(httpd_sys_script_t) + + tunable_policy(`httpd_can_network_connect_db',` + postgresql_tcp_connect(httpd_sys_script_t) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -891,11 +1385,146 @@ optional_policy(` tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && httpd_unified',` allow httpd_user_script_t httpdcontent:file entrypoint; + manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_user_script_t, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_t) + manage_files_pattern(httpd_user_script_t, httpd_user_content_t, httpd_user_content_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_user_script_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t) + manage_files_pattern(httpd_user_script_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t, httpd_user_ra_content_t) ') # allow accessing files/dirs below the users home dir tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_homedirs',` - userdom_search_user_home_dirs(httpd_t) - userdom_search_user_home_dirs(httpd_suexec_t) - userdom_search_user_home_dirs(httpd_user_script_t) + userdom_search_user_home_content(httpd_t) + userdom_search_user_home_content(httpd_suexec_t) + userdom_search_user_home_content(httpd_user_script_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_read_user_content',` + userdom_read_user_home_content_files(httpd_t) + userdom_read_user_home_content_files(httpd_suexec_t) + userdom_read_user_home_content_files(httpd_user_script_t) ') + +######################################## +# +# httpd_passwd local policy +# + +allow httpd_passwd_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow httpd_passwd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow httpd_passwd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(httpd_passwd_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(httpd_passwd_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(httpd_passwd_t) + +dev_read_urand(httpd_passwd_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(httpd_passwd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(httpd_passwd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(httpd_passwd_t) + +miscfiles_read_certs(httpd_passwd_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_passwd_t) + +systemd_manage_passwd_run(httpd_passwd_t) +systemd_manage_passwd_run(httpd_t) +#systemd_passwd_agent_dev_template(httpd) + +domtrans_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_passwd_exec_t, httpd_passwd_t) +dontaudit httpd_passwd_t httpd_config_t:file read; + +search_dirs_pattern(httpd_script_type, httpd_sys_content_t, httpd_script_exec_type) +corecmd_shell_entry_type(httpd_script_type) + +allow httpd_script_type self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow httpd_script_type self:unix_stream_socket connectto; + +allow httpd_script_type httpd_t:fifo_file write; +# apache should set close-on-exec +apache_dontaudit_leaks(httpd_script_type) + +append_files_pattern(httpd_script_type, httpd_log_t, httpd_log_t) +logging_search_logs(httpd_script_type) + +kernel_dontaudit_search_sysctl(httpd_script_type) +kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(httpd_script_type) + +dev_read_rand(httpd_script_type) +dev_read_urand(httpd_script_type) + +corecmd_exec_all_executables(httpd_script_type) +application_exec_all(httpd_script_type) + +files_exec_etc_files(httpd_script_type) +files_read_etc_files(httpd_script_type) +files_search_home(httpd_script_type) + +libs_exec_ld_so(httpd_script_type) +libs_exec_lib_files(httpd_script_type) + +miscfiles_read_fonts(httpd_script_type) +miscfiles_read_public_files(httpd_script_type) + +seutil_dontaudit_search_config(httpd_script_type) +allow httpd_t httpd_script_type:unix_stream_socket connectto; + +allow httpd_t httpd_script_exec_type:file read_file_perms; +allow httpd_t httpd_script_exec_type:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; +allow httpd_t httpd_script_type:process { signal sigkill sigstop }; +allow httpd_t httpd_script_exec_type:dir list_dir_perms; + +allow httpd_script_type self:process { setsched signal_perms }; +allow httpd_script_type self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow httpd_script_type self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +allow httpd_script_type httpd_t:fd use; +allow httpd_script_type httpd_t:process sigchld; + +dontaudit httpd_script_type httpd_t:tcp_socket { read write }; + +kernel_read_system_state(httpd_script_type) + +dev_read_urand(httpd_script_type) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(httpd_script_type) + +files_read_etc_runtime_files(httpd_script_type) +files_read_usr_files(httpd_script_type) + +libs_read_lib_files(httpd_script_type) + +miscfiles_read_localization(httpd_script_type) +allow httpd_script_type httpd_sys_content_t:dir search_dir_perms; + +tunable_policy(`httpd_enable_cgi && allow_ypbind',` + nis_use_ypbind_uncond(httpd_script_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + nscd_socket_use(httpd_script_type) +') + +read_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_content_type, httpd_content_type) + +tunable_policy(`httpd_builtin_scripting',` + allow httpd_t httpd_content_type:dir search_dir_perms; + allow httpd_suexec_t httpd_content_type:dir search_dir_perms; + + allow httpd_t httpd_content_type:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_content_type, httpd_content_type) + read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_content_type, httpd_content_type) + + allow httpd_t httpd_content_type:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_content_type, httpd_content_type) + read_lnk_files_pattern(httpd_t, httpd_content_type, httpd_content_type) +') + +tunable_policy(`httpd_use_openstack',` + corenet_tcp_connect_keystone_port(httpd_sys_script_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(httpd_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_glance_port(httpd_sys_script_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.fc b/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.fc index cd07b96..f3506be 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.fc @@ -1,9 +1,13 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/apcupsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apcupsd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/apcupsd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apcupsd_unit_file_t,s0) + /sbin/apcupsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apcupsd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/apcupsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apcupsd_exec_t,s0) +/var/lock/subsys/apcupsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apcupsd_lock_t,s0) + /var/log/apcupsd\.events.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apcupsd_log_t,s0) /var/log/apcupsd\.status.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apcupsd_log_t,s0) @@ -13,3 +17,4 @@ /var/www/apcupsd/upsfstats\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t,s0) /var/www/apcupsd/upsimage\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t,s0) /var/www/apcupsd/upsstats\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t,s0) +/var/www/cgi-bin/apcgui(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_apcupsd_cgi_script_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.if b/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.if index e342775..1fedbe5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.if @@ -123,6 +123,29 @@ interface(`apcupsd_cgi_script_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute apcupsd server in the apcupsd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`apcupsd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type apcupsd_t; + type apcupsd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 apcupsd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 apcupsd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, apcupsd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an apcupsd environment ## @@ -144,11 +167,16 @@ interface(`apcupsd_admin',` type apcupsd_log_t, apcupsd_lock_t; type apcupsd_var_run_t; type apcupsd_initrc_exec_t; + type apcupsd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 apcupsd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 apcupsd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, apcupsd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 apcupsd_t:process ptrace; + ') + apcupsd_initrc_domtrans($1, apcupsd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 apcupsd_initrc_exec_t system_r; @@ -165,4 +193,8 @@ interface(`apcupsd_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, apcupsd_var_run_t) + + apcupsd_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, apcupsd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 apcupsd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.te b/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.te index d052bf0..77e6e19 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/apcupsd.te @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ files_tmp_file(apcupsd_tmp_t) type apcupsd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(apcupsd_var_run_t) +type apcupsd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(apcupsd_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # apcupsd local policy @@ -76,6 +79,7 @@ files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(apcupsd_t, file) # https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=240805 term_use_unallocated_ttys(apcupsd_t) +term_use_usb_ttys(apcupsd_t) #apcupsd runs shutdown, probably need a shutdown domain init_rw_utmp(apcupsd_t) @@ -87,13 +91,17 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(apcupsd_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(apcupsd_t) -userdom_use_user_ttys(apcupsd_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_ttys(apcupsd_t) optional_policy(` hostname_exec(apcupsd_t) ') optional_policy(` + shutdown_domtrans(apcupsd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` mta_send_mail(apcupsd_t) mta_system_content(apcupsd_tmp_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/apm.fc b/policy/modules/services/apm.fc index 0123777..f2f0c35 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/apm.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/apm.fc @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/usr/lib/systemd/system/apmd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:apmd_unit_file_t,s0) # # /usr diff --git a/policy/modules/services/apm.if b/policy/modules/services/apm.if index 1ea99b2..1bf05b5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/apm.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/apm.if @@ -52,7 +52,8 @@ interface(`apm_write_pipes',` type apmd_t; ') - allow $1 apmd_t:fifo_file write; + allow $1 apmd_t:fd use; + allow $1 apmd_t:fifo_file write_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -89,12 +90,12 @@ interface(`apm_append_log',` ') logging_search_logs($1) - allow $1 apmd_log_t:file append; + allow $1 apmd_log_t:file append_file_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## Connect to apmd over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to apmd over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -108,6 +109,28 @@ interface(`apm_stream_connect',` ') files_search_pids($1) - allow $1 apmd_var_run_t:sock_file write; - allow $1 apmd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + stream_connect_pattern($1, apmd_var_run_t, apmd_var_run_t, apmd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute apmd server in the apmd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`apmd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type apmd_t; + type apmd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 apmd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 apmd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, apmd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/apm.te b/policy/modules/services/apm.te index 1c8c27e..1fbabf7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/apm.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/apm.te @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(apm, 1.11.0) # # Declarations # + type apmd_t; type apmd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(apmd_t, apmd_exec_t) @@ -32,6 +33,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',` files_type(apmd_var_lib_t) ') +type apmd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(apmd_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # apm client Local policy @@ -45,7 +49,7 @@ dev_rw_apm_bios(apm_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(apm_t) -term_use_all_terms(apm_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(apm_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(apm_t) @@ -59,9 +63,10 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(apm_t) # mknod: controlling an orderly resume of PCMCIA requires creating device # nodes 254,{0,1,2} for some reason. allow apmd_t self:capability { sys_admin sys_nice sys_time kill mknod }; -dontaudit apmd_t self:capability { setuid dac_override dac_read_search sys_ptrace sys_tty_config }; +dontaudit apmd_t self:capability { setuid dac_override dac_read_search sys_tty_config }; allow apmd_t self:process { signal_perms getsession }; allow apmd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow apmd_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; allow apmd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow apmd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -81,6 +86,8 @@ kernel_rw_all_sysctls(apmd_t) kernel_read_system_state(apmd_t) kernel_write_proc_files(apmd_t) +dev_read_input(apmd_t) +dev_read_mouse(apmd_t) dev_read_realtime_clock(apmd_t) dev_read_urand(apmd_t) dev_rw_apm_bios(apmd_t) @@ -101,7 +108,6 @@ selinux_search_fs(apmd_t) corecmd_exec_all_executables(apmd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(apmd_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(apmd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(apmd_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(apmd_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_key_sockets(apmd_t) # Excessive? @@ -114,6 +120,8 @@ files_dontaudit_getattr_all_symlinks(apmd_t) # Excessive? files_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(apmd_t) # Excessive? files_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(apmd_t) # Excessive? +auth_use_nsswitch(apmd_t) + init_domtrans_script(apmd_t) init_rw_utmp(apmd_t) init_telinit(apmd_t) @@ -127,10 +135,8 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(apmd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(apmd_t) miscfiles_read_hwdata(apmd_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(apmd_t) -modutils_read_module_config(apmd_t) - seutil_dontaudit_read_config(apmd_t) +seutil_sigchld_newrole(apmd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(apmd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(apmd_t) @@ -142,9 +148,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` can_exec(apmd_t, apmd_var_run_t) - # ifconfig_exec_t needs to be run in its own domain for Red Hat optional_policy(` - sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(apmd_t) + fstools_domtrans(apmd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -155,6 +160,15 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` netutils_domtrans(apmd_t) ') + # ifconfig_exec_t needs to be run in its own domain for Red Hat + optional_policy(` + sssd_search_lib(apmd_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(apmd_t) + ') + ',` # for ifconfig which is run all the time kernel_dontaudit_search_sysctl(apmd_t) @@ -181,6 +195,12 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + devicekit_manage_pid_files(apmd_t) + devicekit_manage_log_files(apmd_t) + devicekit_relabel_log_files(apmd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(apmd_t) optional_policy(` @@ -201,7 +221,8 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(apmd_t) + modutils_domtrans_insmod(apmd_t) + modutils_read_module_config(apmd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -209,8 +230,9 @@ optional_policy(` pcmcia_domtrans_cardctl(apmd_t) ') + optional_policy(` - seutil_sigchld_newrole(apmd_t) + shutdown_domtrans(apmd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -219,10 +241,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(apmd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` vbetool_domtrans(apmd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.fc b/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.fc index a86a6c7..ab50afe 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.fc @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/arpwatch -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:arpwatch_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/arpwatch.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:arpwatch_unit_file_t,s0) + # # /usr # diff --git a/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.if b/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.if index c804110..06a516f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.if @@ -115,6 +115,29 @@ interface(`arpwatch_dontaudit_rw_packet_sockets',` ######################################## ## +## Execute arpwatch server in the arpwatch domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`arpwatch_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type arpwatch_t; + type arpwatch_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 arpwatch_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 arpwatch_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, arpwatch_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an arpwatch environment ## @@ -135,11 +158,16 @@ interface(`arpwatch_admin',` type arpwatch_t, arpwatch_tmp_t; type arpwatch_data_t, arpwatch_var_run_t; type arpwatch_initrc_exec_t; + type arpwatch_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 arpwatch_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 arpwatch_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, arpwatch_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 arpwatch_t:process ptrace; + ') + arpwatch_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 arpwatch_initrc_exec_t system_r; @@ -153,4 +181,8 @@ interface(`arpwatch_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, arpwatch_var_run_t) + + arpwatch_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, arpwatch_unit_file_t) + allow $1 arpwatch_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.te b/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.te index 804135f..613f77f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/arpwatch.te @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ files_tmp_file(arpwatch_tmp_t) type arpwatch_var_run_t; files_pid_file(arpwatch_var_run_t) +type arpwatch_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(arpwatch_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy @@ -34,6 +37,7 @@ allow arpwatch_t self:tcp_socket { connect create_stream_socket_perms }; allow arpwatch_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow arpwatch_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; allow arpwatch_t self:socket create_socket_perms; +allow arpwatch_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms;; manage_dirs_pattern(arpwatch_t, arpwatch_data_t, arpwatch_data_t) manage_files_pattern(arpwatch_t, arpwatch_data_t, arpwatch_data_t) @@ -47,8 +51,9 @@ manage_files_pattern(arpwatch_t, arpwatch_var_run_t, arpwatch_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(arpwatch_t, arpwatch_var_run_t, file) kernel_read_network_state(arpwatch_t) +# meminfo +kernel_read_system_state(arpwatch_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(arpwatch_t) -kernel_list_proc(arpwatch_t) kernel_read_proc_symlinks(arpwatch_t) kernel_request_load_module(arpwatch_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/asterisk.if b/policy/modules/services/asterisk.if index 8b8143e..a04a8af 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/asterisk.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/asterisk.if @@ -64,9 +64,13 @@ interface(`asterisk_admin',` type asterisk_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 asterisk_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 asterisk_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, asterisk_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 asterisk_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, asterisk_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 asterisk_initrc_exec_t system_r; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/asterisk.te b/policy/modules/services/asterisk.te index b3b0176..31e5976 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/asterisk.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/asterisk.te @@ -19,10 +19,11 @@ type asterisk_log_t; logging_log_file(asterisk_log_t) type asterisk_spool_t; -files_type(asterisk_spool_t) +files_spool_file(asterisk_spool_t) type asterisk_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(asterisk_tmp_t) +mta_system_content(asterisk_tmp_t) type asterisk_tmpfs_t; files_tmpfs_file(asterisk_tmpfs_t) @@ -39,8 +40,8 @@ files_pid_file(asterisk_var_run_t) # # dac_override for /var/run/asterisk -allow asterisk_t self:capability { dac_override setgid setuid sys_nice net_admin }; -dontaudit asterisk_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow asterisk_t self:capability { dac_override chown setgid setuid sys_nice net_admin }; +dontaudit asterisk_t self:capability { sys_module sys_tty_config }; allow asterisk_t self:process { getsched setsched signal_perms getcap setcap }; allow asterisk_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow asterisk_t self:sem create_sem_perms; @@ -76,11 +77,13 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(asterisk_t, asterisk_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file f manage_files_pattern(asterisk_t, asterisk_var_lib_t, asterisk_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(asterisk_t, asterisk_var_lib_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(asterisk_t, asterisk_var_run_t, asterisk_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(asterisk_t, asterisk_var_run_t, asterisk_var_run_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(asterisk_t, asterisk_var_run_t, asterisk_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(asterisk_t, asterisk_var_run_t, asterisk_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(asterisk_t, asterisk_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(asterisk_t, asterisk_var_run_t, { dir file }) +kernel_read_network_state(asterisk_t) kernel_read_system_state(asterisk_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(asterisk_t) kernel_request_load_module(asterisk_t) @@ -108,14 +111,19 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(asterisk_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_port(asterisk_t) corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_ports(asterisk_t) corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets(asterisk_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_festival_port(asterisk_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_jabber_client_port(asterisk_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_pktcable_port(asterisk_t) corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(asterisk_t) corenet_tcp_connect_snmp_port(asterisk_t) corenet_tcp_connect_sip_port(asterisk_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_jabber_client_port(asterisk_t) dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(asterisk_t) dev_read_sysfs(asterisk_t) dev_read_sound(asterisk_t) dev_write_sound(asterisk_t) +dev_read_rand(asterisk_t) dev_read_urand(asterisk_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(asterisk_t) @@ -125,6 +133,7 @@ files_search_spool(asterisk_t) # demo files installed in /usr/share/asterisk/sounds/demo-instruct.gsm # are labeled usr_t files_read_usr_files(asterisk_t) +files_dontaudit_search_home(asterisk_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(asterisk_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(asterisk_t) @@ -141,6 +150,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(asterisk_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(asterisk_t) optional_policy(` + alsa_read_rw_config(asterisk_t) +') + +optional_policy(` mysql_stream_connect(asterisk_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/audioentropy.fc b/policy/modules/services/audioentropy.fc deleted file mode 100644 index 001235e..0000000 --- a/policy/modules/services/audioentropy.fc +++ /dev/null @@ -1,6 +0,0 @@ -# -# /usr -# -/usr/sbin/audio-entropyd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:entropyd_exec_t,s0) - -/var/run/audio-entropyd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:entropyd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/audioentropy.if b/policy/modules/services/audioentropy.if deleted file mode 100644 index 67906f0..0000000 --- a/policy/modules/services/audioentropy.if +++ /dev/null @@ -1 +0,0 @@ -## Generate entropy from audio input diff --git a/policy/modules/services/audioentropy.te b/policy/modules/services/audioentropy.te deleted file mode 100644 index 2b348c7..0000000 --- a/policy/modules/services/audioentropy.te +++ /dev/null @@ -1,68 +0,0 @@ -policy_module(audioentropy, 1.6.0) - -######################################## -# -# Declarations -# - -type entropyd_t; -type entropyd_exec_t; -init_daemon_domain(entropyd_t, entropyd_exec_t) - -type entropyd_var_run_t; -files_pid_file(entropyd_var_run_t) - -######################################## -# -# Local policy -# - -allow entropyd_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock sys_admin }; -dontaudit entropyd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow entropyd_t self:process signal_perms; - -manage_files_pattern(entropyd_t, entropyd_var_run_t, entropyd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(entropyd_t, entropyd_var_run_t, file) - -kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(entropyd_t) -kernel_list_proc(entropyd_t) -kernel_read_proc_symlinks(entropyd_t) - -dev_read_sysfs(entropyd_t) -dev_read_urand(entropyd_t) -dev_write_urand(entropyd_t) -dev_read_rand(entropyd_t) -dev_write_rand(entropyd_t) -dev_read_sound(entropyd_t) -# set sound card parameters such as -# sample format, number of channels -# and sample rate. -dev_write_sound(entropyd_t) - -files_read_etc_files(entropyd_t) -files_read_usr_files(entropyd_t) - -fs_getattr_all_fs(entropyd_t) -fs_search_auto_mountpoints(entropyd_t) - -domain_use_interactive_fds(entropyd_t) - -logging_send_syslog_msg(entropyd_t) - -miscfiles_read_localization(entropyd_t) - -userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(entropyd_t) -userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(entropyd_t) - -optional_policy(` - alsa_read_lib(entropyd_t) - alsa_read_rw_config(entropyd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - seutil_sigchld_newrole(entropyd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - udev_read_db(entropyd_t) -') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/automount.fc b/policy/modules/services/automount.fc index f16ab68..e4178a4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/automount.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/automount.fc @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ /etc/apm/event\.d/autofs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:automount_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/autofs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:automount_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/autofs.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:automount_unit_file_t,s0) + # # /usr # diff --git a/policy/modules/services/automount.if b/policy/modules/services/automount.if index d80a16b..14c7b1e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/automount.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/automount.if @@ -29,7 +29,6 @@ interface(`automount_domtrans',` ## ## # -# interface(`automount_signal',` gen_require(` type automount_t; @@ -68,7 +67,8 @@ interface(`automount_read_state',` type automount_t; ') - read_files_pattern($1, automount_t, automount_t) + kernel_search_proc($1) + ps_process_pattern($1, automount_t) ') ######################################## @@ -104,6 +104,7 @@ interface(`automount_dontaudit_write_pipes',` type automount_t; ') + dontaudit $1 automount_t:fd use; dontaudit $1 automount_t:fifo_file write; ') @@ -123,7 +124,30 @@ interface(`automount_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs',` type automount_tmp_t; ') - dontaudit $1 automount_tmp_t:dir getattr; + dontaudit $1 automount_tmp_t:dir getattr_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute automount server in the automount domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`automount_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type automount_t; + type automount_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 automount_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 automount_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, automount_t) ') ######################################## @@ -147,11 +171,16 @@ interface(`automount_admin',` gen_require(` type automount_t, automount_lock_t, automount_tmp_t; type automount_var_run_t, automount_initrc_exec_t; + type automount_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 automount_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 automount_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, automount_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 automount_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, automount_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 automount_initrc_exec_t system_r; @@ -165,4 +194,8 @@ interface(`automount_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, automount_var_run_t) + + automount_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, automount_unit_file_t) + allow $1 automount_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/automount.te b/policy/modules/services/automount.te index 39799db..fe1653e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/automount.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/automount.te @@ -22,6 +22,9 @@ type automount_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(automount_tmp_t) files_mountpoint(automount_tmp_t) +type automount_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(automount_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy @@ -64,6 +67,7 @@ kernel_read_network_state(automount_t) kernel_list_proc(automount_t) kernel_dontaudit_search_xen_state(automount_t) +files_read_usr_files(automount_t) files_search_boot(automount_t) # Automount is slowly adding all mount functionality internally files_search_all(automount_t) @@ -143,9 +147,6 @@ logging_search_logs(automount_t) miscfiles_read_localization(automount_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs(automount_t) -# Run mount in the mount_t domain. -mount_domtrans(automount_t) -mount_signal(automount_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(automount_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(automount_t) @@ -155,6 +156,13 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + # Run mount in the mount_t domain. + mount_domtrans(automount_t) + mount_domtrans_showmount(automount_t) + mount_signal(automount_t) +') + +optional_policy(` fstools_domtrans(automount_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/avahi.fc b/policy/modules/services/avahi.fc index 7e36549..010b2bc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/avahi.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/avahi.fc @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/avahi.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:avahi_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/avahi.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:avahi_unit_file_t,s0) + /usr/sbin/avahi-daemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:avahi_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/avahi-dnsconfd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:avahi_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/avahi-autoipd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:avahi_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/avahi.if b/policy/modules/services/avahi.if index 61c74bc..5e6a564 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/avahi.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/avahi.if @@ -90,6 +90,7 @@ interface(`avahi_dbus_chat',` class dbus send_msg; ') + allow avahi_t $1:file read; allow $1 avahi_t:dbus send_msg; allow avahi_t $1:dbus send_msg; ') @@ -133,6 +134,29 @@ interface(`avahi_dontaudit_search_pid',` ######################################## ## +## Execute avahi server in the avahi domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`avahi_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type avahi_t; + type avahi_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 avahi_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 avahi_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, avahi_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an avahi environment ## @@ -151,11 +175,16 @@ interface(`avahi_dontaudit_search_pid',` interface(`avahi_admin',` gen_require(` type avahi_t, avahi_var_run_t, avahi_initrc_exec_t; + type avahi_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 avahi_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 avahi_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, avahi_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 avahi_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, avahi_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 avahi_initrc_exec_t system_r; @@ -163,4 +192,8 @@ interface(`avahi_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, avahi_var_run_t) + + avahi_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, avahi_unit_file_t) + allow $1 avahi_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/avahi.te b/policy/modules/services/avahi.te index a7a0e71..3b01eed 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/avahi.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/avahi.te @@ -17,6 +17,10 @@ files_pid_file(avahi_var_lib_t) type avahi_var_run_t; files_pid_file(avahi_var_run_t) +init_sock_file(avahi_var_run_t) + +type avahi_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(avahi_unit_file_t) ######################################## # @@ -46,6 +50,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(avahi_t, avahi_var_run_t, { dir file }) kernel_read_system_state(avahi_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(avahi_t) kernel_read_network_state(avahi_t) +kernel_request_load_module(avahi_t) corecmd_exec_bin(avahi_t) corecmd_exec_shell(avahi_t) @@ -104,6 +109,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + rpcbind_signull(avahi_t) +') + +optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(avahi_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bcfg2.fc b/policy/modules/services/bcfg2.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..53a6f26 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/bcfg2.fc @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bcfg2 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bcfg2_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/bcfg2-server.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bcfg2_unit_file_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/bcfg2-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bcfg2_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/bcfg2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bcfg2_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/run/bcfg2-server\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bcfg2_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bcfg2.if b/policy/modules/services/bcfg2.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ff58fd --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/bcfg2.if @@ -0,0 +1,185 @@ + +## policy for bcfg2 + +######################################## +## +## Transition to bcfg2. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`bcfg2_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type bcfg2_t, bcfg2_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, bcfg2_exec_t, bcfg2_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute bcfg2 server in the bcfg2 domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`bcfg2_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type bcfg2_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, bcfg2_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search bcfg2 lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`bcfg2_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type bcfg2_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 bcfg2_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read bcfg2 lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`bcfg2_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type bcfg2_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, bcfg2_var_lib_t, bcfg2_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage bcfg2 lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`bcfg2_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type bcfg2_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, bcfg2_var_lib_t, bcfg2_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage bcfg2 lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`bcfg2_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type bcfg2_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, bcfg2_var_lib_t, bcfg2_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute bcfg2 server in the bcfg2 domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`bcfg2_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type bcfg2_t; + type bcfg2_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + allow $1 bcfg2_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 bcfg2_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, bcfg2_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an bcfg2 environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`bcfg2_admin',` + gen_require(` + type bcfg2_t; + type bcfg2_initrc_exec_t; + type bcfg2_var_lib_t; + type bcfg2_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 bcfg2_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, bcfg2_t) + + bcfg2_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 bcfg2_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, bcfg2_var_lib_t) + + bcfg2_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, bcfg2_unit_file_t) + allow $1 bcfg2_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bcfg2.te b/policy/modules/services/bcfg2.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7c301dc --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/bcfg2.te @@ -0,0 +1,55 @@ +policy_module(bcfg2, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type bcfg2_t; +type bcfg2_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(bcfg2_t, bcfg2_exec_t) + +type bcfg2_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(bcfg2_initrc_exec_t) + +type bcfg2_var_lib_t; +files_type(bcfg2_var_lib_t) + +type bcfg2_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(bcfg2_unit_file_t) + +type bcfg2_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(bcfg2_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# bcfg2 local policy +# + +allow bcfg2_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow bcfg2_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow bcfg2_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; + +manage_dirs_pattern(bcfg2_t, bcfg2_var_lib_t, bcfg2_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(bcfg2_t, bcfg2_var_lib_t, bcfg2_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(bcfg2_t, bcfg2_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +manage_files_pattern(bcfg2_t, bcfg2_var_run_t,bcfg2_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(bcfg2_t,bcfg2_var_run_t, { file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(bcfg2_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(bcfg2_t) + +dev_read_urand(bcfg2_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(bcfg2_t) + +files_read_etc_files(bcfg2_t) +files_read_usr_files(bcfg2_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(bcfg2_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(bcfg2_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(bcfg2_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bind.fc b/policy/modules/services/bind.fc index 59aa54f..b01072c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bind.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/bind.fc @@ -4,6 +4,11 @@ /etc/rndc.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:named_conf_t,s0) /etc/rndc\.key -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnssec_t,s0) /etc/unbound(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:named_conf_t,s0) +/etc/unbound/.*\.key -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnssec_t,s0) +/etc/dnssec-trigger/dnssec_trigger_server\.key -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnssec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/unbound.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:named_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/named.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:named_unit_file_t,s0) /usr/sbin/lwresd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:named_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/named -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:named_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bind.if b/policy/modules/services/bind.if index 44a1e3d..9b50c13 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bind.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/bind.if @@ -20,6 +20,29 @@ interface(`bind_initrc_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute bind server in the bind domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`bind_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type named_unit_file_t; + type named_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 named_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 named_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, named_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute ndc in the ndc domain. ## ## @@ -186,7 +209,7 @@ interface(`bind_write_config',` ') write_files_pattern($1, named_conf_t, named_conf_t) - allow $1 named_conf_t:file setattr; + allow $1 named_conf_t:file setattr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -210,6 +233,25 @@ interface(`bind_manage_config_dirs',` ######################################## ## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## BIND configuration files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`bind_manage_config',` + gen_require(` + type named_conf_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, named_conf_t, named_conf_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Search the BIND cache directory. ## ## @@ -266,7 +308,7 @@ interface(`bind_setattr_pid_dirs',` type named_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 named_var_run_t:dir setattr; + allow $1 named_var_run_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -284,7 +326,7 @@ interface(`bind_setattr_zone_dirs',` type named_zone_t; ') - allow $1 named_zone_t:dir setattr; + allow $1 named_zone_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -308,6 +350,27 @@ interface(`bind_read_zone',` ######################################## ## +## Read BIND zone files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`bind_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type named_zone_t; + type named_log_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + allow $1 named_zone_t:dir search_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, named_log_t, named_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Manage BIND zone files. ## ## @@ -359,18 +422,26 @@ interface(`bind_udp_chat_named',` interface(`bind_admin',` gen_require(` type named_t, named_tmp_t, named_log_t; - type named_conf_t, named_var_lib_t, named_var_run_t; - type named_cache_t, named_zone_t; - type dnssec_t, ndc_t; - type named_initrc_exec_t; + type named_conf_t, named_var_run_t, named_cache_t; + type named_zone_t, named_initrc_exec_t; + type dnssec_t, ndc_t, named_keytab_t; + type named_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 named_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 named_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, named_t) - allow $1 ndc_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 named_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 ndc_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, ndc_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ndc_t:process ptrace; + ') + bind_run_ndc($1, $2) init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, named_initrc_exec_t) @@ -391,9 +462,12 @@ interface(`bind_admin',` admin_pattern($1, named_zone_t) admin_pattern($1, dnssec_t) - files_list_var_lib($1) - admin_pattern($1, named_var_lib_t) + admin_pattern($1, named_keytab_t) files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, named_var_run_t) + + admin_pattern($1, named_unit_file_t) + bind_systemctl($1) + allow $1 named_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bind.te b/policy/modules/services/bind.te index 4deca04..7859fa1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bind.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/bind.te @@ -6,16 +6,24 @@ policy_module(bind, 1.11.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow BIND to write the master zone files. -## Generally this is used for dynamic DNS or zone transfers. -##

    +##

    +## Allow BIND to bind apache port. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(named_bind_http_port, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow BIND to write the master zone files. +## Generally this is used for dynamic DNS or zone transfers. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(named_write_master_zones, false) # for DNSSEC key files type dnssec_t; files_security_file(dnssec_t) +files_mountpoint(dnssec_t) type named_t; type named_exec_t; @@ -27,7 +35,7 @@ init_system_domain(named_t, named_checkconf_exec_t) # A type for configuration files of named. type named_conf_t; -files_type(named_conf_t) +files_config_file(named_conf_t) files_mountpoint(named_conf_t) # for secondary zone files @@ -37,6 +45,9 @@ files_type(named_cache_t) type named_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(named_initrc_exec_t) +type named_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(named_unit_file_t) + type named_log_t; logging_log_file(named_log_t) @@ -89,9 +100,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(named_t, named_tmp_t, named_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(named_t, named_tmp_t, named_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(named_t, named_tmp_t, { file dir }) +manage_dirs_pattern(named_t, named_var_run_t, named_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(named_t, named_var_run_t, named_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(named_t, named_var_run_t, named_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(named_t, named_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(named_t, named_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir }) # read zone files allow named_t named_zone_t:dir list_dir_perms; @@ -147,6 +159,10 @@ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(named_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(named_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(named_t) +tunable_policy(`named_bind_http_port',` + corenet_tcp_bind_http_port(named_t) +') + tunable_policy(`named_write_master_zones',` manage_dirs_pattern(named_t, named_zone_t, named_zone_t) manage_files_pattern(named_t, named_zone_t, named_zone_t) @@ -154,6 +170,12 @@ tunable_policy(`named_write_master_zones',` ') optional_policy(` + # needed by FreeIPA with DNS support + dirsrv_stream_connect(named_t) + ldap_stream_connect(named_t) +') + +optional_policy(` init_dbus_chat_script(named_t) sysnet_dbus_chat_dhcpc(named_t) @@ -198,18 +220,18 @@ allow ndc_t self:process { fork signal_perms }; allow ndc_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow ndc_t self:unix_stream_socket { connect create_stream_socket_perms }; allow ndc_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; -allow ndc_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; allow ndc_t dnssec_t:file read_file_perms; -allow ndc_t dnssec_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow ndc_t dnssec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; stream_connect_pattern(ndc_t, named_var_run_t, named_var_run_t, named_t) allow ndc_t named_conf_t:file read_file_perms; -allow ndc_t named_conf_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow ndc_t named_conf_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; allow ndc_t named_zone_t:dir search_dir_perms; +kernel_read_system_state(ndc_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ndc_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(ndc_t) @@ -228,6 +250,8 @@ files_search_pids(ndc_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(ndc_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(ndc_t) + init_use_fds(ndc_t) init_use_script_ptys(ndc_t) @@ -235,24 +259,13 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(ndc_t) miscfiles_read_localization(ndc_t) -sysnet_read_config(ndc_t) -sysnet_dns_name_resolve(ndc_t) - -userdom_use_user_terminals(ndc_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ndc_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(ndc_t) # for /etc/rndc.key ifdef(`distro_redhat',` - allow ndc_t named_conf_t:dir search; -') - -optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(ndc_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(ndc_t) + allow ndc_t named_conf_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.fc b/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.fc index 0197980..909ce04 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.fc @@ -1,6 +1,13 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/bitlbee -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bitlbee_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/bitlbee(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bitlbee_conf_t,s0) +/usr/bin/bip -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bitlbee_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/bitlbee -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bitlbee_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/bitlbee(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bitlbee_var_t,s0) + +/var/log/bip(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bitlbee_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/bitlbee\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bitlbee_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/bitlbee\.sock -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:bitlbee_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/bip(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:bitlbee_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.if b/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.if index de0bd67..1df2048 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.if @@ -43,9 +43,13 @@ interface(`bitlbee_admin',` type bitlbee_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 bitlbee_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 bitlbee_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, bitlbee_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 bitlbee_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, bitlbee_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 bitlbee_initrc_exec_t system_r; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.te b/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.te index f4e7ad3..c323651 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/bitlbee.te @@ -22,29 +22,47 @@ files_tmp_file(bitlbee_tmp_t) type bitlbee_var_t; files_type(bitlbee_var_t) +type bitlbee_log_t; +logging_log_file(bitlbee_log_t) + +type bitlbee_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(bitlbee_var_run_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy # -allow bitlbee_t self:capability { setgid setuid }; -allow bitlbee_t self:process signal; +allow bitlbee_t self:capability { dac_override kill setgid setuid sys_nice }; +allow bitlbee_t self:process { setsched signal }; + +allow bitlbee_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow bitlbee_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow bitlbee_t self:tcp_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connected_stream_socket_perms }; allow bitlbee_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -allow bitlbee_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow bitlbee_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; bitlbee_read_config(bitlbee_t) # tmp files manage_files_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_tmp_t, bitlbee_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_tmp_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_tmp_t, bitlbee_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_tmp_t, { dir file }) # user account information is read and edited at runtime; give the usual # r/w access to bitlbee_var_t manage_files_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_var_t, bitlbee_var_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_var_t, file) +# log files +manage_dirs_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_log_t, bitlbee_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_log_t, bitlbee_log_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_var_run_t, bitlbee_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_var_run_t, bitlbee_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_var_run_t, bitlbee_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(bitlbee_t, bitlbee_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) + kernel_read_system_state(bitlbee_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(bitlbee_t) @@ -52,6 +70,9 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(bitlbee_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(bitlbee_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(bitlbee_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(bitlbee_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(bitlbee_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_gatekeeper_port(bitlbee_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_ircd_port(bitlbee_t) # Allow bitlbee to connect to jabber servers corenet_tcp_connect_jabber_client_port(bitlbee_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_jabber_client_port(bitlbee_t) @@ -69,6 +90,11 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(bitlbee_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(bitlbee_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(bitlbee_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(bitlbee_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_ircd_port(bitlbee_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ircd_port(bitlbee_t) +corenet_sendrecv_ircd_server_packets(bitlbee_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_interwise_port(bitlbee_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_interwise_port(bitlbee_t) dev_read_rand(bitlbee_t) dev_read_urand(bitlbee_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/blueman.fc b/policy/modules/services/blueman.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..98ba16a --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/blueman.fc @@ -0,0 +1,4 @@ + +/usr/libexec/blueman-mechanism -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:blueman_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/blueman(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:blueman_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/blueman.if b/policy/modules/services/blueman.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a66b2ff --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/blueman.if @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +## policy for blueman + +######################################## +## +## Transition to blueman. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`blueman_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type blueman_t, blueman_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, blueman_exec_t, blueman_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## blueman over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`blueman_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type blueman_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 blueman_t:dbus send_msg; + allow blueman_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## Search blueman lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`blueman_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type blueman_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 blueman_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read blueman lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`blueman_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type blueman_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, blueman_var_lib_t, blueman_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## blueman lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`blueman_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type blueman_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, blueman_var_lib_t, blueman_var_lib_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/blueman.te b/policy/modules/services/blueman.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6ed024b --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/blueman.te @@ -0,0 +1,56 @@ +policy_module(blueman, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type blueman_t; +type blueman_exec_t; +dbus_system_domain(blueman_t, blueman_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(blueman_t, blueman_exec_t) + +type blueman_var_lib_t; +files_type(blueman_var_lib_t) + +######################################## +# +# blueman local policy +# +allow blueman_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(blueman_t, blueman_var_lib_t, blueman_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(blueman_t, blueman_var_lib_t, blueman_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(blueman_t, blueman_var_lib_t, { file dir }) + +kernel_read_system_state(blueman_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(blueman_t) + +dev_read_rand(blueman_t) +dev_read_urand(blueman_t) +dev_rw_wireless(blueman_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(blueman_t) + +files_read_etc_files(blueman_t) +files_read_usr_files(blueman_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(blueman_t) +auth_read_passwd(blueman_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(blueman_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(blueman_t) + +optional_policy(` + avahi_domtrans(blueman_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_search_gconf(blueman_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_read_state_xdm(blueman_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.fc b/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.fc index dc687e6..e0255eb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.fc @@ -7,6 +7,8 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dund -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bluetooth_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pand -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bluetooth_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/bluetooth.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:bluetooth_unit_file_t,s0) + # # /usr # diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.if b/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.if index 3e45431..2d28039 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.if @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ## User domain for the role ##     ## +## # interface(`bluetooth_role',` gen_require(` @@ -27,7 +28,11 @@ interface(`bluetooth_role',` # allow ps to show cdrecord and allow the user to kill it ps_process_pattern($2, bluetooth_helper_t) - allow $2 bluetooth_helper_t:process signal; + allow $2 bluetooth_helper_t:process signal_perms; + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 bluetooth_helper_t:process ptrace; + ') manage_dirs_pattern($2, bluetooth_helper_tmp_t, bluetooth_helper_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern($2, bluetooth_helper_tmp_t, bluetooth_helper_tmp_t) @@ -35,6 +40,8 @@ interface(`bluetooth_role',` manage_dirs_pattern($2, bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t, bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t) manage_files_pattern($2, bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t, bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t) + + bluetooth_stream_connect($2) ') ##################################### @@ -91,7 +98,7 @@ interface(`bluetooth_read_config',` type bluetooth_conf_t; ') - allow $1 bluetooth_conf_t:file { getattr read ioctl }; + allow $1 bluetooth_conf_t:file read_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -117,6 +124,27 @@ interface(`bluetooth_dbus_chat',` ######################################## ## +## dontaudit Send and receive messages from +## bluetooth over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`bluetooth_dontaudit_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type bluetooth_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + dontaudit $1 bluetooth_t:dbus send_msg; + dontaudit bluetooth_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute bluetooth_helper in the bluetooth_helper domain. (Deprecated) ## ## @@ -157,7 +185,7 @@ interface(`bluetooth_run_helper',` ######################################## ## -## Read bluetooth helper state files. +## Do not audit attempts to read bluetooth helper state files. ## ## ## @@ -170,8 +198,31 @@ interface(`bluetooth_dontaudit_read_helper_state',` type bluetooth_helper_t; ') - dontaudit $1 bluetooth_helper_t:dir search; - dontaudit $1 bluetooth_helper_t:file { read getattr }; + dontaudit $1 bluetooth_helper_t:dir search_dir_perms; + dontaudit $1 bluetooth_helper_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute bluetooth server in the bluetooth domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`bluetooth_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type bluetooth_t; + type bluetooth_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 bluetooth_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 bluetooth_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, bluetooth_t) ') ######################################## @@ -193,23 +244,24 @@ interface(`bluetooth_dontaudit_read_helper_state',` # interface(`bluetooth_admin',` gen_require(` - type bluetooth_t, bluetooth_tmp_t, bluetooth_lock_t; - type bluetooth_spool_t, bluetooth_var_lib_t, bluetooth_var_run_t; + type bluetooth_t, bluetooth_lock_t; + type bluetooth_var_lib_t, bluetooth_var_run_t, bluetooth_initrc_exec_t; type bluetooth_conf_t, bluetooth_conf_rw_t; - type bluetooth_initrc_exec_t; + type bluetooth_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 bluetooth_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 bluetooth_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, bluetooth_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 bluetooth_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, bluetooth_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 bluetooth_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - files_list_tmp($1) - admin_pattern($1, bluetooth_tmp_t) - files_list_var($1) admin_pattern($1, bluetooth_lock_t) @@ -217,12 +269,13 @@ interface(`bluetooth_admin',` admin_pattern($1, bluetooth_conf_t) admin_pattern($1, bluetooth_conf_rw_t) - files_list_spool($1) - admin_pattern($1, bluetooth_spool_t) - files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, bluetooth_var_lib_t) files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, bluetooth_var_run_t) + + bluetooth_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, bluetooth_unit_file_t) + allow $1 bluetooth_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.te b/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.te index 215b86b..d7c4d98 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/bluetooth.te @@ -4,12 +4,13 @@ policy_module(bluetooth, 3.3.0) # # Declarations # + type bluetooth_t; type bluetooth_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_exec_t) type bluetooth_conf_t; -files_type(bluetooth_conf_t) +files_config_file(bluetooth_conf_t) type bluetooth_conf_rw_t; files_type(bluetooth_conf_rw_t) @@ -39,15 +40,15 @@ init_script_file(bluetooth_initrc_exec_t) type bluetooth_lock_t; files_lock_file(bluetooth_lock_t) -type bluetooth_tmp_t; -files_tmp_file(bluetooth_tmp_t) - type bluetooth_var_lib_t; files_type(bluetooth_var_lib_t) type bluetooth_var_run_t; files_pid_file(bluetooth_var_run_t) +type bluetooth_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(bluetooth_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # Bluetooth services local policy @@ -80,10 +81,6 @@ can_exec(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_helper_exec_t) allow bluetooth_t bluetooth_lock_t:file manage_file_perms; files_lock_filetrans(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_lock_t, file) -manage_dirs_pattern(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_tmp_t, bluetooth_tmp_t) -manage_files_pattern(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_tmp_t, bluetooth_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_tmp_t, { file dir }) - manage_dirs_pattern(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_var_lib_t, bluetooth_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_var_lib_t, bluetooth_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(bluetooth_t, bluetooth_var_lib_t, { dir file } ) @@ -147,6 +144,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(bluetooth_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(bluetooth_t) optional_policy(` + devicekit_dbus_chat_power(bluetooth_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(bluetooth_t) dbus_connect_system_bus(bluetooth_t) @@ -190,7 +191,6 @@ allow bluetooth_helper_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow bluetooth_helper_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow bluetooth_helper_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; allow bluetooth_helper_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; -allow bluetooth_helper_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; allow bluetooth_helper_t bluetooth_t:socket { read write }; @@ -220,6 +220,8 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(bluetooth_helper_t) files_read_usr_files(bluetooth_helper_t) files_dontaudit_list_default(bluetooth_helper_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(bluetooth_helper_t) + locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(bluetooth_helper_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(bluetooth_helper_t) @@ -236,9 +238,5 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(bluetooth_helper_t) -') - -optional_policy(` xserver_user_x_domain_template(bluetooth_helper, bluetooth_helper_t, bluetooth_helper_tmpfs_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/boinc.fc b/policy/modules/services/boinc.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c095160 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/boinc.fc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/boinc-client -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:boinc_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/boinc_client -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:boinc_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/boinc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:boinc_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/boinc/projects(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:boinc_project_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/boinc/slots(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:boinc_project_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/boinc.if b/policy/modules/services/boinc.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9fe3f9e --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/boinc.if @@ -0,0 +1,154 @@ +## policy for boinc + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run boinc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`boinc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type boinc_t, boinc_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, boinc_exec_t, boinc_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute boinc server in the boinc domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`boinc_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type boinc_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, boinc_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search boinc lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`boinc_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type boinc_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 boinc_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read boinc lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`boinc_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type boinc_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## boinc lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`boinc_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type boinc_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage boinc var_lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`boinc_manage_var_lib',` + gen_require(` + type boinc_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an boinc environment. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`boinc_admin',` + gen_require(` + type boinc_t, boinc_initrc_exec_t, boinc_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 boinc_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, boinc_t) + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 boic_t:process ptrace; + ') + + boinc_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 boinc_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_list_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, boinc_var_lib_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/boinc.te b/policy/modules/services/boinc.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b1c752c --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/boinc.te @@ -0,0 +1,190 @@ +policy_module(boinc, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +attribute boinc_domain; + +type boinc_t, boinc_domain; +type boinc_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(boinc_t, boinc_exec_t) + +type boinc_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(boinc_initrc_exec_t) + +type boinc_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(boinc_tmp_t) + +type boinc_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(boinc_tmpfs_t) + +type boinc_var_lib_t; +files_type(boinc_var_lib_t) + +type boinc_project_t; +domain_type(boinc_project_t) +role system_r types boinc_project_t; + +type boinc_project_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(boinc_project_tmp_t) + +type boinc_project_var_lib_t; +files_type(boinc_project_var_lib_t) + +####################################### +# +# boinc domain local policy +# + +allow boinc_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow boinc_domain self:sem create_sem_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(boinc_domain, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(boinc_domain, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t) + +# needs read /proc/interrupts +kernel_read_system_state(boinc_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(boinc_domain) +corecmd_exec_shell(boinc_domain) + +dev_read_rand(boinc_domain) +dev_read_urand(boinc_domain) +dev_read_sysfs(boinc_domain) +dev_rw_xserver_misc(boinc_domain) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(boinc_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(boinc_domain) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(boinc_domain) +files_read_usr_files(boinc_domain) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(boinc_domain) + +miscfiles_read_fonts(boinc_domain) +miscfiles_read_localization(boinc_domain) + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(boinc_domain) +') + +######################################## +# +# boinc local policy +# + +allow boinc_t self:process { setsched setpgid signull sigkill }; + +allow boinc_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow boinc_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow boinc_t self:shm create_shm_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_tmp_t, boinc_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_tmp_t, boinc_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(boinc_t, boinc_tmp_t, { dir file }) + +manage_files_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_tmpfs_t, boinc_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(boinc_t, boinc_tmpfs_t, file) + +exec_files_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_var_lib_t) +# this should be created by default by boinc +# we need this label for transition to boinc_project_t +# other boinc lib files will end up with boinc_var_lib_t +filetrans_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, dir, "slots") +filetrans_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_var_lib_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, dir, "projects") + +manage_dirs_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t) + +kernel_search_vm_sysctl(boinc_t) + +files_getattr_all_dirs(boinc_t) +files_getattr_all_files(boinc_t) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(boinc_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(boinc_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(boinc_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(boinc_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(boinc_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(boinc_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(boinc_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(boinc_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(boinc_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(boinc_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_boinc_port(boinc_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_boinc_client_ctrl_port(boinc_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_boinc_port(boinc_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(boinc_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(boinc_t) + +files_dontaudit_getattr_boot_dirs(boinc_t) + +auth_read_passwd(boinc_t) + +term_getattr_all_ptys(boinc_t) +term_getattr_unallocated_ttys(boinc_t) + +init_read_utmp(boinc_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(boinc_t) + +optional_policy(` + mta_send_mail(boinc_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# boinc-projects local policy +# + +allow boinc_project_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; + +domtrans_pattern(boinc_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, boinc_project_t) +allow boinc_t boinc_project_t:process sigkill; +allow boinc_t boinc_project_t:process noatsecure; + +allow boinc_project_t self:process { ptrace setcap getcap setpgid setsched signal signull sigkill sigstop }; +allow boinc_project_t self:process { execmem execstack }; + +manage_dirs_pattern(boinc_project_t, boinc_project_tmp_t, boinc_project_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(boinc_project_t, boinc_project_tmp_t, boinc_project_tmp_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(boinc_project_t, boinc_project_tmp_t, boinc_project_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(boinc_project_t, boinc_project_tmp_t, { dir file sock_file}) + +allow boinc_project_t boinc_project_var_lib_t:file entrypoint; +exec_files_pattern(boinc_project_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(boinc_project_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(boinc_project_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(boinc_project_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, dir, "projects") +files_var_lib_filetrans(boinc_project_t, boinc_project_var_lib_t, dir, "slots" ) + +allow boinc_project_t boinc_project_var_lib_t:file execmod; + +allow boinc_project_t boinc_t:shm rw_shm_perms; +allow boinc_project_t boinc_tmpfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(boinc_project_t) +kernel_search_vm_sysctl(boinc_project_t) +kernel_read_network_state(boinc_project_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_boinc_port(boinc_project_t) + +files_dontaudit_search_home(boinc_project_t) + +# needed by java +fs_read_hugetlbfs_files(boinc_project_t) + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_gconf_config(boinc_project_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + java_exec(boinc_project_t) +') + +# until solution for VirtualBox, java .. +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(boinc_project_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.fc b/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.fc index 8c84063..c8bfb68 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.fc @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ + /usr/share/bugzilla(/.*)? -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_bugzilla_content_t,s0) /usr/share/bugzilla(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.if b/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.if index de89d0f..954e726 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.if @@ -58,13 +58,20 @@ interface(`bugzilla_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets',` interface(`bugzilla_admin',` gen_require(` type httpd_bugzilla_script_t, httpd_bugzilla_content_t, httpd_bugzilla_ra_content_t; - type httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t, httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t; - type httpd_bugzilla_htaccess_t; - ') + type httpd_bugzilla_rw_content_t, httpd_bugzilla_script_exec_t; + type httpd_bugzilla_htaccess_t, httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t; + ') - allow $1 httpd_bugzilla_script_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 httpd_bugzilla_script_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, httpd_bugzilla_script_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 httpd_bugzilla_script_t:process ptrace; + ') + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t) + files_list_var_lib(httpd_bugzilla_script_t) apache_list_sys_content($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.te b/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.te index 048abbf..7368f57 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/bugzilla.te @@ -7,6 +7,9 @@ policy_module(bugzilla, 1.0.0) apache_content_template(bugzilla) +type httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t) + ######################################## # # bugzilla local policy @@ -31,6 +34,10 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(httpd_bugzilla_script_t) corenet_sendrecv_postgresql_client_packets(httpd_bugzilla_script_t) corenet_sendrecv_mysqld_client_packets(httpd_bugzilla_script_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_bugzilla_script_t, httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t, httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(httpd_bugzilla_script_t, httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t, httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_bugzilla_script_t, httpd_bugzilla_tmp_t, { file dir }) + files_search_var_lib(httpd_bugzilla_script_t) sysnet_read_config(httpd_bugzilla_script_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cachefilesd.fc b/policy/modules/services/cachefilesd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a561ce0 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/cachefilesd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,34 @@ +############################################################################### +# +# Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +# Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) +# Karl MacMillan (kmacmill@redhat.com) +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License +# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version +# 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. +# +############################################################################### + +# +# Define the contexts to be assigned to various files and directories of +# importance to the CacheFiles kernel module and userspace management daemon. +# + +# cachefilesd executable will have: +# label: system_u:object_r:cachefilesd_exec_t +# MLS sensitivity: s0 +# MCS categories: + +/dev/cachefiles -c gen_context(system_u:object_r:cachefiles_dev_t,s0) + +/sbin/cachefilesd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cachefilesd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/cachefilesd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cachefilesd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/cache/fscache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cachefiles_var_t,s0) + +/var/fscache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cachefiles_var_t,s0) + +/var/run/cachefilesd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cachefiles_var_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cachefilesd.if b/policy/modules/services/cachefilesd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3b41945 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/cachefilesd.if @@ -0,0 +1,35 @@ +############################################################################### +# +# Copyright (C) 2006 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +# Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) +# Karl MacMillan (kmacmill@redhat.com) +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License +# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version +# 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. +# +############################################################################### + +# +# Define the policy interface for the CacheFiles userspace management daemon. +# +## policy for cachefilesd + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run cachefilesd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`cachefilesd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type cachefilesd_t, cachefilesd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, cachefilesd_exec_t, cachefilesd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cachefilesd.te b/policy/modules/services/cachefilesd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7d2a5b --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/cachefilesd.te @@ -0,0 +1,145 @@ +############################################################################### +# +# Copyright (C) 2006, 2010 Red Hat, Inc. All Rights Reserved. +# Written by David Howells (dhowells@redhat.com) +# Karl MacMillan (kmacmill@redhat.com) +# +# This program is free software; you can redistribute it and/or +# modify it under the terms of the GNU General Public License +# as published by the Free Software Foundation; either version +# 2 of the License, or (at your option) any later version. +# +############################################################################### + +# +# This security policy governs access by the CacheFiles kernel module and +# userspace management daemon to the files and directories in the on-disk +# cache, on behalf of the processes accessing the cache through a network +# filesystem such as NFS +# +policy_module(cachefilesd, 1.0.17) + +############################################################################### +# +# Declarations +# + +# +# Files in the cache are created by the cachefiles module with security ID +# cachefiles_var_t +# +type cachefiles_var_t; +files_type(cachefiles_var_t) + +# +# The /dev/cachefiles character device has security ID cachefiles_dev_t +# +type cachefiles_dev_t; +dev_node(cachefiles_dev_t) + +# +# The cachefilesd daemon normally runs with security ID cachefilesd_t +# +type cachefilesd_t; +type cachefilesd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(cachefilesd_t, cachefilesd_exec_t) + +# +# The cachefilesd daemon pid file context +# +type cachefilesd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(cachefilesd_var_run_t) + +# +# The CacheFiles kernel module causes processes accessing the cache files to do +# so acting as security ID cachefiles_kernel_t +# +type cachefiles_kernel_t; +domain_type(cachefiles_kernel_t) +domain_obj_id_change_exemption(cachefiles_kernel_t) +role system_r types cachefiles_kernel_t; + +############################################################################### +# +# Permit RPM to deal with files in the cache +# +optional_policy(` + rpm_use_script_fds(cachefilesd_t) +') + +############################################################################### +# +# cachefilesd local policy +# +# These define what cachefilesd is permitted to do. This doesn't include very +# much: startup stuff, logging, pid file, scanning the cache superstructure and +# deleting files from the cache. It is not permitted to read/write files in +# the cache. +# +# Check in /usr/share/selinux/devel/include/ for macros to use instead of allow +# rules. +# +allow cachefilesd_t self:capability { setuid setgid sys_admin dac_override }; + +# Allow manipulation of pid file +allow cachefilesd_t cachefilesd_var_run_t:file create_file_perms; +manage_files_pattern(cachefilesd_t, cachefilesd_var_run_t, cachefilesd_var_run_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(cachefilesd_t, cachefilesd_var_run_t, cachefilesd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(cachefilesd_t, cachefilesd_var_run_t, file) +files_create_as_is_all_files(cachefilesd_t) + +# Allow access to cachefiles device file +allow cachefilesd_t cachefiles_dev_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; + +# Allow access to cache superstructure +allow cachefilesd_t cachefiles_var_t:dir { rw_dir_perms delete_dir_perms }; +allow cachefilesd_t cachefiles_var_t:file { rename delete_file_perms }; + +# Permit statfs on the backing filesystem +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(cachefilesd_t) + +# Basic access +files_read_etc_files(cachefilesd_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(cachefilesd_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(cachefilesd_t) +init_dontaudit_use_script_ptys(cachefilesd_t) +term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys(cachefilesd_t) +term_dontaudit_getattr_unallocated_ttys(cachefilesd_t) + +############################################################################### +# +# When cachefilesd invokes the kernel module to begin caching, it has to tell +# the kernel module the security context in which it should act, and this +# policy has to approve that. +# +# There are two parts to this: +# +# (1) the security context used by the module to access files in the cache, +# as set by the 'secctx' command in /etc/cachefilesd.conf, and +# +allow cachefilesd_t cachefiles_kernel_t:kernel_service { use_as_override }; + +# +# (2) the label that will be assigned to new files and directories created in +# the cache by the module, which will be the same as the label on the +# directory pointed to by the 'dir' command. +# +allow cachefilesd_t cachefiles_var_t:kernel_service { create_files_as }; + +############################################################################### +# +# cachefiles kernel module local policy +# +# This governs what the kernel module is allowed to do the contents of the +# cache. +# +allow cachefiles_kernel_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search }; + +manage_dirs_pattern(cachefiles_kernel_t, cachefiles_var_t, cachefiles_var_t) +manage_files_pattern(cachefiles_kernel_t, cachefiles_var_t, cachefiles_var_t) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(cachefiles_kernel_t) + +dev_search_sysfs(cachefiles_kernel_t) + +init_sigchld_script(cachefiles_kernel_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/callweaver.fc b/policy/modules/services/callweaver.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e15c63 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/callweaver.fc @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/callweaver -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:callweaver_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/callweaver -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:callweaver_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/callweaver(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:callweaver_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/callweaver(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:callweaver_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/callweaver(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:callweaver_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/spool/callweaver(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:callweaver_spool_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/callweaver.if b/policy/modules/services/callweaver.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e07d3b8 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/callweaver.if @@ -0,0 +1,362 @@ +## Open source PBX project. + +######################################## +## +## Execute callweaver in the +## callweaver domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_t, callweaver_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, callweaver_exec_t, callweaver_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute callweaver in the +## callers domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_exec',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + can_exec($1, callweaver_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute callweaver in the +## callweaver domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, callweaver_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read callweaver log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, callweaver_log_t, callweaver_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to callweaver log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, callweaver_log_t, callweaver_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage callweaver log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, callweaver_log_t, callweaver_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, callweaver_log_t, callweaver_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, callweaver_log_t, callweaver_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search callweaver lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 callweaver_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read callweaver lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, callweaver_var_lib_t, callweaver_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage callweaver lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, callweaver_var_lib_t, callweaver_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage callweaver lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, callweaver_var_lib_t, callweaver_var_lib_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read callweaver PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 callweaver_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to callweaver over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_t, callweaver_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, callweaver_var_run_t, callweaver_var_run_t, callweaver_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search callweaver spool directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_search_spool',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_spool_t; + ') + + allow $1 callweaver_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_spool($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read callweaver spool files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_read_spool_files',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + read_files_pattern($1, callweaver_spool_t, callweaver_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage callweaver spool files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_manage_spool_files',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, callweaver_spool_t, callweaver_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage callweaver spool dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_manage_spool_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, callweaver_spool_t, callweaver_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an callweaver environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`callweaver_admin',` + gen_require(` + type callweaver_t; + type callweaver_initrc_exec_t; + type callweaver_log_t; + type callweaver_var_lib_t; + type callweaver_var_run_t; + type callweaver_spool_t; + ') + + allow $1 callweaver_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, callweaver_t) + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 callweaver_t:process ptrace; + ') + + callweaver_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 callweaver_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, callweaver_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, callweaver_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, callweaver_var_run_t) + + files_search_spool($1) + admin_pattern($1, callweaver_spool_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/callweaver.te b/policy/modules/services/callweaver.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4cfc9f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/callweaver.te @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +policy_module(callweaver,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type callweaver_t; +type callweaver_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(callweaver_t, callweaver_exec_t) + +type callweaver_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(callweaver_initrc_exec_t) + +type callweaver_log_t; +logging_log_file(callweaver_log_t) + +type callweaver_var_lib_t; +files_type(callweaver_var_lib_t) + +type callweaver_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(callweaver_var_run_t) + +type callweaver_spool_t; +files_spool_file(callweaver_spool_t) + +######################################## +# +# callweaver local policy +# + +allow callweaver_t self:capability { setuid sys_nice setgid }; +allow callweaver_t self:process { setsched signal }; +allow callweaver_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow callweaver_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_log_t, callweaver_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_log_t, callweaver_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(callweaver_t, callweaver_log_t, { dir file } ) + +manage_dirs_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_var_lib_t, callweaver_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_var_lib_t, callweaver_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(callweaver_t, callweaver_var_lib_t, { dir file } ) + +manage_dirs_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_var_run_t, callweaver_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_var_run_t, callweaver_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_var_run_t, callweaver_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(callweaver_t, callweaver_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_spool_t, callweaver_spool_t) +manage_files_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_spool_t, callweaver_spool_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(callweaver_t, callweaver_spool_t, callweaver_spool_t) +files_spool_filetrans(callweaver_t, callweaver_spool_t, { dir file }) + +allow callweaver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow callweaver_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_sysctl(callweaver_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(callweaver_t) + +corenet_udp_bind_asterisk_port(callweaver_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_port(callweaver_t) +corenet_udp_bind_sip_port(callweaver_t) + +dev_manage_generic_symlinks(callweaver_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(callweaver_t) + +files_read_etc_files(callweaver_t) + +term_getattr_pty_fs(callweaver_t) +term_use_generic_ptys(callweaver_t) +term_use_ptmx(callweaver_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(callweaver_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(callweaver_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/canna.fc b/policy/modules/services/canna.fc index 5432d0e..f77df02 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/canna.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/canna.fc @@ -20,4 +20,4 @@ /var/run/\.iroha_unix -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:canna_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/\.iroha_unix/.* -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:canna_var_run_t,s0) -/var/run/wnn-unix(/.*) gen_context(system_u:object_r:canna_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/wnn-unix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:canna_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/canna.if b/policy/modules/services/canna.if index 4a26b0c..00b64dc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/canna.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/canna.if @@ -42,9 +42,13 @@ interface(`canna_admin',` type canna_var_run_t, canna_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 canna_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 canna_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, canna_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 canna_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, canna_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 canna_initrc_exec_t system_r; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/canna.te b/policy/modules/services/canna.te index 1d25efe..1b16191 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/canna.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/canna.te @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ allow canna_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow canna_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; manage_files_pattern(canna_t, canna_log_t, canna_log_t) -allow canna_t canna_log_t:dir setattr; +allow canna_t canna_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; logging_log_filetrans(canna_t, canna_log_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(canna_t, canna_var_lib_t, canna_var_lib_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ccs.fc b/policy/modules/services/ccs.fc index 8a7177d..bc4f6e7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ccs.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/ccs.fc @@ -2,5 +2,7 @@ /sbin/ccsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ccs_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ccsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ccs_exec_t,s0) + /var/run/cluster/ccsd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ccs_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/cluster/ccsd\.sock -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:ccs_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ccs.if b/policy/modules/services/ccs.if index 6ee2cc8..b509c40 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ccs.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ccs.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run ccs. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`ccs_domtrans',` @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ interface(`ccs_domtrans',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to ccs over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to ccs over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ccs.te b/policy/modules/services/ccs.te index 4c90b57..2e3fb03 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ccs.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ccs.te @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type ccs_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(ccs_t, ccs_exec_t) type cluster_conf_t; -files_type(cluster_conf_t) +files_config_file(cluster_conf_t) type ccs_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(ccs_tmp_t) @@ -34,7 +34,6 @@ files_pid_file(ccs_var_run_t) allow ccs_t self:capability { ipc_owner ipc_lock sys_nice sys_resource sys_admin }; allow ccs_t self:process { signal setrlimit setsched }; -dontaudit ccs_t self:process ptrace; allow ccs_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow ccs_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; allow ccs_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -61,7 +60,7 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(ccs_t, ccs_var_lib_t, ccs_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(ccs_t, ccs_var_lib_t, ccs_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(ccs_t, ccs_var_lib_t, { file dir }) -allow ccs_t ccs_var_log_t:dir setattr; +allow ccs_t ccs_var_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; manage_files_pattern(ccs_t, ccs_var_log_t, ccs_var_log_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(ccs_t, ccs_var_log_t, ccs_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(ccs_t, ccs_var_log_t, { sock_file file dir }) @@ -97,6 +96,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(ccs_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(ccs_t) init_rw_script_tmp_files(ccs_t) +init_signal(ccs_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(ccs_t) @@ -107,7 +107,7 @@ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(ccs_t) userdom_manage_unpriv_user_shared_mem(ccs_t) userdom_manage_unpriv_user_semaphores(ccs_t) -ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` corecmd_dontaudit_write_bin_dirs(ccs_t) files_manage_isid_type_files(ccs_t) ') @@ -118,5 +118,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + qpidd_rw_semaphores(ccs_t) + qpidd_rw_shm(ccs_t) +') + +optional_policy(` unconfined_use_fds(ccs_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/certmaster.if b/policy/modules/services/certmaster.if index fa62787..d61f61f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/certmaster.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/certmaster.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run certmaster. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`certmaster_domtrans',` @@ -108,7 +108,7 @@ interface(`certmaster_manage_log',` ## ## ## -## The role to be allowed to manage the syslog domain. +## Role allowed access. ## ## ## @@ -116,21 +116,24 @@ interface(`certmaster_manage_log',` interface(`certmaster_admin',` gen_require(` type certmaster_t, certmaster_var_run_t, certmaster_var_lib_t; - type certmaster_etc_rw_t, certmaster_var_log_t; - type certmaster_initrc_exec_t; + type certmaster_etc_rw_t, certmaster_var_log_t, certmaster_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 certmaster_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 certmaster_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, certmaster_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 certmaster_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, certmaster_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 certmaster_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; files_list_etc($1) - miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_dirs($1) - miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_files($1) + miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_dirs($1) + miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_files($1) admin_pattern($1, certmaster_etc_rw_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/certmaster.te b/policy/modules/services/certmaster.te index 3384132..97d3269 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/certmaster.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/certmaster.te @@ -43,23 +43,25 @@ files_var_lib_filetrans(certmaster_t, certmaster_var_lib_t, { file dir }) # log files manage_files_pattern(certmaster_t, certmaster_var_log_t, certmaster_var_log_t) -logging_log_filetrans(certmaster_t, certmaster_var_log_t, file ) +logging_log_filetrans(certmaster_t, certmaster_var_log_t, file) # pid file manage_files_pattern(certmaster_t, certmaster_var_run_t, certmaster_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(certmaster_t, certmaster_var_run_t, certmaster_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(certmaster_t ,certmaster_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(certmaster_t, certmaster_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) # read meminfo kernel_read_system_state(certmaster_t) -corecmd_search_bin(certmaster_t) -corecmd_getattr_bin_files(certmaster_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(certmaster_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(certmaster_t) corenet_tcp_bind_certmaster_port(certmaster_t) +dev_read_urand(certmaster_t) + files_search_etc(certmaster_t) +files_read_usr_files(certmaster_t) files_list_var(certmaster_t) files_search_var_lib(certmaster_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/certmonger.fc b/policy/modules/services/certmonger.fc index 5ad1a52..e66fcf6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/certmonger.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/certmonger.fc @@ -4,3 +4,5 @@ /var/lib/certmonger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:certmonger_var_lib_t,s0) /var/run/certmonger.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:certmonger_var_run_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/ipa/certmonger(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:certmonger_unconfined_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/certmonger.if b/policy/modules/services/certmonger.if index 7a6e5ba..e238dfd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/certmonger.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/certmonger.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run certmonger. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`certmonger_domtrans',` @@ -158,7 +158,11 @@ interface(`certmonger_admin',` ') ps_process_pattern($1, certmonger_t) - allow $1 certmonger_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 certmonger_t:process signal_perms; + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 certmonger_t:process ptrace; + ') # Allow certmonger_t to restart the apache service certmonger_initrc_domtrans($1) @@ -166,9 +170,9 @@ interface(`certmonger_admin',` role_transition $2 certmonger_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - files_search_var_lib($1) + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, certmonger_var_lib_t) - files_search_pids($1) + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, certmonger_var_run_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/certmonger.te b/policy/modules/services/certmonger.te index c3e3f79..3bf8b0c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/certmonger.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/certmonger.te @@ -18,12 +18,16 @@ files_pid_file(certmonger_var_run_t) type certmonger_var_lib_t; files_type(certmonger_var_lib_t) +type certmonger_unconfined_exec_t; +application_executable_file(certmonger_unconfined_exec_t) + ######################################## # # certmonger local policy # -allow certmonger_t self:capability { kill sys_nice }; +allow certmonger_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search setgid setuid kill sys_nice }; +dontaudit certmonger_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow certmonger_t self:process { getsched setsched sigkill }; allow certmonger_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow certmonger_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -32,16 +36,23 @@ allow certmonger_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_lib_t, certmonger_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_lib_t, certmonger_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_lib_t, { file dir } ) +files_var_lib_filetrans(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_lib_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_run_t, certmonger_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_run_t, certmonger_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(certmonger_t, certmonger_var_run_t, { file dir }) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(certmonger_t) +kernel_read_system_state(certmonger_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(certmonger_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(certmonger_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(certmonger_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(certmonger_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(certmonger_t) corenet_tcp_connect_certmaster_port(certmonger_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(certmonger_t) dev_read_urand(certmonger_t) @@ -51,6 +62,11 @@ files_read_etc_files(certmonger_t) files_read_usr_files(certmonger_t) files_list_tmp(certmonger_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(certmonger_t) +auth_rw_cache(certmonger_t) + +init_getattr_all_script_files(certmonger_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(certmonger_t) miscfiles_read_localization(certmonger_t) @@ -58,15 +74,60 @@ miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_files(certmonger_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(certmonger_t) +userdom_search_user_home_content(certmonger_t) + +optional_policy(` + apache_search_config(certmonger_t) + apache_signal(certmonger_t) + apache_signull(certmonger_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + bind_search_cache(certmonger_t) +') + optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(certmonger_t) dbus_connect_system_bus(certmonger_t) ') optional_policy(` + dirsrv_manage_config(certmonger_t) + dirsrv_signal(certmonger_t) + dirsrv_signull(certmonger_t) +') + +optional_policy(` kerberos_use(certmonger_t) + kerberos_read_keytab(certmonger_t) ') optional_policy(` + pcscd_read_pub_files(certmonger_t) pcscd_stream_connect(certmonger_t) ') + +######################################## +# +# certmonger_unconfined_script_t local policy +# + +optional_policy(` + type certmonger_unconfined_t; + domain_type(certmonger_unconfined_t) + + domain_entry_file(certmonger_unconfined_t, certmonger_unconfined_exec_t) + role system_r types certmonger_unconfined_t; + + domtrans_pattern(certmonger_t, certmonger_unconfined_exec_t, certmonger_unconfined_t) + + unconfined_domain(certmonger_unconfined_t) + + allow certmonger_t certmonger_unconfined_exec_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow certmonger_t certmonger_unconfined_exec_t:dir read_file_perms; + allow certmonger_t certmonger_unconfined_exec_t:file ioctl; + + init_domtrans_script(certmonger_unconfined_t) + + unconfined_domain(certmonger_unconfined_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cfengine.fc b/policy/modules/services/cfengine.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4c52fa3 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/cfengine.fc @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + +/usr/sbin/cf-serverd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cfengine_serverd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cf-execd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cfengine_execd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cf-monitord -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cfengine_monitord_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-serverd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cfengine_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-monitord -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cfengine_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cf-execd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cfengine_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/var/cfengine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cfengine_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/cfengine/outputs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cfengine_var_log_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cfengine.if b/policy/modules/services/cfengine.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2972c77 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/cfengine.if @@ -0,0 +1,143 @@ + +## policy for cfengine + +###################################### +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## cfengine init daemon domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`cfengine_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + attribute cfengine_domain; + ') + + ############################## + # + # Declarations + # + + type cfengine_$1_t, cfengine_domain; + type cfengine_$1_exec_t; + init_daemon_domain(cfengine_$1_t, cfengine_$1_exec_t) + +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to cfengine. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`cfengine_domtrans_server',` + gen_require(` + type cfengine_server_t, cfengine_server_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, cfengine_server_exec_t, cfengine_server_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Search cfengine lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cfengine_search_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type cfengine_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 cfengine_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read cfengine lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cfengine_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type cfengine_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, cfengine_var_lib_t, cfengine_var_lib_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to read cfengine's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cfengine_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type cfengine_var_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + files_search_var_lib($1) + cfengine_search_lib_files($1) + read_files_pattern($1, cfengine_var_log_t, cfengine_var_log_t) +') + +##################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to append cfengine's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cfengine_append_inherited_log',` + gen_require(` + type cfengine_var_log_t; + ') + + cfengine_search_lib_files($1) + allow $1 cfengine_var_log_t:file { getattr append ioctl lock }; +') + +#################################### +## +## Dontaudit the specified domain to write cfengine's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cfengine_dontaudit_write_log',` + gen_require(` + type cfengine_var_log_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 cfengine_var_log_t:file write; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cfengine.te b/policy/modules/services/cfengine.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0de6133 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/cfengine.te @@ -0,0 +1,101 @@ +policy_module(cfengine, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +attribute cfengine_domain; + +cfengine_domain_template(serverd) +cfengine_domain_template(execd) +cfengine_domain_template(monitord) + +type cfengine_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(cfengine_initrc_exec_t) + +type cfengine_var_lib_t; +files_type(cfengine_var_lib_t) + +type cfengine_var_log_t; +logging_log_file(cfengine_var_log_t) + +####################################### +# +# cfengine domain local policy +# + +allow cfengine_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow cfengine_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(cfengine_domain, cfengine_var_lib_t, cfengine_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(cfengine_domain, cfengine_var_lib_t, cfengine_var_lib_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(cfengine_domain, cfengine_var_lib_t, cfengine_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(cfengine_domain, cfengine_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +manage_files_pattern(cfengine_domain, cfengine_var_log_t,cfengine_var_log_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(cfengine_domain, cfengine_var_log_t,cfengine_var_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(cfengine_domain,cfengine_var_log_t,{ dir file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(cfengine_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(cfengine_domain) +corecmd_exec_shell(cfengine_domain) + +dev_read_urand(cfengine_domain) +dev_read_sysfs(cfengine_domain) + + +logging_send_syslog_msg(cfengine_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(cfengine_domain) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(cfengine_domain) +sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(cfengine_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(cfengine_domain) + +######################################## +# +# cfengine-server local policy +# + +allow cfengine_serverd_t self:capability { chown kill setgid setuid sys_chroot }; +allow cfengine_serverd_t self:process { fork setfscreate signal }; + +domain_use_interactive_fds(cfengine_serverd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(cfengine_serverd_t) + +######################################## +# +# cfengine_exec local policy +# + +allow cfengine_execd_t self:capability { chown kill setgid setuid sys_chroot }; +allow cfengine_execd_t self:process { fork setfscreate signal }; + +kernel_read_sysctl(cfengine_execd_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(cfengine_execd_t) +domain_use_interactive_fds(cfengine_execd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(cfengine_execd_t) + +######################################## +# +# cfengine_monitord local policy +# + +allow cfengine_monitord_t self:capability { chown kill setgid setuid sys_chroot }; +allow cfengine_monitord_t self:process { fork setfscreate signal }; + +kernel_read_hotplug_sysctls(cfengine_monitord_t) +kernel_read_network_state(cfengine_monitord_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(cfengine_monitord_t) +domain_use_interactive_fds(cfengine_monitord_t) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(cfengine_monitord_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(cfengine_monitord_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cgroup.fc b/policy/modules/services/cgroup.fc index b6bb46c..645d203 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cgroup.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/cgroup.fc @@ -11,5 +11,9 @@ /sbin/cgrulesengd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgred_exec_t,s0) /sbin/cgclear -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgclear_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cgconfigparser -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgconfig_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cgrulesengd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgred_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cgclear -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgclear_exec_t,s0) + /var/log/cgrulesengd\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgred_log_t,s0) /var/run/cgred.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:cgred_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cgroup.if b/policy/modules/services/cgroup.if index 33facaf..225e70c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cgroup.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/cgroup.if @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ ## CG Clear. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`cgroup_domtrans_cgclear',` @@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ interface(`cgroup_domtrans_cgclear',` ## CG config parser. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`cgroup_domtrans_cgconfig',` @@ -65,9 +65,9 @@ interface(`cgroup_initrc_domtrans_cgconfig',` ## CG rules engine daemon. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`cgroup_domtrans_cgred',` @@ -171,15 +171,27 @@ interface(`cgroup_admin',` type cgrules_etc_t, cgclear_t; ') - allow $1 cgclear_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 cgclear_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, cgclear_t) - allow $1 cgconfig_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 cglear_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 cgconfig_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, cgconfig_t) - allow $1 cgred_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 cgconfig_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 cgred_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, cgred_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 cgred_t:process ptrace; + ') + admin_pattern($1, cgconfig_etc_t) admin_pattern($1, cgrules_etc_t) files_list_etc($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cgroup.te b/policy/modules/services/cgroup.te index dad226c..59c2a27 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cgroup.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/cgroup.te @@ -25,8 +25,8 @@ files_pid_file(cgred_var_run_t) type cgrules_etc_t; files_config_file(cgrules_etc_t) -type cgconfig_t; -type cgconfig_exec_t; +type cgconfig_t alias cgconfigparser_t; +type cgconfig_exec_t alias cgconfigparser_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(cgconfig_t, cgconfig_exec_t) type cgconfig_initrc_exec_t; @@ -39,7 +39,6 @@ files_config_file(cgconfig_etc_t) # # cgclear personal policy. # - allow cgclear_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override sys_admin }; kernel_read_system_state(cgclear_t) @@ -72,12 +71,15 @@ fs_mount_cgroup(cgconfig_t) fs_mounton_cgroup(cgconfig_t) fs_unmount_cgroup(cgconfig_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(cgconfig_t) + ######################################## # # cgred personal policy. # -allow cgred_t self:capability { chown fsetid net_admin sys_admin sys_ptrace dac_override }; +allow cgred_t self:capability { chown fsetid net_admin sys_admin dac_override sys_ptrace }; + allow cgred_t self:netlink_socket { write bind create read }; allow cgred_t self:unix_dgram_socket { write create connect }; @@ -86,6 +88,9 @@ logging_log_filetrans(cgred_t, cgred_log_t, file) allow cgred_t cgrules_etc_t:file read_file_perms; +manage_files_pattern(cgred_t, cgred_log_t, cgred_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(cgred_t, cgred_log_t, file) + # rc script creates pid file manage_files_pattern(cgred_t, cgred_var_run_t, cgred_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(cgred_t, cgred_var_run_t, cgred_var_run_t) @@ -104,6 +109,8 @@ files_read_etc_files(cgred_t) fs_write_cgroup_files(cgred_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(cgred_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(cgred_t) miscfiles_read_localization(cgred_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/chronyd.fc b/policy/modules/services/chronyd.fc index fd8cd0b..f33885f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/chronyd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/chronyd.fc @@ -2,8 +2,12 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/chronyd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chronyd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/chrony.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chronyd_unit_file_t,s0) + /usr/sbin/chronyd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chronyd_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/chrony(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:chronyd_var_lib_t,s0) /var/log/chrony(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:chronyd_var_log_t,s0) /var/run/chronyd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chronyd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/chronyd(/.*) gen_context(system_u:object_r:chronyd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/chronyd\.sock gen_context(system_u:object_r:chronyd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/chronyd.if b/policy/modules/services/chronyd.if index 9a0da94..113eae2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/chronyd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/chronyd.if @@ -19,6 +19,24 @@ interface(`chronyd_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, chronyd_exec_t, chronyd_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Execute chronyd server in the chronyd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`chronyd_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type chronyd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, chronyd_initrc_exec_t) +') + #################################### ## ## Execute chronyd @@ -56,6 +74,125 @@ interface(`chronyd_read_log',` read_files_pattern($1, chronyd_var_log_t, chronyd_var_log_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Read and write chronyd shared memory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`chronyd_rw_shm',` + gen_require(` + type chronyd_t, chronyd_tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 chronyd_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + allow $1 chronyd_tmpfs_t:dir list_dir_perms; + rw_files_pattern($1, chronyd_tmpfs_t, chronyd_tmpfs_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, chronyd_tmpfs_t, chronyd_tmpfs_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read chronyd keys files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`chronyd_read_keys',` + gen_require(` + type chronyd_keys_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, chronyd_keys_t, chronyd_keys_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append chronyd keys files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`chronyd_append_keys',` + gen_require(` + type chronyd_keys_t; + ') + + append_files_pattern($1, chronyd_keys_t, chronyd_keys_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute chronyd server in the chronyd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`chronyd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type chronyd_t; + type chronyd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 chronyd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 chronyd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, chronyd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to chronyd over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`chronyd_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type chronyd_t, chronyd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, chronyd_var_run_t, chronyd_var_run_t, chronyd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send to chronyd over a unix domain +## datagram socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`chronyd_dgram_send',` + gen_require(` + type chronyd_t; + ') + + allow $1 chronyd_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +') + #################################### ## ## All of the rules required to administrate @@ -75,31 +212,38 @@ interface(`chronyd_read_log',` # interface(`chronyd_admin',` gen_require(` - type chronyd_t, chronyd_var_log_t; - type chronyd_var_run_t, chronyd_var_lib_t; - type chronyd_initrc_exec_t, chronyd_keys_t; + type chronyd_t, chronyd_var_log_t, chronyd_var_run_t; + type chronyd_var_lib_t, chronyd_tmpfs_t, chronyd_initrc_exec_t; + type chronyd_keys_t, chronyd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 chronyd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 chronyd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, chronyd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 chronyd_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, chronyd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 chronyd_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - files_search_etc($1) + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, chronyd_keys_t) - logging_search_logs($1) + logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, chronyd_var_log_t) - files_search_var_lib($1) + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, chronyd_var_lib_t) - files_search_pids($1) + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, chronyd_var_run_t) - files_search_tmp($1) - admin_pattern($1, chronyd_tmp_t) + admin_pattern($1, chronyd_tmpfs_t) + + admin_pattern($1, chronyd_unit_file_t) + chronyd_systemctl($1) + allow $1 chronyd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/chronyd.te b/policy/modules/services/chronyd.te index fa82327..898d0db 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/chronyd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/chronyd.te @@ -15,6 +15,12 @@ init_script_file(chronyd_initrc_exec_t) type chronyd_keys_t; files_type(chronyd_keys_t) +type chronyd_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(chronyd_tmpfs_t) + +type chronyd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(chronyd_unit_file_t) + type chronyd_var_lib_t; files_type(chronyd_var_lib_t) @@ -30,13 +36,18 @@ files_pid_file(chronyd_var_run_t) # allow chronyd_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock setuid setgid sys_resource sys_time }; -allow chronyd_t self:process { getcap setcap setrlimit }; +allow chronyd_t self:process { getcap setcap setrlimit signal }; allow chronyd_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow chronyd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow chronyd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; +allow chronyd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow chronyd_t chronyd_keys_t:file read_file_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(chronyd_t, chronyd_tmpfs_t, chronyd_tmpfs_t) +manage_files_pattern(chronyd_t, chronyd_tmpfs_t, chronyd_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(chronyd_t, chronyd_tmpfs_t, { dir file }) + manage_files_pattern(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_lib_t, chronyd_var_lib_t) manage_dirs_pattern(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_lib_t, chronyd_var_lib_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_lib_t, chronyd_var_lib_t) @@ -48,8 +59,15 @@ logging_log_filetrans(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_log_t, { file dir }) manage_files_pattern(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_run_t, chronyd_var_run_t) manage_dirs_pattern(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_run_t, chronyd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_run_t, file) +manage_sock_files_pattern(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_run_t, chronyd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(chronyd_t, chronyd_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) +kernel_read_system_state(chronyd_t) +kernel_read_network_state(chronyd_t) + +corecmd_exec_shell(chronyd_t) + +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(chronyd_t) corenet_udp_bind_ntp_port(chronyd_t) # bind to udp/323 corenet_udp_bind_chronyd_port(chronyd_t) @@ -63,6 +81,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(chronyd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(chronyd_t) +mta_send_mail(chronyd_t) + optional_policy(` gpsd_rw_shm(chronyd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/clamav.fc b/policy/modules/services/clamav.fc index e8e9a21..22986ef 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/clamav.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/clamav.fc @@ -8,9 +8,13 @@ /usr/sbin/clamd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/clamav-milter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/clamd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_unit_file_t,s0) + /var/clamav(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/clamav(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/clamd.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_var_lib_t,s0) /var/log/clamav.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_var_log_t,s0) +/var/log/freshclam.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:freshclam_var_log_t,s0) /var/log/clamav/freshclam.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:freshclam_var_log_t,s0) /var/log/clamd.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_var_log_t,s0) /var/run/amavis(d)?/clamd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clamd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/clamav.if b/policy/modules/services/clamav.if index 1f11572..87840b4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/clamav.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/clamav.if @@ -33,6 +33,7 @@ interface(`clamav_stream_connect',` type clamd_t, clamd_var_run_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) stream_connect_pattern($1, clamd_var_run_t, clamd_var_run_t, clamd_t) ') @@ -49,12 +50,12 @@ interface(`clamav_stream_connect',` # interface(`clamav_append_log',` gen_require(` - type clamav_log_t; + type clamd_var_log_t; ') logging_search_logs($1) - allow $1 clamav_log_t:dir list_dir_perms; - append_files_pattern($1, clamav_log_t, clamav_log_t) + allow $1 clamd_var_log_t:dir list_dir_perms; + append_files_pattern($1, clamd_var_log_t, clamd_var_log_t) ') ######################################## @@ -133,6 +134,49 @@ interface(`clamav_exec_clamscan',` ######################################## ## +## Manage clamd pid content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`clamav_manage_clamd_pid',` + gen_require(` + type clamd_var_run_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, clamd_var_run_t, clamd_var_run_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, clamd_var_run_t, clamd_var_run_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute clamd server in the clamd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`clamd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type clamd_t; + type clamd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + allow $1 clamd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 clamd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, clamd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an clamav environment ## @@ -151,19 +195,25 @@ interface(`clamav_exec_clamscan',` interface(`clamav_admin',` gen_require(` type clamd_t, clamd_etc_t, clamd_tmp_t; - type clamd_var_log_t, clamd_var_lib_t; - type clamd_var_run_t, clamscan_t, clamscan_tmp_t; - type clamd_initrc_exec_t; + type clamd_var_log_t, clamd_var_lib_t, clamd_var_run_t; + type clamscan_t, clamscan_tmp_t, clamd_initrc_exec_t; type freshclam_t, freshclam_var_log_t; + type clamd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 clamd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 clamd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, clamd_t) - allow $1 clamscan_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 clamd_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 clamscan_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 freshclam_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 clamscan_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, clamscan_t) - allow $1 freshclam_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 freshclam_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, freshclam_t) init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, clamd_initrc_exec_t) @@ -171,6 +221,10 @@ interface(`clamav_admin',` role_transition $2 clamd_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + clamd_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, clamd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 clamd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, clamd_etc_t) @@ -189,4 +243,10 @@ interface(`clamav_admin',` admin_pattern($1, clamscan_tmp_t) admin_pattern($1, freshclam_var_log_t) + + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') + ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/clamav.te b/policy/modules/services/clamav.te index f758323..ced0ce2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/clamav.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/clamav.te @@ -1,9 +1,23 @@ policy_module(clamav, 1.9.0) ## -##

    -## Allow clamd to use JIT compiler -##

    +##

    +## Allow clamscan to read user content +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(clamscan_read_user_content, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow clamscan to non security files on a system +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(clamscan_can_scan_system, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow clamd to use JIT compiler +##

    ##     gen_tunable(clamd_use_jit, false) @@ -24,6 +38,9 @@ files_config_file(clamd_etc_t) type clamd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(clamd_initrc_exec_t) +type clamd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(clamd_unit_file_t) + # tmp files type clamd_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(clamd_tmp_t) @@ -64,6 +81,8 @@ logging_log_file(freshclam_var_log_t) allow clamd_t self:capability { kill setgid setuid dac_override }; dontaudit clamd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow clamd_t self:process signal; + allow clamd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow clamd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; allow clamd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -80,6 +99,7 @@ manage_files_pattern(clamd_t, clamd_tmp_t, clamd_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(clamd_t, clamd_tmp_t, { file dir }) # var/lib files for clamd +manage_sock_files_pattern(clamd_t, clamd_var_lib_t, clamd_var_lib_t) manage_dirs_pattern(clamd_t, clamd_var_lib_t, clamd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(clamd_t, clamd_var_lib_t, clamd_var_lib_t) @@ -89,9 +109,10 @@ manage_files_pattern(clamd_t, clamd_var_log_t, clamd_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(clamd_t, clamd_var_log_t, { dir file }) # pid file +manage_dirs_pattern(clamd_t, clamd_var_run_t, clamd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(clamd_t, clamd_var_run_t, clamd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(clamd_t, clamd_var_run_t, clamd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(clamd_t, clamd_var_run_t, { file dir }) +files_pid_filetrans(clamd_t, clamd_var_run_t, { sock_file file dir }) kernel_dontaudit_list_proc(clamd_t) kernel_read_sysctl(clamd_t) @@ -110,6 +131,7 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(clamd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_clamd_port(clamd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(clamd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(clamd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_clamd_port(clamd_t) corenet_sendrecv_clamd_server_packets(clamd_t) dev_read_rand(clamd_t) @@ -127,13 +149,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(clamd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(clamd_t) -cron_use_fds(clamd_t) -cron_use_system_job_fds(clamd_t) -cron_rw_pipes(clamd_t) - -mta_read_config(clamd_t) -mta_send_mail(clamd_t) - optional_policy(` amavis_read_lib_files(clamd_t) amavis_read_spool_files(clamd_t) @@ -142,13 +157,31 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + cron_use_fds(clamd_t) + cron_use_system_job_fds(clamd_t) + cron_rw_pipes(clamd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` exim_read_spool_files(clamd_t) ') +optional_policy(` + mta_read_config(clamd_t) + mta_send_mail(clamd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + spamd_stream_connect(clamd_t) + spamassassin_read_pid_files(clamd_t) +') + tunable_policy(`clamd_use_jit',` allow clamd_t self:process execmem; -', ` + allow clamscan_t self:process execmem; +',` dontaudit clamd_t self:process execmem; + dontaudit clamscan_t self:process execmem; ') ######################################## @@ -178,10 +211,16 @@ files_pid_filetrans(freshclam_t, clamd_var_run_t, file) # log files (own logfiles only) manage_files_pattern(freshclam_t, freshclam_var_log_t, freshclam_var_log_t) -allow freshclam_t freshclam_var_log_t:dir setattr; -allow freshclam_t clamd_var_log_t:dir search_dir_perms; +allow freshclam_t freshclam_var_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; +read_files_pattern(freshclam_t, clamd_var_log_t, clamd_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(freshclam_t, freshclam_var_log_t, file) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(freshclam_t) +kernel_read_system_state(freshclam_t) + +corecmd_exec_shell(freshclam_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(freshclam_t) + corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(freshclam_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(freshclam_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(freshclam_t) @@ -189,6 +228,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(freshclam_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(freshclam_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_clamd_port(freshclam_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(freshclam_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_clamd_port(freshclam_t) corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(freshclam_t) dev_read_rand(freshclam_t) @@ -207,16 +247,22 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(freshclam_t) clamav_stream_connect(freshclam_t) -optional_policy(` - cron_system_entry(freshclam_t, freshclam_exec_t) -') +userdom_stream_connect(freshclam_t) tunable_policy(`clamd_use_jit',` allow freshclam_t self:process execmem; -', ` +',` dontaudit freshclam_t self:process execmem; ') +optional_policy(` + clamd_systemctl(freshclam_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(freshclam_t, freshclam_exec_t) +') + ######################################## # # clamscam local policy @@ -242,15 +288,33 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(clamscan_t, clamscan_tmp_t, { file dir }) manage_files_pattern(clamscan_t, clamd_var_lib_t, clamd_var_lib_t) allow clamscan_t clamd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_files_pattern(clamscan_t, clamd_var_run_t, clamd_var_run_t) +allow clamscan_t clamd_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(clamscan_t) + corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(clamscan_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(clamscan_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(clamscan_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(clamscan_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(clamscan_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_clamd_port(clamscan_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(clamscan_t) corenet_tcp_connect_clamd_port(clamscan_t) +corecmd_read_all_executables(clamscan_t) + +tunable_policy(`clamscan_read_user_content',` + userdom_read_user_home_content_files(clamscan_t) + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(clamscan_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`clamscan_can_scan_system',` + files_read_non_security_files(clamscan_t) +') + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(clamscan_t) +kernel_read_system_state(clamscan_t) files_read_etc_files(clamscan_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(clamscan_t) @@ -264,10 +328,15 @@ miscfiles_read_public_files(clamscan_t) clamav_stream_connect(clamscan_t) -mta_send_mail(clamscan_t) +sysnet_read_config(clamscan_t) + +optional_policy(` + mta_send_mail(clamscan_t) + mta_read_queue(clamscan_t) +') optional_policy(` - amavis_read_spool_files(clamscan_t) + amavis_manage_spool_files(clamscan_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/clockspeed.te b/policy/modules/services/clockspeed.te index b40f3f7..3676ecc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/clockspeed.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/clockspeed.te @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ files_read_etc_files(clockspeed_cli_t) miscfiles_read_localization(clockspeed_cli_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(clockspeed_cli_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(clockspeed_cli_t) ######################################## # diff --git a/policy/modules/services/clogd.if b/policy/modules/services/clogd.if index c0a66a4..e438c5f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/clogd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/clogd.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run clogd. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`clogd_domtrans',` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/clogd.te b/policy/modules/services/clogd.te index 6077339..d10acd2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/clogd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/clogd.te @@ -23,7 +23,6 @@ files_pid_file(clogd_var_run_t) allow clogd_t self:capability { net_admin mknod }; allow clogd_t self:process signal; - allow clogd_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow clogd_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow clogd_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -36,7 +35,7 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(clogd_t, clogd_tmpfs_t, { dir file }) # pid files manage_files_pattern(clogd_t, clogd_var_run_t, clogd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(clogd_t, clogd_var_run_t, clogd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(clogd_t, clogd_var_run_t, { file }) +files_pid_filetrans(clogd_t, clogd_var_run_t, file) dev_read_lvm_control(clogd_t) dev_manage_generic_blk_files(clogd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cloudform.fc b/policy/modules/services/cloudform.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f2968f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/cloudform.fc @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/iwhd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iwhd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mongod -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/deltacloudd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:deltacloudd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/iwhd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iwhd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/mongod -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/thin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thin_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/share/aeolus-conductor/dbomatic/dbomatic -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/iwhd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:iwhd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/mongodb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/deltacloud-core(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:deltacloudd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/iwhd\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iwhd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/mongodb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_log_t,s0) + + + +/var/run/mongodb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/aeolus/dbomatic\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mongod_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/aeolus/thin\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:thin_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/iwhd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iwhd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cloudform.if b/policy/modules/services/cloudform.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7f55959 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/cloudform.if @@ -0,0 +1,40 @@ +## cloudform policy + +####################################### +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## cloudform daemon domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`cloudform_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + attribute cloudform_domain; + ') + + type $1_t, cloudform_domain; + type $1_exec_t; + init_daemon_domain($1_t, $1_exec_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Execute mongod in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cloudform_exec_mongod',` + gen_require(` + type mongod_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, mongod_exec_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cloudform.te b/policy/modules/services/cloudform.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2709243 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/cloudform.te @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +policy_module(cloudform, 1.0) +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +attribute cloudform_domain; + +cloudform_domain_template(deltacloudd) +cloudform_domain_template(iwhd) +cloudform_domain_template(mongod) +cloudform_domain_template(thin) + +type deltacloudd_log_t; +logging_log_file(deltacloudd_log_t) + +type deltacloudd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(deltacloudd_var_run_t) + +type deltacloudd_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(deltacloudd_tmp_t) + +type iwhd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(iwhd_initrc_exec_t) + +type iwhd_var_lib_t; +files_type(iwhd_var_lib_t) + +type iwhd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(iwhd_var_run_t) + +type mongod_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(mongod_initrc_exec_t) + +type mongod_log_t; +logging_log_file(mongod_log_t) + +type mongod_var_lib_t; +files_type(mongod_var_lib_t) + +type mongod_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(mongod_tmp_t) + +type mongod_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(mongod_var_run_t) + +type thin_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(thin_var_run_t) + +type iwhd_log_t; +logging_log_file(iwhd_log_t) + +######################################## +# +# cloudform_domain local policy +# + +allow cloudform_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow cloudform_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +dev_read_urand(cloudform_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(cloudform_domain) + +miscfiles_read_certs(cloudform_domain) +miscfiles_read_localization(cloudform_domain) + +######################################## +# +# deltacloudd local policy +# + +allow deltacloudd_t self:capability { dac_override setuid setgid }; + +allow deltacloudd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow deltacloudd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +allow deltacloudd_t self:process signal; + +allow deltacloudd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow deltacloudd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow deltacloudd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_tmp_t, deltacloudd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_tmp_t, deltacloudd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +manage_files_pattern(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_var_run_t, deltacloudd_var_run_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_var_run_t, deltacloudd_var_run_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_var_run_t, deltacloudd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_var_run_t, { file dir }) + +manage_files_pattern(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_log_t, deltacloudd_log_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_log_t, deltacloudd_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(deltacloudd_t, deltacloudd_log_t, { file dir }) + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(deltacloudd_t) +kernel_read_system_state(deltacloudd_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(deltacloudd_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(deltacloudd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(deltacloudd_t) + +files_read_usr_files(deltacloudd_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(deltacloudd_t) + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_read_config(deltacloudd_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# iwhd local policy +# + +allow iwhd_t self:capability { chown kill }; +allow iwhd_t self:process { fork }; + +allow iwhd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow iwhd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(iwhd_t, iwhd_var_lib_t, iwhd_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(iwhd_t, iwhd_var_lib_t, iwhd_var_lib_t) + +manage_files_pattern(iwhd_t, iwhd_log_t, iwhd_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(iwhd_t, iwhd_log_t, { file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(iwhd_t, iwhd_var_run_t, iwhd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(iwhd_t, iwhd_var_run_t, iwhd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(iwhd_t, iwhd_var_run_t, { dir file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(iwhd_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(iwhd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_websm_port(iwhd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(iwhd_t) + +dev_read_rand(iwhd_t) +dev_read_urand(iwhd_t) + +userdom_home_manager(iwhd_t) + +######################################## +# +# mongod local policy +# + +allow mongod_t self:process { execmem setsched signal }; + +allow mongod_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow mongod_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow mongod_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_log_t, mongod_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_log_t, mongod_log_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_var_lib_t, mongod_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_var_lib_t, mongod_var_lib_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_tmp_t, mongod_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_tmp_t, mongod_tmp_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_tmp_t, mongod_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(mongod_t, mongod_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_var_run_t, mongod_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(mongod_t, mongod_var_run_t, mongod_var_run_t) +#needed by dbomatic +files_pid_filetrans(mongod_t, mongod_var_run_t, { file }) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(mongod_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_mongod_port(mongod_t) + +kernel_read_vm_sysctls(mongod_t) +kernel_read_system_state(mongod_t) + +files_read_usr_files(mongod_t) + +optional_policy(` + mysql_stream_connect(mongod_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + postgresql_stream_connect(mongod_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(mongod_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# thin local policy +# + +allow thin_t self:capability { setuid kill setgid dac_override }; + +allow thin_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow thin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow thin_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(thin_t, thin_var_run_t, thin_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(thin_t, thin_var_run_t, { file }) + +corecmd_exec_bin(thin_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(thin_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_ntop_port(thin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(thin_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(iwhd_t) + +files_read_usr_files(thin_t) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(thin_t) + +init_read_utmp(thin_t) + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(thin_t) + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_read_config(thin_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cmirrord.fc b/policy/modules/services/cmirrord.fc index 049e2b6..dcc7de8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cmirrord.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/cmirrord.fc @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ + /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cmirrord -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cmirrord_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/cmirrord -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cmirrord_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cmirrord -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cmirrord_exec_t,s0) /var/run/cmirrord\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cmirrord_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cmirrord.if b/policy/modules/services/cmirrord.if index f8463c0..126b293 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cmirrord.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/cmirrord.if @@ -70,10 +70,11 @@ interface(`cmirrord_rw_shm',` type cmirrord_t, cmirrord_tmpfs_t; ') - allow $1 cmirrord_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + allow $1 cmirrord_t:shm { rw_shm_perms destroy }; allow $1 cmirrord_tmpfs_t:dir list_dir_perms; rw_files_pattern($1, cmirrord_tmpfs_t, cmirrord_tmpfs_t) + delete_files_pattern($1, cmirrord_tmpfs_t, cmirrord_tmpfs_t) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, cmirrord_tmpfs_t, cmirrord_tmpfs_t) fs_search_tmpfs($1) ') @@ -100,9 +101,13 @@ interface(`cmirrord_admin',` type cmirrord_t, cmirrord_initrc_exec_t, cmirrord_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 cmirrord_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 cmirrord_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, cmirrord_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 cmorrord_t:process ptrace; + ') + cmirrord_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 cmirrord_initrc_exec_t system_r; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cobbler.fc b/policy/modules/services/cobbler.fc index 1cf6c4e..0858f92 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cobbler.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/cobbler.fc @@ -1,7 +1,35 @@ -/etc/cobbler(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_etc_t, s0) -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cobblerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobblerd_initrc_exec_t, s0) -/usr/bin/cobblerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobblerd_exec_t, s0) +/etc/cobbler(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_etc_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cobblerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobblerd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/cobblerd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobblerd_unit_file_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/cobblerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobblerd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/cobbler(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/lib/tftpboot/etc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/tftpboot/grub(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/tftpboot/images(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/tftpboot/memdisk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/tftpboot/menu\.c32 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/tftpboot/ppc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/tftpboot/pxelinux\.0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/tftpboot/pxelinux\.cfg(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/tftpboot/s390x(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/tftpboot/yaboot -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/cobbler(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_log_t,s0) + +# This should removable when cobbler package installs /var/www/cobbler/rendered +/var/www/cobbler(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_cobbler_content_t,s0) + +/var/www/cobbler/images(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/www/cobbler/ks_mirror(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/www/cobbler/links(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/www/cobbler/localmirror(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/www/cobbler/pub(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/www/cobbler/rendered(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/www/cobbler/repo_mirror(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t,s0) -/var/lib/cobbler(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_lib_t, s0) -/var/log/cobbler(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cobbler_var_log_t, s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cobbler.if b/policy/modules/services/cobbler.if index 116d60f..e2c6ec6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cobbler.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/cobbler.if @@ -1,12 +1,12 @@ ## Cobbler installation server. ## ##

    -## Cobbler is a Linux installation server that allows for -## rapid setup of network installation environments. It -## glues together and automates many associated Linux -## tasks so you do not have to hop between lots of various -## commands and applications when rolling out new systems, -## and, in some cases, changing existing ones. +## Cobbler is a Linux installation server that allows for +## rapid setup of network installation environments. It +## glues together and automates many associated Linux +## tasks so you do not have to hop between lots of various +## commands and applications when rolling out new systems, +## and, in some cases, changing existing ones. ##

    ##     @@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run cobblerd. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`cobblerd_domtrans',` @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ interface(`cobblerd_domtrans',` ') domtrans_pattern($1, cobblerd_exec_t, cobblerd_t) + corecmd_search_bin($1) ') ######################################## @@ -48,7 +49,7 @@ interface(`cobblerd_initrc_domtrans',` ######################################## ## -## Read Cobbler content in /etc +## List Cobbler configuration. ## ## ## @@ -56,19 +57,18 @@ interface(`cobblerd_initrc_domtrans',` ## ## # -interface(`cobbler_read_config',` +interface(`cobbler_list_config',` gen_require(` type cobbler_etc_t; ') - read_files_pattern($1, cobbler_etc_t, cobbler_etc_t) + list_dirs_pattern($1, cobbler_etc_t, cobbler_etc_t) files_search_etc($1) ') ######################################## ## -## Do not audit attempts to read and write -## Cobbler log files (leaked fd). +## Read Cobbler configuration files. ## ## ## @@ -76,12 +76,13 @@ interface(`cobbler_read_config',` ## ## # -interface(`cobbler_dontaudit_rw_log',` +interface(`cobbler_read_config',` gen_require(` - type cobbler_var_log_t; + type cobbler_etc_t; ') - dontaudit $1 cobbler_var_log_t:file rw_file_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, cobbler_etc_t, cobbler_etc_t) + files_search_etc($1) ') ######################################## @@ -100,6 +101,7 @@ interface(`cobbler_search_lib',` ') search_dirs_pattern($1, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib($1) ') @@ -119,6 +121,7 @@ interface(`cobbler_read_lib_files',` ') read_files_pattern($1, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib($1) ') @@ -137,12 +140,56 @@ interface(`cobbler_manage_lib_files',` type cobbler_var_lib_t; ') + manage_dirs_pattern($1, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern($1, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib($1) ') ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to read and write +## Cobbler log files (leaked fd). +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`cobbler_dontaudit_rw_log',` + gen_require(` + type cobbler_var_log_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 cobbler_var_log_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute cobblerd server in the cobblerd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`cobblerd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type cobblerd_t; + type cobblerd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 cobblerd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 cobblerd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, cobblerd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an cobblerd environment ## @@ -161,25 +208,43 @@ interface(`cobbler_manage_lib_files',` interface(`cobblerd_admin',` gen_require(` type cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_log_t; - type cobbler_etc_t, cobblerd_initrc_exec_t; + type cobbler_etc_t, cobblerd_initrc_exec_t, httpd_cobbler_content_t; + type httpd_cobbler_content_ra_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t; + type cobblerd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 cobblerd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; - read_files_pattern($1, cobblerd_t, cobblerd_t) + allow $1 cobblerd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, cobblerd_t) - files_search_etc($1) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 cobblerd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, cobbler_etc_t) files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, cobbler_var_lib_t) - logging_search_logs($1) + logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, cobbler_var_log_t) + apache_list_sys_content($1) + admin_pattern($1, httpd_cobbler_content_t) + admin_pattern($1, httpd_cobbler_content_ra_t) admin_pattern($1, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t) cobblerd_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 cobblerd_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + + optional_policy(` + # traverse /var/lib/tftpdir to get to cobbler_var_lib_t there. + tftp_search_rw_content($1) + ') + + cobblerd_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, cobblerd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 cobblerd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cobbler.te b/policy/modules/services/cobbler.te index 0258b48..5f685a0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cobbler.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/cobbler.te @@ -6,13 +6,35 @@ policy_module(cobbler, 1.1.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow Cobbler to modify public files -## used for public file transfer services. -##

    +##

    +## Allow Cobbler to modify public files +## used for public file transfer services. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(cobbler_anon_write, false) +## +##

    +## Allow Cobbler to connect to the +## network using TCP. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(cobbler_can_network_connect, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow Cobbler to access cifs file systems. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(cobbler_use_cifs, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow Cobbler to access nfs file systems. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(cobbler_use_nfs, false) + type cobblerd_t; type cobblerd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(cobblerd_t, cobblerd_exec_t) @@ -26,25 +48,43 @@ files_config_file(cobbler_etc_t) type cobbler_var_log_t; logging_log_file(cobbler_var_log_t) -type cobbler_var_lib_t; +type cobbler_var_lib_t alias cobbler_content_t; files_type(cobbler_var_lib_t) +type cobbler_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(cobbler_tmp_t) + +type cobblerd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(cobblerd_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # Cobbler personal policy. # -allow cobblerd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner sys_nice }; +allow cobblerd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner fsetid sys_nice }; +dontaudit cobblerd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; + allow cobblerd_t self:process { getsched setsched signal }; allow cobblerd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow cobblerd_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; allow cobblerd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow cobblerd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow cobblerd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; list_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_etc_t, cobbler_etc_t) read_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_etc_t, cobbler_etc_t) +# Something that runs in the cobberd_t domain tries to relabelfrom cobbler_var_lib_t dir to httpd_sys_content_t. +dontaudit cobblerd_t cobbler_var_lib_t:dir relabel_dir_perms; + manage_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_lib_t, { dir file }) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_lib_t, cobbler_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_lib_t, { dir file lnk_file }) + +# Something really needs to write to cobbler.log. Ideally this should not be happening. +allow cobblerd_t cobbler_var_log_t:file write; append_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, cobbler_var_log_t) create_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, cobbler_var_log_t) @@ -52,7 +92,12 @@ read_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, cobbler_var_log_t) setattr_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, cobbler_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_log_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_tmp_t, cobbler_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, cobbler_tmp_t, cobbler_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(cobblerd_t, cobbler_tmp_t, { dir file }) + kernel_read_system_state(cobblerd_t) +kernel_dontaudit_search_network_state(cobblerd_t) corecmd_exec_bin(cobblerd_t) corecmd_exec_shell(cobblerd_t) @@ -65,44 +110,111 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(cobblerd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(cobblerd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(cobblerd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port(cobblerd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_cobbler_port(cobblerd_t) +# sync and rsync to ftp and http are permitted by default, for any other media use cobbler_can_network_connect. +corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(cobblerd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(cobblerd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ftp_port(cobblerd_t) +corenet_sendrecv_ftp_client_packets(cobblerd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(cobblerd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_port(cobblerd_t) +corenet_sendrecv_http_client_packets(cobblerd_t) dev_read_urand(cobblerd_t) +domain_dontaudit_exec_all_entry_files(cobblerd_t) +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(cobblerd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(cobblerd_t) +# mtab +files_read_etc_runtime_files(cobblerd_t) files_read_usr_files(cobblerd_t) files_list_boot(cobblerd_t) +files_read_boot_files(cobblerd_t) files_list_tmp(cobblerd_t) -# read /etc/nsswitch.conf -files_read_etc_files(cobblerd_t) + +# read from mounted images (install media) +fs_read_iso9660_files(cobblerd_t) + +init_dontaudit_read_all_script_files(cobblerd_t) + +term_use_console(cobblerd_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(cobblerd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(cobblerd_t) miscfiles_read_public_files(cobblerd_t) +selinux_get_enforce_mode(cobblerd_t) + sysnet_read_config(cobblerd_t) sysnet_rw_dhcp_config(cobblerd_t) sysnet_write_config(cobblerd_t) +userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(cobblerd_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(cobblerd_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(cobblerd_t) + tunable_policy(`cobbler_anon_write',` miscfiles_manage_public_files(cobblerd_t) ') +tunable_policy(`cobbler_can_network_connect',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(cobblerd_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(cobblerd_t) + corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(cobblerd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`cobbler_use_cifs',` + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(cobblerd_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(cobblerd_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(cobblerd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`cobbler_use_nfs',` + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(cobblerd_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(cobblerd_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(cobblerd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + # Cobbler traverses /var/www to get to /var/www/cobbler/* + apache_search_sys_content(cobblerd_t) +') + optional_policy(` bind_read_config(cobblerd_t) bind_write_config(cobblerd_t) bind_domtrans_ndc(cobblerd_t) bind_domtrans(cobblerd_t) bind_initrc_domtrans(cobblerd_t) + bind_systemctl(cobblerd_t) bind_manage_zone(cobblerd_t) ') optional_policy(` + certmaster_exec(cobblerd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dhcpd_domtrans(cobblerd_t) dhcpd_initrc_domtrans(cobblerd_t) + dhcpd_systemctl(cobblerd_t) ') optional_policy(` dnsmasq_domtrans(cobblerd_t) dnsmasq_initrc_domtrans(cobblerd_t) dnsmasq_write_config(cobblerd_t) + dnsmasq_systemctl(cobblerd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(cobblerd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + puppet_domtrans_puppetca(cobblerd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -110,12 +222,21 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - rsync_read_config(cobblerd_t) - rsync_write_config(cobblerd_t) + rsync_exec(cobblerd_t) + rsync_manage_config(cobblerd_t) + # cobbler creates /etc/rsync.conf if its not there. + rsync_filetrans_config(cobblerd_t, file) ') optional_policy(` - tftp_manage_rw_content(cobblerd_t) + # Cobbler puts objects in both /var/lib/tftpdir as well as /var/lib/tftpdir/images. + # tftp_manage_rw_content(cobblerd_t) can be used instead if: + # 1. cobbler package installs /var/lib/tftpdir/images. + # 2. no FILES in /var/lib/TFTPDIR are hard linked. + # Cobbler also creates other directories in /var/lib/tftpdir (etc, s390x, ppc, pxelinux.cfg) + # are any of those hard linked? + tftp_filetrans_tftpdir(cobblerd_t, cobbler_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + tftp_manage_config(cobblerd_t) ') ######################################## @@ -124,5 +245,6 @@ optional_policy(` # apache_content_template(cobbler) +list_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_t, httpd_cobbler_content_t) manage_dirs_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t) manage_files_pattern(cobblerd_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t, httpd_cobbler_content_rw_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/collectd.fc b/policy/modules/services/collectd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2e1007b --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/collectd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/collectd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:collectd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/collectd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:collectd_unit_file_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/collectd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:collectd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/collectd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:collectd_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/run/collectd\.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:collectd_var_run_t,s0) + +/usr/share/collectd/collection3/bin/.*\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_collectd_script_exec_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/collectd.if b/policy/modules/services/collectd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..40415f8 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/collectd.if @@ -0,0 +1,186 @@ + +## policy for collectd + +######################################## +## +## Transition to collectd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`collectd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type collectd_t, collectd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, collectd_exec_t, collectd_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute collectd server in the collectd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`collectd_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type collectd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, collectd_initrc_exec_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Search collectd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`collectd_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type collectd_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 collectd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read collectd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`collectd_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type collectd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, collectd_var_lib_t, collectd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage collectd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`collectd_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type collectd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, collectd_var_lib_t, collectd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage collectd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`collectd_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type collectd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, collectd_var_lib_t, collectd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute collectd server in the collectd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`collectd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type collectd_t; + type collectd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 collectd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 collectd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, collectd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an collectd environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`collectd_admin',` + gen_require(` + type collectd_t; + type collectd_initrc_exec_t; + type collectd_var_lib_t; + type collectd_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 collectd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, collectd_t) + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 collectd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + collectd_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 collectd_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, collectd_var_lib_t) + + collectd_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, collectd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 collectd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/collectd.te b/policy/modules/services/collectd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e7ca6fc --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/collectd.te @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ +policy_module(collectd, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +## +##

    +## Allow collectd to connect to the +## network using TCP. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(collectd_can_network_connect, false) + +type collectd_t; +type collectd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(collectd_t, collectd_exec_t) + +type collectd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(collectd_initrc_exec_t) + +type collectd_var_lib_t; +files_type(collectd_var_lib_t) + +type collectd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(collectd_var_run_t) + +type collectd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(collectd_unit_file_t) + +######################################## +# +# collectd local policy +# + +allow collectd_t self:capability ipc_lock; +allow collectd_t self:process { signal fork }; + +allow collectd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow collectd_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; +allow collectd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(collectd_t, collectd_var_lib_t, collectd_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(collectd_t, collectd_var_lib_t, collectd_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(collectd_t, collectd_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(collectd_t, collectd_var_run_t, collectd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(collectd_t, collectd_var_run_t, collectd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(collectd_t, collectd_var_run_t, { dir file }) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(collectd_t) + +kernel_read_network_state(collectd_t) +kernel_read_net_sysctls(collectd_t) +kernel_read_system_state(collectd_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(collectd_t) +dev_read_urand(collectd_t) +dev_read_rand(collectd_t) + +files_getattr_all_dirs(collectd_t) +files_read_etc_files(collectd_t) +files_read_usr_files(collectd_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(collectd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(collectd_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(collectd_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(collectd_t) + +tunable_policy(`collectd_can_network_connect',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(collectd_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(collectd_t) + corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(collectd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + apache_content_template(collectd) + + files_search_var_lib(httpd_collectd_script_t) + read_files_pattern(httpd_collectd_script_t, collectd_var_lib_t, collectd_var_lib_t) + list_dirs_pattern(httpd_collectd_script_t, collectd_var_lib_t, collectd_var_lib_t) + miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(httpd_collectd_script_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/colord.fc b/policy/modules/services/colord.fc index 78b2fea..ef975ac 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/colord.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/colord.fc @@ -1,4 +1,7 @@ /usr/libexec/colord -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:colord_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/colord-sane -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:colord_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/colord.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:colord_unit_file_t,s0) /var/lib/color(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:colord_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/colord(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:colord_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/colord.if b/policy/modules/services/colord.if index 733e4e6..fa2c3cb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/colord.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/colord.if @@ -57,3 +57,26 @@ interface(`colord_read_lib_files',` files_search_var_lib($1) read_files_pattern($1, colord_var_lib_t, colord_var_lib_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Execute colord server in the colord domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`colord_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type colord_t; + type colord_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 colord_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 colord_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, colord_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/colord.te b/policy/modules/services/colord.te index 74505cc..dbd4f7f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/colord.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/colord.te @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ policy_module(colord, 1.0.0) type colord_t; type colord_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(colord_t, colord_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(colord_t, colord_exec_t) type colord_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(colord_tmp_t) @@ -18,14 +19,20 @@ files_tmpfs_file(colord_tmpfs_t) type colord_var_lib_t; files_type(colord_var_lib_t) +type colord_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(colord_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # colord local policy # allow colord_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override }; +dontaudit colord_t self:capability sys_admin; allow colord_t self:process signal; allow colord_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow colord_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +allow colord_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow colord_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow colord_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow colord_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -41,8 +48,14 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(colord_t, colord_var_lib_t, colord_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(colord_t, colord_var_lib_t, colord_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(colord_t, colord_var_lib_t, { file dir }) -kernel_getattr_proc_files(colord_t) +kernel_read_network_state(colord_t) +kernel_read_system_state(colord_t) kernel_read_device_sysctls(colord_t) +kernel_request_load_module(colord_t) + +# reads *.ini files +corecmd_exec_bin(colord_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(colord_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(colord_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(colord_t) @@ -50,6 +63,8 @@ corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(colord_t) corenet_udp_bind_ipp_port(colord_t) corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(colord_t) +dev_read_raw_memory(colord_t) +dev_write_raw_memory(colord_t) dev_read_video_dev(colord_t) dev_write_video_dev(colord_t) dev_rw_printer(colord_t) @@ -65,19 +80,35 @@ files_list_mnt(colord_t) files_read_etc_files(colord_t) files_read_usr_files(colord_t) +fs_search_all(colord_t) +fs_getattr_noxattr_fs(colord_t) +fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs(colord_t) +fs_list_noxattr_fs(colord_t) fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(colord_t) +storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(colord_t) +storage_getattr_removable_dev(colord_t) +storage_read_scsi_generic(colord_t) +storage_write_scsi_generic(colord_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(colord_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(colord_t) miscfiles_read_localization(colord_t) -sysnet_dns_name_resolve(colord_t) +fs_getattr_tmpfs(colord_t) +userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files(colord_t) + +userdom_home_reader(colord_t) tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_getattr_nfs(colord_t) fs_read_nfs_files(colord_t) ') tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_getattr_cifs(colord_t) fs_read_cifs_files(colord_t) ') @@ -89,6 +120,12 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_read_home_icc_data_content(colord_t) + # Fixes lots of breakage in F16 on upgrade + gnome_read_generic_data_home_files(colord_t) +') + +optional_policy(` policykit_dbus_chat(colord_t) policykit_domtrans_auth(colord_t) policykit_read_lib(colord_t) @@ -96,5 +133,20 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + sysnet_exec_ifconfig(colord_t) + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(colord_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_read_db(colord_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_dbus_chat_xdm(colord_t) + # /var/lib/gdm/.local/share/icc/edid-0a027915105823af34f99b1704e80336.icc + xserver_read_inherited_xdm_lib_files(colord_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + zoneminder_rw_tmpfs_files(colord_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/condor.fc b/policy/modules/services/condor.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3a5b51 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/condor.fc @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ +/usr/lib/systemd/system/condor.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_unit_file_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/condor_master -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_master_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/condor_collector -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_collector_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/condor_negotiator -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_negotiator_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/condor_schedd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_schedd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/condor_startd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_startd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/condor_starter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_startd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/condor_procd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_procd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/condor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/lib/condor/execute(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/lib/condor/spool(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/lock/condor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_var_lock_t,s0) + +/var/log/condor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/condor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:condor_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/condor.if b/policy/modules/services/condor.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..168f664 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/condor.if @@ -0,0 +1,327 @@ + +## policy for condor + +##################################### +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## condor init daemon domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`condor_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + type condor_master_t; + attribute condor_domain; + ') + + ############################# + # + # Declarations + # + + type condor_$1_t, condor_domain; + type condor_$1_exec_t; + init_daemon_domain(condor_$1_t, condor_$1_exec_t) + role system_r types condor_$1_t; + + domtrans_pattern(condor_master_t, condor_$1_exec_t, condor_$1_t) + allow condor_master_t condor_$1_exec_t:file ioctl; +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to condor. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type condor_t, condor_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, condor_exec_t, condor_t) +') +######################################## +## +## Read condor's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`condor_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type condor_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, condor_log_t, condor_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to condor log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type condor_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, condor_log_t, condor_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage condor log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type condor_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, condor_log_t, condor_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, condor_log_t, condor_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, condor_log_t, condor_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search condor lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type condor_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 condor_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read condor lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type condor_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, condor_var_lib_t, condor_var_lib_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Read and write condor lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_rw_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type condor_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + rw_files_pattern($1, condor_var_lib_t, condor_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage condor lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type condor_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, condor_var_lib_t, condor_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage condor lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type condor_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, condor_var_lib_t, condor_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read condor PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type condor_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 condor_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute condor server in the condor domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type condor_t; + type condor_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + allow $1 condor_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 condor_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, condor_t) +') + + +####################################### +## +## Read and write condor_startd server TCP sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_rw_tcp_sockets_startd',` + gen_require(` + type condor_startd_t; + ') + + allow $1 condor_startd_t:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## Read and write condor_schedd server TCP sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_rw_tcp_sockets_schedd',` + gen_require(` + type condor_schedd_t; + ') + + allow $1 condor_schedd_t:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an condor environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`condor_admin',` + gen_require(` + type condor_t; + type condor_log_t; + type condor_var_lib_t; + type condor_var_run_t; + type condor_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 condor_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, condor_t) + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, condor_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, condor_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, condor_var_run_t) + + condor_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, condor_unit_file_t) + allow $1 condor_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/condor.te b/policy/modules/services/condor.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4eb7bd9 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/condor.te @@ -0,0 +1,231 @@ +policy_module(condor, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +## +##

    +## Allow codnor domain to connect to the network using TCP. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(condor_domain_can_network_connect, false) + +attribute condor_domain; + +type condor_master_t, condor_domain; +type condor_master_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(condor_master_t, condor_master_exec_t) + +condor_domain_template(collector) +condor_domain_template(negotiator) +condor_domain_template(schedd) +condor_domain_template(startd) +condor_domain_template(procd) + +type condor_schedd_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(condor_schedd_tmp_t) + +type condor_startd_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(condor_startd_tmp_t) + +type condor_startd_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(condor_startd_tmpfs_t) + +type condor_log_t; +logging_log_file(condor_log_t) + +type condor_var_lib_t; +files_type(condor_var_lib_t) + +type condor_var_lock_t; +files_lock_file(condor_var_lock_t) + +type condor_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(condor_var_run_t) + +type condor_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(condor_unit_file_t) + +######################################## +# +# condor domain local policy +# + +allow condor_domain self:process signal_perms; +allow condor_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +allow condor_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow condor_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow condor_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +allow condor_domain condor_master_t:process signull; +allow condor_domain condor_master_t:tcp_socket getattr; + +manage_dirs_pattern(condor_domain, condor_log_t, condor_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(condor_domain, condor_log_t, condor_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(condor_domain, condor_log_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_lib_t, condor_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_lib_t, condor_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(condor_domain, condor_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +manage_files_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_lock_t, condor_var_lock_t) +files_lock_filetrans(condor_domain, condor_var_lock_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_run_t, condor_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_run_t, condor_var_run_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(condor_domain, condor_var_run_t, condor_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(condor_domain, condor_var_run_t, { dir file fifo_file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(condor_domain) +kernel_read_network_state(condor_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(condor_domain) +corecmd_exec_shell(condor_domain) + +corenet_tcp_connect_condor_port(condor_domain) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(condor_domain) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(condor_domain) + +dev_read_rand(condor_domain) +dev_read_urand(condor_domain) +dev_read_sysfs(condor_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(condor_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(condor_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(condor_domain) + +tunable_policy(`condor_domain_can_network_connect',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(condor_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + rhcs_stream_connect_cluster(condor_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(condor_domain) +') + +##################################### +# +# condor master local policy +# + +allow condor_master_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override sys_ptrace }; + +allow condor_master_t condor_domain:process signal; + +corenet_tcp_bind_condor_port(condor_master_t) +corenet_udp_bind_condor_port(condor_master_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(condor_master_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(condor_master_t) + +###################################### +# +# condor collector local policy +# + +allow condor_collector_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; + +allow condor_collector_t condor_master_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms; +allow condor_collector_t condor_master_t:udp_socket rw_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_network_state(condor_collector_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(condor_collector_t) + +##################################### +# +# condor negotiator local policy +# +allow condor_negotiator_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; +allow condor_negotiator_t condor_master_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms; +allow condor_negotiator_t condor_master_t:udp_socket getattr; + +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(condor_negotiator_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(condor_negotiator_t) + +###################################### +# +# condor procd local policy +# + +allow condor_procd_t self:capability { fowner chown dac_override sys_ptrace }; + +domain_read_all_domains_state(condor_procd_t) + +####################################### +# +# condor schedd local policy +# + +domtrans_pattern(condor_schedd_t, condor_procd_exec_t, condor_procd_t) +domtrans_pattern(condor_schedd_t, condor_startd_exec_t, condor_startd_t) + +# dac_override because of /var/log/condor +allow condor_schedd_t self:capability { setuid chown setgid dac_override }; +allow condor_schedd_t condor_master_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms; +allow condor_schedd_t condor_master_t:udp_socket getattr; + +allow condor_schedd_t condor_var_lock_t:dir manage_file_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(condor_schedd_t, condor_schedd_tmp_t, condor_schedd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(condor_schedd_t, condor_schedd_tmp_t, condor_schedd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(condor_schedd_t, condor_schedd_tmp_t, { file dir }) +allow condor_schedd_t condor_schedd_tmp_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(condor_schedd_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(condor_schedd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(condor_schedd_t) + +##################################### +# +# condor startd local policy +# + +# also needed by java +allow condor_startd_t self:capability { setuid net_admin setgid dac_override }; +allow condor_startd_t self:process execmem; + +manage_dirs_pattern(condor_startd_t, condor_startd_tmp_t, condor_startd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(condor_startd_t, condor_startd_tmp_t, condor_startd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(condor_startd_t, condor_startd_tmp_t, { file dir }) +allow condor_startd_t condor_startd_tmp_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; + +manage_dirs_pattern(condor_startd_t, condor_startd_tmpfs_t, condor_startd_tmpfs_t) +manage_files_pattern(condor_startd_t, condor_startd_tmpfs_t, condor_startd_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(condor_startd_t, condor_startd_tmpfs_t, { dir file }) + +can_exec(condor_startd_t, condor_startd_exec_t) + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(condor_startd_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(condor_startd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(condor_startd_t) + +init_domtrans_script(condor_startd_t) + +libs_exec_lib_files(condor_startd_t) + +files_read_usr_files(condor_startd_t) + +optional_policy(` + ssh_basic_client_template(condor_startd, condor_startd_t, system_r) + ssh_domtrans(condor_startd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(condor_startd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/consolekit.fc b/policy/modules/services/consolekit.fc index 32233ab..7058d21 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/consolekit.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/consolekit.fc @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +/usr/lib/systemd/system/console-kit.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:consolekit_unit_file_t,s0) + /usr/sbin/console-kit-daemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:consolekit_exec_t,s0) /var/log/ConsoleKit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:consolekit_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/consolekit.if b/policy/modules/services/consolekit.if index fd15dfe..b6337fd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/consolekit.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/consolekit.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run consolekit. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`consolekit_domtrans',` @@ -20,6 +20,27 @@ interface(`consolekit_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## dontaudit Send and receive messages from +## consolekit over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`consolekit_dontaudit_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type consolekit_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + dontaudit $1 consolekit_t:dbus send_msg; + dontaudit consolekit_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## ## Send and receive messages from ## consolekit over dbus. ## @@ -41,6 +62,24 @@ interface(`consolekit_dbus_chat',` ######################################## ## +## Dontaudit attempts to read consolekit log files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`consolekit_dontaudit_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type consolekit_log_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 consolekit_log_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read consolekit log files. ## ## @@ -96,3 +135,64 @@ interface(`consolekit_read_pid_files',` allow $1 consolekit_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern($1, consolekit_var_run_t, consolekit_var_run_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## List consolekit PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`consolekit_list_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type consolekit_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + list_dirs_pattern($1, consolekit_var_run_t, consolekit_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the domain to read consolekit state files in /proc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`consolekit_read_state',` + gen_require(` + type consolekit_t; + ') + + kernel_search_proc($1) + ps_process_pattern($1, consolekit_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute consolekit server in the consolekit domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`consolekit_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type consolekit_t; + type consolekit_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 consolekit_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 consolekit_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, consolekit_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/consolekit.te b/policy/modules/services/consolekit.te index e67a003..cc813f3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/consolekit.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/consolekit.te @@ -15,12 +15,19 @@ logging_log_file(consolekit_log_t) type consolekit_var_run_t; files_pid_file(consolekit_var_run_t) +type consolekit_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(consolekit_tmpfs_t) + +type consolekit_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(consolekit_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # consolekit local policy # allow consolekit_t self:capability { chown setuid setgid sys_tty_config dac_override sys_nice sys_ptrace }; + allow consolekit_t self:process { getsched signal }; allow consolekit_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow consolekit_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -43,7 +50,6 @@ dev_read_sysfs(consolekit_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(consolekit_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(consolekit_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(consolekit_t) files_read_etc_files(consolekit_t) files_read_usr_files(consolekit_t) @@ -53,8 +59,6 @@ files_search_all_mountpoints(consolekit_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(consolekit_t) -mcs_ptrace_all(consolekit_t) - term_use_all_terms(consolekit_t) auth_use_nsswitch(consolekit_t) @@ -69,17 +73,17 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(consolekit_t) miscfiles_read_localization(consolekit_t) +systemd_exec_systemctl(consolekit_t) + +userdom_read_all_users_state(consolekit_t) userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(consolekit_t) +userdom_dontaudit_getattr_admin_home_files(consolekit_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_files(consolekit_t) -hal_ptrace(consolekit_t) - -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_read_nfs_files(consolekit_t) -') +userdom_home_reader(consolekit_t) -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_read_cifs_files(consolekit_t) +optional_policy(` + cron_read_system_job_lib_files(consolekit_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -99,6 +103,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + networkmanager_append_log(consolekit_t) +') + +optional_policy(` policykit_dbus_chat(consolekit_t) policykit_domtrans_auth(consolekit_t) policykit_read_lib(consolekit_t) @@ -106,9 +114,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - type consolekit_tmpfs_t; - files_tmpfs_file(consolekit_tmpfs_t) + shutdown_domtrans(consolekit_t) +') +optional_policy(` xserver_read_xdm_pid(consolekit_t) xserver_read_user_xauth(consolekit_t) xserver_non_drawing_client(consolekit_t) @@ -124,6 +133,5 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - #reading .Xauthity unconfined_stream_connect(consolekit_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/corosync.fc b/policy/modules/services/corosync.fc index 3a6d7eb..bb32bf0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/corosync.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/corosync.fc @@ -1,12 +1,22 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/corosync -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/heartbeat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/corosync.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_unit_file_t,s0) /usr/sbin/corosync -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/corosync-notifyd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/ccs_tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cman_tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib(64)?/heartbeat/heartbeat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/corosync(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/heartbeat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_lib_t,s0) /var/log/cluster/corosync\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_log_t,s0) /var/run/cman_.* -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/corosync\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/heartbeat(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/rsctmp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:corosync_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/corosync.if b/policy/modules/services/corosync.if index 5220c9d..11e5dc4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/corosync.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/corosync.if @@ -18,6 +18,25 @@ interface(`corosync_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, corosync_exec_t, corosync_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Execute corosync in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`corosync_exec',` + gen_require(` + type corosync_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + can_exec($1, corosync_exec_t) +') + ####################################### ## ## Allow the specified domain to read corosync's log files. @@ -58,6 +77,29 @@ interface(`corosync_stream_connect',` stream_connect_pattern($1, corosync_var_run_t, corosync_var_run_t, corosync_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Execute corosync server in the corosync domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`corosync_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type corosync_t; + type corosync_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 corosync_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 corosync_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, corosync_t) +') + ###################################### ## ## All of the rules required to administrate @@ -80,11 +122,16 @@ interface(`corosyncd_admin',` type corosync_t, corosync_var_lib_t, corosync_var_log_t; type corosync_var_run_t, corosync_tmp_t, corosync_tmpfs_t; type corosync_initrc_exec_t; + type corosync_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 corosync_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 corosync_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, corosync_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 corosync_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, corosync_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 corosync_initrc_exec_t system_r; @@ -103,4 +150,8 @@ interface(`corosyncd_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, corosync_var_run_t) + + corosync_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, corosync_unit_file_t) + allow $1 corosync_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/corosync.te b/policy/modules/services/corosync.te index 04969e5..58b16a6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/corosync.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/corosync.te @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ policy_module(corosync, 1.0.0) type corosync_t; type corosync_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(corosync_t, corosync_exec_t) +domain_obj_id_change_exemption(corosync_t) type corosync_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(corosync_initrc_exec_t) @@ -27,23 +28,32 @@ logging_log_file(corosync_var_log_t) type corosync_var_run_t; files_pid_file(corosync_var_run_t) +type corosync_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(corosync_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # corosync local policy # -allow corosync_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_resource ipc_lock }; -allow corosync_t self:process { setrlimit setsched signal }; +allow corosync_t self:capability { dac_override setuid setgid sys_nice sys_admin sys_resource ipc_lock }; +# for hearbeat +allow corosync_t self:capability { net_raw chown }; +allow corosync_t self:process { setpgid setrlimit setsched signal signull }; allow corosync_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow corosync_t self:sem create_sem_perms; +allow corosync_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow corosync_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; allow corosync_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow corosync_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +can_exec(corosync_t, corosync_exec_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_tmp_t, corosync_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_tmp_t, corosync_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(corosync_t, corosync_tmp_t, { file dir }) +allow corosync_t corosync_tmp_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; manage_dirs_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_tmpfs_t, corosync_tmpfs_t) manage_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_tmpfs_t, corosync_tmpfs_t) @@ -52,7 +62,8 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(corosync_t, corosync_tmpfs_t, { dir file }) manage_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_lib_t, corosync_var_lib_t) manage_dirs_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_lib_t, corosync_var_lib_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_lib_t, corosync_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(corosync_t, corosync_var_lib_t, { file dir sock_file }) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_lib_t,corosync_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(corosync_t,corosync_var_lib_t, { file dir fifo_file sock_file }) manage_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_log_t, corosync_var_log_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_log_t, corosync_var_log_t) @@ -60,11 +71,16 @@ logging_log_filetrans(corosync_t, corosync_var_log_t, { sock_file file }) manage_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_run_t, corosync_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_run_t, corosync_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(corosync_t, corosync_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +manage_dirs_pattern(corosync_t, corosync_var_run_t,corosync_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(corosync_t, corosync_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir }) kernel_read_system_state(corosync_t) +kernel_read_network_state(corosync_t) +kernel_read_net_sysctls(corosync_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(corosync_t) corecmd_exec_bin(corosync_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(corosync_t) corenet_udp_bind_netsupport_port(corosync_t) @@ -73,9 +89,12 @@ dev_read_urand(corosync_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(corosync_t) files_manage_mounttab(corosync_t) +files_read_etc_files(corosync_t) +files_read_usr_files(corosync_t) auth_use_nsswitch(corosync_t) +init_domtrans_script(corosync_t) init_read_script_state(corosync_t) init_rw_script_tmp_files(corosync_t) @@ -83,21 +102,52 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(corosync_t) miscfiles_read_localization(corosync_t) +userdom_read_user_tmp_files(corosync_t) +userdom_delete_user_tmpfs_files(corosync_t) userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files(corosync_t) optional_policy(` + fs_manage_tmpfs_files(corosync_t) + init_manage_script_status_files(corosync_t) +') + +optional_policy(` ccs_read_config(corosync_t) ') optional_policy(` - # to communication with RHCS - rhcs_rw_dlm_controld_semaphores(corosync_t) + cmirrord_rw_shm(corosync_t) +') - rhcs_rw_fenced_semaphores(corosync_t) +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(corosync_t) +') - rhcs_rw_gfs_controld_semaphores(corosync_t) +optional_policy(` + drbd_domtrans(corosync_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + lvm_rw_clvmd_tmpfs_files(corosync_t) + lvm_delete_clvmd_tmpfs_files(corosync_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + qpidd_rw_shm(corosync_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rhcs_getattr_fenced(corosync_t) + # to communication with RHCS + rhcs_rw_cluster_shm(corosync_t) + rhcs_rw_cluster_semaphores(corosync_t) + rhcs_stream_connect_cluster(corosync_t) + rhcs_read_cluster_lib_files(corosync_t) + rhcs_manage_cluster_lib_files(corosync_t) + rhcs_relabel_cluster_lib_files(corosync_t) ') optional_policy(` rgmanager_manage_tmpfs_files(corosync_t) ') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/couchdb.fc b/policy/modules/services/couchdb.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..196461b --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/couchdb.fc @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/etc/couchdb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:couchdb_etc_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/couchdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:couchdb_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/couchdb.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:couchdb_unit_file_t,s0) + +/var/lib/couchdb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:couchdb_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/couchdb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:couchdb_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/couchdb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:couchdb_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/couchdb.if b/policy/modules/services/couchdb.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..31692fb --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/couchdb.if @@ -0,0 +1,249 @@ + +## policy for couchdb + +######################################## +## +## Transition to couchdb. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_t, couchdb_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, couchdb_exec_t, couchdb_t) +') +######################################## +## +## Read couchdb's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, couchdb_log_t, couchdb_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to couchdb log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, couchdb_log_t, couchdb_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage couchdb log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, couchdb_log_t, couchdb_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, couchdb_log_t, couchdb_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, couchdb_log_t, couchdb_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search couchdb lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 couchdb_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read couchdb lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, couchdb_var_lib_t, couchdb_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage couchdb lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, couchdb_var_lib_t, couchdb_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage couchdb lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, couchdb_var_lib_t, couchdb_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read couchdb PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 couchdb_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute couchdb server in the couchdb domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_t; + type couchdb_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + allow $1 couchdb_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 couchdb_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, couchdb_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an couchdb environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`couchdb_admin',` + gen_require(` + type couchdb_t, couchdb_etc_t, couchdb_log_t; + type couchdb_var_lib_t, couchdb_var_run_t; + type couchdb_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 couchdb_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, couchdb_t) + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, couchdb_log_t) + + files_search_etc($1) + admin_pattern($1, couchdb_etc_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, couchdb_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, couchdb_var_run_t) + + admin_pattern($1, couchdb_unit_file_t) + couchdb_systemctl($1) + allow $1 couchdb_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/couchdb.te b/policy/modules/services/couchdb.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4a80b5c --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/couchdb.te @@ -0,0 +1,85 @@ +policy_module(couchdb, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type couchdb_t; +type couchdb_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(couchdb_t, couchdb_exec_t) + +type couchdb_etc_t; +files_config_file(couchdb_etc_t) + +type couchdb_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(couchdb_tmp_t) + +type couchdb_log_t; +logging_log_file(couchdb_log_t) + +type couchdb_var_lib_t; +files_type(couchdb_var_lib_t) + +type couchdb_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(couchdb_var_run_t) + +type couchdb_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(couchdb_unit_file_t) + +######################################## +# +# couchdb local policy +# +allow couchdb_t self:process { setsched signal signull sigkill }; +allow couchdb_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow couchdb_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow couchdb_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow couchdb_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +allow couchdb_t couchdb_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_files_pattern(couchdb_t, couchdb_etc_t, couchdb_etc_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(couchdb_t, couchdb_log_t, couchdb_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(couchdb_t, couchdb_log_t, couchdb_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(couchdb_t, couchdb_log_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(couchdb_t, couchdb_tmp_t, couchdb_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(couchdb_t, couchdb_tmp_t, couchdb_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(couchdb_t, couchdb_tmp_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(couchdb_t, couchdb_var_lib_t, couchdb_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(couchdb_t, couchdb_var_lib_t, couchdb_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(couchdb_t, couchdb_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(couchdb_t, couchdb_var_run_t, couchdb_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(couchdb_t, couchdb_var_run_t, couchdb_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(couchdb_t, couchdb_var_run_t, { dir file }) + +can_exec(couchdb_t, couchdb_exec_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(couchdb_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(couchdb_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(couchdb_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(couchdb_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(couchdb_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_couchdb_port(couchdb_t) + +dev_list_sysfs(couchdb_t) +dev_read_sysfs(couchdb_t) +dev_read_urand(couchdb_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(couchdb_t) + +files_read_etc_files(couchdb_t) +files_read_usr_files(couchdb_t) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(couchdb_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(couchdb_t) + +libs_exec_lib_files(couchdb_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(couchdb_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/courier.fc b/policy/modules/services/courier.fc index 01d31f1..8e2754b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/courier.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/courier.fc @@ -6,18 +6,18 @@ /usr/sbin/courierldapaliasd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/couriertcpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_tcpd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier/(courier-)?authlib/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_authdaemon_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier/courier/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier/courier/courierpop.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pop_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier/courier/imaplogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pop_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier/courier/pcpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pcp_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier/imapd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pop_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier/pop3d -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pop_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier/rootcerts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_etc_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/courier/sqwebmail/cleancache\.pl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sqwebmail_cron_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier/authlib/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_authdaemon_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier/courier/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier/courier/courierpop.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pop_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier/courier/imaplogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pop_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier/courier/pcpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pcp_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier/imapd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pop_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier/pop3d -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_pop_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier/rootcerts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_etc_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier/sqwebmail/cleancache\.pl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sqwebmail_cron_exec_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` -/usr/lib(64)?/courier-imap/couriertcpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_tcpd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/courier-imap/couriertcpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_tcpd_exec_t,s0) ') /var/lib/courier(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:courier_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/courier.if b/policy/modules/services/courier.if index 9971337..db88074 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/courier.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/courier.if @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ template(`courier_domain_template',` ## Execute the courier authentication daemon with ## a domain transition. ## -## +## ## ## Domain allowed to transition. ## @@ -104,12 +104,31 @@ interface(`courier_domtrans_authdaemon',` domtrans_pattern($1, courier_authdaemon_exec_t, courier_authdaemon_t) ') +####################################### +## +## Connect to courier-authdaemon over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`courier_stream_connect_authdaemon',` + gen_require(` + type courier_authdaemon_t, courier_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, courier_spool_t, courier_spool_t, courier_authdaemon_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute the courier POP3 and IMAP server with ## a domain transition. ## -## +## ## ## Domain allowed to transition. ## @@ -127,7 +146,7 @@ interface(`courier_domtrans_pop',` ## ## Read courier config files ## -## +## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## @@ -138,6 +157,7 @@ interface(`courier_read_config',` type courier_etc_t; ') + files_search_etc($1) read_files_pattern($1, courier_etc_t, courier_etc_t) ') @@ -146,7 +166,7 @@ interface(`courier_read_config',` ## Create, read, write, and delete courier ## spool directories. ## -## +## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## @@ -157,6 +177,7 @@ interface(`courier_manage_spool_dirs',` type courier_spool_t; ') + files_search_spool($1) manage_dirs_pattern($1, courier_spool_t, courier_spool_t) ') @@ -165,7 +186,7 @@ interface(`courier_manage_spool_dirs',` ## Create, read, write, and delete courier ## spool files. ##     -## +## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## @@ -176,6 +197,7 @@ interface(`courier_manage_spool_files',` type courier_spool_t; ') + files_search_spool($1) manage_files_pattern($1, courier_spool_t, courier_spool_t) ') @@ -183,7 +205,7 @@ interface(`courier_manage_spool_files',` ## ## Read courier spool files. ## -## +## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## @@ -194,6 +216,7 @@ interface(`courier_read_spool',` type courier_spool_t; ') + files_search_spool($1) read_files_pattern($1, courier_spool_t, courier_spool_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/courier.te b/policy/modules/services/courier.te index 838dec7..59d0f96 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/courier.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/courier.te @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ courier_domain_template(pcp) courier_domain_template(pop) type courier_spool_t; -files_type(courier_spool_t) +files_spool_file(courier_spool_t) courier_domain_template(tcpd) @@ -95,7 +95,7 @@ allow courier_pop_t courier_authdaemon_t:process sigchld; allow courier_pop_t courier_tcpd_t:{ unix_stream_socket tcp_socket } rw_stream_socket_perms; # inherits file handle - should it? -allow courier_pop_t courier_var_lib_t:file { read write }; +allow courier_pop_t courier_var_lib_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; miscfiles_read_localization(courier_pop_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cpucontrol.fc b/policy/modules/services/cpucontrol.fc index 789c8c7..d1723f5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cpucontrol.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/cpucontrol.fc @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ /sbin/microcode_ctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cpucontrol_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/microcode_ctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cpucontrol_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/cpufreqd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cpuspeed_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/cpuspeed -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cpuspeed_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/powernowd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cpuspeed_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cpucontrol.te b/policy/modules/services/cpucontrol.te index 13d2f63..861fad7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cpucontrol.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/cpucontrol.te @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type cpucontrol_exec_t; init_system_domain(cpucontrol_t, cpucontrol_exec_t) type cpucontrol_conf_t; -files_type(cpucontrol_conf_t) +files_config_file(cpucontrol_conf_t) type cpuspeed_t; type cpuspeed_exec_t; @@ -55,10 +55,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(cpucontrol_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cpucontrol_t) optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(cpucontrol_t) -') - -optional_policy(` rhgb_use_ptys(cpucontrol_t) ') @@ -110,10 +106,6 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(cpuspeed_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cpuspeed_t) optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(cpuspeed_t) -') - -optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(cpuspeed_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cron.fc b/policy/modules/services/cron.fc index 2eefc08..16adc00 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cron.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/cron.fc @@ -3,6 +3,9 @@ /etc/cron\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_cron_spool_t,s0) /etc/crontab -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_cron_spool_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/atd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/crond.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_unit_file_t,s0) + /usr/bin/at -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crontab_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/(f)?crontab -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crontab_exec_t,s0) @@ -11,17 +14,20 @@ /usr/sbin/cron(d)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/fcron -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_exec_t,s0) +/var/log/rpmpkgs.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cron_log_t,s0) + /var/run/anacron\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/atd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/crond?\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_var_run_t,s0) -/var/run/crond\.reboot -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/crond?\.reboot -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/fcron\.fifo -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/fcron\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/.*cron.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:crond_var_run_t,s0) /var/spool/anacron(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_cron_spool_t,s0) /var/spool/at(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_cron_spool_t,s0) -/var/spool/cron -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:cron_spool_t,s0) +/var/spool/cron -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_cron_spool_t,s0) #/var/spool/cron/root -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysadm_cron_spool_t,s0) /var/spool/cron/[^/]* -- <> @@ -45,3 +51,5 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /var/spool/fcron/systab\.orig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_cron_spool_t,s0) /var/spool/fcron/systab -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_cron_spool_t,s0) /var/spool/fcron/new\.systab -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_cron_spool_t,s0) + +/var/lib/glpi/files(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cron_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cron.if b/policy/modules/services/cron.if index 35241ed..2f6f038 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cron.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/cron.if @@ -12,6 +12,11 @@ ## # template(`cron_common_crontab_template',` + gen_require(` + type crond_t, crond_var_run_t, crontab_exec_t; + type cron_spool_t, user_cron_spool_t; + ') + ############################## # # Declarations @@ -31,11 +36,15 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',` # dac_override is to create the file in the directory under /tmp allow $1_t self:capability { fowner setuid setgid chown dac_override }; - allow $1_t self:process { setsched signal_perms }; + allow $1_t self:process { getcap setsched signal_perms }; allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - allow $1_t $1_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; - files_tmp_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmp_t, file) + allow $1_t crond_t:process signal; + allow $1_t crond_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; + + manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t) + manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t) + files_tmp_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmp_t, { dir file }) # create files in /var/spool/cron manage_files_pattern($1_t, { cron_spool_t user_cron_spool_t }, user_cron_spool_t) @@ -43,7 +52,7 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',` files_list_spool($1_t) # crontab signals crond by updating the mtime on the spooldir - allow $1_t cron_spool_t:dir setattr; + allow $1_t cron_spool_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; kernel_read_system_state($1_t) @@ -51,6 +60,8 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',` selinux_dontaudit_search_fs($1_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_t) + fs_manage_cgroup_dirs($1_t) + fs_manage_cgroup_files($1_t) domain_use_interactive_fds($1_t) @@ -59,12 +70,16 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',` files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_t) + auth_rw_var_auth($1_t) + auth_use_nsswitch($1_t) logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) logging_send_audit_msgs($1_t) + logging_set_loginuid($1_t) init_dontaudit_write_utmp($1_t) init_read_utmp($1_t) + init_read_state($1_t) miscfiles_read_localization($1_t) @@ -73,9 +88,10 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',` userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs($1_t) userdom_manage_user_tmp_files($1_t) # Access terminals. - userdom_use_user_terminals($1_t) + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals($1_t) # Read user crontabs userdom_read_user_home_content_files($1_t) + userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks($1_t) tunable_policy(`fcron_crond',` # fcron wants an instant update of a crontab change for the administrator @@ -83,9 +99,6 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',` dontaudit $1_t crond_t:process signal; ') - optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use($1_t) - ') ') ######################################## @@ -102,10 +115,12 @@ template(`cron_common_crontab_template',` ## User domain for the role ##     ## +## # interface(`cron_role',` gen_require(` type cronjob_t, crontab_t, crontab_exec_t; + type user_cron_spool_t, crond_t; ') role $1 types { cronjob_t crontab_t }; @@ -116,9 +131,20 @@ interface(`cron_role',` # Transition from the user domain to the derived domain. domtrans_pattern($2, crontab_exec_t, crontab_t) + allow crond_t $2:process transition; + dontaudit crond_t $2:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; + allow $2 crond_t:process sigchld; + + # needs to be authorized SELinux context for cron + allow $2 user_cron_spool_t:file { getattr read write ioctl entrypoint }; + # crontab shows up in user ps ps_process_pattern($2, crontab_t) - allow $2 crontab_t:process signal; + allow $2 crontab_t:process signal_perms; + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 crontab_t:process ptrace; + ') # Run helper programs as the user domain #corecmd_bin_domtrans(crontab_t, $2) @@ -132,9 +158,8 @@ interface(`cron_role',` ') dbus_stub(cronjob_t) - allow cronjob_t $2:dbus send_msg; - ') + ') ') ######################################## @@ -151,29 +176,21 @@ interface(`cron_role',` ## User domain for the role ##     ## +## # interface(`cron_unconfined_role',` gen_require(` - type unconfined_cronjob_t, crontab_t, crontab_tmp_t, crontab_exec_t; + type unconfined_cronjob_t; ') - role $1 types { unconfined_cronjob_t crontab_t }; + role $1 types unconfined_cronjob_t; # cronjob shows up in user ps ps_process_pattern($2, unconfined_cronjob_t) - - # Transition from the user domain to the derived domain. - domtrans_pattern($2, crontab_exec_t, crontab_t) - - # crontab shows up in user ps - ps_process_pattern($2, crontab_t) - allow $2 crontab_t:process signal; - - # Run helper programs as the user domain - #corecmd_bin_domtrans(crontab_t, $2) - #corecmd_shell_domtrans(crontab_t, $2) - corecmd_exec_bin(crontab_t) - corecmd_exec_shell(crontab_t) + allow $2 unconfined_cronjob_t:process signal_perms; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 unconfined_cronjob_t:process ptrace; + ') optional_policy(` gen_require(` @@ -181,9 +198,8 @@ interface(`cron_unconfined_role',` ') dbus_stub(unconfined_cronjob_t) - allow unconfined_cronjob_t $2:dbus send_msg; - ') + ') ') ######################################## @@ -200,6 +216,7 @@ interface(`cron_unconfined_role',` ## User domain for the role ##     ## +## # interface(`cron_admin_role',` gen_require(` @@ -220,7 +237,10 @@ interface(`cron_admin_role',` # crontab shows up in user ps ps_process_pattern($2, admin_crontab_t) - allow $2 admin_crontab_t:process signal; + allow $2 admin_crontab_t:process signal_perms; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 admin_crontab_t:process ptrace; + ') # Run helper programs as the user domain #corecmd_bin_domtrans(admin_crontab_t, $2) @@ -234,9 +254,8 @@ interface(`cron_admin_role',` ') dbus_stub(admin_cronjob_t) - allow cronjob_t $2:dbus send_msg; - ') + ') ') ######################################## @@ -264,6 +283,9 @@ interface(`cron_system_entry',` domtrans_pattern(crond_t, $2, $1) role system_r types $1; + + allow $1 crond_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + allow $1 system_cronjob_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -304,7 +326,7 @@ interface(`cron_exec',` ######################################## ## -## Execute crond server in the nscd domain. +## Execute crond server in the crond domain. ## ## ## @@ -322,6 +344,29 @@ interface(`cron_initrc_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute crond server in the crond domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`cron_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type crond_unit_file_t; + type crond_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 crond_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 crond_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, crond_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Inherit and use a file descriptor ## from the cron daemon. ## @@ -359,6 +404,24 @@ interface(`cron_sigchld',` ######################################## ## +## Send a generic signal to cron daemon. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cron_signal',` + gen_require(` + type crond_t; + ') + + allow $1 crond_t:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read a cron daemon unnamed pipe. ## ## @@ -377,6 +440,47 @@ interface(`cron_read_pipes',` ######################################## ## +## Read crond state files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cron_read_state_crond',` + gen_require(` + type crond_t; + ') + + kernel_search_proc($1) + ps_process_pattern($1, crond_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## crond over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cron_dbus_chat_crond',` + gen_require(` + type crond_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 crond_t:dbus send_msg; + allow crond_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to write cron daemon unnamed pipes. ## ## @@ -390,6 +494,7 @@ interface(`cron_dontaudit_write_pipes',` type crond_t; ') + dontaudit $1 crond_t:fd use; dontaudit $1 crond_t:fifo_file write; ') @@ -408,7 +513,43 @@ interface(`cron_rw_pipes',` type crond_t; ') - allow $1 crond_t:fifo_file { getattr read write }; + allow $1 crond_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write inherited user spool files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cron_rw_inherited_user_spool_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_cron_spool_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_cron_spool_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write inherited spool files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cron_rw_inherited_spool_files',` + gen_require(` + type cron_spool_t; + ') + + allow $1 cron_spool_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -468,6 +609,25 @@ interface(`cron_search_spool',` ######################################## ## +## Search the directory containing user cron tables. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cron_manage_system_spool',` + gen_require(` + type cron_system_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, cron_system_spool_t, cron_system_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Manage pid files used by cron ## ## @@ -481,6 +641,7 @@ interface(`cron_manage_pid_files',` type crond_var_run_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) manage_files_pattern($1, crond_var_run_t, crond_var_run_t) ') @@ -536,7 +697,7 @@ interface(`cron_write_system_job_pipes',` type system_cronjob_t; ') - allow $1 system_cronjob_t:file write; + allow $1 system_cronjob_t:fifo_file write; ') ######################################## @@ -554,7 +715,7 @@ interface(`cron_rw_system_job_pipes',` type system_cronjob_t; ') - allow $1 system_cronjob_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + allow $1 system_cronjob_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -587,11 +748,14 @@ interface(`cron_rw_system_job_stream_sockets',` # interface(`cron_read_system_job_tmp_files',` gen_require(` - type system_cronjob_tmp_t; + type system_cronjob_tmp_t, cron_var_run_t; ') files_search_tmp($1) allow $1 system_cronjob_tmp_t:file read_file_perms; + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 cron_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -627,7 +791,47 @@ interface(`cron_dontaudit_append_system_job_tmp_files',` interface(`cron_dontaudit_write_system_job_tmp_files',` gen_require(` type system_cronjob_tmp_t; + type cron_var_run_t; ') dontaudit $1 system_cronjob_tmp_t:file write_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 cron_var_run_t:file write_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read temporary files from the system cron jobs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cron_read_system_job_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type system_cronjob_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, system_cronjob_var_lib_t, system_cronjob_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage files from the system cron jobs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cron_manage_system_job_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type system_cronjob_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, system_cronjob_var_lib_t, system_cronjob_var_lib_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cron.te b/policy/modules/services/cron.te index f7583ab..4545fb1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cron.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/cron.te @@ -10,18 +10,18 @@ gen_require(` # ## -##

    -## Allow system cron jobs to relabel filesystem -## for restoring file contexts. -##

    +##

    +## Allow system cron jobs to relabel filesystem +## for restoring file contexts. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(cron_can_relabel, false) ## -##

    -## Enable extra rules in the cron domain -## to support fcron. -##

    +##

    +## Enable extra rules in the cron domain +## to support fcron. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(fcron_crond, false) @@ -31,14 +31,14 @@ type anacron_exec_t; application_executable_file(anacron_exec_t) type cron_spool_t; -files_type(cron_spool_t) +files_spool_file(cron_spool_t) # var/lib files type cron_var_lib_t; files_type(cron_var_lib_t) type cron_var_run_t; -files_type(cron_var_run_t) +files_pid_file(cron_var_run_t) # var/log files type cron_log_t; @@ -61,11 +61,17 @@ domain_cron_exemption_source(crond_t) type crond_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(crond_initrc_exec_t) +type crond_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(crond_unit_file_t) + type crond_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(crond_tmp_t) +files_poly_parent(crond_tmp_t) +mta_system_content(crond_tmp_t) type crond_var_run_t; files_pid_file(crond_var_run_t) +mta_system_content(crond_var_run_t) type crontab_exec_t; application_executable_file(crontab_exec_t) @@ -79,14 +85,16 @@ typealias crontab_t alias { user_crontab_t staff_crontab_t }; typealias crontab_t alias { auditadm_crontab_t secadm_crontab_t }; typealias crontab_tmp_t alias { user_crontab_tmp_t staff_crontab_tmp_t }; typealias crontab_tmp_t alias { auditadm_crontab_tmp_t secadm_crontab_tmp_t }; +allow admin_crontab_t crond_t:process signal; type system_cron_spool_t, cron_spool_type; -files_type(system_cron_spool_t) +files_spool_file(system_cron_spool_t) type system_cronjob_t alias system_crond_t; init_daemon_domain(system_cronjob_t, anacron_exec_t) corecmd_shell_entry_type(system_cronjob_t) role system_r types system_cronjob_t; +domtrans_pattern(crond_t, anacron_exec_t, system_cronjob_t) type system_cronjob_lock_t alias system_crond_lock_t; files_lock_file(system_cronjob_lock_t) @@ -94,10 +102,6 @@ files_lock_file(system_cronjob_lock_t) type system_cronjob_tmp_t alias system_crond_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(system_cronjob_tmp_t) -ifdef(`enable_mcs',` - init_ranged_daemon_domain(crond_t, crond_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) -') - type unconfined_cronjob_t; domain_type(unconfined_cronjob_t) domain_cron_exemption_target(unconfined_cronjob_t) @@ -106,8 +110,20 @@ domain_cron_exemption_target(unconfined_cronjob_t) type user_cron_spool_t, cron_spool_type; typealias user_cron_spool_t alias { staff_cron_spool_t sysadm_cron_spool_t unconfined_cron_spool_t }; typealias user_cron_spool_t alias { auditadm_cron_spool_t secadm_cron_spool_t }; -files_type(user_cron_spool_t) +files_spool_file(user_cron_spool_t) ubac_constrained(user_cron_spool_t) +mta_system_content(user_cron_spool_t) + +type system_cronjob_var_lib_t; +files_type(system_cronjob_var_lib_t) +typealias system_cronjob_var_lib_t alias system_crond_var_lib_t; + +type system_cronjob_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(system_cronjob_var_run_t) + +ifdef(`enable_mcs',` + init_ranged_daemon_domain(crond_t, crond_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) +') ######################################## # @@ -115,7 +131,7 @@ ubac_constrained(user_cron_spool_t) # # Allow our crontab domain to unlink a user cron spool file. -allow admin_crontab_t user_cron_spool_t:file { getattr read unlink }; +allow admin_crontab_t user_cron_spool_t:file { read_file_perms delete_file_perms }; # Manipulate other users crontab. selinux_get_fs_mount(admin_crontab_t) @@ -125,7 +141,7 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(admin_crontab_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context(admin_crontab_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts(admin_crontab_t) -tunable_policy(`fcron_crond', ` +tunable_policy(`fcron_crond',` # fcron wants an instant update of a crontab change for the administrator # also crontab does a security check for crontab -u allow admin_crontab_t self:process setfscreate; @@ -136,9 +152,9 @@ tunable_policy(`fcron_crond', ` # Cron daemon local policy # -allow crond_t self:capability { dac_override setgid setuid sys_nice dac_read_search }; +allow crond_t self:capability { dac_override chown fowner setgid setuid sys_nice dac_read_search }; dontaudit crond_t self:capability { sys_resource sys_tty_config }; -allow crond_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; +allow crond_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate execmem execstack execheap }; allow crond_t self:process { setexec setfscreate }; allow crond_t self:fd use; allow crond_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -151,6 +167,7 @@ allow crond_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow crond_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; allow crond_t self:msg { send receive }; allow crond_t self:key { search write link }; +dontaudit crond_t self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_tty_audit; manage_files_pattern(crond_t, cron_log_t, cron_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(crond_t, cron_log_t, file) @@ -187,12 +204,16 @@ fs_list_inotifyfs(crond_t) # need auth_chkpwd to check for locked accounts. auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(crond_t) +auth_manage_var_auth(crond_t) corecmd_exec_shell(crond_t) corecmd_list_bin(crond_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(crond_t) corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(crond_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(crond_t) +domain_subj_id_change_exemption(crond_t) +domain_role_change_exemption(crond_t) files_read_usr_files(crond_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(crond_t) @@ -203,11 +224,28 @@ files_list_usr(crond_t) files_search_var_lib(crond_t) files_search_default(crond_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(crond_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_files(crond_t) + +# needed by "crontab -e" +mls_file_read_all_levels(crond_t) +mls_file_write_all_levels(crond_t) + +# needed because of kernel check of transition +mls_process_set_level(crond_t) + +# to make cronjob working +mls_fd_share_all_levels(crond_t) +mls_trusted_object(crond_t) + +init_read_state(crond_t) init_rw_utmp(crond_t) init_spec_domtrans_script(crond_t) +auth_manage_var_auth(crond_t) auth_use_nsswitch(crond_t) +logging_send_audit_msgs(crond_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(crond_t) logging_set_loginuid(crond_t) @@ -220,20 +258,23 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(crond_t) userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(crond_t) # Not sure why this is needed userdom_list_user_home_dirs(crond_t) +userdom_list_admin_dir(crond_t) +userdom_manage_all_users_keys(crond_t) mta_send_mail(crond_t) +mta_system_content(cron_spool_t) ifdef(`distro_debian',` # pam_limits is used allow crond_t self:process setrlimit; - optional_policy(` - # Debian logcheck has the home dir set to its cache - logwatch_search_cache_dir(crond_t) - ') ') -ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` +optional_policy(` + logwatch_search_cache_dir(crond_t) +') + +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # Run the rpm program in the rpm_t domain. Allow creation of RPM log files # via redirection of standard out. optional_policy(` @@ -250,11 +291,27 @@ tunable_policy(`fcron_crond', ` ') optional_policy(` + apache_search_sys_content(crond_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + djbdns_search_tinydns_keys(crond_t) + djbdns_link_tinydns_keys(crond_t) +') + +optional_policy(` locallogin_search_keys(crond_t) locallogin_link_keys(crond_t) ') optional_policy(` + # these should probably be unconfined_crond_t + dbus_system_bus_client(crond_t) + init_dbus_send_script(crond_t) + init_dbus_chat(crond_t) +') + +optional_policy(` amanda_search_var_lib(crond_t) ') @@ -264,6 +321,8 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` hal_dbus_chat(crond_t) + hal_write_log(crond_t) + hal_dbus_chat(system_cronjob_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -286,15 +345,25 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + systemd_use_fds_logind(crond_t) + systemd_write_inherited_logind_sessions_pipes(crond_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_read_db(crond_t) ') +optional_policy(` + vnstatd_search_lib(crond_t) +') + ######################################## # # System cron process domain # allow system_cronjob_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search chown setgid setuid fowner net_bind_service fsetid sys_nice }; + allow system_cronjob_t self:process { signal_perms getsched setsched }; allow system_cronjob_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow system_cronjob_t self:passwd rootok; @@ -306,10 +375,19 @@ logging_log_filetrans(system_cronjob_t, cron_log_t, file) # This is to handle /var/lib/misc directory. Used currently # by prelink var/lib files for cron -allow system_cronjob_t cron_var_lib_t:file manage_file_perms; +allow system_cronjob_t cron_var_lib_t:file { manage_file_perms relabel_file_perms }; files_var_lib_filetrans(system_cronjob_t, cron_var_lib_t, file) +allow system_cronjob_t cron_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; +files_pid_filetrans(system_cronjob_t, cron_var_run_t, file) + allow system_cronjob_t system_cron_spool_t:file read_file_perms; + +mls_file_read_to_clearance(system_cronjob_t) + +# anacron forces the following +manage_files_pattern(system_cronjob_t, system_cron_spool_t, system_cron_spool_t) + # The entrypoint interface is not used as this is not # a regular entrypoint. Since crontab files are # not directly executed, crond must ensure that @@ -329,6 +407,7 @@ allow crond_t system_cronjob_t:fd use; allow system_cronjob_t crond_t:fd use; allow system_cronjob_t crond_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow system_cronjob_t crond_t:process sigchld; +allow crond_t system_cronjob_t:key manage_key_perms; # Write /var/lock/makewhatis.lock. allow system_cronjob_t system_cronjob_lock_t:file manage_file_perms; @@ -340,11 +419,16 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(system_cronjob_t, crond_tmp_t, system_cronjob_tmp_t) filetrans_pattern(system_cronjob_t, crond_tmp_t, system_cronjob_tmp_t, { file lnk_file }) files_tmp_filetrans(system_cronjob_t, system_cronjob_tmp_t, file) +# var/lib files for system_crond +files_search_var_lib(system_cronjob_t) +manage_files_pattern(system_cronjob_t, system_cronjob_var_lib_t, system_cronjob_var_lib_t) + # Read from /var/spool/cron. allow system_cronjob_t cron_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms; -allow system_cronjob_t cron_spool_t:file read_file_perms; +allow system_cronjob_t cron_spool_t:file rw_file_perms; kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_cronjob_t) +kernel_read_network_state(system_cronjob_t) kernel_read_system_state(system_cronjob_t) kernel_read_software_raid_state(system_cronjob_t) @@ -365,6 +449,7 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(system_cronjob_t) dev_getattr_all_blk_files(system_cronjob_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(system_cronjob_t) dev_read_urand(system_cronjob_t) +dev_read_sysfs(system_cronjob_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(system_cronjob_t) fs_getattr_all_files(system_cronjob_t) @@ -391,6 +476,7 @@ files_dontaudit_search_pids(system_cronjob_t) # Access other spool directories like # /var/spool/anacron and /var/spool/slrnpull. files_manage_generic_spool(system_cronjob_t) +files_create_boot_flag(system_cronjob_t) init_use_script_fds(system_cronjob_t) init_read_utmp(system_cronjob_t) @@ -413,8 +499,10 @@ miscfiles_manage_man_pages(system_cronjob_t) seutil_read_config(system_cronjob_t) -ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # Run the rpm program in the rpm_t domain. Allow creation of RPM log files + allow crond_t system_cron_spool_t:file manage_file_perms; + # via redirection of standard out. optional_policy(` rpm_manage_log(system_cronjob_t) @@ -439,6 +527,8 @@ optional_policy(` apache_read_config(system_cronjob_t) apache_read_log(system_cronjob_t) apache_read_sys_content(system_cronjob_t) + apache_delete_cache_dirs(system_cronjob_t) + apache_delete_cache_files(system_cronjob_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -446,6 +536,14 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(system_cronjob_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + exim_read_spool_files(system_cronjob_t) +') + +optional_policy(` ftp_read_log(system_cronjob_t) ') @@ -456,6 +554,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + livecd_read_tmp_files(system_cronjob_t) +') + +optional_policy(` lpd_list_spool(system_cronjob_t) ') @@ -464,7 +566,9 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + mta_read_config(system_cronjob_t) mta_send_mail(system_cronjob_t) + mta_system_content(system_cron_spool_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -472,6 +576,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + networkmanager_dbus_chat(system_cronjob_t) +') + +optional_policy(` postfix_read_config(system_cronjob_t) ') @@ -480,7 +588,7 @@ optional_policy(` prelink_manage_lib(system_cronjob_t) prelink_manage_log(system_cronjob_t) prelink_read_cache(system_cronjob_t) - prelink_relabelfrom_lib(system_cronjob_t) + prelink_relabel_lib(system_cronjob_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -495,6 +603,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` spamassassin_manage_lib_files(system_cronjob_t) + spamassassin_manage_home_client(system_cronjob_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -502,7 +611,18 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + systemd_dbus_chat_logind(system_cronjob_t) + systemd_write_inherited_logind_sessions_pipes(system_cronjob_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(crond_t) unconfined_domain(system_cronjob_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_shell_domtrans(crond_t) + unconfined_dbus_send(crond_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(system_cronjob_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file }) ') @@ -595,9 +715,12 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(cronjob_t) #userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(cronjob_t, notdevfile_class_set) list_dirs_pattern(crond_t, user_cron_spool_t, user_cron_spool_t) +rw_dirs_pattern(crond_t, user_cron_spool_t, user_cron_spool_t) read_files_pattern(crond_t, user_cron_spool_t, user_cron_spool_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(crond_t, user_cron_spool_t, user_cron_spool_t) +allow crond_t user_cron_spool_t:file manage_lnk_file_perms; -tunable_policy(`fcron_crond', ` +tunable_policy(`fcron_crond',` allow crond_t user_cron_spool_t:file manage_file_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ctdbd.fc b/policy/modules/services/ctdbd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2db6b61 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/ctdbd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ctdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/ctdb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_var_lib_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/ctdbd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/log/log\.ctdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_log_t,s0) + +/var/spool/ctdb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_spool_t,s0) + +/var/run/ctdbd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_var_run_t,s0) + + +/var/ctdbd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/ctdb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/ctdbd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ctdbd_var_lib_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ctdbd.if b/policy/modules/services/ctdbd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4f7d237 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/ctdbd.if @@ -0,0 +1,259 @@ + +## policy for ctdbd + +######################################## +## +## Transition to ctdbd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_t, ctdbd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, ctdbd_exec_t, ctdbd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute ctdbd server in the ctdbd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ctdbd_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read ctdbd's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, ctdbd_log_t, ctdbd_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to ctdbd log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, ctdbd_log_t, ctdbd_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage ctdbd log files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, ctdbd_log_t, ctdbd_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, ctdbd_log_t, ctdbd_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, ctdbd_log_t, ctdbd_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search ctdbd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 ctdbd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read ctdbd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, ctdbd_var_lib_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage ctdbd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, ctdbd_var_lib_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage ctdbd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, ctdbd_var_lib_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read ctdbd PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 ctdbd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Connect to ctdbd over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_t, ctdbd_var_run_t, ctdbd_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, ctdbd_var_run_t, ctdbd_var_run_t, ctdbd_t) + stream_connect_pattern($1, ctdbd_tmp_t, ctdbd_tmp_t, ctdbd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an ctdbd environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`ctdbd_admin',` + gen_require(` + type ctdbd_t, ctdbd_initrc_exec_t; + type ctdbd_log_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t, ctdbd_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 ctdbd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, ctdbd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ctdbd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + ctdbd_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 ctdbd_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, ctdbd_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, ctdbd_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, ctdbd_var_run_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ctdbd.te b/policy/modules/services/ctdbd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..284fbae --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/ctdbd.te @@ -0,0 +1,114 @@ +policy_module(ctdbd, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type ctdbd_t; +type ctdbd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_exec_t) + +type ctdbd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(ctdbd_initrc_exec_t) + +type ctdbd_log_t; +logging_log_file(ctdbd_log_t) + +type ctdbd_spool_t; +files_type(ctdbd_spool_t) +#files_spool_file(ctdbd_spool_t) + +type ctdbd_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(ctdbd_tmp_t) + +type ctdbd_var_lib_t; +files_type(ctdbd_var_lib_t) + +type ctdbd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(ctdbd_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# ctdbd local policy +# + +allow ctdbd_t self:capability { chown ipc_lock net_admin net_raw sys_nice }; +allow ctdbd_t self:process { setpgid signal_perms setsched }; + +allow ctdbd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow ctdbd_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; +allow ctdbd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow ctdbd_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; +allow ctdbd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_log_t, ctdbd_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_log_t, ctdbd_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_log_t, { dir file } ) + +manage_files_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_tmp_t, ctdbd_tmp_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_tmp_t, ctdbd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_tmp_t, { file sock_file}) + +manage_dirs_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_spool_t, ctdbd_spool_t) +manage_files_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_spool_t, ctdbd_spool_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_spool_t, ctdbd_spool_t) +files_spool_filetrans(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_spool_t, { dir file }) + +exec_files_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_var_lib_t, { dir file } ) + +manage_dirs_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_var_run_t, ctdbd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_var_run_t, ctdbd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(ctdbd_t, ctdbd_var_run_t, { dir file }) + +kernel_read_network_state(ctdbd_t) +kernel_rw_net_sysctls(ctdbd_t) +kernel_read_system_state(ctdbd_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ctdbd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_ctdb_port(ctdbd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_ctdb_port(ctdbd_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(ctdbd_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(ctdbd_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(ctdbd_t) +dev_read_urand(ctdbd_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(ctdbd_t) +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(ctdbd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(ctdbd_t) +files_search_all_mountpoints(ctdbd_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(ctdbd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(ctdbd_t) +miscfiles_read_public_files(ctdbd_t) + + +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(ctdbd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + hostname_exec(ctdbd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + iptables_domtrans(ctdbd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + samba_initrc_domtrans(ctdbd_t) + samba_domtrans_net(ctdbd_t) + samba_rw_var_files(ctdbd_t) + samba_systemctl(ctdbd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(ctdbd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cups.fc b/policy/modules/services/cups.fc index 1b492ed..d3e9822 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cups.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/cups.fc @@ -19,7 +19,10 @@ /etc/printcap.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/cups.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_unit_file_t,s0) + /lib/udev/udev-configure-printer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_config_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/udev-configure-printer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_config_exec_t,s0) /opt/gutenprint/ppds(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0) @@ -28,11 +31,8 @@ # keep as separate lines to ensure proper sorting /usr/lib/cups/daemon/cups-lpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_lpd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/cups/daemon/cups-lpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_lpd_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/cups/backend/cups-pdf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cups_pdf_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/cups/backend/cups-pdf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cups_pdf_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/cups/backend/hp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hplip_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/cups/backend/hp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hplip_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/cups-pk-helper-mechanism -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_config_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/hal_lpadmin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_config_exec_t,s0) @@ -56,6 +56,7 @@ /var/lib/cups/certs -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0) /var/lib/cups/certs/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0) +/usr/lib/bjlib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/lib/hp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hplip_var_lib_t,s0) @@ -64,10 +65,16 @@ /var/ccpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_var_run_t,s0) /var/ekpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_var_run_t,s0) -/var/run/cups(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/cups(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/run/hp.*\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hplip_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/hp.*\.port -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hplip_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/ptal-printd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ptal_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/ptal-mlcd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ptal_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/udev-configure-printer(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_config_var_run_t,s0) /var/turboprint(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_var_run_t,s0) + +/usr/local/Brother/fax/.*\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_log_t,s0) +/usr/local/Brother/(.*/)?inf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0) +/usr/local/Printer/(.*/)?inf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0) + +/usr/local/linuxprinter/ppd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cupsd_rw_etc_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cups.if b/policy/modules/services/cups.if index 305ddf4..4d70951 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cups.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/cups.if @@ -9,6 +9,11 @@ ## Domain allowed access. ##     ## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## # interface(`cups_backend',` gen_require(` @@ -47,7 +52,7 @@ interface(`cups_domtrans',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to cupsd over an unix domain stream socket. +## Connect to cupsd over a unix domain stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -190,10 +195,12 @@ interface(`cups_dbus_chat_config',` interface(`cups_read_config',` gen_require(` type cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t; + type hplip_etc_t; ') files_search_etc($1) read_files_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_etc_t) + read_files_pattern($1, hplip_etc_t, hplip_etc_t) read_files_pattern($1, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t) ') @@ -277,7 +284,7 @@ interface(`cups_write_log',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to ptal over an unix domain stream socket. +## Connect to ptal over a unix domain stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -296,6 +303,29 @@ interface(`cups_stream_connect_ptal',` ######################################## ## +## Execute cupsd server in the cupsd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`cupsd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type cupsd_t; + type cupsd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 cupsd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 cupsd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, cupsd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an cups environment ## @@ -314,16 +344,20 @@ interface(`cups_stream_connect_ptal',` interface(`cups_admin',` gen_require(` type cupsd_t, cupsd_tmp_t, cupsd_lpd_tmp_t; - type cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_log_t, cupsd_spool_t; - type cupsd_config_var_run_t, cupsd_lpd_var_run_t; - type cupsd_var_run_t, ptal_etc_t; - type ptal_var_run_t, hplip_var_run_t; - type cupsd_initrc_exec_t; + type cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_log_t, hplip_etc_t; + type cupsd_config_var_run_t, cupsd_lpd_var_run_t, cupsd_initrc_exec_t; + type cupsd_var_run_t, ptal_etc_t, hplip_var_run_t; + type ptal_var_run_t; + type cupsd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 cupsd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 cupsd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, cupsd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 cupsd_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, cupsd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 cupsd_initrc_exec_t system_r; @@ -341,18 +375,47 @@ interface(`cups_admin',` admin_pattern($1, cupsd_lpd_var_run_t) - admin_pattern($1, cupsd_spool_t) - files_list_spool($1) - admin_pattern($1, cupsd_tmp_t) files_list_tmp($1) admin_pattern($1, cupsd_var_run_t) files_list_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, hplip_etc_t) + admin_pattern($1, hplip_var_run_t) admin_pattern($1, ptal_etc_t) admin_pattern($1, ptal_var_run_t) + + cupsd_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, cupsd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 cupsd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to cups named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`cups_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type cups_rw_etc_t; + type cups_etc_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "classes.conf") + filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "printers.conf") + filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "cupsd.conf") + filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "cupsd.conf.default") + filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "lpoptions") + filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "subscriptions.conf") + filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "subscriptions.conf.O") + filetrans_pattern($1, cups_etc_t, cups_rw_etc_t, file, "ppds.dat") ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cups.te b/policy/modules/services/cups.te index 0f28095..085e634 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cups.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/cups.te @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ files_pid_file(cupsd_config_var_run_t) type cupsd_t; type cupsd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(cupsd_t, cupsd_exec_t) +mls_trusted_object(cupsd_t) type cupsd_etc_t; files_config_file(cupsd_etc_t) @@ -60,6 +61,9 @@ type cupsd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(cupsd_var_run_t) mls_trusted_object(cupsd_var_run_t) +type cupsd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(cupsd_unit_file_t) + type hplip_t; type hplip_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(hplip_t, hplip_exec_t) @@ -123,6 +127,7 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_etc_t) files_search_etc(cupsd_t) manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_interface_t, cupsd_interface_t) +can_exec(cupsd_t, cupsd_interface_t) manage_dirs_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t) manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_etc_t, cupsd_rw_etc_t) @@ -137,6 +142,7 @@ allow cupsd_t cupsd_exec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; allow cupsd_t cupsd_lock_t:file manage_file_perms; files_lock_filetrans(cupsd_t, cupsd_lock_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_log_t, cupsd_log_t) manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_log_t, cupsd_log_t) allow cupsd_t cupsd_log_t:dir setattr; logging_log_filetrans(cupsd_t, cupsd_log_t, { file dir }) @@ -146,11 +152,12 @@ manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_tmp_t, cupsd_tmp_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_tmp_t, cupsd_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(cupsd_t, cupsd_tmp_t, { file dir fifo_file }) -allow cupsd_t cupsd_var_run_t:dir setattr; +allow cupsd_t cupsd_var_run_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_var_run_t, cupsd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_var_run_t, cupsd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_var_run_t, cupsd_var_run_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(cupsd_t, cupsd_var_run_t, cupsd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(cupsd_t, cupsd_var_run_t, { file fifo_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(cupsd_t, cupsd_var_run_t, { dir file fifo_file }) allow cupsd_t hplip_t:process { signal sigkill }; @@ -159,7 +166,7 @@ read_files_pattern(cupsd_t, hplip_etc_t, hplip_etc_t) allow cupsd_t hplip_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; stream_connect_pattern(cupsd_t, ptal_var_run_t, ptal_var_run_t, ptal_t) -allow cupsd_t ptal_var_run_t : sock_file setattr; +allow cupsd_t ptal_var_run_t:sock_file setattr_sock_file_perms; kernel_read_system_state(cupsd_t) kernel_read_network_state(cupsd_t) @@ -211,6 +218,7 @@ mls_rangetrans_target(cupsd_t) mls_socket_write_all_levels(cupsd_t) mls_fd_use_all_levels(cupsd_t) +term_use_usb_ttys(cupsd_t) term_use_unallocated_ttys(cupsd_t) term_search_ptys(cupsd_t) @@ -220,11 +228,13 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(cupsd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(cupsd_t) +files_getattr_boot_dirs(cupsd_t) files_list_spool(cupsd_t) files_read_etc_files(cupsd_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(cupsd_t) # read python modules files_read_usr_files(cupsd_t) +files_exec_usr_files(cupsd_t) # for /var/lib/defoma files_read_var_lib_files(cupsd_t) files_list_world_readable(cupsd_t) @@ -270,12 +280,6 @@ files_dontaudit_list_home(cupsd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cupsd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(cupsd_t) -# Write to /var/spool/cups. -lpd_manage_spool(cupsd_t) -lpd_read_config(cupsd_t) -lpd_exec_lpr(cupsd_t) -lpd_relabel_spool(cupsd_t) - optional_policy(` apm_domtrans_client(cupsd_t) ') @@ -287,6 +291,8 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(cupsd_t) + init_dbus_chat(cupsd_t) + userdom_dbus_send_all_users(cupsd_t) optional_policy(` @@ -297,8 +303,10 @@ optional_policy(` hal_dbus_chat(cupsd_t) ') + # talk to processes that do not have policy optional_policy(` unconfined_dbus_chat(cupsd_t) + files_write_generic_pid_pipes(cupsd_t) ') ') @@ -311,10 +319,22 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + kerberos_manage_host_rcache(cupsd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` logrotate_domtrans(cupsd_t) ') optional_policy(` + # Write to /var/spool/cups. + lpd_manage_spool(cupsd_t) + lpd_read_config(cupsd_t) + lpd_exec_lpr(cupsd_t) + lpd_relabel_spool(cupsd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` mta_send_mail(cupsd_t) ') @@ -322,6 +342,8 @@ optional_policy(` # cups execs smbtool which reads samba_etc_t files samba_read_config(cupsd_t) samba_rw_var_files(cupsd_t) + # needed by smbspool + samba_stream_connect_nmbd(cupsd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -371,8 +393,9 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_tmp_t, { lnk_file file dir }) allow cupsd_config_t cupsd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_config_var_run_t, cupsd_config_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_config_var_run_t, cupsd_config_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_config_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(cupsd_config_t, cupsd_config_var_run_t, { dir file }) domtrans_pattern(cupsd_config_t, hplip_exec_t, hplip_t) @@ -393,6 +416,10 @@ dev_read_sysfs(cupsd_config_t) dev_read_urand(cupsd_config_t) dev_read_rand(cupsd_config_t) dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(cupsd_config_t) +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` + dev_rw_generic_chr_files(cupsd_config_t) +') + files_search_all_mountpoints(cupsd_config_t) @@ -425,11 +452,11 @@ seutil_dontaudit_search_config(cupsd_config_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cupsd_config_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(cupsd_config_t) +userdom_rw_user_tmp_files(cupsd_config_t) +userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks(cupsd_config_t) cups_stream_connect(cupsd_config_t) -lpd_read_config(cupsd_config_t) - ifdef(`distro_redhat',` optional_policy(` rpm_read_db(cupsd_config_t) @@ -453,6 +480,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(cupsd_config_t) +') + +optional_policy(` hal_domtrans(cupsd_config_t) hal_read_tmp_files(cupsd_config_t) hal_dontaudit_use_fds(hplip_t) @@ -467,6 +498,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + lpd_read_config(cupsd_config_t) +') + +optional_policy(` policykit_dbus_chat(cupsd_config_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(cupsd_config_t) ') @@ -537,6 +572,7 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(cupsd_lpd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(cupsd_lpd_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(cupsd_lpd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(cupsd_lpd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_printer_port(cupsd_lpd_t) dev_read_urand(cupsd_lpd_t) dev_read_rand(cupsd_lpd_t) @@ -587,23 +623,22 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(cups_pdf_t) miscfiles_read_localization(cups_pdf_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(cups_pdf_t) +miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(cups_pdf_t) userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(cups_pdf_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_pattern(cups_pdf_t, { file dir }) userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(cups_pdf_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(cups_pdf_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(cups_pdf_t) -lpd_manage_spool(cups_pdf_t) - - -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_search_auto_mountpoints(cups_pdf_t) - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(cups_pdf_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(cups_pdf_t) +optional_policy(` + lpd_manage_spool(cups_pdf_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(cups_pdf_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(cups_pdf_t) +userdom_home_manager(cups_pdf_t) + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_config(cups_pdf_t) ') ######################################## @@ -639,7 +674,7 @@ manage_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_var_lib_t, hplip_var_lib_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_var_lib_t, hplip_var_lib_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_tmp_t, hplip_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(hplip_t, hplip_tmp_t, fifo_file ) +files_tmp_filetrans(hplip_t, hplip_tmp_t, fifo_file) manage_files_pattern(hplip_t, hplip_var_run_t, hplip_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(hplip_t, hplip_var_run_t, file) @@ -661,6 +696,8 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(hplip_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(hplip_t) corenet_tcp_bind_hplip_port(hplip_t) corenet_tcp_connect_hplip_port(hplip_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_glance_port(hplip_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_glance_port(hplip_t) corenet_tcp_connect_ipp_port(hplip_t) corenet_sendrecv_hplip_client_packets(hplip_t) corenet_receive_hplip_server_packets(hplip_t) @@ -685,6 +722,9 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(hplip_t) files_read_etc_files(hplip_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(hplip_t) files_read_usr_files(hplip_t) +files_dontaudit_write_usr_dirs(hplip_t) + +auth_read_passwd(hplip_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(hplip_t) @@ -696,8 +736,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(hplip_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(hplip_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(hplip_t) -lpd_read_config(hplip_t) -lpd_manage_spool(hplip_t) +optional_policy(` + lpd_read_config(hplip_t) + lpd_manage_spool(hplip_t) +') optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(hplip_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cvs.if b/policy/modules/services/cvs.if index c43ff4c..5da88b5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cvs.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/cvs.if @@ -1,5 +1,23 @@ ## Concurrent versions system +###################################### +## +## Dontaudit Attempts to list the CVS data and metadata. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`cvs_dontaudit_list_data',` + gen_require(` + type cvs_data_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 cvs_data_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + ######################################## ## ## Read the CVS data and metadata. @@ -58,14 +76,17 @@ interface(`cvs_exec',` # interface(`cvs_admin',` gen_require(` - type cvs_t, cvs_tmp_t; + type cvs_t, cvs_tmp_t, cvs_initrc_exec_t; type cvs_data_t, cvs_var_run_t; - type cvs_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 cvs_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 cvs_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, cvs_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 cvs_t:process ptrace; + ') + # Allow cvs_t to restart the apache service init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, cvs_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cvs.te b/policy/modules/services/cvs.te index 88e7e97..1546703 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cvs.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/cvs.te @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ policy_module(cvs, 1.9.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow cvs daemon to read shadow -##

    +##

    +## Allow cvs daemon to read shadow +##

    ##     gen_tunable(allow_cvs_read_shadow, false) @@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ files_pid_file(cvs_var_run_t) # Local policy # +allow cvs_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; allow cvs_t self:process signal_perms; allow cvs_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow cvs_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms; # for identd; cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules? allow cvs_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; -allow cvs_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; manage_dirs_pattern(cvs_t, cvs_data_t, cvs_data_t) manage_files_pattern(cvs_t, cvs_data_t, cvs_data_t) @@ -81,6 +81,8 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(cvs_t) # for identd; cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules? files_search_home(cvs_t) +init_dontaudit_read_utmp(cvs_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(cvs_t) logging_send_audit_msgs(cvs_t) @@ -112,4 +114,5 @@ optional_policy(` read_files_pattern(httpd_cvs_script_t, cvs_data_t, cvs_data_t) manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_cvs_script_t, cvs_tmp_t, cvs_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(httpd_cvs_script_t, cvs_tmp_t, cvs_tmp_t) + files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_cvs_script_t, cvs_tmp_t, { file dir }) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cyphesis.if b/policy/modules/services/cyphesis.if index 9d44538..7e9057e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cyphesis.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/cyphesis.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run cyphesis. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`cyphesis_domtrans',` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cyrus.fc b/policy/modules/services/cyrus.fc index 25546bc..4def4f7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cyrus.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/cyrus.fc @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/cyrus -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cyrus_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/cyrus/master -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cyrus_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/cyrus-imapd/cyrus-master -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cyrus_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cyrus-imapd/cyrus-master -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cyrus_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cyrus/master -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cyrus_exec_t,s0) /var/imap(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cyrus_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/imap(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cyrus_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cyrus.if b/policy/modules/services/cyrus.if index e4e86d0..7c30655 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cyrus.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/cyrus.if @@ -62,9 +62,13 @@ interface(`cyrus_admin',` type cyrus_var_run_t, cyrus_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 cyrus_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 cyrus_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, cyrus_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 cyrus_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, cyrus_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 cyrus_initrc_exec_t system_r; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/cyrus.te b/policy/modules/services/cyrus.te index a01be9d..01f2f23 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/cyrus.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/cyrus.te @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ files_pid_file(cyrus_var_run_t) # Local policy # -allow cyrus_t self:capability { dac_override net_bind_service setgid setuid sys_resource }; +allow cyrus_t self:capability { fsetid dac_override net_bind_service setgid setuid sys_resource }; dontaudit cyrus_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow cyrus_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; allow cyrus_t self:process setrlimit; @@ -73,6 +73,7 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(cyrus_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(cyrus_t) corenet_tcp_bind_mail_port(cyrus_t) corenet_tcp_bind_lmtp_port(cyrus_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_innd_port(cyrus_t) corenet_tcp_bind_pop_port(cyrus_t) corenet_tcp_bind_sieve_port(cyrus_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(cyrus_t) @@ -119,6 +120,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + dirsrv_stream_connect(cyrus_t) +') + +optional_policy(` kerberos_keytab_template(cyrus, cyrus_t) ') @@ -135,6 +140,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + files_dontaudit_write_usr_dirs(cyrus_t) snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_files(cyrus_t) snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files(cyrus_t) snmp_stream_connect(cyrus_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dante.te b/policy/modules/services/dante.te index a8b93c0..831ce70 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dante.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/dante.te @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type dante_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(dante_t, dante_exec_t) type dante_conf_t; -files_type(dante_conf_t) +files_config_file(dante_conf_t) type dante_var_run_t; files_pid_file(dante_var_run_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dbus.fc b/policy/modules/services/dbus.fc index 81eba14..b8cbe47 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dbus.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/dbus.fc @@ -3,7 +3,8 @@ /bin/dbus-daemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dbusd_exec_t,s0) /lib/dbus-1/dbus-daemon-launch-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dbusd_exec_t,s0) -/lib64/dbus-1/dbus-daemon-launch-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dbusd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/dbus-1/dbus-daemon-launch-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dbusd_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/dbus-daemon(-1)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dbusd_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/dbus-daemon-launch-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dbusd_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dbus.if b/policy/modules/services/dbus.if index 1a1becd..115133d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dbus.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/dbus.if @@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ interface(`dbus_stub',` template(`dbus_role_template',` gen_require(` class dbus { send_msg acquire_svc }; - - attribute session_bus_type; + attribute dbusd_unconfined, session_bus_type; type system_dbusd_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t, dbusd_exec_t, dbusd_etc_t; + type $1_t; ') ############################## @@ -52,117 +52,41 @@ template(`dbus_role_template',` # type $1_dbusd_t, session_bus_type; - domain_type($1_dbusd_t) - domain_entry_file($1_dbusd_t, dbusd_exec_t) + application_domain($1_dbusd_t, dbusd_exec_t) ubac_constrained($1_dbusd_t) role $2 types $1_dbusd_t; + userdom_home_manager($1_dbusd_t) + ############################## # # Local policy # - allow $1_dbusd_t self:process { getattr sigkill signal }; - dontaudit $1_dbusd_t self:process ptrace; - allow $1_dbusd_t self:file { getattr read write }; - allow $1_dbusd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - allow $1_dbusd_t self:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc }; - allow $1_dbusd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - allow $1_dbusd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; - allow $1_dbusd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - allow $1_dbusd_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms; - # For connecting to the bus allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; # SE-DBus specific permissions - allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc }; + allow { dbusd_unconfined $3 } $1_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc }; allow $3 system_dbusd_t:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc }; - allow $1_dbusd_t dbusd_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; - read_files_pattern($1_dbusd_t, dbusd_etc_t, dbusd_etc_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern($1_dbusd_t, dbusd_etc_t, dbusd_etc_t) + domtrans_pattern($3, dbusd_exec_t, $1_dbusd_t) - manage_dirs_pattern($1_dbusd_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t) - manage_files_pattern($1_dbusd_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t) - files_tmp_filetrans($1_dbusd_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t, { file dir }) + ps_process_pattern($3, $1_dbusd_t) + allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:process signal_perms; - domtrans_pattern($3, dbusd_exec_t, $1_dbusd_t) - allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:process { signull sigkill signal }; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:process ptrace; + ') # cjp: this seems very broken - corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $3) + corecmd_bin_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $1_t) + corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_dbusd_t, $1_t) allow $1_dbusd_t $3:process sigkill; allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:fd use; allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - allow $3 $1_dbusd_t:process sigchld; - - kernel_read_system_state($1_dbusd_t) - kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_dbusd_t) - - corecmd_list_bin($1_dbusd_t) - corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1_dbusd_t) - corecmd_read_bin_files($1_dbusd_t) - corecmd_read_bin_pipes($1_dbusd_t) - corecmd_read_bin_sockets($1_dbusd_t) - - corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1_dbusd_t) - corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_dbusd_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_dbusd_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1_dbusd_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_dbusd_t) - corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node($1_dbusd_t) - corenet_tcp_bind_reserved_port($1_dbusd_t) - - dev_read_urand($1_dbusd_t) - - domain_use_interactive_fds($1_dbusd_t) - domain_read_all_domains_state($1_dbusd_t) - - files_read_etc_files($1_dbusd_t) - files_list_home($1_dbusd_t) - files_read_usr_files($1_dbusd_t) - files_dontaudit_search_var($1_dbusd_t) - - fs_getattr_romfs($1_dbusd_t) - fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_dbusd_t) - fs_list_inotifyfs($1_dbusd_t) - fs_dontaudit_list_nfs($1_dbusd_t) - - selinux_get_fs_mount($1_dbusd_t) - selinux_validate_context($1_dbusd_t) - selinux_compute_access_vector($1_dbusd_t) - selinux_compute_create_context($1_dbusd_t) - selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_dbusd_t) - selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_dbusd_t) - - auth_read_pam_console_data($1_dbusd_t) - auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t) - - logging_send_audit_msgs($1_dbusd_t) - logging_send_syslog_msg($1_dbusd_t) - - miscfiles_read_localization($1_dbusd_t) - - seutil_read_config($1_dbusd_t) - seutil_read_default_contexts($1_dbusd_t) - - term_use_all_terms($1_dbusd_t) - userdom_read_user_home_content_files($1_dbusd_t) - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - dontaudit $3 $1_dbusd_t:netlink_selinux_socket { read write }; - ') - - optional_policy(` - hal_dbus_chat($1_dbusd_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - xserver_use_xdm_fds($1_dbusd_t) - xserver_rw_xdm_pipes($1_dbusd_t) - ') + auth_use_nsswitch($1_dbusd_t) ') ####################################### @@ -181,11 +105,12 @@ interface(`dbus_system_bus_client',` type system_dbusd_t, system_dbusd_t; type system_dbusd_var_run_t, system_dbusd_var_lib_t; class dbus send_msg; + attribute dbusd_unconfined; ') # SE-DBus specific permissions allow $1 { system_dbusd_t self }:dbus send_msg; - allow system_dbusd_t $1:dbus send_msg; + allow { system_dbusd_t dbusd_unconfined } $1:dbus send_msg; read_files_pattern($1, system_dbusd_var_lib_t, system_dbusd_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib($1) @@ -198,6 +123,34 @@ interface(`dbus_system_bus_client',` ####################################### ## +## Creating connections to specified +## DBUS sessions. +## +## +## +## The prefix of the user role (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_r). +## +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dbus_session_client',` + gen_require(` + class dbus send_msg; + type $1_dbusd_t; + ') + + allow $2 $1_dbusd_t:fd use; + allow $2 { $1_dbusd_t self }:dbus send_msg; + allow $2 $1_dbusd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; +') + +####################################### +## ## Template for creating connections to ## a user DBUS. ## @@ -218,6 +171,8 @@ interface(`dbus_session_bus_client',` # For connecting to the bus allow $1 session_bus_type:unix_stream_socket connectto; + + allow session_bus_type $1:process sigkill; ') ######################################## @@ -322,6 +277,11 @@ interface(`dbus_connect_session_bus',` ## Allow a application domain to be started ## by the session dbus. ##     +## +## +## User domain prefix to be used. +## +## ## ## ## Type to be used as a domain. @@ -336,13 +296,13 @@ interface(`dbus_connect_session_bus',` # interface(`dbus_session_domain',` gen_require(` - attribute session_bus_type; + type $1_dbusd_t; ') - domtrans_pattern(session_bus_type, $2, $1) + domtrans_pattern($1_dbusd_t, $2, $3) - dbus_session_bus_client($1) - dbus_connect_session_bus($1) + dbus_session_bus_client($3) + dbus_connect_session_bus($3) ') ######################################## @@ -421,27 +381,16 @@ interface(`dbus_system_bus_unconfined',` # interface(`dbus_system_domain',` gen_require(` + attribute system_bus_type; type system_dbusd_t; role system_r; ') + typeattribute $1 system_bus_type; domain_type($1) domain_entry_file($1, $2) - role system_r types $1; - domtrans_pattern(system_dbusd_t, $2, $1) - - dbus_system_bus_client($1) - dbus_connect_system_bus($1) - - ps_process_pattern(system_dbusd_t, $1) - - userdom_read_all_users_state($1) - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - dontaudit $1 system_dbusd_t:netlink_selinux_socket { read write }; - ') ') ######################################## @@ -464,26 +413,25 @@ interface(`dbus_use_system_bus_fds',` ######################################## ## -## Dontaudit Read, and write system dbus TCP sockets. +## Allow unconfined access to the system DBUS. ## ## ## -## Domain to not audit. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`dbus_dontaudit_system_bus_rw_tcp_sockets',` +interface(`dbus_unconfined',` gen_require(` - type system_dbusd_t; + attribute dbusd_unconfined; ') - allow $1 system_dbusd_t:tcp_socket { read write }; - allow $1 system_dbusd_t:fd use; + typeattribute $1 dbusd_unconfined; ') ######################################## ## -## Allow unconfined access to the system DBUS. +## Delete all dbus pid files ## ## ## @@ -491,10 +439,51 @@ interface(`dbus_dontaudit_system_bus_rw_tcp_sockets',` ## ## # -interface(`dbus_unconfined',` +interface(`dbus_delete_pid_files',` gen_require(` - attribute dbusd_unconfined; + type system_dbusd_var_run_t; ') - typeattribute $1 dbusd_unconfined; + files_search_pids($1) + delete_files_pattern($1, system_dbusd_var_run_t, system_dbusd_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to connect to +## session bus types with a unix +## stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dbus_dontaudit_stream_connect_session_bus',` + gen_require(` + attribute session_bus_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 session_bus_type:unix_stream_socket connectto; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to send dbus +## messages to session bus types. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dbus_dontaudit_chat_session_bus',` + gen_require(` + attribute session_bus_type; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + dontaudit $1 session_bus_type:dbus send_msg; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dbus.te b/policy/modules/services/dbus.te index 1bff6ee..a3267cd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dbus.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/dbus.te @@ -10,6 +10,7 @@ gen_require(` # attribute dbusd_unconfined; +attribute system_bus_type; attribute session_bus_type; type dbusd_etc_t; @@ -36,6 +37,7 @@ files_type(system_dbusd_var_lib_t) type system_dbusd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(system_dbusd_var_run_t) +init_sock_file(system_dbusd_var_run_t) ifdef(`enable_mcs',` init_ranged_system_domain(system_dbusd_t, dbusd_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) @@ -52,9 +54,9 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',` # dac_override: /var/run/dbus is owned by messagebus on Debian # cjp: dac_override should probably go in a distro_debian -allow system_dbusd_t self:capability { dac_override setgid setpcap setuid }; +allow system_dbusd_t self:capability { sys_resource dac_override setgid setpcap setuid }; dontaudit system_dbusd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow system_dbusd_t self:process { getattr getsched signal_perms setpgid getcap setcap }; +allow system_dbusd_t self:process { getattr getsched signal_perms setpgid getcap setcap setrlimit }; allow system_dbusd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow system_dbusd_t self:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc }; allow system_dbusd_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; @@ -74,9 +76,10 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(system_dbusd_t, system_dbusd_tmp_t, { file dir }) read_files_pattern(system_dbusd_t, system_dbusd_var_lib_t, system_dbusd_var_lib_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(system_dbusd_t, system_dbusd_var_run_t, system_dbusd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(system_dbusd_t, system_dbusd_var_run_t, system_dbusd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(system_dbusd_t, system_dbusd_var_run_t, system_dbusd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(system_dbusd_t, system_dbusd_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(system_dbusd_t, system_dbusd_var_run_t, { file dir }) kernel_read_system_state(system_dbusd_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_dbusd_t) @@ -84,6 +87,8 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_urand(system_dbusd_t) dev_read_sysfs(system_dbusd_t) +files_rw_inherited_non_security_files(system_dbusd_t) + fs_getattr_all_fs(system_dbusd_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(system_dbusd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(system_dbusd_t) @@ -111,6 +116,8 @@ auth_read_pam_console_data(system_dbusd_t) corecmd_list_bin(system_dbusd_t) corecmd_read_bin_pipes(system_dbusd_t) corecmd_read_bin_sockets(system_dbusd_t) +# needed for system-tools-backends +corecmd_exec_shell(system_dbusd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(system_dbusd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(system_dbusd_t) @@ -121,7 +128,9 @@ files_read_usr_files(system_dbusd_t) init_use_fds(system_dbusd_t) init_use_script_ptys(system_dbusd_t) +init_bin_domtrans_spec(system_dbusd_t) init_domtrans_script(system_dbusd_t) +init_rw_stream_sockets(system_dbusd_t) logging_send_audit_msgs(system_dbusd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(system_dbusd_t) @@ -136,11 +145,27 @@ seutil_sigchld_newrole(system_dbusd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(system_dbusd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(system_dbusd_t) +userdom_home_reader(system_dbusd_t) + optional_policy(` bind_domtrans(system_dbusd_t) ') optional_policy(` + gnome_exec_gconf(system_dbusd_t) + gnome_read_inherited_home_icc_data_files(system_dbusd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + cpufreqselector_dbus_chat(system_dbusd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + networkmanager_initrc_domtrans(system_dbusd_t) + networkmanager_systemctl(system_dbusd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` policykit_dbus_chat(system_dbusd_t) policykit_domtrans_auth(system_dbusd_t) policykit_search_lib(system_dbusd_t) @@ -151,12 +176,160 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + systemd_use_fds_logind(system_dbusd_t) + systemd_write_inherited_logind_sessions_pipes(system_dbusd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_read_db(system_dbusd_t) ') +optional_policy(` + # /var/lib/gdm/.local/share/icc/edid-0a027915105823af34f99b1704e80336.icc + xserver_read_inherited_xdm_lib_files(system_dbusd_t) +') + ######################################## # -# Unconfined access to this module +# system_bus_type rules +# +role system_r types system_bus_type; + +fs_search_all(system_bus_type) + +dbus_system_bus_client(system_bus_type) +dbus_connect_system_bus(system_bus_type) + +init_stream_connect(system_bus_type) +init_dgram_send(system_bus_type) +init_use_fds(system_bus_type) +init_rw_stream_sockets(system_bus_type) + +ps_process_pattern(system_dbusd_t, system_bus_type) + +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(system_bus_type) +userdom_read_all_users_state(system_bus_type) + +optional_policy(` + abrt_stream_connect(system_bus_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpm_script_dbus_chat(system_bus_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_dbus_send(system_bus_type) +') + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + dontaudit system_bus_type system_dbusd_t:netlink_selinux_socket { read write }; +') + +######################################## +# +# session_bus_type rules # +dontaudit session_bus_type self:capability sys_resource; +allow session_bus_type self:process { getattr sigkill signal }; +dontaudit session_bus_type self:process setrlimit; +allow session_bus_type self:file { getattr read write }; +allow session_bus_type self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow session_bus_type self:dbus { send_msg acquire_svc }; +allow session_bus_type self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow session_bus_type self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; +allow session_bus_type self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow session_bus_type self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms; + +allow session_bus_type dbusd_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_files_pattern(session_bus_type, dbusd_etc_t, dbusd_etc_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(session_bus_type, dbusd_etc_t, dbusd_etc_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(session_bus_type, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(session_bus_type, session_dbusd_tmp_t, session_dbusd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(session_bus_type, session_dbusd_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +kernel_read_system_state(session_bus_type) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(session_bus_type) + +corecmd_list_bin(session_bus_type) +corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(session_bus_type) +corecmd_read_bin_files(session_bus_type) +corecmd_read_bin_pipes(session_bus_type) +corecmd_read_bin_sockets(session_bus_type) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(session_bus_type) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(session_bus_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(session_bus_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(session_bus_type) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(session_bus_type) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(session_bus_type) +corenet_tcp_bind_reserved_port(session_bus_type) + +dev_read_urand(session_bus_type) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(session_bus_type) +domain_read_all_domains_state(session_bus_type) + +files_read_etc_files(session_bus_type) +files_list_home(session_bus_type) +files_read_usr_files(session_bus_type) +files_dontaudit_search_var(session_bus_type) + +fs_getattr_romfs(session_bus_type) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(session_bus_type) +fs_list_inotifyfs(session_bus_type) +fs_dontaudit_list_nfs(session_bus_type) + +selinux_get_fs_mount(session_bus_type) +selinux_validate_context(session_bus_type) +selinux_compute_access_vector(session_bus_type) +selinux_compute_create_context(session_bus_type) +selinux_compute_relabel_context(session_bus_type) +selinux_compute_user_contexts(session_bus_type) + +auth_read_pam_console_data(session_bus_type) + +logging_send_audit_msgs(session_bus_type) +logging_send_syslog_msg(session_bus_type) + +miscfiles_read_localization(session_bus_type) + +seutil_read_config(session_bus_type) +seutil_read_default_contexts(session_bus_type) + +term_use_all_inherited_terms(session_bus_type) + +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(session_bus_type) +userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(session_bus_type) +userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(session_bus_type) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(session_bus_type, { dir file }) + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_gconf_home_files(session_bus_type) +') +optional_policy(` + hal_dbus_chat(session_bus_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + thumb_domtrans(session_bus_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_search_xdm_lib(session_bus_type) + xserver_use_xdm_fds(session_bus_type) + xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(session_bus_type) + xserver_use_xdm_fds(session_bus_type) + xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(session_bus_type) + xserver_append_xdm_home_files(session_bus_type) +') + +######################################## +# +# Unconfined access to this module +# allow dbusd_unconfined session_bus_type:dbus all_dbus_perms; +allow dbusd_unconfined dbusd_unconfined:dbus all_dbus_perms; +allow session_bus_type dbusd_unconfined:dbus send_msg; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dcc.if b/policy/modules/services/dcc.if index 784753e..bf65e7d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dcc.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/dcc.if @@ -168,6 +168,6 @@ interface(`dcc_stream_connect_dccifd',` type dcc_var_t, dccifd_var_run_t, dccifd_t; ') - files_search_var($1) + files_search_pids($1) stream_connect_pattern($1, dcc_var_t, dccifd_var_run_t, dccifd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dcc.te b/policy/modules/services/dcc.te index ec19ff4..2f84017 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dcc.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/dcc.te @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ type dcc_var_t; files_type(dcc_var_t) type dcc_var_run_t; -files_type(dcc_var_run_t) +files_pid_file(dcc_var_run_t) type dccd_t; type dccd_exec_t; @@ -110,7 +110,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(cdcc_t) miscfiles_read_localization(cdcc_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(cdcc_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(cdcc_t) ######################################## # @@ -152,7 +152,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(dcc_client_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dcc_client_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(dcc_client_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(dcc_client_t) optional_policy(` amavis_read_spool_files(dcc_client_t) @@ -197,7 +197,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(dcc_dbclean_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dcc_dbclean_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(dcc_dbclean_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(dcc_dbclean_t) ######################################## # diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ddclient.if b/policy/modules/services/ddclient.if index 0a1a61b..64742c6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ddclient.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ddclient.if @@ -64,13 +64,17 @@ interface(`ddclient_run',` interface(`ddclient_admin',` gen_require(` type ddclient_t, ddclient_etc_t, ddclient_log_t; - type ddclient_var_t, ddclient_var_lib_t; - type ddclient_var_run_t, ddclient_initrc_exec_t; + type ddclient_var_t, ddclient_var_lib_t, ddclient_initrc_exec_t; + type ddclient_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 ddclient_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 ddclient_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, ddclient_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ddclient_t:process ptrace; + ') + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ddclient_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 ddclient_initrc_exec_t system_r; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ddclient.te b/policy/modules/services/ddclient.te index 24ba98a..b8d064a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ddclient.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ddclient.te @@ -18,6 +18,9 @@ init_script_file(ddclient_initrc_exec_t) type ddclient_log_t; logging_log_file(ddclient_log_t) +type ddclient_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(ddclient_tmp_t) + type ddclient_var_t; files_type(ddclient_var_t) @@ -37,12 +40,17 @@ allow ddclient_t self:process signal_perms; allow ddclient_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow ddclient_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; allow ddclient_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow ddclient_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; -allow ddclient_t ddclient_etc_t:file read_file_perms; +read_files_pattern(ddclient_t, ddclient_etc_t, ddclient_etc_t) +setattr_files_pattern(ddclient_t, ddclient_etc_t, ddclient_etc_t) allow ddclient_t ddclient_log_t:file manage_file_perms; logging_log_filetrans(ddclient_t, ddclient_log_t, file) +manage_files_pattern(ddclient_t, ddclient_tmp_t, ddclient_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(ddclient_t, ddclient_tmp_t, { file }) + manage_dirs_pattern(ddclient_t, ddclient_var_t, ddclient_var_t) manage_files_pattern(ddclient_t, ddclient_var_t, ddclient_var_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(ddclient_t, ddclient_var_t, ddclient_var_t) @@ -62,6 +70,7 @@ kernel_read_software_raid_state(ddclient_t) kernel_getattr_core_if(ddclient_t) kernel_getattr_message_if(ddclient_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ddclient_t) +kernel_search_network_sysctl(ddclient_t) corecmd_exec_shell(ddclient_t) corecmd_exec_bin(ddclient_t) @@ -74,6 +83,8 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(ddclient_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(ddclient_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(ddclient_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(ddclient_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ddclient_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(ddclient_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(ddclient_t) corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(ddclient_t) @@ -89,6 +100,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(ddclient_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(ddclient_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ddclient_t) +mta_send_mail(ddclient_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(ddclient_t) miscfiles_read_localization(ddclient_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/denyhosts.if b/policy/modules/services/denyhosts.if index 567865f..3a57eb9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/denyhosts.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/denyhosts.if @@ -13,12 +13,12 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run denyhosts. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # -interface(`denyhosts_domtrans', ` +interface(`denyhosts_domtrans',` gen_require(` type denyhosts_t, denyhosts_exec_t; ') @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ interface(`denyhosts_domtrans', ` ##     ## # -interface(`denyhosts_initrc_domtrans', ` +interface(`denyhosts_initrc_domtrans',` gen_require(` type denyhosts_initrc_exec_t; ') @@ -59,27 +59,32 @@ interface(`denyhosts_initrc_domtrans', ` ## Role allowed access. ##     ## +## # -interface(`denyhosts_admin', ` +interface(`denyhosts_admin',` gen_require(` type denyhosts_t, denyhosts_var_lib_t, denyhosts_var_lock_t; type denyhosts_var_log_t, denyhosts_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 denyhosts_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 denyhosts_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, denyhosts_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 denyhosts_t:process ptrace; + ') + denyhosts_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 denyhosts_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - files_search_var_lib($1) + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, denyhosts_var_lib_t) - logging_search_logs($1) + logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, denyhosts_var_log_t) - files_search_locks($1) + files_list_locks($1) admin_pattern($1, denyhosts_var_lock_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/denyhosts.te b/policy/modules/services/denyhosts.te index 8ba9425..1d68f66 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/denyhosts.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/denyhosts.te @@ -25,7 +25,9 @@ logging_log_file(denyhosts_var_log_t) # # DenyHosts personal policy. # - +# Bug #588563 +allow denyhosts_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow denyhosts_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow denyhosts_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; allow denyhosts_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; allow denyhosts_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -43,8 +45,11 @@ read_files_pattern(denyhosts_t, denyhosts_var_log_t, denyhosts_var_log_t) setattr_files_pattern(denyhosts_t, denyhosts_var_log_t, denyhosts_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(denyhosts_t, denyhosts_var_log_t, file) +kernel_read_network_state(denyhosts_t) kernel_read_system_state(denyhosts_t) +kernel_read_network_state(denyhosts_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(denyhosts_t) corecmd_exec_bin(denyhosts_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(denyhosts_t) @@ -53,20 +58,30 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(denyhosts_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(denyhosts_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(denyhosts_t) corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(denyhosts_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_sype_port(denyhosts_t) corenet_sendrecv_smtp_client_packets(denyhosts_t) dev_read_urand(denyhosts_t) files_read_etc_files(denyhosts_t) +files_read_usr_files(denyhosts_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(denyhosts_t) # /var/log/secure logging_read_generic_logs(denyhosts_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(denyhosts_t) miscfiles_read_localization(denyhosts_t) +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(denyhosts_t) sysnet_manage_config(denyhosts_t) sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(denyhosts_t) optional_policy(` cron_system_entry(denyhosts_t, denyhosts_exec_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(denyhosts_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/devicekit.fc b/policy/modules/services/devicekit.fc index 418a5a0..de67309 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/devicekit.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/devicekit.fc @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +/lib/udev/udisks-part-id -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_disk_exec_t,s0) +/lib/udisks2/udisksd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_disk_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/udev/udisks-part-id -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_disk_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udisks2/udisksd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_disk_exec_t,s0) + /usr/libexec/devkit-daemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/devkit-disks-daemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_disk_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/devkit-power-daemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_power_exec_t,s0) @@ -6,9 +12,14 @@ /var/lib/DeviceKit-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/upower(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_lib_t,s0) -/var/lib/udisks(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/udisks.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/pm-powersave\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_log_t,s0) +/var/log/pm-suspend\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_log_t,s0) /var/run/devkit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/DeviceKit-disks(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_run_t,s0) -/var/run/udisks(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/pm-utils(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/run/udisks.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/upower(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:devicekit_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/devicekit.if b/policy/modules/services/devicekit.if index f706b99..9b9f4ad 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/devicekit.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/devicekit.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run devicekit. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`devicekit_domtrans',` @@ -20,6 +20,24 @@ interface(`devicekit_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute a domain transition to run devicekit_disk. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`devicekit_domtrans_disk',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_disk_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, devicekit_disk_exec_t, devicekit_disk_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Send to devicekit over a unix domain ## datagram socket. ## @@ -81,6 +99,45 @@ interface(`devicekit_dbus_chat_disk',` ######################################## ## +## Use file descriptors for devicekit_disk. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`devicekit_use_fds_disk',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_disk_t; + ') + + allow $1 devicekit_disk_t:fd use; +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit Send and receive messages from +## devicekit disk over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`devicekit_dontaudit_dbus_chat_disk',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_disk_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + dontaudit $1 devicekit_disk_t:dbus send_msg; + dontaudit devicekit_disk_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## ## Send signal devicekit power ## ## @@ -118,6 +175,62 @@ interface(`devicekit_dbus_chat_power',` allow devicekit_power_t $1:dbus send_msg; ') +####################################### +## +## Append inherited devicekit log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`devicekit_append_inherited_log_files',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_var_log_t; + ') + + allow $1 devicekit_var_log_t:file append_inherited_file_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Do not audit attempts to write the devicekit +## log files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`devicekit_dontaudit_rw_log',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_var_log_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 devicekit_var_log_t:file rw_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the domain to read devicekit_power state files in /proc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`devicekit_read_state_power',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_power_t; + ') + + kernel_search_proc($1) + ps_process_pattern($1, devicekit_power_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Read devicekit PID files. @@ -139,22 +252,93 @@ interface(`devicekit_read_pid_files',` ######################################## ## -## All of the rules required to administrate -## an devicekit environment +## Do not audit attempts to read +## devicekit PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`devicekit_dontaudit_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_var_run_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 devicekit_var_run_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## Manage devicekit PID files. ## ## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## -## +# +interface(`devicekit_manage_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, devicekit_var_run_t, devicekit_var_run_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, devicekit_var_run_t, devicekit_var_run_t) + files_pid_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_run_t, dir, "pm-utils") +') + +####################################### +## +## Relabel devicekit LOG files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`devicekit_relabel_log_files',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_var_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + relabel_files_pattern($1, devicekit_var_log_t, devicekit_var_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage devicekit LOG files. +## +## ## -## The role to be allowed to manage the devicekit domain. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## -## +# +interface(`devicekit_manage_log_files',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_var_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, devicekit_var_log_t, devicekit_var_log_t) + #logging_log_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_log_t, file, "pm-powersave.log") + #logging_log_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_log_t, file, "pm-suspend.log") +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an devicekit environment +## +## ## -## The type of the user terminal. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## ## @@ -165,21 +349,46 @@ interface(`devicekit_admin',` type devicekit_var_lib_t, devicekit_var_run_t, devicekit_tmp_t; ') - allow $1 devicekit_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 devicekit_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, devicekit_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 devicekit_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 devicekit_disk_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 devicekit_power_t:process ptrace; + ') - allow $1 devicekit_disk_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 devicekit_disk_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, devicekit_disk_t) - allow $1 devicekit_power_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 devicekit_power_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, devicekit_power_t) admin_pattern($1, devicekit_tmp_t) - files_search_tmp($1) + files_list_tmp($1) admin_pattern($1, devicekit_var_lib_t) - files_search_var_lib($1) + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, devicekit_var_run_t) - files_search_pids($1) + files_list_pids($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to devicekit named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`devicekit_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type devicekit_var_run_t, devicekit_var_log_t; + ') + + files_pid_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_run_t, dir, "pm-utils") + #logging_log_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_log_t, file, "pm-powersave.log") + #logging_log_filetrans($1, devicekit_var_log_t, file, "pm-suspend.log") ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/devicekit.te b/policy/modules/services/devicekit.te index f231f17..f6803f2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/devicekit.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/devicekit.te @@ -8,14 +8,17 @@ policy_module(devicekit, 1.1.0) type devicekit_t; type devicekit_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(devicekit_t, devicekit_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(devicekit_t, devicekit_exec_t) type devicekit_power_t; type devicekit_power_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_power_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_power_exec_t) type devicekit_disk_t; type devicekit_disk_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_disk_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_disk_exec_t) type devicekit_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(devicekit_tmp_t) @@ -26,6 +29,9 @@ files_pid_file(devicekit_var_run_t) type devicekit_var_lib_t; files_type(devicekit_var_lib_t) +type devicekit_var_log_t; +logging_log_file(devicekit_var_log_t) + ######################################## # # DeviceKit local policy @@ -62,7 +68,8 @@ optional_policy(` # DeviceKit disk local policy # -allow devicekit_disk_t self:capability { chown setuid setgid dac_override fowner fsetid net_admin sys_admin sys_nice sys_ptrace sys_rawio }; +allow devicekit_disk_t self:capability { chown setuid setgid dac_override fowner fsetid net_admin sys_admin sys_nice sys_rawio }; + allow devicekit_disk_t self:process { getsched signal_perms }; allow devicekit_disk_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow devicekit_disk_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -75,10 +82,14 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, devicekit_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, devicekit_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, dir) +allow devicekit_disk_t devicekit_var_run_t:dir mounton; manage_dirs_pattern(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_run_t, devicekit_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_run_t, devicekit_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(devicekit_disk_t, devicekit_var_run_t, { file dir }) +files_filetrans_named_content(devicekit_disk_t) +kernel_list_unlabeled(devicekit_disk_t) +kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_files(devicekit_disk_t) kernel_getattr_message_if(devicekit_disk_t) kernel_read_fs_sysctls(devicekit_disk_t) kernel_read_network_state(devicekit_disk_t) @@ -97,6 +108,7 @@ dev_getattr_usbfs_dirs(devicekit_disk_t) dev_manage_generic_files(devicekit_disk_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(devicekit_disk_t) dev_getattr_mtrr_dev(devicekit_disk_t) +dev_rw_generic_blk_files(devicekit_disk_t) domain_getattr_all_pipes(devicekit_disk_t) domain_getattr_all_sockets(devicekit_disk_t) @@ -105,14 +117,17 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(devicekit_disk_t) files_dontaudit_read_all_symlinks(devicekit_disk_t) files_getattr_all_sockets(devicekit_disk_t) -files_getattr_all_mountpoints(devicekit_disk_t) +files_getattr_all_dirs(devicekit_disk_t) files_getattr_all_files(devicekit_disk_t) +files_getattr_all_pipes(devicekit_disk_t) +files_manage_boot_dirs(devicekit_disk_t) files_manage_isid_type_dirs(devicekit_disk_t) files_manage_mnt_dirs(devicekit_disk_t) files_read_etc_files(devicekit_disk_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(devicekit_disk_t) files_read_usr_files(devicekit_disk_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(devicekit_disk_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(devicekit_disk_t) fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(devicekit_disk_t) fs_mount_all_fs(devicekit_disk_t) @@ -127,14 +142,17 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(devicekit_disk_t) storage_raw_read_removable_device(devicekit_disk_t) storage_raw_write_removable_device(devicekit_disk_t) -term_use_all_terms(devicekit_disk_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(devicekit_disk_t) auth_use_nsswitch(devicekit_disk_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(devicekit_disk_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(devicekit_disk_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(devicekit_disk_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(devicekit_disk_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(devicekit_disk_t) optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(devicekit_disk_t) @@ -170,6 +188,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + systemd_read_logind_sessions_files(devicekit_disk_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_domtrans(devicekit_disk_t) udev_read_db(devicekit_disk_t) ') @@ -178,55 +200,85 @@ optional_policy(` virt_manage_images(devicekit_disk_t) ') +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(devicekit_t) + unconfined_domain(devicekit_power_t) + unconfined_domain(devicekit_disk_t) +') + ######################################## # # DeviceKit-Power local policy # -allow devicekit_power_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin sys_admin sys_tty_config sys_nice sys_ptrace }; -allow devicekit_power_t self:process getsched; +allow devicekit_power_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin sys_admin sys_tty_config sys_nice }; +allow devicekit_power_t self:process { getsched signal_perms }; allow devicekit_power_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow devicekit_power_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow devicekit_power_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +manage_files_pattern(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_log_t, devicekit_var_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_log_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_tmp_t, devicekit_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_tmp_t, devicekit_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_tmp_t, { file dir }) + manage_dirs_pattern(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, devicekit_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, devicekit_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_lib_t, dir) +manage_files_pattern(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_log_t, devicekit_var_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_log_t, file) + +manage_files_pattern(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_run_t, devicekit_var_run_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_run_t, devicekit_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(devicekit_power_t, devicekit_var_run_t, dir) + +kernel_read_fs_sysctls(devicekit_power_t) kernel_read_network_state(devicekit_power_t) kernel_read_system_state(devicekit_power_t) kernel_rw_hotplug_sysctls(devicekit_power_t) kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(devicekit_power_t) +kernel_rw_vm_sysctls(devicekit_power_t) kernel_search_debugfs(devicekit_power_t) kernel_write_proc_files(devicekit_power_t) +kernel_setsched(devicekit_power_t) corecmd_exec_bin(devicekit_power_t) corecmd_exec_shell(devicekit_power_t) -consoletype_exec(devicekit_power_t) - domain_read_all_domains_state(devicekit_power_t) dev_read_input(devicekit_power_t) +dev_read_urand(devicekit_power_t) dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(devicekit_power_t) dev_rw_generic_chr_files(devicekit_power_t) dev_rw_netcontrol(devicekit_power_t) dev_rw_sysfs(devicekit_power_t) +dev_read_rand(devicekit_power_t) +dev_getattr_all_chr_files(devicekit_power_t) files_read_kernel_img(devicekit_power_t) files_read_etc_files(devicekit_power_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(devicekit_power_t) files_read_usr_files(devicekit_power_t) +files_dontaudit_list_mnt(devicekit_power_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(devicekit_power_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(devicekit_power_t) -term_use_all_terms(devicekit_power_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(devicekit_power_t) auth_use_nsswitch(devicekit_power_t) miscfiles_read_localization(devicekit_power_t) +seutil_exec_setfiles(devicekit_power_t) + sysnet_read_config(devicekit_power_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(devicekit_power_t) +sysnet_domtrans_dhcpc(devicekit_power_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(devicekit_power_t) @@ -235,7 +287,12 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(devicekit_power_t) +') + +optional_policy(` cron_initrc_domtrans(devicekit_power_t) + cron_systemctl(devicekit_power_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -261,14 +318,21 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_manage_home_config(devicekit_power_t) +') + +optional_policy(` hal_domtrans_mac(devicekit_power_t) - hal_manage_log(devicekit_power_t) hal_manage_pid_dirs(devicekit_power_t) hal_manage_pid_files(devicekit_power_t) hal_dbus_chat(devicekit_power_t) ') optional_policy(` + networkmanager_domtrans(devicekit_power_t) +') + +optional_policy(` policykit_dbus_chat(devicekit_power_t) policykit_domtrans_auth(devicekit_power_t) policykit_read_lib(devicekit_power_t) @@ -276,9 +340,30 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(devicekit_power_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_domtrans(devicekit_power_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + readahead_domtrans(devicekit_power_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_read_db(devicekit_power_t) ') optional_policy(` + usbmuxd_stream_connect(devicekit_power_t) +') + +optional_policy(` vbetool_domtrans(devicekit_power_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + corenet_tcp_connect_xserver_port(devicekit_power_t) + xserver_stream_connect(devicekit_power_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dhcp.fc b/policy/modules/services/dhcp.fc index 767e0c7..9553bcf 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dhcp.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/dhcp.fc @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dhcpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dhcpd(6)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/dhcpcd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpd_unit_file_t,s0) /usr/sbin/dhcpd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpd_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/dhcpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpd_state_t,s0) /var/lib/dhcp(3)?/dhcpd\.leases.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpd_state_t,s0) -/var/run/dhcpd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/dhcpd(6)?\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dhcp.if b/policy/modules/services/dhcp.if index 5e2cea8..2ab8a14 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dhcp.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/dhcp.if @@ -36,7 +36,7 @@ interface(`dhcpd_setattr_state_files',` ') sysnet_search_dhcp_state($1) - allow $1 dhcpd_state_t:file setattr; + allow $1 dhcpd_state_t:file setattr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -60,6 +60,30 @@ interface(`dhcpd_initrc_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute dhcpd server in the dhcpd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`dhcpd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type dhcpd_unit_file_t; + type dhcpd_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_search_unit_dirs($1) + allow $1 dhcpd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 dhcpd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, dhcpd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an dhcp environment ## @@ -77,12 +101,16 @@ interface(`dhcpd_initrc_domtrans',` # interface(`dhcpd_admin',` gen_require(` - type dhcpd_t; type dhcpd_tmp_t; type dhcpd_state_t; + type dhcpd_t, dhcpd_tmp_t, dhcpd_state_t; type dhcpd_var_run_t, dhcpd_initrc_exec_t; + type dhcpd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 dhcpd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 dhcpd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, dhcpd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 dhcpd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, dhcpd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -96,4 +124,8 @@ interface(`dhcpd_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, dhcpd_var_run_t) + + dhcpd_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, dhcpd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 dhcpd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dhcp.te b/policy/modules/services/dhcp.te index d4424ad..5d01064 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dhcp.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/dhcp.te @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ init_daemon_domain(dhcpd_t, dhcpd_exec_t) type dhcpd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(dhcpd_initrc_exec_t) +type dhcpd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(dhcpd_unit_file_t) + type dhcpd_state_t; files_type(dhcpd_state_t) @@ -26,9 +29,9 @@ files_pid_file(dhcpd_var_run_t) # Local policy # -allow dhcpd_t self:capability { net_raw sys_resource }; +allow dhcpd_t self:capability { dac_override sys_chroot net_raw setgid setuid sys_resource }; dontaudit dhcpd_t self:capability { net_admin sys_tty_config }; -allow dhcpd_t self:process signal_perms; +allow dhcpd_t self:process { getcap setcap signal_perms }; allow dhcpd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow dhcpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow dhcpd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -73,6 +76,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(dhcpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_dhcpd_server_packets(dhcpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_pxe_server_packets(dhcpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(dhcpd_t) +corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_reserved_ports(dhcpd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(dhcpd_t) dev_read_sysfs(dhcpd_t) dev_read_rand(dhcpd_t) @@ -111,6 +116,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + cobbler_dontaudit_rw_log(dhcpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(dhcpd_t) dbus_connect_system_bus(dhcpd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dictd.if b/policy/modules/services/dictd.if index a0d23ce..83a7ca5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dictd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/dictd.if @@ -38,8 +38,11 @@ interface(`dictd_admin',` type dictd_var_run_t, dictd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 dictd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 dictd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, dictd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 dictd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, dictd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dictd.te b/policy/modules/services/dictd.te index d2d9359..ee10625 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dictd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/dictd.te @@ -73,23 +73,15 @@ files_search_var_lib(dictd_t) # for checking for nscd files_dontaudit_search_pids(dictd_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(dictd_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(dictd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dictd_t) -sysnet_read_config(dictd_t) - userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dictd_t) optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(dictd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(dictd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(dictd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dirsrv-admin.fc b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv-admin.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..fdf5675 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv-admin.fc @@ -0,0 +1,15 @@ +/etc/dirsrv/admin-serv(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrvadmin_config_t,s0) + +/etc/dirsrv/dsgw(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrvadmin_config_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/restart-ds-admin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrvadmin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/start-ds-admin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrvadmin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/stop-ds-admin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrvadmin_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/dirsrv/dsgw-cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_create -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/dirsrv/cgi-bin/ds_remove -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lock/subsys/dirsrv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrvadmin_lock_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dirsrv-admin.if b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv-admin.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..332a1c9 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv-admin.if @@ -0,0 +1,134 @@ +## Administration Server for Directory Server, dirsrv-admin. + +######################################## +## +## Exec dirsrv-admin programs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrvadmin_run_exec',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrvadmin_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 dirsrvadmin_exec_t:dir search_dir_perms; + can_exec($1, dirsrvadmin_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Exec cgi programs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrvadmin_run_httpd_script_exec',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t:dir search_dir_perms; + can_exec($1, httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage dirsrv-adminserver configuration files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrvadmin_read_config',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrvadmin_config_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, dirsrvadmin_config_t, dirsrvadmin_config_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage dirsrv-adminserver configuration files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrvadmin_manage_config',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrvadmin_config_t; + ') + + allow $1 dirsrvadmin_config_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1 dirsrvadmin_config_t:file manage_file_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Read dirsrv-adminserver tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrvadmin_read_tmp',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrvadmin_tmp_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage dirsrv-adminserver tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrvadmin_manage_tmp',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrvadmin_tmp_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute admin cgi programs in caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrvadmin_domtrans_unconfined_script_t',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t; + type dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t, dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) + allow $1 dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t:process signal_perms; + +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dirsrv-admin.te b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv-admin.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c2ac646 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv-admin.te @@ -0,0 +1,144 @@ +policy_module(dirsrv-admin,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations for the daemon +# + +type dirsrvadmin_t; +type dirsrvadmin_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(dirsrvadmin_t, dirsrvadmin_exec_t) +role system_r types dirsrvadmin_t; + +type dirsrvadmin_config_t; +files_type(dirsrvadmin_config_t) + +type dirsrvadmin_lock_t; +files_lock_file(dirsrvadmin_lock_t) + +type dirsrvadmin_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) + +type dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t; +type dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t; +domain_type(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +domain_entry_file(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_exec_t) +corecmd_shell_entry_type(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +role system_r types dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t; + +######################################## +# +# Local policy for the daemon +# +allow dirsrvadmin_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow dirsrvadmin_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override sys_tty_config sys_resource }; +allow dirsrvadmin_t self:process setrlimit; + +manage_files_pattern(dirsrvadmin_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(dirsrvadmin_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(dirsrvadmin_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +kernel_read_system_state(dirsrvadmin_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(dirsrvadmin_t) +corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(dirsrvadmin_t) +corecmd_search_bin(dirsrvadmin_t) +corecmd_shell_entry_type(dirsrvadmin_t) + +files_exec_etc_files(dirsrvadmin_t) + +libs_exec_ld_so(dirsrvadmin_t) + +logging_search_logs(dirsrvadmin_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(dirsrvadmin_t) + +# Needed for stop and restart scripts +dirsrv_read_var_run(dirsrvadmin_t) + +optional_policy(` + apache_domtrans(dirsrvadmin_t) + apache_signal(dirsrvadmin_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# Local policy for the CGIs +# +# +# +# Create a domain for the CGI scripts + +optional_policy(` + apache_content_template(dirsrvadmin) + + allow httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t self:process { getsched getpgid }; + allow httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t self:capability { setuid net_bind_service setgid chown sys_nice kill dac_read_search dac_override }; + allow httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + allow httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + allow httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + allow httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; + allow httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t self:sem create_sem_perms; + + + manage_files_pattern(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, dirsrvadmin_lock_t, dirsrvadmin_lock_t) + files_lock_filetrans(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, dirsrvadmin_lock_t, { file }) + + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + + corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + + files_search_var_lib(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + + sysnet_read_config(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + + manage_files_pattern(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) + files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, { file dir }) + + # The CGI scripts must be able to manage dirsrv-admin + dirsrvadmin_run_exec(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrvadmin_manage_config(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrv_domtrans(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrv_signal(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrv_signull(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrv_manage_log(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrv_manage_var_lib(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrv_pid_filetrans(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrv_manage_var_run(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrv_manage_config(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) + dirsrv_read_share(httpd_dirsrvadmin_script_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# Local policy for the admin CGIs +# +# + + +manage_files_pattern(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t, dirsrvadmin_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +# needed because of filetrans rules +dirsrvadmin_run_exec(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrvadmin_manage_config(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrv_domtrans(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrv_signal(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrv_signull(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrv_manage_log(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrv_manage_var_lib(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrv_pid_filetrans(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrv_manage_var_run(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrv_manage_config(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +dirsrv_read_share(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(dirsrvadmin_unconfined_script_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dirsrv.fc b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6fc4865 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv.fc @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/etc/dirsrv(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_config_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/ns-slapd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ldap-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ldap-agent-bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_snmp_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/start-dirsrv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/restart-dirsrv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/share/dirsrv(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_share_t,s0) + +/var/run/dirsrv(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/ldap-agent\.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t,s0) + +# BZ: +/var/run/slapd.* -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/lib/dirsrv(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/lock/dirsrv(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_var_lock_t,s0) + +/var/log/dirsrv(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_var_log_t,s0) + +/var/log/dirsrv/ldap-agent.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dirsrv.if b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b214253 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv.if @@ -0,0 +1,208 @@ +## policy for dirsrv + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run dirsrv. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_t, dirsrv_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, dirsrv_exec_t,dirsrv_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Allow caller to signal dirsrv. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_signal',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_t; + ') + + allow $1 dirsrv_t:process signal; +') + + +######################################## +## +## Send a null signal to dirsrv. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_signull',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_t; + ') + + allow $1 dirsrv_t:process signull; +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow a domain to manage dirsrv logs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_var_log_t; + ') + + allow $1 dirsrv_var_log_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1 dirsrv_var_log_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1 dirsrv_var_log_t:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow a domain to manage dirsrv /var/lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_manage_var_lib',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_var_lib_t; + ') + allow $1 dirsrv_var_lib_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1 dirsrv_var_lib_t:file manage_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to dirsrv over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, dirsrv_var_run_t, dirsrv_var_run_t, dirsrv_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow a domain to manage dirsrv /var/run files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_manage_var_run',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_var_run_t; + ') + allow $1 dirsrv_var_run_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1 dirsrv_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1 dirsrv_var_run_t:sock_file manage_file_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow a domain to create dirsrv pid directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_pid_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_var_run_t; + ') + # Allow creating a dir in /var/run with this type + files_pid_filetrans($1, dirsrv_var_run_t, dir) +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow a domain to read dirsrv /var/run files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_read_var_run',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_var_run_t; + ') + allow $1 dirsrv_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow $1 dirsrv_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage dirsrv configuration files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_manage_config',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_config_t; + ') + + allow $1 dirsrv_config_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1 dirsrv_config_t:file manage_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read dirsrv share files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dirsrv_read_share',` + gen_require(` + type dirsrv_share_t; + ') + + allow $1 dirsrv_share_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow $1 dirsrv_share_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 dirsrv_share_t:lnk_file read; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dirsrv.te b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..71f225b --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dirsrv.te @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +policy_module(dirsrv,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +# main daemon +type dirsrv_t; +type dirsrv_exec_t; +domain_type(dirsrv_t) +init_daemon_domain(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_exec_t) + +type dirsrv_snmp_t; +type dirsrv_snmp_exec_t; +domain_type(dirsrv_snmp_t) +init_daemon_domain(dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrv_snmp_exec_t) + +type dirsrv_var_lib_t; +files_type(dirsrv_var_lib_t) + +type dirsrv_var_log_t; +logging_log_file(dirsrv_var_log_t) + +type dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t; +logging_log_file(dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t) + +type dirsrv_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(dirsrv_var_run_t) + +type dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t) + +type dirsrv_var_lock_t; +files_lock_file(dirsrv_var_lock_t) + +type dirsrv_config_t; +files_type(dirsrv_config_t) + +type dirsrv_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(dirsrv_tmp_t) + +type dirsrv_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(dirsrv_tmpfs_t) + +type dirsrv_share_t; +files_type(dirsrv_share_t); + +######################################## +# +# dirsrv local policy +# +allow dirsrv_t self:process { getsched setsched setfscreate signal_perms}; +allow dirsrv_t self:capability { sys_nice setuid setgid fsetid chown dac_override fowner }; +allow dirsrv_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow dirsrv_t self:sem create_sem_perms; +allow dirsrv_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_tmpfs_t, dirsrv_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_tmpfs_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_lib_t, dirsrv_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_lib_t, dirsrv_var_lib_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_lib_t, dirsrv_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(dirsrv_t,dirsrv_var_lib_t, { file dir sock_file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_log_t, dirsrv_var_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_log_t, dirsrv_var_log_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_log_t, dirsrv_var_log_t) +allow dirsrv_t dirsrv_var_log_t:dir { setattr }; +logging_log_filetrans(dirsrv_t,dirsrv_var_log_t,{ sock_file file dir }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_run_t, dirsrv_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_run_t, dirsrv_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_run_t, dirsrv_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file }) + +manage_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_lock_t, dirsrv_var_lock_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_lock_t, dirsrv_var_lock_t) +files_lock_filetrans(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_var_lock_t, file) +files_setattr_lock_dirs(dirsrv_t) + +manage_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_config_t, dirsrv_config_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_config_t, dirsrv_config_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_config_t, dirsrv_config_t) + +manage_files_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_tmp_t, dirsrv_tmp_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_tmp_t, dirsrv_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(dirsrv_t, dirsrv_tmp_t, { file dir }) +allow dirsrv_t dirsrv_tmp_t:file relabel_file_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(dirsrv_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dirsrv_t) + +corecmd_search_bin(dirsrv_t) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(dirsrv_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(dirsrv_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(dirsrv_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(dirsrv_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(dirsrv_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(dirsrv_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_ldap_port(dirsrv_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_dogtag_port(dirsrv_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_all_rpc_ports(dirsrv_t) +corenet_udp_bind_all_rpc_ports(dirsrv_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(dirsrv_t) +corenet_sendrecv_ldap_server_packets(dirsrv_t) +corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(dirsrv_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(dirsrv_t) +dev_read_urand(dirsrv_t) + +files_read_etc_files(dirsrv_t) +files_read_usr_symlinks(dirsrv_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(dirsrv_t) + +auth_use_pam(dirsrv_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(dirsrv_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(dirsrv_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dirsrv_t) + +optional_policy(` + apache_dontaudit_leaks(dirsrv_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dirsrvadmin_read_tmp(dirsrv_t) +') + + +optional_policy(` + kerberos_use(dirsrv_t) +') + +# FIPS mode +optional_policy(` + prelink_exec(dirsrv_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpcbind_stream_connect(dirsrv_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# dirsrv-snmp local policy +# +allow dirsrv_snmp_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search }; +allow dirsrv_snmp_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +rw_files_pattern(dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrv_tmpfs_t, dirsrv_tmpfs_t) + +read_files_pattern(dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrv_var_run_t, dirsrv_var_run_t) + +read_files_pattern(dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrv_config_t, dirsrv_config_t) + +manage_files_pattern(dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t, dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrv_snmp_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +search_dirs_pattern(dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrv_var_run_t, dirsrv_var_run_t) + +manage_files_pattern(dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrv_var_log_t, dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t); +filetrans_pattern(dirsrv_snmp_t, dirsrv_var_log_t, dirsrv_snmp_var_log_t, file) + +corenet_tcp_connect_agentx_port(dirsrv_snmp_t) + +dev_read_rand(dirsrv_snmp_t) +dev_read_urand(dirsrv_snmp_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(dirsrv_snmp_t) + +#files_manage_var_files(dirsrv_snmp_t) +files_read_etc_files(dirsrv_snmp_t) +files_read_usr_files(dirsrv_snmp_t) + +fs_getattr_tmpfs(dirsrv_snmp_t) +fs_search_tmpfs(dirsrv_snmp_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(dirsrv_snmp_t) + +sysnet_read_config(dirsrv_snmp_t) +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dirsrv_snmp_t) + +optional_policy(` + snmp_dontaudit_read_snmp_var_lib_files(dirsrv_snmp_t) + snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files(dirsrv_snmp_t) + snmp_manage_var_lib_dirs(dirsrv_snmp_t) + snmp_manage_var_lib_files(dirsrv_snmp_t) + snmp_stream_connect(dirsrv_snmp_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/djbdns.te b/policy/modules/services/djbdns.te index 03b5286..fcafa0b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/djbdns.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/djbdns.te @@ -23,9 +23,6 @@ djbdns_daemontools_domain_template(tinydns) # Local policy for axfrdns component # -daemontools_ipc_domain(djbdns_axfrdns_t) -daemontools_read_svc(djbdns_axfrdns_t) - allow djbdns_axfrdns_t self:capability { setuid setgid sys_chroot }; allow djbdns_axfrdns_t djbdns_axfrdns_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms; @@ -39,6 +36,9 @@ allow djbdns_axfrdns_t djbdns_tinydns_conf_t:file read_file_perms; files_search_var(djbdns_axfrdns_t) +daemontools_ipc_domain(djbdns_axfrdns_t) +daemontools_read_svc(djbdns_axfrdns_t) + ucspitcp_service_domain(djbdns_axfrdns_t, djbdns_axfrdns_exec_t) ######################################## diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dkim.fc b/policy/modules/services/dkim.fc index dc1056c..bd60100 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dkim.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/dkim.fc @@ -7,3 +7,5 @@ /var/run/dkim-filter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0) /var/run/dkim-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0) /var/run/dkim-milter\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0) + +/var/lib/dkim-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.fc b/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.fc index b886676..3d5ca2b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.fc @@ -1,12 +1,14 @@ /etc/dnsmasq\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_etc_t, s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dnsmasq -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/dnsmasq.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_unit_file_t,s0) + /usr/sbin/dnsmasq -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/misc/dnsmasq\.leases -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_lease_t,s0) /var/lib/dnsmasq(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_lease_t,s0) -/var/log/dnsmasq\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_log_t,s0) +/var/log/dnsmasq.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_log_t,s0) /var/run/dnsmasq\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/libvirt/network(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnsmasq_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.if b/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.if index 9bd812b..6572368 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.if @@ -10,7 +10,6 @@ ## ## # -# interface(`dnsmasq_domtrans',` gen_require(` type dnsmasq_exec_t, dnsmasq_t; @@ -20,6 +19,24 @@ interface(`dnsmasq_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, dnsmasq_exec_t, dnsmasq_t) ') +####################################### +## +## Execute dnsmasq server in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`dnsmasq_exec',` + gen_require(` + type dnsmasq_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, dnsmasq_exec_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute the dnsmasq init script in the init script domain. @@ -41,6 +58,29 @@ interface(`dnsmasq_initrc_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute dnsmasq server in the dnsmasq domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`dnsmasq_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type dnsmasq_unit_file_t; + type dnsmasq_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 dnsmasq_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 dnsmasq_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, dnsmasq_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Send dnsmasq a signal ## ## @@ -101,9 +141,9 @@ interface(`dnsmasq_kill',` ## Read dnsmasq config files. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`dnsmasq_read_config',` @@ -120,9 +160,9 @@ interface(`dnsmasq_read_config',` ## Write to dnsmasq config files. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`dnsmasq_write_config',` @@ -144,12 +184,12 @@ interface(`dnsmasq_write_config',` ##     ## # -# interface(`dnsmasq_delete_pid_files',` gen_require(` type dnsmasq_var_run_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) delete_files_pattern($1, dnsmasq_var_run_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t) ') @@ -163,17 +203,80 @@ interface(`dnsmasq_delete_pid_files',` ##     ## # -# interface(`dnsmasq_read_pid_files',` gen_require(` type dnsmasq_var_run_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) read_files_pattern($1, dnsmasq_var_run_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t) ') ######################################## ## +## Create dnsmasq pid dirs +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dnsmasq_create_pid_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type dnsmasq_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + create_dirs_pattern($1, dnsmasq_var_run_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to dnsmasq named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the directory for the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`dnsmasq_filetrans_named_content_fromdir',` + gen_require(` + type dnsmasq_var_run_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, $2, dnsmasq_var_run_t, dir, "network") + filetrans_pattern($1, $2, dnsmasq_var_run_t, file, "dnsmasq.pid") +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to dnsmasq named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dnsmasq_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type dnsmasq_var_run_t; + ') + + files_pid_filetrans($1, dnsmasq_var_run_t, dir, "network") + files_pid_filetrans($1, dnsmasq_var_run_t, file, "dnsmasq.pid") + virt_pid_filetrans($1, dnsmasq_var_run_t, file, "network") +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an dnsmasq environment ## @@ -193,10 +296,14 @@ interface(`dnsmasq_admin',` gen_require(` type dnsmasq_t, dnsmasq_lease_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t; type dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t; + type dnsmasq_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 dnsmasq_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 dnsmasq_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, dnsmasq_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 dnsmasq_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, dnsmasq_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -208,4 +315,8 @@ interface(`dnsmasq_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, dnsmasq_var_run_t) + + dnsmasq_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, dnsmasq_unit_file_t) + allow $1 dnsmasq_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.te b/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.te index fdaeeba..1a2a666 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/dnsmasq.te @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ logging_log_file(dnsmasq_var_log_t) type dnsmasq_var_run_t; files_pid_file(dnsmasq_var_run_t) +type dnsmasq_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(dnsmasq_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy @@ -48,11 +51,14 @@ files_var_lib_filetrans(dnsmasq_t, dnsmasq_lease_t, file) manage_files_pattern(dnsmasq_t, dnsmasq_var_log_t, dnsmasq_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(dnsmasq_t, dnsmasq_var_log_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(dnsmasq_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(dnsmasq_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(dnsmasq_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(dnsmasq_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t, { dir file }) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dnsmasq_t) kernel_read_system_state(dnsmasq_t) +kernel_read_network_state(dnsmasq_t) +kernel_request_load_module(dnsmasq_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(dnsmasq_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(dnsmasq_t) @@ -88,6 +94,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(dnsmasq_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dnsmasq_t) +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dnsmasq_t) + userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dnsmasq_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(dnsmasq_t) @@ -96,7 +104,20 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + cron_manage_pid_files(dnsmasq_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(dnsmasq_t) + dbus_connect_system_bus(dnsmasq_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + networkmanager_read_pid_files(dnsmasq_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ppp_read_pid_files(dnsmasq_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -113,5 +134,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` virt_manage_lib_files(dnsmasq_t) + virt_read_lib_files(dnsmasq_t) virt_read_pid_files(dnsmasq_t) + virt_pid_filetrans(dnsmasq_t, dnsmasq_var_run_t, { dir file }) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dnssec.fc b/policy/modules/services/dnssec.fc new file mode 100755 index 0000000..9e231a8 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dnssec.fc @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ +/usr/sbin/dnssec-triggerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnssec_trigger_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/dnssec.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:dnssec_trigger_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dnssec.if b/policy/modules/services/dnssec.if new file mode 100755 index 0000000..a9dbcf2 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dnssec.if @@ -0,0 +1,70 @@ + +## policy for dnssec_trigger + +######################################## +## +## Transition to dnssec_trigger. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`dnssec_trigger_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type dnssec_trigger_t, dnssec_trigger_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, dnssec_trigger_exec_t, dnssec_trigger_t) +') +######################################## +## +## Read dnssec_trigger PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dnssec_trigger_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type dnssec_trigger_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 dnssec_trigger_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an dnssec_trigger environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`dnssec_trigger_admin',` + gen_require(` + type dnssec_trigger_t; + type dnssec_trigger_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 dnssec_trigger_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, dnssec_trigger_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, dnssec_trigger_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dnssec.te b/policy/modules/services/dnssec.te new file mode 100755 index 0000000..98ba6e1 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dnssec.te @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +policy_module(dnssec, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type dnssec_trigger_t; +type dnssec_trigger_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(dnssec_trigger_t, dnssec_trigger_exec_t) + +type dnssec_trigger_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(dnssec_trigger_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# dnssec_trigger local policy +# +allow dnssec_trigger_t self:capability linux_immutable; +allow dnssec_trigger_t self:process signal; +allow dnssec_trigger_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow dnssec_trigger_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow dnssec_trigger_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow dnssec_trigger_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(dnssec_trigger_t, dnssec_trigger_var_run_t, dnssec_trigger_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(dnssec_trigger_t, dnssec_trigger_var_run_t, dnssec_trigger_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(dnssec_trigger_t, dnssec_trigger_var_run_t, { dir file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(dnssec_trigger_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(dnssec_trigger_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(dnssec_trigger_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(dnssec_trigger_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_dnssec_port(dnssec_trigger_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_rndc_port(dnssec_trigger_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(dnssec_trigger_t) + +dev_read_urand(dnssec_trigger_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(dnssec_trigger_t) + +files_read_etc_runtime_files(dnssec_trigger_t) +files_read_etc_files(dnssec_trigger_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(dnssec_trigger_t) + +auth_read_passwd(dnssec_trigger_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(dnssec_trigger_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dnssec_trigger_t) +sysnet_manage_config(dnssec_trigger_t) + +optional_policy(` + bind_read_config(dnssec_trigger_t) + bind_read_dnssec_keys(dnssec_trigger_t) +') + + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dovecot.fc b/policy/modules/services/dovecot.fc index bfc880b..9a1dcba 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dovecot.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/dovecot.fc @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian', ` ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` /usr/libexec/dovecot/auth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_auth_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/dovecot/deliver -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_deliver_exec_t,s0) -/usr/libexec/dovecot/deliver-lda -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_deliver_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/dovecot/dovecot-lda -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_deliver_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/dovecot/dovecot-auth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dovecot_auth_exec_t,s0) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dovecot.if b/policy/modules/services/dovecot.if index e1d7dc5..13e4800 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dovecot.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/dovecot.if @@ -1,5 +1,24 @@ ## Dovecot POP and IMAP mail server +####################################### +## +## Connect to dovecot unix domain stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dovecot_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Connect to dovecot auth unix domain stream socket. @@ -9,13 +28,13 @@ ## Domain allowed access. ## ## -## # interface(`dovecot_stream_connect_auth',` gen_require(` type dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_var_run_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) stream_connect_pattern($1, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_auth_t) ') @@ -52,6 +71,7 @@ interface(`dovecot_manage_spool',` type dovecot_spool_t; ') + files_search_spool($1) manage_files_pattern($1, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t) ') @@ -74,6 +94,25 @@ interface(`dovecot_dontaudit_unlink_lib_files',` dontaudit $1 dovecot_var_lib_t:file unlink; ') +###################################### +## +## Allow attempts to write inherited +## dovecot tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dovecot_write_inherited_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type dovecot_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 dovecot_tmp_t:file write; +') + ######################################## ## ## All of the rules required to administrate @@ -93,16 +132,17 @@ interface(`dovecot_dontaudit_unlink_lib_files',` # interface(`dovecot_admin',` gen_require(` - type dovecot_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_log_t; - type dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_var_lib_t; - type dovecot_var_run_t; - - type dovecot_cert_t, dovecot_passwd_t; - type dovecot_initrc_exec_t; + type dovecot_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t; + type dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_var_lib_t, dovecot_var_log_t; + type dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_tmp_t, dovecot_keytab_t; + type dovecot_cert_t, dovecot_passwd_t, dovecot_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 dovecot_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 dovecot_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, dovecot_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 dovecot_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, dovecot_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -112,8 +152,11 @@ interface(`dovecot_admin',` files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, dovecot_etc_t) - logging_list_logs($1) - admin_pattern($1, dovecot_log_t) + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, dovecot_auth_tmp_t) + admin_pattern($1, dovecot_tmp_t) + + admin_pattern($1, dovecot_keytab_t) files_list_spool($1) admin_pattern($1, dovecot_spool_t) @@ -121,6 +164,9 @@ interface(`dovecot_admin',` files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, dovecot_var_lib_t) + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, dovecot_var_log_t) + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, dovecot_var_run_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dovecot.te b/policy/modules/services/dovecot.te index acf6d4f..f31286c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/dovecot.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/dovecot.te @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ type dovecot_auth_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(dovecot_auth_tmp_t) type dovecot_cert_t; -files_type(dovecot_cert_t) +miscfiles_cert_type(dovecot_cert_t) type dovecot_deliver_t; type dovecot_deliver_exec_t; @@ -26,6 +26,9 @@ domain_type(dovecot_deliver_t) domain_entry_file(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_exec_t) role system_r types dovecot_deliver_t; +type dovecot_deliver_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(dovecot_deliver_tmp_t) + type dovecot_etc_t; files_config_file(dovecot_etc_t) @@ -36,7 +39,7 @@ type dovecot_passwd_t; files_type(dovecot_passwd_t) type dovecot_spool_t; -files_type(dovecot_spool_t) +files_spool_file(dovecot_spool_t) type dovecot_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(dovecot_tmp_t) @@ -56,9 +59,9 @@ files_pid_file(dovecot_var_run_t) # dovecot local policy # -allow dovecot_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search chown kill net_bind_service setgid setuid sys_chroot }; +allow dovecot_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search chown fsetid kill net_bind_service setgid setuid sys_chroot }; dontaudit dovecot_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow dovecot_t self:process { setrlimit signal_perms getcap setcap }; +allow dovecot_t self:process { setrlimit signal_perms getcap setcap setsched }; allow dovecot_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow dovecot_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow dovecot_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -72,7 +75,9 @@ allow dovecot_t dovecot_cert_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_cert_t, dovecot_cert_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_cert_t, dovecot_cert_t) -allow dovecot_t dovecot_etc_t:file read_file_perms; +allow dovecot_t dovecot_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_etc_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_etc_t) files_search_etc(dovecot_t) can_exec(dovecot_t, dovecot_exec_t) @@ -94,10 +99,12 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t) manage_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_spool_t, dovecot_spool_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, file) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(dovecot_t, dovecot_var_run_t, { dir file fifo_file }) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(dovecot_t) kernel_read_system_state(dovecot_t) @@ -110,6 +117,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(dovecot_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(dovecot_t) corenet_tcp_bind_mail_port(dovecot_t) corenet_tcp_bind_pop_port(dovecot_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_lmtp_port(dovecot_t) corenet_tcp_bind_sieve_port(dovecot_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(dovecot_t) corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(dovecot_t) @@ -135,6 +143,7 @@ files_dontaudit_list_default(dovecot_t) # Dovecot now has quota support and it uses getmntent() to find the mountpoints. files_read_etc_runtime_files(dovecot_t) files_search_all_mountpoints(dovecot_t) +files_read_var_lib_files(dovecot_t) init_getattr_utmp(dovecot_t) @@ -145,6 +154,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs(dovecot_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dovecot_t) +userdom_home_manager(dovecot_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(dovecot_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(dovecot_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(dovecot_t) @@ -160,10 +170,24 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_manage_data(dovecot_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + postfix_manage_private_sockets(dovecot_t) + postfix_search_spool(dovecot_t) +') + +optional_policy(` postgresql_stream_connect(dovecot_t) ') optional_policy(` + # Handle sieve scripts + sendmail_domtrans(dovecot_t) +') + +optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(dovecot_t) ') @@ -180,8 +204,8 @@ optional_policy(` # dovecot auth local policy # -allow dovecot_auth_t self:capability { chown dac_override setgid setuid }; -allow dovecot_auth_t self:process { signal_perms getcap setcap }; +allow dovecot_auth_t self:capability { chown dac_override ipc_lock setgid setuid sys_nice }; +allow dovecot_auth_t self:process { getsched setsched signal_perms getcap setcap }; allow dovecot_auth_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow dovecot_auth_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow dovecot_auth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -190,6 +214,9 @@ allow dovecot_auth_t dovecot_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_stream_socket_p read_files_pattern(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_passwd_t, dovecot_passwd_t) +read_files_pattern(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_etc_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_etc_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(dovecot_auth_t, dovecot_auth_tmp_t, { file dir }) @@ -201,9 +228,12 @@ dovecot_stream_connect_auth(dovecot_auth_t) kernel_read_all_sysctls(dovecot_auth_t) kernel_read_system_state(dovecot_auth_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(dovecot_auth_t) + logging_send_audit_msgs(dovecot_auth_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_auth_t) +dev_search_sysfs(dovecot_auth_t) dev_read_urand(dovecot_auth_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(dovecot_auth_t) @@ -216,7 +246,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(dovecot_auth_t) files_read_usr_symlinks(dovecot_auth_t) files_read_var_lib_files(dovecot_auth_t) files_search_tmp(dovecot_auth_t) -files_read_var_lib_files(dovecot_t) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(dovecot_auth_t) init_rw_utmp(dovecot_auth_t) @@ -236,6 +267,8 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` mysql_search_db(dovecot_auth_t) mysql_stream_connect(dovecot_auth_t) + mysql_read_config(dovecot_auth_t) + mysql_tcp_connect(dovecot_auth_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -243,6 +276,8 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + postfix_manage_private_sockets(dovecot_auth_t) + postfix_rw_master_pipes(dovecot_deliver_t) postfix_search_spool(dovecot_auth_t) ') @@ -250,23 +285,42 @@ optional_policy(` # # dovecot deliver local policy # + +allow dovecot_deliver_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow dovecot_deliver_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_t:process signull; -allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_etc_t:file read_file_perms; +allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_etc_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_etc_t, dovecot_etc_t) + +allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_cert_t:dir search_dir_perms; + +append_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_var_log_t, dovecot_var_log_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_tmp_t, { file dir }) + allow dovecot_deliver_t dovecot_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_sock_files_pattern(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_var_run_t, dovecot_var_run_t) +dovecot_stream_connect(dovecot_deliver_t) + +can_exec(dovecot_deliver_t, dovecot_deliver_exec_t) kernel_read_all_sysctls(dovecot_deliver_t) kernel_read_system_state(dovecot_deliver_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(dovecot_deliver_t) + files_read_etc_files(dovecot_deliver_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(dovecot_deliver_t) auth_use_nsswitch(dovecot_deliver_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(dovecot_deliver_t) -logging_search_logs(dovecot_auth_t) +logging_append_all_logs(dovecot_deliver_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dovecot_deliver_t) @@ -283,24 +337,22 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(dovecot_deliver_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(dovecot_deliver_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(dovecot_deliver_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file }) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(dovecot_deliver_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(dovecot_deliver_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(dovecot_deliver_t) - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(dovecot_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(dovecot_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(dovecot_t) -') +userdom_home_manager(dovecot_deliver_t) -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(dovecot_deliver_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(dovecot_deliver_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(dovecot_deliver_t) - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(dovecot_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(dovecot_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(dovecot_t) +optional_policy(` + gnome_manage_data(dovecot_deliver_t) ') optional_policy(` mta_manage_spool(dovecot_deliver_t) + mta_read_queue(dovecot_deliver_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + postfix_use_fds_master(dovecot_deliver_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + # Handle sieve scripts + sendmail_domtrans(dovecot_deliver_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/drbd.fc b/policy/modules/services/drbd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..60c19b9 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/drbd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + +/sbin/drbdadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:drbd_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/drbdsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:drbd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/ocf/resource.\d/linbit/drbd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:drbd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/drbdadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:drbd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/drbdsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:drbd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/drbd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:drbd_var_lib_t,s0) + + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/drbd.if b/policy/modules/services/drbd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..659d051 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/drbd.if @@ -0,0 +1,127 @@ + +## policy for drbd + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run drbd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`drbd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type drbd_t, drbd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, drbd_exec_t, drbd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search drbd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`drbd_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type drbd_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 drbd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read drbd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`drbd_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type drbd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, drbd_var_lib_t, drbd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## drbd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`drbd_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type drbd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, drbd_var_lib_t, drbd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage drbd lib dirs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`drbd_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type drbd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, drbd_var_lib_t, drbd_var_lib_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an drbd environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`drbd_admin',` + gen_require(` + type drbd_t; + type drbd_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 drbd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, drbd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 drbd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, drbd_var_lib_t) + +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/drbd.te b/policy/modules/services/drbd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f09fbb3 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/drbd.te @@ -0,0 +1,52 @@ +policy_module(drbd, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type drbd_t; +type drbd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(drbd_t, drbd_exec_t) + +type drbd_var_lib_t; +files_type(drbd_var_lib_t) + +type drbd_lock_t; +files_lock_file(drbd_lock_t) + +######################################## +# +# drbd local policy +# + +allow drbd_t self:capability { kill net_admin }; +dontaudit drbd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow drbd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow drbd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow drbd_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; +allow drbd_t self:netlink_route_socket rw_netlink_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(drbd_t, drbd_var_lib_t, drbd_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(drbd_t, drbd_var_lib_t, drbd_var_lib_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(drbd_t, drbd_var_lib_t, drbd_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(drbd_t, drbd_var_lib_t, { dir file } ) + +manage_files_pattern(drbd_t, drbd_lock_t, drbd_lock_t) +files_lock_filetrans(drbd_t, drbd_lock_t, file) + +can_exec(drbd_t, drbd_exec_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(drbd_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(drbd_t) +dev_read_rand(drbd_t) +dev_read_urand(drbd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(drbd_t) + +storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(drbd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(drbd_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(drbd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dspam.fc b/policy/modules/services/dspam.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..cc0815b --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dspam.fc @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/dspam -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dspam_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/dspam -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dspam_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/dspam(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dspam_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/dspam(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dspam_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/dspam(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dspam_var_run_t,s0) + +# web + +/usr/share/dspam-web/dspam\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_dspam_script_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/dspam/data(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_dspam_content_rw_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dspam.if b/policy/modules/services/dspam.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a446210 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dspam.if @@ -0,0 +1,267 @@ + +## policy for dspam + + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run dspam. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_t, dspam_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, dspam_exec_t, dspam_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute dspam server in the dspam domain. +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, dspam_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to read dspam's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, dspam_log_t, dspam_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to append +## dspam log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, dspam_log_t, dspam_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow domain to manage dspam log files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, dspam_log_t, dspam_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, dspam_log_t, dspam_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, dspam_log_t, dspam_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search dspam lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 dspam_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read dspam lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, dspam_var_lib_t, dspam_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## dspam lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, dspam_var_lib_t, dspam_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage dspam lib dirs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, dspam_var_lib_t, dspam_var_lib_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read dspam PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 dspam_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Connect to DSPAM using a unix domain stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_t, dspam_var_run_t, dspam_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + files_search_tmp($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, dspam_var_run_t, dspam_var_run_t, dspam_t) + stream_connect_pattern($1, dspam_tmp_t, dspam_tmp_t, dspam_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an dspam environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`dspam_admin',` + gen_require(` + type dspam_t; + type dspam_initrc_exec_t; + type dspam_log_t; + type dspam_var_lib_t; + type dspam_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 dspam_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, dspam_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 dspam_t:process ptrace; + ') + + dspam_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 dspam_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, dspam_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, dspam_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, dspam_var_run_t) + +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/dspam.te b/policy/modules/services/dspam.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d409571 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/dspam.te @@ -0,0 +1,95 @@ + +policy_module(dspam, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type dspam_t; +type dspam_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(dspam_t, dspam_exec_t) + +type dspam_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(dspam_initrc_exec_t) + +type dspam_log_t; +logging_log_file(dspam_log_t) + +type dspam_var_lib_t; +files_type(dspam_var_lib_t) + +type dspam_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(dspam_var_run_t) + +# FIXME +# /tmp/dspam.sock +type dspam_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(dspam_tmp_t) + +######################################## +# +# dspam local policy +# + +allow dspam_t self:capability net_admin; + +allow dspam_t self:process { signal }; + +allow dspam_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow dspam_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_log_t, dspam_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_log_t, dspam_log_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_var_lib_t, dspam_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_var_lib_t, dspam_var_lib_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_var_run_t, dspam_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_var_run_t, dspam_var_run_t) + +manage_sock_files_pattern(dspam_t, dspam_tmp_t, dspam_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(dspam_t, dspam_tmp_t, { sock_file }) + +# need to add the port tcp/10026 to corenetwork.te.in +#allow dspam_t port_t:tcp_socket name_connect; + +files_read_etc_files(dspam_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(dspam_t) + +# for RHEL5 +libs_use_ld_so(dspam_t) +libs_use_shared_libs(dspam_t) +libs_read_lib_files(dspam_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(dspam_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(dspam_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dspam_t) + +optional_policy(` + mysql_tcp_connect(dspam_t) + mysql_search_db(dspam_t) + mysql_stream_connect(dspam_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + postgresql_tcp_connect(dspam_t) + postgresql_stream_connect(dspam_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# dspam web local policy. +# + +optional_policy(` + apache_content_template(dspam) + + list_dirs_pattern(dspam_t, httpd_dspam_content_t, httpd_dspam_content_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(dspam_t, httpd_dspam_content_rw_t, httpd_dspam_content_rw_t) + manage_files_pattern(dspam_t, httpd_dspam_content_rw_t, httpd_dspam_content_rw_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/entropyd.fc b/policy/modules/services/entropyd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d2d8ce3 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/entropyd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +# +# /usr +# +/usr/sbin/audio-entropyd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:entropyd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/haveged -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:entropyd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/audio-entropyd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:entropyd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/haveged\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:entropyd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/entropyd.if b/policy/modules/services/entropyd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..67906f0 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/entropyd.if @@ -0,0 +1 @@ +## Generate entropy from audio input diff --git a/policy/modules/services/entropyd.te b/policy/modules/services/entropyd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..053caed --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/entropyd.te @@ -0,0 +1,82 @@ +policy_module(entropyd, 1.7.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +## +##

    +## Allow the use of the audio devices as the source for the entropy feeds +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(entropyd_use_audio, false) + +type entropyd_t; +type entropyd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(entropyd_t, entropyd_exec_t) + +type entropyd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(entropyd_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# Local policy +# + +allow entropyd_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock sys_admin }; +dontaudit entropyd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow entropyd_t self:process signal_perms; +allow entropyd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(entropyd_t, entropyd_var_run_t, entropyd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(entropyd_t, entropyd_var_run_t, file) + +kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(entropyd_t) +kernel_list_proc(entropyd_t) +kernel_read_proc_symlinks(entropyd_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(entropyd_t) +dev_read_urand(entropyd_t) +dev_write_urand(entropyd_t) +dev_read_rand(entropyd_t) +dev_write_rand(entropyd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(entropyd_t) +files_read_usr_files(entropyd_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(entropyd_t) +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(entropyd_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(entropyd_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(entropyd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(entropyd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(entropyd_t) + +userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(entropyd_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(entropyd_t) + +tunable_policy(`entropyd_use_audio',` + dev_read_sound(entropyd_t) + # set sound card parameters such as sample format, number of channels + # and sample rate. + dev_write_sound(entropyd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`entropyd_use_audio',` + alsa_read_lib(entropyd_t) + alsa_read_rw_config(entropyd_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + seutil_sigchld_newrole(entropyd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + udev_read_db(entropyd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/exim.fc b/policy/modules/services/exim.fc index 298f066..b54de69 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/exim.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/exim.fc @@ -1,4 +1,8 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/exim -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:exim_initrc_exec_t,s0) + /usr/sbin/exim[0-9]? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:exim_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/exim_tidydb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:exim_exec_t,s0) /var/log/exim[0-9]?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:exim_log_t,s0) /var/run/exim[0-9]?\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:exim_var_run_t,s0) /var/spool/exim[0-9]?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:exim_spool_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/exim.if b/policy/modules/services/exim.if index 6bef7f8..fb2fd2f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/exim.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/exim.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run exim. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`exim_domtrans',` @@ -20,6 +20,49 @@ interface(`exim_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute the mailman program in the mailman domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## The role to allow the mailman domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`exim_run',` + gen_require(` + type exim_t; + ') + + exim_domtrans($1) + role $2 types exim_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute exim in the exim domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`exim_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type exim_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, exim_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read, ## exim tmp files ## @@ -101,9 +144,9 @@ interface(`exim_read_log',` ## exim log files. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`exim_append_log',` @@ -194,3 +237,49 @@ interface(`exim_manage_spool_files',` manage_files_pattern($1, exim_spool_t, exim_spool_t) files_search_spool($1) ') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an exim environment. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`exim_admin',` + gen_require(` + type exim_t, exim_initrc_exec_t, exim_log_t; + type exim_tmp_t, exim_spool_t, exim_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 exim_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, exim_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 exim_t:process ptrace; + ') + + exim_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 exim_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + logging_list_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, exim_log_t) + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, exim_tmp_t) + + files_list_spool($1) + admin_pattern($1, exim_spool_t) + + files_list_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, exim_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/exim.te b/policy/modules/services/exim.te index f28f64b..9d0a5db 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/exim.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/exim.te @@ -6,24 +6,24 @@ policy_module(exim, 1.5.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow exim to connect to databases (postgres, mysql) -##

    +##

    +## Allow exim to connect to databases (PostgreSQL, MySQL) +##

    ##     gen_tunable(exim_can_connect_db, false) ## -##

    -## Allow exim to read unprivileged user files. -##

    +##

    +## Allow exim to read unprivileged user files. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(exim_read_user_files, false) ## -##

    -## Allow exim to create, read, write, and delete -## unprivileged user files. -##

    +##

    +## Allow exim to create, read, write, and delete +## unprivileged user files. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(exim_manage_user_files, false) @@ -35,11 +35,14 @@ mta_mailserver_user_agent(exim_t) application_executable_file(exim_exec_t) mta_agent_executable(exim_exec_t) +type exim_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(exim_initrc_exec_t) + type exim_log_t; logging_log_file(exim_log_t) type exim_spool_t; -files_type(exim_spool_t) +files_spool_file(exim_spool_t) type exim_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(exim_tmp_t) @@ -79,7 +82,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(exim_t, exim_var_run_t, { file dir }) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(exim_t) kernel_read_network_state(exim_t) -kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state(exim_t) +kernel_read_system_state(exim_t) corecmd_search_bin(exim_t) @@ -108,6 +111,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(exim_t) files_search_usr(exim_t) files_search_var(exim_t) +files_read_usr_files(exim_t) files_read_etc_files(exim_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(exim_t) files_getattr_all_mountpoints(exim_t) @@ -162,6 +166,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + dovecot_stream_connect(exim_t) +') + +optional_policy(` kerberos_keytab_template(exim, exim_t) ') @@ -171,6 +179,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + nagios_search_spool(exim_t) +') + +optional_policy(` tunable_policy(`exim_can_connect_db',` mysql_stream_connect(exim_t) ') @@ -184,6 +196,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` procmail_domtrans(exim_t) + procmail_read_home_files(exim_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.fc b/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.fc index 0de2b83..b93171c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.fc @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/fail2ban -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fail2ban_initrc_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/fail2ban -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fail2ban_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/fail2ban-client -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fail2ban_client_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/fail2ban-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fail2ban_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/fail2ban(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:fail2ban_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.if b/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.if index f590a1f..eb6f870 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run fail2ban. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`fail2ban_domtrans',` @@ -40,7 +40,26 @@ interface(`fail2ban_stream_connect',` ######################################## ## -## Read and write to an fail2ban unix stream socket. +## Read and write inherited temporary files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fail2ban_rw_inherited_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type fail2ban_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + allow $1 fail2ban_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write to an fail2ba unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -72,7 +91,7 @@ interface(`fail2ban_read_lib_files',` ') files_search_var_lib($1) - allow $1 fail2ban_var_lib_t:file read_file_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, fail2ban_var_lib_t, fail2ban_var_lib_t) ') ######################################## @@ -102,9 +121,9 @@ interface(`fail2ban_read_log',` ## fail2ban log files. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`fail2ban_append_log',` @@ -138,6 +157,26 @@ interface(`fail2ban_read_pid_files',` ######################################## ## +## dontaudit read and write an leaked file descriptors +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`fail2ban_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type fail2ban_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 fail2ban_t:tcp_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 fail2ban_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 fail2ban_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an fail2ban environment ## @@ -155,12 +194,16 @@ interface(`fail2ban_read_pid_files',` # interface(`fail2ban_admin',` gen_require(` - type fail2ban_t, fail2ban_log_t; - type fail2ban_var_run_t, fail2ban_initrc_exec_t; + type fail2ban_t, fail2ban_log_t, fail2ban_initrc_exec_t; + type fail2ban_var_run_t, fail2ban_var_lib_t, fail2ban_tmp_t; + type fail2ban_client_t; ') - allow $1 fail2ban_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; - ps_process_pattern($1, fail2ban_t) + allow $1 { fail2ban_t fail2ban_client_t }:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, { fail2ban_t fail2ban_client_t }) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 { fail2ban_t fail2ban_client_t }:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, fail2ban_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -172,4 +215,10 @@ interface(`fail2ban_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, fail2ban_var_run_t) + + files_list_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, fail2ban_var_lib_t) + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, fail2ban_tmp_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.te b/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.te index 2a69e5e..78841e5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/fail2ban.te @@ -23,12 +23,19 @@ files_type(fail2ban_var_lib_t) type fail2ban_var_run_t; files_pid_file(fail2ban_var_run_t) +type fail2ban_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(fail2ban_tmp_t) + +type fail2ban_client_t; +type fail2ban_client_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(fail2ban_client_t, fail2ban_client_exec_t) + ######################################## # -# fail2ban local policy +# fail2ban server local policy # -allow fail2ban_t self:capability { sys_tty_config }; +allow fail2ban_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override sys_tty_config }; allow fail2ban_t self:process signal; allow fail2ban_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow fail2ban_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; @@ -36,7 +43,7 @@ allow fail2ban_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow fail2ban_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; # log files -allow fail2ban_t fail2ban_log_t:dir setattr; +allow fail2ban_t fail2ban_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; manage_files_pattern(fail2ban_t, fail2ban_log_t, fail2ban_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(fail2ban_t, fail2ban_log_t, file) @@ -50,6 +57,11 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(fail2ban_t, fail2ban_var_run_t, fail2ban_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(fail2ban_t, fail2ban_var_run_t, fail2ban_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(fail2ban_t, fail2ban_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) +manage_dirs_pattern(fail2ban_t, fail2ban_tmp_t, fail2ban_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(fail2ban_t, fail2ban_tmp_t, fail2ban_tmp_t) +exec_files_pattern(fail2ban_t, fail2ban_tmp_t, fail2ban_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(fail2ban_t, fail2ban_tmp_t, { dir file }) + kernel_read_system_state(fail2ban_t) corecmd_exec_bin(fail2ban_t) @@ -66,6 +78,7 @@ corenet_sendrecv_whois_client_packets(fail2ban_t) dev_read_urand(fail2ban_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(fail2ban_t) +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(fail2ban_t) files_read_etc_files(fail2ban_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(fail2ban_t) @@ -85,6 +98,9 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(fail2ban_t) mta_send_mail(fail2ban_t) +sysnet_manage_config(fail2ban_t) +sysnet_filetrans_named_content(fail2ban_t) + optional_policy(` apache_read_log(fail2ban_t) ') @@ -94,5 +110,45 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(fail2ban_t) +') + +optional_policy(` iptables_domtrans(fail2ban_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + libs_exec_ldconfig(fail2ban_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + shorewall_domtrans(fail2ban_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# fail2ban client local policy +# + +domtrans_pattern(fail2ban_client_t, fail2ban_exec_t, fail2ban_t) + +stream_connect_pattern(fail2ban_client_t, fail2ban_var_run_t, fail2ban_var_run_t, fail2ban_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(fail2ban_client_t) + +# python +corecmd_exec_bin(fail2ban_client_t) + +# nsswitch.conf, passwd +files_read_etc_files(fail2ban_client_t) +files_read_usr_files(fail2ban_client_t) +files_search_pids(fail2ban_client_t) + +auth_read_passwd(fail2ban_client_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(fail2ban_client_t) + +optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(fail2ban_client_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fcoemon.fc b/policy/modules/services/fcoemon.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83279fb --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/fcoemon.fc @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + +/usr/sbin/fcoemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fcoemon_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/fcm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:fcoemon_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/fcoemon\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fcoemon_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fcoemon.if b/policy/modules/services/fcoemon.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..33508c1 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/fcoemon.if @@ -0,0 +1,88 @@ + +## policy for fcoemon + +######################################## +## +## Transition to fcoemon. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`fcoemon_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type fcoemon_t, fcoemon_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, fcoemon_exec_t, fcoemon_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read fcoemon PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fcoemon_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type fcoemon_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 fcoemon_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Send to a fcoemon unix dgram socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fcoemon_dgram_send',` + gen_require(` + type fcoemon_t; + ') + + allow $1 fcoemon_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an fcoemon environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`fcoemon_admin',` + gen_require(` + type fcoemon_t; + type fcoemon_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 fcoemon_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, fcoemon_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 fcoemon_t:process ptrace; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, fcoemon_var_run_t) + +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fcoemon.te b/policy/modules/services/fcoemon.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1f39a80 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/fcoemon.te @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +policy_module(fcoemon, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type fcoemon_t; +type fcoemon_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(fcoemon_t, fcoemon_exec_t) + +type fcoemon_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(fcoemon_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# fcoemon local policy +# + +# dac_override +# /var/rnn/fcm/fcm_clif socket is owned by root +allow fcoemon_t self:capability { net_admin dac_override }; +allow fcoemon_t self:capability { kill }; + +allow fcoemon_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow fcoemon_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow fcoemon_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; +allow fcoemon_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(fcoemon_t, fcoemon_var_run_t, fcoemon_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(fcoemon_t, fcoemon_var_run_t, fcoemon_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(fcoemon_t, fcoemon_var_run_t, fcoemon_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(fcoemon_t, fcoemon_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) + +files_read_etc_files(fcoemon_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(fcoemon_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(fcoemon_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(fcoemon_t) + +optional_policy(` + lldpad_dgram_send(fcoemon_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.fc b/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.fc index 455c620..c263c70 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.fc @@ -1,3 +1,9 @@ +# +# /HOME +# +HOME_DIR/\.fetchmailrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fetchmail_home_t, s0) +/root/\.fetchmailrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fetchmail_home_t, s0) + # # /etc diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.if b/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.if index 6537214..8629354 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.if @@ -18,7 +18,11 @@ interface(`fetchmail_admin',` type fetchmail_var_run_t; ') + allow $1 fetchmail_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, fetchmail_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 fetchmail_t:process ptrace; + ') files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, fetchmail_etc_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.te b/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.te index 3459d93..3d4e162 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/fetchmail.te @@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ type fetchmail_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_exec_t) application_executable_file(fetchmail_exec_t) +type fetchmail_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(fetchmail_home_t) + type fetchmail_var_run_t; files_pid_file(fetchmail_var_run_t) @@ -41,6 +44,11 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_var_run_t, fetchmail_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_var_run_t, fetchmail_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_var_run_t, { dir file }) +list_dirs_pattern(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_home_t, fetchmail_home_t) +read_files_pattern(fetchmail_t, fetchmail_home_t, fetchmail_home_t) +userdom_search_user_home_dirs(fetchmail_t) +userdom_search_admin_dir(fetchmail_t) + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(fetchmail_t) kernel_list_proc(fetchmail_t) kernel_getattr_proc_files(fetchmail_t) @@ -85,7 +93,10 @@ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(fetchmail_t) sysnet_read_config(fetchmail_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(fetchmail_t) -userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(fetchmail_t) + +optional_policy(` + kerberos_use(fetchmail_t) +') optional_policy(` procmail_domtrans(fetchmail_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/finger.te b/policy/modules/services/finger.te index 9b7036a..4770f61 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/finger.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/finger.te @@ -66,6 +66,7 @@ term_getattr_all_ttys(fingerd_t) term_getattr_all_ptys(fingerd_t) auth_read_lastlog(fingerd_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(fingerd_t) corecmd_exec_bin(fingerd_t) corecmd_exec_shell(fingerd_t) @@ -83,8 +84,6 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(fingerd_t) mta_getattr_spool(fingerd_t) -sysnet_read_config(fingerd_t) - miscfiles_read_localization(fingerd_t) # stop it accessing sub-directories, prevents checking a Maildir for new mail, @@ -101,14 +100,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(fingerd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(fingerd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(fingerd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/firewalld.fc b/policy/modules/services/firewalld.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..f440549 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/firewalld.fc @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/firewalld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:firewalld_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/firewalld(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:firewalld_etc_rw_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/firewalld.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:firewalld_unit_file_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/firewalld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:firewalld_exec_t,s0) + +/var/log/firewalld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:firewalld_var_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/firewalld(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:firewalld_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/firewalld\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:firewalld_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/firewalld.if b/policy/modules/services/firewalld.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c4c7510 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/firewalld.if @@ -0,0 +1,130 @@ +## policy for firewalld + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run firewalld. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`firewalld_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type firewalld_t, firewalld_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, firewalld_exec_t, firewalld_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute firewalld server in the firewalld domain. +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +interface(`firewalld_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type firewalld_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, firewalld_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute firewalld server in the firewalld domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`firewalld_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type firewalld_t; + type firewalld_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 firewalld_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 firewalld_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, firewalld_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## firewalld over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`firewalld_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type firewalld_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 firewalld_t:dbus send_msg; + allow firewalld_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an firewalld environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`firewalld_admin',` + gen_require(` + type firewalld_t, firewalld_initrc_exec_t; + type firewall_etc_rw_t, firewalld_var_run_t; + type firewalld_var_log_t; + ') + + allow $1 firewalld_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, firewalld_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 firewalld_t:process ptrace; + ') + + firewalld_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 firewalld_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, firewalld_var_run_t) + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, firewalld_var_log_t) + + admin_pattern($1, firewall_etc_rw_t) + + admin_pattern($1, firewalld_unit_file_t) + firewalld_systemctl($1) + allow $1 firewalld_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/firewalld.te b/policy/modules/services/firewalld.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b3727f1 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/firewalld.te @@ -0,0 +1,91 @@ + +policy_module(firewalld,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type firewalld_t; +type firewalld_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(firewalld_t, firewalld_exec_t) + +type firewalld_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(firewalld_initrc_exec_t) + +type firewalld_etc_rw_t; +files_config_file(firewalld_etc_rw_t) + +type firewalld_var_log_t; +logging_log_file(firewalld_var_log_t) + +type firewalld_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(firewalld_var_run_t) + +type firewalld_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(firewalld_unit_file_t) + +######################################## +# +# firewalld local policy +# +dontaudit firewalld_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow firewalld_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow firewalld_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(firewalld_t, firewalld_etc_rw_t, firewalld_etc_rw_t) +manage_files_pattern(firewalld_t, firewalld_etc_rw_t, firewalld_etc_rw_t) + +append_files_pattern(firewalld_t, firewalld_var_log_t, firewalld_var_log_t) +create_files_pattern(firewalld_t, firewalld_var_log_t, firewalld_var_log_t) +read_files_pattern(firewalld_t, firewalld_var_log_t, firewalld_var_log_t) +setattr_files_pattern(firewalld_t, firewalld_var_log_t, firewalld_var_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(firewalld_t, firewalld_var_log_t, file) + +# should be fixed to cooperate with systemd to create /var/run/firewalld directory +manage_files_pattern(firewalld_t, firewalld_var_run_t, firewalld_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(firewalld_t, firewalld_var_run_t, { file }) + +kernel_read_network_state(firewalld_t) +kernel_read_system_state(firewalld_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(firewalld_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(firewalld_t) + +dev_read_urand(firewalld_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(firewalld_t) + +files_read_etc_files(firewalld_t) +files_read_usr_files(firewalld_t) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(firewalld_t) + +auth_read_passwd(firewalld_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(firewalld_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(firewalld_t) + +seutil_exec_setfiles(firewalld_t) +seutil_read_file_contexts(firewalld_t) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_domain(firewalld_t, firewalld_exec_t) + + optional_policy(` + policykit_dbus_chat(firewalld_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + networkmanager_dbus_chat(firewalld_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + iptables_domtrans(firewalld_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(firewalld_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fprintd.if b/policy/modules/services/fprintd.if index ebad8c4..eeddf7b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/fprintd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/fprintd.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run fprintd. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`fprintd_domtrans',` @@ -37,5 +37,5 @@ interface(`fprintd_dbus_chat',` allow $1 fprintd_t:dbus send_msg; allow fprintd_t $1:dbus send_msg; + allow fprintd_t $1:file read; ') - diff --git a/policy/modules/services/fprintd.te b/policy/modules/services/fprintd.te index 7df52c7..26422af 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/fprintd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/fprintd.te @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ policy_module(fprintd, 1.1.0) type fprintd_t; type fprintd_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(fprintd_t, fprintd_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(fprintd_t, fprintd_exec_t) type fprintd_var_lib_t; files_type(fprintd_var_lib_t) @@ -17,9 +18,10 @@ files_type(fprintd_var_lib_t) # Local policy # -allow fprintd_t self:capability sys_ptrace; +allow fprintd_t self:capability sys_nice; + allow fprintd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -allow fprintd_t self:process { getsched signal }; +allow fprintd_t self:process { getsched setsched signal }; manage_dirs_pattern(fprintd_t, fprintd_var_lib_t, fprintd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(fprintd_t, fprintd_var_lib_t, fprintd_var_lib_t) @@ -54,4 +56,5 @@ optional_policy(` policykit_read_lib(fprintd_t) policykit_dbus_chat(fprintd_t) policykit_domtrans_auth(fprintd_t) + policykit_dbus_chat_auth(fprintd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ftp.fc b/policy/modules/services/ftp.fc index 69dcd2a..4d97da7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ftp.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/ftp.fc @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/vsftpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ftpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/proftpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ftpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/vsftpd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/proftpd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_unit_file_t,s0) + # # /usr # @@ -29,3 +32,4 @@ /var/log/vsftpd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xferlog_t,s0) /var/log/xferlog.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xferlog_t,s0) /var/log/xferreport.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xferlog_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/webmin/vsftpd/webalizer/xfer_log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xferlog_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ftp.if b/policy/modules/services/ftp.if index 9d3201b..6e75e3d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ftp.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ftp.if @@ -1,5 +1,66 @@ ## File transfer protocol service +###################################### +## +## Execute a domain transition to run ftpd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`ftp_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type ftpd_t, ftpd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1,ftpd_exec_t, ftpd_t) + +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute ftpd server in the ftpd domain. +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +interface(`ftp_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type ftpd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ftpd_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute ftpd server in the ftpd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`ftp_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type ftpd_unit_file_t; + type ftpd_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 ftpd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 ftpd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, ftpd_t) +') + ####################################### ## ## Allow domain dyntransition to sftpd_anon domain. @@ -174,10 +235,14 @@ interface(`ftp_admin',` type ftpd_etc_t, ftpd_lock_t; type ftpd_var_run_t, xferlog_t; type ftpd_initrc_exec_t; + type ftpd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 ftpd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 ftpd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, ftpd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ftpd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ftpd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -203,4 +268,8 @@ interface(`ftp_admin',` logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, xferlog_t) + + ftp_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, ftpd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 ftpd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ftp.te b/policy/modules/services/ftp.te index 8a74a83..9be06fe 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ftp.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ftp.te @@ -40,6 +40,27 @@ gen_tunable(allow_ftpd_use_nfs, false) ## ##

    +## Allow ftp servers to connect to mysql database ports +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(ftpd_connect_db, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow ftp servers to use bind to all unreserved ports for passive mode +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(ftpd_use_passive_mode, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow ftp servers to connect to all ports > 1023 +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(ftpd_connect_all_unreserved, false) + +## +##

    ## Allow ftp to read and write files in the user home directories ##

    ##     @@ -48,7 +69,7 @@ gen_tunable(ftp_home_dir, false) ## ##

    ## Allow anon internal-sftp to upload files, used for -## public file transfer services. Directories must be labeled +## public file transfer services, directories must be labeled ## public_content_rw_t. ##

    ##     @@ -70,6 +91,14 @@ gen_tunable(sftpd_enable_homedirs, false) ## gen_tunable(sftpd_full_access, false) +## +##

    +## Allow internal-sftp to read and write files +## in the user ssh home directories. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(sftpd_write_ssh_home, false) + type anon_sftpd_t; typealias anon_sftpd_t alias sftpd_anon_t; domain_type(anon_sftpd_t) @@ -85,6 +114,9 @@ files_config_file(ftpd_etc_t) type ftpd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(ftpd_initrc_exec_t) +type ftpd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(ftpd_unit_file_t) + type ftpd_lock_t; files_lock_file(ftpd_lock_t) @@ -115,6 +147,10 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',` init_ranged_daemon_domain(ftpd_t, ftpd_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) ') +ifdef(`enable_mls',` + init_ranged_daemon_domain(ftpd_t, ftpd_exec_t, mls_systemhigh) +') + ######################################## # # anon-sftp local policy @@ -122,6 +158,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',` files_read_etc_files(anon_sftpd_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(anon_sftpd_t) miscfiles_read_public_files(anon_sftpd_t) tunable_policy(`sftpd_anon_write',` @@ -133,7 +170,7 @@ tunable_policy(`sftpd_anon_write',` # ftpd local policy # -allow ftpd_t self:capability { chown fowner fsetid setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_nice sys_resource }; +allow ftpd_t self:capability { chown fowner fsetid ipc_lock kill setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_admin sys_nice sys_resource }; dontaudit ftpd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow ftpd_t self:process { getcap getpgid setcap setsched setrlimit signal_perms }; allow ftpd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -151,7 +188,6 @@ files_lock_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_lock_t, file) manage_dirs_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmp_t, ftpd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmp_t, ftpd_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmp_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t) manage_files_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t) @@ -163,13 +199,13 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file manage_dirs_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(ftpd_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_var_run_t, { file dir} ) +files_pid_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_var_run_t, { file dir }) # proftpd requires the client side to bind a socket so that # it can stat the socket to perform access control decisions, # since getsockopt with SO_PEERCRED is not available on all # proftpd-supported OSs -allow ftpd_t ftpdctl_tmp_t:sock_file { getattr unlink }; +allow ftpd_t ftpdctl_tmp_t:sock_file delete_sock_file_perms; # Create and modify /var/log/xferlog. manage_files_pattern(ftpd_t, xferlog_t, xferlog_t) @@ -177,7 +213,7 @@ logging_log_filetrans(ftpd_t, xferlog_t, file) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ftpd_t) kernel_read_system_state(ftpd_t) -kernel_search_network_state(ftpd_t) +kernel_read_network_state(ftpd_t) dev_read_sysfs(ftpd_t) dev_read_urand(ftpd_t) @@ -196,9 +232,8 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ftpd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_ftp_port(ftpd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_ftp_data_port(ftpd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(ftpd_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(ftpd_t) -corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_ports(ftpd_t) -corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(ftpd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_all_ephemeral_ports(ftpd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(ftpd_t) corenet_sendrecv_ftp_server_packets(ftpd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(ftpd_t) @@ -212,13 +247,11 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ftpd_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(ftpd_t) fs_search_fusefs(ftpd_t) -auth_use_nsswitch(ftpd_t) -auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(ftpd_t) -# Append to /var/log/wtmp. -auth_append_login_records(ftpd_t) +auth_use_pam(ftpd_t) #kerberized ftp requires the following auth_write_login_records(ftpd_t) auth_rw_faillog(ftpd_t) +auth_manage_var_auth(ftpd_t) init_rw_utmp(ftpd_t) @@ -261,7 +294,15 @@ tunable_policy(`allow_ftpd_use_nfs && allow_ftpd_anon_write',` tunable_policy(`allow_ftpd_full_access',` allow ftpd_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search }; - auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(ftpd_t) + files_manage_non_security_files(ftpd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`ftpd_use_passive_mode',` + corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(ftpd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`ftpd_connect_all_unreserved',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_unreserved_ports(ftpd_t) ') tunable_policy(`ftp_home_dir',` @@ -270,10 +311,13 @@ tunable_policy(`ftp_home_dir',` # allow access to /home files_list_home(ftpd_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(ftpd_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(ftpd_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(ftpd_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks(ftpd_t) - userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(ftpd_t, { dir file lnk_file }) + userdom_manage_user_home_content(ftpd_t) + userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(ftpd_t) + userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp(ftpd_t, file) +',` + # Needed for permissive mode, to make sure everything gets labeled correctly + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_pattern(ftpd_t, { dir file lnk_file }) + files_tmp_filetrans(ftpd_t, ftpd_tmp_t, { file dir }) ') tunable_policy(`ftp_home_dir && use_nfs_home_dirs',` @@ -309,10 +353,34 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + fail2ban_read_lib_files(ftpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` selinux_validate_context(ftpd_t) kerberos_keytab_template(ftpd, ftpd_t) - kerberos_manage_host_rcache(ftpd_t) + # this part of auth_use_pam + #kerberos_manage_host_rcache(ftpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`ftpd_connect_db',` + mysql_stream_connect(ftpd_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`ftpd_connect_db',` + postgresql_stream_connect(ftpd_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`ftpd_connect_db',` + mysql_tcp_connect(ftpd_t) + postgresql_tcp_connect(ftpd_t) + ') ') optional_policy(` @@ -347,16 +415,17 @@ optional_policy(` # Allow ftpdctl to talk to ftpd over a socket connection stream_connect_pattern(ftpdctl_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_var_run_t, ftpd_t) +files_search_pids(ftpdctl_t) # ftpdctl creates a socket so that the daemon can perform # access control decisions (see comments in ftpd_t rules above) -allow ftpdctl_t ftpdctl_tmp_t:sock_file { create setattr }; +allow ftpdctl_t ftpdctl_tmp_t:sock_file manage_sock_file_perms; files_tmp_filetrans(ftpdctl_t, ftpdctl_tmp_t, sock_file) # Allow ftpdctl to read config files files_read_etc_files(ftpdctl_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(ftpdctl_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ftpdctl_t) ######################################## # @@ -365,18 +434,33 @@ userdom_use_user_terminals(ftpdctl_t) files_read_etc_files(sftpd_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(sftpd_t) + # allow read access to /home by default userdom_read_user_home_content_files(sftpd_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(sftpd_t) +userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(sftpd_t) + +tunable_policy(`sftpd_full_access',` + allow sftpd_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search }; + fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(sftpd_t) + files_manage_non_security_files(sftpd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`sftpd_write_ssh_home',` + ssh_manage_home_files(sftpd_t) +') tunable_policy(`sftpd_enable_homedirs',` allow sftpd_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search }; # allow access to /home files_list_home(sftpd_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(sftpd_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(sftpd_t) - userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(sftpd_t, { dir file }) + userdom_read_user_home_content_files(sftpd_t) + userdom_manage_user_home_content(sftpd_t) +',` + # Needed for permissive mode, to make sure everything gets labeled correctly + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_pattern(sftpd_t, { dir file lnk_file }) ') tunable_policy(`sftpd_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',` @@ -394,19 +478,7 @@ tunable_policy(`sftpd_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',` tunable_policy(`sftpd_full_access',` allow sftpd_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search }; fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(sftpd_t) - auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(sftpd_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - # allow read access to /home by default - fs_list_cifs(sftpd_t) - fs_read_cifs_files(sftpd_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(sftpd_t) + files_manage_non_security_files(sftpd_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - # allow read access to /home by default - fs_list_nfs(sftpd_t) - fs_read_nfs_files(sftpd_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(ftpd_t) -') +userdom_home_reader(sftpd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/gatekeeper.te b/policy/modules/services/gatekeeper.te index 99a94de..6dbc203 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/gatekeeper.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/gatekeeper.te @@ -33,7 +33,7 @@ allow gatekeeper_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow gatekeeper_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow gatekeeper_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; -allow gatekeeper_t gatekeeper_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow gatekeeper_t gatekeeper_etc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; allow gatekeeper_t gatekeeper_etc_t:file read_file_perms; files_search_etc(gatekeeper_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/git.fc b/policy/modules/services/git.fc index 54f0737..44a9663 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/git.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/git.fc @@ -1,3 +1,17 @@ +HOME_DIR/public_git(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:git_session_content_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gitaliases -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:git_session_content_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gitconfig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:git_session_content_t,s0) + +/srv/git(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:git_system_content_t,s0) + +/usr/libexec/git-core/git-daemon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gitd_exec_t,s0) + /var/cache/cgit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_git_rw_content_t,s0) -/var/lib/git(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_git_content_t,s0) +/var/cache/gitweb-caching(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_git_rw_content_t,s0) + +/var/lib/git(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:git_system_content_t,s0) + /var/www/cgi-bin/cgit -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_git_script_exec_t,s0) +/var/www/git(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_git_content_t,s0) +/var/www/git/gitweb\.cgi gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_git_script_exec_t,s0) +/var/www/gitweb-caching/gitweb\.cgi gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_git_script_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/git.if b/policy/modules/services/git.if index 458aac6..9077b2d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/git.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/git.if @@ -1 +1,515 @@ -## GIT revision control system +## Fast Version Control System. +## +##

    +## A really simple TCP git daemon that normally listens on +## port DEFAULT_GIT_PORT aka 9418. It waits for a +## connection asking for a service, and will serve that +## service if it is enabled. +##

    +##     + +####################################### +## +## Role access for Git daemon session. +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role. +## +## +# +interface(`git_session_role',` + gen_require(` + type git_session_t, gitd_exec_t, git_session_content_t; + ') + + ######################################## + # + # Git daemon session shared declarations. + # + + role $1 types git_session_t; + + ######################################## + # + # Git daemon session shared policy. + # + + domtrans_pattern($2, gitd_exec_t, git_session_t) + + allow $2 git_session_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($2, git_session_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 git_session_t:process ptrace; + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Create a set of derived types for Git +## daemon shared repository content. +## +## +## +## The prefix to be used for deriving type names. +## +## +# +template(`git_content_template',` + gen_require(` + attribute git_system_content, git_content; + ') + + ######################################## + # + # Git daemon content shared declarations. + # + + type git_$1_content_t, git_system_content, git_content; + files_type(git_$1_content_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create a set of derived types for Git +## daemon shared repository roles. +## +## +## +## The prefix to be used for deriving type names. +## +## +# +template(`git_role_template',` + gen_require(` + class context contains; + role system_r; + ') + + ######################################## + # + # Git daemon role shared declarations. + # + + attribute $1_usertype; + + type $1_t; + userdom_unpriv_usertype($1, $1_t) + domain_type($1_t) + + role $1_r types $1_t; + allow system_r $1_r; + + ######################################## + # + # Git daemon role shared policy. + # + + allow $1_t self:context contains; + allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + + corecmd_exec_bin($1_t) + corecmd_bin_entry_type($1_t) + corecmd_shell_entry_type($1_t) + + domain_interactive_fd($1_t) + domain_user_exemption_target($1_t) + + kernel_read_system_state($1_t) + + files_read_etc_files($1_t) + files_dontaudit_search_home($1_t) + + miscfiles_read_localization($1_t) + + git_rwx_generic_system_content($1_t) + + ssh_rw_stream_sockets($1_t) + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',` + fs_exec_cifs_files($1_t) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files($1_t) + ') + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',` + fs_exec_nfs_files($1_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files($1_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + nscd_read_pid($1_t) + ') +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow specified domain access to the +## specified Git daemon content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Type of the object that access is allowed to. +## +## +# +interface(`git_content_delegation',` + gen_require(` + type $1, $2; + ') + + exec_files_pattern($1, $2, $2) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, $2, $2) + manage_files_pattern($1, $2, $2) + files_search_var_lib($1) + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',` + fs_exec_cifs_files($1) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1) + fs_manage_cifs_files($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',` + fs_exec_nfs_files($1) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1) + fs_manage_nfs_files($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to manage +## and execute all Git daemon content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_rwx_all_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute git_content; + ') + + exec_files_pattern($1, git_content, git_content) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, git_content, git_content) + manage_files_pattern($1, git_content, git_content) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + files_search_var_lib($1) + + userdom_home_manager($1) + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',` + fs_exec_cifs_files($1) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1) + fs_manage_cifs_files($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',` + fs_exec_nfs_files($1) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1) + fs_manage_nfs_files($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to manage +## and execute all Git daemon system content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_rwx_all_system_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute git_system_content; + ') + + exec_files_pattern($1, git_system_content, git_system_content) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, git_system_content, git_system_content) + manage_files_pattern($1, git_system_content, git_system_content) + files_search_var_lib($1) + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',` + fs_exec_cifs_files($1) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1) + fs_manage_cifs_files($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',` + fs_exec_nfs_files($1) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1) + fs_manage_nfs_files($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to manage +## and execute Git daemon generic system content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_rwx_generic_system_content',` + gen_require(` + type git_system_content_t; + ') + + exec_files_pattern($1, git_system_content_t, git_system_content_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, git_system_content_t, git_system_content_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, git_system_content_t, git_system_content_t) + files_search_var_lib($1) + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',` + fs_exec_cifs_files($1) + fs_manage_cifs_dirs($1) + fs_manage_cifs_files($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',` + fs_exec_nfs_files($1) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1) + fs_manage_nfs_files($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to read +## all Git daemon content files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_read_all_content_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute git_content; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, git_content, git_content) + read_files_pattern($1, git_content, git_content) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + files_search_var_lib($1) + + userdom_home_reader($1) + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',` + fs_list_cifs($1) + fs_read_cifs_files($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',` + fs_list_nfs($1) + fs_read_nfs_files($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to read +## Git daemon session content files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_read_session_content_files',` + gen_require(` + type git_session_content_t; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, git_session_content_t, git_session_content_t) + read_files_pattern($1, git_session_content_t, git_session_content_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + userdom_home_reader($1) +') + +####################################### +## +## Dontaudit the specified domain to read +## Git daemon session content files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`git_dontaudit_read_session_content_files',` + gen_require(` + type git_session_content_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 git_session_content_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to read +## all Git daemon system content files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_read_all_system_content_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute git_system_content; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, git_system_content, git_system_content) + read_files_pattern($1, git_system_content, git_system_content) + files_search_var_lib($1) + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',` + fs_list_cifs($1) + fs_read_cifs_files($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',` + fs_list_nfs($1) + fs_read_nfs_files($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to read +## Git daemon generic system content files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_read_generic_system_content_files',` + gen_require(` + type git_system_content_t; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, git_system_content_t, git_system_content_t) + read_files_pattern($1, git_system_content_t, git_system_content_t) + files_search_var_lib($1) + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',` + fs_list_cifs($1) + fs_read_cifs_files($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',` + fs_list_nfs($1) + fs_read_nfs_files($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to relabel +## all Git daemon content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_relabel_all_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute git_content; + ') + + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, git_content, git_content) + relabel_files_pattern($1, git_content, git_content) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to relabel +## all Git daemon system content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_relabel_all_system_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute git_system_content; + ') + + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, git_system_content, git_system_content) + relabel_files_pattern($1, git_system_content, git_system_content) + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to relabel +## Git daemon generic system content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_relabel_generic_system_content',` + gen_require(` + type git_system_content_t; + ') + + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, git_system_content_t, git_system_content_t) + relabel_files_pattern($1, git_system_content_t, git_system_content_t) + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to relabel +## Git daemon session content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`git_relabel_session_content',` + gen_require(` + type git_session_content_t; + ') + + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, git_session_content_t, git_session_content_t) + relabel_files_pattern($1, git_session_content_t, git_session_content_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/git.te b/policy/modules/services/git.te index 7382f85..fa32fcf 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/git.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/git.te @@ -1,8 +1,189 @@ -policy_module(git, 1.0) +policy_module(git, 1.0.3) + +## +##

    +## Allow Git daemon system to search home directories. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(git_system_enable_homedirs, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow Git daemon system to access cifs file systems. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(git_system_use_cifs, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow Git daemon system to access nfs file systems. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(git_system_use_nfs, false) + +######################################## +# +# Git daemon global private declarations. +# + +attribute git_domains; +attribute git_system_content; +attribute git_content; + +type gitd_exec_t; +application_executable_file(gitd_exec_t) + +role git_shell_r; + +######################################## +# +# Git daemon system private declarations. +# + +type git_system_t, git_domains; +inetd_service_domain(git_system_t, gitd_exec_t) +role system_r types git_system_t; + +type git_system_content_t, git_system_content, git_content; +files_type(git_system_content_t) +typealias git_system_content_t alias git_data_t; + +######################################## +# +# Git daemon session private declarations. +# + +## +##

    +## Allow Git daemon session to bind +## tcp sockets to all unreserved ports. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports, false) + +type git_session_t, git_domains; +application_domain(git_session_t, gitd_exec_t) +ubac_constrained(git_session_t) + +type git_session_content_t, git_content; +userdom_user_home_content(git_session_content_t) + +######################################## +# +# Git daemon global private policy. +# + +allow git_domains self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow git_domains self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; +allow git_domains self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow git_domains self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow git_domains self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(git_domains) +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(git_domains) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(git_domains) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(git_domains) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(git_domains) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_port(git_domains) +corenet_tcp_bind_git_port(git_domains) +corenet_sendrecv_git_server_packets(git_domains) + +corecmd_exec_bin(git_domains) + +files_read_etc_files(git_domains) +files_read_usr_files(git_domains) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(git_domains) + +kernel_read_system_state(git_domains) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(git_domains) + +miscfiles_read_localization(git_domains) + +sysnet_read_config(git_domains) + +optional_policy(` + automount_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs(git_domains) +') + +optional_policy(` + nis_use_ypbind(git_domains) +') + +######################################## +# +# Git daemon system repository private policy. +# + +list_dirs_pattern(git_system_t, git_content, git_content) +read_files_pattern(git_system_t, git_content, git_content) +files_search_var_lib(git_system_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(git_system_t) + +tunable_policy(`git_system_enable_homedirs',` + userdom_search_user_home_dirs(git_system_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`git_system_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_list_nfs(git_system_t) + fs_read_nfs_files(git_system_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`git_system_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_list_cifs(git_system_t) + fs_read_cifs_files(git_system_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`git_system_use_cifs',` + fs_list_cifs(git_system_t) + fs_read_cifs_files(git_system_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`git_system_use_nfs',` + fs_list_nfs(git_system_t) + fs_read_nfs_files(git_system_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# Git daemon session repository private policy. +# + +allow git_session_t self:tcp_socket { accept listen }; + +auth_use_nsswitch(git_session_t) + +list_dirs_pattern(git_session_t, git_session_content_t, git_session_content_t) +read_files_pattern(git_session_t, git_session_content_t, git_session_content_t) +userdom_search_user_home_dirs(git_session_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(git_session_t) + +tunable_policy(`git_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports',` + corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(git_session_t) + corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets(git_session_t) +') + +userdom_home_reader(git_session_t) ######################################## # -# Declarations +# cgi git Declarations # -apache_content_template(git) +optional_policy(` + apache_content_template(git) + git_read_all_content_files(httpd_git_script_t) + files_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs(httpd_git_script_t) + + auth_use_nsswitch(httpd_git_script_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# Git-shell private policy. +# +git_role_template(git_shell) +gen_user(git_shell_u, user, git_shell_r, s0, s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/glance.fc b/policy/modules/services/glance.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..657d8f5 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/glance.fc @@ -0,0 +1,13 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openstack-glance-api -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:glance_api_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openstack-glance-registry -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:glance_registry_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/glance-api -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:glance_api_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/glance-registry -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:glance_registry_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/glance(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:glance_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/glance(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:glance_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/glance(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:glance_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/glance.if b/policy/modules/services/glance.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ebe1dde --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/glance.if @@ -0,0 +1,268 @@ + +## policy for glance + +######################################## +## +## Transition to glance registry. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_domtrans_registry',` + gen_require(` + type glance_registry_t, glance_registry_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, glance_registry_exec_t, glance_registry_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to glance api. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_domtrans_api',` + gen_require(` + type glance_api_t, glance_api_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, glance_api_exec_t, glance_api_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read glance's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`glance_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type glance_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, glance_log_t, glance_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to glance log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type glance_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, glance_log_t, glance_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage glance log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type glance_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, glance_log_t, glance_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, glance_log_t, glance_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, glance_log_t, glance_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search glance lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type glance_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 glance_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read glance lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type glance_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, glance_var_lib_t, glance_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage glance lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type glance_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, glance_var_lib_t, glance_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage glance lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type glance_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, glance_var_lib_t, glance_var_lib_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read glance PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type glance_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + read_files_pattern($1, glance_var_run_t, glance_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage glance PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`glance_manage_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type glance_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, glance_var_run_t, glance_var_run_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an glance environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`glance_admin',` + gen_require(` + type glance_registry_t, glance_api_t, glance_log_t; + type glance_var_lib_t, glance_var_run_t; + type glance_registry_initrc_exec_t, glance_api_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 glance_registry_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, glance_registry_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 glance_registry_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 glance_api_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 glance_api_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, glance_api_t) + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, glance_registry_initrc_exec_t) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 glance_registry_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, glance_api_initrc_exec_t) + role_transition $2 glance_api_initrc_exec_t system_r; + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, glance_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, glance_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, glance_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/glance.te b/policy/modules/services/glance.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..57e0566 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/glance.te @@ -0,0 +1,112 @@ +policy_module(glance, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +attribute glance_domain; + +type glance_registry_t, glance_domain; +type glance_registry_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_exec_t) + +type glance_registry_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(glance_registry_initrc_exec_t) + +type glance_registry_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(glance_registry_tmp_t) + +type glance_api_t, glance_domain; +type glance_api_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(glance_api_t, glance_api_exec_t) + +type glance_api_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(glance_api_initrc_exec_t) + +type glance_log_t; +logging_log_file(glance_log_t) + +type glance_var_lib_t; +files_type(glance_var_lib_t) + +type glance_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(glance_tmp_t) + +type glance_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(glance_var_run_t) + +####################################### +# +# glance general domain local policy +# + +allow glance_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow glance_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow glance_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(glance_domain, glance_log_t, glance_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(glance_domain, glance_log_t, glance_log_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(glance_domain, glance_var_lib_t, glance_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(glance_domain, glance_var_lib_t, glance_var_lib_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(glance_domain, glance_var_run_t, glance_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(glance_domain, glance_var_run_t, glance_var_run_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(glance_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(glance_domain) + +dev_read_urand(glance_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(glance_domain) +files_read_usr_files(glance_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(glance_domain) + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(glance_domain) +') + +######################################## +# +# glance-registry local policy +# + +manage_dirs_pattern(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmp_t, glance_registry_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmp_t, glance_registry_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(glance_registry_t, glance_registry_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(glance_registry_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_glance_registry_port(glance_registry_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(glance_registry_t) + + +optional_policy(` + mysql_stream_connect(glance_registry_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# glance-api local policy +# + +manage_dirs_pattern(glance_api_t, glance_tmp_t, glance_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(glance_api_t, glance_tmp_t, glance_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(glance_api_t, glance_tmp_t, { dir file }) +can_exec(glance_api_t, glance_tmp_t) + +corecmd_exec_shell(glance_api_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(glance_api_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_glance_port(glance_api_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_glance_registry_port(glance_api_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(glance_api_t) + +dev_read_urand(glance_api_t) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(glance_api_t) + +libs_exec_ldconfig(glance_api_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.fc b/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.fc index 462de63..5df751b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.fc @@ -1,2 +1,6 @@ + /usr/libexec/gnome-clock-applet-mechanism -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnomeclock_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/gsd-datetime-mechanism -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnomeclock_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/libexec/kde(3|4)/kcmdatetimehelper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gnomeclock_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.if b/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.if index 671d8fd..25c7ab8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.if @@ -63,3 +63,24 @@ interface(`gnomeclock_dbus_chat',` allow $1 gnomeclock_t:dbus send_msg; allow gnomeclock_t $1:dbus send_msg; ') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit send and receive messages from +## gnomeclock over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`gnomeclock_dontaudit_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type gnomeclock_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + dontaudit $1 gnomeclock_t:dbus send_msg; + dontaudit gnomeclock_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.te b/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.te index 4fde46b..469a6e3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/gnomeclock.te @@ -8,25 +8,37 @@ policy_module(gnomeclock, 1.0.0) type gnomeclock_t; type gnomeclock_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(gnomeclock_t, gnomeclock_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(gnomeclock_t, gnomeclock_exec_t) ######################################## # # gnomeclock local policy # -allow gnomeclock_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_time sys_ptrace }; -allow gnomeclock_t self:process { getattr getsched }; +allow gnomeclock_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_time }; +allow gnomeclock_t self:process { getattr getsched signal }; allow gnomeclock_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow gnomeclock_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow gnomeclock_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(gnomeclock_t) corecmd_exec_bin(gnomeclock_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(gnomeclock_t) +corecmd_dontaudit_access_check_bin(gnomeclock_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_time_port(gnomeclock_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(gnomeclock_t) -files_read_etc_files(gnomeclock_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(gnomeclock_t) files_read_usr_files(gnomeclock_t) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(gnomeclock_t) + auth_use_nsswitch(gnomeclock_t) -clock_domtrans(gnomeclock_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(gnomeclock_t) miscfiles_read_localization(gnomeclock_t) miscfiles_manage_localization(gnomeclock_t) @@ -35,10 +47,34 @@ miscfiles_etc_filetrans_localization(gnomeclock_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(gnomeclock_t) optional_policy(` + chronyd_systemctl(gnomeclock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + clock_domtrans(gnomeclock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` consolekit_dbus_chat(gnomeclock_t) ') optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(gnomeclock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_manage_usr_config(gnomeclock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ntp_domtrans_ntpdate(gnomeclock_t) + ntp_initrc_domtrans(gnomeclock_t) + init_dontaudit_getattr_all_script_files(gnomeclock_t) + init_dontaudit_getattr_exec(gnomeclock_t) + ntp_systemctl(gnomeclock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` policykit_dbus_chat(gnomeclock_t) policykit_domtrans_auth(gnomeclock_t) policykit_read_lib(gnomeclock_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/gpm.if b/policy/modules/services/gpm.if index 7d97298..d6b2959 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/gpm.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/gpm.if @@ -16,8 +16,8 @@ interface(`gpm_stream_connect',` type gpmctl_t, gpm_t; ') - allow $1 gpmctl_t:sock_file rw_sock_file_perms; - allow $1 gpm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, gpmctl_t, gpmctl_t, gpm_t) ') ######################################## @@ -37,7 +37,7 @@ interface(`gpm_getattr_gpmctl',` ') dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) - allow $1 gpmctl_t:sock_file getattr; + allow $1 gpmctl_t:sock_file getattr_sock_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ interface(`gpm_dontaudit_getattr_gpmctl',` type gpmctl_t; ') - dontaudit $1 gpmctl_t:sock_file getattr; + dontaudit $1 gpmctl_t:sock_file getattr_sock_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -77,5 +77,5 @@ interface(`gpm_setattr_gpmctl',` ') dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) - allow $1 gpmctl_t:sock_file setattr; + allow $1 gpmctl_t:sock_file setattr_sock_file_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/gpm.te b/policy/modules/services/gpm.te index a627b34..c4cfc6d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/gpm.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/gpm.te @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type gpm_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(gpm_t, gpm_exec_t) type gpm_conf_t; -files_type(gpm_conf_t) +files_config_file(gpm_conf_t) type gpm_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(gpm_tmp_t) @@ -69,6 +69,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(gpm_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(gpm_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(gpm_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(gpm_t) optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(gpm_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/gpsd.te b/policy/modules/services/gpsd.te index 03742d8..3f7065f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/gpsd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/gpsd.te @@ -24,8 +24,9 @@ files_pid_file(gpsd_var_run_t) # gpsd local policy # -allow gpsd_t self:capability { fowner fsetid setuid setgid sys_nice sys_tty_config }; -allow gpsd_t self:process setsched; +allow gpsd_t self:capability { fowner fsetid setuid setgid sys_nice sys_time sys_tty_config }; +dontaudit gpsd_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override }; +allow gpsd_t self:process { setsched signal_perms }; allow gpsd_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow gpsd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow gpsd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -38,16 +39,25 @@ manage_files_pattern(gpsd_t, gpsd_var_run_t, gpsd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(gpsd_t, gpsd_var_run_t, gpsd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(gpsd_t, gpsd_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +kernel_list_proc(gpsd_t) +kernel_request_load_module(gpsd_t) + corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(gpsd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(gpsd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(gpsd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(gpsd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(gpsd_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(gpsd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(gpsd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_gpsd_port(gpsd_t) +dev_read_sysfs(gpsd_t) +dev_rw_realtime_clock(gpsd_t) + +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(gpsd_t) + term_use_unallocated_ttys(gpsd_t) term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(gpsd_t) +term_use_usb_ttys(gpsd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(gpsd_t) @@ -56,6 +66,12 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(gpsd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(gpsd_t) optional_policy(` + chronyd_rw_shm(gpsd_t) + chronyd_stream_connect(gpsd_t) + chronyd_dgram_send(gpsd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(gpsd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/hadoop.if b/policy/modules/services/hadoop.if index 2d0b4e1..6437f07 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/hadoop.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/hadoop.if @@ -91,7 +91,7 @@ template(`hadoop_domain_template',` corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(hadoop_$1_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(hadoop_$1_t) - corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(hadoop_$1_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(hadoop_$1_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(hadoop_$1_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(hadoop_$1_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(hadoop_$1_t) @@ -109,6 +109,7 @@ template(`hadoop_domain_template',` files_read_etc_files(hadoop_$1_t) auth_domtrans_chkpwd(hadoop_$1_t) + auth_use_nsswitch(hadoop_$1_t) hadoop_match_lan_spd(hadoop_$1_t) @@ -126,16 +127,14 @@ template(`hadoop_domain_template',` hadoop_exec_config(hadoop_$1_t) - java_exec(hadoop_$1_t) + optional_policy(` + java_exec(hadoop_$1_t) + ') kerberos_use(hadoop_$1_t) su_exec(hadoop_$1_t) - optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(hadoop_$1_t) - ') - #################################### # # Shared hadoop_$1 initrc policy. @@ -175,8 +174,6 @@ template(`hadoop_domain_template',` files_read_etc_files(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) files_read_usr_files(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) - consoletype_exec(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) - fs_getattr_xattr_fs(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) fs_search_cgroup_dirs(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) @@ -184,6 +181,8 @@ template(`hadoop_domain_template',` hadoop_exec_config(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) + auth_domtrans_chkpwd(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) + init_rw_utmp(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) init_use_fds(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) init_use_script_ptys(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) @@ -196,8 +195,9 @@ template(`hadoop_domain_template',` userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) + consoletype_exec(hadoop_$1_initrc_t) ') + ') ######################################## @@ -224,14 +224,21 @@ interface(`hadoop_role',` hadoop_domtrans($2) role $1 types hadoop_t; - allow $2 hadoop_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $2 hadoop_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($2, hadoop_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 hadoop_t:process ptrace; + ') hadoop_domtrans_zookeeper_client($2) role $1 types zookeeper_t; - allow $2 zookeeper_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $2 zookeeper_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($2, zookeeper_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 zookeeper_t:process ptrace; + ') + ') ######################################## diff --git a/policy/modules/services/hadoop.te b/policy/modules/services/hadoop.te index 7d3a469..c6824f1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/hadoop.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/hadoop.te @@ -161,23 +161,17 @@ files_read_usr_files(hadoop_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(hadoop_t) -miscfiles_read_localization(hadoop_t) - -sysnet_read_config(hadoop_t) - -userdom_use_user_terminals(hadoop_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(hadoop_t) -java_exec(hadoop_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(hadoop_t) -kerberos_use(hadoop_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(hadoop_t) optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(hadoop_t) + java_exec(hadoop_t) ') -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(hadoop_t) -') +kerberos_use(hadoop_t) ######################################## # @@ -341,17 +335,17 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(zookeeper_t) files_read_etc_files(zookeeper_t) files_read_usr_files(zookeeper_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(zookeeper_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(zookeeper_t) sysnet_read_config(zookeeper_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(zookeeper_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(zookeeper_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(zookeeper_t) -java_exec(zookeeper_t) - optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(zookeeper_t) + java_exec(zookeeper_t) ') ######################################## @@ -437,4 +431,6 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(zookeeper_server_t) sysnet_read_config(zookeeper_server_t) -java_exec(zookeeper_server_t) +optional_policy(` + java_exec(zookeeper_server_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/hal.fc b/policy/modules/services/hal.fc index c98b0df..3b1a051 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/hal.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/hal.fc @@ -18,13 +18,9 @@ /var/lib/hal(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hald_var_lib_t,s0) -/var/log/pm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hald_log_t,s0) -/var/log/pm-.*\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:hald_log_t,s0) - /var/run/hald(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hald_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/haldaemon\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hald_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/pm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hald_var_run_t,s0) -/var/run/pm-utils(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hald_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/synce.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:hald_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/vbe.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hald_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/hal.if b/policy/modules/services/hal.if index 7cf6763..4a7bc56 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/hal.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/hal.if @@ -51,6 +51,7 @@ interface(`hal_read_state',` type hald_t; ') + kernel_search_proc($1) ps_process_pattern($1, hald_t) ') @@ -69,7 +70,9 @@ interface(`hal_ptrace',` type hald_t; ') - allow $1 hald_t:process ptrace; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 hald_t:process ptrace; + ') ') ######################################## @@ -87,7 +90,7 @@ interface(`hal_use_fds',` type hald_t; ') - allow $1 hald_t:fd use; + allow $1 hald_t:fd use; ') ######################################## @@ -105,7 +108,7 @@ interface(`hal_dontaudit_use_fds',` type hald_t; ') - dontaudit $1 hald_t:fd use; + dontaudit $1 hald_t:fd use; ') ######################################## @@ -124,7 +127,7 @@ interface(`hal_rw_pipes',` type hald_t; ') - allow $1 hald_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + allow $1 hald_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -143,7 +146,7 @@ interface(`hal_dontaudit_rw_pipes',` type hald_t; ') - dontaudit $1 hald_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 hald_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -377,6 +380,25 @@ interface(`hal_read_pid_files',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to read +## hald PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`hal_dontaudit_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type hald_var_run_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 hald_var_run_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read/Write hald PID files. ## ## @@ -431,3 +453,25 @@ interface(`hal_manage_pid_files',` files_search_pids($1) manage_files_pattern($1, hald_var_run_t, hald_var_run_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## dontaudit read and write an leaked file descriptors +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`hal_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type hald_log_t, hald_t, hald_var_run_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 hald_t:fd use; + dontaudit $1 hald_log_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 hald_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + dontaudit hald_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; + dontaudit $1 hald_var_run_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/hal.te b/policy/modules/services/hal.te index 24c6253..c31f21c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/hal.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/hal.te @@ -54,6 +54,9 @@ files_pid_file(hald_var_run_t) type hald_var_lib_t; files_type(hald_var_lib_t) +typealias hald_log_t alias pmtools_log_t; +typealias hald_var_run_t alias pmtools_var_run_t; + ######################################## # # Local policy @@ -61,7 +64,7 @@ files_type(hald_var_lib_t) # execute openvt which needs setuid allow hald_t self:capability { chown setuid setgid kill net_admin sys_admin sys_nice dac_override dac_read_search mknod sys_rawio sys_tty_config }; -dontaudit hald_t self:capability {sys_ptrace sys_tty_config }; +dontaudit hald_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow hald_t self:process { getsched getattr signal_perms }; allow hald_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow hald_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; @@ -99,7 +102,7 @@ kernel_read_fs_sysctls(hald_t) kernel_rw_irq_sysctls(hald_t) kernel_rw_vm_sysctls(hald_t) kernel_write_proc_files(hald_t) -kernel_search_network_sysctl(hald_t) +kernel_rw_net_sysctls(hald_t) kernel_setsched(hald_t) kernel_request_load_module(hald_t) @@ -125,6 +128,7 @@ dev_rw_printer(hald_t) dev_read_lvm_control(hald_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(hald_t) dev_manage_generic_chr_files(hald_t) +dev_manage_generic_blk_files(hald_t) dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(hald_t) dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev(hald_t) dev_setattr_usbfs_files(hald_t) @@ -136,10 +140,10 @@ dev_read_video_dev(hald_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(hald_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(hald_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(hald_t) files_exec_etc_files(hald_t) files_read_etc_files(hald_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(hald_t) files_rw_etc_runtime_files(hald_t) files_manage_mnt_dirs(hald_t) files_manage_mnt_files(hald_t) @@ -165,6 +169,7 @@ fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(hald_t) fs_rw_removable_blk_files(hald_t) files_getattr_all_mountpoints(hald_t) +files_read_kernel_modules(hald_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(hald_t) @@ -186,8 +191,6 @@ term_use_unallocated_ttys(hald_t) auth_use_nsswitch(hald_t) -fstools_getattr_swap_files(hald_t) - init_domtrans_script(hald_t) init_read_utmp(hald_t) #hal runs shutdown, probably need a shutdown domain @@ -204,20 +207,25 @@ logging_search_logs(hald_t) miscfiles_read_localization(hald_t) miscfiles_read_hwdata(hald_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(hald_t) -modutils_read_module_deps(hald_t) - seutil_read_config(hald_t) seutil_read_default_contexts(hald_t) seutil_read_file_contexts(hald_t) -sysnet_read_config(hald_t) +sysnet_delete_dhcpc_pid(hald_t) sysnet_domtrans_dhcpc(hald_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(hald_t) +sysnet_read_config(hald_t) sysnet_read_dhcp_config(hald_t) +sysnet_read_dhcpc_pid(hald_t) +sysnet_signal_dhcpc(hald_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(hald_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(hald_t) +userdom_stream_connect(hald_t) + +optional_policy(` + netutils_domtrans(hald_t) +') optional_policy(` alsa_domtrans(hald_t) @@ -252,8 +260,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - dbus_system_bus_client(hald_t) - dbus_connect_system_bus(hald_t) + dbus_system_domain(hald_t, hald_exec_t) init_dbus_chat_script(hald_t) @@ -263,15 +270,28 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + # for pm-suspend.lock in /var/run/pm-utils/ + devicekit_manage_pid_files(hald_t) +') + +optional_policy(` # For /usr/libexec/hald-probe-smbios dmidecode_domtrans(hald_t) ') optional_policy(` + gnome_read_config(hald_t) +') + +optional_policy(` gpm_dontaudit_getattr_gpmctl(hald_t) ') optional_policy(` + fstools_getattr_swap_files(hald_t) +') + +optional_policy(` hotplug_read_config(hald_t) ') @@ -280,6 +300,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(hald_t) + modutils_read_module_deps(hald_t) +') + +optional_policy(` mount_domtrans(hald_t) ') @@ -302,7 +327,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - policykit_dbus_chat(hald_t) + policykit_dbus_chat(hald_t) policykit_domtrans_auth(hald_t) policykit_domtrans_resolve(hald_t) policykit_read_lib(hald_t) @@ -318,6 +343,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + shutdown_domtrans(hald_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_domtrans(hald_t) udev_read_db(hald_t) ') @@ -338,6 +367,10 @@ optional_policy(` virt_manage_images(hald_t) ') +optional_policy(` + xserver_read_pid(hald_t) +') + ######################################## # # Hal acl local policy @@ -358,6 +391,7 @@ files_search_var_lib(hald_acl_t) manage_dirs_pattern(hald_acl_t, hald_var_run_t, hald_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(hald_acl_t, hald_var_run_t, hald_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(hald_acl_t, hald_var_run_t, { dir file }) +allow hald_t hald_var_run_t:dir mounton; corecmd_exec_bin(hald_acl_t) @@ -388,7 +422,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(hald_acl_t) miscfiles_read_localization(hald_acl_t) optional_policy(` - policykit_dbus_chat(hald_acl_t) + policykit_dbus_chat(hald_acl_t) policykit_domtrans_auth(hald_acl_t) policykit_read_lib(hald_acl_t) policykit_read_reload(hald_acl_t) @@ -470,6 +504,12 @@ files_read_usr_files(hald_keymap_t) miscfiles_read_localization(hald_keymap_t) +optional_policy(` + # This is caused by a bug in hald and PolicyKit. + # Should be removed when this is fixed + cron_read_system_job_lib_files(hald_t) +') + ######################################## # # Local hald dccm policy @@ -524,7 +564,9 @@ files_read_usr_files(hald_dccm_t) miscfiles_read_localization(hald_dccm_t) -hal_dontaudit_rw_dgram_sockets(hald_dccm_t) +optional_policy(` + hal_dontaudit_rw_dgram_sockets(hald_dccm_t) +') optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(hald_dccm_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/hddtemp.if b/policy/modules/services/hddtemp.if index 87b4531..901d905 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/hddtemp.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/hddtemp.if @@ -60,8 +60,11 @@ interface(`hddtemp_admin',` type hddtemp_t, hddtemp_etc_t, hddtemp_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 hddtemp_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 hddtemp_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, hddtemp_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 hddtemp_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, hddtemp_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -69,9 +72,5 @@ interface(`hddtemp_admin',` allow $2 system_r; admin_pattern($1, hddtemp_etc_t) - files_search_etc($1) - - allow $1 hddtemp_t:dir list_dir_perms; - read_lnk_files_pattern($1, hddtemp_t, hddtemp_t) - kernel_search_proc($1) + files_list_etc($1) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/hddtemp.te b/policy/modules/services/hddtemp.te index c234b32..6c0a73d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/hddtemp.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/hddtemp.te @@ -38,12 +38,16 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_hddtemp_port(hddtemp_t) corenet_sendrecv_hddtemp_server_packets(hddtemp_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_hddtemp_port(hddtemp_t) -files_search_etc(hddtemp_t) +files_read_etc_files(hddtemp_t) files_read_usr_files(hddtemp_t) storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(hddtemp_t) +storage_raw_read_removable_device(hddtemp_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(hddtemp_t) miscfiles_read_localization(hddtemp_t) +optional_policy(` + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(hddtemp_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/i18n_input.te b/policy/modules/services/i18n_input.te index 5fc89c4..738c3e2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/i18n_input.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/i18n_input.te @@ -74,16 +74,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(i18n_input_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(i18n_input_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(i18n_input_t) - -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_read_nfs_files(i18n_input_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(i18n_input_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_read_cifs_files(i18n_input_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(i18n_input_t) -') +userdom_home_reader(i18n_input_t) optional_policy(` canna_stream_connect(i18n_input_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/icecast.if b/policy/modules/services/icecast.if index ecab47a..6ba84cf 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/icecast.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/icecast.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run icecast. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`icecast_domtrans',` @@ -118,9 +118,9 @@ interface(`icecast_read_log',` ## icecast log files. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`icecast_append_log',` @@ -173,7 +173,11 @@ interface(`icecast_admin',` type icecast_t, icecast_initrc_exec_t; ') + allow $1 icecast_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, icecast_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 icecast_t:process ptrace; + ') # Allow icecast_t to restart the apache service icecast_initrc_domtrans($1) @@ -182,7 +186,5 @@ interface(`icecast_admin',` allow $2 system_r; icecast_manage_pid_files($1) - icecast_manage_log($1) - ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/icecast.te b/policy/modules/services/icecast.te index fdb7e9a..17ed705 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/icecast.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/icecast.te @@ -5,6 +5,14 @@ policy_module(icecast, 1.1.0) # Declarations # +## +##

    +## Allow icecast to connect to all ports, not just +## sound ports. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(icecast_connect_any, false) + type icecast_t; type icecast_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(icecast_t, icecast_exec_t) @@ -31,7 +39,7 @@ allow icecast_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(icecast_t, icecast_log_t, icecast_log_t) manage_files_pattern(icecast_t, icecast_log_t, icecast_log_t) -logging_log_filetrans(icecast_t, icecast_log_t, { file dir } ) +logging_log_filetrans(icecast_t, icecast_log_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(icecast_t, icecast_var_run_t, icecast_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(icecast_t, icecast_var_run_t, icecast_var_run_t) @@ -39,7 +47,18 @@ files_pid_filetrans(icecast_t, icecast_var_run_t, { file dir }) kernel_read_system_state(icecast_t) +dev_read_sysfs(icecast_t) +dev_read_urand(icecast_t) +dev_read_rand(icecast_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_soundd_port(icecast_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(icecast_t) + +tunable_policy(`icecast_connect_any',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(icecast_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(icecast_t) + corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(icecast_t) +') # Init script handling domain_use_interactive_fds(icecast_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ifplugd.if b/policy/modules/services/ifplugd.if index dfb4232..fa1b91d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ifplugd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ifplugd.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run ifplugd. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`ifplugd_domtrans',` @@ -113,11 +113,11 @@ interface(`ifplugd_read_pid_files',` # interface(`ifplugd_admin',` gen_require(` - type ifplugd_t, ifplugd_etc_t; - type ifplugd_var_run_t, ifplugd_initrc_exec_t; + type ifplugd_t, ifplugd_etc_t, ifplugd_var_run_t; + type ifplugd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 ifplugd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 ifplugd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, ifplugd_t) init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ifplugd_initrc_exec_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ifplugd.te b/policy/modules/services/ifplugd.te index 978c32f..9bf1f1e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ifplugd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ifplugd.te @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(ifplugd_t, ifplugd_exec_t) # config files type ifplugd_etc_t; -files_type(ifplugd_etc_t) +files_config_file(ifplugd_etc_t) type ifplugd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(ifplugd_initrc_exec_t) @@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ files_pid_file(ifplugd_var_run_t) # allow ifplugd_t self:capability { net_admin sys_nice net_bind_service }; -dontaudit ifplugd_t self:capability { sys_tty_config sys_ptrace }; +dontaudit ifplugd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow ifplugd_t self:process { signal signull }; allow ifplugd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow ifplugd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -54,7 +54,7 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(ifplugd_t) # reading of hardware information dev_read_sysfs(ifplugd_t) -domain_read_confined_domains_state(ifplugd_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(ifplugd_t) domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(ifplugd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(ifplugd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/inetd.if b/policy/modules/services/inetd.if index df48e5e..878d9df 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/inetd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/inetd.if @@ -37,6 +37,10 @@ interface(`inetd_core_service_domain',` domtrans_pattern(inetd_t, $2, $1) allow inetd_t $1:process { siginh sigkill }; + + optional_policy(` + abrt_stream_connect($1) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -55,7 +59,6 @@ interface(`inetd_core_service_domain',` ## # interface(`inetd_tcp_service_domain',` - gen_require(` type inetd_t; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/inetd.te b/policy/modules/services/inetd.te index c51a7b2..afc68dc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/inetd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/inetd.te @@ -89,6 +89,10 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_ftp_port(inetd_t) corenet_udp_bind_ftp_port(inetd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_inetd_child_port(inetd_t) corenet_udp_bind_inetd_child_port(inetd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_echo_port(inetd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_echo_port(inetd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_time_port(inetd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_time_port(inetd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_ircd_port(inetd_t) corenet_udp_bind_ktalkd_port(inetd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_printer_port(inetd_t) @@ -149,7 +153,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(inetd_t) mls_fd_share_all_levels(inetd_t) mls_socket_read_to_clearance(inetd_t) mls_socket_write_to_clearance(inetd_t) +mls_net_outbound_all_levels(inetd_t) mls_process_set_level(inetd_t) +#706086 +mls_net_outbound_all_levels(inetd_t) sysnet_read_config(inetd_t) @@ -176,6 +183,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + tftp_read_config(inetd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_read_db(inetd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/inn.fc b/policy/modules/services/inn.fc index 8ca038d..8507ee2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/inn.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/inn.fc @@ -19,45 +19,43 @@ /var/lib/news(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_var_lib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/actsync -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/archive -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/batcher -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/buffchan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/convdate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/ctlinnd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/cvtbatch -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/expire -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/expireover -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/fastrm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/filechan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/getlist -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/grephistory -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/inews -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/innconfval -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/inndf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/inndstart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/innfeed -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/innxbatch -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/innxmit -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/makedbz -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/makehistory -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/newsrequeue -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/nnrpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/nntpget -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/ovdb_recover -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/overchan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/prunehistory -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/rnews -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/shlock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/shrinkfile -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/news/bin/startinnfeed -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/actsync -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/archive -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/batcher -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/buffchan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/convdate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/ctlinnd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/cvtbatch -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/expire -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/expireover -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/fastrm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/filechan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/getlist -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/grephistory -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/inews -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/innconfval -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/inndf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/inndstart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/innfeed -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/innxbatch -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/innxmit -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/makedbz -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/makehistory -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/newsrequeue -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/nnrpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/nntpget -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/ovdb_recover -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/overchan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/prunehistory -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/rnews -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/shlock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/shrinkfile -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/news/bin/startinnfeed -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) # cjp: split these to fix an ordering # problem with a match in corecommands /usr/lib/news/bin/innd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/news/bin/sm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/news/bin/innd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/news/bin/sm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_exec_t,s0) /var/log/news(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:innd_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/inn.if b/policy/modules/services/inn.if index ebc9e0d..617f52f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/inn.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/inn.if @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ # interface(`inn_exec',` gen_require(` - type innd_t; + type innd_exec_t; ') can_exec($1, innd_exec_t) @@ -93,6 +93,7 @@ interface(`inn_read_config',` type innd_etc_t; ') + files_search_etc($1) allow $1 innd_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 innd_etc_t:file read_file_perms; allow $1 innd_etc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; @@ -113,6 +114,7 @@ interface(`inn_read_news_lib',` type innd_var_lib_t; ') + files_search_var_lib($1) allow $1 innd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 innd_var_lib_t:file read_file_perms; allow $1 innd_var_lib_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; @@ -133,6 +135,7 @@ interface(`inn_read_news_spool',` type news_spool_t; ') + files_search_spool($1) allow $1 news_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 news_spool_t:file read_file_perms; allow $1 news_spool_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; @@ -195,12 +198,15 @@ interface(`inn_domtrans',` interface(`inn_admin',` gen_require(` type innd_t, innd_etc_t, innd_log_t; - type news_spool_t, innd_var_lib_t; - type innd_var_run_t, innd_initrc_exec_t; + type news_spool_t, innd_var_lib_t, innd_var_run_t; + type innd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 innd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 innd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, innd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 innd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, innd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/inn.te b/policy/modules/services/inn.te index 9fab1dc..2462aa7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/inn.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/inn.te @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(inn, 1.9.0) # # Declarations # + type innd_t; type innd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(innd_t, innd_exec_t) @@ -25,11 +26,13 @@ files_pid_file(innd_var_run_t) type news_spool_t; files_mountpoint(news_spool_t) +files_spool_file(news_spool_t) ######################################## # # Local policy # + allow innd_t self:capability { dac_override kill setgid setuid }; dontaudit innd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow innd_t self:process { setsched signal_perms }; @@ -46,7 +49,7 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(innd_t, innd_etc_t, innd_etc_t) can_exec(innd_t, innd_exec_t) manage_files_pattern(innd_t, innd_log_t, innd_log_t) -allow innd_t innd_log_t:dir setattr; +allow innd_t innd_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; logging_log_filetrans(innd_t, innd_log_t, file) manage_dirs_pattern(innd_t, innd_var_lib_t, innd_var_lib_t) @@ -56,7 +59,7 @@ files_var_lib_filetrans(innd_t, innd_var_lib_t, file) manage_dirs_pattern(innd_t, innd_var_run_t, innd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(innd_t, innd_var_run_t, innd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(innd_t, innd_var_run_t, innd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(innd_t, innd_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(innd_t, innd_var_run_t, { dir file }) manage_dirs_pattern(innd_t, news_spool_t, news_spool_t) manage_files_pattern(innd_t, news_spool_t, news_spool_t) @@ -105,6 +108,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(innd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(innd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(innd_t) +userdom_dgram_send(innd_t) mta_send_mail(innd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/irqbalance.te b/policy/modules/services/irqbalance.te index 9aeeaf9..28fdfc5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/irqbalance.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/irqbalance.te @@ -19,6 +19,11 @@ files_pid_file(irqbalance_var_run_t) allow irqbalance_t self:capability { setpcap net_admin }; dontaudit irqbalance_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + # caused by some bogus kernel code + dontaudit irqbalance_t self:capability sys_module; +') + allow irqbalance_t self:process { getcap setcap signal_perms }; allow irqbalance_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/isnsd.fc b/policy/modules/services/isnsd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3e29080 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/isnsd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/isnsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:isnsd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/isnsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:isnsd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/isns(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:isnsd_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/run/isnsd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:isnsd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/isnsctl -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:isnsd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/isnsd.if b/policy/modules/services/isnsd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b3514a --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/isnsd.if @@ -0,0 +1,181 @@ + +## policy for isnsd + + +######################################## +## +## Transition to isnsd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`isnsd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type isnsd_t, isnsd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, isnsd_exec_t, isnsd_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute isnsd server in the isnsd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`isnsd_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type isnsd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, isnsd_initrc_exec_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Search isnsd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`isnsd_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type isnsd_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 isnsd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read isnsd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`isnsd_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type isnsd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, isnsd_var_lib_t, isnsd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage isnsd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`isnsd_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type isnsd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, isnsd_var_lib_t, isnsd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage isnsd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`isnsd_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type isnsd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, isnsd_var_lib_t, isnsd_var_lib_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read isnsd PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`isnsd_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type isnsd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 isnsd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an isnsd environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`isnsd_admin',` + gen_require(` + type isnsd_t; + type isnsd_initrc_exec_t; + type isnsd_var_lib_t; + type isnsd_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 isnsd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, isnsd_t) + + isnsd_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 isnsd_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, isnsd_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, isnsd_var_run_t) + +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/isnsd.te b/policy/modules/services/isnsd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..a0f2f83 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/isnsd.te @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +policy_module(isnsd, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type isnsd_t; +type isnsd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(isnsd_t, isnsd_exec_t) + +type isnsd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(isnsd_initrc_exec_t) + +type isnsd_var_lib_t; +files_type(isnsd_var_lib_t) + +type isnsd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(isnsd_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# isnsd local policy +# + +allow isnsd_t self:capability { kill }; +allow isnsd_t self:process { signal }; + +allow isnsd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow isnsd_t self:udp_socket { listen }; +allow isnsd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(isnsd_t, isnsd_var_lib_t, isnsd_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(isnsd_t, isnsd_var_lib_t, isnsd_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(isnsd_t, isnsd_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(isnsd_t, isnsd_var_run_t, isnsd_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(isnsd_t, isnsd_var_run_t, isnsd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(isnsd_t, isnsd_var_run_t, isnsd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(isnsd_t, isnsd_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(isnsd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_isns_port(isnsd_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(isnsd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(isnsd_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(isnsd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(isnsd_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(isnsd_t) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/jabber.fc b/policy/modules/services/jabber.fc index 4c9acec..9a9ca2a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/jabber.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/jabber.fc @@ -1,6 +1,18 @@ -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/jabber -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/jabberd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/jabberd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/router -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_router_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/c2s -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_router_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/s2s -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/sm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_exec_t,s0) -/var/lib/jabber(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_var_lib_t,s0) -/var/log/jabber(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_log_t,s0) +/var/lib/jabberd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:jabberd_var_lib_t,s0) + +# pyicq-t + +/usr/share/pyicq-t/PyICQt\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyicqt_exec_t,s0) + +/var/log/pyicq-t\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyicqt_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/pyicq-t(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyicqt_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/spool/pyicq-t(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyicqt_var_spool_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/jabber.if b/policy/modules/services/jabber.if index 9878499..8643cd3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/jabber.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/jabber.if @@ -1,8 +1,71 @@ ## Jabber instant messaging server -######################################## +##################################### +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## jabber init daemon domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`jabber_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + attribute jabberd_domain; + ') + + ############################## + # + # $1_t declarations + # + + type $1_t, jabberd_domain; + type $1_exec_t; + init_daemon_domain($1_t, $1_exec_t) + +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute a domain transition to run jabberd services +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`jabber_domtrans_jabberd',` + gen_require(` + type jabberd_t, jabberd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, jabberd_exec_t, jabberd_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Execute a domain transition to run jabberd router service +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`jabber_domtrans_jabberd_router',` + gen_require(` + type jabberd_router_t, jabberd_router_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, jabberd_router_exec_t, jabberd_router_t) +') + +####################################### ## -## Connect to jabber over a TCP socket (Deprecated) +## Read jabberd lib files. ## ## ## @@ -10,8 +73,51 @@ ## ## # -interface(`jabber_tcp_connect',` - refpolicywarn(`$0($*) has been deprecated.') +interface(`jabberd_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type jabberd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, jabberd_var_lib_t, jabberd_var_lib_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Dontaudit inherited read jabberd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`jabberd_dontaudit_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type jabberd_var_lib_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 jabberd_var_lib_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## jabberd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jabberd_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type jabberd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, jabberd_var_lib_t, jabberd_var_lib_t) ') ######################################## @@ -33,24 +139,25 @@ interface(`jabber_tcp_connect',` # interface(`jabber_admin',` gen_require(` - type jabberd_t, jabberd_log_t, jabberd_var_lib_t; - type jabberd_var_run_t, jabberd_initrc_exec_t; + type jabberd_t, jabberd_var_lib_t; + type jabberd_initrc_exec_t, jabberd_router_t; ') - allow $1 jabberd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 jabberd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, jabberd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 jabberd_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 jabberd_router_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 jabberd_router_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, jabberd_router_t) init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, jabberd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 jabberd_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - logging_list_logs($1) - admin_pattern($1, jabberd_log_t) - files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, jabberd_var_lib_t) - - files_list_pids($1) - admin_pattern($1, jabberd_var_run_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/jabber.te b/policy/modules/services/jabber.te index da2127e..91bdd44 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/jabber.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/jabber.te @@ -5,90 +5,150 @@ policy_module(jabber, 1.8.0) # Declarations # -type jabberd_t; -type jabberd_exec_t; -init_daemon_domain(jabberd_t, jabberd_exec_t) +attribute jabberd_domain; + +jabber_domain_template(jabberd) +jabber_domain_template(jabberd_router) +jabber_domain_template(pyicqt) type jabberd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(jabberd_initrc_exec_t) -type jabberd_log_t; -logging_log_file(jabberd_log_t) - +# type which includes log/pid files pro jabberd components type jabberd_var_lib_t; files_type(jabberd_var_lib_t) -type jabberd_var_run_t; -files_pid_file(jabberd_var_run_t) +# pyicq-t types +type pyicqt_log_t; +logging_log_file(pyicqt_log_t); -######################################## +type pyicqt_var_spool_t; +files_spool_file(pyicqt_var_spool_t) + +type pyicqt_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(pyicqt_var_run_t) + +###################################### # -# Local policy +# Local policy for jabberd-router and c2s components # -allow jabberd_t self:capability dac_override; -dontaudit jabberd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow jabberd_t self:process signal_perms; -allow jabberd_t self:fifo_file read_fifo_file_perms; -allow jabberd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -allow jabberd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow jabberd_router_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; -manage_files_pattern(jabberd_t, jabberd_var_lib_t, jabberd_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(jabberd_t, jabberd_var_lib_t, file) - -manage_files_pattern(jabberd_t, jabberd_log_t, jabberd_log_t) -logging_log_filetrans(jabberd_t, jabberd_log_t, { file dir }) - -manage_files_pattern(jabberd_t, jabberd_var_run_t, jabberd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(jabberd_t, jabberd_var_run_t, file) - -kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(jabberd_t) -kernel_list_proc(jabberd_t) -kernel_read_proc_symlinks(jabberd_t) - -corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(jabberd_t) -corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(jabberd_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(jabberd_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(jabberd_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(jabberd_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(jabberd_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(jabberd_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(jabberd_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(jabberd_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_jabber_client_port(jabberd_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_jabber_interserver_port(jabberd_t) -corenet_sendrecv_jabber_client_server_packets(jabberd_t) -corenet_sendrecv_jabber_interserver_server_packets(jabberd_t) +manage_files_pattern(jabberd_router_t, jabberd_var_lib_t, jabberd_var_lib_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(jabberd_router_t, jabberd_var_lib_t, jabberd_var_lib_t) + +kernel_read_network_state(jabberd_router_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_jabber_client_port(jabberd_router_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_jabber_router_port(jabberd_router_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_jabber_router_port(jabberd_router_t) +corenet_sendrecv_jabber_router_server_packets(jabberd_router_t) +corenet_sendrecv_jabber_client_server_packets(jabberd_router_t) -dev_read_sysfs(jabberd_t) -# For SSL -dev_read_rand(jabberd_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(jabberd_router_t) -domain_use_interactive_fds(jabberd_t) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(jabberd_router_t) -files_read_etc_files(jabberd_t) -files_read_etc_runtime_files(jabberd_t) +optional_policy(` + kerberos_use(jabberd_router_t) +') -fs_getattr_all_fs(jabberd_t) -fs_search_auto_mountpoints(jabberd_t) +optional_policy(` + nis_use_ypbind(jabberd_router_t) +') -logging_send_syslog_msg(jabberd_t) +##################################### +# +# Local policy for other jabberd components +# -miscfiles_read_localization(jabberd_t) +manage_files_pattern(jabberd_t, jabberd_var_lib_t, jabberd_var_lib_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(jabberd_t, jabberd_var_lib_t, jabberd_var_lib_t) -sysnet_read_config(jabberd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_jabber_interserver_port(jabberd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_jabber_router_port(jabberd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(jabberd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(jabberd_t) optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(jabberd_t) + seutil_sigchld_newrole(jabberd_t) ') optional_policy(` - seutil_sigchld_newrole(jabberd_t) + udev_read_db(jabberd_t) ') +###################################### +# +# Local policy for pyicq-t +# + +# need for /var/log/pyicq-t.log +manage_files_pattern(pyicqt_t, pyicqt_log_t, pyicqt_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(pyicqt_t, pyicqt_log_t, file) + +manage_files_pattern(pyicqt_t, pyicqt_var_run_t, pyicqt_var_run_t); + +files_search_spool(pyicqt_t) +manage_files_pattern(pyicqt_t, pyicqt_var_spool_t, pyicqt_var_spool_t); + +corenet_tcp_bind_jabber_router_port(pyicqt_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_jabber_router_port(pyicqt_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(pyicqt_t) + +dev_read_urand(pyicqt_t); + +files_read_usr_files(pyicqt_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(pyicqt_t); + +# for RHEL5 +libs_use_ld_so(pyicqt_t) +libs_use_shared_libs(pyicqt_t) + +# needed for pyicq-t-mysql optional_policy(` - udev_read_db(jabberd_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(pyicqt_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_use_ldap(pyicqt_t) ') + +####################################### +# +# Local policy for jabberd domains +# + +allow jabberd_domain self:process signal_perms; +allow jabberd_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow jabberd_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow jabberd_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(jabberd_domain) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(jabberd_domain) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(jabberd_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(jabberd_domain) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(jabberd_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(jabberd_domain) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(jabberd_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(jabberd_domain) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(jabberd_domain) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(jabberd_domain) + +dev_read_urand(jabberd_domain) +dev_read_urand(jabberd_domain) +dev_read_sysfs(jabberd_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(jabberd_domain) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(jabberd_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(jabberd_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(jabberd_domain) + +sysnet_read_config(jabberd_domain) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/jetty.fc b/policy/modules/services/jetty.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1725b7e --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/jetty.fc @@ -0,0 +1,9 @@ + +/var/cache/jetty(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:jetty_cache_t,s0) + +/var/lib/jetty(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:jetty_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/jetty(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:jetty_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/jetty(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:jetty_var_run_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/jetty.if b/policy/modules/services/jetty.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9f09101 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/jetty.if @@ -0,0 +1,273 @@ + +## policy for jetty + +######################################## +## +## Search jetty cache directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_search_cache',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_cache_t; + ') + + allow $1 jetty_cache_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read jetty cache files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_read_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_cache_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + read_files_pattern($1, jetty_cache_t, jetty_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## jetty cache files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_manage_cache_files',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_cache_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, jetty_cache_t, jetty_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage jetty cache dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_manage_cache_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_cache_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, jetty_cache_t, jetty_cache_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read jetty's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, jetty_log_t, jetty_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to jetty log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, jetty_log_t, jetty_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage jetty log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, jetty_log_t, jetty_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, jetty_log_t, jetty_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, jetty_log_t, jetty_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search jetty lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 jetty_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read jetty lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, jetty_var_lib_t, jetty_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage jetty lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, jetty_var_lib_t, jetty_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage jetty lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, jetty_var_lib_t, jetty_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read jetty PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 jetty_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an jetty environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`jetty_admin',` + gen_require(` + type jetty_cache_t; + type jetty_log_t; + type jetty_var_lib_t; + type jetty_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + admin_pattern($1, jetty_cache_t) + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, jetty_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, jetty_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, jetty_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/jetty.te b/policy/modules/services/jetty.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..af510ea --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/jetty.te @@ -0,0 +1,25 @@ +policy_module(jetty, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type jetty_cache_t; +files_type(jetty_cache_t) + +type jetty_log_t; +logging_log_file(jetty_log_t) + +type jetty_var_lib_t; +files_type(jetty_var_lib_t) + +type jetty_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(jetty_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# jetty local policy +# + +# No local policy. This module just contains type definitions diff --git a/policy/modules/services/kerberos.fc b/policy/modules/services/kerberos.fc index 3525d24..36582cd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/kerberos.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/kerberos.fc @@ -8,7 +8,7 @@ HOME_DIR/\.k5login -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_home_t,s0) /etc/krb5kdc/kadm5\.keytab -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_keytab_t,s0) /etc/krb5kdc/principal.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5kdc_principal_t,s0) -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/kadmind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kerberos_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/kadmin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kerberos_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/kprop -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kerberos_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/krb524d -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kerberos_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/krb5kdc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:kerberos_initrc_exec_t,s0) @@ -30,4 +30,12 @@ HOME_DIR/\.k5login -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_home_t,s0) /var/log/krb5kdc\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5kdc_log_t,s0) /var/log/kadmin(d)?\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:kadmind_log_t,s0) +/var/cache/krb5rcache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0) + /var/tmp/host_0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0) +/var/tmp/HTTP_23 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0) +/var/tmp/HTTP_48 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0) +/var/tmp/nfs_0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0) +/var/tmp/ldapmap1_0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0) +/var/tmp/ldap_487 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0) +/var/tmp/ldap_55 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:krb5_host_rcache_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/kerberos.if b/policy/modules/services/kerberos.if index 604f67b..ea249fa 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/kerberos.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/kerberos.if @@ -26,9 +26,9 @@ ## Execute kadmind in the current domain ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`kerberos_exec_kadmind',` @@ -44,9 +44,9 @@ interface(`kerberos_exec_kadmind',` ## Execute a domain transition to run kpropd. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`kerberos_domtrans_kpropd',` @@ -69,8 +69,7 @@ interface(`kerberos_domtrans_kpropd',` # interface(`kerberos_use',` gen_require(` - type krb5_conf_t, krb5kdc_conf_t; - type krb5_host_rcache_t; + type krb5_conf_t, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5_host_rcache_t; ') files_search_etc($1) @@ -103,7 +102,8 @@ interface(`kerberos_use',` corenet_sendrecv_kerberos_client_packets($1) corenet_sendrecv_ocsp_client_packets($1) - allow $1 krb5_host_rcache_t:file getattr; + allow $1 krb5_host_rcache_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $1 krb5_host_rcache_t:file getattr_file_perms; ') optional_policy(` @@ -111,10 +111,6 @@ interface(`kerberos_use',` pcscd_stream_connect($1) ') ') - - optional_policy(` - sssd_read_public_files($1) - ') ') ######################################## @@ -218,6 +214,25 @@ interface(`kerberos_rw_keytab',` ######################################## ## +## Create keytab file in /etc +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kerberos_etc_filetrans_keytab',` + gen_require(` + type krb5_keytab_t; + ') + + allow $1 krb5_keytab_t:file manage_file_perms; + files_etc_filetrans($1, krb5_keytab_t, file, $2) +') + +######################################## +## ## Create a derived type for kerberos keytab ## ## @@ -235,7 +250,7 @@ template(`kerberos_keytab_template',` type $1_keytab_t; files_type($1_keytab_t) - allow $2 $1_keytab_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $2 $1_keytab_t:file read_file_perms; kerberos_read_keytab($2) kerberos_use($2) @@ -289,31 +304,18 @@ interface(`kerberos_manage_host_rcache',` seutil_read_file_contexts($1) - allow $1 krb5_host_rcache_t:file manage_file_perms; + files_rw_generic_tmp_dir($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, krb5_host_rcache_t, krb5_host_rcache_t) files_search_tmp($1) ') -') - -######################################## -## -## Connect to krb524 service -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`kerberos_connect_524',` - tunable_policy(`allow_kerberos',` - allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; - corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node($1) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_kerberos_master_port($1) - corenet_sendrecv_kerberos_master_client_packets($1) - ') + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "host_0") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "HTTP_23") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "HTTP_48") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "nfs_0") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "ldapmap1_0") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "ldap_487") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "ldap_55") ') ######################################## @@ -338,18 +340,22 @@ interface(`kerberos_admin',` type kadmind_t, krb5kdc_t, kerberos_initrc_exec_t; type kadmind_log_t, kadmind_tmp_t, kadmind_var_run_t; type krb5_conf_t, krb5_keytab_t, krb5kdc_conf_t; - type krb5kdc_principal_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t; + type krb5kdc_principal_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t, kpropd_t; type krb5kdc_var_run_t, krb5_host_rcache_t; - type kpropd_t; ') - allow $1 kadmind_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 kadmind_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, kadmind_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 kadmind_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 krb5kdc_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 kpropd_t:process ptrace; + ') - allow $1 krb5kdc_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 krb5kdc_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, krb5kdc_t) - allow $1 kpropd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 kpropd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, kpropd_t) init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, kerberos_initrc_exec_t) @@ -378,3 +384,113 @@ interface(`kerberos_admin',` admin_pattern($1, krb5kdc_var_run_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Type transition files created in /tmp +## to the krb5_host_rcache type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache',` + gen_require(` + type krb5_host_rcache_t; + ') + + files_tmp_filetrans($1, krb5_host_rcache_t, file, $2) +') + +######################################## +## +## read kerberos homedir content (.k5login) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kerberos_read_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type krb5_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, krb5_home_t, krb5_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## create kerberos content in the in the /root directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kerberos_filetrans_admin_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type krb5_home_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, krb5_home_t, file, ".k5login") +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to kerberos named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kerberos_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type krb5_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, krb5_home_t, file, ".k5login") +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to kerberos named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`kerberos_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type krb5_conf_t, krb5_keytab_t, krb5kdc_conf_t; + type krb5kdc_principal_t; + ') + + files_etc_filetrans($1, krb5_conf_t, file, "krb5.conf") + filetrans_pattern($1, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5_keytab_t, file, "kadm5.keytab") + filetrans_pattern($1, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_principal_t, file, "principal") + filetrans_pattern($1, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_principal_t, file, "principal0") + filetrans_pattern($1, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_principal_t, file, "principal1") + #filetrans_pattern($1, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_principal_t, file, "principal1") + + kerberos_etc_filetrans_keytab($1, "krb5.keytab") + kerberos_filetrans_admin_home_content($1) + + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "host_0") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "HTTP_23") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "HTTP_48") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "nfs_0") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "ldapmap1_0") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "ldap_487") + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache($1, "ldap_55") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/kerberos.te b/policy/modules/services/kerberos.te index 8edc29b..92dde2c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/kerberos.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/kerberos.te @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ policy_module(kerberos, 1.11.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow confined applications to run with kerberos. -##

    +##

    +## Allow confined applications to run with kerberos. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(allow_kerberos, false) @@ -35,12 +35,12 @@ init_daemon_domain(kpropd_t, kpropd_exec_t) domain_obj_id_change_exemption(kpropd_t) type krb5_conf_t; -files_type(krb5_conf_t) +files_config_file(krb5_conf_t) type krb5_home_t; userdom_user_home_content(krb5_home_t) -type krb5_host_rcache_t; +type krb5_host_rcache_t alias saslauthd_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(krb5_host_rcache_t) # types for general configuration files in /etc @@ -49,10 +49,10 @@ files_security_file(krb5_keytab_t) # types for KDC configs and principal file(s) type krb5kdc_conf_t; -files_type(krb5kdc_conf_t) +files_config_file(krb5kdc_conf_t) type krb5kdc_lock_t; -files_type(krb5kdc_lock_t) +files_lock_file(krb5kdc_lock_t) # types for KDC principal file(s) type krb5kdc_principal_t; @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ files_pid_file(krb5kdc_var_run_t) # Use capabilities. Surplus capabilities may be allowed. allow kadmind_t self:capability { setuid setgid chown fowner dac_override sys_nice }; dontaudit kadmind_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow kadmind_t self:process { setfscreate signal_perms }; +allow kadmind_t self:process { setfscreate setsched getsched signal_perms }; allow kadmind_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; allow kadmind_t self:unix_dgram_socket { connect create write }; allow kadmind_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms; @@ -93,9 +93,9 @@ allow kadmind_t krb5_conf_t:file read_file_perms; dontaudit kadmind_t krb5_conf_t:file write; read_files_pattern(kadmind_t, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_conf_t) -dontaudit kadmind_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file { write setattr }; +dontaudit kadmind_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file { write_file_perms setattr_file_perms }; -allow kadmind_t krb5kdc_lock_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr }; +allow kadmind_t krb5kdc_lock_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr_file_perms }; allow kadmind_t krb5kdc_principal_t:file manage_file_perms; filetrans_pattern(kadmind_t, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_principal_t, file) @@ -126,10 +126,13 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(kadmind_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(kadmind_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(kadmind_t) corenet_tcp_bind_kerberos_admin_port(kadmind_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_kerberos_password_port(kadmind_t) corenet_udp_bind_kerberos_admin_port(kadmind_t) +corenet_udp_bind_kerberos_password_port(kadmind_t) corenet_tcp_bind_reserved_port(kadmind_t) corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports(kadmind_t) corenet_sendrecv_kerberos_admin_server_packets(kadmind_t) +corenet_sendrecv_kerberos_password_server_packets(kadmind_t) dev_read_sysfs(kadmind_t) dev_read_rand(kadmind_t) @@ -149,17 +152,25 @@ selinux_validate_context(kadmind_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(kadmind_t) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(kadmind_t) miscfiles_read_localization(kadmind_t) seutil_read_file_contexts(kadmind_t) -sysnet_read_config(kadmind_t) sysnet_use_ldap(kadmind_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(kadmind_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(kadmind_t) optional_policy(` + ldap_stream_connect(kadmind_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dirsrv_stream_connect(kadmind_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nis_use_ypbind(kadmind_t) ') @@ -193,13 +204,12 @@ can_exec(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_exec_t) read_files_pattern(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_conf_t, krb5kdc_conf_t) dontaudit krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_conf_t:file write; -allow krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_lock_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr }; +allow krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_lock_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr_file_perms }; allow krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_log_t:file manage_file_perms; logging_log_filetrans(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_log_t, file) -allow krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_principal_t:file read_file_perms; -dontaudit krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_principal_t:file write; +allow krb5kdc_t krb5kdc_principal_t:file rw_file_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(krb5kdc_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t, krb5kdc_tmp_t) @@ -249,17 +259,25 @@ selinux_validate_context(krb5kdc_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(krb5kdc_t) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(krb5kdc_t) miscfiles_read_localization(krb5kdc_t) seutil_read_file_contexts(krb5kdc_t) -sysnet_read_config(krb5kdc_t) sysnet_use_ldap(krb5kdc_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(krb5kdc_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(krb5kdc_t) optional_policy(` + ldap_stream_connect(krb5kdc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dirsrv_stream_connect(krb5kdc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nis_use_ypbind(krb5kdc_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/kerneloops.if b/policy/modules/services/kerneloops.if index 835b16b..a0f9bc6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/kerneloops.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/kerneloops.if @@ -5,15 +5,14 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run kerneloops. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`kerneloops_domtrans',` gen_require(` - type kerneloops_t; - type kerneloops_exec_t; + type kerneloops_t, kerneloops_exec_t; ') domtrans_pattern($1, kerneloops_exec_t, kerneloops_t) @@ -99,17 +98,20 @@ interface(`kerneloops_manage_tmp_files',` # interface(`kerneloops_admin',` gen_require(` - type kerneloops_t, kerneloops_initrc_exec_t; - type kerneloops_tmp_t; + type kerneloops_t, kerneloops_initrc_exec_t, kerneloops_tmp_t; ') - allow $1 kerneloops_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 kerneloops_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, kerneloops_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 kerneloops_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, kerneloops_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 kerneloops_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + files_list_tmp($1) admin_pattern($1, kerneloops_tmp_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/keyboardd.fc b/policy/modules/services/keyboardd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..485aacc --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/keyboardd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ + +/usr/bin/system-setup-keyboard -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:keyboardd_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/keyboardd.if b/policy/modules/services/keyboardd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6134ef2 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/keyboardd.if @@ -0,0 +1,39 @@ + +## policy for system-setup-keyboard daemon + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run keyboard setup daemon. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`keyboardd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type keyboardd_t, keyboardd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, keyboardd_exec_t, keyboardd_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow attempts to read to +## keyboardd unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`keyboardd_read_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type keyboardd_t; + ') + + allow $1 keyboardd_t:fifo_file read_fifo_file_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/keyboardd.te b/policy/modules/services/keyboardd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..21e49e3 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/keyboardd.te @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ + +policy_module(keyboardd, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type keyboardd_t; +type keyboardd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(keyboardd_t, keyboardd_exec_t) + +######################################## +# +# keyboardd local policy +# + +allow keyboardd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow keyboardd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +files_manage_etc_runtime_files(keyboardd_t) +files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(keyboardd_t, file) + +files_read_etc_files(keyboardd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(keyboardd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/keystone.fc b/policy/modules/services/keystone.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..408d6c0 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/keystone.fc @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +/usr/bin/keystone-all -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:keystone_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-keystone.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:keystone_unit_file_t,s0) + +/var/lib/keystone(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:keystone_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/keystone(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:keystone_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/keystone.if b/policy/modules/services/keystone.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c7a5aeb --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/keystone.if @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ + +## policy for keystone + +######################################## +## +## Transition to keystone. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_t, keystone_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, keystone_exec_t, keystone_t) +') +######################################## +## +## Read keystone's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, keystone_log_t, keystone_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to keystone log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, keystone_log_t, keystone_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage keystone log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, keystone_log_t, keystone_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, keystone_log_t, keystone_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, keystone_log_t, keystone_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search keystone lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 keystone_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read keystone lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, keystone_var_lib_t, keystone_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage keystone lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, keystone_var_lib_t, keystone_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage keystone lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, keystone_var_lib_t, keystone_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute keystone server in the keystone domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_t; + type keystone_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + allow $1 keystone_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 keystone_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, keystone_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an keystone environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`keystone_admin',` + gen_require(` + type keystone_t; + type keystone_log_t; + type keystone_var_lib_t; + type keystone_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 keystone_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, keystone_t) + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, keystone_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, keystone_var_lib_t) + + keystone_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, keystone_unit_file_t) + allow $1 keystone_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/keystone.te b/policy/modules/services/keystone.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1b3d4d9 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/keystone.te @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +policy_module(keystone, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type keystone_t; +type keystone_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(keystone_t, keystone_exec_t) + +type keystone_log_t; +logging_log_file(keystone_log_t) + +type keystone_var_lib_t; +files_type(keystone_var_lib_t) + +type keystone_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(keystone_tmp_t) + +type keystone_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(keystone_unit_file_t) + +######################################## +# +# keystone local policy +# +allow keystone_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow keystone_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow keystone_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(keystone_t, keystone_log_t, keystone_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(keystone_t, keystone_log_t, keystone_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(keystone_t, keystone_log_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(keystone_t, keystone_tmp_t, keystone_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(keystone_t, keystone_tmp_t, keystone_tmp_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(keystone_t, keystone_tmp_t, keystone_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(keystone_t, keystone_tmp_t, { file dir lnk_file }) +can_exec(keystone_t, keystone_tmp_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(keystone_t, keystone_var_lib_t, keystone_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(keystone_t, keystone_var_lib_t, keystone_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(keystone_t, keystone_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(keystone_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(keystone_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(keystone_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_keystone_port(keystone_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(keystone_t) + +dev_read_urand(keystone_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(keystone_t) + +files_read_etc_files(keystone_t) +files_read_usr_files(keystone_t) + +auth_use_pam(keystone_t) + +libs_exec_ldconfig(keystone_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(keystone_t) + +optional_policy(` + mysql_stream_connect(keystone_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.fc b/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.fc index 9c0c835..8360166 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.fc @@ -3,3 +3,5 @@ /usr/sbin/ksmtuned -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ksmtuned_exec_t,s0) /var/run/ksmtune\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ksmtuned_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/log/ksmtuned.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:ksmtuned_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.if b/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.if index 6fd0b4c..5024e1e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run ksmtuned. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`ksmtuned_domtrans',` @@ -55,12 +55,14 @@ interface(`ksmtuned_initrc_domtrans',` # interface(`ksmtuned_admin',` gen_require(` - type ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_var_run_t; - type ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t; + type ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_var_run_t, ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 ksmtuned_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; - ps_process_pattern(ksmtumed_t) + allow $1 ksmtuned_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, ksmtuned_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ksmtuned_t:process ptrace; + ') files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, ksmtuned_var_run_t) @@ -70,5 +72,4 @@ interface(`ksmtuned_admin',` domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.te b/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.te index a73b7a1..d845f46 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ksmtuned.te @@ -9,6 +9,9 @@ type ksmtuned_t; type ksmtuned_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_exec_t) +type ksmtuned_log_t; +logging_log_file(ksmtuned_log_t) + type ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(ksmtuned_initrc_exec_t) @@ -20,9 +23,13 @@ files_pid_file(ksmtuned_var_run_t) # ksmtuned local policy # -allow ksmtuned_t self:capability { sys_ptrace sys_tty_config }; +allow ksmtuned_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow ksmtuned_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_log_t, ksmtuned_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_log_t, ksmtuned_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_log_t, { file dir }) + manage_files_pattern(ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_var_run_t, ksmtuned_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(ksmtuned_t, ksmtuned_var_run_t, file) @@ -31,9 +38,19 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ksmtuned_t) dev_rw_sysfs(ksmtuned_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(ksmtuned_t) +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(ksmtuned_t) corecmd_exec_bin(ksmtuned_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(ksmtuned_t) files_read_etc_files(ksmtuned_t) +mls_file_read_to_clearance(ksmtuned_t) + +term_use_all_inherited_terms(ksmtuned_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(ksmtuned_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(ksmtuned_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(ksmtuned_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ktalk.te b/policy/modules/services/ktalk.te index ca5cfdf..554ad30 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ktalk.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ktalk.te @@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(ktalkd_t) files_read_etc_files(ktalkd_t) term_search_ptys(ktalkd_t) -term_use_all_terms(ktalkd_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(ktalkd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(ktalkd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/l2tpd.fc b/policy/modules/services/l2tpd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6b27066 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/l2tpd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,18 @@ +/etc/prol2tp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tp_etc_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openl2tpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/prol2tpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/xl2tpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/sysconfig/prol2tpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tp_etc_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/openl2tpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/prol2tpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/xl2tpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/openl2tpd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/prol2tpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/prol2tpd\.ctl -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/prol2tpd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/xl2tpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/xl2tpd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:l2tpd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/l2tpd.if b/policy/modules/services/l2tpd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8bc2c6d --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/l2tpd.if @@ -0,0 +1,178 @@ +## Layer 2 Tunneling Protocol daemons. + +######################################## +## +## Transition to l2tpd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`l2tpd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type l2tpd_t, l2tpd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, l2tpd_exec_t, l2tpd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute l2tpd server in the l2tpd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`l2tpd_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type l2tpd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, l2tpd_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send to l2tpd via a unix dgram socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`l2tpd_dgram_send',` + gen_require(` + type l2tpd_t, l2tpd_tmp_t, l2tpd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + dgram_send_pattern($1, { l2tpd_tmp_t l2tpd_var_run_t }, { l2tpd_tmp_t l2tpd_var_run_t }, l2tpd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write l2tpd sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`l2tpd_rw_socket',` + gen_require(` + type l2tpd_t; + ') + + allow $1 l2tpd_t:socket rw_socket_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read l2tpd PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`l2tpd_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type l2tpd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 l2tpd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +##################################### +## +## Connect to l2tpd over a unix domain +## stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`l2tpd_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type l2tpd_t, l2tpd_var_run_t, l2tpd_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, l2tpd_tmp_t, l2tpd_tmp_t, l2tpd_t) + stream_connect_pattern($1, l2tpd_var_run_t, l2tpd_var_run_t, l2tpd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write l2tpd unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`l2tpd_rw_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type l2tpd_t; + ') + + allow $1 l2tpd_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an l2tpd environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`l2tpd_admin',` + gen_require(` + type l2tpd_t, l2tpd_initrc_exec_t. l2tpd_var_run_t; + type l2tp_etc_t, l2tpd_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 l2tpd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, l2tpd_t) + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 l2tpd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + l2tpd_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 l2tpd_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_search_etc($1) + admin_pattern($1, l2tp_etc_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, l2tpd_var_run_t) + + files_search_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, l2tpd_tmp_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/l2tpd.te b/policy/modules/services/l2tpd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4786fde --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/l2tpd.te @@ -0,0 +1,99 @@ +policy_module(l2tpd, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type l2tpd_t; +type l2tpd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(l2tpd_t, l2tpd_exec_t) + +type l2tpd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(l2tpd_initrc_exec_t) + +type l2tp_etc_t; +files_config_file(l2tp_etc_t) + +type l2tpd_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(l2tpd_tmp_t) + +type l2tpd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(l2tpd_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# Local policy +# + +allow l2tpd_t self:capability { net_admin net_bind_service }; +allow l2tpd_t self:process signal; +allow l2tpd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow l2tpd_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; +allow l2tpd_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; +allow l2tpd_t self:socket create_socket_perms; +allow l2tpd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow l2tpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +allow l2tpd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +read_files_pattern(l2tpd_t, l2tp_etc_t, l2tp_etc_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(l2tpd_t, l2tpd_var_run_t, l2tpd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(l2tpd_t, l2tpd_var_run_t, l2tpd_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(l2tpd_t, l2tpd_var_run_t, l2tpd_var_run_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(l2tpd_t, l2tpd_var_run_t, l2tpd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(l2tpd_t, l2tpd_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file fifo_file }) + +manage_sock_files_pattern(l2tpd_t, l2tpd_tmp_t, l2tpd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(l2tpd_t, l2tpd_tmp_t, sock_file) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(l2tpd_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(l2tpd_t) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(l2tpd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(l2tpd_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(l2tpd_t) +corenet_raw_bind_generic_node(l2tpd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(l2tpd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(l2tpd_t) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(l2tpd_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(l2tpd_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(l2tpd_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_all_rpc_ports(l2tpd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_all_rpc_ports(l2tpd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_port(l2tpd_t) + +corenet_udp_bind_l2tp_port(l2tpd_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_l2tp_port(l2tpd_t) +corenet_sendrecv_l2tp_server_packets(l2tpd_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(l2tpd_t) +kernel_read_network_state(l2tpd_t) +# net-pf-24 (pppox) +kernel_request_load_module(l2tpd_t) + +term_use_ptmx(l2tpd_t) +term_use_generic_ptys(l2tpd_t) + +# prol2tpc +corecmd_exec_bin(l2tpd_t) + +dev_read_urand(l2tpd_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(l2tpd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(l2tpd_t) + +term_use_ptmx(l2tpd_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(l2tpd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(l2tpd_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(l2tpd_t) + +optional_policy(` + ppp_domtrans(l2tpd_t) + ppp_signal(l2tpd_t) + ppp_kill(l2tpd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ldap.fc b/policy/modules/services/ldap.fc index c62f23e..8b1a1dd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ldap.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/ldap.fc @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /etc/ldap/slapd\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_etc_t,s0) -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ldap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/openldap/slapd\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_db_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/slapd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/slapd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_unit_file_t,s0) /usr/sbin/slapd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_exec_t,s0) @@ -15,3 +19,4 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',` /var/run/openldap(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/slapd\.args -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/slapd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_var_run_t,s0) +#/var/run/slapd.* -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:slapd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ldap.if b/policy/modules/services/ldap.if index 3aa8fa7..27cb806 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ldap.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ldap.if @@ -1,5 +1,64 @@ ## OpenLDAP directory server +####################################### +## +## Execute OpenLDAP in the ldap domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ldap_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type slapd_t, slapd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, slapd_exec_t, slapd_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute OpenLDAP server in the ldap domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ldap_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type slapd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, slapd_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute slapd server in the slapd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`ldap_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type slapd_unit_file_t; + type slapd_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 slapd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 slapd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, slapd_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Read the contents of the OpenLDAP @@ -21,6 +80,25 @@ interface(`ldap_list_db',` ######################################## ## +## Read the contents of the OpenLDAP +## database files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ldap_read_db_files',` + gen_require(` + type slapd_db_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, slapd_db_t, slapd_db_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read the OpenLDAP configuration files. ## ## @@ -55,7 +133,7 @@ interface(`ldap_use',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to slapd over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to slapd over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -69,8 +147,7 @@ interface(`ldap_stream_connect',` ') files_search_pids($1) - allow $1 slapd_var_run_t:sock_file write; - allow $1 slapd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + stream_connect_pattern($1, slapd_var_run_t, slapd_var_run_t, slapd_t) ') ######################################## @@ -95,10 +172,14 @@ interface(`ldap_admin',` type slapd_t, slapd_tmp_t, slapd_replog_t; type slapd_lock_t, slapd_etc_t, slapd_var_run_t; type slapd_initrc_exec_t; + type ldap_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 slapd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 slapd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, slapd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 slapd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, slapd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -110,6 +191,7 @@ interface(`ldap_admin',` admin_pattern($1, slapd_lock_t) + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, slapd_replog_t) files_list_tmp($1) @@ -117,4 +199,8 @@ interface(`ldap_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, slapd_var_run_t) + + ldap_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, ldap_unit_file_t) + allow $1 ldap_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ldap.te b/policy/modules/services/ldap.te index 64fd1ff..0f5d0b7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ldap.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ldap.te @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ type slapd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(slapd_t, slapd_exec_t) type slapd_cert_t; -files_type(slapd_cert_t) +miscfiles_cert_type(slapd_cert_t) type slapd_db_t; files_type(slapd_db_t) @@ -21,15 +21,24 @@ files_config_file(slapd_etc_t) type slapd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(slapd_initrc_exec_t) +type slapd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(slapd_unit_file_t) + type slapd_lock_t; files_lock_file(slapd_lock_t) type slapd_replog_t; files_type(slapd_replog_t) +type slapd_log_t; +logging_log_file(slapd_log_t) + type slapd_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(slapd_tmp_t) +type slapd_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(slapd_tmpfs_t) + type slapd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(slapd_var_run_t) @@ -67,13 +76,21 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_replog_t, slapd_replog_t) manage_files_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_replog_t, slapd_replog_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_replog_t, slapd_replog_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_log_t, slapd_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_log_t, slapd_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(slapd_t, slapd_log_t, { file dir }) + manage_dirs_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_tmp_t, slapd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_tmp_t, slapd_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(slapd_t, slapd_tmp_t, { file dir }) +manage_files_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_tmpfs_t, slapd_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(slapd_t, slapd_tmpfs_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_var_run_t, slapd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_var_run_t, slapd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(slapd_t, slapd_var_run_t, slapd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(slapd_t, slapd_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(slapd_t, slapd_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) kernel_read_system_state(slapd_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(slapd_t) @@ -106,6 +123,7 @@ files_read_usr_files(slapd_t) files_list_var_lib(slapd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(slapd_t) +auth_rw_cache(slapd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(slapd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/likewise.fc b/policy/modules/services/likewise.fc index 057a4e4..57491fc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/likewise.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/likewise.fc @@ -20,7 +20,8 @@ /usr/sbin/netlogond -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:netlogond_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/srvsvcd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:srvsvcd_exec_t,s0) -/var/lib/likewise-open(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:likewise_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/likewise-open(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:likewise_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/likewise(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:likewise_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/likewise-open/\.lsassd -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:lsassd_var_socket_t,s0) /var/lib/likewise-open/\.lwiod -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:lwiod_var_socket_t,s0) /var/lib/likewise-open/\.regsd -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:lwregd_var_socket_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/likewise.if b/policy/modules/services/likewise.if index 771e04b..81d98b3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/likewise.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/likewise.if @@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ template(`likewise_domain_template',` allow $1_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow $1_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; - allow $1_t likewise_var_lib_t:dir setattr; + allow $1_t likewise_var_lib_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_run_t, file) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/likewise.te b/policy/modules/services/likewise.te index 5037e06..18dc6e5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/likewise.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/likewise.te @@ -17,7 +17,7 @@ type likewise_var_lib_t; files_type(likewise_var_lib_t) type likewise_pstore_lock_t; -files_type(likewise_pstore_lock_t) +files_lock_file(likewise_pstore_lock_t) type likewise_krb5_ad_t; files_type(likewise_krb5_ad_t) @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ stream_connect_pattern(lwsmd_t, likewise_var_lib_t, lwregd_var_socket_t, lwregd_ # Likewise DC location service local policy # -allow netlogond_t self:capability {dac_override}; +allow netlogond_t self:capability dac_override; manage_files_pattern(netlogond_t, likewise_etc_t, likewise_etc_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/lircd.fc b/policy/modules/services/lircd.fc index 49e04e5..69db026 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/lircd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/lircd.fc @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lirc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lircd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/lircd\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lircd_etc_t,s0) +/etc/lirc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lircd_etc_t,s0) /usr/sbin/lircd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lircd_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/lircd.if b/policy/modules/services/lircd.if index 418cc81..cdb2561 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/lircd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/lircd.if @@ -80,8 +80,11 @@ interface(`lircd_admin',` type lircd_initrc_exec_t, lircd_etc_t; ') - allow $1 lircd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 lircd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, lircd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 lircd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, lircd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/lircd.te b/policy/modules/services/lircd.te index 6a78de1..8db7d14 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/lircd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/lircd.te @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type lircd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(lircd_initrc_exec_t) type lircd_etc_t; -files_type(lircd_etc_t) +files_config_file(lircd_etc_t) type lircd_var_run_t alias lircd_sock_t; files_pid_file(lircd_var_run_t) @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ files_pid_file(lircd_var_run_t) # allow lircd_t self:capability { chown kill sys_admin }; +allow lircd_t self:process signal; allow lircd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow lircd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow lircd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -44,18 +45,20 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_lirc_port(lircd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(lircd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_lirc_port(lircd_t) -dev_read_generic_usb_dev(lircd_t) +dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(lircd_t) # this needs to be reproduced. might not be right dev_read_mouse(lircd_t) dev_filetrans_lirc(lircd_t) dev_rw_lirc(lircd_t) dev_rw_input_dev(lircd_t) +dev_read_sysfs(lircd_t) -files_read_etc_files(lircd_t) +files_read_config_files(lircd_t) files_list_var(lircd_t) files_manage_generic_locks(lircd_t) files_read_all_locks(lircd_t) term_use_ptmx(lircd_t) +term_use_usb_ttys(lircd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(lircd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/lldpad.fc b/policy/modules/services/lldpad.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..83a4348 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/lldpad.fc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/lldpad -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lldpad_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/lldpad -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lldpad_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/lldpad(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lldpad_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/run/lldpad\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lldpad_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/lldpad.if b/policy/modules/services/lldpad.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6550968 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/lldpad.if @@ -0,0 +1,201 @@ + +## policy for lldpad + +######################################## +## +## Transition to lldpad. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`lldpad_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type lldpad_t, lldpad_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, lldpad_exec_t, lldpad_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute lldpad server in the lldpad domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lldpad_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type lldpad_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, lldpad_initrc_exec_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Search lldpad lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lldpad_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type lldpad_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 lldpad_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read lldpad lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lldpad_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type lldpad_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, lldpad_var_lib_t, lldpad_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage lldpad lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lldpad_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type lldpad_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, lldpad_var_lib_t, lldpad_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage lldpad lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lldpad_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type lldpad_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, lldpad_var_lib_t, lldpad_var_lib_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read lldpad PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lldpad_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type lldpad_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 lldpad_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +##################################### +## +## Send to a lldpad unix dgram socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lldpad_dgram_send',` + gen_require(` + type lldpad_t; + ') + + allow $1 lldpad_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; + allow lldpad_t $1:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an lldpad environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`lldpad_admin',` + gen_require(` + type lldpad_t; + type lldpad_initrc_exec_t; + type lldpad_var_lib_t; + type lldpad_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 lldpad_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, lldpad_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 lldpad_t:process ptrace; + ') + + lldpad_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 lldpad_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, lldpad_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, lldpad_var_run_t) + +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/lldpad.te b/policy/modules/services/lldpad.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b7f4268 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/lldpad.te @@ -0,0 +1,72 @@ +policy_module(lldpad, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type lldpad_t; +type lldpad_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(lldpad_t, lldpad_exec_t) + +type lldpad_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(lldpad_initrc_exec_t) + +type lldpad_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(lldpad_tmpfs_t) + +type lldpad_var_lib_t; +files_type(lldpad_var_lib_t) + +type lldpad_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(lldpad_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# lldpad local policy +# + +allow lldpad_t self:capability { net_admin net_raw }; +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + # caused by some bogus kernel code + dontaudit lldpad_t self:capability sys_module; +') + +allow lldpad_t self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow lldpad_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +allow lldpad_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow lldpad_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; +allow lldpad_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; +allow lldpad_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(lldpad_t,lldpad_tmpfs_t,lldpad_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(lldpad_t,lldpad_tmpfs_t,file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(lldpad_t, lldpad_var_lib_t, lldpad_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(lldpad_t, lldpad_var_lib_t, lldpad_var_lib_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(lldpad_t, lldpad_var_run_t, lldpad_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(lldpad_t, lldpad_var_run_t, lldpad_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(lldpad_t, lldpad_var_run_t, lldpad_var_run_t) +# this needs to be fixed in lldpad package +# bug: # +files_pid_filetrans(lldpad_t, lldpad_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) + +kernel_read_all_sysctls(lldpad_t) +kernel_read_network_state(lldpad_t) +kernel_request_load_module(lldpad_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(lldpad_t) + +files_read_etc_files(lldpad_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(lldpad_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(lldpad_t) + +userdom_dgram_send(lldpad_t) + +optional_policy(` + fcoemon_dgram_send(lldpad_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/lpd.fc b/policy/modules/services/lpd.fc index 5c9eb68..ca4fd2b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/lpd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/lpd.fc @@ -35,3 +35,4 @@ /var/spool/cups-pdf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:print_spool_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/spool/lpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:print_spool_t,s0) /var/run/lprng(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lpd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/spool/turboprint(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lpd_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/lpd.if b/policy/modules/services/lpd.if index a4f32f5..628b63c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/lpd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/lpd.if @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ## User domain for the role ## ## +## # interface(`lpd_role',` gen_require(` @@ -27,7 +28,10 @@ interface(`lpd_role',` dontaudit lpr_t $2:unix_stream_socket { read write }; ps_process_pattern($2, lpr_t) - allow $2 lpr_t:process signull; + allow $2 lpr_t:process signal_perms; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 lpr_t:process ptrace; + ') optional_policy(` cups_read_config($2) @@ -153,7 +157,7 @@ interface(`lpd_relabel_spool',` ') files_search_spool($1) - allow $1 print_spool_t:file { relabelto relabelfrom }; + allow $1 print_spool_t:file relabel_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -186,7 +190,7 @@ interface(`lpd_read_config',` ## ## # -template(`lpd_domtrans_lpr',` +interface(`lpd_domtrans_lpr',` gen_require(` type lpr_t, lpr_exec_t; ') @@ -196,6 +200,32 @@ template(`lpd_domtrans_lpr',` ######################################## ## +## Execute lpr in the lpr domain, and +## allow the specified role the lpr domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`lpd_run_lpr',` + gen_require(` + type lpr_t; + ') + + lpd_domtrans_lpr($1) + role $2 types lpr_t; +') + +######################################## +## ## Allow the specified domain to execute lpr ## in the caller domain. ## diff --git a/policy/modules/services/lpd.te b/policy/modules/services/lpd.te index 93c14ca..d3d5067 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/lpd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/lpd.te @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ policy_module(lpd, 1.12.0) # ## -##

    -## Use lpd server instead of cups -##

    +##

    +## Use lpd server instead of cups +##

    ##     gen_tunable(use_lpd_server, false) @@ -47,14 +47,14 @@ ubac_constrained(lpr_tmp_t) type print_spool_t; typealias print_spool_t alias { user_print_spool_t staff_print_spool_t sysadm_print_spool_t }; typealias print_spool_t alias { auditadm_print_spool_t secadm_print_spool_t }; -files_type(print_spool_t) +files_spool_file(print_spool_t) ubac_constrained(print_spool_t) type printer_t; files_type(printer_t) type printconf_t; -files_type(printconf_t) +files_config_file(printconf_t) ######################################## # @@ -80,7 +80,7 @@ rw_files_pattern(checkpc_t, print_spool_t, print_spool_t) delete_files_pattern(checkpc_t, print_spool_t, print_spool_t) files_search_spool(checkpc_t) -allow checkpc_t printconf_t:file getattr; +allow checkpc_t printconf_t:file getattr_file_perms; allow checkpc_t printconf_t:dir list_dir_perms; kernel_read_system_state(checkpc_t) @@ -113,7 +113,7 @@ init_use_fds(checkpc_t) sysnet_read_config(checkpc_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(checkpc_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(checkpc_t) optional_policy(` cron_system_entry(checkpc_t, checkpc_exec_t) @@ -145,9 +145,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(lpd_t, lpd_tmp_t, lpd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(lpd_t, lpd_tmp_t, lpd_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(lpd_t, lpd_tmp_t, { file dir }) +manage_dirs_pattern(lpd_t, lpd_var_run_t, lpd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(lpd_t, lpd_var_run_t, lpd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(lpd_t, lpd_var_run_t, lpd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(lpd_t, lpd_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(lpd_t, lpd_var_run_t, { dir file }) # Write to /var/spool/lpd. manage_files_pattern(lpd_t, print_spool_t, print_spool_t) @@ -277,19 +278,19 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(lpr_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks(lpr_t) # Write to the user domain tty. -userdom_use_user_terminals(lpr_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(lpr_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(lpr_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_files(lpr_t) tunable_policy(`use_lpd_server',` # lpr can run in lightweight mode, without a local print spooler. - allow lpr_t lpd_var_run_t:dir search; - allow lpr_t lpd_var_run_t:sock_file write; + allow lpr_t lpd_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow lpr_t lpd_var_run_t:sock_file write_sock_file_perms; files_read_var_files(lpr_t) # Connect to lpd via a Unix domain socket. - allow lpr_t printer_t:sock_file rw_sock_file_perms; - allow lpr_t lpd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow lpr_t printer_t:sock_file read_sock_file_perms; + stream_connect_pattern(lpr_t, printer_t, printer_t, lpd_t) # Send SIGHUP to lpd. allow lpr_t lpd_t:process signal; @@ -307,17 +308,7 @@ tunable_policy(`use_lpd_server',` read_lnk_files_pattern(lpr_t, printconf_t, printconf_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_list_auto_mountpoints(lpr_t) - fs_read_nfs_files(lpr_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(lpr_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_list_auto_mountpoints(lpr_t) - fs_read_cifs_files(lpr_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(lpr_t) -') +userdom_home_reader(lpr_t) optional_policy(` cups_read_config(lpr_t) @@ -326,5 +317,13 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_stream_connect_gkeyringd(lpr_t) +') + +optional_policy(` logging_send_syslog_msg(lpr_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + mozilla_plugin_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files(lpr_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mailman.fc b/policy/modules/services/mailman.fc index 14ad189..c7daa85 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mailman.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/mailman.fc @@ -1,11 +1,14 @@ -/usr/lib(64)?/mailman/bin/mailmanctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_mail_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib/mailman/cron/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_queue_exec_t,s0) -/var/lib/mailman(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_data_t,s0) -/var/lib/mailman/archives(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_archive_t,s0) -/var/lock/mailman(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_lock_t,s0) -/var/log/mailman(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_log_t,s0) -/var/run/mailman(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_lock_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mailmanctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_mail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/mm-handler.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_mail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mailman.*/cron/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_queue_exec_t,s0) +/usr/share/doc/mailman.*/mm-handler.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_mail_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/mailman.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_data_t,s0) +/var/lib/mailman.*/archives(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_archive_t,s0) +/var/lock/mailman.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_lock_t,s0) +/var/log/mailman.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_log_t,s0) +/var/run/mailman.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_var_run_t,s0) # # distro_debian @@ -23,12 +26,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian', ` # distro_redhat # ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` -/etc/mailman(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_data_t,s0) +/etc/mailman.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_data_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/mailman/bin/qrunner -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_queue_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/mailman/cgi-bin/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_cgi_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/mailman/mail/mailman -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_mail_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/mailman/scripts/mailman -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_mail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mailman.*/bin/qrunner -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_queue_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mailman.*/cgi-bin/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_cgi_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mailman.*/mail/mailman -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_mail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mailman.*/scripts/mailman -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_mail_exec_t,s0) -/var/spool/mailman(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_data_t,s0) +/var/spool/mailman.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:mailman_data_t,s0) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mailman.if b/policy/modules/services/mailman.if index 67c7fdd..d7338be 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mailman.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/mailman.if @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ ## ## # -template(`mailman_domain_template', ` +template(`mailman_domain_template',` type mailman_$1_t; domain_type(mailman_$1_t) role system_r types mailman_$1_t; @@ -74,7 +74,7 @@ template(`mailman_domain_template', ` corecmd_exec_all_executables(mailman_$1_t) files_exec_etc_files(mailman_$1_t) - files_list_usr(mailman_$1_t) + files_read_usr_files(mailman_$1_t) files_list_var(mailman_$1_t) files_list_var_lib(mailman_$1_t) files_read_var_lib_symlinks(mailman_$1_t) @@ -108,6 +108,31 @@ interface(`mailman_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, mailman_mail_exec_t, mailman_mail_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Execute the mailman program in the mailman domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## The role to allow the mailman domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`mailman_run',` + gen_require(` + type mailman_mail_t; + ') + + mailman_domtrans($1) + role $2 types mailman_mail_t; +') + ####################################### ## ## Execute mailman CGI scripts in the diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mailman.te b/policy/modules/services/mailman.te index af4d572..0c0925e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mailman.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/mailman.te @@ -19,6 +19,9 @@ logging_log_file(mailman_log_t) type mailman_lock_t; files_lock_file(mailman_lock_t) +type mailman_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(mailman_var_run_t) + mailman_domain_template(mail) init_daemon_domain(mailman_mail_t, mailman_mail_exec_t) @@ -61,14 +64,24 @@ optional_policy(` # Mailman mail local policy # -allow mailman_mail_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; -allow mailman_mail_t self:process { signal signull }; allow mailman_mail_t self:capability { kill dac_override setuid setgid sys_tty_config }; +allow mailman_mail_t self:process { signal signull }; +allow mailman_mail_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(mailman_mail_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t) manage_files_pattern(mailman_mail_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(mailman_mail_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t) +manage_files_pattern(mailman_mail_t, mailman_var_run_t, mailman_var_run_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(mailman_mail_t, mailman_var_run_t, mailman_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(mailman_mail_t, mailman_var_run_t, { file dir }) + +# make NNTP gateway working +corenet_tcp_connect_innd_port(mailman_mail_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_spamd_port(mailman_mail_t) + +dev_read_urand(mailman_mail_t) + files_search_spool(mailman_mail_t) fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(mailman_mail_t) @@ -81,11 +94,16 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(mailman_mail_t) +') + +optional_policy(` cron_read_pipes(mailman_mail_t) ') optional_policy(` postfix_search_spool(mailman_mail_t) + postfix_rw_master_pipes(mailman_mail_t) ') ######################################## @@ -104,6 +122,8 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(mailman_queue_t, mailman_archive_t, mailman_archive_t) kernel_read_proc_symlinks(mailman_queue_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_innd_port(mailman_queue_t) + auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(mailman_queue_t) files_dontaudit_search_pids(mailman_queue_t) @@ -125,4 +145,4 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` su_exec(mailman_queue_t) -') \ No newline at end of file +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mailscanner.fc b/policy/modules/services/mailscanner.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..827e22e --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/mailscanner.fc @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/etc/MailScanner(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mscan_etc_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/MailScanner -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mscan_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/sysconfig/MailScanner -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mscan_etc_t,s0) + +/etc/sysconfig/update_spamassassin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mscan_etc_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/MailScanner -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mscan_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/MailScanner\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mscan_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mailscanner.if b/policy/modules/services/mailscanner.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bd1d48e --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/mailscanner.if @@ -0,0 +1,61 @@ +## E-mail security and anti-spam package for e-mail gateway systems. + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run +## MailScanner. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`mailscanner_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type mscan_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, mscan_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an mailscanner environment. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`mailscanner_admin',` + gen_require(` + type mscan_t, mscan_var_run_t, mscan_etc_t; + type mscan_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + mailscanner_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 mscan_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + allow $1 mscan_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, mscan_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 mscan_t:process ptrace; + ') + + admin_pattern($1, mscan_etc_t) + files_list_etc($1) + + admin_pattern($1, mscan_var_run_t) + files_list_pids($1) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mailscanner.te b/policy/modules/services/mailscanner.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5b84980 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/mailscanner.te @@ -0,0 +1,87 @@ +policy_module(mailscanner, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type mscan_t; +type mscan_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(mscan_t, mscan_exec_t) + +type mscan_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(mscan_initrc_exec_t) + +type mscan_etc_t; +files_config_file(mscan_etc_t) + +type mscan_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(mscan_tmp_t) + +type mscan_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(mscan_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# Local policy +# + +allow mscan_t self:capability { setuid chown setgid dac_override }; +allow mscan_t self:process signal; +allow mscan_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +read_files_pattern(mscan_t, mscan_etc_t, mscan_etc_t) + +manage_files_pattern(mscan_t, mscan_var_run_t, mscan_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(mscan_t, mscan_var_run_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mscan_t, mscan_tmp_t, mscan_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(mscan_t, mscan_tmp_t, mscan_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(mscan_t, mscan_tmp_t, dir) + +can_exec(mscan_t, mscan_exec_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(mscan_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(mscan_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(mscan_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_fprot_port(mscan_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_fprot_port(mscan_t) +corenet_sendrecv_fprot_client_packets(mscan_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(mscan_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_port(mscan_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(mscan_t) +corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets(mscan_t) + +dev_read_urand(mscan_t) + +files_read_usr_files(mscan_t) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(mscan_t) + +auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(mscan_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(mscan_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(mscan_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(mscan_t) + +optional_policy(` + clamav_domtrans_clamscan(mscan_t) + clamav_manage_clamd_pid(mscan_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mta_send_mail(mscan_t) + mta_manage_queue(mscan_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + procmail_domtrans(mscan_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + spamassassin_read_home_client(mscan_t) + spamassassin_read_lib_files(mscan_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/matahari.fc b/policy/modules/services/matahari.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..515def0 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/matahari.fc @@ -0,0 +1,37 @@ +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-host -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-net -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/matahari-sysconfig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init.d/matahari-sysconfig-console -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-host.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_hostd_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-network.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_netd_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-rpc.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_rpcd_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-service.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_serviced_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/matahari-sysconfig-console.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t,s0) + + +/usr/sbin/matahari-hostd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_hostd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-hostd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_hostd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-hostd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_hostd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-sysconfigd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-sysconfigd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-sysconfig-consoled -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_sysconfigd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/matahari-netd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_netd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-networkd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_netd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-networkd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_netd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-rpcd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_rpcd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/matahari-serviced -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_serviced_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/matahari-dbus-serviced -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_serviced_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/matahari-qmf-serviced -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_serviced_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/matahari(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/run/matahari(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/matahari\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/matahari-broker\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:matahari_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/matahari.if b/policy/modules/services/matahari.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1ec1c97 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/matahari.if @@ -0,0 +1,291 @@ +## policy for matahari + +###################################### +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## matahari init daemon domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`matahari_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + attribute matahari_domain; + ') + + ############################## + # + # Declarations + # + + type matahari_$1_t, matahari_domain; + type matahari_$1_exec_t; + init_daemon_domain(matahari_$1_t, matahari_$1_exec_t) + + type matahari_$1_unit_file_t; + systemd_unit_file(matahari_$1_unit_file_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search matahari lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 matahari_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read matahari lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, matahari_var_lib_t, matahari_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## matahari lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, matahari_var_lib_t, matahari_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage matahari lib dirs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, matahari_var_lib_t, matahari_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read matahari PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 matahari_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read matahari PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_manage_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, matahari_var_run_t, matahari_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run matahari_hostd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_hostd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_hostd_t, matahari_hostd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, matahari_hostd_exec_t, matahari_hostd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run matahari_netd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_netd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_netd_t, matahari_netd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, matahari_netd_exec_t, matahari_netd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run matahari_serviced. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_serviced_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_serviced_t, matahari_serviced_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, matahari_serviced_exec_t, matahari_serviced_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute matahari services in the matahari domains. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_hostd_t; + type matahari_netd_t; + type matahari_serviced_t; + type matahari_sysconfigd_t; + type matahari_hostd_unit_file_t; + type matahari_netd_unit_file_t; + type matahari_serviced_unit_file_t; + type matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t; + attribute matahari_domain; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + + allow $1 matahari_hostd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 matahari_netd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 matahari_serviced_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + + allow $1 matahari_hostd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + allow $1 matahari_netd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + allow $1 matahari_serviced_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + allow $1 matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, matahari_domain) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an matahari environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`matahari_admin',` + gen_require(` + type matahari_initrc_exec_t, matahari_hostd_t; + type matahari_netd_t, matahari_serviced_t, matahari_sysconfigd_t; + type matahari_var_lib_t, matahari_var_run_t; + attribute matahari_domain; + type matahari_hostd_unit_file_t; + type matahari_netd_unit_file_t; + type matahari_serviced_unit_file_t; + type matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, matahari_initrc_exec_t) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 matahari_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + allow $1 matahari_domain:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, matahari_domain) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, matahari_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, matahari_var_run_t) + + matahari_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, matahari_hostd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 matahari_hostd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + admin_pattern($1, matahari_netd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 matahari_netd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + admin_pattern($1, matahari_serviced_unit_file_t) + allow $1 matahari_serviced_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + admin_pattern($1, matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 matahari_sysconfigd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/matahari.te b/policy/modules/services/matahari.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d1ba3e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/matahari.te @@ -0,0 +1,108 @@ +policy_module(matahari,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +attribute matahari_domain; + +matahari_domain_template(hostd) +matahari_domain_template(netd) +matahari_domain_template(rpcd) +matahari_domain_template(serviced) +matahari_domain_template(sysconfigd) + +type matahari_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(matahari_initrc_exec_t) + +type matahari_var_lib_t; +files_type(matahari_var_lib_t) + +type matahari_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(matahari_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# matahari_hostd local policy +# + +dev_read_sysfs(matahari_hostd_t) +dev_rw_mtrr(matahari_hostd_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(matahari_hostd_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(matahari_hostd_t) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(matahari_hostd_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# matahari_netd local policy +# + +domain_use_interactive_fds(matahari_netd_t) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(matahari_netd_t) +') + + +####################################### +# +# matahari_rpcd local policy +# + +corecmd_exec_bin(matahari_rpcd_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(matahari_rpcd_t) + +auth_read_passwd(matahari_rpcd_t) + +files_read_usr_files(matahari_rpcd_t) + +######################################## +# +# matahari_serviced local policy +# +allow matahari_serviced_t self:process setpgid; + +dev_read_sysfs(matahari_serviced_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(matahari_serviced_t) + +init_domtrans_script(matahari_serviced_t) + +systemd_config_all_services(matahari_serviced_t) + +######################################## +# +# matahari_sysconfigd local policy +# +dev_read_sysfs(matahari_sysconfigd_t) + +####################################### +# +# matahari domain local policy +# +allow matahari_domain self:capability sys_nice; +allow matahari_domain self:process setsched; +allow matahari_domain self:process signal; +allow matahari_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow matahari_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(matahari_domain) +kernel_read_network_state(matahari_domain) + +corenet_tcp_connect_matahari_port(matahari_domain) + +dev_read_urand(matahari_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(matahari_domain) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(matahari_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(matahari_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(matahari_domain) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(matahari_domain) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mediawiki.if b/policy/modules/services/mediawiki.if index 98d28b4..1c1d012 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mediawiki.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/mediawiki.if @@ -1 +1,40 @@ ## Mediawiki policy + +####################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to read +## mediawiki tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mediawiki_read_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + read_files_pattern($1, httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t, httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t, httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Delete mediawiki tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mediawiki_delete_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t; + ') + + delete_files_pattern($1, httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t, httpd_mediawiki_tmp_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/memcached.fc b/policy/modules/services/memcached.fc index 4d69477..d3b4f39 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/memcached.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/memcached.fc @@ -2,4 +2,5 @@ /usr/bin/memcached -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:memcached_exec_t,s0) +/var/run/ipa_memcached(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:memcached_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/memcached(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:memcached_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/memcached.if b/policy/modules/services/memcached.if index db4fd6f..a1003ed 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/memcached.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/memcached.if @@ -5,15 +5,14 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run memcached. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`memcached_domtrans',` gen_require(` - type memcached_t; - type memcached_exec_t; + type memcached_t, memcached_exec_t; ') domtrans_pattern($1, memcached_exec_t, memcached_t) @@ -40,6 +39,44 @@ interface(`memcached_read_pid_files',` ######################################## ## +## Manage memcached PID files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`memcached_manage_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type memcached_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, memcached_var_run_t, memcached_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to memcached over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`memcached_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type memcached_t, memcached_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, memcached_var_run_t, memcached_var_run_t, memcached_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an memcached environment ## @@ -57,17 +94,20 @@ interface(`memcached_read_pid_files',` # interface(`memcached_admin',` gen_require(` - type memcached_t; - type memcached_initrc_exec_t; + type memcached_t, memcached_initrc_exec_t, memcached_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 memcached_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 memcached_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, memcached_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 memcached_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, memcached_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 memcached_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, memcached_var_run_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/memcached.te b/policy/modules/services/memcached.te index b681608..0934c95 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/memcached.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/memcached.te @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ files_pid_file(memcached_var_run_t) # memcached local policy # -allow memcached_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; +allow memcached_t self:capability { setuid setgid sys_resource }; dontaudit memcached_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow memcached_t self:process { setrlimit signal_perms }; allow memcached_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -42,7 +42,8 @@ corenet_udp_bind_memcache_port(memcached_t) manage_dirs_pattern(memcached_t, memcached_var_run_t, memcached_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(memcached_t, memcached_var_run_t, memcached_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(memcached_t, memcached_var_run_t, { file dir }) +manage_sock_files_pattern(memcached_t, memcached_var_run_t, memcached_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(memcached_t, memcached_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file }) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(memcached_t) kernel_read_system_state(memcached_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/milter.fc b/policy/modules/services/milter.fc index 55a3e2f..bc489e0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/milter.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/milter.fc @@ -1,10 +1,15 @@ +/etc/mail/dkim-milter/keys(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_private_key_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/dkim-filter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/milter-greylist -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/milter-regex -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:regex_milter_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/spamass-milter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamass_milter_exec_t,s0) +/var/lib/dkim-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0) /var/lib/milter-greylist(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_data_t,s0) /var/lib/spamass-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamass_milter_state_t,s0) +/var/run/dkim-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dkim_milter_data_t,s0) /var/run/milter-greylist(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_data_t,s0) /var/run/milter-greylist\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:greylist_milter_data_t,s0) /var/run/spamass-milter(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamass_milter_data_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/milter.if b/policy/modules/services/milter.if index ed1af3c..40b5f0e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/milter.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/milter.if @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ template(`milter_template',` # Type for the milter data (e.g. the socket used to communicate with the MTA) type $1_milter_data_t, milter_data_type; - files_type($1_milter_data_t) + files_pid_file($1_milter_data_t) allow $1_milter_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -37,6 +37,8 @@ template(`milter_template',` files_read_etc_files($1_milter_t) + kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state($1_milter_t) + miscfiles_read_localization($1_milter_t) logging_send_syslog_msg($1_milter_t) @@ -57,7 +59,7 @@ interface(`milter_stream_connect_all',` attribute milter_data_type, milter_domains; ') - getattr_dirs_pattern($1, milter_data_type, milter_data_type) + files_search_pids($1) stream_connect_pattern($1, milter_data_type, milter_data_type, milter_domains) ') @@ -76,12 +78,29 @@ interface(`milter_getattr_all_sockets',` attribute milter_data_type; ') - getattr_dirs_pattern($1, milter_data_type, milter_data_type) getattr_sock_files_pattern($1, milter_data_type, milter_data_type) ') ######################################## ## +## Allow setattr of milter dirs +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`milter_setattr_all_dirs',` + gen_require(` + attribute milter_data_type; + ') + + setattr_dirs_pattern($1, milter_data_type, milter_data_type) +') + +######################################## +## ## Manage spamassassin milter state ## ## @@ -100,3 +119,22 @@ interface(`milter_manage_spamass_state',` manage_dirs_pattern($1, spamass_milter_state_t, spamass_milter_state_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, spamass_milter_state_t, spamass_milter_state_t) ') + +####################################### +## +## Delete dkim-milter PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`milter_delete_dkim_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type dkim_milter_data_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + delete_files_pattern($1, dkim_milter_data_t, dkim_milter_data_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/milter.te b/policy/modules/services/milter.te index 47e3612..ece07ab 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/milter.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/milter.te @@ -9,6 +9,13 @@ policy_module(milter, 1.3.0) attribute milter_domains; attribute milter_data_type; +# support for dkim-milter - domainKeys Identified Mail sender authentication sendmail milter +milter_template(dkim) + +# type for the private key of dkim-milter +type dkim_milter_private_key_t; +files_type(dkim_milter_private_key_t) + # currently-supported milters are milter-greylist, milter-regex and spamass-milter milter_template(greylist) milter_template(regex) @@ -20,11 +27,28 @@ milter_template(spamass) type spamass_milter_state_t; files_type(spamass_milter_state_t) +####################################### +# +# dkim-milter local policy +# + +allow dkim_milter_t self:capability { kill setgid setuid }; +allow dkim_milter_t self:process signal; +allow dkim_milter_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +read_files_pattern(dkim_milter_t, dkim_milter_private_key_t, dkim_milter_private_key_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(dkim_milter_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(dkim_milter_t) + +mta_read_config(dkim_milter_t) + ######################################## # # milter-greylist local policy -# ensure smtp clients retry mail like real MTAs and not spamware -# http://hcpnet.free.fr/milter-greylist/ +# ensure smtp clients retry mail like real MTAs and not spamware +# http://hcpnet.free.fr/milter-greylist/ # # It removes any existing socket (not owned by root) whilst running as root, @@ -33,11 +57,19 @@ files_type(spamass_milter_state_t) allow greylist_milter_t self:capability { chown dac_override setgid setuid sys_nice }; allow greylist_milter_t self:process { setsched getsched }; +allow greylist_milter_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + # It creates a pid file /var/run/milter-greylist.pid files_pid_filetrans(greylist_milter_t, greylist_milter_data_t, file) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(greylist_milter_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(greylist_milter_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(greylist_milter_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_movaz_ssc_port(greylist_milter_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_movaz_ssc_port(greylist_milter_t) + # Allow the milter to read a GeoIP database in /usr/share files_read_usr_files(greylist_milter_t) # The milter runs from /var/lib/milter-greylist and maintains files there @@ -52,8 +84,8 @@ mta_read_config(greylist_milter_t) ######################################## # # milter-regex local policy -# filter emails using regular expressions -# http://www.benzedrine.cx/milter-regex.html +# filter emails using regular expressions +# http://www.benzedrine.cx/milter-regex.html # # It removes any existing socket (not owned by root) whilst running as root @@ -72,8 +104,8 @@ mta_read_config(regex_milter_t) ######################################## # # spamass-milter local policy -# pipe emails through SpamAssassin -# http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/spamass-milt/ +# pipe emails through SpamAssassin +# http://savannah.nongnu.org/projects/spamass-milt/ # # The milter runs from /var/lib/spamass-milter diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mock.fc b/policy/modules/services/mock.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8d0e473 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/mock.fc @@ -0,0 +1,5 @@ + +/usr/sbin/mock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mock_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/mock(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mock_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/cache/mock(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mock_cache_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mock.if b/policy/modules/services/mock.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..1d76fb8 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/mock.if @@ -0,0 +1,313 @@ +## policy for mock + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run mock. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type mock_t, mock_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, mock_exec_t, mock_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search mock lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type mock_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 mock_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read mock lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type mock_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Getattr on mock lib file,dir,sock_file ... +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_getattr_lib',` + gen_require(` + type mock_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 mock_var_lib_t:dir_file_class_set getattr; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## mock lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type mock_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage mock lib dirs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type mock_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################### +## +## Manage mock lib symlinks. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_manage_lib_symlinks',` + gen_require(` + type mock_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage mock lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_manage_lib_chr_files',` + gen_require(` + type mock_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_chr_files_pattern($1, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage mock lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_dontaudit_write_lib_chr_files',` + gen_require(` + type mock_var_lib_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 mock_var_lib_t:chr_file write; +') + +####################################### +## +## Dontaudit read and write an leaked file descriptors +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type mock_tmp_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 mock_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute mock in the mock domain, and +## allow the specified role the mock domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the mock domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`mock_run',` + gen_require(` + type mock_t; + type mock_build_t; + ') + + mock_domtrans($1) + role $2 types mock_t; + role $2 types mock_build_t; + + optional_policy(` + mount_run(mock_t, $2) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Role access for mock +## +## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +## +# +interface(`mock_role',` + gen_require(` + type mock_t; + ') + + role $1 types mock_t; + + mock_run($2, $1) + + ps_process_pattern($2, mock_t) + allow $2 mock_t:process signal_perms; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 mock_t:process ptrace; + ') +') + +####################################### +## +## Send a generic signal to mock. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mock_signal',` + gen_require(` + type mock_t; + ') + + allow $1 mock_t:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an mock environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`mock_admin',` + gen_require(` + type mock_t, mock_var_lib_t; + type mock_build_t, mock_etc_t, mock_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 mock_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, mock_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 mock_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 mock_build_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 mock_build_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, mock_build_t) + + files_list_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, mock_var_lib_t) + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, mock_tmp_t) + + files_search_etc($1) + admin_pattern($1, mock_etc_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mock.te b/policy/modules/services/mock.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..621fc5a --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/mock.te @@ -0,0 +1,253 @@ +policy_module(mock,1.0.0) + +## +##

    +## Allow mock to read files in home directories. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(mock_enable_homedirs, false) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type mock_t; +type mock_exec_t; +application_domain(mock_t, mock_exec_t) +domain_role_change_exemption(mock_t) +domain_system_change_exemption(mock_t) +role system_r types mock_t; + +type mock_build_t; +type mock_build_exec_t; +application_domain(mock_build_t, mock_build_exec_t) +role system_r types mock_build_t; + +type mock_cache_t; +files_type(mock_cache_t) + +type mock_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(mock_tmp_t) + +type mock_var_lib_t; +files_type(mock_var_lib_t) + +type mock_etc_t; +files_config_file(mock_etc_t) + +######################################## +# +# mock local policy +# + +allow mock_t self:capability { sys_admin setfcap setuid sys_chroot chown audit_write dac_override sys_nice mknod fsetid setgid fowner }; +allow mock_t self:process { siginh noatsecure signal_perms transition rlimitinh setsched setpgid }; +# Needed because mock can run java and mono withing build environment +allow mock_t self:process { execmem execstack }; +dontaudit mock_t self:process { siginh noatsecure rlimitinh }; +allow mock_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow mock_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow mock_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(mock_t, mock_cache_t, mock_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_cache_t, mock_cache_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_cache_t, mock_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(mock_t, mock_cache_t, { dir file } ) + +read_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_etc_t, mock_etc_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_etc_t, mock_etc_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mock_t, mock_tmp_t, mock_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_tmp_t, mock_tmp_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_tmp_t, mock_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(mock_t, mock_tmp_t, { dir file lnk_file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mock_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +manage_blk_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +manage_chr_files_pattern(mock_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(mock_t, mock_var_lib_t, { dir file }) +allow mock_t mock_var_lib_t:dir mounton; +allow mock_t mock_var_lib_t:dir relabel_dir_perms; +allow mock_t mock_var_lib_t:file relabel_file_perms; + +kernel_list_proc(mock_t) +kernel_read_irq_sysctls(mock_t) +kernel_read_system_state(mock_t) +kernel_read_network_state(mock_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mock_t) +kernel_request_load_module(mock_t) +kernel_dontaudit_setattr_proc_dirs(mock_t) +kernel_read_fs_sysctls(mock_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(mock_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(mock_t) +corecmd_dontaudit_exec_all_executables(mock_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_git_port(mock_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(mock_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(mock_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(mock_t) + +dev_read_urand(mock_t) +dev_read_sysfs(mock_t) +dev_setattr_sysfs_dirs(mock_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(mock_t) +domain_use_interactive_fds(mock_t) + +files_read_etc_files(mock_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(mock_t) +files_read_usr_files(mock_t) +files_dontaudit_list_boot(mock_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(mock_t) +fs_search_all(mock_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(mock_t) +files_list_isid_type_dirs(mock_t) + +selinux_get_enforce_mode(mock_t) + +term_search_ptys(mock_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(mock_t) + +init_exec(mock_t) +init_dontaudit_stream_connect(mock_t) + +libs_exec_ldconfig(mock_t) + +logging_send_audit_msgs(mock_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(mock_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(mock_t) + +userdom_use_user_ptys(mock_t) + +files_search_home(mock_t) + +tunable_policy(`mock_enable_homedirs',` + userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(mock_t) + userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(mock_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`mock_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',` + rpc_search_nfs_state_data(mock_t) + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(mock_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(mock_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`mock_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(mock_t) + fs_read_cifs_files(mock_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(mock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + abrt_read_spool_retrace(mock_t) + abrt_read_cache_retrace(mock_t) + abrt_stream_connect(mock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpm_exec(mock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_domtrans(mock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + apache_read_sys_content_rw_files(mock_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# mock_build local policy +# +allow mock_build_t self:capability { sys_admin setfcap setuid sys_chroot chown dac_override sys_nice mknod fsetid setgid fowner }; +dontaudit mock_build_t self:capability audit_write; +allow mock_build_t self:process { fork setsched setpgid signal_perms }; +allow mock_build_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_socket_perms nlmsg_relay }; +# Needed because mock can run java and mono withing build environment +allow mock_build_t self:process { execmem execstack }; +dontaudit mock_build_t self:process { siginh noatsecure rlimitinh }; +allow mock_build_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow mock_build_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow mock_build_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; +allow mock_build_t self:dir list_dir_perms; +allow mock_build_t self:dir read_file_perms; + +ps_process_pattern(mock_t, mock_build_t) +allow mock_t mock_build_t:process signal_perms; +domtrans_pattern(mock_t, mock_build_exec_t, mock_build_t) +domtrans_pattern(mock_t, mock_tmp_t, mock_build_t) +domain_entry_file(mock_build_t, mock_tmp_t) +domtrans_pattern(mock_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_build_t) +domain_entry_file(mock_build_t, mock_var_lib_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_cache_t, mock_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_cache_t, mock_cache_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_cache_t, mock_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(mock_build_t, mock_cache_t, { dir file } ) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_tmp_t, mock_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_tmp_t, mock_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(mock_build_t, mock_tmp_t, { dir file }) +can_exec(mock_build_t, mock_tmp_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +manage_blk_files_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +manage_chr_files_pattern(mock_build_t, mock_var_lib_t, mock_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(mock_build_t, mock_var_lib_t, { dir file }) +can_exec(mock_build_t, mock_var_lib_t) +allow mock_build_t mock_var_lib_t:dir mounton; +allow mock_build_t mock_var_lib_t:dir relabel_dir_perms; +allow mock_build_t mock_var_lib_t:file relabel_file_perms; + +kernel_list_proc(mock_build_t) +kernel_read_irq_sysctls(mock_build_t) +kernel_read_system_state(mock_build_t) +kernel_read_network_state(mock_build_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mock_build_t) +kernel_request_load_module(mock_build_t) +kernel_dontaudit_setattr_proc_dirs(mock_build_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(mock_build_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(mock_build_t) +corecmd_dontaudit_exec_all_executables(mock_build_t) + +dev_getattr_all_chr_files(mock_build_t) +dev_dontaudit_list_all_dev_nodes(mock_build_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(mock_build_t) +fs_getattr_all_dirs(mock_build_t) +dev_read_sysfs(mock_build_t) + +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(mock_build_t) +domain_use_interactive_fds(mock_build_t) + +files_read_etc_files(mock_build_t) +files_read_usr_files(mock_build_t) +files_dontaudit_list_boot(mock_build_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(mock_build_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(mock_build_t) + +selinux_get_enforce_mode(mock_build_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(mock_build_t) + +init_exec(mock_build_t) +init_dontaudit_stream_connect(mock_build_t) + +libs_exec_ldconfig(mock_build_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(mock_build_t) + +tunable_policy(`mock_enable_homedirs',` + userdom_read_user_home_content_files(mock_build_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/modemmanager.if b/policy/modules/services/modemmanager.if index 3368699..7a7fc02 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/modemmanager.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/modemmanager.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run modemmanager. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`modemmanager_domtrans',` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/modemmanager.te b/policy/modules/services/modemmanager.te index b3ace16..83392b6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/modemmanager.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/modemmanager.te @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ policy_module(modemmanager, 1.1.0) type modemmanager_t; type modemmanager_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(modemmanager_t, modemmanager_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(modemmanager_t, modemmanager_exec_t) typealias modemmanager_t alias ModemManager_t; typealias modemmanager_exec_t alias ModemManager_exec_t; @@ -16,7 +17,8 @@ typealias modemmanager_exec_t alias ModemManager_exec_t; # ModemManager local policy # -allow modemmanager_t self:process signal; +allow modemmanager_t self:capability { net_admin sys_admin sys_tty_config }; +allow modemmanager_t self:process { getsched signal }; allow modemmanager_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow modemmanager_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow modemmanager_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -28,13 +30,25 @@ dev_rw_modem(modemmanager_t) files_read_etc_files(modemmanager_t) -term_use_unallocated_ttys(modemmanager_t) +term_use_generic_ptys(modemmanager_t) +term_use_unallocated_ttys(modemmanager_t) # this should be reproduced, might have been mislabelled usbtty_device_t +term_use_usb_ttys(modemmanager_t) miscfiles_read_localization(modemmanager_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(modemmanager_t) -networkmanager_dbus_chat(modemmanager_t) +optional_policy(` + networkmanager_dbus_chat(modemmanager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + devicekit_dbus_chat_power(modemmanager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + policykit_dbus_chat(modemmanager_t) +') optional_policy(` udev_read_db(modemmanager_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mojomojo.if b/policy/modules/services/mojomojo.if index 657a9fc..0b9bf04 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mojomojo.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/mojomojo.if @@ -19,18 +19,23 @@ # interface(`mojomojo_admin',` gen_require(` - type httpd_mojomojo_script_t; - type httpd_mojomojo_content_t, httpd_mojomojo_ra_content_t; - type httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t; - type httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t, httpd_mojomojo_htaccess_t; + type httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_content_t, httpd_mojomojo_ra_content_t; + type httpd_mojomojo_rw_content_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, httpd_mojomojo_htaccess_t; + type httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t; ') - allow $1 httpd_mojomojo_script_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 httpd_mojomojo_script_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, httpd_mojomojo_script_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 httpd_mojomo_script_t:process ptrace; + ') + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t) - files_search_var_lib(httpd_mojomojo_script_t) + files_list_var_lib(httpd_mojomojo_script_t) - apache_search_sys_content($1) + apache_list_sys_content($1) admin_pattern($1, httpd_mojomojo_script_exec_t) admin_pattern($1, httpd_mojomojo_script_t) admin_pattern($1, httpd_mojomojo_content_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mojomojo.te b/policy/modules/services/mojomojo.te index 83f002c..fa8a3d5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mojomojo.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/mojomojo.te @@ -7,12 +7,17 @@ policy_module(mojomojo, 1.0.0) apache_content_template(mojomojo) +type httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t) + ######################################## # # mojomojo local policy # -allow httpd_mojomojo_script_t httpd_t:unix_stream_socket rw_stream_socket_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_mojomojo_script_t, httpd_mojomojo_tmp_t, { file dir }) corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t) corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(httpd_mojomojo_script_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mpd.fc b/policy/modules/services/mpd.fc index ddc14d6..c74bf3d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mpd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/mpd.fc @@ -6,3 +6,5 @@ /var/lib/mpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mpd_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/mpd/music(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mpd_data_t,s0) /var/lib/mpd/playlists(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mpd_data_t,s0) + +/var/log/mpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mpd_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mpd.if b/policy/modules/services/mpd.if index d72276f..cb8c563 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mpd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/mpd.if @@ -244,8 +244,11 @@ interface(`mpd_admin',` type mpd_tmpfs_t; ') - allow $1 mpd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 mpd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, mpd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 mpd_t:process ptrace; + ') mpd_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mpd.te b/policy/modules/services/mpd.te index 7f68872..72c1f8a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mpd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/mpd.te @@ -44,6 +44,9 @@ allow mpd_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; allow mpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow mpd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow mpd_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +allow mpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; + +read_files_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_etc_t, mpd_etc_t) manage_dirs_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_data_t, mpd_data_t) manage_files_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_data_t, mpd_data_t) @@ -51,6 +54,10 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_data_t, mpd_data_t) read_files_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_etc_t, mpd_etc_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_log_t, mpd_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_log_t, mpd_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(mpd_t, mpd_log_t, { dir file lnk_file }) + manage_dirs_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_tmp_t, mpd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_tmp_t, mpd_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(mpd_t, mpd_tmp_t, mpd_tmp_t) @@ -103,6 +110,10 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(mpd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(mpd_t) +userdom_read_home_audio_files(mpd_t) +userdom_read_user_tmpfs_files(mpd_t) +userdom_home_reader(mpd_t) + optional_policy(` alsa_read_rw_config(mpd_t) ') @@ -122,5 +133,14 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + rtkit_daemon_dontaudit_dbus_chat(mpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_read_db(mpd_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_dontaudit_stream_connect(mpd_t) + xserver_dontaudit_read_xdm_pid(mpd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mta.fc b/policy/modules/services/mta.fc index 256166a..a8fe27a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mta.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/mta.fc @@ -1,4 +1,7 @@ -HOME_DIR/\.forward -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_forward_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.forward[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/dead.letter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/.mailrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/Maildir(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_rw_t,s0) /bin/mail(x)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) @@ -11,20 +14,27 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /etc/postfix/aliases.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:etc_aliases_t,s0) ') -/usr/bin/esmtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) +/root/\.forward -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_t,s0) +/root/dead.letter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_t,s0) +/root/.mailrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_t,s0) +/root/Maildir(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_home_rw_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/sendmail -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/esmtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/mail(x)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/sendmail -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/courier/bin/sendmail -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/rmail -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/sendmail\.postfix -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/sendmail(\.sendmail)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/ssmtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/rmail -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/sendmail\.postfix -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/sendmail(\.sendmail)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ssmtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) /var/mail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_spool_t,s0) /var/qmail/bin/sendmail -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_exec_t,s0) /var/spool/imap(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_spool_t,s0) -/var/spool/(client)?mqueue(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mqueue_spool_t,s0) +/var/spool/(client)?mqueue(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mqueue_spool_t,s0) +/var/spool/mqueue\.in(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mqueue_spool_t,s0) /var/spool/mail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mail_spool_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mta.if b/policy/modules/services/mta.if index 343cee3..555300e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mta.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/mta.if @@ -37,9 +37,9 @@ interface(`mta_stub',` ## is the prefix for user_t). ## ## +## # template(`mta_base_mail_template',` - gen_require(` attribute user_mail_domain; type sendmail_exec_t; @@ -56,92 +56,15 @@ template(`mta_base_mail_template',` type $1_mail_tmp_t; files_tmp_file($1_mail_tmp_t) - ############################## - # - # $1_mail_t local policy - # - - allow $1_mail_t self:capability { setuid setgid chown }; - allow $1_mail_t self:process { signal_perms setrlimit }; - allow $1_mail_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; - - # re-exec itself - can_exec($1_mail_t, sendmail_exec_t) - allow $1_mail_t sendmail_exec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; - - kernel_read_system_state($1_mail_t) - kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_mail_t) - - corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1_mail_t) - corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_mail_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_mail_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1_mail_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_mail_t) - corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_mail_t) - corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port($1_mail_t) - corenet_sendrecv_smtp_client_packets($1_mail_t) - - corecmd_exec_bin($1_mail_t) - - files_read_etc_files($1_mail_t) - files_search_spool($1_mail_t) - # It wants to check for nscd - files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_mail_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, $1_mail_tmp_t) + manage_files_pattern($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, $1_mail_tmp_t) + files_tmp_filetrans($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, { file dir }) auth_use_nsswitch($1_mail_t) - init_dontaudit_rw_utmp($1_mail_t) - - logging_send_syslog_msg($1_mail_t) - - miscfiles_read_localization($1_mail_t) - - optional_policy(` - exim_read_log($1_mail_t) - exim_append_log($1_mail_t) - exim_manage_spool_files($1_mail_t) - ') - optional_policy(` postfix_domtrans_user_mail_handler($1_mail_t) ') - - optional_policy(` - procmail_exec($1_mail_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - qmail_domtrans_inject($1_mail_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - gen_require(` - type etc_mail_t, mail_spool_t, mqueue_spool_t; - ') - - manage_dirs_pattern($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, $1_mail_tmp_t) - manage_files_pattern($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, $1_mail_tmp_t) - files_tmp_filetrans($1_mail_t, $1_mail_tmp_t, { file dir }) - - allow $1_mail_t etc_mail_t:dir search_dir_perms; - - # Write to /var/spool/mail and /var/spool/mqueue. - manage_files_pattern($1_mail_t, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) - manage_files_pattern($1_mail_t, mqueue_spool_t, mqueue_spool_t) - - # Check available space. - fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_mail_t) - - files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_mail_t) - - # Write to /var/log/sendmail.st - sendmail_manage_log($1_mail_t) - sendmail_create_log($1_mail_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - uucp_manage_spool($1_mail_t) - ') ') ######################################## @@ -158,6 +81,7 @@ template(`mta_base_mail_template',` ## User domain for the role ## ## +## # interface(`mta_role',` gen_require(` @@ -169,11 +93,19 @@ interface(`mta_role',` # Transition from the user domain to the derived domain. domtrans_pattern($2, sendmail_exec_t, user_mail_t) - allow $2 sendmail_exec_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; + allow $2 sendmail_exec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; allow mta_user_agent $2:fd use; allow mta_user_agent $2:process sigchld; allow mta_user_agent $2:fifo_file { read write }; + + optional_policy(` + exim_run($2, $1) + ') + + optional_policy(` + mailman_run(mta_user_agent, $1) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -220,6 +152,25 @@ interface(`mta_agent_executable',` application_executable_file($1) ') +###################################### +## +## Dontaudit read and write an leaked file descriptors +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_dontaudit_leaks_system_mail',` + gen_require(` + type system_mail_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 system_mail_t:fifo_file write; + dontaudit $1 system_mail_t:tcp_socket { read write }; +') + ######################################## ## ## Make the specified type by a system MTA. @@ -306,10 +257,11 @@ interface(`mta_mailserver_sender',` interface(`mta_mailserver_delivery',` gen_require(` attribute mailserver_delivery; - type mail_spool_t; ') typeattribute $1 mailserver_delivery; + + userdom_home_manager($1) ') ####################################### @@ -330,12 +282,6 @@ interface(`mta_mailserver_user_agent',` ') typeattribute $1 mta_user_agent; - - optional_policy(` - # apache should set close-on-exec - apache_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets($1) - apache_dontaudit_rw_sys_script_stream_sockets($1) - ') ') ######################################## @@ -350,9 +296,8 @@ interface(`mta_mailserver_user_agent',` # interface(`mta_send_mail',` gen_require(` - attribute mta_user_agent; + attribute mta_user_agent, mta_exec_type; type system_mail_t; - attribute mta_exec_type; ') allow $1 mta_exec_type:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; @@ -391,12 +336,19 @@ interface(`mta_send_mail',` # interface(`mta_sendmail_domtrans',` gen_require(` - type sendmail_exec_t; + attribute mta_exec_type; + attribute mta_user_agent; ') files_search_usr($1) + allow $1 mta_exec_type:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; corecmd_read_bin_symlinks($1) - domain_auto_trans($1, sendmail_exec_t, $2) + + allow $2 mta_exec_type:file entrypoint; + domtrans_pattern($1, mta_exec_type, $2) + allow mta_user_agent $1:fd use; + allow mta_user_agent $1:process sigchld; + allow mta_user_agent $1:fifo_file { read write }; ') ######################################## @@ -409,7 +361,6 @@ interface(`mta_sendmail_domtrans',` ## ## # -# interface(`mta_signal_system_mail',` gen_require(` type system_mail_t; @@ -420,6 +371,60 @@ interface(`mta_signal_system_mail',` ######################################## ## +## Send all user mail client a signal +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_signal_user_agent',` + gen_require(` + attribute mta_user_agent; + ') + + allow $1 mta_user_agent:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send all user mail client a kill signal +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_kill_user_agent',` + gen_require(` + attribute mta_user_agent; + ') + + allow $1 mta_user_agent:process sigkill; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send system mail client a kill signal +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_kill_system_mail',` + gen_require(` + type system_mail_t; + ') + + allow $1 system_mail_t:process sigkill; +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute sendmail in the caller domain. ## ## @@ -438,6 +443,26 @@ interface(`mta_sendmail_exec',` ######################################## ## +## Check whether sendmail executable +## files are executable. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_sendmail_access_check',` + gen_require(` + type sendmail_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + allow $1 sendmail_exec_t:file { getattr_file_perms execute }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read mail server configuration. ## ## @@ -474,7 +499,8 @@ interface(`mta_write_config',` type etc_mail_t; ') - write_files_pattern($1, etc_mail_t, etc_mail_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, etc_mail_t, etc_mail_t) + allow $1 etc_mail_t:file setattr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -494,6 +520,7 @@ interface(`mta_read_aliases',` files_search_etc($1) allow $1 etc_aliases_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 etc_aliases_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -532,7 +559,7 @@ interface(`mta_etc_filetrans_aliases',` type etc_aliases_t; ') - files_etc_filetrans($1, etc_aliases_t, file) + files_etc_filetrans($1, etc_aliases_t, file, $2) ') ######################################## @@ -552,7 +579,7 @@ interface(`mta_rw_aliases',` ') files_search_etc($1) - allow $1 etc_aliases_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr }; + allow $1 etc_aliases_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr_file_perms }; ') ####################################### @@ -646,8 +673,8 @@ interface(`mta_dontaudit_getattr_spool_files',` files_dontaudit_search_spool($1) dontaudit $1 mail_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms; - dontaudit $1 mail_spool_t:lnk_file read; - dontaudit $1 mail_spool_t:file getattr; + dontaudit $1 mail_spool_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 mail_spool_t:file getattr_file_perms; ') ####################################### @@ -677,7 +704,26 @@ interface(`mta_spool_filetrans',` ') files_search_spool($1) - filetrans_pattern($1, mail_spool_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, mail_spool_t, $2, $3, $4) +') + +####################################### +## +## Read the mail spool. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_read_spool',` + gen_require(` + type mail_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + read_files_pattern($1, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) ') ######################################## @@ -697,8 +743,8 @@ interface(`mta_rw_spool',` files_search_spool($1) allow $1 mail_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms; - allow $1 mail_spool_t:file setattr; - rw_files_pattern($1, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) + allow $1 mail_spool_t:file setattr_file_perms; + manage_files_pattern($1, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) ') @@ -838,7 +884,7 @@ interface(`mta_dontaudit_rw_queue',` ') dontaudit $1 mqueue_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms; - dontaudit $1 mqueue_spool_t:file { getattr read write }; + dontaudit $1 mqueue_spool_t:file rw_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -864,6 +910,36 @@ interface(`mta_manage_queue',` ####################################### ## +## Create private objects in the +## mqueue spool directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the object to be created. +## +## +## +## +## The object class of the object being created. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_spool_filetrans_queue',` + gen_require(` + type mqueue_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + filetrans_pattern($1, mqueue_spool_t, $2, $3, $4) +') + +####################################### +## ## Read sendmail binary. ## ## @@ -899,3 +975,118 @@ interface(`mta_rw_user_mail_stream_sockets',` allow $1 user_mail_domain:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; ') + +######################################## +## +## Type transition files created in calling dir +## to the mail address aliases type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Directory to transition on. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_filetrans_aliases',` + gen_require(` + type etc_aliases_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, $2, etc_aliases_t, file) +') + +###################################### +## +## ALlow domain to read mail content in the homedir +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_read_home',` + gen_require(` + type mail_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, mail_home_t, mail_home_t) + + ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + userdom_search_admin_dir($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## create mail content in the in the /root directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_filetrans_admin_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type mail_home_t; + type mail_home_rw_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, mail_home_t, file, "dead.letter") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, mail_home_t, file, ".mailrc") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, mail_home_t, file, ".forward") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, mail_home_rw_t, file, "Maildir") +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to mta named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type mail_home_t; + type mail_home_rw_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mail_home_t, file, ".mailrc") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mail_home_t, file, "dead.letter") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mail_home_t, file, ".forward") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mail_home_rw_t, file, "Maildir") +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to apache named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mta_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type etc_aliases_t; + type etc_mail_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, etc_mail_t, etc_aliases_t, { dir file }) + mta_etc_filetrans_aliases($1, "aliases") + mta_etc_filetrans_aliases($1, "aliases.db") + mta_filetrans_home_content($1) + mta_filetrans_admin_home_content($1) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mta.te b/policy/modules/services/mta.te index 64268e4..da35763 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mta.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/mta.te @@ -20,14 +20,19 @@ files_type(etc_aliases_t) type etc_mail_t; files_config_file(etc_mail_t) -type mail_forward_t; -files_type(mail_forward_t) +type mail_home_t alias mail_forward_t; +userdom_user_home_content(mail_home_t) + +type mail_home_rw_t; +userdom_user_home_content(mail_home_rw_t) type mqueue_spool_t; files_mountpoint(mqueue_spool_t) +files_spool_file(mqueue_spool_t) type mail_spool_t; files_mountpoint(mail_spool_t) +files_spool_file(mail_spool_t) type sendmail_exec_t; mta_agent_executable(sendmail_exec_t) @@ -42,6 +47,7 @@ typealias user_mail_tmp_t alias { staff_mail_tmp_t sysadm_mail_tmp_t }; typealias user_mail_tmp_t alias { auditadm_mail_tmp_t secadm_mail_tmp_t }; ubac_constrained(user_mail_t) ubac_constrained(user_mail_tmp_t) +userdom_user_tmp_content(user_mail_tmp_t) ######################################## # @@ -50,22 +56,11 @@ ubac_constrained(user_mail_tmp_t) # newalias required this, not sure if it is needed in 'if' file allow system_mail_t self:capability { dac_override fowner }; -allow system_mail_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -read_files_pattern(system_mail_t, etc_mail_t, etc_mail_t) +allow system_mail_t mail_home_t:file manage_file_perms; read_files_pattern(system_mail_t, mailcontent_type, mailcontent_type) -allow system_mail_t mail_forward_t:file read_file_perms; - -allow system_mail_t mta_exec_type:file entrypoint; - -can_exec(system_mail_t, mta_exec_type) - -kernel_read_system_state(system_mail_t) -kernel_read_network_state(system_mail_t) -kernel_request_load_module(system_mail_t) - dev_read_sysfs(system_mail_t) dev_read_rand(system_mail_t) dev_read_urand(system_mail_t) @@ -79,9 +74,22 @@ selinux_getattr_fs(system_mail_t) term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(system_mail_t) init_use_script_ptys(system_mail_t) +init_dontaudit_rw_stream_socket(system_mail_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(system_mail_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(system_mail_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(system_mail_t) +userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(system_mail_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(system_mail_t, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t) +manage_files_pattern(system_mail_t, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t) + +allow system_mail_t mail_home_t:file manage_file_perms; +userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(system_mail_t, mail_home_t, file) + + +logging_append_all_logs(system_mail_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(system_mail_t) optional_policy(` apache_read_squirrelmail_data(system_mail_t) @@ -92,14 +100,21 @@ optional_policy(` apache_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(system_mail_t) apache_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets(system_mail_t) apache_dontaudit_rw_sys_script_stream_sockets(system_mail_t) + apache_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files(system_mail_t) + + # apache should set close-on-exec + apache_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(mta_user_agent) + apache_dontaudit_rw_sys_script_stream_sockets(mta_user_agent) + apache_append_log(mta_user_agent) ') optional_policy(` arpwatch_manage_tmp_files(system_mail_t) +') - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - arpwatch_dontaudit_rw_packet_sockets(system_mail_t) - ') +optional_policy(` + bugzilla_search_content(system_mail_t) + bugzilla_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(system_mail_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -108,9 +123,15 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + courier_stream_connect_authdaemon(system_mail_t) +') + +optional_policy(` cron_read_system_job_tmp_files(system_mail_t) cron_dontaudit_write_pipes(system_mail_t) cron_rw_system_job_stream_sockets(system_mail_t) + cron_rw_inherited_spool_files(system_mail_t) + cron_rw_inherited_user_spool_files(system_mail_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -124,12 +145,9 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - exim_domtrans(system_mail_t) - exim_manage_log(system_mail_t) -') - -optional_policy(` fail2ban_append_log(system_mail_t) + fail2ban_dontaudit_leaks(system_mail_t) + fail2ban_rw_inherited_tmp_files(system_mail_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -146,6 +164,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + munin_dontaudit_leaks(system_mail_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nagios_read_tmp_files(system_mail_t) ') @@ -158,22 +180,13 @@ optional_policy(` files_etc_filetrans(system_mail_t, etc_aliases_t, { file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) domain_use_interactive_fds(system_mail_t) - - # postfix needs this for newaliases - files_getattr_tmp_dirs(system_mail_t) - - postfix_exec_master(system_mail_t) - postfix_read_config(system_mail_t) - postfix_search_spool(system_mail_t) - - ifdef(`distro_redhat',` - # compatability for old default main.cf - postfix_config_filetrans(system_mail_t, etc_aliases_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) - ') ') optional_policy(` qmail_domtrans_inject(system_mail_t) + qmail_manage_spool_dirs(system_mail_t) + qmail_manage_spool_files(system_mail_t) + qmail_rw_spool_pipes(system_mail_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -189,6 +202,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + spamd_stream_connect(system_mail_t) +') + +optional_policy(` smartmon_read_tmp_files(system_mail_t) ') @@ -199,15 +216,16 @@ optional_policy(` arpwatch_search_data(mailserver_delivery) arpwatch_manage_tmp_files(mta_user_agent) - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - arpwatch_dontaudit_rw_packet_sockets(mta_user_agent) - ') - optional_policy(` cron_read_system_job_tmp_files(mta_user_agent) ') ') +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + domain_dontaudit_leaks(user_mail_domain) + domain_dontaudit_leaks(mta_user_agent) +') + ######################################## # # Mailserver delivery local policy @@ -220,21 +238,13 @@ append_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) create_lnk_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) -read_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_forward_t, mail_forward_t) +userdom_search_admin_dir(mailserver_delivery) +read_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_home_t, mail_home_t) -read_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, system_mail_tmp_t, system_mail_tmp_t) - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(mailserver_delivery) - fs_manage_cifs_files(mailserver_delivery) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(mailserver_delivery) -') +manage_dirs_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t) +manage_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(mailserver_delivery) - fs_manage_nfs_files(mailserver_delivery) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(mailserver_delivery) -') +read_files_pattern(mailserver_delivery, system_mail_tmp_t, system_mail_tmp_t) optional_policy(` dovecot_manage_spool(mailserver_delivery) @@ -242,6 +252,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + logwatch_search_cache_dir(mailserver_delivery) +') + +optional_policy(` # so MTA can access /var/lib/mailman/mail/wrapper files_search_var_lib(mailserver_delivery) @@ -249,16 +263,25 @@ optional_policy(` mailman_read_data_symlinks(mailserver_delivery) ') +optional_policy(` + postfix_rw_master_pipes(mailserver_delivery) +') + +optional_policy(` + uucp_domtrans_uux(mailserver_delivery) +') + ######################################## # # User send mail local policy # + domain_use_interactive_fds(user_mail_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(user_mail_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(user_mail_t) # Write to the user domain tty. cjp: why? -userdom_use_user_terminals(mta_user_agent) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(mta_user_agent) # Create dead.letter in user home directories. userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(user_mail_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(user_mail_t, file) @@ -277,14 +300,14 @@ userdom_dontaudit_append_user_tmp_files(user_mail_t) # files in an appropriate place for mta_user_agent userdom_read_user_tmp_files(mta_user_agent) +dev_read_sysfs(user_mail_t) + tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` fs_manage_cifs_files(user_mail_t) fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(user_mail_t) ') optional_policy(` - allow user_mail_t self:capability dac_override; - # Read user temporary files. # postfix seems to need write access if the file handle is opened read/write userdom_rw_user_tmp_files(user_mail_t) @@ -292,3 +315,123 @@ optional_policy(` postfix_read_config(user_mail_t) postfix_list_spool(user_mail_t) ') + +######################################## +# +# Comman user_mail_domain policy +# + +allow user_mail_domain self:capability { setuid setgid chown }; +allow user_mail_domain self:process { signal_perms setrlimit }; +allow user_mail_domain self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow user_mail_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow user_mail_domain mta_exec_type:file entrypoint; + +append_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, mail_home_t, mail_home_t) +read_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, mail_home_t, mail_home_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(user_mail_domain, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t) +manage_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, mail_home_rw_t, mail_home_rw_t) + +read_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, etc_aliases_t, etc_aliases_t) + +can_exec(user_mail_domain, mta_exec_type) + +allow system_mail_t user_mail_domain:file read_file_perms; + +read_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, etc_mail_t, etc_mail_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(user_mail_domain) +kernel_read_network_state(user_mail_domain) +kernel_request_load_module(user_mail_domain) + +dev_read_urand(user_mail_domain) + +files_read_usr_files(user_mail_domain) + +# Write to /var/spool/mail and /var/spool/mqueue. +manage_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) +manage_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, mqueue_spool_t, mqueue_spool_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, mail_spool_t, mail_spool_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(user_mail_domain, mqueue_spool_t, mqueue_spool_t) + +# re-exec itself +can_exec(user_mail_domain, sendmail_exec_t) +allow user_mail_domain sendmail_exec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(user_mail_domain) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(user_mail_domain) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(user_mail_domain) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(user_mail_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(user_mail_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(user_mail_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(user_mail_domain) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(user_mail_domain) +corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(user_mail_domain) +corenet_sendrecv_smtp_client_packets(user_mail_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(user_mail_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(user_mail_domain) +files_search_spool(user_mail_domain) +# It wants to check for nscd +files_dontaudit_search_pids(user_mail_domain) +allow user_mail_domain etc_mail_t:dir search_dir_perms; + +files_read_etc_runtime_files(user_mail_domain) + +# Check available space. +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(user_mail_domain) + +init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(user_mail_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(user_mail_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(user_mail_domain) + +optional_policy(` + courier_manage_spool_dirs(user_mail_domain) + courier_manage_spool_files(user_mail_domain) + courier_rw_spool_pipes(user_mail_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + exim_domtrans(user_mail_domain) + exim_manage_log(user_mail_domain) + exim_manage_spool_files(user_mail_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + # postfix needs this for newaliases + files_getattr_tmp_dirs(user_mail_domain) + + postfix_exec_master(user_mail_domain) + postfix_read_config(user_mail_domain) + postfix_search_spool(user_mail_domain) + postfix_rw_master_pipes(user_mail_domain) + + ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + # compatability for old default main.cf + postfix_config_filetrans(user_mail_domain, etc_aliases_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + ') +') + + +optional_policy(` + procmail_exec(user_mail_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + qmail_domtrans_inject(user_mail_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + # Write to /var/log/sendmail.st + sendmail_manage_log(user_mail_domain) + sendmail_create_log(user_mail_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + uucp_manage_spool(user_mail_domain) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/munin.fc b/policy/modules/services/munin.fc index fd71d69..26597b2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/munin.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/munin.fc @@ -41,6 +41,9 @@ /usr/share/munin/plugins/tomcat_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:services_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/munin/plugins/varnish_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:services_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) +# selinux plugins +/usr/share/munin/plugins/selinux_avcstat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:selinux_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) + # system plugins /usr/share/munin/plugins/acpi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/munin/plugins/cpu.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) @@ -51,6 +54,7 @@ /usr/share/munin/plugins/irqstats -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/munin/plugins/load -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/munin/plugins/memory -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/share/munin/plugins/munin_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/munin/plugins/netstat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/munin/plugins/nfs.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/munin/plugins/open_files -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) @@ -63,6 +67,7 @@ /usr/share/munin/plugins/yum -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:system_munin_plugin_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/munin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/munin/plugin-state(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_plugin_state_t,s0) /var/log/munin.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_log_t,s0) /var/run/munin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:munin_var_run_t,s0) /var/www/html/munin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_munin_content_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/munin.if b/policy/modules/services/munin.if index c358d8f..7c097ec 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/munin.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/munin.if @@ -13,10 +13,11 @@ # template(`munin_plugin_template',` gen_require(` - type munin_t, munin_exec_t, munin_etc_t; + type munin_t; + attribute munin_plugin_domain; ') - type $1_munin_plugin_t; + type $1_munin_plugin_t, munin_plugin_domain; type $1_munin_plugin_exec_t; typealias $1_munin_plugin_t alias munin_$1_plugin_t; typealias $1_munin_plugin_exec_t alias munin_$1_plugin_exec_t; @@ -36,17 +37,7 @@ template(`munin_plugin_template',` # automatic transition rules from munin domain # to specific munin plugin domain domtrans_pattern(munin_t, $1_munin_plugin_exec_t, $1_munin_plugin_t) - - allow $1_munin_plugin_t munin_exec_t:file read_file_perms; - allow $1_munin_plugin_t munin_t:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms; - - read_lnk_files_pattern($1_munin_plugin_t, munin_etc_t, munin_etc_t) - - kernel_read_system_state($1_munin_plugin_t) - - corecmd_exec_bin($1_munin_plugin_t) - - miscfiles_read_localization($1_munin_plugin_t) + allow munin_t $1_munin_plugin_t:process signal_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -65,9 +56,8 @@ interface(`munin_stream_connect',` type munin_var_run_t, munin_t; ') - allow $1 munin_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; - allow $1 munin_var_run_t:sock_file { getattr write }; files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, munin_var_run_t, munin_var_run_t, munin_t) ') ####################################### @@ -88,10 +78,28 @@ interface(`munin_read_config',` allow $1 munin_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 munin_etc_t:file read_file_perms; - allow $1 munin_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; + allow $1 munin_etc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; files_search_etc($1) ') +###################################### +## +## dontaudit read and write an leaked file descriptors +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`munin_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type munin_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 munin_t:tcp_socket { read write }; +') + ####################################### ## ## Append to the munin log. @@ -172,12 +180,14 @@ interface(`munin_admin',` gen_require(` type munin_t, munin_etc_t, munin_tmp_t; type munin_log_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_run_t; - type httpd_munin_content_t; - type munin_initrc_exec_t; + type httpd_munin_content_t, munin_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 munin_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 munin_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, munin_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 munin_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, munin_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/munin.te b/policy/modules/services/munin.te index f17583b..923fdfb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/munin.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/munin.te @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ policy_module(munin, 1.8.0) # Declarations # +attribute munin_plugin_domain; + type munin_t alias lrrd_t; type munin_exec_t alias lrrd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(munin_t, munin_exec_t) @@ -24,15 +26,16 @@ files_tmp_file(munin_tmp_t) type munin_var_lib_t alias lrrd_var_lib_t; files_type(munin_var_lib_t) +type munin_plugin_state_t; +files_type(munin_plugin_state_t) + type munin_var_run_t alias lrrd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(munin_var_run_t) munin_plugin_template(disk) - munin_plugin_template(mail) - +munin_plugin_template(selinux) munin_plugin_template(services) - munin_plugin_template(system) ######################################## @@ -40,7 +43,7 @@ munin_plugin_template(system) # Local policy # -allow munin_t self:capability { chown dac_override setgid setuid }; +allow munin_t self:capability { chown dac_override kill setgid setuid sys_rawio }; dontaudit munin_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow munin_t self:process { getsched setsched signal_perms }; allow munin_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; @@ -71,9 +74,12 @@ manage_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib(munin_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(munin_t, munin_var_run_t, munin_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_var_run_t, munin_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_var_run_t, munin_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(munin_t, munin_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(munin_t, munin_var_run_t, { file dir }) + +read_files_pattern(munin_t, munin_plugin_state_t, munin_plugin_state_t) kernel_read_system_state(munin_t) kernel_read_network_state(munin_t) @@ -116,6 +122,7 @@ logging_read_all_logs(munin_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(munin_t) miscfiles_read_localization(munin_t) +miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(munin_t) sysnet_exec_ifconfig(munin_t) @@ -145,6 +152,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` mta_read_config(munin_t) mta_send_mail(munin_t) + mta_list_queue(munin_t) mta_read_queue(munin_t) ') @@ -159,6 +167,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` postfix_list_spool(munin_t) + postfix_getattr_spool_files(munin_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -182,6 +191,7 @@ optional_policy(` # local policy for disk plugins # +allow disk_munin_plugin_t self:capability { sys_admin sys_rawio }; allow disk_munin_plugin_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; rw_files_pattern(disk_munin_plugin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t) @@ -192,13 +202,13 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_hddtemp_port(disk_munin_plugin_t) files_read_etc_files(disk_munin_plugin_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(disk_munin_plugin_t) +files_read_usr_files(disk_munin_plugin_t) -fs_getattr_all_fs(disk_munin_plugin_t) - +dev_getattr_lvm_control(disk_munin_plugin_t) dev_read_sysfs(disk_munin_plugin_t) dev_read_urand(disk_munin_plugin_t) -storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(disk_munin_plugin_t) +storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(disk_munin_plugin_t) sysnet_read_config(disk_munin_plugin_t) @@ -221,30 +231,44 @@ rw_files_pattern(mail_munin_plugin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t) dev_read_urand(mail_munin_plugin_t) -files_read_etc_files(mail_munin_plugin_t) - -fs_getattr_all_fs(mail_munin_plugin_t) - logging_read_generic_logs(mail_munin_plugin_t) -mta_read_config(mail_munin_plugin_t) -mta_send_mail(mail_munin_plugin_t) -mta_read_queue(mail_munin_plugin_t) +optional_policy(` + mta_read_config(mail_munin_plugin_t) + mta_send_mail(mail_munin_plugin_t) + mta_list_queue(mail_munin_plugin_t) + mta_read_queue(mail_munin_plugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + nscd_socket_use(mail_munin_plugin_t) +') optional_policy(` postfix_read_config(mail_munin_plugin_t) postfix_list_spool(mail_munin_plugin_t) + postfix_getattr_spool_files(mail_munin_plugin_t) ') optional_policy(` sendmail_read_log(mail_munin_plugin_t) ') +################################## +# +# local policy for selinux plugins +# + +selinux_get_enforce_mode(selinux_munin_plugin_t) + + ################################### # # local policy for service plugins # +allow services_munin_plugin_t self:shm create_sem_perms; +allow services_munin_plugin_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow services_munin_plugin_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow services_munin_plugin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow services_munin_plugin_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; @@ -255,13 +279,10 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(services_munin_plugin_t) dev_read_urand(services_munin_plugin_t) dev_read_rand(services_munin_plugin_t) -fs_getattr_all_fs(services_munin_plugin_t) - -files_read_etc_files(services_munin_plugin_t) - sysnet_read_config(services_munin_plugin_t) optional_policy(` + cups_read_config(services_munin_plugin_t) cups_stream_connect(services_munin_plugin_t) ') @@ -279,6 +300,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + nscd_socket_use(services_munin_plugin_t) +') + +optional_policy(` postgresql_stream_connect(services_munin_plugin_t) ') @@ -286,6 +311,10 @@ optional_policy(` snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_files(services_munin_plugin_t) ') +optional_policy(` + varnishd_read_lib_files(services_munin_plugin_t) +') + ################################## # # local policy for system plugins @@ -295,13 +324,12 @@ allow system_munin_plugin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; rw_files_pattern(system_munin_plugin_t, munin_var_lib_t, munin_var_lib_t) +# needed by munin_* plugins +allow system_munin_plugin_t munin_log_t:file read_file_perms; + kernel_read_network_state(system_munin_plugin_t) kernel_read_all_sysctls(system_munin_plugin_t) -corecmd_exec_shell(system_munin_plugin_t) - -fs_getattr_all_fs(system_munin_plugin_t) - dev_read_sysfs(system_munin_plugin_t) dev_read_urand(system_munin_plugin_t) @@ -313,3 +341,35 @@ init_read_utmp(system_munin_plugin_t) sysnet_exec_ifconfig(system_munin_plugin_t) term_getattr_unallocated_ttys(system_munin_plugin_t) +term_getattr_all_ttys(system_munin_plugin_t) +term_getattr_all_ptys(system_munin_plugin_t) + +################################ +# +# local policy for munin plugin domains +# + +allow munin_plugin_domain munin_exec_t:file read_file_perms; +allow munin_plugin_domain munin_t:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms; + +# creates plugin state files +manage_files_pattern(munin_plugin_domain, munin_plugin_state_t, munin_plugin_state_t) + +read_lnk_files_pattern(munin_plugin_domain, munin_etc_t, munin_etc_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(munin_plugin_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(munin_plugin_domain) +corecmd_exec_shell(munin_plugin_domain) + +files_search_var_lib(munin_plugin_domain) +files_read_etc_files(munin_plugin_domain) +files_read_usr_files(munin_plugin_domain) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(munin_plugin_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(munin_plugin_domain) + +optional_policy(` + nscd_socket_use(munin_plugin_domain) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mysql.fc b/policy/modules/services/mysql.fc index cc7192c..cb169dc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mysql.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/mysql.fc @@ -1,6 +1,14 @@ # mysql database server # +# /HOME +# +HOME_DIR/\.my\.cnf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mysqld_home_t, s0) +/root/\.my\.cnf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mysqld_home_t, s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/mysqld.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mysqld_unit_file_t,s0) + +# # /etc # /etc/my\.cnf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mysqld_etc_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mysql.if b/policy/modules/services/mysql.if index e9c0982..404ed6d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mysql.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/mysql.if @@ -18,6 +18,24 @@ interface(`mysql_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, mysqld_exec_t, mysqld_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Execute MySQL in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mysql_exec',` + gen_require(` + type mysqld_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, mysqld_exec_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Send a generic signal to MySQL. @@ -36,6 +54,24 @@ interface(`mysql_signal',` allow $1 mysqld_t:process signal; ') +####################################### +## +## Send a null signal to mysql. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mysql_signull',` + gen_require(` + type mysqld_t; + ') + + allow $1 mysqld_t:process signull; +') + ######################################## ## ## Allow the specified domain to connect to postgresql with a tcp socket. @@ -73,6 +109,7 @@ interface(`mysql_stream_connect',` type mysqld_t, mysqld_var_run_t, mysqld_db_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) stream_connect_pattern($1, mysqld_var_run_t, mysqld_var_run_t, mysqld_t) stream_connect_pattern($1, mysqld_db_t, mysqld_var_run_t, mysqld_t) ') @@ -122,6 +159,26 @@ interface(`mysql_search_db',` ######################################## ## +## List the directories that contain MySQL +## database storage. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mysql_list_db',` + gen_require(` + type mysqld_db_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 mysqld_db_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write to the MySQL database directory. ## ## @@ -252,12 +309,12 @@ interface(`mysql_write_log',` ') logging_search_logs($1) - allow $1 mysqld_log_t:file { write_file_perms setattr }; + allow $1 mysqld_log_t:file { write_file_perms setattr_file_perms }; ') ###################################### ## -## Execute MySQL server in the mysql domain. +## Execute MySQL safe script in the mysql safe domain. ## ## ## @@ -273,6 +330,24 @@ interface(`mysql_domtrans_mysql_safe',` domtrans_pattern($1, mysqld_safe_exec_t, mysqld_safe_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Execute MySQL_safe in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mysql_safe_exec',` + gen_require(` + type mysqld_safe_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, mysqld_safe_exec_t) +') + ##################################### ## ## Read MySQL PID files. @@ -313,6 +388,67 @@ interface(`mysql_search_pid_files',` ######################################## ## +## Execute mysqld server in the mysqld domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`mysql_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type mysqld_unit_file_t; + type mysqld_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 mysqld_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 mysqld_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, mysqld_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## read mysqld homedir content (.k5login) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mysql_read_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type mysqld_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, mysqld_home_t, mysqld_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to mysqld named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mysql_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type mysqld_home_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, mysqld_home_t, file, ".my.cnf") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, mysqld_home_t, file, ".my.cnf") +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate an mysql environment ## ## @@ -329,27 +465,45 @@ interface(`mysql_search_pid_files',` # interface(`mysql_admin',` gen_require(` - type mysqld_t, mysqld_var_run_t; - type mysqld_tmp_t, mysqld_db_t; - type mysqld_etc_t, mysqld_log_t; - type mysqld_initrc_exec_t; + type mysqld_t, mysqld_var_run_t, mysqld_initrc_exec_t; + type mysqld_tmp_t, mysqld_db_t, mysqld_log_t; + type mysqld_etc_t; + type mysqld_home_t; + type mysqld_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 mysqld_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 mysqld_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, mysqld_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 mysqld_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, mysqld_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 mysqld_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, mysqld_var_run_t) admin_pattern($1, mysqld_db_t) + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, mysqld_etc_t) + logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, mysqld_log_t) + files_list_tmp($1) admin_pattern($1, mysqld_tmp_t) + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + files_list_root($1) + admin_pattern($1, mysqld_home_t) + + mysql_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, mysqld_unit_file_t) + allow $1 mysqld_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + + mysql_stream_connect($1) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/mysql.te b/policy/modules/services/mysql.te index 0a0d63c..a798a26 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/mysql.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/mysql.te @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ policy_module(mysql, 1.12.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow mysqld to connect to all ports -##

    +##

    +## Allow mysqld to connect to all ports +##

    ##     gen_tunable(mysql_connect_any, false) @@ -29,6 +29,12 @@ files_type(mysqld_db_t) type mysqld_etc_t alias etc_mysqld_t; files_config_file(mysqld_etc_t) +type mysqld_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(mysqld_home_t) + +type mysqld_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(mysqld_unit_file_t) + type mysqld_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(mysqld_initrc_exec_t) @@ -64,11 +70,12 @@ allow mysqld_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_db_t, mysqld_db_t) manage_files_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_db_t, mysqld_db_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_db_t, mysqld_db_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_db_t, mysqld_db_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(mysqld_t, mysqld_db_t, { dir file lnk_file }) allow mysqld_t mysqld_etc_t:file read_file_perms; -allow mysqld_t mysqld_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow mysqld_t mysqld_etc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; allow mysqld_t mysqld_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow mysqld_t mysqld_log_t:file manage_file_perms; @@ -78,13 +85,21 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_tmp_t, mysqld_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_tmp_t, mysqld_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(mysqld_t, mysqld_tmp_t, { file dir }) +manage_dirs_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_var_run_t, mysqld_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_var_run_t, mysqld_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_var_run_t, mysqld_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(mysqld_t, mysqld_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(mysqld_t, mysqld_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) + +userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(mysqld_t) +kernel_read_network_state(mysqld_t) kernel_read_system_state(mysqld_t) +kernel_read_network_state(mysqld_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mysqld_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(mysqld_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(mysqld_t) + corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(mysqld_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(mysqld_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(mysqld_t) @@ -122,13 +137,8 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(mysqld_t) sysnet_read_config(mysqld_t) -userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(mysqld_t) -# for /root/.my.cnf - should not be needed: -userdom_read_user_home_content_files(mysqld_t) - ifdef(`distro_redhat',` - # because Fedora has the sock_file in the database directory - type_transition mysqld_t mysqld_db_t:sock_file mysqld_var_run_t; + filetrans_pattern(mysqld_t, mysqld_db_t, mysqld_var_run_t, sock_file) ') tunable_policy(`mysql_connect_any',` @@ -154,10 +164,11 @@ optional_policy(` # allow mysqld_safe_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner kill }; -dontaudit mysqld_safe_t self:capability sys_ptrace; +allow mysqld_safe_t self:process { setsched getsched setrlimit }; allow mysqld_safe_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; read_lnk_files_pattern(mysqld_safe_t, mysqld_db_t, mysqld_db_t) +delete_sock_files_pattern(mysqld_safe_t, mysqld_db_t, mysqld_db_t) domtrans_pattern(mysqld_safe_t, mysqld_exec_t, mysqld_t) @@ -170,26 +181,35 @@ kernel_read_system_state(mysqld_safe_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mysqld_safe_t) corecmd_exec_bin(mysqld_safe_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(mysqld_safe_t) dev_list_sysfs(mysqld_safe_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(mysqld_safe_t) +files_dontaudit_search_all_mountpoints(mysqld_safe_t) files_read_etc_files(mysqld_safe_t) files_read_usr_files(mysqld_safe_t) files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(mysqld_safe_t) logging_log_filetrans(mysqld_safe_t, mysqld_log_t, file) -hostname_exec(mysqld_safe_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(mysqld_safe_t) + +auth_read_passwd(mysqld_safe_t) miscfiles_read_localization(mysqld_safe_t) mysql_manage_db_files(mysqld_safe_t) mysql_read_config(mysqld_safe_t) mysql_search_pid_files(mysqld_safe_t) +mysql_signull(mysqld_safe_t) mysql_write_log(mysqld_safe_t) +optional_policy(` + hostname_exec(mysqld_safe_t) +') + ######################################## # # MySQL Manager Policy diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nagios.fc b/policy/modules/services/nagios.fc index 1fc9905..d80b4db 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nagios.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/nagios.fc @@ -6,8 +6,8 @@ /usr/s?bin/nagios -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_exec_t,s0) /usr/s?bin/nrpe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nrpe_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/cgi-bin/netsaint(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_nagios_script_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/cgi(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_nagios_script_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cgi-bin/netsaint(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_nagios_script_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/cgi(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_nagios_script_exec_t,s0) /var/log/nagios(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_log_t,s0) /var/log/netsaint(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_log_t,s0) @@ -19,70 +19,75 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',` /usr/sbin/nagios -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_exec_t,s0) ') -/usr/lib(64)?/cgi-bin/nagios(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_nagios_script_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_nagios_script_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cgi-bin/nagios(/.+)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_nagios_script_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_nagios_script_exec_t,s0) # admin plugins -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_file_age -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_file_age -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_admin_plugin_exec_t,s0) # check disk plugins -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_disk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_disk_smb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_ide_smart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_linux_raid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_disk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_disk_smb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ide_smart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_linux_raid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t,s0) # mail plugins -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_mailq -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mailq -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_mail_plugin_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/pnp4nagios(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_var_lib_t,s0) # system plugins -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_breeze -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_dummy -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_flexlm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_ifoperstatus -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_ifstatus -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_load -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_mrtg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_mrtgtraf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_nagios -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_nwstat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_overcr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_procs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_sensors -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_swap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_users -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_wave -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_breeze -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dummy -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_flexlm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ifoperstatus -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ifstatus -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_load -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mrtg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mrtgtraf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nagios -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nwstat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_overcr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_procs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_sensors -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_swap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_users -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_wave -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_system_plugin_exec_t,s0) # services plugins -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_cluster -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_dhcp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_dig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_dns -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_game -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_fping -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_hpjd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_http -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_icmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_ircd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_ldap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_mysql -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_mysql_query -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_nrpe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_nt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_ntp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_oracle -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_pgsql -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_ping -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_radius -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_real -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_rpc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_tcp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_time -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_sip -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_smtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_snmp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_ssh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_ups -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_cluster -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dhcp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_dns -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_game -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_fping -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_hpjd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_http -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_icmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ircd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ldap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mysql -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_mysql_query -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nrpe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_nt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ntp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_oracle -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_pgsql -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ping -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_radius -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_real -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_rpc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_tcp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_time -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_sip -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_smtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_snmp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ssh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_ups -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_services_plugin_exec_t,s0) # unconfined plugins -/usr/lib(64)?/nagios/plugins/check_by_ssh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/check_by_ssh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_unconfined_plugin_exec_t,s0) + +# eventhandlers +/usr/lib/nagios/plugins/eventhandlers(/.*) gen_context(system_u:object_r:nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nagios.if b/policy/modules/services/nagios.if index 8581040..7d8e93b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nagios.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/nagios.if @@ -12,31 +12,22 @@ ## # template(`nagios_plugin_template',` - gen_require(` + attribute nagios_plugin_domain; type nagios_t, nrpe_t; - type nagios_log_t; ') - type nagios_$1_plugin_t; + type nagios_$1_plugin_t, nagios_plugin_domain; type nagios_$1_plugin_exec_t; application_domain(nagios_$1_plugin_t, nagios_$1_plugin_exec_t) role system_r types nagios_$1_plugin_t; - allow nagios_$1_plugin_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - domtrans_pattern(nrpe_t, nagios_$1_plugin_exec_t, nagios_$1_plugin_t) + allow nagios_t nagios_$1_plugin_exec_t:file ioctl; # needed by command.cfg domtrans_pattern(nagios_t, nagios_$1_plugin_exec_t, nagios_$1_plugin_t) - allow nagios_t nagios_$1_plugin_t:process signal_perms; - - # cjp: leaked file descriptor - dontaudit nagios_$1_plugin_t nrpe_t:tcp_socket { read write }; - dontaudit nagios_$1_plugin_t nagios_log_t:file { read write }; - - miscfiles_read_localization(nagios_$1_plugin_t) ') ######################################## @@ -49,7 +40,6 @@ template(`nagios_plugin_template',` ## Domain to not audit. ##     ## -## # interface(`nagios_dontaudit_rw_pipes',` gen_require(` @@ -159,6 +149,26 @@ interface(`nagios_read_tmp_files',` ######################################## ## +## Allow the specified domain to read +## nagios temporary files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nagios_rw_inerited_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type nagios_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 nagios_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + files_search_tmp($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute the nagios NRPE with ## a domain transition. ## @@ -195,15 +205,16 @@ interface(`nagios_domtrans_nrpe',` # interface(`nagios_admin',` gen_require(` - type nagios_t, nrpe_t; - type nagios_tmp_t, nagios_log_t; - type nagios_etc_t, nrpe_etc_t; - type nagios_spool_t, nagios_var_run_t; - type nagios_initrc_exec_t; + type nagios_t, nrpe_t, nagios_initrc_exec_t; + type nagios_tmp_t, nagios_log_t, nagios_var_run_t; + type nagios_etc_t, nrpe_etc_t, nagios_spool_t; ') - allow $1 nagios_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 nagios_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, nagios_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 nagios_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, nagios_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nagios.te b/policy/modules/services/nagios.te index bf64a4c..1f9d8e1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nagios.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/nagios.te @@ -5,6 +5,8 @@ policy_module(nagios, 1.10.0) # Declarations # +attribute nagios_plugin_domain; + type nagios_t; type nagios_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(nagios_t, nagios_exec_t) @@ -25,7 +27,10 @@ type nagios_var_run_t; files_pid_file(nagios_var_run_t) type nagios_spool_t; -files_type(nagios_spool_t) +files_spool_file(nagios_spool_t) + +type nagios_var_lib_t; +files_type(nagios_var_lib_t) nagios_plugin_template(admin) nagios_plugin_template(checkdisk) @@ -33,6 +38,10 @@ nagios_plugin_template(mail) nagios_plugin_template(services) nagios_plugin_template(system) nagios_plugin_template(unconfined) +nagios_plugin_template(eventhandler) + +type nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t) type nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t) @@ -77,8 +86,13 @@ files_pid_filetrans(nagios_t, nagios_var_run_t, file) manage_fifo_files_pattern(nagios_t, nagios_spool_t, nagios_spool_t) files_spool_filetrans(nagios_t, nagios_spool_t, fifo_file) +manage_files_pattern(nagios_t, nagios_var_lib_t, nagios_var_lib_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(nagios_t, nagios_var_lib_t, nagios_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(nagios_t, nagios_var_lib_t, { file dir }) + kernel_read_system_state(nagios_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nagios_t) +kernel_read_software_raid_state(nagios_t) corecmd_exec_bin(nagios_t) corecmd_exec_shell(nagios_t) @@ -107,13 +121,11 @@ files_read_etc_files(nagios_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(nagios_t) files_read_kernel_symbol_table(nagios_t) files_search_spool(nagios_t) +files_read_usr_files(nagios_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(nagios_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nagios_t) -# for who -init_read_utmp(nagios_t) - auth_use_nsswitch(nagios_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(nagios_t) @@ -124,10 +136,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(nagios_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(nagios_t) mta_send_mail(nagios_t) +mta_signal_system_mail(nagios_t) +mta_kill_system_mail(nagios_t) optional_policy(` - netutils_domtrans_ping(nagios_t) - netutils_signal_ping(nagios_t) netutils_kill_ping(nagios_t) ') @@ -143,6 +155,7 @@ optional_policy(` # # Nagios CGI local policy # + optional_policy(` apache_content_template(nagios) typealias httpd_nagios_script_t alias nagios_cgi_t; @@ -180,11 +193,13 @@ optional_policy(` # allow nrpe_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; -dontaudit nrpe_t self:capability {sys_tty_config sys_resource}; +dontaudit nrpe_t self:capability { sys_tty_config sys_resource }; allow nrpe_t self:process { setpgid signal_perms setsched setrlimit }; allow nrpe_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow nrpe_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +read_files_pattern(nrpe_t, nrpe_etc_t, nrpe_etc_t) + domtrans_pattern(nrpe_t, nagios_checkdisk_plugin_exec_t, nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t) read_files_pattern(nrpe_t, nagios_etc_t, nagios_etc_t) @@ -201,7 +216,8 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(nrpe_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(nrpe_t) corenet_tcp_bind_inetd_child_port(nrpe_t) -corenet_sendrecv_unlabeled_packets(nrpe_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(nrpe_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(nrpe_t) dev_read_sysfs(nrpe_t) dev_read_urand(nrpe_t) @@ -211,6 +227,7 @@ domain_read_all_domains_state(nrpe_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(nrpe_t) files_read_etc_files(nrpe_t) +files_read_usr_files(nrpe_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(nrpe_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nrpe_t) @@ -251,7 +268,6 @@ optional_policy(` corecmd_read_bin_files(nagios_admin_plugin_t) corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(nagios_admin_plugin_t) -dev_read_urand(nagios_admin_plugin_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(nagios_admin_plugin_t) dev_getattr_all_blk_files(nagios_admin_plugin_t) @@ -270,19 +286,15 @@ files_getattr_all_file_type_fs(nagios_admin_plugin_t) # allow nagios_mail_plugin_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override }; - allow nagios_mail_plugin_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; allow nagios_mail_plugin_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow nagios_mail_plugin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; -kernel_read_system_state(nagios_mail_plugin_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nagios_mail_plugin_t) corecmd_read_bin_files(nagios_mail_plugin_t) corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(nagios_mail_plugin_t) -dev_read_urand(nagios_mail_plugin_t) - files_read_etc_files(nagios_mail_plugin_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(nagios_mail_plugin_t) @@ -299,7 +311,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` postfix_stream_connect_master(nagios_mail_plugin_t) - posftix_exec_postqueue(nagios_mail_plugin_t) + postfix_exec_postqueue(nagios_mail_plugin_t) ') ###################################### @@ -310,6 +322,9 @@ optional_policy(` # needed by ioctl() allow nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t self:capability { sys_admin sys_rawio }; +kernel_read_software_raid_state(nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t) + +files_getattr_all_dirs(nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t) @@ -321,11 +336,11 @@ storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(nagios_checkdisk_plugin_t) # local policy for service check plugins # -allow nagios_services_plugin_t self:capability { net_bind_service net_raw }; +allow nagios_services_plugin_t self:capability { setuid net_bind_service net_raw }; allow nagios_services_plugin_t self:process { signal sigkill }; - allow nagios_services_plugin_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow nagios_services_plugin_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow nagios_services_plugin_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; corecmd_exec_bin(nagios_services_plugin_t) @@ -340,6 +355,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(nagios_services_plugin_t) optional_policy(` netutils_domtrans_ping(nagios_services_plugin_t) + netutils_signal_ping(nagios_services_plugin_t) + netutils_kill_ping(nagios_services_plugin_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -363,6 +380,8 @@ manage_files_pattern(nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t, nagios_ manage_dirs_pattern(nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t, nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_system_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file }) +read_files_pattern(nagios_system_plugin_t, nagios_log_t, nagios_log_t) + kernel_read_system_state(nagios_system_plugin_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nagios_system_plugin_t) @@ -370,12 +389,15 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(nagios_system_plugin_t) corecmd_exec_shell(nagios_system_plugin_t) dev_read_sysfs(nagios_system_plugin_t) -dev_read_urand(nagios_system_plugin_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(nagios_system_plugin_t) files_read_etc_files(nagios_system_plugin_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(nagios_system_plugin_t) + +auth_read_passwd(nagios_system_plugin_t) + # needed by check_users plugin optional_policy(` init_read_utmp(nagios_system_plugin_t) @@ -389,3 +411,52 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(nagios_unconfined_plugin_t) ') + +####################################### +# +# Event handler plugin plugin policy +# + +manage_files_pattern(nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t, nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t, nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t, nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t, nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t, nagios_eventhandler_plugin_tmp_t, { dir file }) + +corecmd_exec_bin(nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t) + +init_domtrans_script(nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t) + +systemd_exec_systemctl(nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t) + +allow nagios_t nagios_eventhandler_plugin_exec_t:dir list_dir_perms; + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(nagios_eventhandler_plugin_t) +') + +###################################### +# +# nagios plugin domain policy +# + +allow nagios_plugin_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +allow nrpe_t nagios_plugin_domain:process { signal sigkill }; + +allow nagios_t nagios_plugin_domain:process signal_perms; + +# cjp: leaked file descriptor +dontaudit nagios_plugin_domain nrpe_t:tcp_socket { read write }; +dontaudit nagios_plugin_domain nagios_log_t:file { read write }; + +kernel_read_system_state(nagios_plugin_domain) + +dev_read_urand(nagios_plugin_domain) +dev_read_rand(nagios_plugin_domain) + +files_read_usr_files(nagios_plugin_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(nagios_plugin_domain) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(nagios_plugin_domain) +userdom_use_inherited_user_ttys(nagios_plugin_domain) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nessus.fc b/policy/modules/services/nessus.fc index 74da57f..b94bb3b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nessus.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/nessus.fc @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /etc/nessus/nessusd\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nessusd_etc_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nessus/plugins/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nessusd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nessus/plugins/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nessusd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/nessusd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nessusd_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.fc b/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.fc index 386543b..8fe1d63 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.fc @@ -1,6 +1,19 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/wicd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher\.d(/.*) gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/NetworkManager(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_etc_t,s0) +/etc/NetworkManager/NetworkManager\.conf gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_etc_rw_t,s0) +/etc/NetworkManager/system-connections(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_etc_rw_t,s0) +/etc/NetworkManager/dispatcher\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/dhcp/manager-settings.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_lib_t, s0) +/etc/dhcp/wireless-settings.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_lib_t, s0) +/etc/dhcp/wired-settings.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_lib_t, s0) + +/etc/wicd/manager-settings.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_lib_t, s0) +/etc/wicd/wireless-settings.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_lib_t, s0) +/etc/wicd/wired-settings.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_lib_t, s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/NetworkManager.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_unit_file_t,s0) /usr/libexec/nm-dispatcher.action -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t,s0) @@ -12,15 +25,19 @@ /usr/sbin/NetworkManagerDispatcher -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/nm-system-settings -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/wicd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/wpa_cli -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wpa_cli_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/wpa_supplicant -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/wicd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/NetworkManager(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_lib_t,s0) -/var/log/wicd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_log_t,s0) +/var/log/wicd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_log_t,s0) + /var/log/wpa_supplicant.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_log_t,s0) /var/run/NetworkManager\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/NetworkManager(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/nm-dhclient.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/nm-dns-dnsmasq\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/wpa_supplicant(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/wpa_supplicant-global -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:NetworkManager_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.if b/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.if index 2324d9e..da61d01 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.if @@ -43,9 +43,9 @@ interface(`networkmanager_rw_packet_sockets',` ## Allow caller to relabel tun_socket ##     ## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## ## # interface(`networkmanager_attach_tun_iface',` @@ -116,6 +116,29 @@ interface(`networkmanager_initrc_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute NetworkManager server in the NetworkManager domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`networkmanager_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type NetworkManager_unit_file_t; + type NetworkManager_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 NetworkManager_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 NetworkManager_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, NetworkManager_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Send and receive messages from ## NetworkManager over dbus. ## @@ -137,6 +160,28 @@ interface(`networkmanager_dbus_chat',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to send and +## receive messages from NetworkManager +## over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`networkmanager_dontaudit_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type NetworkManager_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + dontaudit $1 NetworkManager_t:dbus send_msg; + dontaudit NetworkManager_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## ## Send a generic signal to NetworkManager ## ## @@ -191,3 +236,90 @@ interface(`networkmanager_read_pid_files',` files_search_pids($1) allow $1 NetworkManager_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; ') + +######################################## +## +## Execute NetworkManager in the NetworkManager domain, and +## allow the specified role the NetworkManager domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`networkmanager_run',` + gen_require(` + type NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_exec_t; + ') + + networkmanager_domtrans($1) + role $2 types NetworkManager_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to append +## to Network Manager log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`networkmanager_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type NetworkManager_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + allow $1 NetworkManager_log_t:dir list_dir_perms; + append_files_pattern($1, NetworkManager_log_t, NetworkManager_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to networkmanager named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`networkmanager_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type NetworkManager_var_run_t; + type NetworkManager_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth0.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth1.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth2.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth3.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth4.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth5.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth6.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth7.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth8.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient.-eth9.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient-em0.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient-em1.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient-em2.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient-em3.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient-em4.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient-em5.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient-em6.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient-em7.conf") + files_pid_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_run_t, file, "nm-dhclient-em8.conf") + files_etc_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_lib_t, file, "manager-settings.conf") + files_etc_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_lib_t, file, "wireless-settings.conf") + files_etc_filetrans($1, NetworkManager_var_lib_t, file, "wireed-settings.conf") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.te b/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.te index 0619395..103f6f8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/networkmanager.te @@ -12,6 +12,15 @@ init_daemon_domain(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_exec_t) type NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(NetworkManager_initrc_exec_t) +type NetworkManager_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(NetworkManager_unit_file_t) + +type NetworkManager_etc_t; +files_config_file(NetworkManager_etc_t) + +type NetworkManager_etc_rw_t; +files_config_file(NetworkManager_etc_rw_t) + type NetworkManager_log_t; logging_log_file(NetworkManager_log_t) @@ -35,16 +44,26 @@ init_system_domain(wpa_cli_t, wpa_cli_exec_t) # networkmanager will ptrace itself if gdb is installed # and it receives a unexpected signal (rh bug #204161) -allow NetworkManager_t self:capability { chown fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_nice sys_ptrace dac_override net_admin net_raw net_bind_service ipc_lock }; -dontaudit NetworkManager_t self:capability { sys_tty_config sys_ptrace }; -allow NetworkManager_t self:process { ptrace getcap setcap setpgid getsched setsched signal_perms }; +allow NetworkManager_t self:capability { chown fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_admin sys_nice dac_override net_admin net_raw net_bind_service ipc_lock }; +dontaudit NetworkManager_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + # caused by some bogus kernel code + dontaudit NetworkManager_t self:capability sys_module; +') +allow NetworkManager_t self:process { getcap setcap setpgid getsched setsched signal_perms }; +tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow NetworkManager_t self:capability sys_ptrace; + allow NetworkManager_t self:process ptrace; +') + allow NetworkManager_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow NetworkManager_t self:unix_dgram_socket { sendto create_socket_perms }; allow NetworkManager_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow NetworkManager_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; +allow NetworkManager_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; allow NetworkManager_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; allow NetworkManager_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -allow NetworkManager_t self:tun_socket { create_socket_perms relabelfrom }; +allow NetworkManager_t self:tun_socket { create_socket_perms relabelfrom relabelto }; allow NetworkManager_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow NetworkManager_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -52,9 +71,20 @@ allow NetworkManager_t wpa_cli_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; can_exec(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_exec_t) +list_dirs_pattern(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_etc_t, NetworkManager_etc_t) +read_files_pattern(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_etc_t, NetworkManager_etc_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_etc_t, NetworkManager_etc_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_etc_rw_t, NetworkManager_etc_rw_t) +manage_files_pattern(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_etc_rw_t, NetworkManager_etc_rw_t) +filetrans_pattern(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_etc_t, NetworkManager_etc_rw_t, { dir file }) + +logging_log_filetrans(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_log_t, file) + manage_files_pattern(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_log_t, NetworkManager_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_log_t, file) +can_exec(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_tmp_t, NetworkManager_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_tmp_t, NetworkManager_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_tmp_t, { sock_file file }) @@ -95,11 +125,12 @@ corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(NetworkManager_t) corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(NetworkManager_t) corenet_getattr_ppp_dev(NetworkManager_t) -dev_read_sysfs(NetworkManager_t) +dev_rw_sysfs(NetworkManager_t) dev_read_rand(NetworkManager_t) dev_read_urand(NetworkManager_t) dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_blk_files(NetworkManager_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(NetworkManager_t) +dev_rw_wireless(NetworkManager_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(NetworkManager_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(NetworkManager_t) @@ -113,10 +144,11 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(NetworkManager_t) corecmd_exec_bin(NetworkManager_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(NetworkManager_t) -domain_read_confined_domains_state(NetworkManager_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(NetworkManager_t) files_read_etc_files(NetworkManager_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(NetworkManager_t) +files_read_system_conf_files(NetworkManager_t) files_read_usr_files(NetworkManager_t) files_read_usr_src_files(NetworkManager_t) @@ -133,30 +165,37 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(NetworkManager_t) miscfiles_read_localization(NetworkManager_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs(NetworkManager_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(NetworkManager_t) - seutil_read_config(NetworkManager_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(NetworkManager_t) sysnet_domtrans_dhcpc(NetworkManager_t) sysnet_signal_dhcpc(NetworkManager_t) +sysnet_signull_dhcpc(NetworkManager_t) sysnet_read_dhcpc_pid(NetworkManager_t) +sysnet_read_dhcp_config(NetworkManager_t) sysnet_delete_dhcpc_pid(NetworkManager_t) +sysnet_kill_dhcpc(NetworkManager_t) +sysnet_read_dhcpc_state(NetworkManager_t) +sysnet_delete_dhcpc_state(NetworkManager_t) sysnet_search_dhcp_state(NetworkManager_t) # in /etc created by NetworkManager will be labelled net_conf_t. sysnet_manage_config(NetworkManager_t) sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(NetworkManager_t) +userdom_stream_connect(NetworkManager_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(NetworkManager_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys(NetworkManager_t) # Read gnome-keyring +userdom_read_home_certs(NetworkManager_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(NetworkManager_t) +userdom_dgram_send(NetworkManager_t) optional_policy(` avahi_domtrans(NetworkManager_t) avahi_kill(NetworkManager_t) avahi_signal(NetworkManager_t) avahi_signull(NetworkManager_t) + avahi_dbus_chat(NetworkManager_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -176,10 +215,17 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + cron_read_system_job_lib_files(NetworkManager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_domain(NetworkManager_t, NetworkManager_exec_t) + init_dbus_chat(NetworkManager_t) + optional_policy(` consolekit_dbus_chat(NetworkManager_t) + consolekit_read_pid_files(NetworkManager_t) ') ') @@ -191,6 +237,7 @@ optional_policy(` dnsmasq_kill(NetworkManager_t) dnsmasq_signal(NetworkManager_t) dnsmasq_signull(NetworkManager_t) + dnsmasq_systemctl(NetworkManager_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -202,23 +249,45 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(NetworkManager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ipsec_domtrans_mgmt(NetworkManager_t) + ipsec_kill_mgmt(NetworkManager_t) + ipsec_signal_mgmt(NetworkManager_t) + ipsec_signull_mgmt(NetworkManager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` iptables_domtrans(NetworkManager_t) ') optional_policy(` + netutils_exec_ping(NetworkManager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nscd_domtrans(NetworkManager_t) nscd_signal(NetworkManager_t) nscd_signull(NetworkManager_t) nscd_kill(NetworkManager_t) nscd_initrc_domtrans(NetworkManager_t) + nscd_systemctl(NetworkManager_t) ') optional_policy(` # Dispatcher starting and stoping ntp ntp_initrc_domtrans(NetworkManager_t) + ntp_systemctl(NetworkManager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(NetworkManager_t) ') optional_policy(` + openvpn_read_config(NetworkManager_t) openvpn_domtrans(NetworkManager_t) openvpn_kill(NetworkManager_t) openvpn_signal(NetworkManager_t) @@ -234,6 +303,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + polipo_systemctl(NetworkManager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` ppp_initrc_domtrans(NetworkManager_t) ppp_domtrans(NetworkManager_t) ppp_manage_pid_files(NetworkManager_t) @@ -241,6 +314,7 @@ optional_policy(` ppp_signal(NetworkManager_t) ppp_signull(NetworkManager_t) ppp_read_config(NetworkManager_t) + ppp_systemctl(NetworkManager_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -254,6 +328,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + systemd_read_logind_sessions_files(NetworkManager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_exec(NetworkManager_t) udev_read_db(NetworkManager_t) ') @@ -263,6 +341,7 @@ optional_policy(` vpn_kill(NetworkManager_t) vpn_signal(NetworkManager_t) vpn_signull(NetworkManager_t) + vpn_relabelfrom_tun_socket(NetworkManager_t) ') ######################################## diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nis.fc b/policy/modules/services/nis.fc index 15448d5..36b45bd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nis.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/nis.fc @@ -1,5 +1,5 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ypbind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypbind_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/yppasswd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nis_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/yppasswdd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nis_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ypserv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nis_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ypxfrd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nis_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/ypserv\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypserv_conf_t,s0) @@ -7,10 +7,11 @@ /sbin/ypbind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypbind_exec_t,s0) /usr/lib/yp/ypxfr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypxfr_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/yp/ypxfr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypxfr_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rpc\.yppasswdd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:yppasswdd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/rpc\.yppasswdd\.env -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:yppasswdd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rpc\.ypxfrd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypxfr_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ypbind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypbind_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/ypserv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypserv_exec_t,s0) /var/yp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_yp_t,s0) @@ -19,3 +20,8 @@ /var/run/ypbind.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypbind_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/ypserv.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypserv_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/yppass.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:yppasswdd_var_run_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ypbind.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ypbind_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ypserv.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nis_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/yppasswdd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nis_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ypxfrd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nis_unit_file_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nis.if b/policy/modules/services/nis.if index abe3f7f..8ba3aef 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nis.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/nis.if @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind_uncond',` allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow $1 var_yp_t:dir list_dir_perms; - allow $1 var_yp_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; + allow $1 var_yp_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; allow $1 var_yp_t:file read_file_perms; corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) @@ -49,14 +49,15 @@ interface(`nis_use_ypbind_uncond',` corenet_udp_bind_generic_node($1) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port($1) corenet_udp_bind_generic_port($1) - corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports($1) - corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_reserved_ports($1) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_rpc_ports($1) + corenet_udp_bind_all_rpc_ports($1) corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_ports($1) corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_ports($1) corenet_tcp_connect_portmap_port($1) - corenet_tcp_connect_reserved_port($1) + corenet_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports($1) corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port($1) - corenet_dontaudit_tcp_connect_all_ports($1) +# Attempt to see if this is actually needed +# corenet_dontaudit_tcp_connect_all_ports($1) corenet_sendrecv_portmap_client_packets($1) corenet_sendrecv_generic_client_packets($1) corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets($1) @@ -243,25 +244,6 @@ interface(`nis_read_ypbind_pid',` ######################################## ## -## Delete ypbind pid files. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`nis_delete_ypbind_pid',` - gen_require(` - type ypbind_t; - ') - - # TODO: add delete pid from dir call to files - allow $1 ypbind_t:file unlink; -') - -######################################## -## ## Read ypserv configuration files. ## ## @@ -337,6 +319,55 @@ interface(`nis_initrc_domtrans_ypbind',` ######################################## ## +## Execute ypbind server in the ypbind domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`nis_systemctl_ypbind',` + gen_require(` + type ypbind_unit_file_t; + type ypbind_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 ypbind_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 ypbind_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, ypbind_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute ypbind server in the ypbind domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`nis_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type nis_unit_file_t, ypbind_unit_file_t; + type ypbind_t, yppasswdd_t, ypserv_t, ypxfr_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 nis_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 nis_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, ypbind_t) + ps_process_pattern($1, yppasswdd_t) + ps_process_pattern($1, ypserv_t) + ps_process_pattern($1, ypxfr_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an nis environment ## @@ -354,22 +385,30 @@ interface(`nis_initrc_domtrans_ypbind',` # interface(`nis_admin',` gen_require(` - type ypbind_t, yppasswdd_t, ypserv_t, ypxfr_t; - type ypbind_tmp_t, ypserv_tmp_t, ypserv_conf_t; + type ypbind_t, yppasswdd_t, ypserv_t; + type ypserv_conf_t; type ypbind_var_run_t, yppasswdd_var_run_t, ypserv_var_run_t; - type ypbind_initrc_exec_t, nis_initrc_exec_t; + type ypbind_initrc_exec_t, nis_initrc_exec_t, ypxfr_t; + type nis_unit_file_t; + type ypbind_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 ypbind_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 ypbind_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, ypbind_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ypbind_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 yppasswdd_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 ypserv_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 ypxfr_t:process ptrace; + ') - allow $1 yppasswdd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 yppasswdd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, yppasswdd_t) - allow $1 ypserv_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 ypserv_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, ypserv_t) - allow $1 ypxfr_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 ypxfr_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, ypxfr_t) nis_initrc_domtrans($1) @@ -379,18 +418,20 @@ interface(`nis_admin',` role_transition $2 ypbind_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - files_list_tmp($1) - admin_pattern($1, ypbind_tmp_t) - files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, ypbind_var_run_t) + nis_systemctl_ypbind($1) + admin_pattern($1, ypbind_unit_file_t) + allow $1 ypbind_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; admin_pattern($1, yppasswdd_var_run_t) files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, ypserv_conf_t) - admin_pattern($1, ypserv_tmp_t) - admin_pattern($1, ypserv_var_run_t) + + nis_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, nis_unit_file_t) + allow $1 nis_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nis.te b/policy/modules/services/nis.te index 4876cae..9f3b09b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nis.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/nis.te @@ -18,12 +18,12 @@ init_daemon_domain(ypbind_t, ypbind_exec_t) type ypbind_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(ypbind_initrc_exec_t) -type ypbind_tmp_t; -files_tmp_file(ypbind_tmp_t) - type ypbind_var_run_t; files_pid_file(ypbind_var_run_t) +type ypbind_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(ypbind_unit_file_t) + type yppasswdd_t; type yppasswdd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(yppasswdd_t, yppasswdd_exec_t) @@ -37,10 +37,7 @@ type ypserv_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(ypserv_t, ypserv_exec_t) type ypserv_conf_t; -files_type(ypserv_conf_t) - -type ypserv_tmp_t; -files_tmp_file(ypserv_tmp_t) +files_config_file(ypserv_conf_t) type ypserv_var_run_t; files_pid_file(ypserv_var_run_t) @@ -52,22 +49,22 @@ init_daemon_domain(ypxfr_t, ypxfr_exec_t) type ypxfr_var_run_t; files_pid_file(ypxfr_var_run_t) +type nis_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(nis_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # ypbind local policy +# dontaudit ypbind_t self:capability { net_admin sys_tty_config }; -allow ypbind_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow ypbind_t self:process signal_perms; +allow ypbind_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow ypbind_t self:{ unix_dgram_socket unix_stream_socket } create_socket_perms; allow ypbind_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; allow ypbind_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow ypbind_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; -manage_dirs_pattern(ypbind_t, ypbind_tmp_t, ypbind_tmp_t) -manage_files_pattern(ypbind_t, ypbind_tmp_t, ypbind_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(ypbind_t, ypbind_tmp_t, { file dir }) - manage_files_pattern(ypbind_t, ypbind_var_run_t, ypbind_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(ypbind_t, ypbind_var_run_t, file) @@ -142,8 +139,8 @@ optional_policy(` allow yppasswdd_t self:capability dac_override; dontaudit yppasswdd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow yppasswdd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow yppasswdd_t self:process { getsched setfscreate signal_perms }; +allow yppasswdd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow yppasswdd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow yppasswdd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow yppasswdd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; @@ -156,6 +153,8 @@ files_pid_filetrans(yppasswdd_t, yppasswdd_var_run_t, file) manage_files_pattern(yppasswdd_t, var_yp_t, var_yp_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(yppasswdd_t, var_yp_t, var_yp_t) +can_exec(yppasswdd_t,yppasswdd_exec_t) + kernel_list_proc(yppasswdd_t) kernel_read_proc_symlinks(yppasswdd_t) kernel_getattr_proc_files(yppasswdd_t) @@ -186,6 +185,7 @@ selinux_get_fs_mount(yppasswdd_t) auth_manage_shadow(yppasswdd_t) auth_relabel_shadow(yppasswdd_t) +auth_read_passwd(yppasswdd_t) auth_etc_filetrans_shadow(yppasswdd_t) corecmd_exec_bin(yppasswdd_t) @@ -211,6 +211,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + mta_send_mail(yppasswdd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(yppasswdd_t) ') @@ -224,8 +228,8 @@ optional_policy(` # dontaudit ypserv_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow ypserv_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow ypserv_t self:process signal_perms; +allow ypserv_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow ypserv_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow ypserv_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow ypserv_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; @@ -236,10 +240,6 @@ manage_files_pattern(ypserv_t, var_yp_t, var_yp_t) allow ypserv_t ypserv_conf_t:file read_file_perms; -manage_dirs_pattern(ypserv_t, ypserv_tmp_t, ypserv_tmp_t) -manage_files_pattern(ypserv_t, ypserv_tmp_t, ypserv_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(ypserv_t, ypserv_tmp_t, { file dir }) - manage_files_pattern(ypserv_t, ypserv_var_run_t, ypserv_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(ypserv_t, ypserv_var_run_t, file) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nova.fc b/policy/modules/services/nova.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..02dc6dc --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/nova.fc @@ -0,0 +1,32 @@ + +/usr/bin/nova-ajax-console-proxy -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_ajax_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-console.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_console_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-direct-api -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_direct_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-api -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_api_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-cert -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_cert_exec_t,s0) +/usr//bin/nova-api-metadata -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_api_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-network -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_network_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-objectstore -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_objectstore_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-scheduler -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_scheduler_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-vncproxy -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_vncproxy_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-volume -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_volume_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/nova-xvpvncproxy -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_vncproxy_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-ajax-console-proxy.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_ajax_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-api.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_api_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-cert.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_cert_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-console.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_console_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-direct-api.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_direct_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-metadata-api.service.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_api_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-network.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_network_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-objectstore.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_objectstore_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-scheduler.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_scheduler_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-vncproxy.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_vncproxy_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-xvpvncproxy.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_vncproxy_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/openstack-nova-volume.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_volume_unit_file_t,s0) + +/var/lib/nova(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/nova(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/nova(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nova_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nova.if b/policy/modules/services/nova.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0d11800 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/nova.if @@ -0,0 +1,33 @@ +## openstack-nova + +####################################### +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## openstack-nova systemd daemon domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`nova_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + attribute nova_domain; + ') + + type nova_$1_t, nova_domain; + type nova_$1_exec_t; + init_daemon_domain(nova_$1_t, nova_$1_exec_t) + + type nova_$1_unit_file_t; + systemd_unit_file(nova_$1_unit_file_t) + + type nova_$1_tmp_t; + files_tmp_file(nova_$1_tmp_t) + + manage_dirs_pattern(nova_$1_t, nova_$1_tmp_t, nova_$1_tmp_t) + manage_files_pattern(nova_$1_t, nova_$1_tmp_t, nova_$1_tmp_t) + files_tmp_filetrans(nova_$1_t, nova_$1_tmp_t, { file dir }) + can_exec(nova_$1_t, nova_$1_tmp_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nova.te b/policy/modules/services/nova.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b0d25bb --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/nova.te @@ -0,0 +1,328 @@ +policy_module(nova, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +# +# nova-stack daemons contain security issue with using sudo in the code +# we make this policy as unconfined until this issue is fixed +# + +attribute nova_domain; + +nova_domain_template(ajax) +nova_domain_template(api) +nova_domain_template(cert) +nova_domain_template(compute) +nova_domain_template(console) +nova_domain_template(direct) +nova_domain_template(network) +nova_domain_template(objectstore) +nova_domain_template(scheduler) +nova_domain_template(vncproxy) +nova_domain_template(volume) + +type nova_log_t; +logging_log_file(nova_log_t) + +type nova_var_lib_t; +files_type(nova_var_lib_t) + +type nova_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(nova_var_run_t) + + +###################################### +# +# nova general domain local policy +# + +allow nova_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow nova_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow nova_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(nova_domain, nova_log_t, nova_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(nova_domain, nova_log_t, nova_log_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(nova_domain, nova_var_lib_t, nova_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(nova_domain, nova_var_lib_t, nova_var_lib_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(nova_domain, nova_var_run_t, nova_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(nova_domain, nova_var_run_t, nova_var_run_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(nova_domain) + +corenet_tcp_connect_amqp_port(nova_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(nova_domain) +corecmd_exec_shell(nova_domain) + +dev_read_urand(nova_domain) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(nova_domain) + +files_read_usr_files(nova_domain) + +libs_exec_ldconfig(nova_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(nova_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(nova_domain) + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_read_config(nova_domain) +') + +###################################### +# +# nova ajax local policy +# + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(nova_ajax_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# nova api local policy +# + +allow nova_api_t self:process setfscreate; + +allow nova_api_t self:key write; + +allow nova_api_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; + +allow nova_api_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nova_api_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(nova_api_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(nova_api_t) +# should be add to booleans +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(nova_api_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(nova_api_t) + +auth_read_passwd(nova_api_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(nova_api_t) + +miscfiles_read_certs(nova_api_t) + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + optional_policy(` + sudo_exec(nova_api_t) + allow nova_api_t self:capability { setuid sys_resource setgid }; + allow nova_api_t self:process { setsched setrlimit }; + logging_send_audit_msgs(nova_api_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + iptables_domtrans(nova_api_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_exec_keygen(nova_api_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(nova_api_t) +') + +###################################### +# +# nova cert local policy +# + +allow nova_cert_t self:process setfscreate; + +allow nova_cert_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +auth_read_passwd(nova_cert_t) + +miscfiles_read_certs(nova_cert_t) + +optional_policy(` + mysql_stream_connect(nova_cert_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# nova compute local policy +# + +# needs to be re-write since now runs as virtd_t + +allow nova_compute_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_network_state(nova_compute_t) + +dev_read_rand(nova_compute_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(nova_compute_t) + +optional_policy(` + virt_getattr_exec(nova_compute_t) + virt_stream_connect(nova_compute_t) +') + +###################################### +# +# nova console local policy +# + +allow nova_console_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +auth_use_nsswitch(nova_console_t) + +####################################### +# +# nova direct local policy +# + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(nova_direct_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# nova network local policy +# + +allow nova_network_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin net_bind_service }; +allow nova_network_t self:process { getcap setcap }; + +allow nova_network_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow nova_network_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_network_state(nova_network_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nova_network_t) + +# should be added to boolean or fixed in the code +# dnsmasq domtrans does not work since then dnsmasq_t wants +# to do some stuff with nova_lib, nova_tmp +# nova-dhcpbridge runs in dnsmasq domain +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(nova_network_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(nova_network_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(nova_network_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(nova_network_t) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(nova_network_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(nova_network_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(nova_network_t) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(nova_network_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(nova_network_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(nova_network_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(nova_network_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(nova_network_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_dns_port(nova_network_t) +corenet_udp_bind_all_ports(nova_network_t) +corenet_sendrecv_dns_server_packets(nova_network_t) +corenet_sendrecv_dhcpd_server_packets(nova_network_t) + +libs_exec_ldconfig(nova_network_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(nova_network_t) + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + optional_policy(` + sudo_exec(nova_network_t) + allow nova_network_t self:capability { setuid sys_resource setgid }; + allow nova_network_t self:process { setsched setrlimit }; + logging_send_audit_msgs(nova_network_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + brctl_domtrans(nova_network_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dnsmasq_exec(nova_network_t) +# dnsmasq_domtrans(nova_network_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + iptables_domtrans(nova_network_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(nova_network_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(nova_network_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# nova object store local policy +# + +allow nova_objectstore_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(nova_objectstore_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(nova_objectstore_t) + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(nova_objectstore_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# nova scheduler local policy +# + +allow nova_scheduler_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow nova_scheduler_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(nova_scheduler_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# nova vncproxy local policy +# + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(nova_vncproxy_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# nova volume local policy +# + +allow nova_volume_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; + +allow nova_volume_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nova_volume_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(nova_volume_t) + +optional_policy(` + lvm_domtrans(nova_volume_t) +') + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + require { + type sudo_exec_t; + } + + allow nova_volume_t sudo_exec_t:file { read execute open execute_no_trans }; + + allow nova_volume_t self:capability { setuid sys_resource setgid audit_write }; + allow nova_volume_t self:process { setsched setrlimit }; + + logging_send_audit_msgs(nova_volume_t) + +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(nova_volume_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nscd.if b/policy/modules/services/nscd.if index 85188dc..783accb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nscd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/nscd.if @@ -116,7 +116,26 @@ interface(`nscd_socket_use',` dontaudit $1 nscd_t:nscd { getserv shmempwd shmemgrp shmemhost shmemserv }; files_search_pids($1) stream_connect_pattern($1, nscd_var_run_t, nscd_var_run_t, nscd_t) - dontaudit $1 nscd_var_run_t:file { getattr read }; + dontaudit $1 nscd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; + ps_process_pattern(nscd_t, $1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Use nscd services +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nscd_use',` + tunable_policy(`nscd_use_shm',` + nscd_shm_use($1) + ',` + nscd_socket_use($1) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -146,11 +165,14 @@ interface(`nscd_shm_use',` # nscd_socket_domain macro. need to investigate # if they are all actually required allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - allow $1 nscd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; - allow $1 nscd_var_run_t:sock_file rw_file_perms; + + # dg: This may not be required. + allow $1 nscd_var_run_t:sock_file read_sock_file_perms; + + stream_connect_pattern($1, nscd_var_run_t, nscd_var_run_t, nscd_t) files_search_pids($1) allow $1 nscd_t:nscd { getpwd getgrp gethost }; - dontaudit $1 nscd_var_run_t:file { getattr read }; + dontaudit $1 nscd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -168,7 +190,7 @@ interface(`nscd_dontaudit_search_pid',` type nscd_var_run_t; ') - dontaudit $1 nscd_var_run_t:dir search; + dontaudit $1 nscd_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -224,6 +246,7 @@ interface(`nscd_unconfined',` ## Role allowed access. ##     ## +## # interface(`nscd_run',` gen_require(` @@ -254,6 +277,29 @@ interface(`nscd_initrc_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute nscd server in the nscd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`nscd_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type nscd_unit_file_t; + type nscd_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 nscd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 nscd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, nscd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an nscd environment ## @@ -273,10 +319,14 @@ interface(`nscd_admin',` gen_require(` type nscd_t, nscd_log_t, nscd_var_run_t; type nscd_initrc_exec_t; + type nscd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 nscd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 nscd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, nscd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 nscd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, nscd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -288,4 +338,8 @@ interface(`nscd_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, nscd_var_run_t) + + nscd_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, ncsd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 ncsd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nscd.te b/policy/modules/services/nscd.te index 7936e09..c0538d0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nscd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/nscd.te @@ -1,9 +1,16 @@ -policy_module(nscd, 1.10.0) +policy_module(nscd, 1.10.1) gen_require(` class nscd all_nscd_perms; ') +## +##

    +## Allow confined applications to use nscd shared memory. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(nscd_use_shm, false) + ######################################## # # Declarations @@ -22,6 +29,9 @@ init_daemon_domain(nscd_t, nscd_exec_t) type nscd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(nscd_initrc_exec_t) +type nscd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(nscd_unit_file_t) + type nscd_log_t; logging_log_file(nscd_log_t) @@ -47,13 +57,15 @@ allow nscd_t self:nscd { admin getstat }; allow nscd_t nscd_log_t:file manage_file_perms; logging_log_filetrans(nscd_t, nscd_log_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(nscd_t, nscd_var_run_t, nscd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(nscd_t, nscd_var_run_t, nscd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(nscd_t, nscd_var_run_t, nscd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(nscd_t, nscd_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(nscd_t, nscd_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir }) corecmd_search_bin(nscd_t) can_exec(nscd_t, nscd_exec_t) +kernel_read_network_state(nscd_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nscd_t) kernel_list_proc(nscd_t) kernel_read_proc_symlinks(nscd_t) @@ -90,6 +102,7 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(nscd_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context(nscd_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts(nscd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(nscd_t) +domain_search_all_domains_state(nscd_t) files_read_etc_files(nscd_t) files_read_generic_tmp_symlinks(nscd_t) @@ -112,6 +125,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(nscd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(nscd_t) optional_policy(` + accountsd_dontaudit_rw_fifo_file(nscd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` cron_read_system_job_tmp_files(nscd_t) ') @@ -127,3 +144,17 @@ optional_policy(` xen_dontaudit_rw_unix_stream_sockets(nscd_t) xen_append_log(nscd_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`samba_domain_controller',` + samba_append_log(nscd_t) + samba_dontaudit_use_fds(nscd_t) + ') + + samba_read_config(nscd_t) + samba_read_var_files(nscd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_dontaudit_rw_packet_sockets(nscd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nsd.fc b/policy/modules/services/nsd.fc index 53cc800..5348e92 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nsd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/nsd.fc @@ -1,6 +1,6 @@ /etc/nsd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_conf_t,s0) -/etc/nsd/nsd\.db -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_db_t,s0) +/etc/nsd/nsd\.db -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_zone_t,s0) /etc/nsd/primary(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_zone_t,s0) /etc/nsd/secondary(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_zone_t,s0) @@ -10,5 +10,4 @@ /usr/sbin/zonec -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/nsd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_zone_t,s0) -/var/lib/nsd/nsd\.db -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_db_t,s0) /var/run/nsd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nsd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nsd.te b/policy/modules/services/nsd.te index 4b15536..e9c0f83 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nsd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/nsd.te @@ -18,15 +18,11 @@ domain_type(nsd_crond_t) domain_entry_file(nsd_crond_t, nsd_exec_t) role system_r types nsd_crond_t; -# a type for nsd.db -type nsd_db_t; -files_type(nsd_db_t) - type nsd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(nsd_var_run_t) # A type for zone files -type nsd_zone_t; +type nsd_zone_t alias nsd_db_t; files_type(nsd_zone_t) ######################################## @@ -34,25 +30,24 @@ files_type(nsd_zone_t) # NSD Local policy # -allow nsd_t self:capability { dac_override chown setuid setgid }; +allow nsd_t self:capability { chown dac_override kill setgid setuid }; dontaudit nsd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow nsd_t self:process signal_perms; allow nsd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow nsd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow nsd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow nsd_t nsd_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern(nsd_t, nsd_conf_t, nsd_conf_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(nsd_t, nsd_conf_t, nsd_conf_t) -allow nsd_t nsd_db_t:file manage_file_perms; -filetrans_pattern(nsd_t, nsd_zone_t, nsd_db_t, file) - manage_files_pattern(nsd_t, nsd_var_run_t, nsd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(nsd_t, nsd_var_run_t, file) -allow nsd_t nsd_zone_t:dir list_dir_perms; -read_files_pattern(nsd_t, nsd_zone_t, nsd_zone_t) -read_lnk_files_pattern(nsd_t, nsd_zone_t, nsd_zone_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(nsd_t, nsd_zone_t, nsd_zone_t) +manage_files_pattern(nsd_t, nsd_zone_t, nsd_zone_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(nsd_t, nsd_zone_t, nsd_zone_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(nsd_t, nsd_zone_t, dir) can_exec(nsd_t, nsd_exec_t) @@ -81,24 +76,23 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(nsd_t) files_read_etc_files(nsd_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(nsd_t) +files_search_var_lib(nsd_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(nsd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(nsd_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(nsd_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(nsd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(nsd_t) -sysnet_read_config(nsd_t) +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(nsd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(nsd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(nsd_t) optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(nsd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(nsd_t) ') @@ -121,8 +115,6 @@ allow nsd_crond_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow nsd_crond_t nsd_conf_t:file read_file_perms; -allow nsd_crond_t nsd_db_t:file manage_file_perms; -filetrans_pattern(nsd_crond_t, nsd_zone_t, nsd_db_t, file) files_search_var_lib(nsd_crond_t) allow nsd_crond_t nsd_t:process signal; @@ -157,7 +149,8 @@ domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(nsd_crond_t) files_read_etc_files(nsd_crond_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(nsd_crond_t) -files_search_var_lib(nsd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(nsd_crond_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(nsd_crond_t) @@ -172,9 +165,5 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(nsd_crond_t) -') - -optional_policy(` nscd_read_pid(nsd_crond_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nslcd.if b/policy/modules/services/nslcd.if index 23c769c..0a334ae 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nslcd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/nslcd.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run nslcd. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`nslcd_domtrans',` @@ -57,7 +57,7 @@ interface(`nslcd_read_pid_files',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to nslcd over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to nslcd over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -93,12 +93,15 @@ interface(`nslcd_stream_connect',` # interface(`nslcd_admin',` gen_require(` - type nslcd_t, nslcd_initrc_exec_t; - type nslcd_conf_t, nslcd_var_run_t; + type nslcd_t, nslcd_initrc_exec_t, nslcd_var_run_t; + type nslcd_conf_t; ') ps_process_pattern($1, nslcd_t) - allow $1 nslcd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 nslcd_t:process signal_perms; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 nslcd_t:process ptrace; + ') # Allow nslcd_t to restart the apache service nslcd_initrc_domtrans($1) @@ -106,9 +109,9 @@ interface(`nslcd_admin',` role_transition $2 nslcd_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - manage_files_pattern($1, nslcd_conf_t, nslcd_conf_t) + files_list_etc($1) + admin_pattern($1, nslcd_conf_t) - manage_dirs_pattern($1, nslcd_var_run_t, nslcd_var_run_t) - manage_files_pattern($1, nslcd_var_run_t, nslcd_var_run_t) - manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, nslcd_var_run_t, nslcd_var_run_t) + files_list_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, nslcd_var_run_t, nslcd_var_run_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nslcd.te b/policy/modules/services/nslcd.te index 4e28d58..bee3070 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nslcd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/nslcd.te @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type nslcd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(nslcd_var_run_t) type nslcd_conf_t; -files_type(nslcd_conf_t) +files_config_file(nslcd_conf_t) ######################################## # @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ files_type(nslcd_conf_t) # allow nslcd_t self:capability { setgid setuid dac_override }; -allow nslcd_t self:process signal; +allow nslcd_t self:process { setsched signal }; allow nslcd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow nslcd_t nslcd_conf_t:file read_file_perms; @@ -37,9 +37,22 @@ files_pid_filetrans(nslcd_t, nslcd_var_run_t, { file dir }) kernel_read_system_state(nslcd_t) files_read_etc_files(nslcd_t) +files_read_usr_symlinks(nslcd_t) +files_list_tmp(nslcd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(nslcd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(nslcd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(nslcd_t) + +userdom_read_user_tmp_files(nslcd_t) + +optional_policy(` + dirsrv_stream_connect(nslcd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ldap_stream_connect(nslcd_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ntop.te b/policy/modules/services/ntop.te index ded9fb6..9d1e60a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ntop.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ntop.te @@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(ntop_t, ntop_tmp_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(ntop_t, ntop_var_lib_t, ntop_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(ntop_t, ntop_var_lib_t, ntop_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(ntop_t, ntop_var_lib_t, { file dir } ) +files_var_lib_filetrans(ntop_t, ntop_var_lib_t, { file dir }) manage_files_pattern(ntop_t, ntop_var_run_t, ntop_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(ntop_t, ntop_var_run_t, file) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ntp.fc b/policy/modules/services/ntp.fc index e79dccc..e8d3e38 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ntp.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/ntp.fc @@ -10,6 +10,8 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ntpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ntpd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpd_unit_file_t,s0) + /usr/sbin/ntpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/ntpdate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ntpdate_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ntp.if b/policy/modules/services/ntp.if index e80f8c0..0044e73 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ntp.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ntp.if @@ -98,6 +98,48 @@ interface(`ntp_initrc_domtrans',` init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ntpd_initrc_exec_t) ') +##################################### +## +## Allow domain to read ntpd systemd unit files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ntp_read_unit_file',` + gen_require(` + type ntpd_unit_file_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 ntpd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute ntpd server in the ntpd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`ntp_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type ntpd_unit_file_t; + type ntpd_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 ntpd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 ntpd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, ntpd_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Read and write ntpd shared memory. @@ -122,6 +164,25 @@ interface(`ntp_rw_shm',` ######################################## ## +## Allow the domain to read ntpd state files in /proc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ntp_read_state',` + gen_require(` + type ntpd_t; + ') + + kernel_search_proc($1) + ps_process_pattern($1, ntpd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an ntp environment ## @@ -140,12 +201,15 @@ interface(`ntp_rw_shm',` interface(`ntp_admin',` gen_require(` type ntpd_t, ntpd_tmp_t, ntpd_log_t; - type ntpd_key_t, ntpd_var_run_t; - type ntpd_initrc_exec_t; + type ntpd_key_t, ntpd_var_run_t, ntpd_initrc_exec_t; + type ntpd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 ntpd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 ntpd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, ntpd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ntpd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ntpd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -162,4 +226,8 @@ interface(`ntp_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, ntpd_var_run_t) + + ntp_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, ntpd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 ntpd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ntp.te b/policy/modules/services/ntp.te index c61adc8..09bb140 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ntp.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ntp.te @@ -15,6 +15,9 @@ init_daemon_domain(ntpd_t, ntpd_exec_t) type ntpd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(ntpd_initrc_exec_t) +type ntpd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(ntpd_unit_file_t) + type ntpd_key_t; files_type(ntpd_key_t) @@ -96,11 +99,15 @@ corenet_sendrecv_ntp_client_packets(ntpd_t) dev_read_sysfs(ntpd_t) # for SSP dev_read_urand(ntpd_t) +dev_rw_realtime_clock(ntpd_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(ntpd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ntpd_t) +# Necessary to communicate with gpsd devices +fs_rw_tmpfs_files(ntpd_t) term_use_ptmx(ntpd_t) +term_use_unallocated_ttys(ntpd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(ntpd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/numad.fc b/policy/modules/services/numad.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..be6fcb0 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/numad.fc @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ +/usr/bin/numad -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:numad_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/numad.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:numad_unit_file_t,s0) + +/var/log/numad\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:numad_var_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/numad\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:numad_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/numad.if b/policy/modules/services/numad.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..77a3112 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/numad.if @@ -0,0 +1,78 @@ + +## policy for numad + +######################################## +## +## Transition to numad. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`numad_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type numad_t, numad_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, numad_exec_t, numad_t) +') +######################################## +## +## Execute numad server in the numad domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`numad_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type numad_t; + type numad_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + allow $1 numad_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 numad_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, numad_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an numad environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`numad_admin',` + gen_require(` + type numad_t; + type numad_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 numad_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, numad_t) + + numad_systemctl($1) + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/numad.te b/policy/modules/services/numad.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e18b767 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/numad.te @@ -0,0 +1,45 @@ +policy_module(numad, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type numad_t; +type numad_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(numad_t, numad_exec_t) + +type numad_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(numad_unit_file_t) + +type numad_var_log_t; +logging_log_file(numad_var_log_t) + +type numad_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(numad_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# numad local policy +# + +allow numad_t self:process { fork }; +allow numad_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow numad_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; +allow numad_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(numad_t, numad_var_log_t, numad_var_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(numad_t, numad_var_log_t, { file }) + +manage_files_pattern(numad_t, numad_var_run_t, numad_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(numad_t, numad_var_run_t, { file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(numad_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(numad_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(numad_t) + +files_read_etc_files(numad_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(numad_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nut.fc b/policy/modules/services/nut.fc index 0a929ef..371119d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nut.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/nut.fc @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ /sbin/upsdrvctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/upsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nut_upsd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/upsdrvctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nut_upsdrvctl_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/upsmon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nut_upsmon_exec_t,s0) /var/run/nut(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nut_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nut.te b/policy/modules/services/nut.te index ff962dd..c856c64 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nut.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/nut.te @@ -29,6 +29,7 @@ files_pid_file(nut_var_run_t) # allow nut_upsd_t self:capability { setgid setuid dac_override }; +allow nut_upsd_t self:process signal_perms; allow nut_upsd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow nut_upsd_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms; @@ -47,7 +48,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nut_upsd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_ups_port(nut_upsd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(nut_upsd_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(nut_upsd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(nut_upsd_t) files_read_usr_files(nut_upsd_t) @@ -133,6 +134,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nut_upsdrvctl_t) # /sbin/upsdrvctl executes other drivers corecmd_exec_bin(nut_upsdrvctl_t) +dev_read_sysfs(nut_upsdrvctl_t) dev_read_urand(nut_upsdrvctl_t) dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(nut_upsdrvctl_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nx.if b/policy/modules/services/nx.if index 79a225c..d82b231 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nx.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/nx.if @@ -33,8 +33,10 @@ interface(`nx_read_home_files',` type nx_server_home_ssh_t, nx_server_var_lib_t; ') + files_search_var_lib($1) allow $1 nx_server_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; read_files_pattern($1, nx_server_home_ssh_t, nx_server_home_ssh_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, nx_server_home_ssh_t, nx_server_home_ssh_t) ') ######################################## @@ -52,6 +54,7 @@ interface(`nx_search_var_lib',` type nx_server_var_lib_t; ') + files_search_var_lib($1) allow $1 nx_server_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') @@ -81,5 +84,24 @@ interface(`nx_var_lib_filetrans',` type nx_server_var_lib_t; ') + files_search_var_lib($1) filetrans_pattern($1, nx_server_var_lib_t, $2, $3) ') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to nx named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`nx_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type nx_server_home_ssh_t, nx_server_var_lib_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, nx_server_var_lib_t, nx_server_home_ssh_t, dir, ".ssh") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/nx.te b/policy/modules/services/nx.te index ebb9582..8b22d08 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/nx.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/nx.te @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ domain_entry_file(nx_server_t, nx_server_exec_t) domain_user_exemption_target(nx_server_t) # we need an extra role because nxserver is called from sshd # cjp: do we really need this? +role nx_server_r; role nx_server_r types nx_server_t; allow system_r nx_server_r; @@ -27,6 +28,9 @@ files_type(nx_server_var_lib_t) type nx_server_var_run_t; files_pid_file(nx_server_var_run_t) +type nx_server_home_ssh_t; +files_type(nx_server_home_ssh_t) + ######################################## # # NX server local policy @@ -36,7 +40,7 @@ allow nx_server_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow nx_server_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; allow nx_server_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; -allow nx_server_t nx_server_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr }; +allow nx_server_t nx_server_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms }; term_create_pty(nx_server_t, nx_server_devpts_t) manage_dirs_pattern(nx_server_t, nx_server_tmp_t, nx_server_tmp_t) @@ -50,6 +54,9 @@ files_var_lib_filetrans(nx_server_t, nx_server_var_lib_t, { file dir }) manage_files_pattern(nx_server_t, nx_server_var_run_t, nx_server_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(nx_server_t, nx_server_var_run_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(nx_server_t, nx_server_home_ssh_t, nx_server_home_ssh_t) +manage_files_pattern(nx_server_t, nx_server_home_ssh_t, nx_server_home_ssh_t) + kernel_read_system_state(nx_server_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(nx_server_t) @@ -83,10 +90,10 @@ seutil_dontaudit_search_config(nx_server_t) sysnet_read_config(nx_server_t) ifdef(`TODO',` -# clients already have create permissions; the nxclient wants to also have unlink rights -allow userdomain xdm_tmp_t:sock_file unlink; -# for a lockfile created by the client process -allow nx_server_t user_tmpfile:file getattr; + # clients already have create permissions; the nxclient wants to also have unlink rights + allow userdomain xdm_tmp_t:sock_file delete_sock_file_perms; + # for a lockfile created by the client process + allow nx_server_t user_tmpfile:file getattr_file_perms; ') ######################################## diff --git a/policy/modules/services/oav.te b/policy/modules/services/oav.te index b4c5f86..0f1549d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/oav.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/oav.te @@ -66,7 +66,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(oav_update_t) sysnet_read_config(oav_update_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(oav_update_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(oav_update_t) optional_policy(` cron_system_entry(oav_update_t, oav_update_exec_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/obex.fc b/policy/modules/services/obex.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7b31529 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/obex.fc @@ -0,0 +1,3 @@ + + +/usr/bin/obex-data-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:obex_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/obex.if b/policy/modules/services/obex.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d3b9544 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/obex.if @@ -0,0 +1,77 @@ +## SELinux policy for obex-data-server + +######################################## +## +## Transition to obex. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`obex_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type obex_t, obex_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, obex_exec_t, obex_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## obex over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`obex_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type obex_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 obex_t:dbus send_msg; + allow obex_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +####################################### +## +## Role access for obex domains +## that executes via dbus-session +## +## +## +## The role associated with the user domain. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the user domain. +## +## +## +## +## User domain prefix to be used. +## +## +# +template(`obex_role',` + gen_require(` + type obex_t, obex_exec_t; + ') + + role $1 types obex_t; + + allow $2 obex_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($2, obex_t) + + dbus_session_domain($3, obex_exec_t, obex_t) + + obex_dbus_chat($2) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/obex.te b/policy/modules/services/obex.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3689d8a --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/obex.te @@ -0,0 +1,30 @@ +policy_module(obex,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type obex_t; +type obex_exec_t; +application_domain(obex_t, obex_exec_t) +ubac_constrained(obex_t) + +######################################## +# +# obex local policy +# + +allow obex_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow obex_t self:socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +dev_read_urand(obex_t) + +files_read_etc_files(obex_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(obex_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(obex_t) + +userdom_search_user_home_content(obex_t) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/oddjob.fc b/policy/modules/services/oddjob.fc index bdf8c89..0132b08 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/oddjob.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/oddjob.fc @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ -/usr/lib(64)?/oddjob/mkhomedir -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/oddjob/mkhomedir -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/oddjob/mkhomedir -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/oddjobd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:oddjob_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/oddjob.if b/policy/modules/services/oddjob.if index bd76ec2..ca6517b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/oddjob.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/oddjob.if @@ -9,9 +9,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run oddjob. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`oddjob_domtrans',` @@ -22,6 +22,25 @@ interface(`oddjob_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, oddjob_exec_t, oddjob_t) ') +##################################### +## +## Do not audit attempts to read and write +## oddjob fifo file. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`oddjob_dontaudit_rw_fifo_file',` + gen_require(` + type oddjob_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 oddjob_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') + ######################################## ## ## Make the specified program domain accessable @@ -44,6 +63,7 @@ interface(`oddjob_system_entry',` ') domtrans_pattern(oddjob_t, $2, $1) + domain_user_exemption_target($1) ') ######################################## @@ -67,6 +87,24 @@ interface(`oddjob_dbus_chat',` allow oddjob_t $1:dbus send_msg; ') +###################################### +## +## Send a SIGCHLD signal to oddjob. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`oddjob_sigchld',` + gen_require(` + type oddjob_t; + ') + + allow $1 oddjob_t:process sigchld; +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute a domain transition to run oddjob_mkhomedir. diff --git a/policy/modules/services/oddjob.te b/policy/modules/services/oddjob.te index cadfc63..e056e78 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/oddjob.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/oddjob.te @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ policy_module(oddjob, 1.7.0) type oddjob_t; type oddjob_exec_t; -domain_type(oddjob_t) init_daemon_domain(oddjob_t, oddjob_exec_t) domain_obj_id_change_exemption(oddjob_t) domain_role_change_exemption(oddjob_t) @@ -15,7 +14,6 @@ domain_subj_id_change_exemption(oddjob_t) type oddjob_mkhomedir_t; type oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t; -domain_type(oddjob_mkhomedir_t) domain_obj_id_change_exemption(oddjob_mkhomedir_t) init_system_domain(oddjob_mkhomedir_t, oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t) oddjob_system_entry(oddjob_mkhomedir_t, oddjob_mkhomedir_exec_t) @@ -53,6 +51,8 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(oddjob_t) files_read_etc_files(oddjob_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(oddjob_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(oddjob_t) locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(oddjob_t) @@ -99,8 +99,6 @@ seutil_read_default_contexts(oddjob_mkhomedir_t) # Add/remove user home directories userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(oddjob_mkhomedir_t) -userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(oddjob_mkhomedir_t) -userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(oddjob_mkhomedir_t) userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(oddjob_mkhomedir_t) -userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(oddjob_mkhomedir_t, notdevfile_class_set) - +userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(oddjob_mkhomedir_t) +userdom_manage_user_home_content(oddjob_mkhomedir_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/oident.if b/policy/modules/services/oident.if index bb4fae5..044486c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/oident.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/oident.if @@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ ## ## # -interface(`oident_read_user_content', ` +interface(`oident_read_user_content',` gen_require(` type oidentd_home_t; ') @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ interface(`oident_read_user_content', ` ## ## # -interface(`oident_manage_user_content', ` +interface(`oident_manage_user_content',` gen_require(` type oidentd_home_t; ') @@ -58,7 +58,7 @@ interface(`oident_manage_user_content', ` ## ## # -interface(`oident_relabel_user_content', ` +interface(`oident_relabel_user_content',` gen_require(` type oidentd_home_t; ') @@ -66,3 +66,40 @@ interface(`oident_relabel_user_content', ` allow $1 oidentd_home_t:file relabel_file_perms; userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) ') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an oident environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`oident_admin',` + gen_require(` + type oidentd_t, oidentd_initrc_exec_t, oidentd_config_t; + ') + + allow $1 oidentd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, oidentd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 oidentd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, oidentd_initrc_exec_t) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 oidentd_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_list_etc($1) + admin_pattern($1, oidentd_config_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/oident.te b/policy/modules/services/oident.te index 8845174..58148ed 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/oident.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/oident.te @@ -26,10 +26,10 @@ files_config_file(oidentd_config_t) # allow oidentd_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; -allow oidentd_t self:netlink_route_socket { write getattr read bind create nlmsg_read }; -allow oidentd_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket { write read create nlmsg_read }; -allow oidentd_t self:tcp_socket { setopt read bind create accept write getattr listen }; -allow oidentd_t self:udp_socket { write read create connect getattr ioctl }; +allow oidentd_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; +allow oidentd_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; +allow oidentd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow oidentd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow oidentd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create connect }; allow oidentd_t oidentd_config_t:file read_file_perms; @@ -59,17 +59,8 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(oidentd_t) sysnet_read_config(oidentd_t) oident_read_user_content(oidentd_t) +userdom_home_reader(oidentd_t) optional_policy(` nis_use_ypbind(oidentd_t) ') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs', ` - fs_list_cifs(oidentd_t) - fs_read_cifs_files(oidentd_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs', ` - fs_list_nfs(oidentd_t) - fs_read_nfs_files(oidentd_t) -') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/openct.if b/policy/modules/services/openct.if index 9d0a67b..351f7c8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/openct.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/openct.if @@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ interface(`openct_signull',` ## Execute openct in the caller domain. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`openct_exec',` @@ -42,9 +42,9 @@ interface(`openct_exec',` ## Execute a domain transition to run openct. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`openct_domtrans',` @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ interface(`openct_read_pid_files',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to openct over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to openct over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/services/openct.te b/policy/modules/services/openct.te index 7f8fdc2..047d985 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/openct.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/openct.te @@ -23,12 +23,13 @@ allow openct_t self:process signal_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(openct_t, openct_var_run_t, openct_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(openct_t, openct_var_run_t, openct_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(openct_t, openct_var_run_t, openct_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(openct_t, openct_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(openct_t) kernel_list_proc(openct_t) kernel_read_proc_symlinks(openct_t) +can_exec(openct_t, openct_exec_t) + dev_read_sysfs(openct_t) # openct asks for this dev_rw_usbfs(openct_t) @@ -50,7 +51,9 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(openct_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(openct_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(openct_t) -openct_exec(openct_t) +optional_policy(` + pcscd_stream_connect(openct_t) +') optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(openct_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/openhpid.fc b/policy/modules/services/openhpid.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9441fd7 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/openhpid.fc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/openhpid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openhpid_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/openhpid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openhpid_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/openhpi(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:openhpid_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/run/openhpid\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:openhpid_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/openhpid.if b/policy/modules/services/openhpid.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..598789a --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/openhpid.if @@ -0,0 +1,159 @@ + +## policy for openhpid + + +######################################## +## +## Transition to openhpid. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`openhpid_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type openhpid_t, openhpid_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, openhpid_exec_t, openhpid_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute openhpid server in the openhpid domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`openhpid_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type openhpid_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, openhpid_initrc_exec_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Search openhpid lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`openhpid_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type openhpid_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 openhpid_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read openhpid lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`openhpid_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type openhpid_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, openhpid_var_lib_t, openhpid_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage openhpid lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`openhpid_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type openhpid_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, openhpid_var_lib_t, openhpid_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage openhpid lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`openhpid_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type openhpid_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, openhpid_var_lib_t, openhpid_var_lib_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an openhpid environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`openhpid_admin',` + gen_require(` + type openhpid_t; + type openhpid_initrc_exec_t; + type openhpid_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 openhpid_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, openhpid_t) + + openhpid_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 openhpid_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, openhpid_var_lib_t) + + + +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/openhpid.te b/policy/modules/services/openhpid.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..faa9b16 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/openhpid.te @@ -0,0 +1,53 @@ +policy_module(openhpid, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type openhpid_t; +type openhpid_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(openhpid_t, openhpid_exec_t) + +type openhpid_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(openhpid_initrc_exec_t) + +type openhpid_var_lib_t; +files_type(openhpid_var_lib_t) + +type openhpid_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(openhpid_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# openhpid local policy +# + +allow openhpid_t self:capability { kill }; +allow openhpid_t self:process { fork signal }; + +allow openhpid_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow openhpid_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow openhpid_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow openhpid_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow openhpid_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(openhpid_t, openhpid_var_lib_t, openhpid_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(openhpid_t, openhpid_var_lib_t, openhpid_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(openhpid_t, openhpid_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +manage_files_pattern(openhpid_t, openhpid_var_run_t, openhpid_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(openhpid_t, openhpid_var_run_t, { file }) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(openhpid_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_openhpid_port(openhpid_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(openhpid_t) + +dev_read_urand(openhpid_t) + +files_read_etc_files(openhpid_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(openhpid_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(openhpid_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/openvpn.if b/policy/modules/services/openvpn.if index d883214..d6afa87 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/openvpn.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/openvpn.if @@ -144,8 +144,11 @@ interface(`openvpn_admin',` type openvpn_var_run_t, openvpn_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 openvpn_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 openvpn_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, openvpn_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 openvpn_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, openvpn_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/openvpn.te b/policy/modules/services/openvpn.te index 8b550f4..6075d39 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/openvpn.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/openvpn.te @@ -6,9 +6,9 @@ policy_module(openvpn, 1.10.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow openvpn to read home directories -##

    +##

    +## Allow openvpn to read home directories +##

    ##     gen_tunable(openvpn_enable_homedirs, false) @@ -24,6 +24,9 @@ files_config_file(openvpn_etc_t) type openvpn_etc_rw_t; files_config_file(openvpn_etc_rw_t) +type openvpn_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(openvpn_tmp_t) + type openvpn_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(openvpn_initrc_exec_t) @@ -40,15 +43,14 @@ files_pid_file(openvpn_var_run_t) # openvpn local policy # -allow openvpn_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override ipc_lock net_bind_service net_admin setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_tty_config }; -allow openvpn_t self:process { signal getsched }; +allow openvpn_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override ipc_lock net_bind_service net_admin setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_tty_config sys_nice }; +allow openvpn_t self:process { signal getsched setsched }; allow openvpn_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - allow openvpn_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow openvpn_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; allow openvpn_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow openvpn_t self:tcp_socket server_stream_socket_perms; -allow openvpn_t self:tun_socket create; +allow openvpn_t self:tun_socket { create_socket_perms relabelfrom }; allow openvpn_t self:netlink_route_socket rw_netlink_socket_perms; can_exec(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t) @@ -58,9 +60,15 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t, openvpn_etc_t) manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t, openvpn_etc_rw_t) filetrans_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_etc_t, openvpn_etc_rw_t, file) -allow openvpn_t openvpn_var_log_t:file manage_file_perms; -logging_log_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, file) +manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_tmp_t, openvpn_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_tmp_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, openvpn_var_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, openvpn_var_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_log_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_run_t, openvpn_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_run_t, openvpn_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(openvpn_t, openvpn_var_run_t, { file dir }) @@ -68,6 +76,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(openvpn_t) kernel_read_net_sysctls(openvpn_t) kernel_read_network_state(openvpn_t) kernel_read_system_state(openvpn_t) +kernel_request_load_module(openvpn_t) corecmd_exec_bin(openvpn_t) corecmd_exec_shell(openvpn_t) @@ -87,6 +96,7 @@ corenet_udp_bind_openvpn_port(openvpn_t) corenet_tcp_bind_http_port(openvpn_t) corenet_tcp_connect_openvpn_port(openvpn_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(openvpn_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_tor_socks_port(openvpn_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(openvpn_t) corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(openvpn_t) corenet_sendrecv_openvpn_server_packets(openvpn_t) @@ -100,33 +110,40 @@ dev_read_urand(openvpn_t) files_read_etc_files(openvpn_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(openvpn_t) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(openvpn_t) + auth_use_pam(openvpn_t) +init_read_utmp(openvpn_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(openvpn_t) miscfiles_read_localization(openvpn_t) miscfiles_read_all_certs(openvpn_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(openvpn_t) +sysnet_use_ldap(openvpn_t) sysnet_exec_ifconfig(openvpn_t) sysnet_manage_config(openvpn_t) sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(openvpn_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(openvpn_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(openvpn_t) +userdom_read_home_certs(openvpn_t) +userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface(openvpn_t) +userdom_read_inherited_user_tmp_files(openvpn_t) +userdom_read_inherited_user_home_content_files(openvpn_t) tunable_policy(`openvpn_enable_homedirs',` - userdom_read_user_home_content_files(openvpn_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs(openvpn_t) ') tunable_policy(`openvpn_enable_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_read_nfs_files(openvpn_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(openvpn_t) -') + fs_read_nfs_files(openvpn_t) +') tunable_policy(`openvpn_enable_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_read_cifs_files(openvpn_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(openvpn_t) -') + fs_read_cifs_files(openvpn_t) +') optional_policy(` daemontools_service_domain(openvpn_t, openvpn_exec_t) @@ -138,3 +155,7 @@ optional_policy(` networkmanager_dbus_chat(openvpn_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_attach_tun_iface(openvpn_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pacemaker.fc b/policy/modules/services/pacemaker.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..4e915ab --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/pacemaker.fc @@ -0,0 +1,11 @@ +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pacemaker -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/pacemaker.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_unit_file_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/pacemakerd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/heartbeat/crm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/lib/pengine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/run/crm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pacemaker_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pacemaker.if b/policy/modules/services/pacemaker.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..e05c78f --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/pacemaker.if @@ -0,0 +1,209 @@ + +## policy for pacemaker + +######################################## +## +## Transition to pacemaker. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`pacemaker_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type pacemaker_t, pacemaker_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, pacemaker_exec_t, pacemaker_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute pacemaker server in the pacemaker domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`pacemaker_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type pacemaker_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pacemaker_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search pacemaker lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`pacemaker_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type pacemaker_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 pacemaker_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read pacemaker lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`pacemaker_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type pacemaker_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage pacemaker lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`pacemaker_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type pacemaker_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage pacemaker lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`pacemaker_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type pacemaker_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read pacemaker PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`pacemaker_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type pacemaker_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 pacemaker_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute pacemaker server in the pacemaker domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`pacemaker_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type pacemaker_t; + type pacemaker_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + allow $1 pacemaker_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 pacemaker_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, pacemaker_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an pacemaker environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`pacemaker_admin',` + gen_require(` + type pacemaker_t; + type pacemaker_initrc_exec_t; + type pacemaker_var_lib_t; + type pacemaker_var_run_t; + type pacemaker_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 pacemaker_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, pacemaker_t) + + pacemaker_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 pacemaker_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, pacemaker_var_run_t) + + pacemaker_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, pacemaker_unit_file_t) + allow $1 pacemaker_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pacemaker.te b/policy/modules/services/pacemaker.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..99ab306 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/pacemaker.te @@ -0,0 +1,49 @@ +policy_module(pacemaker, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type pacemaker_t; +type pacemaker_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_exec_t) + +type pacemaker_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(pacemaker_initrc_exec_t) + +type pacemaker_var_lib_t; +files_type(pacemaker_var_lib_t) + +type pacemaker_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(pacemaker_var_run_t) + +type pacemaker_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(pacemaker_unit_file_t) + +######################################## +# +# pacemaker local policy +# +allow pacemaker_t self:capability { chown dac_override setuid }; +allow pacemaker_t self:process { fork setrlimit signal }; +allow pacemaker_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow pacemaker_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_run_t, pacemaker_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_run_t, pacemaker_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(pacemaker_t, pacemaker_var_run_t, { dir file }) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(pacemaker_t) + +files_read_etc_files(pacemaker_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(pacemaker_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(pacemaker_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(pacemaker_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pads.fc b/policy/modules/services/pads.fc index 0870c56..6d5fb1d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pads.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/pads.fc @@ -1,10 +1,10 @@ /etc/pads-ether-codes -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0) /etc/pads-signature-list -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0) -/etc/pads.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0) +/etc/pads\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0) /etc/pads-assets.csv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_config_t, s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pads -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_initrc_exec_t, s0) /usr/bin/pads -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_exec_t, s0) -/var/run/pads.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_var_run_t, s0) +/var/run/pads\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pads_var_run_t, s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pads.if b/policy/modules/services/pads.if index 8ac407e..45673ad 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pads.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/pads.if @@ -25,20 +25,26 @@ ## ## # -interface(`pads_admin', ` +interface(`pads_admin',` gen_require(` - type pads_t, pads_config_t; - type pads_var_run_t, pads_initrc_exec_t; + type pads_t, pads_config_t, pads_initrc_exec_t; + type pads_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 pads_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 pads_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, pads_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 pads_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pads_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 pads_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, pads_var_run_t) + + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, pads_config_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pads.te b/policy/modules/services/pads.te index b246bdd..e6a686f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pads.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/pads.te @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -policy_module(pads, 1.0.0) +policy_module(pads, 1.0.0) ######################################## # @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ policy_module(pads, 1.0.0) type pads_t; type pads_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(pads_t, pads_exec_t) -role system_r types pads_t; type pads_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(pads_initrc_exec_t) @@ -25,10 +24,11 @@ files_pid_file(pads_var_run_t) # allow pads_t self:capability { dac_override net_raw }; -allow pads_t self:netlink_route_socket { write getattr read bind create nlmsg_read }; -allow pads_t self:packet_socket { ioctl setopt getopt read bind create }; -allow pads_t self:udp_socket { create ioctl }; -allow pads_t self:unix_dgram_socket { write create connect }; +allow pads_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; +allow pads_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; +allow pads_t self:socket create_socket_perms; +allow pads_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow pads_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow pads_t pads_config_t:file manage_file_perms; files_etc_filetrans(pads_t, pads_config_t, file) @@ -37,6 +37,7 @@ allow pads_t pads_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; files_pid_filetrans(pads_t, pads_var_run_t, file) kernel_read_sysctl(pads_t) +kernel_read_network_state(pads_t) corecmd_search_bin(pads_t) @@ -48,6 +49,7 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_prelude_port(pads_t) dev_read_rand(pads_t) dev_read_urand(pads_t) +dev_read_sysfs(pads_t) files_read_etc_files(pads_t) files_search_spool(pads_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pcscd.fc b/policy/modules/services/pcscd.fc index 87f17e8..63ee18a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pcscd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/pcscd.fc @@ -1,4 +1,5 @@ /var/run/pcscd\.comm -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/pcscd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/pcscd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/pcscd\.pub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/pcscd\.events(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pcscd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pcscd.if b/policy/modules/services/pcscd.if index 1c2a091..6be0b2c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pcscd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/pcscd.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run pcscd. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`pcscd_domtrans',` @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ interface(`pcscd_read_pub_files',` ') files_search_pids($1) - allow $1 pcscd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, pcscd_var_run_t, pcscd_var_run_t) ') ######################################## @@ -77,7 +77,7 @@ interface(`pcscd_manage_pub_pipes',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to pcscd over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to pcscd over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pcscd.te b/policy/modules/services/pcscd.te index ceafba6..9eb6967 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pcscd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/pcscd.te @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ policy_module(pcscd, 1.7.0) type pcscd_t; type pcscd_exec_t; -domain_type(pcscd_t) init_daemon_domain(pcscd_t, pcscd_exec_t) # pid files @@ -25,6 +24,7 @@ allow pcscd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow pcscd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow pcscd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow pcscd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow pcscd_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(pcscd_t, pcscd_var_run_t, pcscd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(pcscd_t, pcscd_var_run_t, pcscd_var_run_t) @@ -77,3 +77,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` rpm_use_script_fds(pcscd_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + udev_read_db(pcscd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pegasus.te b/policy/modules/services/pegasus.te index 3185114..4abd429 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pegasus.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/pegasus.te @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type pegasus_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(pegasus_tmp_t) type pegasus_conf_t; -files_type(pegasus_conf_t) +files_config_file(pegasus_conf_t) type pegasus_mof_t; files_type(pegasus_mof_t) @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ files_pid_file(pegasus_var_run_t) # Local policy # -allow pegasus_t self:capability { chown sys_nice setuid setgid dac_override net_bind_service }; +allow pegasus_t self:capability { chown kill ipc_lock sys_nice setuid setgid dac_override net_bind_service }; dontaudit pegasus_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow pegasus_t self:process signal; allow pegasus_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ allow pegasus_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow pegasus_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:dir rw_dir_perms; -allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:file { read_file_perms link unlink }; +allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:file { read_file_perms link delete_file_perms rename_file_perms }; allow pegasus_t pegasus_conf_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_data_t, pegasus_data_t) @@ -56,15 +56,19 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_tmp_t, pegasus_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_tmp_t, pegasus_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_tmp_t, { file dir }) -allow pegasus_t pegasus_var_run_t:sock_file { create setattr unlink }; +allow pegasus_t pegasus_var_run_t:sock_file { create_sock_file_perms setattr_sock_file_perms delete_sock_file_perms }; +manage_dirs_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, pegasus_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, pegasus_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(pegasus_t, pegasus_var_run_t, { file dir }) +kernel_read_network_state(pegasus_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(pegasus_t) kernel_read_fs_sysctls(pegasus_t) kernel_read_system_state(pegasus_t) kernel_search_vm_sysctl(pegasus_t) kernel_read_net_sysctls(pegasus_t) +kernel_read_xen_state(pegasus_t) +kernel_write_xen_state(pegasus_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(pegasus_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(pegasus_t) @@ -95,17 +99,14 @@ files_getattr_all_dirs(pegasus_t) auth_use_nsswitch(pegasus_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(pegasus_t) +auth_read_shadow(pegasus_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(pegasus_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(pegasus_t) -files_read_etc_files(pegasus_t) -files_list_var_lib(pegasus_t) -files_read_var_lib_files(pegasus_t) +files_read_all_files(pegasus_t) files_read_var_lib_symlinks(pegasus_t) -hostname_exec(pegasus_t) - init_rw_utmp(pegasus_t) init_stream_connect_script(pegasus_t) @@ -114,17 +115,35 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(pegasus_t) miscfiles_read_localization(pegasus_t) -sysnet_read_config(pegasus_t) -sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(pegasus_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(pegasus_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(pegasus_t) optional_policy(` + hostname_exec(pegasus_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + lldpad_dgram_send(pegasus_t) +') + +optional_policy(` rpm_exec(pegasus_t) ') optional_policy(` + samba_manage_config(pegasus_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(pegasus_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_exec(pegasus_t) +') + +optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(pegasus_t) seutil_dontaudit_read_config(pegasus_t) ') @@ -136,3 +155,14 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` unconfined_signull(pegasus_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + virt_domtrans(pegasus_t) + virt_stream_connect(pegasus_t) + virt_manage_config(pegasus_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xen_stream_connect(pegasus_t) + xen_stream_connect_xenstore(pegasus_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pingd.if b/policy/modules/services/pingd.if index 8688aae..f1c3000 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pingd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/pingd.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run pingd. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`pingd_domtrans',` @@ -55,7 +55,6 @@ interface(`pingd_manage_config',` files_search_etc($1) manage_dirs_pattern($1, pingd_etc_t, pingd_etc_t) manage_files_pattern($1, pingd_etc_t, pingd_etc_t) - ') ####################################### @@ -77,12 +76,15 @@ interface(`pingd_manage_config',` # interface(`pingd_admin',` gen_require(` - type pingd_t, pingd_etc_t; - type pingd_initrc_exec_t, pingd_modules_t; + type pingd_t, pingd_etc_t, pingd_modules_t; + type pingd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 pingd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 pingd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, pingd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 pingd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pingd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pingd.te b/policy/modules/services/pingd.te index e9cf8a4..9a7e5dc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pingd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/pingd.te @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(pingd_t, pingd_exec_t) # type for config type pingd_etc_t; -files_type(pingd_etc_t) +files_config_file(pingd_etc_t) type pingd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(pingd_initrc_exec_t) @@ -27,7 +27,7 @@ files_type(pingd_modules_t) allow pingd_t self:capability net_raw; allow pingd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -allow pingd_t self:rawip_socket { write read create bind }; +allow pingd_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; read_files_pattern(pingd_t, pingd_etc_t, pingd_etc_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/piranha.fc b/policy/modules/services/piranha.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c7e06f --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/piranha.fc @@ -0,0 +1,26 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pulse -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +# RHEL6 +#/etc/sysconfig/ha/lvs\.cf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_etc_rw_t,s0) + +/etc/piranha/lvs\.cf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_etc_rw_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/paster -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/fos -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_fos_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_lvs_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/piranha_gui -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pulse -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_pulse_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/luci(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_data_t,s0) +/var/lib/luci/cert(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_conf_t,s0) +/var/lib/luci/etc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_conf_t,s0) + +/var/log/piranha(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/fos\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_fos_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/lvs\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_lvs_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/piranha-httpd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_web_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/pulse\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:piranha_pulse_var_run_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/piranha.if b/policy/modules/services/piranha.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..548d0a2 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/piranha.if @@ -0,0 +1,175 @@ +## policy for piranha + +####################################### +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## cluster init daemon domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`piranha_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + attribute piranha_domain; + ') + + ############################## + # + # piranha_$1_t declarations + # + + type piranha_$1_t, piranha_domain; + type piranha_$1_exec_t; + init_daemon_domain(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_exec_t) + + # pid files + type piranha_$1_var_run_t; + files_pid_file(piranha_$1_var_run_t) + + ############################## + # + # piranha_$1_t local policy + # + + allow piranha_$1_t self:process signal_perms; + + manage_files_pattern(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t) + files_pid_filetrans(piranha_$1_t, piranha_$1_var_run_t, { dir file }) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run fos. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`piranha_domtrans_fos',` + gen_require(` + type piranha_fos_t, piranha_fos_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, piranha_fos_exec_t, piranha_fos_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute a domain transition to run lvsd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`piranha_domtrans_lvs',` + gen_require(` + type piranha_lvs_t, piranha_lvs_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, piranha_lvs_exec_t, piranha_lvs_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute a domain transition to run pulse. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`piranha_domtrans_pulse',` + gen_require(` + type piranha_pulse_t, piranha_pulse_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, piranha_pulse_exec_t, piranha_pulse_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute pulse server in the pulse domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`piranha_pulse_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to read piranha's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`piranha_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type piranha_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to append +## piranha log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`piranha_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type piranha_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow domain to manage piranha log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`piranha_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type piranha_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/piranha.te b/policy/modules/services/piranha.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..44c7098 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/piranha.te @@ -0,0 +1,302 @@ +policy_module(piranha, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +## +##

    +## Allow piranha-lvs domain to connect to the network using TCP. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(piranha_lvs_can_network_connect, false) + +attribute piranha_domain; + +piranha_domain_template(fos) + +piranha_domain_template(lvs) + +piranha_domain_template(pulse) + +type piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(piranha_pulse_initrc_exec_t) + +piranha_domain_template(web) + +type piranha_web_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(piranha_web_tmpfs_t) + +type piranha_web_conf_t; +files_config_file(piranha_web_conf_t) + +type piranha_web_data_t; +files_type(piranha_web_data_t) + +type piranha_web_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(piranha_web_tmp_t) + +type piranha_etc_rw_t; +files_config_file(piranha_etc_rw_t) + +type piranha_log_t; +logging_log_file(piranha_log_t) + +####################################### +# +# piranha-fos local policy +# + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_fos_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(piranha_fos_t) + +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(piranha_fos_t) +') + +# start and stop services +init_domtrans_script(piranha_fos_t) + +######################################## +# +# piranha-gui local policy +# + +allow piranha_web_t self:capability { setuid sys_nice kill setgid }; +allow piranha_web_t self:process { getsched setsched signal signull }; + +allow piranha_web_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; +allow piranha_web_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow piranha_web_t self:sem create_sem_perms; +allow piranha_web_t self:shm create_shm_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_data_t, piranha_web_data_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_data_t, piranha_web_data_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_data_t, file) + +read_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_conf_t, piranha_web_conf_t) + +rw_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_etc_rw_t, piranha_etc_rw_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_log_t, piranha_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_log_t, { dir file }) + +can_exec(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t, piranha_web_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t, piranha_web_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t) +manage_files_pattern(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(piranha_web_t, piranha_web_tmpfs_t, { dir file }) + +piranha_pulse_initrc_domtrans(piranha_web_t) + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_web_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_http_cache_port(piranha_web_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_luci_port(piranha_web_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_piranha_port(piranha_web_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_ricci_port(piranha_web_t) + +dev_read_rand(piranha_web_t) +dev_read_urand(piranha_web_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(piranha_web_t) + +files_read_usr_files(piranha_web_t) + +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(piranha_web_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + apache_read_config(piranha_web_t) + apache_exec_modules(piranha_web_t) + apache_exec(piranha_web_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(piranha_web_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sasl_connect(piranha_web_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + snmp_dontaudit_read_snmp_var_lib_files(piranha_web_t) + snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files(piranha_web_t) +') + +###################################### +# +# piranha-lvs local policy +# + +# neede by nanny +allow piranha_lvs_t self:capability { net_raw sys_nice }; +allow piranha_lvs_t self:process signal; +allow piranha_lvs_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; +allow piranha_lvs_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_lvs_t) + +# needed by nanny +corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(piranha_lvs_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(piranha_lvs_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(piranha_lvs_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(piranha_lvs_t) + +# needed by nanny +tunable_policy(`piranha_lvs_can_network_connect',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(piranha_lvs_t) +') + +# needed by ipvsadm +optional_policy(` + iptables_domtrans(piranha_lvs_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# piranha-pulse local policy +# + +allow piranha_pulse_t self:capability net_admin; + +allow piranha_pulse_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; + +# pulse starts fos and lvs daemon +domtrans_pattern(piranha_pulse_t, piranha_fos_exec_t, piranha_fos_t) +allow piranha_pulse_t piranha_fos_t:process signal; + +domtrans_pattern(piranha_pulse_t, piranha_lvs_exec_t, piranha_lvs_t) +allow piranha_pulse_t piranha_lvs_t:process signal; + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(piranha_pulse_t) +kernel_read_rpc_sysctls(piranha_pulse_t) +kernel_read_system_state(piranha_pulse_t) +kernel_rw_rpc_sysctls(piranha_pulse_t) +kernel_search_debugfs(piranha_pulse_t) +kernel_search_network_state(piranha_pulse_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(piranha_pulse_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(piranha_pulse_t) +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +corenet_udp_bind_apertus_ldp_port(piranha_pulse_t) +corenet_udp_bind_cma_port(piranha_pulse_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(piranha_pulse_t) +domain_getattr_all_domains(piranha_pulse_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(piranha_pulse_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(piranha_pulse_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(piranha_pulse_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(piranha_pulse_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(piranha_pulse_t) + +# various services to failover + +optional_policy(` + apache_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t) + apache_signal(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ftp_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t) + ftp_initrc_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t) + ftp_systemctl(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + hostname_exec(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ldap_systemctl(piranha_pulse_t) + ldap_initrc_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t) + ldap_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mysql_domtrans_mysql_safe(piranha_pulse_t) + mysql_stream_connect(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + netutils_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t) + netutils_domtrans_ping(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + postgresql_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t) + postgresql_signal(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + samba_initrc_domtrans(piranha_pulse_t) + samba_systemctl(piranha_pulse_t) + samba_domtrans_smbd(piranha_pulse_t) + samba_domtrans_nmbd(piranha_pulse_t) + samba_manage_var_files(piranha_pulse_t) + samba_rw_config(piranha_pulse_t) + samba_signal_smbd(piranha_pulse_t) + samba_signal_nmbd(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + udev_read_db(piranha_pulse_t) +') + +#################################### +# +# piranha domains common policy +# + +allow piranha_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow piranha_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow piranha_domain self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow piranha_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +read_files_pattern(piranha_domain, piranha_etc_rw_t, piranha_etc_rw_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(piranha_domain) +kernel_read_network_state(piranha_domain) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(piranha_domain) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(piranha_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(piranha_domain) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(piranha_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(piranha_domain) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(piranha_domain) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(piranha_domain) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(piranha_domain) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(piranha_domain) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(piranha_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(piranha_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(piranha_domain) +corecmd_exec_shell(piranha_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(piranha_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(piranha_domain) + +sysnet_read_config(piranha_domain) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.fc b/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.fc index 5702ca4..498d856 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.fc @@ -2,6 +2,10 @@ /sbin/plymouthd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/plymouth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouth_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/plymouthd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_exec_t,s0) + /var/lib/plymouth(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_var_lib_t,s0) /var/run/plymouth(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_var_run_t,s0) /var/spool/plymouth(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:plymouthd_spool_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.if b/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.if index 9759ed8..34b79af 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.if @@ -5,12 +5,12 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run plymouthd. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_domtrans', ` +interface(`plymouthd_domtrans',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_t, plymouthd_exec_t; ') @@ -23,12 +23,12 @@ interface(`plymouthd_domtrans', ` ## Execute the plymoth daemon in the current domain ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_exec', ` +interface(`plymouthd_exec',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_exec_t; ') @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ interface(`plymouthd_exec', ` ## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_stream_connect', ` +interface(`plymouthd_stream_connect',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_t; ') @@ -60,12 +60,12 @@ interface(`plymouthd_stream_connect', ` ## Execute the plymoth command in the current domain ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_exec_plymouth', ` +interface(`plymouthd_exec_plymouth',` gen_require(` type plymouth_exec_t; ') @@ -78,12 +78,12 @@ interface(`plymouthd_exec_plymouth', ` ## Execute a domain transition to run plymouthd. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_domtrans_plymouth', ` +interface(`plymouthd_domtrans_plymouth',` gen_require(` type plymouth_t, plymouth_exec_t; ') @@ -101,7 +101,7 @@ interface(`plymouthd_domtrans_plymouth', ` ## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_search_spool', ` +interface(`plymouthd_search_spool',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_spool_t; ') @@ -120,7 +120,7 @@ interface(`plymouthd_search_spool', ` ## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_read_spool_files', ` +interface(`plymouthd_read_spool_files',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_spool_t; ') @@ -140,7 +140,7 @@ interface(`plymouthd_read_spool_files', ` ## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_manage_spool_files', ` +interface(`plymouthd_manage_spool_files',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_spool_t; ') @@ -159,7 +159,7 @@ interface(`plymouthd_manage_spool_files', ` ## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_search_lib', ` +interface(`plymouthd_search_lib',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_var_lib_t; ') @@ -178,7 +178,7 @@ interface(`plymouthd_search_lib', ` ## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_read_lib_files', ` +interface(`plymouthd_read_lib_files',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_var_lib_t; ') @@ -198,7 +198,7 @@ interface(`plymouthd_read_lib_files', ` ## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_manage_lib_files', ` +interface(`plymouthd_manage_lib_files',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_var_lib_t; ') @@ -217,7 +217,7 @@ interface(`plymouthd_manage_lib_files', ` ## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_read_pid_files', ` +interface(`plymouthd_read_pid_files',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_var_run_t; ') @@ -228,6 +228,48 @@ interface(`plymouthd_read_pid_files', ` ######################################## ## +## Allow the specified domain to read +## to plymouthd log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`plymouthd_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type plymouthd_var_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_log_t, plymouthd_var_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to manage +## to plymouthd log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`plymouthd_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type plymouthd_var_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_log_t, plymouthd_var_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_log_t, plymouthd_var_log_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_log_t, plymouthd_var_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an plymouthd environment ## @@ -243,18 +285,23 @@ interface(`plymouthd_read_pid_files', ` ## ## # -interface(`plymouthd_admin', ` +interface(`plymouthd_admin',` gen_require(` type plymouthd_t, plymouthd_spool_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t; type plymouthd_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 plymouthd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; - read_files_pattern($1, plymouthd_t, plymouthd_t) + allow $1 plymouthd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, plymouthd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 plymouthd_t:process ptrace; + ') + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, plymouthd_spool_t) admin_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_lib_t) + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, plymouthd_var_run_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.te b/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.te index 06e217d..cadc832 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/plymouthd.te @@ -8,17 +8,21 @@ policy_module(plymouthd, 1.0.1) type plymouth_t; type plymouth_exec_t; application_domain(plymouth_t, plymouth_exec_t) +role system_r types plymouth_t; type plymouthd_t; type plymouthd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_exec_t) type plymouthd_spool_t; -files_type(plymouthd_spool_t) +files_spool_file(plymouthd_spool_t) type plymouthd_var_lib_t; files_type(plymouthd_var_lib_t) +type plymouthd_var_log_t; +logging_log_file(plymouthd_var_log_t) + type plymouthd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(plymouthd_var_run_t) @@ -42,6 +46,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_lib_t, { file dir }) +manage_dirs_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_log_t, plymouthd_var_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_log_t, plymouthd_var_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_log_t, { file dir }) + manage_dirs_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_run_t, plymouthd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_run_t, plymouthd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(plymouthd_t, plymouthd_var_run_t, { file dir }) @@ -60,10 +68,32 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(plymouthd_t) files_read_etc_files(plymouthd_t) files_read_usr_files(plymouthd_t) +term_use_unallocated_ttys(plymouthd_t) + +init_signal(plymouthd_t) + +logging_link_generic_logs(plymouthd_t) +logging_delete_generic_logs(plymouthd_t) + +auth_read_passwd(plymouthd_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(plymouthd_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(plymouthd_t) miscfiles_manage_fonts_cache(plymouthd_t) +userdom_read_admin_home_files(plymouthd_t) + +optional_policy(` + sssd_stream_connect(plymouthd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_xdm_manage_spool(plymouthd_t) + xserver_read_state_xdm(plymouthd_t) +') + +term_use_unallocated_ttys(plymouthd_t) + ######################################## # # Plymouth private policy @@ -74,6 +104,7 @@ allow plymouth_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow plymouth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; kernel_read_system_state(plymouth_t) +kernel_stream_connect(plymouth_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(plymouth_t) @@ -87,7 +118,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(plymouth_t) plymouthd_stream_connect(plymouth_t) -ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` optional_policy(` hal_dontaudit_write_log(plymouth_t) hal_dontaudit_rw_pipes(plymouth_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/policykit.fc b/policy/modules/services/policykit.fc index 27c739c..c65d18f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/policykit.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/policykit.fc @@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ /usr/libexec/polkit-read-auth-helper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_auth_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/polkit-grant-helper.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_grant_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/polkit-resolve-exe-helper.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_resolve_exec_t,s0) -/usr/libexec/polkitd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/polkitd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkit-agent-helper-1 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_auth_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/polkit-1/polkitd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/misc/PolicyKit.reload gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_reload_t,s0) /var/lib/PolicyKit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/polkit-1(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/PolicyKit-public(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_var_lib_t,s0) /var/run/PolicyKit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:policykit_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/policykit.if b/policy/modules/services/policykit.if index 48ff1e8..be00a65 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/policykit.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/policykit.if @@ -17,18 +17,43 @@ interface(`policykit_dbus_chat',` class dbus send_msg; ') + ps_process_pattern(policykit_t, $1) + allow $1 policykit_t:dbus send_msg; allow policykit_t $1:dbus send_msg; ') ######################################## ## -## Execute a domain transition to run polkit_auth. +## Send and receive messages from +## policykit over dbus. ## ## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`policykit_dbus_chat_auth',` + gen_require(` + type policykit_auth_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + ps_process_pattern(policykit_auth_t, $1) + + allow $1 policykit_auth_t:dbus send_msg; + allow policykit_auth_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## ## -## Domain allowed to transition. +## Execute a domain transition to run polkit_auth. ## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## ## # interface(`policykit_domtrans_auth',` @@ -54,6 +79,7 @@ interface(`policykit_domtrans_auth',` ## Role allowed access. ## ## +## # interface(`policykit_run_auth',` gen_require(` @@ -62,6 +88,9 @@ interface(`policykit_run_auth',` policykit_domtrans_auth($1) role $2 types policykit_auth_t; + + allow $1 policykit_auth_t:process signal; + ps_process_pattern(policykit_auth_t, $1) ') ######################################## @@ -69,9 +98,9 @@ interface(`policykit_run_auth',` ## Execute a domain transition to run polkit_grant. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`policykit_domtrans_grant',` @@ -155,9 +184,9 @@ interface(`policykit_rw_reload',` ## Execute a domain transition to run polkit_resolve. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`policykit_domtrans_resolve',` @@ -206,4 +235,50 @@ interface(`policykit_read_lib',` files_search_var_lib($1) read_files_pattern($1, policykit_var_lib_t, policykit_var_lib_t) + + optional_policy(` + # Broken placement + cron_read_system_job_lib_files($1) + ') +') + +####################################### +## +## The per role template for the policykit module. +## +## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +# +template(`policykit_role',` + policykit_run_auth($2, $1) + policykit_run_grant($2, $1) + policykit_read_lib($2) + policykit_read_reload($2) + policykit_dbus_chat($2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send generic signal to policy_auth +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`policykit_signal_auth',` + gen_require(` + type policykit_auth_t; + ') + + allow $1 policykit_auth_t:process signal; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/policykit.te b/policy/modules/services/policykit.te index 1e7169d..67a2c44 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/policykit.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/policykit.te @@ -5,47 +5,69 @@ policy_module(policykit, 1.1.0) # Declarations # -type policykit_t alias polkit_t; -type policykit_exec_t alias polkit_exec_t; +attribute policykit_domain; + +type policykit_t, policykit_domain; +type policykit_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(policykit_t, policykit_exec_t) -type policykit_auth_t alias polkit_auth_t; -type policykit_auth_exec_t alias polkit_auth_exec_t; +type policykit_auth_t, policykit_domain; +type policykit_auth_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(policykit_auth_t, policykit_auth_exec_t) -type policykit_grant_t alias polkit_grant_t; -type policykit_grant_exec_t alias polkit_grant_exec_t; +type policykit_grant_t, policykit_domain; +type policykit_grant_exec_t; init_system_domain(policykit_grant_t, policykit_grant_exec_t) -type policykit_resolve_t alias polkit_resolve_t; -type policykit_resolve_exec_t alias polkit_resolve_exec_t; +type policykit_resolve_t, policykit_domain; +type policykit_resolve_exec_t; init_system_domain(policykit_resolve_t, policykit_resolve_exec_t) type policykit_reload_t alias polkit_reload_t; files_type(policykit_reload_t) +type policykit_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(policykit_tmp_t) + type policykit_var_lib_t alias polkit_var_lib_t; files_type(policykit_var_lib_t) type policykit_var_run_t alias polkit_var_run_t; files_pid_file(policykit_var_run_t) +####################################### +# +# policykit_domain local policy +# + +allow policykit_domain self:process getattr; +allow policykit_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +dev_read_sysfs(policykit_domain) + +#auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_domain) + ######################################## # # policykit local policy # -allow policykit_t self:capability { setgid setuid }; -allow policykit_t self:process getattr; -allow policykit_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow policykit_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search setgid setuid sys_nice sys_ptrace }; +allow policykit_t self:process { getsched setsched signal }; allow policykit_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; -allow policykit_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow policykit_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; policykit_domtrans_auth(policykit_t) can_exec(policykit_t, policykit_exec_t) corecmd_exec_bin(policykit_t) +dev_read_sysfs(policykit_t) + rw_files_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_reload_t, policykit_reload_t) policykit_domtrans_resolve(policykit_t) @@ -56,56 +78,107 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_var_run_t, policykit_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(policykit_t, policykit_var_run_t, policykit_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(policykit_t, policykit_var_run_t, { file dir }) +kernel_read_system_state(policykit_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(policykit_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(policykit_t) + files_read_etc_files(policykit_t) files_read_usr_files(policykit_t) +files_dontaudit_search_all_mountpoints(policykit_t) + +fs_list_inotifyfs(policykit_t) auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_t) -logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_t) +userdom_getattr_all_users(policykit_t) +userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(policykit_t) -miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_t) +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_domain(policykit_t, policykit_exec_t) -userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_t) + init_dbus_chat(policykit_t) + + optional_policy(` + consolekit_dbus_chat(policykit_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + rpm_dbus_chat(policykit_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + consolekit_list_pid_files(policykit_t) + consolekit_read_pid_files(policykit_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_config(policykit_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + systemd_read_logind_sessions_files(policykit_t) + systemd_login_list_pid_dirs(policykit_t) + systemd_login_read_pid_files(policykit_t) +') ######################################## # # polkit_auth local policy # -allow policykit_auth_t self:capability setgid; -allow policykit_auth_t self:process getattr; -allow policykit_auth_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow policykit_auth_t self:capability { ipc_lock setgid setuid }; +dontaudit policykit_auth_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow policykit_auth_t self:process { getsched signal }; + allow policykit_auth_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow policykit_auth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +policykit_dbus_chat(policykit_auth_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(policykit_auth_t) + can_exec(policykit_auth_t, policykit_auth_exec_t) -corecmd_search_bin(policykit_auth_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(policykit_auth_t) rw_files_pattern(policykit_auth_t, policykit_reload_t, policykit_reload_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(policykit_auth_t, policykit_tmp_t, policykit_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(policykit_auth_t, policykit_tmp_t, policykit_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(policykit_auth_t, policykit_tmp_t, { file dir }) + manage_files_pattern(policykit_auth_t, policykit_var_lib_t, policykit_var_lib_t) manage_dirs_pattern(policykit_auth_t, policykit_var_run_t, policykit_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(policykit_auth_t, policykit_var_run_t, policykit_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(policykit_auth_t, policykit_var_run_t, { file dir }) -kernel_read_system_state(policykit_auth_t) +kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(policykit_auth_t) + +dev_read_video_dev(policykit_auth_t) files_read_etc_files(policykit_auth_t) files_read_usr_files(policykit_auth_t) +files_search_home(policykit_auth_t) -auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_auth_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(policykit_auth_t) +fs_search_tmpfs(policykit_auth_t) -logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_auth_t) +auth_rw_var_auth(policykit_auth_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_auth_t) +auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(policykit_auth_t) -miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_auth_t) +miscfiles_read_fonts(policykit_auth_t) +miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(policykit_auth_t) userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(policykit_auth_t) +userdom_dontaudit_write_user_tmp_files(policykit_auth_t) +userdom_read_admin_home_files(policykit_auth_t) optional_policy(` - dbus_system_bus_client(policykit_auth_t) + dbus_system_domain( policykit_auth_t, policykit_auth_exec_t) dbus_session_bus_client(policykit_auth_t) optional_policy(` @@ -118,14 +191,21 @@ optional_policy(` hal_read_state(policykit_auth_t) ') +optional_policy(` + xserver_stream_connect(policykit_auth_t) + xserver_xdm_append_log(policykit_auth_t) + xserver_read_xdm_pid(policykit_auth_t) + xserver_search_xdm_lib(policykit_auth_t) + xserver_create_xdm_tmp_sockets(policykit_auth_t) +') + ######################################## # # polkit_grant local policy # allow policykit_grant_t self:capability setuid; -allow policykit_grant_t self:process getattr; -allow policykit_grant_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow policykit_grant_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow policykit_grant_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -145,19 +225,18 @@ manage_files_pattern(policykit_grant_t, policykit_var_lib_t, policykit_var_lib_t files_read_etc_files(policykit_grant_t) files_read_usr_files(policykit_grant_t) -auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_grant_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(policykit_grant_t) - -logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_grant_t) - -miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_grant_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_grant_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_grant_t) optional_policy(` - dbus_system_bus_client(policykit_grant_t) + cron_manage_system_job_lib_files(policykit_grant_t) +') optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(policykit_grant_t) + optional_policy(` consolekit_dbus_chat(policykit_grant_t) ') ') @@ -167,9 +246,8 @@ optional_policy(` # polkit_resolve local policy # -allow policykit_resolve_t self:capability { setuid sys_nice sys_ptrace }; -allow policykit_resolve_t self:process getattr; -allow policykit_resolve_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow policykit_resolve_t self:capability { setuid sys_nice }; + allow policykit_resolve_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow policykit_resolve_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -185,14 +263,8 @@ corecmd_search_bin(policykit_resolve_t) files_read_etc_files(policykit_resolve_t) files_read_usr_files(policykit_resolve_t) -mcs_ptrace_all(policykit_resolve_t) - auth_use_nsswitch(policykit_resolve_t) -logging_send_syslog_msg(policykit_resolve_t) - -miscfiles_read_localization(policykit_resolve_t) - userdom_read_all_users_state(policykit_resolve_t) optional_policy(` @@ -207,4 +279,3 @@ optional_policy(` kernel_search_proc(policykit_resolve_t) hal_read_state(policykit_resolve_t) ') - diff --git a/policy/modules/services/polipo.fc b/policy/modules/services/polipo.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..11f77ee --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/polipo.fc @@ -0,0 +1,16 @@ +HOME_DIR/\.polipo -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:polipo_config_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.polipo-cache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:polipo_cache_home_t,s0) + +/etc/polipo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:polipo_etc_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/polipo -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:polipo_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/polipo.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:polipo_unit_file_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/polipo -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:polipo_exec_t,s0) + +/var/cache/polipo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:polipo_cache_t,s0) + +/var/log/polipo.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:polipo_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/polipo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:polipo_pid_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/polipo.if b/policy/modules/services/polipo.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d00f6ba --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/polipo.if @@ -0,0 +1,219 @@ +## Caching web proxy. + +######################################## +## +## Role access for polipo session. +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +template(`polipo_role',` + gen_require(` + type polipo_session_t, polipo_exec_t; + ') + + ######################################## + # + # Declarations + # + + role $1 types polipo_session_t; + + ######################################## + # + # Policy + # + + allow $2 polipo_session_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($2, polipo_session_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 polipo_session_t:process ptrace; + ') + + tunable_policy(`polipo_session_users',` + domtrans_pattern($2, polipo_exec_t, polipo_session_t) + ',` + can_exec($2, polipo_exec_t) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Create configuration files in user +## home directories with a named file +## type transition. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`polipo_named_filetrans_config_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type polipo_config_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, polipo_config_home_t, file, ".polipo") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create cache directories in user +## home directories with a named file +## type transition. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`polipo_named_filetrans_cache_home_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type polipo_cache_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, polipo_cache_home_t, dir, ".polipo-cache") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create configuration files in admin +## home directories with a named file +## type transition. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`polipo_named_filetrans_admin_config_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type polipo_config_home_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, polipo_config_home_t, file, ".polipo") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create cache directories in admin +## home directories with a named file +## type transition. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`polipo_named_filetrans_admin_cache_home_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type polipo_cache_home_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, polipo_cache_home_t, dir, ".polipo-cache") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create log files with a named file +## type transition. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`polipo_named_filetrans_log_files',` + gen_require(` + type polipo_log_t; + ') + + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, polipo_log_t, file, "polipo") +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute polipo server in the polipo domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`polipo_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type polipo_t; + type polipo_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 polipo_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 polipo_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, polipo_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Administrate an polipo environment. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`polipo_admin',` + gen_require(` + type polipo_t, polipo_pid_t, polipo_cache_t; + type polipo_etc_t, polipo_log_t, polipo_initrc_exec_t; + type polipo_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 polipo_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, polipo_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 polipo_t:process ptrace; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, polipo_initrc_exec_t) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 polipo_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_list_etc($1) + admin_pattern($1, polipo_etc_t) + + logging_list_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, polipo_log_t) + + files_list_var($1) + admin_pattern($1, polipo_cache_t) + + files_list_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, polipo_pid_t) + + polipo_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, polipo_unit_file_t) + allow $1 polipo_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/polipo.te b/policy/modules/services/polipo.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c08cddc --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/polipo.te @@ -0,0 +1,171 @@ +policy_module(polipo, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +## +##

    +## Determine whether polipo can +## access cifs file systems. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(polipo_use_cifs, false) + +## +##

    +## Determine whether Polipo can +## access nfs file systems. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(polipo_use_nfs, false) + +## +##

    +## Determine whether Polipo session daemon +## can bind tcp sockets to all unreserved ports. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports, false) + +## +##

    +## Determine whether calling user domains +## can execute Polipo daemon in the +## polipo_session_t domain. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(polipo_session_users, false) + +## +##

    +## Determine whether Polipo session daemon +## can send syslog messages. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(polipo_session_send_syslog_msg, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow polipo to connect to all ports > 1023 +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(polipo_connect_all_unreserved, false) + +attribute polipo_daemon; + +type polipo_t, polipo_daemon; +type polipo_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(polipo_t, polipo_exec_t) + +type polipo_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(polipo_initrc_exec_t) + +type polipo_etc_t; +files_config_file(polipo_etc_t) + +type polipo_cache_t; +files_type(polipo_cache_t) + +type polipo_log_t; +logging_log_file(polipo_log_t) + +type polipo_pid_t; +files_pid_file(polipo_pid_t) + +type polipo_session_t, polipo_daemon; +application_domain(polipo_session_t, polipo_exec_t) +ubac_constrained(polipo_session_t) + +type polipo_config_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(polipo_config_home_t) + +type polipo_cache_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(polipo_cache_home_t) + +type polipo_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(polipo_unit_file_t) + +######################################## +# +# Global local policy +# + +allow polipo_daemon self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow polipo_daemon self:tcp_socket { listen accept }; + +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(polipo_daemon) +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(polipo_daemon) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(polipo_daemon) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(polipo_daemon) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(polipo_daemon) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(polipo_daemon) +corenet_tcp_bind_http_cache_port(polipo_daemon) +corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_server_packets(polipo_daemon) + +files_read_usr_files(polipo_daemon) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(polipo_daemon) + +miscfiles_read_localization(polipo_daemon) + +######################################## +# +# Polipo local policy +# + +read_files_pattern(polipo_t, polipo_etc_t, polipo_etc_t) + +manage_files_pattern(polipo_t, polipo_cache_t, polipo_cache_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(polipo_t, polipo_cache_t, polipo_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(polipo_t, polipo_cache_t, dir) + +manage_files_pattern(polipo_t, polipo_log_t, polipo_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(polipo_t, polipo_log_t, file) + +manage_files_pattern(polipo_t, polipo_pid_t, polipo_pid_t) +files_pid_filetrans(polipo_t, polipo_pid_t, file) + +auth_use_nsswitch(polipo_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(polipo_t) + +optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(polipo_t, polipo_exec_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`polipo_connect_all_unreserved',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_unreserved_ports(polipo_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`polipo_use_cifs',` + fs_manage_cifs_files(polipo_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`polipo_use_nfs',` + fs_manage_nfs_files(polipo_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# Polipo session local policy +# + +read_files_pattern(polipo_session_t, polipo_config_home_t, polipo_config_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(polipo_session_t, polipo_cache_home_t, polipo_cache_home_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(polipo_session_t) + +userdom_use_user_terminals(polipo_session_t) + +tunable_policy(`polipo_session_bind_all_unreserved_ports',` + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(polipo_session_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(polipo_session_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`polipo_session_send_syslog_msg',` + logging_send_syslog_msg(polipo_session_t) +') + +userdom_home_manager(polipo_session_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/portmap.fc b/policy/modules/services/portmap.fc index 76f5834..bebd9aa 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/portmap.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/portmap.fc @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ /sbin/portmap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portmap_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/portmap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portmap_exec_t,s0) + ifdef(`distro_debian',` /sbin/pmap_dump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portmap_helper_exec_t,s0) /sbin/pmap_set -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portmap_helper_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/portmap.te b/policy/modules/services/portmap.te index 333a1fe..e599723 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/portmap.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/portmap.te @@ -12,7 +12,6 @@ init_daemon_domain(portmap_t, portmap_exec_t) type portmap_helper_t; type portmap_helper_exec_t; init_system_domain(portmap_helper_t, portmap_helper_exec_t) -role system_r types portmap_helper_t; type portmap_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(portmap_tmp_t) @@ -75,6 +74,8 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(portmap_t) files_read_etc_files(portmap_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(portmap_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(portmap_t) miscfiles_read_localization(portmap_t) @@ -85,14 +86,6 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(portmap_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(portmap_t) optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(portmap_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(portmap_t) -') - -optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(portmap_t) ') @@ -142,7 +135,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(portmap_helper_t) sysnet_read_config(portmap_helper_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(portmap_helper_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(portmap_helper_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_all_users_fds(portmap_helper_t) optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/portreserve.fc b/policy/modules/services/portreserve.fc index 4313a6f..cc334a3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/portreserve.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/portreserve.fc @@ -1,7 +1,10 @@ -/etc/portreserve(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:portreserve_etc_t,s0) -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/portreserve -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portreserve_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/portreserve -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portreserve_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/portreserve(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:portreserve_etc_t,s0) /sbin/portreserve -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portreserve_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/portreserve -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:portreserve_exec_t,s0) + /var/run/portreserve(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:portreserve_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/portreserve.if b/policy/modules/services/portreserve.if index 7719d16..d283895 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/portreserve.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/portreserve.if @@ -104,8 +104,11 @@ interface(`portreserve_admin',` type portreserve_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 portreserve_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 portreserve_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, portreserve_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 portreserve_t:process ptrace; + ') portreserve_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/portreserve.te b/policy/modules/services/portreserve.te index 152af92..1594066 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/portreserve.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/portreserve.te @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type portreserve_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(portreserve_initrc_exec_t) type portreserve_etc_t; -files_type(portreserve_etc_t) +files_config_file(portreserve_etc_t) type portreserve_var_run_t; files_pid_file(portreserve_var_run_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/portslave.te b/policy/modules/services/portslave.te index 69c331e..0555635 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/portslave.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/portslave.te @@ -79,7 +79,7 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(portslave_t) term_use_unallocated_ttys(portslave_t) term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(portslave_t) -term_use_all_ttys(portslave_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ttys(portslave_t) term_search_ptys(portslave_t) auth_rw_login_records(portslave_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postfix.fc b/policy/modules/services/postfix.fc index a3e85c9..c0e0959 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postfix.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/postfix.fc @@ -1,5 +1,6 @@ # postfix -/etc/postfix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_etc_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/postfix -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/postfix.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_etc_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` /usr/libexec/postfix/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/postfix/cleanup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_cleanup_exec_t,s0) @@ -16,22 +17,23 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` /usr/libexec/postfix/pipe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_pipe_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/postfix/virtual -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_virtual_exec_t,s0) ', ` -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/cleanup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_cleanup_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/local -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_local_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/master -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/pickup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_pickup_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/(n)?qmgr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_qmgr_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/smtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_smtp_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/lmtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_smtp_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/scache -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_smtp_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/smtpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_smtpd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/bounce -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_bounce_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/pipe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_pipe_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postfix/virtual -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_virtual_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/cleanup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_cleanup_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/local -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_local_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/master -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/pickup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_pickup_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/(n)?qmgr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_qmgr_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/showq -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_showq_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/smtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_smtp_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/lmtp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_smtp_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/scache -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_smtp_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/smtpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_smtpd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/bounce -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_bounce_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postfix/pipe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_pipe_exec_t,s0) ') /etc/postfix/postfix-script.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_exec_t,s0) /etc/postfix/prng_exch -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_prng_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/postalias -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/postcat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/postdrop -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_postdrop_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/postfix -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t,s0) @@ -42,9 +44,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` /usr/sbin/postqueue -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_postqueue_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/postsuper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_master_exec_t,s0) -/var/lib/postfix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_data_t,s0) +/var/lib/postfix.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_data_t,s0) -/var/spool/postfix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_t,s0) +/var/spool/postfix.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_t,s0) +/var/spool/postfix/deferred(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_maildrop_t,s0) +/var/spool/postfix/defer(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_maildrop_t,s0) /var/spool/postfix/maildrop(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_spool_maildrop_t,s0) /var/spool/postfix/pid/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_var_run_t,s0) /var/spool/postfix/private(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postfix_private_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postfix.if b/policy/modules/services/postfix.if index 46bee12..99499ef 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postfix.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/postfix.if @@ -28,75 +28,19 @@ interface(`postfix_stub',` ## # template(`postfix_domain_template',` - type postfix_$1_t; + gen_require(` + attribute postfix_domain; + ') + + type postfix_$1_t, postfix_domain; type postfix_$1_exec_t; domain_type(postfix_$1_t) domain_entry_file(postfix_$1_t, postfix_$1_exec_t) role system_r types postfix_$1_t; - dontaudit postfix_$1_t self:capability sys_tty_config; - allow postfix_$1_t self:process { signal_perms setpgid }; - allow postfix_$1_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; - allow postfix_$1_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - allow postfix_$1_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; - - allow postfix_master_t postfix_$1_t:process signal; - #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=244456 - allow postfix_$1_t postfix_master_t:file read; - - allow postfix_$1_t postfix_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; - read_files_pattern(postfix_$1_t, postfix_etc_t, postfix_etc_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_$1_t, postfix_etc_t, postfix_etc_t) - - can_exec(postfix_$1_t, postfix_$1_exec_t) - - allow postfix_$1_t postfix_exec_t:file { mmap_file_perms lock ioctl }; - - allow postfix_$1_t postfix_master_t:process sigchld; - - allow postfix_$1_t postfix_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms; - - allow postfix_$1_t postfix_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; - files_pid_filetrans(postfix_$1_t, postfix_var_run_t, file) - - kernel_read_system_state(postfix_$1_t) - kernel_read_network_state(postfix_$1_t) - kernel_read_all_sysctls(postfix_$1_t) - - dev_read_sysfs(postfix_$1_t) - dev_read_rand(postfix_$1_t) - dev_read_urand(postfix_$1_t) - - fs_search_auto_mountpoints(postfix_$1_t) - fs_getattr_xattr_fs(postfix_$1_t) - fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(postfix_$1_t) - - term_dontaudit_use_console(postfix_$1_t) - - corecmd_exec_shell(postfix_$1_t) - - files_read_etc_files(postfix_$1_t) - files_read_etc_runtime_files(postfix_$1_t) - files_read_usr_symlinks(postfix_$1_t) - files_search_spool(postfix_$1_t) - files_getattr_tmp_dirs(postfix_$1_t) - files_search_all_mountpoints(postfix_$1_t) - - init_dontaudit_use_fds(postfix_$1_t) - init_sigchld(postfix_$1_t) - auth_use_nsswitch(postfix_$1_t) - logging_send_syslog_msg(postfix_$1_t) - - miscfiles_read_localization(postfix_$1_t) - miscfiles_read_generic_certs(postfix_$1_t) - - userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(postfix_$1_t) - - optional_policy(` - udev_read_db(postfix_$1_t) - ') + can_exec(postfix_$1_t, postfix_$1_exec_t) ') ######################################## @@ -115,7 +59,7 @@ template(`postfix_server_domain_template',` type postfix_$1_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(postfix_$1_tmp_t) - allow postfix_$1_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override }; + allow postfix_$1_t self:capability { setuid setgid sys_chroot dac_override }; allow postfix_$1_t postfix_master_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_stream_socket_perms }; allow postfix_$1_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; allow postfix_$1_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -165,6 +109,8 @@ template(`postfix_user_domain_template',` domtrans_pattern(postfix_user_domtrans, postfix_$1_exec_t, postfix_$1_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(postfix_$1_t) + + application_domain(postfix_$1_t, postfix_$1_exec_t) ') ######################################## @@ -215,7 +161,7 @@ interface(`postfix_config_filetrans',` ') files_search_etc($1) - filetrans_pattern($1, postfix_etc_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, postfix_etc_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -272,7 +218,8 @@ interface(`postfix_read_local_state',` type postfix_local_t; ') - read_files_pattern($1, postfix_local_t, postfix_local_t) + kernel_search_proc($1) + ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_local_t) ') ######################################## @@ -290,7 +237,27 @@ interface(`postfix_read_master_state',` type postfix_master_t; ') - read_files_pattern($1, postfix_master_t, postfix_master_t) + kernel_search_proc($1) + ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_master_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Use postfix master process file +## file descriptors. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`postfix_use_fds_master',` + gen_require(` + type postfix_master_t; + ') + + allow $1 postfix_master_t:fd use; ') ######################################## @@ -376,6 +343,25 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_master',` domtrans_pattern($1, postfix_master_exec_t, postfix_master_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Execute the master postfix in the postfix master domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`postfix_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type postfix_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, postfix_initrc_exec_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute the master postfix program in the @@ -404,7 +390,6 @@ interface(`postfix_exec_master',` ## Domain allowed access. ## ## -## # interface(`postfix_stream_connect_master',` gen_require(` @@ -416,6 +401,24 @@ interface(`postfix_stream_connect_master',` ######################################## ## +## Allow read/write postfix master pipes +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`postfix_rw_master_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type postfix_master_t; + ') + + allow $1 postfix_master_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute the master postdrop in the ## postfix_postdrop domain. ## @@ -462,7 +465,7 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_postqueue',` ## ## # -interface(`posftix_exec_postqueue',` +interface(`postfix_exec_postqueue',` gen_require(` type postfix_postqueue_exec_t; ') @@ -529,6 +532,25 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_smtp',` ######################################## ## +## Getattr postfix mail spool files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`postfix_getattr_spool_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute postfix_spool_type; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + getattr_files_pattern($1, postfix_spool_type, postfix_spool_type) +') + +######################################## +## ## Search postfix mail spool directories. ## ## @@ -539,10 +561,10 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_smtp',` # interface(`postfix_search_spool',` gen_require(` - type postfix_spool_t; + attribute postfix_spool_type; ') - allow $1 postfix_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $1 postfix_spool_type:dir search_dir_perms; files_search_spool($1) ') @@ -558,10 +580,10 @@ interface(`postfix_search_spool',` # interface(`postfix_list_spool',` gen_require(` - type postfix_spool_t; + attribute postfix_spool_type; ') - allow $1 postfix_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow $1 postfix_spool_type:dir list_dir_perms; files_search_spool($1) ') @@ -577,11 +599,11 @@ interface(`postfix_list_spool',` # interface(`postfix_read_spool_files',` gen_require(` - type postfix_spool_t; + attribute postfix_spool_type; ') files_search_spool($1) - read_files_pattern($1, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) + read_files_pattern($1, postfix_spool_type, postfix_spool_type) ') ######################################## @@ -596,11 +618,11 @@ interface(`postfix_read_spool_files',` # interface(`postfix_manage_spool_files',` gen_require(` - type postfix_spool_t; + attribute postfix_spool_type; ') files_search_spool($1) - manage_files_pattern($1, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, postfix_spool_type, postfix_spool_type) ') ######################################## @@ -621,3 +643,154 @@ interface(`postfix_domtrans_user_mail_handler',` typeattribute $1 postfix_user_domtrans; ') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an postfix environment. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`postfix_admin',` + gen_require(` + attribute postfix_spool_type; + type postfix_bounce_t, postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_local_t; + type postfix_master_t, postfix_pickup_t, postfix_qmgr_t; + type postfix_initrc_exec_t, postfix_data_t, postfix_etc_t; + type postfix_map_tmp_t, postfix_prng_t, postfix_public_t; + type postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 postfix_bounce_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_bounce_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 postfix_bounce_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 postfix_cleanup_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_cleanup_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 postfix_cleanup_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 postfix_local_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 postfix_master_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 postfix_pickup_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 postfix_qmgr_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 postfix_smtpd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 postfix_local_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_local_t) + + allow $1 postfix_master_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_master_t) + + allow $1 postfix_pickup_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_pickup_t) + + allow $1 postfix_qmgr_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_qmgr_t) + + allow $1 postfix_smtpd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_smtpd_t) + + postfix_run_map($1, $2) + postfix_run_postdrop($1, $2) + + postfix_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 postfix_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + admin_pattern($1, postfix_data_t) + + files_list_etc($1) + admin_pattern($1, postfix_etc_t) + + files_list_spool($1) + admin_pattern($1, postfix_spool_type) + + admin_pattern($1, postfix_var_run_t) + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, postfix_map_tmp_t) + + admin_pattern($1, postfix_prng_t) + + admin_pattern($1, postfix_public_t) + + postfix_filetrans_named_content($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute the master postdrop in the +## postfix_postdrop domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the iptables domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`postfix_run_postdrop',` + gen_require(` + type postfix_postdrop_t; + ') + + postfix_domtrans_postdrop($1) + role $2 types postfix_postdrop_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute postfix exec in the users domain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`postfix_exec',` + gen_require(` + type postfix_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, postfix_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to postfix named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`postfix_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type postfix_exec_t; + type postfix_prng_t; + ') + + postfix_config_filetrans($1, postfix_exec_t, file, "postfix-script") + postfix_config_filetrans($1, postfix_prng_t, file, "prng_exch") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postfix.te b/policy/modules/services/postfix.te index a32c4b3..f278544 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postfix.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/postfix.te @@ -5,6 +5,15 @@ policy_module(postfix, 1.12.1) # Declarations # +## +##

    +## Allow postfix_local domain full write access to mail_spool directories +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(allow_postfix_local_write_mail_spool, true) + +attribute postfix_domain; +attribute postfix_spool_type; attribute postfix_user_domains; # domains that transition to the # postfix user domains @@ -12,8 +21,8 @@ attribute postfix_user_domtrans; postfix_server_domain_template(bounce) -type postfix_spool_bounce_t; -files_type(postfix_spool_bounce_t) +type postfix_spool_bounce_t, postfix_spool_type; +files_spool_file(postfix_spool_bounce_t) postfix_server_domain_template(cleanup) @@ -41,6 +50,9 @@ typealias postfix_master_t alias postfix_t; # generation macro work mta_mailserver(postfix_t, postfix_master_exec_t) +type postfix_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(postfix_initrc_exec_t) + postfix_server_domain_template(pickup) postfix_server_domain_template(pipe) @@ -49,6 +61,7 @@ postfix_user_domain_template(postdrop) mta_mailserver_user_agent(postfix_postdrop_t) postfix_user_domain_template(postqueue) +mta_mailserver_user_agent(postfix_postqueue_t) type postfix_private_t; files_type(postfix_private_t) @@ -65,14 +78,14 @@ mta_mailserver_sender(postfix_smtp_t) postfix_server_domain_template(smtpd) -type postfix_spool_t; -files_type(postfix_spool_t) +type postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_type; +files_spool_file(postfix_spool_t) -type postfix_spool_maildrop_t; -files_type(postfix_spool_maildrop_t) +type postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_type; +files_spool_file(postfix_spool_maildrop_t) -type postfix_spool_flush_t; -files_type(postfix_spool_flush_t) +type postfix_spool_flush_t, postfix_spool_type; +files_spool_file(postfix_spool_flush_t) type postfix_public_t; files_type(postfix_public_t) @@ -94,23 +107,24 @@ mta_mailserver_delivery(postfix_virtual_t) # chown is to set the correct ownership of queue dirs allow postfix_master_t self:capability { chown dac_override kill setgid setuid net_bind_service sys_tty_config }; -allow postfix_master_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow postfix_master_t self:process setrlimit; allow postfix_master_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow postfix_master_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; -allow postfix_master_t self:process setrlimit; +allow postfix_master_t postfix_etc_t:dir rw_dir_perms; allow postfix_master_t postfix_etc_t:file rw_file_perms; +mta_filetrans_aliases(postfix_master_t, postfix_etc_t) can_exec(postfix_master_t, postfix_exec_t) allow postfix_master_t postfix_data_t:dir manage_dir_perms; allow postfix_master_t postfix_data_t:file manage_file_perms; -allow postfix_master_t postfix_map_exec_t:file { mmap_file_perms ioctl lock }; +allow postfix_master_t postfix_map_exec_t:file { mmap_file_perms lock }; -allow postfix_master_t postfix_postdrop_exec_t:file getattr; +allow postfix_master_t postfix_postdrop_exec_t:file getattr_file_perms; -allow postfix_master_t postfix_postqueue_exec_t:file getattr; +allow postfix_master_t postfix_postqueue_exec_t:file getattr_file_perms; manage_fifo_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t) @@ -130,7 +144,7 @@ manage_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) files_spool_filetrans(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_t, dir) allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:dir manage_dir_perms; -allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:file getattr; +allow postfix_master_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:file getattr_file_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_flush_t, postfix_spool_flush_t) manage_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_flush_t, postfix_spool_flush_t) @@ -138,6 +152,7 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_flush_t, postfix_spool_ delete_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) rename_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) +rw_files_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) setattr_dirs_pattern(postfix_master_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) kernel_read_all_sysctls(postfix_master_t) @@ -150,6 +165,9 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(postfix_master_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(postfix_master_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(postfix_master_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(postfix_master_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(postfix_master_t) +corenet_udp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(postfix_master_t) +corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_ports(postfix_master_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(postfix_master_t) corenet_tcp_bind_amavisd_send_port(postfix_master_t) corenet_tcp_bind_smtp_port(postfix_master_t) @@ -167,6 +185,10 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_master_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(postfix_master_t) files_read_usr_files(postfix_master_t) +files_search_var_lib(postfix_master_t) +files_search_tmp(postfix_master_t) + +mcs_file_read_all(postfix_master_t) term_dontaudit_search_ptys(postfix_master_t) @@ -220,13 +242,17 @@ allow postfix_bounce_t self:capability dac_read_search; allow postfix_bounce_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; allow postfix_bounce_t postfix_public_t:sock_file write; -allow postfix_bounce_t postfix_public_t:dir search; +allow postfix_bounce_t postfix_public_t:dir search_dir_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) manage_files_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) files_spool_filetrans(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_t, dir) +manage_files_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) +allow postfix_bounce_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + manage_dirs_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t) manage_files_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t, postfix_spool_bounce_t) @@ -243,12 +269,17 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t, rw_fifo_files_pattern(postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t) write_sock_files_pattern(postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t) +allow postfix_cleanup_t postfix_smtpd_t:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) manage_files_pattern(postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) files_spool_filetrans(postfix_cleanup_t, postfix_spool_t, dir) +allow postfix_cleanup_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:dir list_dir_perms; +allow postfix_cleanup_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:file read_file_perms; +allow postfix_cleanup_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + allow postfix_cleanup_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:dir list_dir_perms; corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_cleanup_t) @@ -264,7 +295,6 @@ optional_policy(` # Postfix local local policy # -allow postfix_local_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow postfix_local_t self:process { setsched setrlimit }; # connect to master process @@ -273,6 +303,8 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t, post # for .forward - maybe we need a new type for it? rw_sock_files_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t) +domtrans_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_postdrop_exec_t, postfix_postdrop_t) + allow postfix_local_t postfix_spool_t:file rw_file_perms; corecmd_exec_shell(postfix_local_t) @@ -286,10 +318,15 @@ mta_read_aliases(postfix_local_t) mta_delete_spool(postfix_local_t) # For reading spamassasin mta_read_config(postfix_local_t) +# Handle vacation script +mta_send_mail(postfix_local_t) -domtrans_pattern(postfix_local_t, postfix_postdrop_exec_t, postfix_postdrop_t) -# Might be a leak, but I need a postfix expert to explain -allow postfix_postdrop_t postfix_local_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(postfix_local_t) +userdom_exec_user_bin_files(postfix_local_t) + +tunable_policy(`allow_postfix_local_write_mail_spool',` + mta_manage_spool(postfix_local_t) +') optional_policy(` clamav_search_lib(postfix_local_t) @@ -297,6 +334,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + dspam_domtrans(postfix_local_t) +') + +optional_policy(` # for postalias mailman_manage_data_files(postfix_local_t) mailman_append_log(postfix_local_t) @@ -304,9 +345,22 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + nagios_search_spool(postfix_local_t) +') + +optional_policy(` procmail_domtrans(postfix_local_t) ') +optional_policy(` + sendmail_rw_pipes(postfix_local_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + zarafa_domtrans_deliver(postfix_local_t) + zarafa_stream_connect_server(postfix_local_t) +') + ######################################## # # Postfix map local policy @@ -379,18 +433,24 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t, p rw_fifo_files_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t) rw_sock_files_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t) +allow postfix_pickup_t postfix_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_files_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) +delete_files_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) + postfix_list_spool(postfix_pickup_t) allow postfix_pickup_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) delete_files_pattern(postfix_pickup_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) +mcs_file_read_all(postfix_pickup_t) +mcs_file_write_all(postfix_pickup_t) + ######################################## # # Postfix pipe local policy # -allow postfix_pipe_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow postfix_pipe_t self:process setrlimit; write_sock_files_pattern(postfix_pipe_t, postfix_private_t, postfix_private_t) @@ -401,6 +461,8 @@ rw_files_pattern(postfix_pipe_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) domtrans_pattern(postfix_pipe_t, postfix_postdrop_exec_t, postfix_postdrop_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_pipe_t) + optional_policy(` dovecot_domtrans_deliver(postfix_pipe_t) ') @@ -420,6 +482,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` spamassassin_domtrans_client(postfix_pipe_t) + spamassassin_kill_client(postfix_pipe_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -436,11 +499,17 @@ allow postfix_postdrop_t self:capability sys_resource; allow postfix_postdrop_t self:tcp_socket create; allow postfix_postdrop_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +# Might be a leak, but I need a postfix expert to explain +allow postfix_postdrop_t postfix_local_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; + rw_fifo_files_pattern(postfix_postdrop_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t) postfix_list_spool(postfix_postdrop_t) manage_files_pattern(postfix_postdrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) +mcs_file_read_all(postfix_postdrop_t) +mcs_file_write_all(postfix_postdrop_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(postfix_postdrop_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(postfix_postdrop_t) @@ -487,8 +556,8 @@ write_fifo_files_pattern(postfix_postqueue_t, postfix_public_t, postfix_public_t domtrans_pattern(postfix_postqueue_t, postfix_showq_exec_t, postfix_showq_t) # to write the mailq output, it really should not need read access! -term_use_all_ptys(postfix_postqueue_t) -term_use_all_ttys(postfix_postqueue_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ptys(postfix_postqueue_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ttys(postfix_postqueue_t) init_sigchld_script(postfix_postqueue_t) init_use_script_fds(postfix_postqueue_t) @@ -519,7 +588,11 @@ files_spool_filetrans(postfix_qmgr_t, postfix_spool_t, dir) allow postfix_qmgr_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow postfix_qmgr_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:file read_file_perms; -allow postfix_qmgr_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow postfix_qmgr_t postfix_spool_bounce_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(postfix_qmgr_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(postfix_qmgr_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) +allow postfix_qmgr_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_qmgr_t) @@ -539,7 +612,9 @@ postfix_list_spool(postfix_showq_t) allow postfix_showq_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow postfix_showq_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:file read_file_perms; -allow postfix_showq_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow postfix_showq_t postfix_spool_maildrop_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + +mcs_file_read_all(postfix_showq_t) # to write the mailq output, it really should not need read access! term_use_all_ptys(postfix_showq_t) @@ -558,6 +633,8 @@ allow postfix_smtp_t postfix_prng_t:file rw_file_perms; allow postfix_smtp_t postfix_spool_t:file rw_file_perms; +rw_files_pattern(postfix_smtp_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t, postfix_spool_maildrop_t) + files_search_all_mountpoints(postfix_smtp_t) optional_policy(` @@ -565,6 +642,14 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + dovecot_stream_connect(postfix_smtp_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dspam_stream_connect(postfix_smtp_t) +') + +optional_policy(` milter_stream_connect_all(postfix_smtp_t) ') @@ -581,17 +666,25 @@ stream_connect_pattern(postfix_smtpd_t, { postfix_private_t postfix_public_t }, corenet_tcp_connect_postfix_policyd_port(postfix_smtpd_t) # for prng_exch -allow postfix_smtpd_t postfix_spool_t:file rw_file_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) +manage_files_pattern(postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_smtpd_t, postfix_spool_t, postfix_spool_t) allow postfix_smtpd_t postfix_prng_t:file rw_file_perms; corecmd_exec_bin(postfix_smtpd_t) # for OpenSSL certificates files_read_usr_files(postfix_smtpd_t) + +# postfix checks the size of all mounted file systems +fs_getattr_all_dirs(postfix_smtpd_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(postfix_smtpd_t) + mta_read_aliases(postfix_smtpd_t) optional_policy(` dovecot_stream_connect_auth(postfix_smtpd_t) + dovecot_stream_connect(postfix_smtpd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -599,6 +692,12 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + milter_stream_connect_all(postfix_smtpd_t) + spamassassin_read_pid_files(postfix_smtpd_t) + spamd_stream_connect(postfix_smtpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` postgrey_stream_connect(postfix_smtpd_t) ') @@ -611,7 +710,6 @@ optional_policy(` # Postfix virtual local policy # -allow postfix_virtual_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow postfix_virtual_t self:process { setsched setrlimit }; allow postfix_virtual_t postfix_spool_t:file rw_file_perms; @@ -630,3 +728,75 @@ mta_delete_spool(postfix_virtual_t) # For reading spamassasin mta_read_config(postfix_virtual_t) mta_manage_spool(postfix_virtual_t) + +userdom_manage_user_home_dirs(postfix_virtual_t) +userdom_manage_user_home_content(postfix_virtual_t) +userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(postfix_virtual_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(postfix_virtual_t, {file dir }) + +######################################## +# +# postfix_domain common policy +# +allow postfix_domain self:capability { sys_nice sys_chroot }; +dontaudit postfix_domain self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow postfix_domain self:process { signal_perms setpgid setsched }; +allow postfix_domain self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; +allow postfix_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow postfix_domain self:unix_stream_socket connectto; +allow postfix_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +allow postfix_master_t postfix_domain:process signal; +#https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=244456 +allow postfix_domain postfix_master_t:file read; +allow postfix_domain postfix_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; +read_files_pattern(postfix_domain, postfix_etc_t, postfix_etc_t) +read_lnk_files_pattern(postfix_domain, postfix_etc_t, postfix_etc_t) + +allow postfix_domain postfix_exec_t:file { mmap_file_perms lock }; + +allow postfix_domain postfix_master_t:process sigchld; + +allow postfix_domain postfix_spool_t:dir list_dir_perms; + +allow postfix_domain postfix_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; +files_pid_filetrans(postfix_domain, postfix_var_run_t, file) + +kernel_read_system_state(postfix_domain) +kernel_read_network_state(postfix_domain) +kernel_read_all_sysctls(postfix_domain) + +dev_read_sysfs(postfix_domain) +dev_read_rand(postfix_domain) +dev_read_urand(postfix_domain) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(postfix_domain) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(postfix_domain) +fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(postfix_domain) + +term_dontaudit_use_console(postfix_domain) + +corecmd_exec_shell(postfix_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(postfix_domain) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(postfix_domain) +files_read_usr_files(postfix_domain) +files_read_usr_symlinks(postfix_domain) +files_search_spool(postfix_domain) +files_getattr_tmp_dirs(postfix_domain) +files_search_all_mountpoints(postfix_domain) + +init_dontaudit_use_fds(postfix_domain) +init_sigchld(postfix_domain) +init_dontaudit_rw_stream_socket(postfix_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(postfix_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(postfix_domain) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(postfix_domain) + +userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(postfix_domain) + +optional_policy(` + udev_read_db(postfix_domain) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postfixpolicyd.if b/policy/modules/services/postfixpolicyd.if index feae93b..b2af729 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postfixpolicyd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/postfixpolicyd.if @@ -20,12 +20,14 @@ interface(`postfixpolicyd_admin',` gen_require(` type postfix_policyd_t, postfix_policyd_conf_t; - type postfix_policyd_var_run_t; - type postfix_policyd_initrc_exec_t; + type postfix_policyd_var_run_t, postfix_policyd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 postfix_policyd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 postfix_policyd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, postfix_policyd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 postfix_policyd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, postfix_policyd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postfixpolicyd.te b/policy/modules/services/postfixpolicyd.te index 7257526..7d73656 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postfixpolicyd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/postfixpolicyd.te @@ -23,14 +23,14 @@ files_pid_file(postfix_policyd_var_run_t) # Local Policy # -allow postfix_policyd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow postfix_policyd_t self:capability { sys_resource sys_chroot setgid setuid }; allow postfix_policyd_t self:process setrlimit; -allow postfix_policyd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { connect create write}; +allow postfix_policyd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow postfix_policyd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow postfix_policyd_t postfix_policyd_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow postfix_policyd_t postfix_policyd_conf_t:file read_file_perms; -allow postfix_policyd_t postfix_policyd_conf_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow postfix_policyd_t postfix_policyd_conf_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; manage_files_pattern(postfix_policyd_t, postfix_policyd_var_run_t, postfix_policyd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(postfix_policyd_t, postfix_policyd_var_run_t, file) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.fc b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.fc index f03fad4..df9f22b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.fc @@ -11,9 +11,9 @@ /usr/bin/initdb(\.sepgsql)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/(se)?postgres -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/pgsql/test/regress(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_db_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/pgsql/test/regress/pg_regress -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/postgresql/bin/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_db_t,s0) +/usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/pg_regress -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/postgresql/bin/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_debian', ` /usr/lib/postgresql/.*/bin/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_exec_t,s0) @@ -28,9 +28,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` # /var/lib/postgres(ql)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_db_t,s0) -/var/lib/pgsql/data(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_db_t,s0) +/var/lib/pgsql(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_db_t,s0) /var/lib/pgsql/logfile(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_log_t,s0) -/var/lib/pgsql/pgstartup\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_log_t,s0) +/var/lib/pgsql/.*\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_log_t,s0) /var/lib/sepgsql(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_db_t,s0) /var/lib/sepgsql/pgstartup\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_log_t,s0) @@ -45,4 +45,4 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` /var/run/postgresql(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_var_run_t,s0) -/var/run/postmaster.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_var_run_t,s0) +#/var/run/postmaster.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:postgresql_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.if b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.if index 09aeffa..e66adbd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.if @@ -10,7 +10,7 @@ ## ## ## -## +## ## The type of the user domain. ## ## @@ -51,15 +51,6 @@ interface(`postgresql_role',` # Client local policy # - tunable_policy(`sepgsql_enable_users_ddl',` - allow $2 user_sepgsql_schema_t:db_schema { create drop setattr }; - allow $2 user_sepgsql_table_t:db_table { create drop setattr }; - allow $2 user_sepgsql_table_t:db_column { create drop setattr }; - allow $2 user_sepgsql_sysobj_t:db_tuple { update insert delete }; - allow $2 user_sepgsql_seq_t:db_sequence { create drop setattr set_value }; - allow $2 user_sepgsql_view_t:db_view { create drop setattr }; - allow $2 user_sepgsql_proc_exec_t:db_procedure { create drop setattr }; - ') allow $2 user_sepgsql_schema_t:db_schema { getattr search add_name remove_name }; type_transition $2 sepgsql_database_type:db_schema user_sepgsql_schema_t; @@ -88,6 +79,16 @@ interface(`postgresql_role',` allow $2 sepgsql_trusted_proc_t:process transition; type_transition $2 sepgsql_trusted_proc_exec_t:process sepgsql_trusted_proc_t; + + tunable_policy(`sepgsql_enable_users_ddl',` + allow $2 user_sepgsql_schema_t:db_schema { create drop setattr }; + allow $2 user_sepgsql_table_t:db_table { create drop setattr }; + allow $2 user_sepgsql_table_t:db_column { create drop setattr }; + allow $2 user_sepgsql_sysobj_t:db_tuple { update insert delete }; + allow $2 user_sepgsql_seq_t:db_sequence { create drop setattr set_value }; + allow $2 user_sepgsql_view_t:db_view { create drop setattr }; + allow $2 user_sepgsql_proc_exec_t:db_procedure { create drop setattr }; + ') ') ######################################## @@ -286,7 +287,7 @@ interface(`postgresql_search_db',` type postgresql_db_t; ') - allow $1 postgresql_db_t:dir search; + allow $1 postgresql_db_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -298,14 +299,16 @@ interface(`postgresql_search_db',` ## Domain allowed access. ## ## +# interface(`postgresql_manage_db',` gen_require(` type postgresql_db_t; ') - allow $1 postgresql_db_t:dir rw_dir_perms; - allow $1 postgresql_db_t:file rw_file_perms; - allow $1 postgresql_db_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, postgresql_db_t, postgresql_db_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, postgresql_db_t, postgresql_db_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, postgresql_db_t, postgresql_db_t) ') ######################################## @@ -328,6 +331,24 @@ interface(`postgresql_domtrans',` ###################################### ## +## Execute Postgresql in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`postgresql_exec',` + gen_require(` + type postgresql_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, postgresql_exec_t) +') + +###################################### +## ## Allow domain to signal postgresql ## ## @@ -395,7 +416,6 @@ interface(`postgresql_tcp_connect',` ## Domain allowed access. ## ## -## # interface(`postgresql_stream_connect',` gen_require(` @@ -403,10 +423,8 @@ interface(`postgresql_stream_connect',` ') files_search_pids($1) - allow $1 postgresql_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; - allow $1 postgresql_var_run_t:sock_file write; - # Some versions of postgresql put the sock file in /tmp - allow $1 postgresql_tmp_t:sock_file write; + files_search_tmp($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, { postgresql_var_run_t postgresql_tmp_t }, { postgresql_var_run_t postgresql_tmp_t }, postgresql_t) ') ######################################## @@ -468,6 +486,7 @@ interface(`postgresql_unpriv_client',` allow $1 unpriv_sepgsql_view_t:db_view { create drop setattr }; allow $1 unpriv_sepgsql_proc_exec_t:db_procedure { create drop setattr }; ') + allow $1 unpriv_sepgsql_schema_t:db_schema { getattr add_name remove_name }; type_transition $1 sepgsql_database_type:db_schema unpriv_sepgsql_schema_t; @@ -492,6 +511,7 @@ interface(`postgresql_unpriv_client',` allow $1 unpriv_sepgsql_blob_t:db_blob { create drop getattr setattr read write import export }; type_transition $1 sepgsql_database_type:db_blob unpriv_sepgsql_blob_t; + ') ######################################## @@ -531,33 +551,38 @@ interface(`postgresql_unconfined',` # interface(`postgresql_admin',` gen_require(` - attribute sepgsql_admin_type; - attribute sepgsql_client_type; - - type postgresql_t, postgresql_var_run_t; - type postgresql_tmp_t, postgresql_db_t; - type postgresql_etc_t, postgresql_log_t; - type postgresql_initrc_exec_t; + attribute sepgsql_admin_type, sepgsql_client_type; + type postgresql_t, postgresql_var_run_t, postgresql_initrc_exec_t; + type postgresql_tmp_t, postgresql_db_t, postgresql_log_t; + type postgresql_etc_t; ') typeattribute $1 sepgsql_admin_type; - allow $1 postgresql_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 postgresql_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, postgresql_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 postgresql_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, postgresql_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 postgresql_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, postgresql_var_run_t) + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, postgresql_db_t) + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, postgresql_etc_t) + logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, postgresql_log_t) + files_list_tmp($1) admin_pattern($1, postgresql_tmp_t) postgresql_tcp_connect($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.te b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.te index 4a5387a..3124e96 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postgresql.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/postgresql.te @@ -19,16 +19,16 @@ gen_require(` # ## -##

    -## Allow unprived users to execute DDL statement -##

    +##

    +## Allow unprivileged users to execute DDL statement +##

    ##     gen_tunable(sepgsql_enable_users_ddl, true) ## -##

    -## Allow database admins to execute DML statement -##

    +##

    +## Allow database admins to execute DML statement +##

    ##     gen_tunable(sepgsql_unconfined_dbadm, true) @@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ allow postgresql_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow postgresql_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow postgresql_t self:udp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow postgresql_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; -allow postgresql_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow postgresql_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; allow postgresql_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms; allow postgresql_t sepgsql_database_type:db_database *; @@ -241,7 +241,7 @@ allow postgresql_t postgresql_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern(postgresql_t, postgresql_etc_t, postgresql_etc_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(postgresql_t, postgresql_etc_t, postgresql_etc_t) -allow postgresql_t postgresql_exec_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow postgresql_t postgresql_exec_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; can_exec(postgresql_t, postgresql_exec_t ) allow postgresql_t postgresql_lock_t:file manage_file_perms; @@ -307,8 +307,7 @@ domain_dontaudit_list_all_domains_state(postgresql_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(postgresql_t) files_dontaudit_search_home(postgresql_t) -files_manage_etc_files(postgresql_t) -files_search_etc(postgresql_t) +files_read_etc_files(postgresql_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(postgresql_t) files_read_usr_files(postgresql_t) @@ -330,7 +329,7 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(postgresql_t) mta_getattr_spool(postgresql_t) -tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',` +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` allow postgresql_t self:process execmem; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postgrey.if b/policy/modules/services/postgrey.if index ad15fde..12202e1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postgrey.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/postgrey.if @@ -15,9 +15,9 @@ interface(`postgrey_stream_connect',` type postgrey_var_run_t, postgrey_t, postgrey_spool_t; ') - stream_connect_pattern($1, postgrey_var_run_t, postgrey_var_run_t, postgrey_t) - stream_connect_pattern($1, postgrey_spool_t, postgrey_spool_t, postgrey_t) + stream_connect_pattern($1, { postgrey_spool_t postgrey_var_run_t }, { postgrey_spool_t postgrey_var_run_t }, postgrey_t) files_search_pids($1) + files_search_spool($1) ') ######################################## @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ interface(`postgrey_search_spool',` type postgrey_spool_t; ') + files_search_spool($1) allow $1 postgrey_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') @@ -57,13 +58,15 @@ interface(`postgrey_search_spool',` # interface(`postgrey_admin',` gen_require(` - type postgrey_t, postgrey_etc_t; + type postgrey_t, postgrey_etc_t, postgrey_initrc_exec_t; type postgrey_var_lib_t, postgrey_var_run_t; - type postgrey_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 postgrey_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 postgrey_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, postgrey_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 postgrey_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, postgrey_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/postgrey.te b/policy/modules/services/postgrey.te index db843e2..4389e81 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/postgrey.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/postgrey.te @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type postgrey_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(postgrey_initrc_exec_t) type postgrey_spool_t; -files_type(postgrey_spool_t) +files_spool_file(postgrey_spool_t) type postgrey_var_lib_t; files_type(postgrey_var_lib_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ppp.fc b/policy/modules/services/ppp.fc index 2d82c6d..ff2c96a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ppp.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/ppp.fc @@ -11,19 +11,24 @@ # Fix /etc/ppp {up,down} family scripts (see man pppd) /etc/ppp/(auth|ip(v6|x)?)-(up|down) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ppp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_unit_file_t,s0) + /root/.ppprc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_etc_t,s0) # # /sbin # -/sbin/ppp-watch -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/pppoe-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/ppp-watch -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_exec_t,s0) # # /usr # +/usr/sbin/ipppd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ppp-watch -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/pppd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pppoe-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/pptp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pptp_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/ipppd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_exec_t,s0) # # /var @@ -34,5 +39,7 @@ # Fix pptp sockets /var/run/pptp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pptp_var_run_t,s0) +/var/lock/ppp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_lock_t,s0) + /var/log/ppp-connect-errors.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_log_t,s0) -/var/log/ppp/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/ppp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pppd_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ppp.if b/policy/modules/services/ppp.if index b524673..1cca3d2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ppp.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ppp.if @@ -66,7 +66,6 @@ interface(`ppp_sigchld',` ## ## # -# interface(`ppp_kill',` gen_require(` type pppd_t; @@ -180,8 +179,7 @@ interface(`ppp_run',` ') ppp_domtrans($1) - role $2 types pppd_t; - role $2 types pptp_t; + role $2 types { pppd_t pptp_t }; optional_policy(` ddclient_run(pppd_t, $2) @@ -281,7 +279,8 @@ interface(`ppp_read_pid_files',` type pppd_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 pppd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; + files_search_pids($1) + read_files_pattern($1, pppd_var_run_t, pppd_var_run_t) ') ######################################## @@ -299,6 +298,7 @@ interface(`ppp_manage_pid_files',` type pppd_var_run_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) allow $1 pppd_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; ') @@ -340,6 +340,29 @@ interface(`ppp_initrc_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute pppd server in the pppd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`ppp_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type pppd_unit_file_t; + type pppd_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 pppd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 pppd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, pppd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an ppp environment ## @@ -348,20 +371,31 @@ interface(`ppp_initrc_domtrans',` ## Domain allowed access. ## ## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## ## # interface(`ppp_admin',` gen_require(` type pppd_t, pppd_tmp_t, pppd_log_t, pppd_lock_t; - type pppd_etc_t, pppd_secret_t; - type pppd_etc_rw_t, pppd_var_run_t; - + type pppd_etc_t, pppd_secret_t, pppd_var_run_t; type pptp_t, pptp_log_t, pptp_var_run_t; - type pppd_initrc_exec_t; + type pppd_initrc_exec_t, pppd_etc_rw_t; + type pppd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 pppd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 pppd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, pppd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 pppd_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 pptp_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 pptp_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, pptp_t) ppp_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -374,6 +408,7 @@ interface(`ppp_admin',` logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, pppd_log_t) + files_list_locks($1) admin_pattern($1, pppd_lock_t) files_list_etc($1) @@ -386,10 +421,11 @@ interface(`ppp_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, pppd_var_run_t) - allow $1 pptp_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; - ps_process_pattern($1, pptp_t) - admin_pattern($1, pptp_log_t) admin_pattern($1, pptp_var_run_t) + + ppp_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, pppd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 pppd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ppp.te b/policy/modules/services/ppp.te index 2af42e7..2a05225 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ppp.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ppp.te @@ -6,16 +6,16 @@ policy_module(ppp, 1.12.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems -##

    +##

    +## Allow pppd to load kernel modules for certain modems +##

    ##     gen_tunable(pppd_can_insmod, false) ## -##

    -## Allow pppd to be run for a regular user -##

    +##

    +## Allow pppd to be run for a regular user +##

    ##     gen_tunable(pppd_for_user, false) @@ -39,6 +39,9 @@ files_type(pppd_etc_rw_t) type pppd_initrc_exec_t alias pppd_script_exec_t; init_script_file(pppd_initrc_exec_t) +type pppd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(pppd_unit_file_t) + # pppd_secret_t is the type of the pap and chap password files type pppd_secret_t; files_type(pppd_secret_t) @@ -70,9 +73,9 @@ files_pid_file(pptp_var_run_t) # PPPD Local policy # -allow pppd_t self:capability { kill net_admin setuid setgid fsetid fowner net_raw dac_override }; +allow pppd_t self:capability { kill net_admin setuid setgid sys_admin fsetid fowner net_raw dac_override }; dontaudit pppd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow pppd_t self:process { getsched signal }; +allow pppd_t self:process { getsched setsched signal }; allow pppd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow pppd_t self:socket create_socket_perms; allow pppd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -84,28 +87,29 @@ allow pppd_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; domtrans_pattern(pppd_t, pptp_exec_t, pptp_t) -allow pppd_t pppd_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr }; +allow pppd_t pppd_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms }; allow pppd_t pppd_etc_t:dir rw_dir_perms; allow pppd_t pppd_etc_t:file read_file_perms; -allow pppd_t pppd_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow pppd_t pppd_etc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; manage_files_pattern(pppd_t, pppd_etc_rw_t, pppd_etc_rw_t) # Automatically label newly created files under /etc/ppp with this type filetrans_pattern(pppd_t, pppd_etc_t, pppd_etc_rw_t, file) -allow pppd_t pppd_lock_t:file manage_file_perms; -files_lock_filetrans(pppd_t, pppd_lock_t, file) +manage_files_pattern(pppd_t, pppd_lock_t, pppd_lock_t) +files_search_locks(pppd_t) -allow pppd_t pppd_log_t:file manage_file_perms; +manage_files_pattern(pppd_t, pppd_log_t, pppd_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(pppd_t, pppd_log_t, file) manage_dirs_pattern(pppd_t, pppd_tmp_t, pppd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(pppd_t, pppd_tmp_t, pppd_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(pppd_t, pppd_tmp_t, { file dir }) +manage_dirs_pattern(pppd_t, pppd_var_run_t, pppd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(pppd_t, pppd_var_run_t, pppd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(pppd_t, pppd_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(pppd_t, pppd_var_run_t, { dir file }) allow pppd_t pptp_t:process signal; @@ -143,10 +147,12 @@ fs_getattr_all_fs(pppd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(pppd_t) term_use_unallocated_ttys(pppd_t) +term_use_usb_ttys(pppd_t) term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(pppd_t) term_ioctl_generic_ptys(pppd_t) # for pppoe term_create_pty(pppd_t, pppd_devpts_t) +term_use_generic_ptys(pppd_t) # allow running ip-up and ip-down scripts and running chat. corecmd_exec_bin(pppd_t) @@ -166,6 +172,8 @@ init_dontaudit_write_utmp(pppd_t) init_signal_script(pppd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(pppd_t) +auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(pppd_t) +auth_write_login_records(pppd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(pppd_t) logging_send_audit_msgs(pppd_t) @@ -176,9 +184,10 @@ sysnet_exec_ifconfig(pppd_t) sysnet_manage_config(pppd_t) sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(pppd_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(pppd_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(pppd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(pppd_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(pppd_t) +userdom_search_admin_dir(pppd_t) ppp_exec(pppd_t) @@ -187,13 +196,21 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - tunable_policy(`pppd_can_insmod && ! secure_mode_insmod',` + l2tpd_dgram_send(pppd_t) + l2tpd_rw_socket(pppd_t) + l2tpd_stream_connect(pppd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`pppd_can_insmod',` modutils_domtrans_insmod_uncond(pppd_t) ') ') optional_policy(` mta_send_mail(pppd_t) + mta_system_content(pppd_etc_t) + mta_system_content(pppd_etc_rw_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -243,14 +260,18 @@ allow pptp_t pppd_log_t:file append_file_perms; allow pptp_t pptp_log_t:file manage_file_perms; logging_log_filetrans(pptp_t, pptp_log_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(pptp_t, pptp_var_run_t, pptp_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(pptp_t, pptp_var_run_t, pptp_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(pptp_t, pptp_var_run_t, pptp_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(pptp_t, pptp_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(pptp_t, pptp_var_run_t, { file dir }) kernel_list_proc(pptp_t) +kernel_signal(pptp_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(pptp_t) +kernel_read_network_state(pptp_t) kernel_read_proc_symlinks(pptp_t) kernel_read_system_state(pptp_t) +kernel_signal(pptp_t) dev_read_sysfs(pptp_t) @@ -265,9 +286,8 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(pptp_t) corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(pptp_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(pptp_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(pptp_t) -corenet_tcp_connect_generic_port(pptp_t) -corenet_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports(pptp_t) corenet_sendrecv_generic_client_packets(pptp_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_pptp_port(pptp_t) files_read_etc_files(pptp_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/prelude.fc b/policy/modules/services/prelude.fc index 3bd847a..a52b025 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/prelude.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/prelude.fc @@ -5,6 +5,7 @@ /sbin/audisp-prelude -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:prelude_audisp_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/audisp-prelude -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:prelude_audisp_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/prelude-correlator -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:prelude_correlator_exec_t, s0) /usr/bin/prelude-lml -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:prelude_lml_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/prelude-manager -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:prelude_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/prelude.if b/policy/modules/services/prelude.if index 2316653..b295b91 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/prelude.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/prelude.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run prelude. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`prelude_domtrans',` @@ -23,9 +23,9 @@ interface(`prelude_domtrans',` ## Execute a domain transition to run prelude_audisp. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`prelude_domtrans_audisp',` @@ -41,9 +41,9 @@ interface(`prelude_domtrans_audisp',` ## Signal the prelude_audisp domain. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed acccess. -## +## ## # interface(`prelude_signal_audisp',` @@ -78,9 +78,9 @@ interface(`prelude_read_spool',` ## Manage to prelude-manager spool files. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`prelude_manage_spool',` @@ -112,22 +112,24 @@ interface(`prelude_manage_spool',` # interface(`prelude_admin',` gen_require(` - type prelude_t, prelude_spool_t; - type prelude_var_run_t, prelude_var_lib_t; - type prelude_audisp_t, prelude_audisp_var_run_t; - type prelude_initrc_exec_t; - - type prelude_lml_t, prelude_lml_tmp_t; - type prelude_lml_var_run_t; + type prelude_t, prelude_spool_t, prelude_initrc_exec_t; + type prelude_var_run_t, prelude_var_lib_t, prelude_lml_var_run_t; + type prelude_audisp_t, prelude_audisp_var_run_t, prelude_lml_tmp_t; + type prelude_lml_t; ') - allow $1 prelude_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 prelude_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, prelude_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 prelude_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 prelude_audisp_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 prelude_lml_t:process ptrace; + ') - allow $1 prelude_audisp_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 prelude_audisp_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, prelude_audisp_t) - allow $1 prelude_lml_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 prelude_lml_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, prelude_lml_t) init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, prelude_initrc_exec_t) @@ -135,10 +137,17 @@ interface(`prelude_admin',` role_transition $2 prelude_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + files_list_spool($1) admin_pattern($1, prelude_spool_t) + + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, prelude_var_lib_t) + + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, prelude_var_run_t) admin_pattern($1, prelude_audisp_var_run_t) - admin_pattern($1, prelude_lml_tmp_t) admin_pattern($1, prelude_lml_var_run_t) + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, prelude_lml_tmp_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/prelude.te b/policy/modules/services/prelude.te index b1bc02c..e0c0f70 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/prelude.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/prelude.te @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type prelude_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(prelude_initrc_exec_t) type prelude_spool_t; -files_type(prelude_spool_t) +files_spool_file(prelude_spool_t) type prelude_log_t; logging_log_file(prelude_log_t) @@ -35,7 +35,6 @@ files_pid_file(prelude_audisp_var_run_t) type prelude_correlator_t; type prelude_correlator_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(prelude_correlator_t, prelude_correlator_exec_t) -role system_r types prelude_correlator_t; type prelude_correlator_config_t; files_config_file(prelude_correlator_config_t) @@ -210,8 +209,8 @@ prelude_manage_spool(prelude_correlator_t) # allow prelude_lml_t self:capability dac_override; -allow prelude_lml_t self:tcp_socket { write getattr setopt read create connect }; -allow prelude_lml_t self:unix_dgram_socket { write create connect }; +allow prelude_lml_t self:tcp_socket { setopt create_socket_perms }; +allow prelude_lml_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow prelude_lml_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow prelude_lml_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; @@ -236,11 +235,12 @@ kernel_read_sysctl(prelude_lml_t) corecmd_exec_bin(prelude_lml_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(prelude_lml_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(prelude_lml_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(prelude_lml_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(prelude_lml_t) corenet_tcp_recvfrom_netlabel(prelude_lml_t) corenet_tcp_recvfrom_unlabeled(prelude_lml_t) -corenet_sendrecv_unlabeled_packets(prelude_lml_t) corenet_tcp_connect_prelude_port(prelude_lml_t) dev_read_rand(prelude_lml_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/privoxy.if b/policy/modules/services/privoxy.if index afd1751..5aff531 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/privoxy.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/privoxy.if @@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ interface(`privoxy_admin',` type privoxy_etc_rw_t, privoxy_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 privoxy_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 privoxy_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, privoxy_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 privoxy_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, privoxy_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/privoxy.te b/policy/modules/services/privoxy.te index 2dbf4d4..8323004 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/privoxy.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/privoxy.te @@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ policy_module(privoxy, 1.11.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow privoxy to connect to all ports, not just -## HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports. -##

    +##

    +## Allow privoxy to connect to all ports, not just +## HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(privoxy_connect_any, false) @@ -46,8 +46,9 @@ logging_log_filetrans(privoxy_t, privoxy_log_t, file) manage_files_pattern(privoxy_t, privoxy_var_run_t, privoxy_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(privoxy_t, privoxy_var_run_t, file) -kernel_read_system_state(privoxy_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(privoxy_t) +kernel_read_network_state(privoxy_t) +kernel_read_system_state(privoxy_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(privoxy_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(privoxy_t) @@ -62,6 +63,7 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(privoxy_t) corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(privoxy_t) corenet_tcp_connect_pgpkeyserver_port(privoxy_t) corenet_tcp_connect_tor_port(privoxy_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_tor_socks_port(privoxy_t) corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_client_packets(privoxy_t) corenet_sendrecv_squid_client_packets(privoxy_t) corenet_sendrecv_http_cache_server_packets(privoxy_t) @@ -87,7 +89,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(privoxy_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(privoxy_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(privoxy_t) # cjp: this should really not be needed -userdom_use_user_terminals(privoxy_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(privoxy_t) tunable_policy(`privoxy_connect_any',` corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(privoxy_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/procmail.fc b/policy/modules/services/procmail.fc index 1343621..4b36a13 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/procmail.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/procmail.fc @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +HOME_DIR/\.procmailrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:procmail_home_t, s0) +/root/\.procmailrc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:procmail_home_t, s0) /usr/bin/procmail -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:procmail_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/procmail.if b/policy/modules/services/procmail.if index b64b02f..166e9c3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/procmail.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/procmail.if @@ -77,3 +77,22 @@ interface(`procmail_rw_tmp_files',` files_search_tmp($1) rw_files_pattern($1, procmail_tmp_t, procmail_tmp_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Read procmail home directory content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`procmail_read_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type procmail_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, procmail_home_t, procmail_home_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/procmail.te b/policy/modules/services/procmail.te index 29b9295..624afe6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/procmail.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/procmail.te @@ -10,6 +10,9 @@ type procmail_exec_t; application_domain(procmail_t, procmail_exec_t) role system_r types procmail_t; +type procmail_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(procmail_home_t) + type procmail_log_t; logging_log_file(procmail_log_t) @@ -32,7 +35,7 @@ allow procmail_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; can_exec(procmail_t, procmail_exec_t) # Write log to /var/log/procmail.log or /var/log/procmail/.* -allow procmail_t procmail_log_t:dir setattr; +allow procmail_t procmail_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; create_files_pattern(procmail_t, procmail_log_t, procmail_log_t) append_files_pattern(procmail_t, procmail_log_t, procmail_log_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(procmail_t, procmail_log_t, procmail_log_t) @@ -67,7 +70,6 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(procmail_t) corecmd_exec_bin(procmail_t) corecmd_exec_shell(procmail_t) -corecmd_read_bin_symlinks(procmail_t) files_read_etc_files(procmail_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(procmail_t) @@ -75,10 +77,20 @@ files_search_pids(procmail_t) # for spamassasin files_read_usr_files(procmail_t) +application_exec_all(procmail_t) + +init_read_utmp(procmail_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(procmail_t) +logging_append_all_logs(procmail_t) miscfiles_read_localization(procmail_t) +list_dirs_pattern(procmail_t, procmail_home_t, procmail_home_t) +read_files_pattern(procmail_t, procmail_home_t, procmail_home_t) +userdom_search_user_home_dirs(procmail_t) +userdom_search_admin_dir(procmail_t) + # only works until we define a different type for maildir userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(procmail_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(procmail_t) @@ -87,8 +99,8 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(procmail_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(procmail_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(procmail_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file }) -# Do not audit attempts to access /root. -userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(procmail_t) +# Execute user executables +userdom_exec_user_bin_files(procmail_t) mta_manage_spool(procmail_t) mta_read_queue(procmail_t) @@ -97,21 +109,19 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` mta_dontaudit_rw_queue(procmail_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(procmail_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(procmail_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(procmail_t) +userdom_home_manager(procmail_t) + +optional_policy(` + clamav_domtrans_clamscan(procmail_t) + clamav_search_lib(procmail_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(procmail_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(procmail_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(procmail_t) +optional_policy(` + cyrus_stream_connect(procmail_t) ') optional_policy(` - clamav_domtrans_clamscan(procmail_t) - clamav_search_lib(procmail_t) + gnome_manage_data(procmail_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -125,6 +135,11 @@ optional_policy(` postfix_read_spool_files(procmail_t) postfix_read_local_state(procmail_t) postfix_read_master_state(procmail_t) + postfix_rw_master_pipes(procmail_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + nagios_search_spool(procmail_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/psad.if b/policy/modules/services/psad.if index bc329d1..20bb463 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/psad.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/psad.if @@ -91,7 +91,6 @@ interface(`psad_manage_config',` files_search_etc($1) manage_dirs_pattern($1, psad_etc_t, psad_etc_t) manage_files_pattern($1, psad_etc_t, psad_etc_t) - ') ######################################## @@ -115,7 +114,7 @@ interface(`psad_read_pid_files',` ######################################## ## -## Read psad PID files. +## Read and write psad PID files. ## ## ## @@ -176,6 +175,45 @@ interface(`psad_append_log',` ######################################## ## +## Allow the specified domain to write to psad's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`psad_write_log',` + gen_require(` + type psad_var_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + write_files_pattern($1, psad_var_log_t, psad_var_log_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to setattr to psad's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`psad_setattr_log',` + gen_require(` + type psad_var_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + setattr_files_pattern($1, psad_var_log_t, psad_var_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write psad fifo files. ## ## @@ -186,7 +224,7 @@ interface(`psad_append_log',` # interface(`psad_rw_fifo_file',` gen_require(` - type psad_t; + type psad_t, psad_var_lib_t; ') files_search_var_lib($1) @@ -196,6 +234,26 @@ interface(`psad_rw_fifo_file',` ####################################### ## +## Allow setattr to psad fifo files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`psad_setattr_fifo_file',` + gen_require(` + type psad_t, psad_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 psad_var_lib_t:fifo_file setattr; + search_dirs_pattern($1, psad_var_lib_t, psad_var_lib_t) +') + +####################################### +## ## Read and write psad tmp files. ## ## @@ -233,30 +291,33 @@ interface(`psad_rw_tmp_files',` interface(`psad_admin',` gen_require(` type psad_t, psad_var_run_t, psad_var_log_t; - type psad_initrc_exec_t, psad_var_lib_t; + type psad_initrc_exec_t, psad_var_lib_t, psad_etc_t; type psad_tmp_t; ') - allow $1 psad_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 psad_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, psad_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 psad_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, psad_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 psad_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - files_search_etc($1) + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, psad_etc_t) - files_search_pids($1) + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, psad_var_run_t) - logging_search_logs($1) + logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, psad_var_log_t) - files_search_var_lib($1) + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, psad_var_lib_t) - files_search_tmp($1) + files_list_tmp($1) admin_pattern($1, psad_tmp_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/psad.te b/policy/modules/services/psad.te index d4000e0..f35afa4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/psad.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/psad.te @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(psad_t, psad_exec_t) # config files type psad_etc_t; -files_type(psad_etc_t) +files_config_file(psad_etc_t) type psad_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(psad_initrc_exec_t) @@ -39,7 +39,7 @@ files_tmp_file(psad_tmp_t) allow psad_t self:capability { net_admin net_raw setuid setgid dac_override }; dontaudit psad_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow psad_t self:process signull; +allow psad_t self:process signal_perms; allow psad_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow psad_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -53,9 +53,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(psad_t, psad_var_log_t, psad_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(psad_t, psad_var_log_t, { file dir }) # pid file +manage_dirs_pattern(psad_t, psad_var_run_t, psad_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(psad_t, psad_var_run_t, psad_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(psad_t, psad_var_run_t, psad_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(psad_t, psad_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(psad_t, psad_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) # tmp files manage_dirs_pattern(psad_t, psad_tmp_t, psad_tmp_t) @@ -85,13 +86,12 @@ corenet_sendrecv_whois_client_packets(psad_t) dev_read_urand(psad_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(psad_t) +files_read_usr_files(psad_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(psad_t) auth_use_nsswitch(psad_t) -iptables_domtrans(psad_t) - logging_read_generic_logs(psad_t) logging_read_syslog_config(psad_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(psad_t) @@ -101,6 +101,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(psad_t) sysnet_exec_ifconfig(psad_t) optional_policy(` + iptables_domtrans(psad_t) +') + +optional_policy(` mta_send_mail(psad_t) mta_read_queue(psad_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/puppet.fc b/policy/modules/services/puppet.fc index 2f1e529..8c0b242 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/puppet.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/puppet.fc @@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/puppet -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:puppet_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/puppetmaster -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:puppetmaster_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/puppetca -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:puppetca_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/puppetd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:puppet_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/puppetmasterd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:puppetmaster_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/puppet.if b/policy/modules/services/puppet.if index 2855a44..58bb459 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/puppet.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/puppet.if @@ -8,6 +8,53 @@ ##

    ## +######################################## +## +## Execute puppetca in the puppetca +## domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`puppet_domtrans_puppetca',` + gen_require(` + type puppetca_t, puppetca_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, puppetca_exec_t, puppetca_t) +') + +##################################### +## +## Execute puppetca in the puppetca +## domain and allow the specified +## role the puppetca domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`puppet_run_puppetca',` + gen_require(` + type puppetca_t, puppetca_exec_t; + ') + + puppet_domtrans_puppetca($1) + role $2 types puppetca_t; +') + ################################################ ## ## Read / Write to Puppet temp files. Puppet uses @@ -21,11 +68,87 @@ ## ## # -interface(`puppet_rw_tmp', ` +interface(`puppet_rw_tmp',` gen_require(` type puppet_tmp_t; ') - allow $1 puppet_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms; + allow $1 puppet_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; files_search_tmp($1) ') + +################################################ +## +## Read Puppet lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`puppet_read_lib',` + gen_require(` + type puppet_var_lib_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, puppet_var_lib_t, puppet_var_lib_t) + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +############################################### +## +## Manage Puppet lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`puppet_manage_lib',` + gen_require(` + type puppet_var_lib_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, puppet_var_lib_t, puppet_var_lib_t) + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to search puppet's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`puppet_search_log',` + gen_require(` + type puppet_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + allow $1 puppet_log_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +##################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to search puppet's pid files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`puppet_search_pid',` + gen_require(` + type puppet_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 puppet_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/puppet.te b/policy/modules/services/puppet.te index 64c5f95..d70e965 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/puppet.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/puppet.te @@ -6,12 +6,19 @@ policy_module(puppet, 1.0.0) # ## +##

    +## Allow Puppet client to manage all file +## types. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(puppet_manage_all_files, false) + +## ##

    -## Allow Puppet client to manage all file -## types. +## Allow Puppet master to use connect to MySQL and PostgreSQL database ##

    ##     -gen_tunable(puppet_manage_all_files, false) +gen_tunable(puppetmaster_use_db, false) type puppet_t; type puppet_exec_t; @@ -35,6 +42,11 @@ files_type(puppet_var_lib_t) type puppet_var_run_t; files_pid_file(puppet_var_run_t) +type puppetca_t; +type puppetca_exec_t; +application_domain(puppetca_t, puppetca_exec_t) +role system_r types puppetca_t; + type puppetmaster_t; type puppetmaster_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(puppetmaster_t, puppetmaster_exec_t) @@ -50,7 +62,7 @@ files_tmp_file(puppetmaster_tmp_t) # Puppet personal policy # -allow puppet_t self:capability { fowner fsetid setuid setgid dac_override sys_nice sys_ptrace sys_tty_config }; +allow puppet_t self:capability { fowner fsetid setuid setgid dac_override sys_nice sys_tty_config }; allow puppet_t self:process { signal signull getsched setsched }; allow puppet_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow puppet_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; @@ -63,7 +75,7 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(puppet_t, puppet_var_lib_t, puppet_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(puppet_t, puppet_var_lib_t, puppet_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib(puppet_t) -setattr_dirs_pattern(puppet_t, puppet_var_run_t, puppet_var_run_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(puppet_t, puppet_var_run_t, puppet_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(puppet_t, puppet_var_run_t, puppet_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(puppet_t, puppet_var_run_t, { file dir }) @@ -80,7 +92,10 @@ kernel_dontaudit_search_sysctl(puppet_t) kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(puppet_t) kernel_read_system_state(puppet_t) kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(puppet_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(puppet_t) +corecmd_read_all_executables(puppet_t) +corecmd_dontaudit_access_all_executables(puppet_t) corecmd_exec_bin(puppet_t) corecmd_exec_shell(puppet_t) @@ -103,6 +118,7 @@ files_manage_config_files(puppet_t) files_manage_config_dirs(puppet_t) files_manage_etc_dirs(puppet_t) files_manage_etc_files(puppet_t) +files_read_usr_files(puppet_t) files_read_usr_symlinks(puppet_t) files_relabel_config_dirs(puppet_t) files_relabel_config_files(puppet_t) @@ -115,6 +131,9 @@ selinux_validate_context(puppet_t) term_dontaudit_getattr_unallocated_ttys(puppet_t) term_dontaudit_getattr_all_ttys(puppet_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(puppet_t) +auth_read_passwd(puppet_t) + init_all_labeled_script_domtrans(puppet_t) init_domtrans_script(puppet_t) init_read_utmp(puppet_t) @@ -127,16 +146,21 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(puppet_t) seutil_domtrans_setfiles(puppet_t) seutil_domtrans_semanage(puppet_t) +seutil_read_file_contexts(puppet_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(puppet_t) sysnet_run_ifconfig(puppet_t, system_r) tunable_policy(`puppet_manage_all_files',` - auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(puppet_t) + files_manage_non_security_files(puppet_t) ') optional_policy(` - consoletype_domtrans(puppet_t) + cfengine_read_lib_files(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(puppet_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -144,6 +168,14 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + mount_domtrans(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mta_send_mail(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` files_rw_var_files(puppet_t) rpm_domtrans(puppet_t) @@ -156,13 +188,136 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - usermanage_domtrans_groupadd(puppet_t) - usermanage_domtrans_useradd(puppet_t) + usermanage_access_check_groupadd(puppet_t) + usermanage_access_check_passwd(puppet_t) + usermanage_access_check_useradd(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + auth_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + alsa_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + bootloader_filetrans_config(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + devicekit_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dnsmasq_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + kerberos_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + libs_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mta_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modules_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + networkmanager_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + nx_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + postfix_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + quota_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_filetrans_named_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_filetrans_home_content(puppet_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_filetrans_admin_home_content(puppet_t) ') ######################################## # -# Pupper master personal policy +# PuppetCA personal policy +# + +allow puppetca_t self:capability { dac_override setgid setuid }; +allow puppetca_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +read_files_pattern(puppetca_t, puppet_etc_t, puppet_etc_t) + +allow puppetca_t puppet_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; +manage_files_pattern(puppetca_t, puppet_var_lib_t, puppet_var_lib_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(puppetca_t, puppet_var_lib_t, puppet_var_lib_t) + +allow puppetca_t puppet_log_t:dir search_dir_perms; + +allow puppetca_t puppet_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(puppetca_t) +# Maybe dontaudit this like we did with other puppet domains? +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(puppetca_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(puppetca_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(puppetca_t) + +dev_read_urand(puppetca_t) +dev_search_sysfs(puppetca_t) + +files_read_etc_files(puppetca_t) +files_search_var_lib(puppetca_t) + +selinux_validate_context(puppetca_t) + +logging_search_logs(puppetca_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(puppetca_t) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(puppetca_t) + +seutil_read_file_contexts(puppetca_t) + +optional_policy(` + hostname_exec(puppetca_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mta_sendmail_access_check(puppetca_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + usermanage_access_check_groupadd(puppet_t) + usermanage_access_check_passwd(puppet_t) + usermanage_access_check_useradd(puppet_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# Puppet master personal policy # allow puppetmaster_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override setuid setgid fowner chown fsetid sys_tty_config }; @@ -171,29 +326,36 @@ allow puppetmaster_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow puppetmaster_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; allow puppetmaster_t self:socket create; allow puppetmaster_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -allow puppetmaster_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; list_dirs_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppet_etc_t, puppet_etc_t) read_files_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppet_etc_t, puppet_etc_t) -allow puppetmaster_t puppet_log_t:dir { rw_dir_perms setattr }; -allow puppetmaster_t puppet_log_t:file { rw_file_perms create setattr }; +allow puppetmaster_t puppet_log_t:dir { rw_dir_perms setattr_dir_perms }; +allow puppetmaster_t puppet_log_t:file { rw_file_perms create_file_perms setattr_file_perms }; logging_log_filetrans(puppetmaster_t, puppet_log_t, { file dir }) +allow puppetmaster_t puppet_log_t:file relabel_file_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppet_var_lib_t, puppet_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppet_var_lib_t, puppet_var_lib_t) +allow puppetmaster_t puppet_var_lib_t:dir relabel_dir_perms; +allow puppetmaster_t puppet_var_lib_t:file relabel_file_perms; setattr_dirs_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppet_var_run_t, puppet_var_run_t) +create_dirs_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppet_var_run_t, puppet_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppet_var_run_t, puppet_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(puppetmaster_t, puppet_var_run_t, { file dir }) +allow puppetmaster_t puppet_var_run_t:dir relabel_dir_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppetmaster_tmp_t, puppetmaster_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(puppetmaster_t, puppetmaster_tmp_t, puppetmaster_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(puppetmaster_t, puppetmaster_tmp_t, { file dir }) +allow puppetmaster_t puppet_tmp_t:dir relabel_dir_perms; kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(puppetmaster_t) +kernel_read_network_state(puppetmaster_t) kernel_read_system_state(puppetmaster_t) kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(puppetmaster_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(puppetmaster_t) corecmd_exec_bin(puppetmaster_t) corecmd_exec_shell(puppetmaster_t) @@ -205,22 +367,48 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(puppetmaster_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(puppetmaster_t) corenet_tcp_bind_puppet_port(puppetmaster_t) corenet_sendrecv_puppet_server_packets(puppetmaster_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_ntop_port(puppetmaster_t) + +# This needs investigation. Puppermasterd is confirmed to bind udp sockets to random high ports. +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(puppetmaster_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_port(puppetmaster_t) dev_read_rand(puppetmaster_t) dev_read_urand(puppetmaster_t) +dev_search_sysfs(puppetmaster_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(puppetmaster_t) +domain_obj_id_change_exemption(puppetmaster_t) -files_read_etc_files(puppetmaster_t) -files_search_var_lib(puppetmaster_t) +files_read_usr_files(puppetmaster_t) + +selinux_validate_context(puppetmaster_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(puppetmaster_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(puppetmaster_t) miscfiles_read_localization(puppetmaster_t) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(puppetmaster_t) + +seutil_read_file_contexts(puppetmaster_t) -sysnet_dns_name_resolve(puppetmaster_t) sysnet_run_ifconfig(puppetmaster_t, system_r) +mta_send_mail(puppetmaster_t) + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`puppetmaster_use_db',` + mysql_stream_connect(puppetmaster_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`puppetmaster_use_db',` + postgresql_stream_connect(puppetmaster_t) + ') +') + optional_policy(` hostname_exec(puppetmaster_t) ') @@ -231,3 +419,9 @@ optional_policy(` rpm_exec(puppetmaster_t) rpm_read_db(puppetmaster_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + usermanage_access_check_groupadd(puppetmaster_t) + usermanage_access_check_passwd(puppetmaster_t) + usermanage_access_check_useradd(puppetmaster_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pyicqt.te b/policy/modules/services/pyicqt.te index a841221..b62a01f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pyicqt.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/pyicqt.te @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type pyicqt_conf_t; files_config_file(pyicqt_conf_t) type pyicqt_spool_t; -files_type(pyicqt_spool_t) +files_spool_file(pyicqt_spool_t) type pyicqt_var_run_t; files_pid_file(pyicqt_var_run_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pyzor.fc b/policy/modules/services/pyzor.fc index d4a7750..705196e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pyzor.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/pyzor.fc @@ -1,6 +1,10 @@ /etc/pyzor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyzor_etc_t, s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/pyzord -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyzord_initrc_exec_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.pyzor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyzor_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.spamd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyzor_home_t,s0) +/root/\.pyzor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyzor_home_t,s0) +/root/\.spamd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyzor_home_t,s0) /usr/bin/pyzor -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyzor_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/pyzord -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pyzord_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pyzor.if b/policy/modules/services/pyzor.if index 494f7e2..2c411af 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pyzor.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/pyzor.if @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ## User domain for the role ##     ## +## # interface(`pyzor_role',` gen_require(` @@ -28,7 +29,10 @@ interface(`pyzor_role',` # allow ps to show pyzor and allow the user to kill it ps_process_pattern($2, pyzor_t) - allow $2 pyzor_t:process signal; + allow $2 pyzor_t:process signal_perms; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 pyzor_t:process ptrace; + ') ') ######################################## @@ -88,3 +92,50 @@ interface(`pyzor_exec',` corecmd_search_bin($1) can_exec($1, pyzor_exec_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an pyzor environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed to manage the pyzor domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`pyzor_admin',` + gen_require(` + type pyzord_t, pyzor_tmp_t, pyzord_log_t; + type pyzor_etc_t, pyzor_var_lib_t, pyzord_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 pyzord_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, pyzord_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 pyzord_t:process ptrace; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, pyzord_initrc_exec_t) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 pyzord_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, pyzor_tmp_t) + + logging_list_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, pyzord_log_t) + + files_list_etc($1) + admin_pattern($1, pyzor_etc_t) + + files_list_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, pyzor_var_lib_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/pyzor.te b/policy/modules/services/pyzor.te index cd683f9..a272112 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/pyzor.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/pyzor.te @@ -5,40 +5,62 @@ policy_module(pyzor, 2.1.0) # Declarations # -type pyzor_t; -type pyzor_exec_t; -typealias pyzor_t alias { user_pyzor_t staff_pyzor_t sysadm_pyzor_t }; -typealias pyzor_t alias { auditadm_pyzor_t secadm_pyzor_t }; -application_domain(pyzor_t, pyzor_exec_t) -ubac_constrained(pyzor_t) -role system_r types pyzor_t; - -type pyzor_etc_t; -files_type(pyzor_etc_t) - -type pyzor_home_t; -typealias pyzor_home_t alias { user_pyzor_home_t staff_pyzor_home_t sysadm_pyzor_home_t }; -typealias pyzor_home_t alias { auditadm_pyzor_home_t secadm_pyzor_home_t }; -userdom_user_home_content(pyzor_home_t) - -type pyzor_tmp_t; -typealias pyzor_tmp_t alias { user_pyzor_tmp_t staff_pyzor_tmp_t sysadm_pyzor_tmp_t }; -typealias pyzor_tmp_t alias { auditadm_pyzor_tmp_t secadm_pyzor_tmp_t }; -files_tmp_file(pyzor_tmp_t) -ubac_constrained(pyzor_tmp_t) - -type pyzor_var_lib_t; -typealias pyzor_var_lib_t alias { user_pyzor_var_lib_t staff_pyzor_var_lib_t sysadm_pyzor_var_lib_t }; -typealias pyzor_var_lib_t alias { auditadm_pyzor_var_lib_t secadm_pyzor_var_lib_t }; -files_type(pyzor_var_lib_t) -ubac_constrained(pyzor_var_lib_t) - -type pyzord_t; -type pyzord_exec_t; -init_daemon_domain(pyzord_t, pyzord_exec_t) - -type pyzord_log_t; -logging_log_file(pyzord_log_t) +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + gen_require(` + type spamc_t, spamc_exec_t, spamd_t; + type spamd_initrc_exec_t, spamd_exec_t, spamc_tmp_t; + type spamd_log_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_etc_t; + type spamc_tmp_t, spamc_home_t; + ') + + typealias spamc_t alias pyzor_t; + typealias spamc_exec_t alias pyzor_exec_t; + typealias spamd_t alias pyzord_t; + typealias spamd_initrc_exec_t alias pyzord_initrc_exec_t; + typealias spamd_exec_t alias pyzord_exec_t; + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias pyzor_tmp_t; + typealias spamd_log_t alias pyzor_log_t; + typealias spamd_log_t alias pyzord_log_t; + typealias spamd_var_lib_t alias pyzor_var_lib_t; + typealias spamd_etc_t alias pyzor_etc_t; + typealias spamc_home_t alias pyzor_home_t; + typealias spamc_home_t alias user_pyzor_home_t; +',` + type pyzor_t; + type pyzor_exec_t; + typealias pyzor_t alias { user_pyzor_t staff_pyzor_t sysadm_pyzor_t }; + typealias pyzor_t alias { auditadm_pyzor_t secadm_pyzor_t }; + application_domain(pyzor_t, pyzor_exec_t) + ubac_constrained(pyzor_t) + role system_r types pyzor_t; + + type pyzor_etc_t; + files_config_file(pyzor_etc_t) + + type pyzor_home_t; + typealias pyzor_home_t alias { user_pyzor_home_t staff_pyzor_home_t sysadm_pyzor_home_t }; + typealias pyzor_home_t alias { auditadm_pyzor_home_t secadm_pyzor_home_t }; + userdom_user_home_content(pyzor_home_t) + + type pyzor_tmp_t; + typealias pyzor_tmp_t alias { user_pyzor_tmp_t staff_pyzor_tmp_t sysadm_pyzor_tmp_t }; + typealias pyzor_tmp_t alias { auditadm_pyzor_tmp_t secadm_pyzor_tmp_t }; + files_tmp_file(pyzor_tmp_t) + ubac_constrained(pyzor_tmp_t) + + type pyzor_var_lib_t; + typealias pyzor_var_lib_t alias { user_pyzor_var_lib_t staff_pyzor_var_lib_t sysadm_pyzor_var_lib_t }; + typealias pyzor_var_lib_t alias { auditadm_pyzor_var_lib_t secadm_pyzor_var_lib_t }; + files_type(pyzor_var_lib_t) + ubac_constrained(pyzor_var_lib_t) + + type pyzord_t; + type pyzord_exec_t; + init_daemon_domain(pyzord_t, pyzord_exec_t) + + type pyzord_log_t; + logging_log_file(pyzord_log_t) +') ######################################## # @@ -76,12 +98,16 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(pyzor_t) dev_read_urand(pyzor_t) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(pyzor_t) + files_read_etc_files(pyzor_t) auth_use_nsswitch(pyzor_t) miscfiles_read_localization(pyzor_t) +mta_read_queue(pyzor_t) + userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(pyzor_t) optional_policy(` @@ -111,8 +137,8 @@ allow pyzord_t pyzor_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; can_exec(pyzord_t, pyzor_exec_t) manage_files_pattern(pyzord_t, pyzord_log_t, pyzord_log_t) -allow pyzord_t pyzord_log_t:dir setattr; -logging_log_filetrans(pyzord_t, pyzord_log_t, { file dir } ) +allow pyzord_t pyzord_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; +logging_log_filetrans(pyzord_t, pyzord_log_t, { file dir }) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(pyzord_t) kernel_read_system_state(pyzord_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/qmail.fc b/policy/modules/services/qmail.fc index 0055e54..f988f51 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/qmail.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/qmail.fc @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ /var/qmail/bin/tcp-env -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qmail_tcp_env_exec_t,s0) /var/qmail/control(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:qmail_etc_t,s0) +/var/qmail/owners(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:qmail_etc_t,s0) /var/qmail/queue(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:qmail_spool_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/qmail.if b/policy/modules/services/qmail.if index a55bf44..c6dee66 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/qmail.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/qmail.if @@ -62,14 +62,13 @@ interface(`qmail_domtrans_inject',` type qmail_inject_t, qmail_inject_exec_t; ') + corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, qmail_inject_exec_t, qmail_inject_t) ifdef(`distro_debian',` files_search_usr($1) - corecmd_search_bin($1) ',` files_search_var($1) - corecmd_search_bin($1) ') ') @@ -88,14 +87,13 @@ interface(`qmail_domtrans_queue',` type qmail_queue_t, qmail_queue_exec_t; ') + corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, qmail_queue_exec_t, qmail_queue_t) ifdef(`distro_debian',` files_search_usr($1) - corecmd_search_bin($1) ',` files_search_var($1) - corecmd_search_bin($1) ') ') @@ -149,3 +147,59 @@ interface(`qmail_smtpd_service_domain',` domtrans_pattern(qmail_smtpd_t, $2, $1) ') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete qmail +## spool directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`qmail_manage_spool_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type qmail_spool_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete qmail +## spool files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`qmail_manage_spool_files',` + gen_require(` + type qmail_spool_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write to qmail spool pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`qmail_rw_spool_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type qmail_spool_t; + ') + + allow $1 qmail_spool_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/qmail.te b/policy/modules/services/qmail.te index 355b2a2..88e6f40 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/qmail.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/qmail.te @@ -47,7 +47,7 @@ qmail_child_domain_template(qmail_smtpd, qmail_tcp_env_t) qmail_child_domain_template(qmail_splogger, qmail_start_t) type qmail_spool_t; -files_type(qmail_spool_t) +files_spool_file(qmail_spool_t) type qmail_start_t; type qmail_start_exec_t; @@ -60,7 +60,7 @@ application_domain(qmail_tcp_env_t, qmail_tcp_env_exec_t) ######################################## # # qmail-clean local policy -# this component cleans up the queue directory +# this component cleans up the queue directory # read_files_pattern(qmail_clean_t, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t) @@ -69,11 +69,11 @@ delete_files_pattern(qmail_clean_t, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t) ######################################## # # qmail-inject local policy -# this component preprocesses mail from stdin and invokes qmail-queue +# this component preprocesses mail from stdin and invokes qmail-queue # -allow qmail_inject_t self:fifo_file write_fifo_file_perms; allow qmail_inject_t self:process signal_perms; +allow qmail_inject_t self:fifo_file write_fifo_file_perms; allow qmail_inject_t qmail_queue_exec_t:file read_file_perms; @@ -88,11 +88,11 @@ qmail_read_config(qmail_inject_t) ######################################## # # qmail-local local policy -# this component delivers a mail message +# this component delivers a mail message # -allow qmail_local_t self:fifo_file write_file_perms; allow qmail_local_t self:process signal_perms; +allow qmail_local_t self:fifo_file write_file_perms; allow qmail_local_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(qmail_local_t, qmail_alias_home_t, qmail_alias_home_t) @@ -121,13 +121,17 @@ mta_append_spool(qmail_local_t) qmail_domtrans_queue(qmail_local_t) optional_policy(` + uucp_domtrans(qmail_local_t) +') + +optional_policy(` spamassassin_domtrans_client(qmail_local_t) ') ######################################## # # qmail-lspawn local policy -# this component schedules local deliveries +# this component schedules local deliveries # allow qmail_lspawn_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; @@ -150,15 +154,15 @@ files_search_tmp(qmail_lspawn_t) ######################################## # # qmail-queue local policy -# this component places a mail in a delivery queue, later to be processed by qmail-send +# this component places a mail in a delivery queue, later to be processed by qmail-send # allow qmail_queue_t qmail_lspawn_t:fd use; allow qmail_queue_t qmail_lspawn_t:fifo_file write_fifo_file_perms; +allow qmail_queue_t qmail_smtpd_t:process sigchld; allow qmail_queue_t qmail_smtpd_t:fd use; allow qmail_queue_t qmail_smtpd_t:fifo_file read_fifo_file_perms; -allow qmail_queue_t qmail_smtpd_t:process sigchld; manage_dirs_pattern(qmail_queue_t, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t) manage_files_pattern(qmail_queue_t, qmail_spool_t, qmail_spool_t) @@ -175,7 +179,7 @@ optional_policy(` ######################################## # # qmail-remote local policy -# this component sends mail via SMTP +# this component sends mail via SMTP # allow qmail_remote_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -202,7 +206,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(qmail_remote_t) ######################################## # # qmail-rspawn local policy -# this component scedules remote deliveries +# this component scedules remote deliveries # allow qmail_rspawn_t self:process signal_perms; @@ -217,7 +221,7 @@ corecmd_search_bin(qmail_rspawn_t) ######################################## # # qmail-send local policy -# this component delivers mail messages from the queue +# this component delivers mail messages from the queue # allow qmail_send_t self:process signal_perms; @@ -236,7 +240,7 @@ optional_policy(` ######################################## # # qmail-smtpd local policy -# this component receives mails via SMTP +# this component receives mails via SMTP # allow qmail_smtpd_t self:process signal_perms; @@ -265,7 +269,7 @@ optional_policy(` ######################################## # # splogger local policy -# this component creates entries in syslog +# this component creates entries in syslog # allow qmail_splogger_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -279,13 +283,13 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(qmail_splogger_t) ######################################## # # qmail-start local policy -# this component starts up the mail delivery component +# this component starts up the mail delivery component # allow qmail_start_t self:capability { setgid setuid }; dontaudit qmail_start_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow qmail_start_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow qmail_start_t self:process signal_perms; +allow qmail_start_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; can_exec(qmail_start_t, qmail_start_exec_t) @@ -303,7 +307,7 @@ optional_policy(` ######################################## # # tcp-env local policy -# this component sets up TCP-related environment variables +# this component sets up TCP-related environment variables # allow qmail_tcp_env_t qmail_smtpd_exec_t:file read_file_perms; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/qpid.fc b/policy/modules/services/qpid.fc index 4f94229..f3b89e4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/qpid.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/qpid.fc @@ -1,6 +1,7 @@ -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/qpidd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qpidd_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/qpidd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qpidd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/qpidd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qpidd_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/qpidd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qpidd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/qpidd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:qpidd_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/qpid.if b/policy/modules/services/qpid.if index 5a9630c..bedca3a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/qpid.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/qpid.if @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## Apache QPID AMQP messaging server. +## policy for qpidd ######################################## ## @@ -18,9 +18,9 @@ interface(`qpidd_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, qpidd_exec_t, qpidd_t) ') -##################################### +######################################## ## -## Allow read and write access to qpidd semaphores. +## Execute qpidd server in the qpidd domain. ## ## ## @@ -28,17 +28,17 @@ interface(`qpidd_domtrans',` ## ## # -interface(`qpidd_rw_semaphores',` +interface(`qpidd_initrc_domtrans',` gen_require(` - type qpidd_t; + type qpidd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 qpidd_t:sem rw_sem_perms; + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, qpidd_initrc_exec_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Read and write to qpidd shared memory. +## Read qpidd PID files. ## ## ## @@ -46,17 +46,18 @@ interface(`qpidd_rw_semaphores',` ## ## # -interface(`qpidd_rw_shm',` +interface(`qpidd_read_pid_files',` gen_require(` - type qpidd_t; + type qpidd_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 qpidd_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 qpidd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## Execute qpidd server in the qpidd domain. +## Manage qpidd var_run files. ## ## ## @@ -64,17 +65,20 @@ interface(`qpidd_rw_shm',` ## ## # -interface(`qpidd_initrc_domtrans',` +interface(`qpidd_manage_var_run',` gen_require(` - type qpidd_initrc_exec_t; + type qpidd_var_run_t; ') - init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, qpidd_initrc_exec_t) + files_search_pids($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, qpidd_var_run_t, qpidd_var_run_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, qpidd_var_run_t, qpidd_var_run_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, qpidd_var_run_t, qpidd_var_run_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Read qpidd PID files. +## Search qpidd lib directories. ## ## ## @@ -82,18 +86,18 @@ interface(`qpidd_initrc_domtrans',` ## ## # -interface(`qpidd_read_pid_files',` +interface(`qpidd_search_lib',` gen_require(` - type qpidd_var_run_t; + type qpidd_var_lib_t; ') - files_search_pids($1) - allow $1 qpidd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 qpidd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) ') ######################################## ## -## Search qpidd lib directories. +## Read qpidd lib files. ## ## ## @@ -101,18 +105,19 @@ interface(`qpidd_read_pid_files',` ## ## # -interface(`qpidd_search_lib',` +interface(`qpidd_read_lib_files',` gen_require(` type qpidd_var_lib_t; ') - allow $1 qpidd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Read qpidd lib files. +## Create, read, write, and delete +## qpidd lib files. ## ## ## @@ -120,19 +125,18 @@ interface(`qpidd_search_lib',` ## ## # -interface(`qpidd_read_lib_files',` +interface(`qpidd_manage_lib_files',` gen_require(` type qpidd_var_lib_t; ') files_search_var_lib($1) - read_files_pattern($1, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Create, read, write, and delete -## qpidd lib files. +## Manage qpidd var_lib files. ## ## ## @@ -140,13 +144,15 @@ interface(`qpidd_read_lib_files',` ## ## # -interface(`qpidd_manage_lib_files',` +interface(`qpidd_manage_var_lib',` gen_require(` type qpidd_var_lib_t; ') files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern($1, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) ') ######################################## @@ -171,8 +177,11 @@ interface(`qpidd_admin',` type qpidd_t, qpidd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 qpidd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 qpidd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, qpidd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 qpidd_t:process ptrace; + ') # Allow qpidd_t to restart the apache service qpidd_initrc_domtrans($1) @@ -180,7 +189,46 @@ interface(`qpidd_admin',` role_transition $2 qpidd_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - admin_pattern($1, qpidd_var_lib_t) + qpidd_manage_var_run($1) - admin_pattern($1, qpidd_var_run_t) + qpidd_manage_var_lib($1) +') + +##################################### +## +## Allow read and write access to qpidd semaphores. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`qpidd_rw_semaphores',` + gen_require(` + type qpidd_t; + ') + + allow $1 qpidd_t:sem rw_sem_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Read and write to qpidd shared memory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`qpidd_rw_shm',` + gen_require(` + type qpidd_t; + type qpidd_tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 qpidd_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + fs_search_tmpfs($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, qpidd_tmpfs_t, qpidd_tmpfs_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/qpid.te b/policy/modules/services/qpid.te index cb7ecb5..52cb067 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/qpid.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/qpid.te @@ -12,12 +12,15 @@ init_daemon_domain(qpidd_t, qpidd_exec_t) type qpidd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(qpidd_initrc_exec_t) -type qpidd_var_lib_t; -files_type(qpidd_var_lib_t) +type qpidd_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(qpidd_tmpfs_t) type qpidd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(qpidd_var_run_t) +type qpidd_var_lib_t; +files_type(qpidd_var_lib_t) + ######################################## # # qpidd local policy @@ -30,27 +33,36 @@ allow qpidd_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow qpidd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow qpidd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -manage_dirs_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) -manage_files_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_tmpfs_t, qpidd_tmpfs_t) +manage_files_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_tmpfs_t, qpidd_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(qpidd_t, qpidd_tmpfs_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_lib_t, qpidd_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_lib_t, { file dir }) -manage_dirs_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_run_t, qpidd_var_run_t) -manage_files_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_run_t, qpidd_var_run_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_run_t, qpidd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_run_t, qpidd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(qpidd_t, qpidd_var_run_t, { file dir }) kernel_read_system_state(qpidd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(qpidd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(qpidd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(qpidd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(qpidd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(qpidd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(qpidd_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(qpidd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_amqp_port(qpidd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_matahari_port(qpidd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_amqp_port(qpidd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_matahari_port(qpidd_t) +dev_read_sysfs(qpidd_t) dev_read_urand(qpidd_t) files_read_etc_files(qpidd_t) +files_read_usr_files(qpidd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(qpidd_t) @@ -61,3 +73,8 @@ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(qpidd_t) optional_policy(` corosync_stream_connect(qpidd_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + matahari_manage_lib_files(qpidd_t) + matahari_manage_pid_files(qpidd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/quantum.fc b/policy/modules/services/quantum.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9108437 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/quantum.fc @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +/usr/bin/quantum-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quantum_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/quantum-openvswitch-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quantum_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/quantum-linuxbridge-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quantum_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/quantum-ryu-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quantum_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/quantum.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:quantum_unit_file_t,s0) + +/var/lib/quantum(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:quantum_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/quantum(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:quantum_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/quantum.if b/policy/modules/services/quantum.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..89e4bc5 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/quantum.if @@ -0,0 +1,224 @@ +## Quantum is a virtual network service for Openstack + +######################################## +## +## Transition to quantum. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_t, quantum_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, quantum_exec_t, quantum_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read quantum's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, quantum_log_t, quantum_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to quantum log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, quantum_log_t, quantum_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage quantum log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, quantum_log_t, quantum_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, quantum_log_t, quantum_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, quantum_log_t, quantum_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search quantum lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 quantum_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read quantum lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, quantum_var_lib_t, quantum_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage quantum lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, quantum_var_lib_t, quantum_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage quantum lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, quantum_var_lib_t, quantum_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute quantum server in the quantum domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_t; + type quantum_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + allow $1 quantum_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 quantum_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, quantum_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an quantum environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`quantum_admin',` + gen_require(` + type quantum_t; + type quantum_log_t; + type quantum_var_lib_t; + type quantum_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 quantum_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, quantum_t) + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, quantum_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, quantum_var_lib_t) + + quantum_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, quantum_unit_file_t) + allow $1 quantum_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/quantum.te b/policy/modules/services/quantum.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..616ed06 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/quantum.te @@ -0,0 +1,83 @@ +policy_module(quantum, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type quantum_t; +type quantum_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(quantum_t, quantum_exec_t) + +type quantum_log_t; +logging_log_file(quantum_log_t) + +type quantum_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(quantum_tmp_t) + +type quantum_var_lib_t; +files_type(quantum_var_lib_t) + +type quantum_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(quantum_unit_file_t) + +######################################## +# +# quantum local policy +# +allow quantum_t self:capability { setuid sys_resource setgid audit_write }; +allow quantum_t self:process { setsched setrlimit }; +allow quantum_t self:key manage_key_perms; + +allow quantum_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow quantum_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow quantum_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(quantum_t, quantum_log_t, quantum_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(quantum_t, quantum_log_t, quantum_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(quantum_t, quantum_log_t, { dir file }) + +manage_files_pattern(quantum_t, quantum_tmp_t, quantum_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(quantum_t, quantum_tmp_t, file) +can_exec(quantum_t, quantum_tmp_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(quantum_t, quantum_var_lib_t, quantum_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(quantum_t, quantum_var_lib_t, quantum_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(quantum_t, quantum_var_lib_t, { dir file }) + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(quantum_t) +kernel_read_system_state(quantum_t) + +corecmd_exec_shell(quantum_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(quantum_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(quantum_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_quantum_port(quantum_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(quantum_t) + +dev_read_urand(quantum_t) +dev_list_sysfs(quantum_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(quantum_t) + +files_read_etc_files(quantum_t) +files_read_usr_files(quantum_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(quantum_t) + +libs_exec_ldconfig(quantum_t) + +logging_send_audit_msgs(quantum_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(quantum_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(quantum_t) + +sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(quantum_t) + +optional_policy(` + brctl_domtrans(quantum_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sudo_exec(quantum_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rabbitmq.fc b/policy/modules/services/rabbitmq.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..594c110 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/rabbitmq.fc @@ -0,0 +1,7 @@ + +/usr/lib64/erlang/erts-5.8.5/bin/beam.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rabbitmq_beam_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib64/erlang/erts-5.8.5/bin/epmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/rabbitmq(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rabbitmq_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/rabbitmq(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rabbitmq_var_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rabbitmq.if b/policy/modules/services/rabbitmq.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..491bd1f --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/rabbitmq.if @@ -0,0 +1,21 @@ + +## policy for rabbitmq + +######################################## +## +## Transition to rabbitmq. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`rabbitmq_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type rabbitmq_t, rabbitmq_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, rabbitmq_exec_t, rabbitmq_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rabbitmq.te b/policy/modules/services/rabbitmq.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..591ca32 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/rabbitmq.te @@ -0,0 +1,86 @@ +policy_module(rabbitmq, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type rabbitmq_epmd_t; +type rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(rabbitmq_epmd_t, rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t) + +type rabbitmq_beam_t; +type rabbitmq_beam_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(rabbitmq_beam_t, rabbitmq_beam_exec_t) + +type rabbitmq_var_lib_t; +files_type(rabbitmq_var_lib_t) + +type rabbitmq_var_log_t; +logging_log_file(rabbitmq_var_log_t) + +###################################### +# +# beam local policy +# + +allow rabbitmq_beam_t self:process { setsched signal signull }; + +allow rabbitmq_beam_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow rabbitmq_beam_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(rabbitmq_beam_t, rabbitmq_var_lib_t, rabbitmq_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(rabbitmq_beam_t, rabbitmq_var_lib_t, rabbitmq_var_lib_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(rabbitmq_beam_t, rabbitmq_var_log_t, rabbitmq_var_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(rabbitmq_beam_t, rabbitmq_var_log_t, rabbitmq_var_log_t) + +can_exec(rabbitmq_beam_t, rabbitmq_beam_exec_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(rabbitmq_beam_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(rabbitmq_beam_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(rabbitmq_beam_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(rabbitmq_beam_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(rabbitmq_beam_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ephemeral_ports(rabbitmq_beam_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_amqp_port(rabbitmq_beam_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_epmd_port(rabbitmq_beam_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(rabbitmq_beam_t) + +files_read_etc_files(rabbitmq_beam_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(rabbitmq_beam_t) + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(rabbitmq_beam_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# epmd local policy +# + +domtrans_pattern(rabbitmq_beam_t, rabbitmq_epmd_exec_t, rabbitmq_epmd_t) + +allow rabbitmq_epmd_t self:process signal; + +allow rabbitmq_epmd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow rabbitmq_epmd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow rabbitmq_epmd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +# should be append +allow rabbitmq_epmd_t rabbitmq_var_log_t:file write_file_perms; + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(rabbitmq_epmd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(rabbitmq_epmd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_epmd_port(rabbitmq_epmd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(rabbitmq_epmd_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(rabbitmq_epmd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(rabbitmq_epmd_t) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/radius.if b/policy/modules/services/radius.if index 75e5dc4..87d75fe 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/radius.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/radius.if @@ -38,8 +38,11 @@ interface(`radius_admin',` type radiusd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 radiusd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 radiusd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, radiusd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 radiusd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, radiusd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/radius.te b/policy/modules/services/radius.te index b1ed1bf..4719120 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/radius.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/radius.te @@ -62,6 +62,7 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(radiusd_t, radiusd_var_run_t, radiusd_var_run_t) manage_dirs_pattern(radiusd_t, radiusd_var_run_t, radiusd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(radiusd_t, radiusd_var_run_t, radiusd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(radiusd_t, radiusd_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir }) +files_dontaudit_list_tmp(radiusd_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(radiusd_t) kernel_read_system_state(radiusd_t) @@ -77,6 +78,7 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(radiusd_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(radiusd_t) corenet_udp_bind_radacct_port(radiusd_t) corenet_udp_bind_radius_port(radiusd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(radiusd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(radiusd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_snmp_port(radiusd_t) corenet_sendrecv_radius_server_packets(radiusd_t) @@ -113,6 +115,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(radiusd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(radiusd_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs(radiusd_t) +sysnet_use_ldap(radiusd_t) + userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(radiusd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(radiusd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/radvd.if b/policy/modules/services/radvd.if index be05bff..7b00e1e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/radvd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/radvd.if @@ -19,12 +19,15 @@ # interface(`radvd_admin',` gen_require(` - type radvd_t, radvd_etc_t; - type radvd_var_run_t, radvd_initrc_exec_t; + type radvd_t, radvd_etc_t, radvd_initrc_exec_t; + type radvd_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 radvd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 radvd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, radvd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 radvd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, radvd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/razor.fc b/policy/modules/services/razor.fc index 1efba0c..bfda924 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/razor.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/razor.fc @@ -1,8 +1,9 @@ -HOME_DIR/\.razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_home_t,s0) +#/root/\.razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_home_t,s0) +#HOME_DIR/\.razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_home_t,s0) -/etc/razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_etc_t,s0) +#/etc/razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_etc_t,s0) -/usr/bin/razor.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_exec_t,s0) +#/usr/bin/razor.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_exec_t,s0) -/var/lib/razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_var_lib_t,s0) -/var/log/razor-agent\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_log_t,s0) +#/var/lib/razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_var_lib_t,s0) +#/var/log/razor-agent\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:razor_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/razor.if b/policy/modules/services/razor.if index f04a595..d6a6e1a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/razor.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/razor.if @@ -26,6 +26,7 @@ template(`razor_common_domain_template',` gen_require(` type razor_exec_t, razor_etc_t, razor_log_t, razor_var_lib_t; ') + type $1_t; domain_type($1_t) domain_entry_file($1_t, razor_exec_t) @@ -46,7 +47,7 @@ template(`razor_common_domain_template',` # Read system config file allow $1_t razor_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1_t razor_etc_t:file read_file_perms; - allow $1_t razor_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; + allow $1_t razor_etc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, razor_log_t, razor_log_t) manage_files_pattern($1_t, razor_log_t, razor_log_t) @@ -117,6 +118,7 @@ template(`razor_common_domain_template',` ## User domain for the role ## ## +## # interface(`razor_role',` gen_require(` @@ -130,7 +132,10 @@ interface(`razor_role',` # allow ps to show razor and allow the user to kill it ps_process_pattern($2, razor_t) - allow $2 razor_t:process signal; + allow $2 razor_t:process signal_perms; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $2 razor_t:process ptrace; + ') manage_dirs_pattern($2, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) manage_files_pattern($2, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) @@ -157,3 +162,43 @@ interface(`razor_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, razor_exec_t, razor_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete razor files +## in a user home subdirectory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`razor_manage_user_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type razor_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## read razor lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`razor_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type razor_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, razor_var_lib_t, razor_var_lib_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/razor.te b/policy/modules/services/razor.te index 852840b..9405f78 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/razor.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/razor.te @@ -5,118 +5,125 @@ policy_module(razor, 2.2.0) # Declarations # -type razor_exec_t; -corecmd_executable_file(razor_exec_t) +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + gen_require(` + type spamc_t, spamc_exec_t, spamd_log_t; + type spamd_spool_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_etc_t; + type spamc_home_t, spamc_tmp_t; + ') + + typealias spamc_t alias razor_t; + typealias spamc_exec_t alias razor_exec_t; + typealias spamd_log_t alias razor_log_t; + typealias spamd_var_lib_t alias razor_var_lib_t; + typealias spamd_etc_t alias razor_etc_t; + typealias spamc_home_t alias razor_home_t; + typealias spamc_home_t alias { user_razor_home_t staff_razor_home_t sysadm_razor_home_t }; + typealias spamc_home_t alias { auditadm_razor_home_t secadm_razor_home_t }; + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { user_razor_tmp_t staff_razor_tmp_t sysadm_razor_tmp_t }; + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { auditadm_razor_tmp_t secadm_razor_tmp_t }; +',` + type razor_exec_t; + corecmd_executable_file(razor_exec_t) + + type razor_etc_t; + files_config_file(razor_etc_t) + + type razor_home_t; + typealias razor_home_t alias { user_razor_home_t staff_razor_home_t sysadm_razor_home_t }; + typealias razor_home_t alias { auditadm_razor_home_t secadm_razor_home_t }; + userdom_user_home_content(razor_home_t) + + type razor_log_t; + logging_log_file(razor_log_t) + + type razor_tmp_t; + typealias razor_tmp_t alias { user_razor_tmp_t staff_razor_tmp_t sysadm_razor_tmp_t }; + typealias razor_tmp_t alias { auditadm_razor_tmp_t secadm_razor_tmp_t }; + files_tmp_file(razor_tmp_t) + ubac_constrained(razor_tmp_t) + + type razor_var_lib_t; + files_type(razor_var_lib_t) + + # these are here due to ordering issues: + razor_common_domain_template(razor) + typealias razor_t alias { user_razor_t staff_razor_t sysadm_razor_t }; + typealias razor_t alias { auditadm_razor_t secadm_razor_t }; + ubac_constrained(razor_t) + + razor_common_domain_template(system_razor) + role system_r types system_razor_t; + + ######################################## + # + # System razor local policy + # + + # this version of razor is invoked typically + # via the system spam filter + + allow system_razor_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; + + manage_dirs_pattern(system_razor_t, razor_etc_t, razor_etc_t) + manage_files_pattern(system_razor_t, razor_etc_t, razor_etc_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern(system_razor_t, razor_etc_t, razor_etc_t) + files_search_etc(system_razor_t) + + allow system_razor_t razor_log_t:file manage_file_perms; + logging_log_filetrans(system_razor_t, razor_log_t, file) + + manage_files_pattern(system_razor_t, razor_var_lib_t, razor_var_lib_t) + files_var_lib_filetrans(system_razor_t, razor_var_lib_t, file) + + corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(system_razor_t) + corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(system_razor_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(system_razor_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(system_razor_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(system_razor_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(system_razor_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_razor_port(system_razor_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_razor_port(system_razor_t) + corenet_sendrecv_razor_client_packets(system_razor_t) + + auth_use_nsswitch(system_razor_t) + + # cjp: this shouldn't be needed + userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(system_razor_t) + + optional_policy(` + logging_send_syslog_msg(system_razor_t) + ') + + ######################################## + # + # User razor local policy + # + + # Allow razor to be run by hand. Needed by any action other than + # invocation from a spam filter. + + allow razor_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + + manage_dirs_pattern(razor_t, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) + manage_files_pattern(razor_t, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern(razor_t, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(razor_t, razor_home_t, dir) + + manage_dirs_pattern(razor_t, razor_tmp_t, razor_tmp_t) + manage_files_pattern(razor_t, razor_tmp_t, razor_tmp_t) + files_tmp_filetrans(razor_t, razor_tmp_t, { file dir }) + + auth_use_nsswitch(razor_t) -type razor_etc_t; -files_config_file(razor_etc_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(razor_t) -type razor_home_t; -typealias razor_home_t alias { user_razor_home_t staff_razor_home_t sysadm_razor_home_t }; -typealias razor_home_t alias { auditadm_razor_home_t secadm_razor_home_t }; -userdom_user_home_content(razor_home_t) + userdom_search_user_home_dirs(razor_t) + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(razor_t) -type razor_log_t; -logging_log_file(razor_log_t) + userdom_home_manager(razor_t) -type razor_tmp_t; -typealias razor_tmp_t alias { user_razor_tmp_t staff_razor_tmp_t sysadm_razor_tmp_t }; -typealias razor_tmp_t alias { auditadm_razor_tmp_t secadm_razor_tmp_t }; -files_tmp_file(razor_tmp_t) -ubac_constrained(razor_tmp_t) - -type razor_var_lib_t; -files_type(razor_var_lib_t) - -# these are here due to ordering issues: -razor_common_domain_template(razor) -typealias razor_t alias { user_razor_t staff_razor_t sysadm_razor_t }; -typealias razor_t alias { auditadm_razor_t secadm_razor_t }; -ubac_constrained(razor_t) - -razor_common_domain_template(system_razor) -role system_r types system_razor_t; - -######################################## -# -# System razor local policy -# - -# this version of razor is invoked typically -# via the system spam filter - -allow system_razor_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; - -manage_dirs_pattern(system_razor_t, razor_etc_t, razor_etc_t) -manage_files_pattern(system_razor_t, razor_etc_t, razor_etc_t) -manage_lnk_files_pattern(system_razor_t, razor_etc_t, razor_etc_t) -files_search_etc(system_razor_t) - -allow system_razor_t razor_log_t:file manage_file_perms; -logging_log_filetrans(system_razor_t, razor_log_t, file) - -manage_files_pattern(system_razor_t, razor_var_lib_t, razor_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(system_razor_t, razor_var_lib_t, file) - -corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(system_razor_t) -corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(system_razor_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(system_razor_t) -corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(system_razor_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(system_razor_t) -corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(system_razor_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_razor_port(system_razor_t) -corenet_tcp_connect_razor_port(system_razor_t) -corenet_sendrecv_razor_client_packets(system_razor_t) - -sysnet_read_config(system_razor_t) - -# cjp: this shouldn't be needed -userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(system_razor_t) - -optional_policy(` - logging_send_syslog_msg(system_razor_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(system_razor_t) -') - -######################################## -# -# User razor local policy -# - -# Allow razor to be run by hand. Needed by any action other than -# invocation from a spam filter. - -allow razor_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - -manage_dirs_pattern(razor_t, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) -manage_files_pattern(razor_t, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) -manage_lnk_files_pattern(razor_t, razor_home_t, razor_home_t) -userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(razor_t, razor_home_t, dir) - -manage_dirs_pattern(razor_t, razor_tmp_t, razor_tmp_t) -manage_files_pattern(razor_t, razor_tmp_t, razor_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(razor_t, razor_tmp_t, { file dir }) - -logging_send_syslog_msg(razor_t) - -userdom_search_user_home_dirs(razor_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(razor_t) - -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(razor_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(razor_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(razor_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(razor_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(razor_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(razor_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(razor_t) + optional_policy(` + milter_manage_spamass_state(razor_t) + ') ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rdisc.fc b/policy/modules/services/rdisc.fc index dee4adc..a7e4bc7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rdisc.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/rdisc.fc @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ /sbin/rdisc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rdisc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/rdisc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rdisc_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/remotelogin.te b/policy/modules/services/remotelogin.te index 0a76027..a475797 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/remotelogin.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/remotelogin.te @@ -10,9 +10,6 @@ domain_interactive_fd(remote_login_t) auth_login_pgm_domain(remote_login_t) auth_login_entry_type(remote_login_t) -type remote_login_tmp_t; -files_tmp_file(remote_login_tmp_t) - ######################################## # # Remote login remote policy @@ -34,10 +31,6 @@ allow remote_login_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; allow remote_login_t self:msg { send receive }; allow remote_login_t self:key write; -manage_dirs_pattern(remote_login_t, remote_login_tmp_t, remote_login_tmp_t) -manage_files_pattern(remote_login_t, remote_login_tmp_t, remote_login_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(remote_login_t, remote_login_tmp_t, { file dir }) - kernel_read_system_state(remote_login_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(remote_login_t) @@ -49,6 +42,8 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(remote_login_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(remote_login_t) term_relabel_all_ptys(remote_login_t) +term_use_all_ptys(remote_login_t) +term_setattr_all_ptys(remote_login_t) auth_rw_login_records(remote_login_t) auth_rw_faillog(remote_login_t) @@ -77,7 +72,7 @@ files_list_mnt(remote_login_t) # for when /var/mail is a sym-link files_read_var_symlinks(remote_login_t) -sysnet_dns_name_resolve(remote_login_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(remote_login_t) miscfiles_read_localization(remote_login_t) @@ -87,34 +82,28 @@ userdom_search_user_home_content(remote_login_t) # since very weak authentication is used. userdom_signal_unpriv_users(remote_login_t) userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users(remote_login_t) +userdom_use_user_ptys(remote_login_t) -# Search for mail spool file. -mta_getattr_spool(remote_login_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(remote_login_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(remote_login_t) +userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp(remote_login_t, { file dir }) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_read_nfs_files(remote_login_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(remote_login_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_read_cifs_files(remote_login_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(remote_login_t) -') +userdom_home_reader(remote_login_t) optional_policy(` alsa_domtrans(remote_login_t) ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(remote_login_t) + # Search for mail spool file. + mta_getattr_spool(remote_login_t) ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(remote_login_t) + telnet_use_ptys(remote_login_t) ') optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(remote_login_t) unconfined_shell_domtrans(remote_login_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/resmgr.fc b/policy/modules/services/resmgr.fc index af810b9..9c544e5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/resmgr.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/resmgr.fc @@ -3,5 +3,7 @@ /sbin/resmgrd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:resmgrd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/resmgrd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:resmgrd_exec_t,s0) + /var/run/\.resmgr_socket -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:resmgrd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/resmgr\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:resmgrd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/resmgr.if b/policy/modules/services/resmgr.if index d457736..eabdd78 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/resmgr.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/resmgr.if @@ -16,7 +16,6 @@ interface(`resmgr_stream_connect',` type resmgrd_var_run_t, resmgrd_t; ') - allow $1 resmgrd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; - allow $1 resmgrd_var_run_t:sock_file { getattr write }; files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, resmgrd_var_run_t, resmgrd_var_run_t, resmgrd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.fc b/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.fc index 3c97ef0..c025d59 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.fc @@ -1,3 +1,5 @@ +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rgmanager -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_initrc_exec_t,s0) + /usr/sbin/rgmanager -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_exec_t,s0) /var/log/cluster/rgmanager\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rgmanager_var_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.if b/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.if index 7dc38d1..808f9c6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run rgmanager. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`rgmanager_domtrans',` @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ interface(`rgmanager_domtrans',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to rgmanager over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to rgmanager over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -75,3 +75,67 @@ interface(`rgmanager_manage_tmpfs_files',` fs_search_tmpfs($1) manage_files_pattern($1, rgmanager_tmpfs_t, rgmanager_tmpfs_t) ') + +####################################### +## +## Allow read and write access to rgmanager semaphores. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rgmanager_rw_semaphores',` + gen_require(` + type rgmanager_t; + ') + + allow $1 rgmanager_t:sem rw_sem_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an rgmanager environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed to manage the rgmanager domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`rgmanager_admin',` + gen_require(` + type rgmanager_t, rgmanager_initrc_exec_t, rgmanager_tmp_t; + type rgmanager_tmpfs_t, rgmanager_var_log_t, rgmanager_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 rgmanager_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, rgmanager_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 rgmanager_t:process ptrace; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, rgmanager_initrc_exec_t) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 rgmanager_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, rgmanager_tmp_t) + + admin_pattern($1, rgmanager_tmpfs_t) + + logging_list_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, rgmanager_var_log_t) + + files_list_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, rgmanager_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.te b/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.te index 00fa514..4a9758b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rgmanager.te @@ -6,17 +6,19 @@ policy_module(rgmanager, 1.0.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow rgmanager domain to connect to the network using TCP. -##

    +##

    +## Allow rgmanager domain to connect to the network using TCP. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(rgmanager_can_network_connect, false) type rgmanager_t; type rgmanager_exec_t; -domain_type(rgmanager_t) init_daemon_domain(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_exec_t) +type rgmanager_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(rgmanager_initrc_exec_t) + type rgmanager_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(rgmanager_tmp_t) @@ -35,9 +37,7 @@ files_pid_file(rgmanager_var_run_t) # allow rgmanager_t self:capability { dac_override net_raw sys_resource sys_admin sys_nice ipc_lock }; -dontaudit rgmanager_t self:capability { sys_ptrace }; allow rgmanager_t self:process { setsched signal }; -dontaudit rgmanager_t self:process { ptrace }; allow rgmanager_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow rgmanager_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms }; @@ -55,11 +55,14 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_tmpfs_t, { dir file }) manage_files_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_log_t, rgmanager_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_log_t, { file }) +manage_dirs_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_run_t, rgmanager_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_run_t, rgmanager_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_run_t, rgmanager_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(rgmanager_t, rgmanager_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir }) +kernel_kill(rgmanager_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(rgmanager_t) +kernel_read_rpc_sysctls(rgmanager_t) kernel_read_system_state(rgmanager_t) kernel_rw_rpc_sysctls(rgmanager_t) kernel_search_debugfs(rgmanager_t) @@ -67,7 +70,6 @@ kernel_search_network_state(rgmanager_t) corecmd_exec_bin(rgmanager_t) corecmd_exec_shell(rgmanager_t) -consoletype_exec(rgmanager_t) # need to write to /dev/misc/dlm-control dev_rw_dlm_control(rgmanager_t) @@ -76,31 +78,36 @@ dev_search_sysfs(rgmanager_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(rgmanager_t) domain_getattr_all_domains(rgmanager_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(rgmanager_t) -files_list_all(rgmanager_t) +files_create_var_run_dirs(rgmanager_t) files_getattr_all_symlinks(rgmanager_t) +files_list_all(rgmanager_t) files_manage_mnt_dirs(rgmanager_t) +files_manage_mnt_files(rgmanager_t) +files_manage_mnt_symlinks(rgmanager_t) +files_manage_isid_type_files(rgmanager_t) files_manage_isid_type_dirs(rgmanager_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(rgmanager_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(rgmanager_t) +storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(rgmanager_t) storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(rgmanager_t) term_getattr_pty_fs(rgmanager_t) -#term_use_ptmx(rgmanager_t) # needed by resources scripts -auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(rgmanager_t) +files_read_non_security_files(rgmanager_t) auth_dontaudit_getattr_shadow(rgmanager_t) auth_use_nsswitch(rgmanager_t) +init_domtrans_script(rgmanager_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(rgmanager_t) miscfiles_read_localization(rgmanager_t) -mount_domtrans(rgmanager_t) +userdom_kill_all_users(rgmanager_t) tunable_policy(`rgmanager_can_network_connect',` corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(rgmanager_t) @@ -118,6 +125,14 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(rgmanager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(rgmanager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` fstools_domtrans(rgmanager_t) ') @@ -140,6 +155,16 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + ldap_initrc_domtrans(rgmanager_t) + ldap_systemctl(rgmanager_t) + ldap_domtrans(rgmanager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_domtrans(rgmanager_t) +') + +optional_policy(` mysql_domtrans_mysql_safe(rgmanager_t) mysql_stream_connect(rgmanager_t) ') @@ -165,6 +190,8 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` rpc_initrc_domtrans_nfsd(rgmanager_t) rpc_initrc_domtrans_rpcd(rgmanager_t) + rpc_systemctl_nfsd(rgmanager_t) + rpc_systemctl_rpcd(rgmanager_t) rpc_domtrans_nfsd(rgmanager_t) rpc_domtrans_rpcd(rgmanager_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhcs.fc b/policy/modules/services/rhcs.fc index c2ba53b..1f935bf 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rhcs.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhcs.fc @@ -1,20 +1,25 @@ /usr/sbin/dlm_controld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dlm_controld_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/fenced -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/fence_node -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/fence_tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/gfs_controld -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gfs_controld_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/foghorn -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:foghorn_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/groupd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:groupd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/qdiskd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qdiskd_exec_t,s0) /var/lock/fence_manual\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_lock_t,s0) +/var/lib/cluster(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cluster_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/qdiskd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:qdiskd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/log/cluster/.*\.*log <> /var/log/cluster/dlm_controld\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dlm_controld_var_log_t,s0) /var/log/cluster/fenced\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_log_t,s0) /var/log/cluster/gfs_controld\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gfs_controld_var_log_t,s0) /var/log/cluster/qdiskd\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qdiskd_var_log_t,s0) /var/run/cluster/fenced_override -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/cluster/fence_scsi.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/dlm_controld\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dlm_controld_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/fenced\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fenced_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/gfs_controld\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gfs_controld_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhcs.if b/policy/modules/services/rhcs.if index de37806..3e870b7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rhcs.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhcs.if @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ # template(`rhcs_domain_template',` gen_require(` - attribute cluster_domain; + attribute cluster_domain, cluster_tmpfs, cluster_pid; ') ############################## @@ -25,13 +25,13 @@ template(`rhcs_domain_template',` type $1_exec_t; init_daemon_domain($1_t, $1_exec_t) - type $1_tmpfs_t; + type $1_tmpfs_t, cluster_tmpfs; files_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t) type $1_var_log_t; logging_log_file($1_var_log_t) - type $1_var_run_t; + type $1_var_run_t, cluster_pid; files_pid_file($1_var_run_t) ############################## @@ -51,7 +51,6 @@ template(`rhcs_domain_template',` manage_fifo_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_run_t, { file fifo_file }) - ') ###################################### @@ -59,9 +58,9 @@ template(`rhcs_domain_template',` ## Execute a domain transition to run dlm_controld. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`rhcs_domtrans_dlm_controld',` @@ -133,6 +132,24 @@ interface(`rhcs_domtrans_fenced',` domtrans_pattern($1, fenced_exec_t, fenced_t) ') +##################################### +## +## Allow a domain to getattr on fenced executable. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`rhcs_getattr_fenced',` + gen_require(` + type fenced_t, fenced_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 fenced_exec_t:file getattr; +') + ###################################### ## ## Allow read and write access to fenced semaphores. @@ -156,7 +173,7 @@ interface(`rhcs_rw_fenced_semaphores',` ###################################### ## -## Connect to fenced over an unix domain stream socket. +## Connect to fenced over a unix domain stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -169,9 +186,8 @@ interface(`rhcs_stream_connect_fenced',` type fenced_var_run_t, fenced_t; ') - allow $1 fenced_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; - allow $1 fenced_var_run_t:sock_file { getattr write }; files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, fenced_var_run_t, fenced_var_run_t, fenced_t) ') ##################################### @@ -237,7 +253,7 @@ interface(`rhcs_rw_gfs_controld_shm',` ##################################### ## -## Connect to gfs_controld_t over an unix domain stream socket. +## Connect to gfs_controld_t over a unix domain stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -335,6 +351,65 @@ interface(`rhcs_rw_groupd_shm',` manage_files_pattern($1, groupd_tmpfs_t, groupd_tmpfs_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Read and write to group shared memory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhcs_rw_cluster_shm',` + gen_require(` + attribute cluster_domain, cluster_tmpfs; + ') + + allow $1 cluster_domain:shm { rw_shm_perms destroy }; + + fs_search_tmpfs($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, cluster_tmpfs, cluster_tmpfs) +') + +#################################### +## +## Read and write access to cluster domains semaphores. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhcs_rw_cluster_semaphores',` + gen_require(` + attribute cluster_domain; + ') + + allow $1 cluster_domain:sem { rw_sem_perms destroy }; +') + +#################################### +## +## Connect to cluster domains over a unix domain +## stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhcs_stream_connect_cluster',` + gen_require(` + attribute cluster_domain, cluster_pid; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, cluster_pid, cluster_pid, cluster_domain) +') + ###################################### ## ## Execute a domain transition to run qdiskd. @@ -353,3 +428,80 @@ interface(`rhcs_domtrans_qdiskd',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, qdiskd_exec_t, qdiskd_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Allow domain to read qdiskd tmpfs files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhcs_read_qdiskd_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type qdiskd_tmpfs_t; + ') + + fs_search_tmpfs($1) + allow $1 qdiskd_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow domain to read cluster lib files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhcs_read_cluster_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type cluster_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, cluster_var_lib_t, cluster_var_lib_t) +') + +##################################### +## +## Allow domain to manage cluster lib files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhcs_manage_cluster_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type cluster_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, cluster_var_lib_t, cluster_var_lib_t) +') + +#################################### +## +## Allow domain to relabel cluster lib files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhcs_relabel_cluster_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type cluster_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + relabelto_files_pattern($1, cluster_var_lib_t, cluster_var_lib_t) + relabelfrom_files_pattern($1, cluster_var_lib_t, cluster_var_lib_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhcs.te b/policy/modules/services/rhcs.te index 93c896a..a99868e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rhcs.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhcs.te @@ -6,13 +6,22 @@ policy_module(rhcs, 1.1.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow fenced domain to connect to the network using TCP. -##

    +##

    +## Allow fenced domain to connect to the network using TCP. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(fenced_can_network_connect, false) +## +##

    +## Allow fenced domain to execute ssh. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(fenced_can_ssh, false) + attribute cluster_domain; +attribute cluster_tmpfs; +attribute cluster_pid; rhcs_domain_template(dlm_controld) @@ -24,6 +33,8 @@ files_lock_file(fenced_lock_t) type fenced_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(fenced_tmp_t) +rhcs_domain_template(foghorn) + rhcs_domain_template(gfs_controld) rhcs_domain_template(groupd) @@ -33,6 +44,10 @@ rhcs_domain_template(qdiskd) type qdiskd_var_lib_t; files_type(qdiskd_var_lib_t) +# type for cluster lib files +type cluster_var_lib_t; +files_type(cluster_var_lib_t) + ##################################### # # dlm_controld local policy @@ -46,6 +61,7 @@ stream_connect_pattern(dlm_controld_t, fenced_var_run_t, fenced_var_run_t, fence stream_connect_pattern(dlm_controld_t, groupd_var_run_t, groupd_var_run_t, groupd_t) kernel_read_system_state(dlm_controld_t) +kernel_rw_net_sysctls(dlm_controld_t) dev_rw_dlm_control(dlm_controld_t) dev_rw_sysfs(dlm_controld_t) @@ -55,20 +71,17 @@ fs_manage_configfs_dirs(dlm_controld_t) init_rw_script_tmp_files(dlm_controld_t) -optional_policy(` - ccs_stream_connect(dlm_controld_t) -') - ####################################### # # fenced local policy # allow fenced_t self:capability { sys_rawio sys_resource }; -allow fenced_t self:process getsched; +allow fenced_t self:process { getsched signal_perms }; allow fenced_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow fenced_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow fenced_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; can_exec(fenced_t, fenced_exec_t) @@ -82,13 +95,19 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(fenced_t, fenced_tmp_t, { file fifo_file dir }) stream_connect_pattern(fenced_t, groupd_var_run_t, groupd_var_run_t, groupd_t) +kernel_read_system_state(fenced_t) + corecmd_exec_bin(fenced_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(fenced_t) +corenet_udp_bind_ionixnetmon_port(fenced_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_zented_port(fenced_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(fenced_t) dev_read_sysfs(fenced_t) dev_read_urand(fenced_t) +files_read_usr_files(fenced_t) files_read_usr_symlinks(fenced_t) storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(fenced_t) @@ -97,6 +116,7 @@ storage_raw_read_removable_device(fenced_t) term_getattr_pty_fs(fenced_t) term_use_ptmx(fenced_t) +term_use_generic_ptys(fenced_t) auth_use_nsswitch(fenced_t) @@ -105,8 +125,28 @@ tunable_policy(`fenced_can_network_connect',` ') optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`fenced_can_ssh',` + + allow fenced_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; + + corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(fenced_t) + + ssh_exec(fenced_t) + ssh_read_user_home_files(fenced_t) + ') +') + +# needed by fence_scsi +optional_policy(` + corosync_exec(fenced_t) +') + +optional_policy(` ccs_read_config(fenced_t) - ccs_stream_connect(fenced_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_generic_data_home_files(fenced_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -114,13 +154,43 @@ optional_policy(` lvm_read_config(fenced_t) ') +optional_policy(` + snmp_manage_var_lib_files(fenced_t) + snmp_manage_var_lib_dirs(fenced_t) +') + + +####################################### +# +# foghorn local policy +# + +allow foghorn_t self:process { signal }; +allow foghorn_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow foghorn_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +corenet_tcp_connect_agentx_port(foghorn_t) + +dev_read_urand(foghorn_t) + +files_read_etc_files(foghorn_t) +files_read_usr_files(foghorn_t) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_connect_system_bus(foghorn_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_files(foghorn_t) + snmp_stream_connect(foghorn_t) +') + ###################################### # # gfs_controld local policy # allow gfs_controld_t self:capability { net_admin sys_resource }; - allow gfs_controld_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow gfs_controld_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -139,10 +209,6 @@ storage_getattr_removable_dev(gfs_controld_t) init_rw_script_tmp_files(gfs_controld_t) optional_policy(` - ccs_stream_connect(gfs_controld_t) -') - -optional_policy(` lvm_exec(gfs_controld_t) dev_rw_lvm_control(gfs_controld_t) ') @@ -154,9 +220,10 @@ optional_policy(` allow groupd_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_resource }; allow groupd_t self:process setsched; - allow groupd_t self:shm create_shm_perms; +domtrans_pattern(groupd_t, fenced_exec_t, fenced_t) + dev_list_sysfs(groupd_t) files_read_etc_files(groupd_t) @@ -168,8 +235,7 @@ init_rw_script_tmp_files(groupd_t) # qdiskd local policy # -allow qdiskd_t self:capability ipc_lock; - +allow qdiskd_t self:capability { ipc_lock sys_boot }; allow qdiskd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow qdiskd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -182,7 +248,7 @@ kernel_read_system_state(qdiskd_t) kernel_read_software_raid_state(qdiskd_t) kernel_getattr_core_if(qdiskd_t) -corecmd_getattr_bin_files(qdiskd_t) +corecmd_exec_bin(qdiskd_t) corecmd_exec_shell(qdiskd_t) dev_read_sysfs(qdiskd_t) @@ -199,6 +265,8 @@ files_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(qdiskd_t) files_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(qdiskd_t) files_read_etc_files(qdiskd_t) +fs_list_hugetlbfs(qdiskd_t) + storage_raw_read_removable_device(qdiskd_t) storage_raw_write_removable_device(qdiskd_t) storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(qdiskd_t) @@ -207,10 +275,6 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(qdiskd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(qdiskd_t) optional_policy(` - ccs_stream_connect(qdiskd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` netutils_domtrans_ping(qdiskd_t) ') @@ -223,18 +287,28 @@ optional_policy(` # rhcs domains common policy # -allow cluster_domain self:capability { sys_nice }; +allow cluster_domain self:capability sys_nice; allow cluster_domain self:process setsched; - allow cluster_domain self:sem create_sem_perms; allow cluster_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow cluster_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow cluster_domain self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; +manage_files_pattern(cluster_domain, cluster_var_lib_t, cluster_var_lib_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(cluster_domain, cluster_var_lib_t, cluster_var_lib_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(cluster_domain) miscfiles_read_localization(cluster_domain) optional_policy(` + ccs_stream_connect(cluster_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` corosync_stream_connect(cluster_domain) ') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(cluster_domain) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhev.fc b/policy/modules/services/rhev.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..48beae9 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhev.fc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ +/usr/share/rhev-agent/rhev-agentd\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/share/ovirt-guest-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ovirt-guest-agent.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_unit_file_t,s0) + +/var/run/rhev-agentd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/log/rhev-agent(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhev_agentd_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhev.if b/policy/modules/services/rhev.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bf11e25 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhev.if @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ +## rhev polic module contains policies for rhev apps + +##################################### +## +## Execute rhev-agentd in the rhev_agentd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhev_domtrans_agentd',` + gen_require(` + type rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, rhev_agentd_exec_t, rhev_agentd_t) +') + +#################################### +## +## Read rhev-agentd PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhev_read_pid_files_agentd',` + gen_require(` + type rhev_agentd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + read_files_pattern($1, rhev_agentd_var_run_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t) +') + +##################################### +## +## Connect to rhev_agentd over a unix domain +## stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhev_stream_connect_agentd',` + gen_require(` + type rhev_agentd_var_run_t, rhev_agentd_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, rhev_agentd_var_run_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t, rhev_agentd_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Send sigchld to rhev-agentd +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`rhev_sigchld_agentd',` + gen_require(` + type rhev_agentd_t; + ') + + allow $1 rhev_agentd_t:process sigchld; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhev.te b/policy/modules/services/rhev.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5a48fce --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhev.te @@ -0,0 +1,109 @@ +policy_module(rhev,1.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type rhev_agentd_t; +type rhev_agentd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_exec_t) + +type rhev_agentd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(rhev_agentd_unit_file_t) + +type rhev_agentd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(rhev_agentd_var_run_t) + +type rhev_agentd_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(rhev_agentd_tmp_t) + +type rhev_agentd_log_t; +logging_log_file(rhev_agentd_log_t) + +######################################## +# +# rhev_agentd_t local policy +# + +allow rhev_agentd_t self:capability sys_nice; +allow rhev_agentd_t self:process setsched; + +allow rhev_agentd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow rhev_agentd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) + +manage_files_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_log_t, rhev_agentd_log_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t, { file dir }) +can_exec(rhev_agentd_t, rhev_agentd_tmp_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(rhev_agentd_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(rhev_agentd_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(rhev_agentd_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(rhev_agentd_t) + +dev_read_urand(rhev_agentd_t) + +term_use_virtio_console(rhev_agentd_t) + +files_getattr_all_mountpoints(rhev_agentd_t) +files_read_usr_files(rhev_agentd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(rhev_agentd_t) + +init_read_utmp(rhev_agentd_t) + +libs_exec_ldconfig(rhev_agentd_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(rhev_agentd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(rhev_agentd_t) + +optional_policy(` + rpm_read_db(rhev_agentd_t) + rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(rhev_agentd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_signull(rhev_agentd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(rhev_agentd_t) + dbus_connect_system_bus(rhev_agentd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_dbus_chat_xdm(rhev_agentd_t) +') + +###################################### +# +# rhev_agentd_t consolehelper local policy +# + +optional_policy(` + userhelper_console_role_template(rhev_agentd, system_r, rhev_agentd_t) + + allow rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t rhev_agentd_log_t:file append; + + can_exec(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t, rhev_agentd_exec_t) + kernel_read_system_state(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t) + + term_use_virtio_console(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t) + + optional_policy(` + dbus_session_bus_client(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + unconfined_dbus_chat(rhev_agentd_consolehelper_t) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhgb.if b/policy/modules/services/rhgb.if index 96efae7..793a29f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rhgb.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhgb.if @@ -194,5 +194,6 @@ interface(`rhgb_rw_tmpfs_files',` type rhgb_tmpfs_t; ') + fs_search_tmpfs($1) allow $1 rhgb_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhgb.te b/policy/modules/services/rhgb.te index 0f262a7..4d10897 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rhgb.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhgb.te @@ -30,7 +30,7 @@ allow rhgb_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; allow rhgb_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow rhgb_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; -allow rhgb_t rhgb_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr }; +allow rhgb_t rhgb_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms }; term_create_pty(rhgb_t, rhgb_devpts_t) manage_dirs_pattern(rhgb_t, rhgb_tmpfs_t, rhgb_tmpfs_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhsmcertd.fc b/policy/modules/services/rhsmcertd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b2a8835 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhsmcertd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rhsmcertd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/rhsmcertd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhsmcertd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/rhsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhsmcertd_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/lock/subsys/rhsmcertd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhsmcertd_lock_t,s0) + +/var/log/rhsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhsmcertd_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/rhsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rhsmcertd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhsmcertd.if b/policy/modules/services/rhsmcertd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..6572600 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhsmcertd.if @@ -0,0 +1,300 @@ + +## Subscription Management Certificate Daemon policy + +######################################## +## +## Transition to rhsmcertd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_exec_t, rhsmcertd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute rhsmcertd server in the rhsmcertd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read rhsmcertd's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_log_t, rhsmcertd_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to rhsmcertd log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_log_t, rhsmcertd_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage rhsmcertd log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_log_t, rhsmcertd_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_log_t, rhsmcertd_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_log_t, rhsmcertd_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search rhsmcertd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 rhsmcertd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read rhsmcertd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage rhsmcertd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage rhsmcertd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read rhsmcertd PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 rhsmcertd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +#################################### +## +## Connect to rhsmcertd over a unix domain +## stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_var_run_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t, rhsmcertd_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Send and receive messages from +## rhsmcertd over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 rhsmcertd_t:dbus send_msg; + allow rhsmcertd_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +###################################### +## +## Dontaudit Send and receive messages from +## rhsmcertd over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_dontaudit_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + dontaudit $1 rhsmcertd_t:dbus send_msg; + dontaudit rhsmcertd_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an rhsmcertd environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`rhsmcertd_admin',` + gen_require(` + type rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t, rhsmcertd_log_t; + type rhsmcertd_var_lib_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 rhsmcertd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 rhsmcertd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + rhsmcertd_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, rhsmcertd_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rhsmcertd.te b/policy/modules/services/rhsmcertd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d45cfe5 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/rhsmcertd.te @@ -0,0 +1,69 @@ +policy_module(rhsmcertd, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type rhsmcertd_t; +type rhsmcertd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_exec_t) + +type rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(rhsmcertd_initrc_exec_t) + +type rhsmcertd_log_t; +logging_log_file(rhsmcertd_log_t) + +type rhsmcertd_lock_t; +files_lock_file(rhsmcertd_lock_t) + +type rhsmcertd_var_lib_t; +files_type(rhsmcertd_var_lib_t) + +type rhsmcertd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(rhsmcertd_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# rhsmcertd local policy +# + +allow rhsmcertd_t self:capability sys_nice; +allow rhsmcertd_t self:process setsched; + +allow rhsmcertd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow rhsmcertd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_log_t, rhsmcertd_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_log_t, rhsmcertd_log_t) + +manage_files_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_lock_t, rhsmcertd_lock_t) +files_lock_filetrans(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_lock_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t, rhsmcertd_var_lib_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(rhsmcertd_t, rhsmcertd_var_run_t, { file dir }) + +kernel_read_network_state(rhsmcertd_t) +kernel_read_system_state(rhsmcertd_t) + +files_list_tmp(rhsmcertd_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(rhsmcertd_t) + +dev_read_urand(rhsmcertd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(rhsmcertd_t) +files_read_usr_files(rhsmcertd_t) +files_manage_generic_locks(rhsmcertd_t) + +auth_read_passwd(rhsmcertd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(rhsmcertd_t) +miscfiles_read_certs(rhsmcertd_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(rhsmcertd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ricci.fc b/policy/modules/services/ricci.fc index 5b08327..ed5dc05 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ricci.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/ricci.fc @@ -1,3 +1,6 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ricci -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ricci_initrc_exec_t,s0) + /usr/libexec/modcluster -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ricci_modcluster_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/ricci-modlog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ricci_modlog_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/ricci-modrpm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ricci_modrpm_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ricci.if b/policy/modules/services/ricci.if index f7826f9..23d579c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ricci.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ricci.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run ricci. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`ricci_domtrans',` @@ -18,14 +18,32 @@ interface(`ricci_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, ricci_exec_t, ricci_t) ') +####################################### +## +## Execute ricci server in the ricci domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ricci_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type ricci_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ricci_initrc_exec_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute a domain transition to run ricci_modcluster. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`ricci_domtrans_modcluster',` @@ -71,12 +89,12 @@ interface(`ricci_dontaudit_rw_modcluster_pipes',` type ricci_modcluster_t; ') - dontaudit $1 ricci_modcluster_t:fifo_file { read write }; + dontaudit $1 ricci_modcluster_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## Connect to ricci_modclusterd over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to ricci_modclusterd over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -90,18 +108,36 @@ interface(`ricci_stream_connect_modclusterd',` ') files_search_pids($1) - allow $1 ricci_modcluster_var_run_t:sock_file write; - allow $1 ricci_modclusterd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + stream_connect_pattern($1, ricci_modcluster_var_run_t, ricci_modcluster_var_run_t, ricci_modclusterd_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Execute a domain transition to run ricci_modlog. +## Read and write to ricci_modcluserd temporary file system. ## ## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ricci_rw_modclusterd_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t; + ') + + fs_search_tmpfs($1) + allow $1 ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; +') + +######################################## ## -## Domain allowed to transition. +## Execute a domain transition to run ricci_modlog. ## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## ## # interface(`ricci_domtrans_modlog',` @@ -117,9 +153,9 @@ interface(`ricci_domtrans_modlog',` ## Execute a domain transition to run ricci_modrpm. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`ricci_domtrans_modrpm',` @@ -135,9 +171,9 @@ interface(`ricci_domtrans_modrpm',` ## Execute a domain transition to run ricci_modservice. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`ricci_domtrans_modservice',` @@ -153,9 +189,9 @@ interface(`ricci_domtrans_modservice',` ## Execute a domain transition to run ricci_modstorage. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`ricci_domtrans_modstorage',` @@ -165,3 +201,70 @@ interface(`ricci_domtrans_modstorage',` domtrans_pattern($1, ricci_modstorage_exec_t, ricci_modstorage_t) ') + +#################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to manage ricci's lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ricci_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type ricci_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, ricci_var_lib_t, ricci_var_lib_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, ricci_var_lib_t, ricci_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an ricci environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`ricci_admin',` + gen_require(` + type ricci_t, ricci_initrc_exec_t, ricci_tmp_t; + type ricci_var_lib_t, ricci_var_log_t, ricci_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 ricci_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, ricci_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ricci_t:process ptrace; + ') + + ricci_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 ricci_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, ricci_tmp_t) + + files_list_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, ricci_var_lib_t) + + logging_list_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, ricci_var_log_t) + + files_list_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, ricci_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ricci.te b/policy/modules/services/ricci.te index 33e72e8..8e98863 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ricci.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ricci.te @@ -7,9 +7,11 @@ policy_module(ricci, 1.7.0) type ricci_t; type ricci_exec_t; -domain_type(ricci_t) init_daemon_domain(ricci_t, ricci_exec_t) +type ricci_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(ricci_initrc_exec_t) + type ricci_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(ricci_tmp_t) @@ -39,9 +41,11 @@ files_pid_file(ricci_modcluster_var_run_t) type ricci_modclusterd_t; type ricci_modclusterd_exec_t; -domain_type(ricci_modclusterd_t) init_daemon_domain(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modclusterd_exec_t) +type ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t) + type ricci_modlog_t; type ricci_modlog_exec_t; domain_type(ricci_modlog_t) @@ -95,7 +99,7 @@ manage_files_pattern(ricci_t, ricci_var_lib_t, ricci_var_lib_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(ricci_t, ricci_var_lib_t, ricci_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(ricci_t, ricci_var_lib_t, { file dir sock_file }) -allow ricci_t ricci_var_log_t:dir setattr; +allow ricci_t ricci_var_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; manage_files_pattern(ricci_t, ricci_var_log_t, ricci_var_log_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(ricci_t, ricci_var_log_t, ricci_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(ricci_t, ricci_var_log_t, { sock_file file dir }) @@ -105,6 +109,7 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(ricci_t, ricci_var_run_t, ricci_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(ricci_t, ricci_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ricci_t) +kernel_read_system_state(ricci_t) corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_t) @@ -170,6 +175,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + shutdown_domtrans(ricci_t) +') + +optional_policy(` unconfined_use_fds(ricci_t) ') @@ -193,7 +202,8 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(ricci_modcluster_t) corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_modcluster_t) corenet_tcp_bind_cluster_port(ricci_modclusterd_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_reserved_port(ricci_modclusterd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_all_rpc_ports(ricci_modclusterd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_cluster_port(ricci_modclusterd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(ricci_modcluster_t) @@ -202,6 +212,8 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(ricci_modcluster_t) files_read_etc_files(ricci_modcluster_t) files_search_usr(ricci_modcluster_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(ricci_modcluster_t) + init_exec(ricci_modcluster_t) init_domtrans_script(ricci_modcluster_t) @@ -209,13 +221,9 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modcluster_t) miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modcluster_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(ricci_modcluster_t) - -mount_domtrans(ricci_modcluster_t) - -consoletype_exec(ricci_modcluster_t) - -ricci_stream_connect_modclusterd(ricci_modcluster_t) +optional_policy(` + ricci_stream_connect_modclusterd(ricci_modcluster_t) +') optional_policy(` aisexec_stream_connect(ricci_modcluster_t) @@ -233,7 +241,15 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(ricci_modcluster_t) + modutils_domtrans_insmod(ricci_modcluster_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_domtrans(ricci_modcluster_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(ricci_modcluster_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -241,8 +257,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - # XXX This has got to go. - unconfined_domain(ricci_modcluster_t) + rgmanager_stream_connect(ricci_modclusterd_t) ') ######################################## @@ -261,6 +276,10 @@ allow ricci_modclusterd_t self:socket create_socket_perms; allow ricci_modclusterd_t ricci_modcluster_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow ricci_modclusterd_t ricci_modcluster_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t, ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t) +manage_files_pattern(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t, ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modclusterd_tmpfs_t, { dir file }) + allow ricci_modclusterd_t ricci_modcluster_var_log_t:dir setattr; manage_files_pattern(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modcluster_var_log_t, ricci_modcluster_var_log_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modcluster_var_log_t, ricci_modcluster_var_log_t) @@ -272,6 +291,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(ricci_modclusterd_t, ricci_modcluster_var_run_t, { file sock kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ricci_modclusterd_t) kernel_read_system_state(ricci_modclusterd_t) +kernel_request_load_module(ricci_modclusterd_t) corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_modclusterd_t) @@ -363,6 +383,8 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(ricci_modrpm_t) files_search_usr(ricci_modrpm_t) files_read_etc_files(ricci_modrpm_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modrpm_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modrpm_t) optional_policy(` @@ -394,10 +416,10 @@ files_search_usr(ricci_modservice_t) # Needed for running chkconfig files_manage_etc_symlinks(ricci_modservice_t) -consoletype_exec(ricci_modservice_t) - init_domtrans_script(ricci_modservice_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modservice_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modservice_t) optional_policy(` @@ -405,6 +427,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(ricci_modservice_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nscd_dontaudit_search_pid(ricci_modservice_t) ') @@ -418,7 +444,6 @@ optional_policy(` # allow ricci_modstorage_t self:process { setsched signal }; -dontaudit ricci_modstorage_t self:process ptrace; allow ricci_modstorage_t self:capability { mknod sys_nice }; allow ricci_modstorage_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow ricci_modstorage_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -444,22 +469,22 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(ricci_modstorage_t) files_read_usr_files(ricci_modstorage_t) files_read_kernel_modules(ricci_modstorage_t) +files_create_default_dir(ricci_modstorage_t) +files_root_filetrans_default(ricci_modstorage_t, dir) +files_mounton_default(ricci_modstorage_t) +files_manage_default_dirs(ricci_modstorage_t) +files_manage_default_files(ricci_modstorage_t) + storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(ricci_modstorage_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(ricci_modstorage_t) -fstools_domtrans(ricci_modstorage_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(ricci_modstorage_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(ricci_modstorage_t) miscfiles_read_localization(ricci_modstorage_t) -modutils_read_module_deps(ricci_modstorage_t) - -consoletype_exec(ricci_modstorage_t) - -mount_domtrans(ricci_modstorage_t) - optional_policy(` aisexec_stream_connect(ricci_modstorage_t) corosync_stream_connect(ricci_modstorage_t) @@ -471,12 +496,24 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(ricci_modstorage_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + fstools_domtrans(ricci_modstorage_t) +') + +optional_policy(` lvm_domtrans(ricci_modstorage_t) lvm_manage_config(ricci_modstorage_t) ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(ricci_modstorage_t) + modutils_read_module_deps(ricci_modstorage_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_domtrans(ricci_modstorage_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rlogin.fc b/policy/modules/services/rlogin.fc index 2785337..d7f6b82 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rlogin.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/rlogin.fc @@ -1,7 +1,10 @@ HOME_DIR/\.rlogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rlogind_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.rhosts -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rlogind_home_t,s0) +/root/\.rlogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rlogind_home_t,s0) +/root/\.rhosts -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rlogind_home_t,s0) /usr/kerberos/sbin/klogind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rlogind_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/telnetlogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rlogind_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/telnetlogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rlogind_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/in\.rlogind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rlogind_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rlogin.if b/policy/modules/services/rlogin.if index 63e78c6..fdd8228 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rlogin.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/rlogin.if @@ -21,21 +21,15 @@ interface(`rlogin_domtrans',` ######################################## ## -## read rlogin homedir content (.config) +## read rlogin homedir content (.rlogin) ## -## -## -## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user -## is the prefix for user_t). -## -## -## +## ## -## The type of the user domain. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -template(`rlogin_read_home_content',` +interface(`rlogin_read_home_content',` gen_require(` type rlogind_home_t; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rlogin.te b/policy/modules/services/rlogin.te index 779fa44..1570864 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rlogin.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rlogin.te @@ -27,15 +27,14 @@ files_pid_file(rlogind_var_run_t) # Local policy # -allow rlogind_t self:capability { fsetid chown fowner sys_tty_config dac_override }; +allow rlogind_t self:capability { fsetid chown fowner setuid setgid sys_tty_config dac_override }; allow rlogind_t self:process signal_perms; allow rlogind_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow rlogind_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms; # for identd; cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules? allow rlogind_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; -allow rlogind_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; -allow rlogind_t rlogind_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr }; +allow rlogind_t rlogind_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms }; term_create_pty(rlogind_t, rlogind_devpts_t) # for /usr/lib/telnetlogin @@ -43,7 +42,6 @@ can_exec(rlogind_t, rlogind_exec_t) manage_dirs_pattern(rlogind_t, rlogind_tmp_t, rlogind_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(rlogind_t, rlogind_tmp_t, rlogind_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(rlogind_t, rlogind_tmp_t, { file dir }) manage_files_pattern(rlogind_t, rlogind_var_run_t, rlogind_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(rlogind_t, rlogind_var_run_t, file) @@ -69,8 +67,10 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(rlogind_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(rlogind_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(rlogind_t) +auth_signal_chk_passwd(rlogind_t) auth_rw_login_records(rlogind_t) auth_use_nsswitch(rlogind_t) +auth_login_pgm_domain(rlogind_t) files_read_etc_files(rlogind_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(rlogind_t) @@ -88,27 +88,23 @@ seutil_read_config(rlogind_t) userdom_setattr_user_ptys(rlogind_t) # cjp: this is egregious userdom_read_user_home_content_files(rlogind_t) - -remotelogin_domtrans(rlogind_t) -remotelogin_signal(rlogind_t) +userdom_search_admin_dir(rlogind_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(rlogind_t) +userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp(rlogind_t, file) +userdom_use_user_terminals(rlogind_t) +userdom_home_reader(rlogind_t) rlogin_read_home_content(rlogind_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_list_nfs(rlogind_t) - fs_read_nfs_files(rlogind_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(rlogind_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_list_cifs(rlogind_t) - fs_read_cifs_files(rlogind_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(rlogind_t) +optional_policy(` + kerberos_keytab_template(rlogind, rlogind_t) + #part of auth_use_pam + #kerberos_manage_host_rcache(rlogind_t) ') optional_policy(` - kerberos_keytab_template(rlogind, rlogind_t) - kerberos_manage_host_rcache(rlogind_t) + remotelogin_domtrans(rlogind_t) + remotelogin_signal(rlogind_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/roundup.if b/policy/modules/services/roundup.if index 30c4b75..e07c2ff 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/roundup.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/roundup.if @@ -23,8 +23,11 @@ interface(`roundup_admin',` type roundup_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 roundup_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 roundup_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, roundup_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 roundup_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, roundup_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rpc.fc b/policy/modules/services/rpc.fc index 5c70c0c..b0c22f7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rpc.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/rpc.fc @@ -6,6 +6,9 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/nfslock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rpcidmapd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/nfs.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfsd_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/rpc.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_unit_file_t,s0) + # # /sbin # @@ -15,12 +18,14 @@ # # /usr # +/usr/sbin/rpc\..* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rpc\.idmapd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rpc\.gssd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gssd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rpc\.mountd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfsd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rpc\.nfsd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:nfsd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rpc\.rquotad -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rpc\.svcgssd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:gssd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/sm-notify -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_exec_t,s0) # # /var @@ -29,3 +34,4 @@ /var/run/rpc\.statd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/rpc\.statd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcd_var_run_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rpc.if b/policy/modules/services/rpc.if index cda37bb..fa20a5d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rpc.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/rpc.if @@ -32,7 +32,11 @@ interface(`rpc_stub',` ##     ## # -template(`rpc_domain_template', ` +template(`rpc_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + type var_lib_nfs_t; + ') + ######################################## # # Declarations @@ -152,7 +156,7 @@ interface(`rpc_dontaudit_getattr_exports',` type exports_t; ') - dontaudit $1 exports_t:file getattr; + dontaudit $1 exports_t:file getattr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -188,7 +192,7 @@ interface(`rpc_write_exports',` type exports_t; ') - allow $1 exports_t:file write; + allow $1 exports_t:file write_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -229,6 +233,29 @@ interface(`rpc_initrc_domtrans_nfsd',` ######################################## ## +## Execute nfsd server in the nfsd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`rpc_systemctl_nfsd',` + gen_require(` + type nfsd_unit_file_t; + type nfsd_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 nfsd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 nfsd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, nfsd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute domain in rpcd domain. ## ## @@ -246,6 +273,32 @@ interface(`rpc_domtrans_rpcd',` allow rpcd_t $1:process signal; ') +######################################## +## +## Execute rpcd in the rcpd domain, and +## allow the specified role the rpcd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`rpc_run_rpcd',` + gen_require(` + type rpcd_t; + ') + + rpc_domtrans_rpcd($1) + role $2 types rpcd_t; +') + ####################################### ## ## Execute domain in rpcd domain. @@ -266,6 +319,29 @@ interface(`rpc_initrc_domtrans_rpcd',` ######################################## ## +## Execute rpcd server in the rpcd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`rpc_systemctl_rpcd',` + gen_require(` + type rpcd_unit_file_t; + type rpcd_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 rpcd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 rpcd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, rpcd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read NFS exported content. ## ## @@ -282,7 +358,7 @@ interface(`rpc_read_nfs_content',` allow $1 { nfsd_ro_t nfsd_rw_t }:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 { nfsd_ro_t nfsd_rw_t }:file read_file_perms; - allow $1 { nfsd_ro_t nfsd_rw_t }:lnk_file { getattr read }; + allow $1 { nfsd_ro_t nfsd_rw_t }:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -375,7 +451,26 @@ interface(`rpc_search_nfs_state_data',` ') files_search_var_lib($1) - allow $1 var_lib_nfs_t:dir search; + allow $1 var_lib_nfs_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## List NFS state data in /var/lib/nfs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rpc_list_nfs_state_data',` + gen_require(` + type var_lib_nfs_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 var_lib_nfs_t:dir list_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -414,4 +509,5 @@ interface(`rpc_manage_nfs_state_data',` files_search_var_lib($1) manage_files_pattern($1, var_lib_nfs_t, var_lib_nfs_t) + allow $1 var_lib_nfs_t:file relabel_file_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rpc.te b/policy/modules/services/rpc.te index b1468ed..6ca60ac 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rpc.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rpc.te @@ -6,18 +6,18 @@ policy_module(rpc, 1.12.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt. -##

    +##

    +## Allow gssd to read temp directory. For access to kerberos tgt. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(allow_gssd_read_tmp, true) ## -##

    -## Allow nfs servers to modify public files -## used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be -## labeled public_content_rw_t. -##

    +##

    +## Allow nfs servers to modify public files +## used for public file transfer services. Files/Directories must be +## labeled public_content_rw_t. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(allow_nfsd_anon_write, false) @@ -39,11 +39,17 @@ rpc_domain_template(rpcd) type rpcd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(rpcd_initrc_exec_t) +type rpcd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(rpcd_unit_file_t) + rpc_domain_template(nfsd) type nfsd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(nfsd_initrc_exec_t) +type nfsd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(nfsd_unit_file_t) + type nfsd_rw_t; files_type(nfsd_rw_t) @@ -58,13 +64,14 @@ files_mountpoint(var_lib_nfs_t) # RPC local policy # -allow rpcd_t self:capability { sys_admin chown dac_override setgid setuid }; +allow rpcd_t self:capability { setpcap sys_admin chown dac_override setgid setuid }; allow rpcd_t self:process { getcap setcap }; allow rpcd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -allow rpcd_t rpcd_var_run_t:dir setattr; +allow rpcd_t rpcd_var_run_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(rpcd_t, rpcd_var_run_t, rpcd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(rpcd_t, rpcd_var_run_t, rpcd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(rpcd_t, rpcd_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(rpcd_t, rpcd_var_run_t, { file dir }) # rpc.statd executes sm-notify can_exec(rpcd_t, rpcd_exec_t) @@ -81,12 +88,14 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(rpcd_t) files_manage_mounttab(rpcd_t) files_getattr_all_dirs(rpcd_t) +files_read_usr_files(rpcd_t) fs_list_rpc(rpcd_t) fs_read_rpc_files(rpcd_t) fs_read_rpc_symlinks(rpcd_t) fs_rw_rpc_sockets(rpcd_t) fs_get_all_fs_quotas(rpcd_t) +fs_set_xattr_fs_quotas(rpcd_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(rpcd_t) storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev(rpcd_t) @@ -97,21 +106,41 @@ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(rpcd_t) seutil_dontaudit_search_config(rpcd_t) +userdom_signal_unpriv_users(rpcd_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(rpcd_t) + optional_policy(` automount_signal(rpcd_t) automount_dontaudit_write_pipes(rpcd_t) ') optional_policy(` + domain_unconfined_signal(rpcd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + quota_manage_db(rpcd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nis_read_ypserv_config(rpcd_t) ') +optional_policy(` + quota_read_db(rpcd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rgmanager_manage_tmp_files(rpcd_t) +') + ######################################## # # NFSD local policy # allow nfsd_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search sys_admin sys_resource }; +dontaudit nfsd_t self:capability sys_rawio; allow nfsd_t exports_t:file read_file_perms; allow nfsd_t { nfsd_rw_t nfsd_ro_t }:dir list_dir_perms; @@ -120,9 +149,16 @@ allow nfsd_t { nfsd_rw_t nfsd_ro_t }:dir list_dir_perms; kernel_read_system_state(nfsd_t) kernel_read_network_state(nfsd_t) kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(nfsd_t) +kernel_setsched(nfsd_t) +kernel_request_load_module(nfsd_t) +kernel_mounton_proc(nfsd_t) + +corecmd_exec_shell(nfsd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_all_rpc_ports(nfsd_t) corenet_udp_bind_all_rpc_ports(nfsd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_nfs_port(nfsd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_nfs_port(nfsd_t) dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files(nfsd_t) dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(nfsd_t) @@ -135,12 +171,12 @@ files_getattr_tmp_dirs(nfsd_t) # cjp: this should really have its own type files_manage_mounttab(nfsd_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(nfsd_t) +files_read_usr_files(nfsd_t) fs_mount_nfsd_fs(nfsd_t) -fs_search_nfsd_fs(nfsd_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(nfsd_t) fs_getattr_all_dirs(nfsd_t) -fs_rw_nfsd_fs(nfsd_t) +fs_manage_nfsd_fs(nfsd_t) storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk(nfsd_t) storage_raw_read_removable_device(nfsd_t) @@ -148,6 +184,8 @@ storage_raw_read_removable_device(nfsd_t) # Read access to public_content_t and public_content_rw_t miscfiles_read_public_files(nfsd_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(nfsd_t, { file dir }) + # Write access to public_content_t and public_content_rw_t tunable_policy(`allow_nfsd_anon_write',` miscfiles_manage_public_files(nfsd_t) @@ -158,7 +196,6 @@ tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_rw',` dev_getattr_all_chr_files(nfsd_t) fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(nfsd_t) - auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(nfsd_t) ') tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',` @@ -170,8 +207,11 @@ tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',` fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(nfsd_t) - auth_read_all_dirs_except_shadow(nfsd_t) - auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(nfsd_t) + files_read_non_security_files(nfsd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_exec(nfsd_t) ') ######################################## @@ -181,7 +221,7 @@ tunable_policy(`nfs_export_all_ro',` allow gssd_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search setuid sys_nice }; allow gssd_t self:process { getsched setsched }; -allow gssd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow gssd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(gssd_t, gssd_tmp_t, gssd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(gssd_t, gssd_tmp_t, gssd_tmp_t) @@ -199,6 +239,7 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(gssd_t) fs_list_rpc(gssd_t) fs_rw_rpc_sockets(gssd_t) fs_read_rpc_files(gssd_t) +fs_read_nfsd_files(gssd_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(gssd_t) files_list_tmp(gssd_t) @@ -210,14 +251,14 @@ auth_manage_cache(gssd_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs(gssd_t) -mount_signal(gssd_t) - userdom_signal_all_users(gssd_t) tunable_policy(`allow_gssd_read_tmp',` userdom_list_user_tmp(gssd_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_files(gssd_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_symlinks(gssd_t) + userdom_write_user_tmp_files(gssd_t) + files_read_generic_tmp_files(gssd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -226,6 +267,11 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` kerberos_keytab_template(gssd, gssd_t) + kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache(gssd_t, "nfs_0") +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_signal(gssd_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.fc b/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.fc index f5c47d6..482b584 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.fc @@ -2,6 +2,9 @@ /sbin/rpcbind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/rpcbind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_exec_t,s0) + +/var/cache/rpcbind(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/rpcbind(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_var_lib_t,s0) /var/run/rpc.statd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:rpcbind_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.if b/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.if index a96249c..a345080 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run rpcbind. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`rpcbind_domtrans',` @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ interface(`rpcbind_domtrans',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to rpcbindd over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to rpcbindd over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -34,8 +34,7 @@ interface(`rpcbind_stream_connect',` ') files_search_pids($1) - allow $1 rpcbind_var_run_t:sock_file write; - allow $1 rpcbind_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + stream_connect_pattern($1, rpcbind_var_run_t, rpcbind_var_run_t, rpcbind_t) ') ######################################## @@ -117,6 +116,24 @@ interface(`rpcbind_manage_lib_files',` ######################################## ## +## Send a null signal to rpcbind. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rpcbind_signull',` + gen_require(` + type rpcbind_t; + ') + + allow $1 rpcbind_t:process signull; +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an rpcbind environment ## @@ -138,11 +155,20 @@ interface(`rpcbind_admin',` type rpcbind_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 rpcbind_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 rpcbind_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, rpcbind_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 rpcbind_t:process ptrace; + ') - init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, rbcbind_initrc_exec_t) + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, rpcbind_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 rpcbind_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + + files_list_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, rpcbind_var_lib_t) + + files_list_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, rpcbind_var_run_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.te b/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.te index d6d76e1..9cb5e25 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rpcbind.te @@ -43,6 +43,8 @@ kernel_read_system_state(rpcbind_t) kernel_read_network_state(rpcbind_t) kernel_request_load_module(rpcbind_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(rpcbind_t) + corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(rpcbind_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(rpcbind_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(rpcbind_t) @@ -71,3 +73,7 @@ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(rpcbind_t) ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` dontaudit rpcbind_t self:udp_socket listen; ') + +optional_policy(` + nis_use_ypbind(rpcbind_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rshd.te b/policy/modules/services/rshd.te index 0b405d1..d55394c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rshd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rshd.te @@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ corenet_sendrecv_rsh_server_packets(rshd_t) dev_read_urand(rshd_t) +domain_interactive_fd(rshd_t) + selinux_get_fs_mount(rshd_t) selinux_validate_context(rshd_t) selinux_compute_access_vector(rshd_t) @@ -66,20 +68,13 @@ seutil_read_config(rshd_t) seutil_read_default_contexts(rshd_t) userdom_search_user_home_content(rshd_t) +userdom_manage_tmp_role(system_r, rshd_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_read_nfs_files(rshd_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(rshd_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_read_cifs_files(rshd_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(rshd_t) -') +userdom_home_reader(rshd_t) optional_policy(` kerberos_keytab_template(rshd, rshd_t) - kerberos_manage_host_rcache(rshd_t) + #kerberos_manage_host_rcache(rshd_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rsync.if b/policy/modules/services/rsync.if index 3386f29..b28cae5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rsync.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/rsync.if @@ -109,9 +109,9 @@ interface(`rsync_exec',` ## Read rsync config files. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`rsync_read_config',` @@ -119,7 +119,7 @@ interface(`rsync_read_config',` type rsync_etc_t; ') - allow $1 rsync_etc_t:file read_file_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, rsync_etc_t, rsync_etc_t) files_search_etc($1) ') @@ -128,9 +128,9 @@ interface(`rsync_read_config',` ## Write to rsync config files. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`rsync_write_config',` @@ -138,6 +138,49 @@ interface(`rsync_write_config',` type rsync_etc_t; ') - allow $1 rsync_etc_t:file read_file_perms; + write_files_pattern($1, rsync_etc_t, rsync_etc_t) + files_search_etc($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage rsync config files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`rsync_manage_config',` + gen_require(` + type rsync_etc_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, rsync_etc_t, rsync_etc_t) files_search_etc($1) ') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in etc directories +## with rsync etc type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## Class of the object being created. +## +## +# +interface(`rsync_filetrans_config',` + gen_require(` + type rsync_etc_t; + ') + + files_etc_filetrans($1, rsync_etc_t, $2) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rsync.te b/policy/modules/services/rsync.te index 39015ae..8b08e21 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rsync.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rsync.te @@ -7,6 +7,27 @@ policy_module(rsync, 1.10.0) ## ##

    +## Allow rsync servers to share cifs files systems +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(rsync_use_cifs, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow rsync servers to share nfs files systems +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(rsync_use_nfs, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow rsync to run as a client +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(rsync_client, false) + +## +##

    ## Allow rsync to export any files/directories read only. ##

    ##     @@ -23,7 +44,6 @@ gen_tunable(allow_rsync_anon_write, false) type rsync_t; type rsync_exec_t; -init_daemon_domain(rsync_t, rsync_exec_t) application_executable_file(rsync_exec_t) role system_r types rsync_t; @@ -59,7 +79,7 @@ allow rsync_t self:udp_socket connected_socket_perms; allow rsync_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; #end for identd -allow rsync_t rsync_etc_t:file read_file_perms; +read_files_pattern(rsync_t, rsync_etc_t, rsync_etc_t) allow rsync_t rsync_data_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern(rsync_t, rsync_data_t, rsync_data_t) @@ -121,13 +141,39 @@ optional_policy(` inetd_service_domain(rsync_t, rsync_exec_t) ') +tunable_policy(`rsync_use_cifs',` + fs_list_cifs(rsync_t) + fs_read_cifs_files(rsync_t) + fs_read_cifs_symlinks(rsync_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`rsync_use_nfs',` + fs_list_nfs(rsync_t) + fs_read_nfs_files(rsync_t) + fs_read_nfs_symlinks(rsync_t) +') + tunable_policy(`rsync_export_all_ro',` + files_getattr_all_pipes(rsync_t) fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(rsync_t) fs_read_nfs_files(rsync_t) fs_read_cifs_files(rsync_t) - auth_read_all_dirs_except_shadow(rsync_t) - auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(rsync_t) - auth_read_all_symlinks_except_shadow(rsync_t) + files_read_non_security_files(rsync_t) auth_tunable_read_shadow(rsync_t) ') + +tunable_policy(`rsync_client',` + corenet_tcp_connect_rsync_port(rsync_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(rsync_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(rsync_t, rsync_data_t, rsync_data_t) + manage_files_pattern(rsync_t, rsync_data_t, rsync_data_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern(rsync_t, rsync_data_t, rsync_data_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`rsync_client',` + ssh_exec(rsync_t) + ') +') + auth_can_read_shadow_passwords(rsync_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rtkit.if b/policy/modules/services/rtkit.if index 46dad1f..6586da0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rtkit.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/rtkit.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run rtkit_daemon. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`rtkit_daemon_domtrans',` @@ -41,6 +41,28 @@ interface(`rtkit_daemon_dbus_chat',` ######################################## ## +## Do not audit send and receive messages from +## rtkit_daemon over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`rtkit_daemon_dontaudit_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type rtkit_daemon_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + dontaudit $1 rtkit_daemon_t:dbus send_msg; + dontaudit rtkit_daemon_t $1:dbus send_msg; + dontaudit rtkit_daemon_t $1:process { getsched setsched }; +') + +######################################## +## ## Allow rtkit to control scheduling for your process ## ## @@ -54,6 +76,7 @@ interface(`rtkit_scheduled',` type rtkit_daemon_t; ') + kernel_search_proc($1) ps_process_pattern(rtkit_daemon_t, $1) allow rtkit_daemon_t $1:process { getsched setsched }; rtkit_daemon_dbus_chat($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rtkit.te b/policy/modules/services/rtkit.te index 6f8e268..7d64285 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rtkit.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rtkit.te @@ -8,6 +8,7 @@ policy_module(rtkit, 1.1.0) type rtkit_daemon_t; type rtkit_daemon_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(rtkit_daemon_t, rtkit_daemon_exec_t) +init_system_domain(rtkit_daemon_t, rtkit_daemon_exec_t) ######################################## # diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rwho.if b/policy/modules/services/rwho.if index 71ea0ea..26af97f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rwho.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/rwho.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run rwho. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`rwho_domtrans',` @@ -138,8 +138,11 @@ interface(`rwho_admin',` type rwho_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 rwho_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 rwho_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, rwho_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 rwho_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, rwho_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/rwho.te b/policy/modules/services/rwho.te index a07b2f4..36b4903 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/rwho.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/rwho.te @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ type rwho_log_t; files_type(rwho_log_t) type rwho_spool_t; -files_type(rwho_spool_t) +files_spool_file(rwho_spool_t) ######################################## # @@ -24,6 +24,7 @@ files_type(rwho_spool_t) # allow rwho_t self:capability sys_chroot; +allow rwho_t self:process signal; allow rwho_t self:unix_dgram_socket create; allow rwho_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow rwho_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -55,6 +56,10 @@ files_read_etc_files(rwho_t) init_read_utmp(rwho_t) init_dontaudit_write_utmp(rwho_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(rwho_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(rwho_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(rwho_t) + +userdom_getattr_user_terminals(rwho_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/samba.fc b/policy/modules/services/samba.fc index 69a6074..5c02dec 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/samba.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/samba.fc @@ -14,6 +14,8 @@ # # /usr # +/usr/lib/systemd/system/smb.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_unit_file_t,s0) + /usr/bin/net -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_net_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/ntlm_auth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:winbind_helper_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/smbcontrol -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbcontrol_exec_t,s0) @@ -36,6 +38,9 @@ /var/log/samba(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_log_t,s0) +/var/run/nmbd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:nmbd_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/run/samba(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/samba/brlock\.tdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/samba/connections\.tdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/samba/gencache\.tdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:smbd_var_run_t,s0) @@ -51,3 +56,7 @@ /var/run/winbindd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:winbind_var_run_t,s0) /var/spool/samba(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_var_t,s0) + +ifndef(`enable_mls',` +/var/lib/samba/scripts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:samba_unconfined_script_exec_t,s0) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/samba.if b/policy/modules/services/samba.if index 82cb169..0ed7e14 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/samba.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/samba.if @@ -42,6 +42,25 @@ interface(`samba_signal_nmbd',` ######################################## ## +## Connect to nmbd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`samba_stream_connect_nmbd',` + gen_require(` + type nmbd_t, nmbd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute samba server in the samba domain. ## ## @@ -60,6 +79,29 @@ interface(`samba_initrc_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute samba server in the samba domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`samba_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type samba_unit_file_t; + type smbd_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 samba_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 samba_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, smbd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute samba net in the samba_net domain. ## ## @@ -79,6 +121,25 @@ interface(`samba_domtrans_net',` ######################################## ## +## Execute samba net in the samba_unconfined_net domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`samba_domtrans_unconfined_net',` + gen_require(` + type samba_unconfined_net_t, samba_net_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, samba_net_exec_t, samba_unconfined_net_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute samba net in the samba_net domain, and ## allow the specified role the samba_net domain. ## @@ -103,6 +164,51 @@ interface(`samba_run_net',` role $2 types samba_net_t; ') +####################################### +## +## The role for the samba module. +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the samba_net domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`samba_role_notrans',` + gen_require(` + type smbd_t; + ') + + role $1 types smbd_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute samba net in the samba_unconfined_net domain, and +## allow the specified role the samba_unconfined_net domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the samba_unconfined_net domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`samba_run_unconfined_net',` + gen_require(` + type samba_unconfined_net_t; + ') + + samba_domtrans_unconfined_net($1) + role $2 types samba_unconfined_net_t; +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute smbmount in the smbmount domain. @@ -327,7 +433,6 @@ interface(`samba_search_var',` type samba_var_t; ') - files_search_var($1) files_search_var_lib($1) allow $1 samba_var_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') @@ -348,7 +453,6 @@ interface(`samba_read_var_files',` type samba_var_t; ') - files_search_var($1) files_search_var_lib($1) read_files_pattern($1, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) ') @@ -388,7 +492,6 @@ interface(`samba_rw_var_files',` type samba_var_t; ') - files_search_var($1) files_search_var_lib($1) rw_files_pattern($1, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) ') @@ -409,9 +512,9 @@ interface(`samba_manage_var_files',` type samba_var_t; ') - files_search_var($1) files_search_var_lib($1) manage_files_pattern($1, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) ') ######################################## @@ -419,15 +522,14 @@ interface(`samba_manage_var_files',` ## Execute a domain transition to run smbcontrol. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`samba_domtrans_smbcontrol',` gen_require(` - type smbcontrol_t; - type smbcontrol_exec_t; + type smbcontrol_t, smbcontrol_exec_t; ') domtrans_pattern($1, smbcontrol_exec_t, smbcontrol_t) @@ -564,6 +666,7 @@ interface(`samba_domtrans_winbind_helper',` ') domtrans_pattern($1, winbind_helper_exec_t, winbind_helper_t) + allow $1 winbind_helper_t:process signal; ') ######################################## @@ -644,6 +747,37 @@ interface(`samba_stream_connect_winbind',` ######################################## ## +## Create a set of derived types for apache +## web content. +## +## +## +## The prefix to be used for deriving type names. +## +## +# +template(`samba_helper_template',` + gen_require(` + type smbd_t; + role system_r; + ') + + #This type is for samba helper scripts + type samba_$1_script_t; + domain_type(samba_$1_script_t) + role system_r types samba_$1_script_t; + + # This type is used for executable scripts files + type samba_$1_script_exec_t; + corecmd_shell_entry_type(samba_$1_script_t) + domain_entry_file(samba_$1_script_t, samba_$1_script_exec_t) + + domtrans_pattern(smbd_t, samba_$1_script_exec_t, samba_$1_script_t) + allow smbd_t samba_$1_script_exec_t:file ioctl; +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an samba environment ## @@ -661,33 +795,33 @@ interface(`samba_stream_connect_winbind',` # interface(`samba_admin',` gen_require(` - type nmbd_t, nmbd_var_run_t; - type smbd_t, smbd_tmp_t; - type smbd_var_run_t; - type smbd_spool_t; - - type samba_log_t, samba_var_t; - type samba_etc_t, samba_share_t; - type samba_secrets_t; - - type swat_var_run_t, swat_tmp_t; - - type winbind_var_run_t, winbind_tmp_t; - type winbind_log_t; - - type samba_initrc_exec_t; + type nmbd_t, nmbd_var_run_t, smbd_var_run_t; + type smbd_t, smbd_tmp_t, samba_secrets_t; + type samba_initrc_exec_t, samba_log_t, samba_var_t; + type samba_etc_t, samba_share_t, winbind_log_t; + type swat_var_run_t, swat_tmp_t, samba_unconfined_script_exec_t; + type winbind_var_run_t, winbind_tmp_t, samba_unconfined_script_t; + type samba_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 smbd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 smbd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, smbd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 smbd_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 nmbd_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 samba_unconfined_script_t:process ptrace; + ') - allow $1 nmbd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 nmbd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, nmbd_t) - samba_run_smbcontrol($1, $2, $3) - samba_run_winbind_helper($1, $2, $3) - samba_run_smbmount($1, $2, $3) - samba_run_net($1, $2, $3) + allow $1 samba_unconfined_script_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, samba_unconfined_script_t) + + samba_run_smbcontrol($1, $2) + samba_run_winbind_helper($1, $2) + samba_run_smbmount($1, $2) + samba_run_net($1, $2) init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, samba_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -709,9 +843,6 @@ interface(`samba_admin',` admin_pattern($1, samba_var_t) files_list_var($1) - admin_pattern($1, smbd_spool_t) - files_list_spool($1) - admin_pattern($1, smbd_var_run_t) files_list_pids($1) @@ -727,4 +858,9 @@ interface(`samba_admin',` admin_pattern($1, winbind_tmp_t) admin_pattern($1, winbind_var_run_t) + admin_pattern($1, samba_unconfined_script_exec_t) + + samba_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, samba_unit_file_t) + allow $1 samba_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/samba.te b/policy/modules/services/samba.te index e30bb63..ef60f40 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/samba.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/samba.te @@ -32,6 +32,14 @@ gen_tunable(samba_domain_controller, false) ## ##

    +## Allow samba to act as a portmapper +## +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(samba_portmapper, false) + +## +##

    ## Allow samba to share users home directories. ##

    ##     @@ -85,6 +93,9 @@ files_config_file(samba_etc_t) type samba_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(samba_initrc_exec_t) +type samba_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(samba_unit_file_t) + type samba_log_t; logging_log_file(samba_log_t) @@ -152,9 +163,6 @@ domain_entry_file(winbind_helper_t, winbind_helper_exec_t) type winbind_log_t; logging_log_file(winbind_log_t) -type winbind_tmp_t; -files_tmp_file(winbind_tmp_t) - type winbind_var_run_t; files_pid_file(winbind_var_run_t) @@ -181,7 +189,6 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(samba_net_t, samba_net_tmp_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(samba_net_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) manage_files_pattern(samba_net_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(samba_net_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) - kernel_read_proc_symlinks(samba_net_t) kernel_read_system_state(samba_net_t) @@ -215,22 +222,30 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(samba_net_t) samba_read_var_files(samba_net_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(samba_net_t) +sysnet_use_ldap(samba_net_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(samba_net_t) userdom_list_user_home_dirs(samba_net_t) optional_policy(` + ldap_stream_connect(samba_net_t) + dirsrv_stream_connect(samba_net_t) +') + +optional_policy(` pcscd_read_pub_files(samba_net_t) ') optional_policy(` kerberos_use(samba_net_t) + kerberos_etc_filetrans_keytab(samba_net_t) ') ######################################## # # smbd Local policy # -allow smbd_t self:capability { chown fowner setgid setuid sys_nice sys_resource lease dac_override dac_read_search }; +allow smbd_t self:capability { chown fowner kill fsetid setgid setuid sys_chroot sys_nice sys_admin sys_resource lease dac_override dac_read_search }; dontaudit smbd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow smbd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; allow smbd_t self:process setrlimit; @@ -248,7 +263,9 @@ allow smbd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; allow smbd_t nmbd_t:process { signal signull }; +allow winbind_t smbd_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; allow smbd_t nmbd_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms; +stream_connect_pattern(smbd_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_t) allow smbd_t samba_etc_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr }; @@ -263,12 +280,13 @@ filetrans_pattern(smbd_t, samba_etc_t, samba_secrets_t, file) manage_dirs_pattern(smbd_t, samba_share_t, samba_share_t) manage_files_pattern(smbd_t, samba_share_t, samba_share_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(smbd_t, samba_share_t, samba_share_t) -allow smbd_t samba_share_t:filesystem getattr; +allow smbd_t samba_share_t:filesystem { getattr quotaget }; manage_dirs_pattern(smbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) manage_files_pattern(smbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(smbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(smbd_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) +files_var_filetrans(smbd_t, samba_var_t, dir) allow smbd_t smbcontrol_t:process { signal signull }; @@ -279,7 +297,7 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(smbd_t, smbd_tmp_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(smbd_t, smbd_var_run_t, smbd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(smbd_t, smbd_var_run_t, smbd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(smbd_t, smbd_var_run_t, smbd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(smbd_t, smbd_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(smbd_t, smbd_var_run_t, { dir file }) allow smbd_t swat_t:process signal; @@ -316,6 +334,7 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_smbd_port(smbd_t) dev_read_sysfs(smbd_t) dev_read_urand(smbd_t) +dev_dontaudit_write_urand(smbd_t) dev_getattr_mtrr_dev(smbd_t) dev_dontaudit_getattr_usbfs_dirs(smbd_t) # For redhat bug 566984 @@ -323,15 +342,18 @@ dev_getattr_all_blk_files(smbd_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(smbd_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(smbd_t) +fs_getattr_all_dirs(smbd_t) fs_get_xattr_fs_quotas(smbd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(smbd_t) fs_getattr_rpc_dirs(smbd_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(smbd_t) +fs_get_all_fs_quotas(smbd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(smbd_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(smbd_t) auth_domtrans_upd_passwd(smbd_t) auth_manage_cache(smbd_t) +auth_write_login_records(smbd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(smbd_t) domain_dontaudit_list_all_domains_state(smbd_t) @@ -343,6 +365,7 @@ files_read_usr_files(smbd_t) files_search_spool(smbd_t) # smbd seems to getattr all mountpoints files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(smbd_t) +files_dontaudit_list_all_mountpoints(smbd_t) # Allow samba to list mnt_t for potential mounted dirs files_list_mnt(smbd_t) @@ -354,6 +377,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(smbd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(smbd_t) miscfiles_read_public_files(smbd_t) +sysnet_use_ldap(smbd_t) + userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(smbd_t) userdom_search_user_home_content(smbd_t) userdom_signal_all_users(smbd_t) @@ -372,6 +397,11 @@ tunable_policy(`allow_smbd_anon_write',` miscfiles_manage_public_files(smbd_t) ') +tunable_policy(`samba_portmapper',` + corenet_tcp_bind_epmap_port(smbd_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(smbd_t) +') + tunable_policy(`samba_domain_controller',` gen_require(` class passwd passwd; @@ -385,12 +415,7 @@ tunable_policy(`samba_domain_controller',` ') tunable_policy(`samba_enable_home_dirs',` - userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(smbd_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(smbd_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks(smbd_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(smbd_t) - userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(smbd_t) - userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(smbd_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + userdom_manage_user_home_content(smbd_t) ') # Support Samba sharing of NFS mount points @@ -410,6 +435,10 @@ tunable_policy(`samba_share_fusefs',` fs_search_fusefs(smbd_t) ') +optional_policy(` + ctdbd_stream_connect(smbd_t) + ctdbd_manage_lib_files(smbd_t) +') optional_policy(` cups_read_rw_config(smbd_t) @@ -422,6 +451,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + ldap_stream_connect(smbd_t) + dirsrv_stream_connect(smbd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` lpd_exec_lpr(smbd_t) ') @@ -445,26 +479,25 @@ optional_policy(` tunable_policy(`samba_create_home_dirs',` allow smbd_t self:capability chown; userdom_create_user_home_dirs(smbd_t) - userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(smbd_t) ') +userdom_home_filetrans_user_home_dir(smbd_t) tunable_policy(`samba_export_all_ro',` fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(smbd_t) - auth_read_all_dirs_except_shadow(smbd_t) - auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(smbd_t) + files_read_non_security_files(smbd_t) fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(nmbd_t) - auth_read_all_dirs_except_shadow(nmbd_t) - auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(nmbd_t) + files_read_non_security_files(nmbd_t) ') tunable_policy(`samba_export_all_rw',` fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(smbd_t) - auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(smbd_t) + files_manage_non_security_files(smbd_t) fs_read_noxattr_fs_files(nmbd_t) - auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow(nmbd_t) - userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(nmbd_t, { file dir }) + files_manage_non_security_files(nmbd_t) ') +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(nmbd_t, { file dir }) + ######################################## # # nmbd Local policy @@ -484,8 +517,10 @@ allow nmbd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow nmbd_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow nmbd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; +manage_dirs_pattern(nmbd_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(nmbd_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(nmbd_t, nmbd_var_run_t, file) +manage_sock_files_pattern(nmbd_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(nmbd_t, nmbd_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) read_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_etc_t, samba_etc_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(nmbd_t, samba_etc_t, samba_etc_t) @@ -555,18 +590,21 @@ optional_policy(` # smbcontrol local policy # + +allow smbcontrol_t self:process signal; # internal communication is often done using fifo and unix sockets. allow smbcontrol_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow smbcontrol_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow smbcontrol_t self:process { signal signull }; allow smbcontrol_t nmbd_t:process { signal signull }; +read_files_pattern(smbcontrol_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_var_run_t) -allow smbcontrol_t nmbd_var_run_t:file { read lock }; - -allow smbcontrol_t smbd_t:process signal; - +allow smbcontrol_t smbd_t:process { signal signull }; +read_files_pattern(smbcontrol_t, smbd_var_run_t, smbd_var_run_t) allow smbcontrol_t winbind_t:process { signal signull }; +files_search_var_lib(smbcontrol_t) samba_read_config(smbcontrol_t) samba_rw_var_files(smbcontrol_t) samba_search_var(smbcontrol_t) @@ -574,11 +612,21 @@ samba_read_winbind_pid(smbcontrol_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(smbcontrol_t) +dev_read_urand(smbcontrol_t) + +term_use_console(smbcontrol_t) + files_read_etc_files(smbcontrol_t) miscfiles_read_localization(smbcontrol_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(smbcontrol_t) +sysnet_use_ldap(smbcontrol_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(smbcontrol_t) + +optional_policy(` + ctdbd_stream_connect(smbcontrol_t) +') ######################################## # @@ -644,19 +692,21 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(smbmount_t) miscfiles_read_localization(smbmount_t) -mount_use_fds(smbmount_t) - locallogin_use_fds(smbmount_t) logging_search_logs(smbmount_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(smbmount_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(smbmount_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(smbmount_t) optional_policy(` cups_read_rw_config(smbmount_t) ') +optional_policy(` + mount_use_fds(smbmount_t) +') + ######################################## # # SWAT Local policy @@ -677,7 +727,8 @@ samba_domtrans_nmbd(swat_t) allow swat_t nmbd_t:process { signal signull }; allow nmbd_t swat_t:process signal; -allow swat_t smbd_var_run_t:file { lock unlink }; +read_files_pattern(swat_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_var_run_t) +stream_connect_pattern(swat_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_t) allow swat_t smbd_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind; @@ -692,12 +743,14 @@ manage_files_pattern(swat_t, samba_log_t, samba_log_t) manage_files_pattern(swat_t, samba_etc_t, samba_secrets_t) manage_files_pattern(swat_t, samba_var_t, samba_var_t) +files_list_var_lib(swat_t) allow swat_t smbd_exec_t:file mmap_file_perms ; allow swat_t smbd_t:process signull; allow swat_t smbd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +allow swat_t smbd_var_run_t:file { lock unlink }; manage_dirs_pattern(swat_t, swat_tmp_t, swat_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(swat_t, swat_tmp_t, swat_tmp_t) @@ -710,6 +763,7 @@ allow swat_t winbind_exec_t:file mmap_file_perms; domtrans_pattern(swat_t, winbind_exec_t, winbind_t) allow swat_t winbind_t:process { signal signull }; +read_files_pattern(swat_t, winbind_var_run_t, winbind_var_run_t) allow swat_t winbind_var_run_t:dir { write add_name remove_name }; allow swat_t winbind_var_run_t:sock_file { create unlink }; @@ -752,8 +806,12 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(swat_t) logging_send_audit_msgs(swat_t) logging_search_logs(swat_t) +sysnet_use_ldap(swat_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(swat_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(swat_t) + optional_policy(` cups_read_rw_config(swat_t) cups_stream_connect(swat_t) @@ -783,7 +841,8 @@ allow winbind_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow winbind_t nmbd_t:process { signal signull }; -allow winbind_t nmbd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +allow winbind_t smbd_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; +read_files_pattern(winbind_t, nmbd_var_run_t, nmbd_var_run_t) allow winbind_t samba_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern(winbind_t, samba_etc_t, samba_etc_t) @@ -806,15 +865,16 @@ rw_files_pattern(winbind_t, smbd_tmp_t, smbd_tmp_t) allow winbind_t winbind_log_t:file manage_file_perms; logging_log_filetrans(winbind_t, winbind_log_t, file) -manage_dirs_pattern(winbind_t, winbind_tmp_t, winbind_tmp_t) -manage_files_pattern(winbind_t, winbind_tmp_t, winbind_tmp_t) -manage_sock_files_pattern(winbind_t, winbind_tmp_t, winbind_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(winbind_t, winbind_tmp_t, { file dir }) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(winbind_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(winbind_t) +userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp(winbind_t, { file dir }) +manage_dirs_pattern(winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t, winbind_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t, winbind_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t, winbind_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(winbind_t, winbind_var_run_t, { file dir }) +kernel_read_network_state(winbind_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(winbind_t) kernel_read_system_state(winbind_t) @@ -833,6 +893,7 @@ corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(winbind_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(winbind_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(winbind_t) corenet_tcp_connect_smbd_port(winbind_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_smbd_port(winbind_t) corenet_tcp_connect_epmap_port(winbind_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_unreserved_ports(winbind_t) @@ -850,10 +911,14 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(winbind_t) files_read_etc_files(winbind_t) files_read_usr_symlinks(winbind_t) +files_list_var_lib(winbind_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(winbind_t) miscfiles_read_localization(winbind_t) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(winbind_t) + +sysnet_use_ldap(winbind_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(winbind_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(winbind_t) @@ -863,6 +928,12 @@ userdom_manage_user_home_content_pipes(winbind_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_sockets(winbind_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(winbind_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file }) + +optional_policy(` + ctdbd_stream_connect(winbind_t) + ctdbd_manage_lib_files(winbind_t) +') + optional_policy(` kerberos_use(winbind_t) ') @@ -904,7 +975,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(winbind_helper_t) miscfiles_read_localization(winbind_helper_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(winbind_helper_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(winbind_helper_t) optional_policy(` apache_append_log(winbind_helper_t) @@ -922,19 +993,34 @@ optional_policy(` # optional_policy(` - type samba_unconfined_script_t; - type samba_unconfined_script_exec_t; - domain_type(samba_unconfined_script_t) - domain_entry_file(samba_unconfined_script_t, samba_unconfined_script_exec_t) - corecmd_shell_entry_type(samba_unconfined_script_t) - role system_r types samba_unconfined_script_t; + type samba_unconfined_net_t; + domain_type(samba_unconfined_net_t) + domain_entry_file(samba_unconfined_net_t, samba_net_exec_t) + role system_r types samba_unconfined_net_t; + + unconfined_domain(samba_unconfined_net_t) - allow smbd_t samba_unconfined_script_exec_t:dir search_dir_perms; - allow smbd_t samba_unconfined_script_exec_t:file ioctl; + manage_files_pattern(samba_unconfined_net_t, samba_etc_t, samba_secrets_t) + filetrans_pattern(samba_unconfined_net_t, samba_etc_t, samba_secrets_t, file) + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(samba_unconfined_net_t) +') +type samba_unconfined_script_t; +type samba_unconfined_script_exec_t; +domain_type(samba_unconfined_script_t) +domain_entry_file(samba_unconfined_script_t, samba_unconfined_script_exec_t) +corecmd_shell_entry_type(samba_unconfined_script_t) +role system_r types samba_unconfined_script_t; + +allow smbd_t samba_unconfined_script_exec_t:dir search_dir_perms; +allow smbd_t samba_unconfined_script_exec_t:file ioctl; + +optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(samba_unconfined_script_t) +') - tunable_policy(`samba_run_unconfined',` +tunable_policy(`samba_run_unconfined',` domtrans_pattern(smbd_t, samba_unconfined_script_exec_t, samba_unconfined_script_t) - ') +',` + can_exec(smbd_t, samba_unconfined_script_exec_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/samhain.if b/policy/modules/services/samhain.if index c040ebf..2b601a5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/samhain.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/samhain.if @@ -271,10 +271,14 @@ interface(`samhain_admin',` type samhain_initrc_exec_t, samhain_log_t, samhain_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 samhain_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 samhain_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, samhain_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 samhain_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 samhaind_t:process ptrace; + ') - allow $1 samhaind_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 samhaind_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, samhaind_t) files_list_var_lib($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/samhain.te b/policy/modules/services/samhain.te index 150c85d..71e9315 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/samhain.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/samhain.te @@ -55,7 +55,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(samhain_t) seutil_sigchld_newrole(samhain_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(samhain_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(samhain_t) ######################################## # diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sanlock.fc b/policy/modules/services/sanlock.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..630960e --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/sanlock.fc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sanlock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sanlock_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/sanlock(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sanlock_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/log/sanlock\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:sanlock_log_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/sanlock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sanlock_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sanlock.if b/policy/modules/services/sanlock.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..3eb745d --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/sanlock.if @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ + +## policy for sanlock + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run sanlock. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sanlock_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type sanlock_t, sanlock_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, sanlock_exec_t, sanlock_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute sanlock server in the sanlock domain. +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +interface(`sanlock_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type sanlock_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, sanlock_initrc_exec_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Create, read, write, and delete sanlock PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sanlock_manage_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type sanlock_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to sanlock over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sanlock_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an sanlock environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`sanlock_admin',` + gen_require(` + type sanlock_t; + type sanlock_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 sanlock_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, sanlock_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 sanlock_t:process ptrace; + ') + + sanlock_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 sanlock_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sanlock.te b/policy/modules/services/sanlock.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d5d96e7 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/sanlock.te @@ -0,0 +1,102 @@ +policy_module(sanlock,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +## +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(sanlock_use_nfs, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(sanlock_use_samba, false) + +type sanlock_t; +type sanlock_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(sanlock_t, sanlock_exec_t) + +type sanlock_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(sanlock_var_run_t) + +type sanlock_log_t; +logging_log_file(sanlock_log_t) + +type sanlock_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(sanlock_initrc_exec_t) + +ifdef(`enable_mcs',` + init_ranged_daemon_domain(sanlock_t, sanlock_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) +') + +ifdef(`enable_mls',` + init_ranged_daemon_domain(sanlock_t, sanlock_exec_t, s0 - mls_systemhigh) +') + +######################################## +# +# sanlock local policy +# +allow sanlock_t self:capability { sys_nice ipc_lock }; +allow sanlock_t self:process { setsched signull }; + +allow sanlock_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow sanlock_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(sanlock_t, sanlock_log_t, sanlock_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(sanlock_t, sanlock_log_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t, sanlock_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(sanlock_t, sanlock_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(sanlock_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(sanlock_t) + +files_read_etc_files(sanlock_t) + +storage_raw_rw_fixed_disk(sanlock_t) + +dev_read_urand(sanlock_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(sanlock_t) + +init_read_utmp(sanlock_t) +init_dontaudit_write_utmp(sanlock_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(sanlock_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(sanlock_t) + +tunable_policy(`sanlock_use_nfs',` + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(sanlock_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(sanlock_t) + fs_manage_nfs_named_sockets(sanlock_t) + fs_read_nfs_symlinks(sanlock_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`sanlock_use_samba',` + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(sanlock_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(sanlock_t) + fs_manage_cifs_named_sockets(sanlock_t) + fs_read_cifs_symlinks(sanlock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + wdmd_stream_connect(sanlock_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_kill_svirt(sanlock_t) + virt_manage_lib_files(sanlock_t) + virt_signal_svirt(sanlock_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sasl.if b/policy/modules/services/sasl.if index f1aea88..3e6a93f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sasl.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/sasl.if @@ -38,21 +38,21 @@ interface(`sasl_connect',` # interface(`sasl_admin',` gen_require(` - type saslauthd_t, saslauthd_tmp_t, saslauthd_var_run_t; + type saslauthd_t, saslauthd_var_run_t; type saslauthd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 saslauthd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 saslauthd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, saslauthd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 saslauthd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, saslauthd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 saslauthd_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - files_list_tmp($1) - admin_pattern($1, saslauthd_tmp_t) - files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, saslauthd_var_run_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sasl.te b/policy/modules/services/sasl.te index cfc60dd..8908145 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sasl.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/sasl.te @@ -19,9 +19,6 @@ init_daemon_domain(saslauthd_t, saslauthd_exec_t) type saslauthd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(saslauthd_initrc_exec_t) -type saslauthd_tmp_t; -files_tmp_file(saslauthd_tmp_t) - type saslauthd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(saslauthd_var_run_t) @@ -38,16 +35,19 @@ allow saslauthd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow saslauthd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow saslauthd_t self:tcp_socket create_socket_perms; -allow saslauthd_t saslauthd_tmp_t:dir setattr; -manage_files_pattern(saslauthd_t, saslauthd_tmp_t, saslauthd_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(saslauthd_t, saslauthd_tmp_t, file) +kerberos_tmp_filetrans_host_rcache(saslauthd_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(saslauthd_t, saslauthd_var_run_t, saslauthd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(saslauthd_t, saslauthd_var_run_t, saslauthd_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(saslauthd_t, saslauthd_var_run_t, saslauthd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(saslauthd_t, saslauthd_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(saslauthd_t, saslauthd_var_run_t, { file dir }) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(saslauthd_t) kernel_read_system_state(saslauthd_t) +kernel_rw_afs_state(saslauthd_t) + +#577519 +corecmd_exec_bin(saslauthd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(saslauthd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(saslauthd_t) @@ -55,6 +55,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(saslauthd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(saslauthd_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(saslauthd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_pop_port(saslauthd_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_zarafa_port(saslauthd_t) corenet_sendrecv_pop_client_packets(saslauthd_t) dev_read_urand(saslauthd_t) @@ -94,6 +95,7 @@ tunable_policy(`allow_saslauthd_read_shadow',` optional_policy(` kerberos_keytab_template(saslauthd, saslauthd_t) + #kerberos_manage_host_rcache(saslauthd_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sblim.fc b/policy/modules/services/sblim.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d5c3c3f --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/sblim.fc @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + +/usr/sbin/gatherd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sblim_gatherd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/reposd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sblim_reposd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/gather(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sblim_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sblim.if b/policy/modules/services/sblim.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..182057f --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/sblim.if @@ -0,0 +1,76 @@ + +## policy for SBLIM Gatherer + +######################################## +## +## Transition to gatherd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`sblim_domtrans_gatherd',` + gen_require(` + type sblim_gatherd_t, sblim_gatherd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, sblim_gatherd_exec_t, sblim_gatherd_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read gatherd PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sblim_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type sblim_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 sblim_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an gatherd environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sblim_admin',` + gen_require(` + type sblim_gatherd_t; + type sblim_reposd_t; + type sblim_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 sblim_gatherd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, sblim_gatherd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 sblim_gatherd_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 sblim_reposd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 sblim_reposd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, sblim_reposd_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, sblim_var_run_t) + +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sblim.te b/policy/modules/services/sblim.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..7fad050 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/sblim.te @@ -0,0 +1,105 @@ +policy_module(sblim, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +attribute sblim_domain; + +type sblim_gatherd_t, sblim_domain; +type sblim_gatherd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(sblim_gatherd_t, sblim_gatherd_exec_t) + +type sblim_reposd_t, sblim_domain; +type sblim_reposd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(sblim_reposd_t, sblim_reposd_exec_t) + +type sblim_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(sblim_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# sblim_gatherd local policy +# +allow sblim_gatherd_t self:capability dac_override; +allow sblim_gatherd_t self:process signal; +allow sblim_gatherd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow sblim_gatherd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_fs_sysctls(sblim_gatherd_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(sblim_gatherd_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(sblim_gatherd_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(sblim_gatherd_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_repository_port(sblim_gatherd_t) + +dev_read_rand(sblim_gatherd_t) +dev_read_urand(sblim_gatherd_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(sblim_gatherd_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(sblim_gatherd_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(sblim_gatherd_t) + +term_getattr_pty_fs(sblim_gatherd_t) + +init_read_utmp(sblim_gatherd_t) + +userdom_signull_unpriv_users(sblim_gatherd_t) + +optional_policy(` + locallogin_signull(sblim_gatherd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpc_search_nfs_state_data(sblim_gatherd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_signull(sblim_gatherd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_stream_connect(sblim_gatherd_t) + virt_getattr_exec(sblim_gatherd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xen_stream_connect(sblim_gatherd_t) + xen_stream_connect_xenstore(sblim_gatherd_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# sblim_reposd local policy +# + +domtrans_pattern(sblim_gatherd_t, sblim_reposd_exec_t, sblim_reposd_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(sblim_reposd_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_repository_port(sblim_reposd_t) + +###################################### +# +# sblim_domain local policy +# + +allow sblim_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(sblim_domain, sblim_var_run_t, sblim_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(sblim_domain, sblim_var_run_t, sblim_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(sblim_domain, sblim_var_run_t, sblim_var_run_t) + +kernel_read_network_state(sblim_domain) +kernel_read_system_state(sblim_domain) + +dev_read_sysfs(sblim_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(sblim_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(sblim_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(sblim_domain) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sendmail.fc b/policy/modules/services/sendmail.fc index a86ec50..ef4199b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sendmail.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/sendmail.fc @@ -1,4 +1,6 @@ +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sendmail -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_initrc_exec_t,s0) + /var/log/sendmail\.st -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_log_t,s0) /var/log/mail(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sendmail_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sendmail.if b/policy/modules/services/sendmail.if index 7e94c7c..ca74cd9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sendmail.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/sendmail.if @@ -51,10 +51,24 @@ interface(`sendmail_domtrans',` ') mta_sendmail_domtrans($1, sendmail_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute sendmail in the sendmail domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sendmail_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type sendmail_initrc_exec_t; + ') - allow sendmail_t $1:fd use; - allow sendmail_t $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; - allow sendmail_t $1:process sigchld; + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, sendmail_initrc_exec_t) ') ######################################## @@ -152,7 +166,7 @@ interface(`sendmail_rw_unix_stream_sockets',` type sendmail_t; ') - allow $1 sendmail_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write ioctl }; + allow $1 sendmail_t:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -171,7 +185,7 @@ interface(`sendmail_dontaudit_rw_unix_stream_sockets',` type sendmail_t; ') - dontaudit $1 sendmail_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write ioctl }; + dontaudit $1 sendmail_t:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -295,3 +309,73 @@ interface(`sendmail_run_unconfined',` sendmail_domtrans_unconfined($1) role $2 types unconfined_sendmail_t; ') + +######################################## +## +## Set the attributes of sendmail pid files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sendmail_setattr_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type sendmail_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 sendmail_var_run_t:file setattr_file_perms; + files_search_pids($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an sendmail environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`sendmail_admin',` + gen_require(` + type sendmail_t, sendmail_initrc_exec_t, sendmail_log_t; + type sendmail_tmp_t, sendmail_var_run_t, unconfined_sendmail_t; + type mail_spool_t; + ') + + allow $1 sendmail_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, sendmail_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 sendmail_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 unconfined_sendmail_t:process ptrace; + ') + + allow $1 unconfined_sendmail_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, unconfined_sendmail_t) + + sendmail_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 sendmail_initrc_exec_t system_r; + + logging_list_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, sendmail_log_t) + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, sendmail_tmp_t) + + files_list_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, sendmail_var_run_t) + + files_list_spool($1) + admin_pattern($1, mail_spool_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sendmail.te b/policy/modules/services/sendmail.te index 22dac1f..e2f2d7d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sendmail.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/sendmail.te @@ -19,9 +19,8 @@ mta_sendmail_mailserver(sendmail_t) mta_mailserver_delivery(sendmail_t) mta_mailserver_sender(sendmail_t) -type unconfined_sendmail_t; -application_domain(unconfined_sendmail_t, sendmail_exec_t) -role system_r types unconfined_sendmail_t; +type sendmail_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(sendmail_initrc_exec_t) ######################################## # @@ -84,12 +83,14 @@ files_read_usr_files(sendmail_t) files_search_spool(sendmail_t) # for piping mail to a command files_read_etc_runtime_files(sendmail_t) +files_read_all_tmp_files(sendmail_t) init_use_fds(sendmail_t) init_use_script_ptys(sendmail_t) # sendmail wants to read /var/run/utmp if the controlling tty is /dev/console init_read_utmp(sendmail_t) init_dontaudit_write_utmp(sendmail_t) +init_rw_script_tmp_files(sendmail_t) auth_use_nsswitch(sendmail_t) @@ -103,7 +104,7 @@ miscfiles_read_generic_certs(sendmail_t) miscfiles_read_localization(sendmail_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(sendmail_t) -userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(sendmail_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(sendmail_t) mta_read_config(sendmail_t) mta_etc_filetrans_aliases(sendmail_t) @@ -115,6 +116,10 @@ mta_manage_spool(sendmail_t) mta_sendmail_exec(sendmail_t) optional_policy(` + cfengine_dontaudit_write_log(sendmail_t) +') + +optional_policy(` cron_read_pipes(sendmail_t) ') @@ -128,7 +133,14 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + dovecot_write_inherited_tmp_files(sendmail_t) +') + +optional_policy(` exim_domtrans(sendmail_t) + exim_manage_spool_files(sendmail_t) + exim_manage_spool_dirs(sendmail_t) + exim_read_log(sendmail_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -149,7 +161,9 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + postfix_domtrans_postdrop(sendmail_t) postfix_domtrans_master(sendmail_t) + postfix_domtrans_postqueue(sendmail_t) postfix_read_config(sendmail_t) postfix_search_spool(sendmail_t) ') @@ -168,20 +182,13 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - udev_read_db(sendmail_t) + spamd_stream_connect(sendmail_t) ') optional_policy(` - uucp_domtrans_uux(sendmail_t) + udev_read_db(sendmail_t) ') -######################################## -# -# Unconfined sendmail local policy -# Allow unconfined domain to run newalias and have transitions work -# - optional_policy(` - mta_etc_filetrans_aliases(unconfined_sendmail_t) - unconfined_domain(unconfined_sendmail_t) + uucp_domtrans_uux(sendmail_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/setroubleshoot.if b/policy/modules/services/setroubleshoot.if index bcdd16c..039b0c8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/setroubleshoot.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/setroubleshoot.if @@ -2,7 +2,7 @@ ######################################## ## -## Connect to setroubleshootd over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to setroubleshootd over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ interface(`setroubleshoot_stream_connect',` ######################################## ## ## Dontaudit attempts to connect to setroubleshootd -## over an unix stream socket. +## over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -105,6 +105,25 @@ interface(`setroubleshoot_dbus_chat_fixit',` ######################################## ## +## Dontaudit read/write to a setroubleshoot leaked sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`setroubleshoot_fixit_dontaudit_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type setroubleshoot_fixit_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 setroubleshoot_fixit_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 setroubleshoot_fixit_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an setroubleshoot environment ## @@ -117,15 +136,18 @@ interface(`setroubleshoot_dbus_chat_fixit',` # interface(`setroubleshoot_admin',` gen_require(` - type setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_log_t; - type setroubleshoot_var_lib_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t; + type setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_var_log_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t; + type setroubleshoot_var_lib_t; ') - allow $1 setroubleshootd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 setroubleshootd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, setroubleshootd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 setroubleshootd_t:process ptrace; + ') logging_list_logs($1) - admin_pattern($1, setroubleshoot_log_t) + admin_pattern($1, setroubleshoot_var_log_t) files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, setroubleshoot_var_lib_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/setroubleshoot.te b/policy/modules/services/setroubleshoot.te index 086cd5f..e010142 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/setroubleshoot.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/setroubleshoot.te @@ -13,6 +13,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshootd_exec_t) type setroubleshoot_fixit_t; type setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t; dbus_system_domain(setroubleshoot_fixit_t, setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(setroubleshoot_fixit_t, setroubleshoot_fixit_exec_t) type setroubleshoot_var_lib_t; files_type(setroubleshoot_var_lib_t) @@ -30,8 +31,10 @@ files_pid_file(setroubleshoot_var_run_t) # setroubleshootd local policy # -allow setroubleshootd_t self:capability { dac_override sys_nice sys_tty_config }; +allow setroubleshootd_t self:capability { dac_override sys_nice sys_ptrace sys_tty_config }; allow setroubleshootd_t self:process { getattr getsched setsched sigkill signull signal }; +# if bad library causes setroubleshoot to require these, we want to give it so setroubleshoot can continue to run +allow setroubleshootd_t self:process { execmem execstack }; allow setroubleshootd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow setroubleshootd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow setroubleshootd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; @@ -49,17 +52,21 @@ manage_sock_files_pattern(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_var_log_t, setrouble logging_log_filetrans(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_var_log_t, { file dir }) # pid file +manage_dirs_pattern(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshoot_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir }) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(setroubleshootd_t) kernel_read_system_state(setroubleshootd_t) kernel_read_net_sysctls(setroubleshootd_t) kernel_read_network_state(setroubleshootd_t) +kernel_dontaudit_list_all_proc(setroubleshootd_t) +kernel_read_unlabeled_state(setroubleshootd_t) corecmd_exec_bin(setroubleshootd_t) corecmd_exec_shell(setroubleshootd_t) +corecmd_read_all_executables(setroubleshootd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(setroubleshootd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(setroubleshootd_t) @@ -85,6 +92,7 @@ files_getattr_all_files(setroubleshootd_t) files_getattr_all_pipes(setroubleshootd_t) files_getattr_all_sockets(setroubleshootd_t) files_read_all_symlinks(setroubleshootd_t) +files_read_mnt_files(setroubleshootd_t) fs_getattr_all_dirs(setroubleshootd_t) fs_getattr_all_files(setroubleshootd_t) @@ -95,6 +103,7 @@ fs_dontaudit_read_cifs_files(setroubleshootd_t) selinux_get_enforce_mode(setroubleshootd_t) selinux_validate_context(setroubleshootd_t) +selinux_read_policy(setroubleshootd_t) term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(setroubleshootd_t) term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(setroubleshootd_t) @@ -104,6 +113,8 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(setroubleshootd_t) init_read_utmp(setroubleshootd_t) init_dontaudit_write_utmp(setroubleshootd_t) +libs_exec_ld_so(setroubleshootd_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(setroubleshootd_t) locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(setroubleshootd_t) @@ -112,8 +123,6 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(setroubleshootd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(setroubleshootd_t) logging_stream_connect_dispatcher(setroubleshootd_t) -modutils_read_module_config(setroubleshootd_t) - seutil_read_config(setroubleshootd_t) seutil_read_file_contexts(setroubleshootd_t) seutil_read_bin_policy(setroubleshootd_t) @@ -121,10 +130,23 @@ seutil_read_bin_policy(setroubleshootd_t) userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(setroubleshootd_t) optional_policy(` + locate_read_lib_files(setroubleshootd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mock_getattr_lib(setroubleshootd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_read_module_config(setroubleshootd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_domain(setroubleshootd_t, setroubleshootd_exec_t) ') optional_policy(` + rpm_exec(setroubleshootd_t) rpm_signull(setroubleshootd_t) rpm_read_db(setroubleshootd_t) rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(setroubleshootd_t) @@ -151,7 +173,11 @@ kernel_read_system_state(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) corecmd_exec_bin(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) corecmd_exec_shell(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) +dev_read_sysfs(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) +dev_read_urand(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) + seutil_domtrans_setfiles(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) +seutil_domtrans_setsebool(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) files_read_usr_files(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) files_read_etc_files(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) @@ -164,6 +190,13 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) miscfiles_read_localization(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) +userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) +userdom_signull_unpriv_users(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) + +optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) +') + optional_policy(` rpm_signull(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) rpm_read_db(setroubleshoot_fixit_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sge.fc b/policy/modules/services/sge.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..160ddc2 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/sge.fc @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + +/usr/bin/sge_execd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sge_execd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/sge_shepherd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sge_shepherd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/spool/gridengine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sge_spool_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sge.if b/policy/modules/services/sge.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..839f1b3 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/sge.if @@ -0,0 +1,2 @@ +## Policy for gridengine MPI jobs + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sge.te b/policy/modules/services/sge.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..803c998 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/sge.te @@ -0,0 +1,195 @@ +policy_module(sge, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +## +##

    +## Allow sge to access nfs file systems. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(sge_use_nfs, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow sge to connect to the network using any TCP port +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(sge_domain_can_network_connect, false) + +attribute sge_domain; + +type sge_execd_t, sge_domain; +type sge_execd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(sge_execd_t, sge_execd_exec_t) + +type sge_spool_t; +files_type(sge_spool_t) + +type sge_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(sge_tmp_t) + +type sge_shepherd_t, sge_domain; +type sge_shepherd_exec_t; +application_domain(sge_shepherd_t, sge_shepherd_exec_t) +role system_r types sge_shepherd_t; + +type sge_job_t, sge_domain; +type sge_job_exec_t; +application_domain(sge_job_t, sge_job_exec_t) +corecmd_shell_entry_type(sge_job_t) +role system_r types sge_job_t; + +####################################### +# +# sge_execd local policy +# + +allow sge_execd_t self:capability { dac_override setuid chown setgid }; +allow sge_execd_t self:process { setsched signal setpgid }; + +allow sge_execd_t sge_shepherd_t:process signal; + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(sge_execd_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(sge_execd_t) + +files_exec_usr_files(sge_execd_t) +files_search_spool(sge_execd_t) + +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(sge_execd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(sge_execd_t) + +init_read_utmp(sge_execd_t) + +optional_policy(` + sendmail_domtrans(sge_execd_t) +') + +###################################### +# +# sge_shepherd local policy +# + +allow sge_shepherd_t self:capability { setuid sys_nice chown kill setgid dac_override }; +allow sge_shepherd_t self:process { setsched setrlimit setpgid }; +allow sge_shepherd_t self:process signal_perms; + +domtrans_pattern(sge_execd_t, sge_shepherd_exec_t, sge_shepherd_t) + +kernel_read_sysctl(sge_shepherd_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(sge_shepherd_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(sge_shepherd_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(sge_shepherd_t) + +optional_policy(` + mta_send_mail(sge_shepherd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_domtrans(sge_shepherd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(sge_shepherd_t) +') + +##################################### +# +# sge_job local policy +# + +allow sge_shepherd_t sge_job_t:process signal_perms; + +corecmd_shell_domtrans(sge_shepherd_t, sge_job_t) + +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(sge_job_t) + +term_use_all_terms(sge_job_t) + +optional_policy(` + ssh_basic_client_template(sge_job, sge_job_t, system_r) + ssh_domtrans(sge_job_t) + + allow sge_job_t sge_job_ssh_t:process sigkill; + allow sge_shepherd_t sge_job_ssh_t:process sigkill; + + xserver_exec_xauth(sge_job_ssh_t) + + tunable_policy(`sge_use_nfs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(sge_job_ssh_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(sge_job_ssh_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(sge_job_ssh_t) + fs_read_nfs_symlinks(sge_job_ssh_t) + ') + ') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_domtrans_xauth(sge_job_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(sge_job_t) +') + +##################################### +# +# sge_domain local policy +# + +allow sge_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow sge_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(sge_domain, sge_spool_t, sge_spool_t) +manage_files_pattern(sge_domain, sge_spool_t, sge_spool_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(sge_domain, sge_spool_t, sge_spool_t) + +manage_files_pattern(sge_domain, sge_tmp_t, sge_tmp_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(sge_domain, sge_tmp_t, sge_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(sge_domain, sge_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +kernel_read_network_state(sge_domain) +kernel_read_system_state(sge_domain) + +corecmd_exec_bin(sge_domain) +corecmd_exec_shell(sge_domain) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(sge_domain) + +files_read_etc_files(sge_domain) +files_read_usr_files(sge_domain) + +dev_read_urand(sge_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(sge_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(sge_domain) + +tunable_policy(`sge_domain_can_network_connect',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(sge_domain) +') + +tunable_policy(`sge_use_nfs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(sge_domain) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(sge_domain) + fs_manage_nfs_files(sge_domain) + fs_read_nfs_symlinks(sge_domain) + fs_exec_nfs_files(sge_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(sge_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + hostname_exec(sge_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + nslcd_stream_connect(sge_domain) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/slrnpull.te b/policy/modules/services/slrnpull.te index e5e72fd..92eecec 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/slrnpull.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/slrnpull.te @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type slrnpull_var_run_t; files_pid_file(slrnpull_var_run_t) type slrnpull_spool_t; -files_type(slrnpull_spool_t) +files_spool_file(slrnpull_spool_t) type slrnpull_log_t; logging_log_file(slrnpull_log_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/smartmon.if b/policy/modules/services/smartmon.if index adea9f9..145adbd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/smartmon.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/smartmon.if @@ -15,6 +15,7 @@ interface(`smartmon_read_tmp_files',` type fsdaemon_tmp_t; ') + files_search_tmp($1) allow $1 fsdaemon_tmp_t:file read_file_perms; ') @@ -41,8 +42,11 @@ interface(`smartmon_admin',` type fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 fsdaemon_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 fsdaemon_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, fsdaemon_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 smartmon_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, fsdaemon_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/smartmon.te b/policy/modules/services/smartmon.te index 606a098..522fb54 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/smartmon.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/smartmon.te @@ -35,7 +35,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',` # Local policy # -allow fsdaemon_t self:capability { setpcap setgid sys_rawio sys_admin }; +allow fsdaemon_t self:capability { dac_override kill setpcap setgid sys_rawio sys_admin }; dontaudit fsdaemon_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow fsdaemon_t self:process { getcap setcap signal_perms }; allow fsdaemon_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -52,6 +52,7 @@ manage_files_pattern(fsdaemon_t, fsdaemon_var_run_t, fsdaemon_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(fsdaemon_t, fsdaemon_var_run_t, file) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(fsdaemon_t) +kernel_read_network_state(fsdaemon_t) kernel_read_software_raid_state(fsdaemon_t) kernel_read_system_state(fsdaemon_t) @@ -73,19 +74,31 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(fsdaemon_t) files_read_usr_files(fsdaemon_t) # for config files_read_etc_files(fsdaemon_t) +files_read_usr_files(fsdaemon_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(fsdaemon_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(fsdaemon_t) +fs_read_removable_files(fsdaemon_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(fsdaemon_t) #mls_rangetrans_target(fsdaemon_t) +storage_create_fixed_disk_dev(fsdaemon_t) +storage_dev_filetrans_named_fixed_disk(fsdaemon_t) storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(fsdaemon_t) storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(fsdaemon_t) storage_raw_read_removable_device(fsdaemon_t) +storage_read_scsi_generic(fsdaemon_t) +storage_write_scsi_generic(fsdaemon_t) term_dontaudit_search_ptys(fsdaemon_t) +application_signull(fsdaemon_t) + +auth_read_passwd(fsdaemon_t) + +init_read_utmp(fsdaemon_t) + libs_exec_ld_so(fsdaemon_t) libs_exec_lib_files(fsdaemon_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/smokeping.if b/policy/modules/services/smokeping.if index 8265278..017b923 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/smokeping.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/smokeping.if @@ -153,8 +153,11 @@ interface(`smokeping_admin',` type smokeping_t, smokeping_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 smokeping_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 smokeping_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, smokeping_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 smokeping_t:process ptrace; + ') smokeping_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/smokeping.te b/policy/modules/services/smokeping.te index 740994a..a92ba26 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/smokeping.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/smokeping.te @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ files_type(smokeping_var_lib_t) # smokeping local policy # -dontaudit smokeping_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override }; +dontaudit smokeping_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override }; allow smokeping_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow smokeping_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow smokeping_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/snmp.fc b/policy/modules/services/snmp.fc index 623c8fa..0a802f7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/snmp.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/snmp.fc @@ -18,7 +18,8 @@ /var/log/snmpd\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:snmpd_log_t,s0) -/var/net-snmp(/.*) gen_context(system_u:object_r:snmpd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/net-snmp(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:snmpd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/run/net-snmpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:snmpd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/snmpd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:snmpd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/snmpd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:snmpd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/snmp.if b/policy/modules/services/snmp.if index 275f9fb..f1343b7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/snmp.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/snmp.if @@ -11,12 +11,12 @@ ## # interface(`snmp_stream_connect',` - gen_require(` + gen_require(` type snmpd_t, snmpd_var_lib_t; - ') + ') - files_search_var_lib($1) - stream_connect_pattern($1, snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_t) + files_search_var_lib($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_t) ') ######################################## @@ -62,11 +62,70 @@ interface(`snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_files',` type snmpd_var_lib_t; ') + files_search_var_lib($1) allow $1 snmpd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern($1, snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_var_lib_t) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_var_lib_t) ') +####################################### +## +## Read snmpd libraries directories +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type snmpd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 snmpd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage snmpd libraries directories +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`snmp_manage_var_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type snmpd_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 snmpd_var_lib_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + files_var_lib_filetrans($1, snmpd_var_lib_t, dir) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage snmpd libraries. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`snmp_manage_var_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type snmpd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 snmpd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; + manage_files_pattern($1, snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_var_lib_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## dontaudit Read snmpd libraries. @@ -81,9 +140,10 @@ interface(`snmp_dontaudit_read_snmp_var_lib_files',` gen_require(` type snmpd_var_lib_t; ') + dontaudit $1 snmpd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; dontaudit $1 snmpd_var_lib_t:file read_file_perms; - dontaudit $1 snmpd_var_lib_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; + dontaudit $1 snmpd_var_lib_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -123,13 +183,15 @@ interface(`snmp_dontaudit_write_snmp_var_lib_files',` # interface(`snmp_admin',` gen_require(` - type snmpd_t, snmpd_log_t; + type snmpd_t, snmpd_log_t, snmpd_initrc_exec_t; type snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_var_run_t; - type snmpd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 snmpd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 snmpd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, snmpd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 snmpd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, snmpd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/snmp.te b/policy/modules/services/snmp.te index 3d8d1b3..f4d9c37 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/snmp.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/snmp.te @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(snmp, 1.11.0) # # Declarations # + type snmpd_t; type snmpd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(snmpd_t, snmpd_exec_t) @@ -24,12 +25,14 @@ files_type(snmpd_var_lib_t) # # Local policy # -allow snmpd_t self:capability { chown dac_override kill ipc_lock sys_ptrace net_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config }; + +allow snmpd_t self:capability { chown dac_override kill ipc_lock setgid setuid net_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config }; + dontaudit snmpd_t self:capability { sys_module sys_tty_config }; allow snmpd_t self:process { signal_perms getsched setsched }; allow snmpd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow snmpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; -allow snmpd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow snmpd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; allow snmpd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow snmpd_t self:udp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms; @@ -41,18 +44,19 @@ manage_files_pattern(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_var_lib_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_lib_t, snmpd_var_lib_t) files_usr_filetrans(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_lib_t, file) files_var_filetrans(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_lib_t, { file dir sock_file }) -files_var_lib_filetrans(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_lib_t, file) +files_var_lib_filetrans(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_lib_t, { dir file }) +manage_dirs_pattern(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_run_t, snmpd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_run_t, snmpd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_run_t, file) +files_pid_filetrans(snmpd_t, snmpd_var_run_t, { file dir }) kernel_read_device_sysctls(snmpd_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(snmpd_t) kernel_read_fs_sysctls(snmpd_t) kernel_read_net_sysctls(snmpd_t) -kernel_read_proc_symlinks(snmpd_t) -kernel_read_system_state(snmpd_t) kernel_read_network_state(snmpd_t) +kernel_read_proc_symlinks(snmpd_t) +kernel_read_all_proc(snmpd_t) corecmd_exec_bin(snmpd_t) corecmd_exec_shell(snmpd_t) @@ -83,7 +87,6 @@ dev_getattr_usbfs_dirs(snmpd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(snmpd_t) domain_signull_all_domains(snmpd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(snmpd_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(snmpd_t) domain_exec_all_entry_files(snmpd_t) files_read_etc_files(snmpd_t) @@ -94,15 +97,19 @@ files_search_home(snmpd_t) fs_getattr_all_dirs(snmpd_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(snmpd_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(snmpd_t) +files_search_all_mountpoints(snmpd_t) storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk(snmpd_t) storage_dontaudit_read_removable_device(snmpd_t) +storage_dontaudit_write_removable_device(snmpd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(snmpd_t) -auth_read_all_dirs_except_shadow(snmpd_t) +files_list_all(snmpd_t) init_read_utmp(snmpd_t) init_dontaudit_write_utmp(snmpd_t) +# need write to /var/run/systemd/notify +init_write_pid_socket(snmpd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(snmpd_t) @@ -115,7 +122,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(snmpd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(snmpd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(snmpd_t) -ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` optional_policy(` rpm_read_db(snmpd_t) rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(snmpd_t) @@ -140,6 +147,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + ricci_stream_connect_modclusterd(snmpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` rpc_search_nfs_state_data(snmpd_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/snort.if b/policy/modules/services/snort.if index c117e8b..e428bb9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/snort.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/snort.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run snort. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`snort_domtrans',` @@ -41,8 +41,11 @@ interface(`snort_admin',` type snort_etc_t, snort_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 snort_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 snort_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, snort_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 snort_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, snort_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -50,11 +53,11 @@ interface(`snort_admin',` allow $2 system_r; admin_pattern($1, snort_etc_t) - files_search_etc($1) + files_list_etc($1) admin_pattern($1, snort_log_t) - logging_search_logs($1) + logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, snort_var_run_t) - files_search_pids($1) + files_list_pids($1) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/snort.te b/policy/modules/services/snort.te index 179bc1b..735c400 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/snort.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/snort.te @@ -32,17 +32,17 @@ files_pid_file(snort_var_run_t) allow snort_t self:capability { setgid setuid net_admin net_raw dac_override }; dontaudit snort_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow snort_t self:process signal_perms; -allow snort_t self:netlink_route_socket { bind create getattr nlmsg_read read write }; +allow snort_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; allow snort_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow snort_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow snort_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; allow snort_t self:socket create_socket_perms; # Snort IPS node. unverified. -allow snort_t self:netlink_firewall_socket { bind create getattr }; +allow snort_t self:netlink_firewall_socket create_socket_perms; allow snort_t snort_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow snort_t snort_etc_t:file read_file_perms; -allow snort_t snort_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow snort_t snort_etc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; manage_files_pattern(snort_t, snort_log_t, snort_log_t) create_dirs_pattern(snort_t, snort_log_t, snort_log_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/soundserver.if b/policy/modules/services/soundserver.if index 93fe7bf..1b07ed4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/soundserver.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/soundserver.if @@ -33,13 +33,15 @@ interface(`soundserver_tcp_connect',` # interface(`soundserver_admin',` gen_require(` - type soundd_t, soundd_etc_t; + type soundd_t, soundd_etc_t, soundd_initrc_exec_t; type soundd_tmp_t, soundd_var_run_t; - type soundd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 soundd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 soundd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, soundd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 soundd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, soundd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.fc b/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.fc index 6b3abf9..21f3e07 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.fc @@ -1,15 +1,38 @@ -HOME_DIR/\.spamassassin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamassassin_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.spamassassin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamc_home_t,s0) +/root/\.spamassassin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamc_home_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/spamd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/mimedefang.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/sa-learn -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamc_exec_t,s0) -/usr/bin/spamassassin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamassassin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/spamassassin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamc_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/spamc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamc_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/spamd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/sa-update -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_update_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/spamd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/mimedefang -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/mimedefang-multiplexor -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/spamassassin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/spamassassin/compiled(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_compiled_t,s0) + +/var/log/spamd\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_log_t,s0) +/var/log/mimedefang -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_log_t,s0) /var/run/spamassassin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_var_run_t,s0) /var/spool/spamassassin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_spool_t,s0) /var/spool/spamd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_spool_t,s0) +/var/spool/MD-Quarantine(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/spool/MIMEDefang(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_var_run_t,s0) + +/root/\.razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamc_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamc_home_t,s0) + +/etc/razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_etc_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/razor.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamc_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/razor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/log/razor-agent\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:spamd_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if b/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if index c954f31..82fc7f6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.if @@ -14,6 +14,7 @@ ## User domain for the role ##     ## +## # interface(`spamassassin_role',` gen_require(` @@ -25,9 +26,13 @@ interface(`spamassassin_role',` role $1 types { spamc_t spamassassin_t }; domtrans_pattern($2, spamassassin_exec_t, spamassassin_t) + + allow $2 spamassassin_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($2, spamassassin_t) domtrans_pattern($2, spamc_exec_t, spamc_t) + + allow $2 spamc_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($2, spamc_t) manage_dirs_pattern($2, spamassassin_home_t, spamassassin_home_t) @@ -55,7 +60,6 @@ interface(`spamassassin_exec',` ') can_exec($1, spamassassin_exec_t) - ') ######################################## @@ -111,6 +115,67 @@ interface(`spamassassin_domtrans_client',` ') domtrans_pattern($1, spamc_exec_t, spamc_t) + allow $1 spamc_exec_t:file ioctl; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send kill signal to spamassassin client +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`spamassassin_kill_client',` + gen_require(` + type spamc_t; + ') + + allow $1 spamc_t:process sigkill; +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage spamc home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`spamassassin_manage_home_client',` + gen_require(` + type spamc_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read spamc home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`spamassassin_read_home_client',` + gen_require(` + type spamc_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + list_dirs_pattern($1, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) + read_files_pattern($1, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) ') ######################################## @@ -166,7 +231,9 @@ interface(`spamassassin_read_lib_files',` ') files_search_var_lib($1) + list_dirs_pattern($1, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) read_files_pattern($1, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) ') ######################################## @@ -204,6 +271,7 @@ interface(`spamassassin_read_spamd_tmp_files',` type spamd_tmp_t; ') + files_search_tmp($1) allow $1 spamd_tmp_t:file read_file_perms; ') @@ -223,5 +291,94 @@ interface(`spamassassin_dontaudit_getattr_spamd_tmp_sockets',` type spamd_tmp_t; ') - dontaudit $1 spamd_tmp_t:sock_file getattr; + dontaudit $1 spamd_tmp_t:sock_file getattr_sock_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to run spamd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to connect. +## +## +# +interface(`spamd_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type spamd_t, spamd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, spamd_var_run_t, spamd_var_run_t, spamd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read spamd pid files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`spamassassin_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type spamd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + read_files_pattern($1, spamd_var_run_t, spamd_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an spamassassin environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed to manage the spamassassin domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`spamassassin_spamd_admin',` + gen_require(` + type spamd_t, spamd_tmp_t, spamd_log_t; + type spamd_spool_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_run_t; + type spamd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 spamd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, spamd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 spamd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, spamd_initrc_exec_t) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 spamd_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_list_tmp($1) + admin_pattern($1, spamd_tmp_t) + + logging_list_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, spamd_log_t) + + files_list_spool($1) + admin_pattern($1, spamd_spool_t) + + files_list_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, spamd_var_lib_t) + + files_list_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, spamd_var_run_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te b/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te index ec1eb1e..9d10f0b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/spamassassin.te @@ -6,56 +6,101 @@ policy_module(spamassassin, 2.4.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow user spamassassin clients to use the network. -##

    +##

    +## Allow user spamassassin clients to use the network. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(spamassassin_can_network, false) ## -##

    -## Allow spamd to read/write user home directories. -##

    +##

    +## Allow spamd to read/write user home directories. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(spamd_enable_home_dirs, true) -type spamassassin_t; -type spamassassin_exec_t; -typealias spamassassin_t alias { user_spamassassin_t staff_spamassassin_t sysadm_spamassassin_t }; -typealias spamassassin_t alias { auditadm_spamassassin_t secadm_spamassassin_t }; -application_domain(spamassassin_t, spamassassin_exec_t) -ubac_constrained(spamassassin_t) - -type spamassassin_home_t; -typealias spamassassin_home_t alias { user_spamassassin_home_t staff_spamassassin_home_t sysadm_spamassassin_home_t }; -typealias spamassassin_home_t alias { auditadm_spamassassin_home_t secadm_spamassassin_home_t }; -userdom_user_home_content(spamassassin_home_t) - -type spamassassin_tmp_t; -typealias spamassassin_tmp_t alias { user_spamassassin_tmp_t staff_spamassassin_tmp_t sysadm_spamassassin_tmp_t }; -typealias spamassassin_tmp_t alias { auditadm_spamassassin_tmp_t secadm_spamassassin_tmp_t }; -files_tmp_file(spamassassin_tmp_t) -ubac_constrained(spamassassin_tmp_t) - -type spamc_t; -type spamc_exec_t; -typealias spamc_t alias { user_spamc_t staff_spamc_t sysadm_spamc_t }; -typealias spamc_t alias { auditadm_spamc_t secadm_spamc_t }; -application_domain(spamc_t, spamc_exec_t) -ubac_constrained(spamc_t) - -type spamc_tmp_t; -typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { user_spamc_tmp_t staff_spamc_tmp_t sysadm_spamc_tmp_t }; -typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { auditadm_spamc_tmp_t secadm_spamc_tmp_t }; -files_tmp_file(spamc_tmp_t) -ubac_constrained(spamc_tmp_t) +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + # spamassassin client executable + type spamc_t; + type spamc_exec_t; + application_domain(spamc_t, spamc_exec_t) + role system_r types spamc_t; + + type spamd_etc_t; + files_config_file(spamd_etc_t) + + typealias spamc_exec_t alias spamassassin_exec_t; + typealias spamc_t alias spamassassin_t; + + type spamc_home_t; + userdom_user_home_content(spamc_home_t) + typealias spamc_home_t alias { spamassassin_home_t user_spamassassin_home_t staff_spamassassin_home_t sysadm_spamassassin_home_t }; + typealias spamc_home_t alias { auditadm_spamassassin_home_t secadm_spamassassin_home_t }; + typealias spamc_home_t alias { user_spamc_home_t staff_spamc_home_t sysadm_spamc_home_t }; + typealias spamc_home_t alias { auditadm_spamc_home_t secadm_spamc_home_t }; + + type spamc_tmp_t; + files_tmp_file(spamc_tmp_t) + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias spamassassin_tmp_t; + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { user_spamassassin_tmp_t staff_spamassassin_tmp_t sysadm_spamassassin_tmp_t }; + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { auditadm_spamassassin_tmp_t secadm_spamassassin_tmp_t }; + + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { user_spamc_tmp_t staff_spamc_tmp_t sysadm_spamc_tmp_t }; + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { auditadm_spamc_tmp_t secadm_spamc_tmp_t }; +',` + type spamassassin_t; + type spamassassin_exec_t; + typealias spamassassin_t alias { user_spamassassin_t staff_spamassassin_t sysadm_spamassassin_t }; + typealias spamassassin_t alias { auditadm_spamassassin_t secadm_spamassassin_t }; + application_domain(spamassassin_t, spamassassin_exec_t) + ubac_constrained(spamassassin_t) + + type spamassassin_home_t; + typealias spamassassin_home_t alias { user_spamassassin_home_t staff_spamassassin_home_t sysadm_spamassassin_home_t }; + typealias spamassassin_home_t alias { auditadm_spamassassin_home_t secadm_spamassassin_home_t }; + userdom_user_home_content(spamassassin_home_t) + + type spamassassin_tmp_t; + typealias spamassassin_tmp_t alias { user_spamassassin_tmp_t staff_spamassassin_tmp_t sysadm_spamassassin_tmp_t }; + typealias spamassassin_tmp_t alias { auditadm_spamassassin_tmp_t secadm_spamassassin_tmp_t }; + files_tmp_file(spamassassin_tmp_t) + ubac_constrained(spamassassin_tmp_t) + + type spamc_t; + type spamc_exec_t; + typealias spamc_t alias { user_spamc_t staff_spamc_t sysadm_spamc_t }; + typealias spamc_t alias { auditadm_spamc_t secadm_spamc_t }; + application_domain(spamc_t, spamc_exec_t) + ubac_constrained(spamc_t) + + type spamc_tmp_t; + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { user_spamc_tmp_t staff_spamc_tmp_t sysadm_spamc_tmp_t }; + typealias spamc_tmp_t alias { auditadm_spamc_tmp_t secadm_spamc_tmp_t }; + files_tmp_file(spamc_tmp_t) + ubac_constrained(spamc_tmp_t) +') + +type spamd_update_t; +type spamd_update_exec_t; +application_domain(spamd_update_t, spamd_update_exec_t) +cron_system_entry(spamd_update_t, spamd_update_exec_t) +role system_r types spamd_update_t; type spamd_t; type spamd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(spamd_t, spamd_exec_t) +type spamd_compiled_t; +files_type(spamd_compiled_t) + +type spamd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(spamd_initrc_exec_t) + +type spamd_log_t; +logging_log_file(spamd_log_t) + type spamd_spool_t; -files_type(spamd_spool_t) +files_spool_file(spamd_spool_t) type spamd_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(spamd_tmp_t) @@ -102,12 +147,14 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamassassin_home_t, spamassassin_home_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamassassin_home_t, spamassassin_home_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamassassin_home_t, spamassassin_home_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(spamd_t, spamassassin_home_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) +userdom_home_manager(spamassassin_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(spamassassin_t) dev_read_urand(spamassassin_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(spamassassin_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(spamassassin_t) # this should probably be removed corecmd_list_bin(spamassassin_t) @@ -148,6 +195,9 @@ tunable_policy(`spamassassin_can_network',` corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(spamassassin_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(spamassassin_t) corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(spamassassin_t) + corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(spamassassin_t) + corenet_udp_bind_generic_port(spamassassin_t) + corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_ports(spamassassin_t) sysnet_read_config(spamassassin_t) ') @@ -158,18 +208,6 @@ tunable_policy(`spamd_enable_home_dirs',` userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks(spamd_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(spamassassin_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(spamassassin_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(spamassassin_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(spamassassin_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(spamassassin_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(spamassassin_t) -') - optional_policy(` # Write pid file and socket in ~/.evolution/cache/tmp evolution_home_filetrans(spamd_t, spamd_tmp_t, { file sock_file }) @@ -184,6 +222,8 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` mta_read_config(spamassassin_t) sendmail_stub(spamassassin_t) + sendmail_dontaudit_rw_unix_stream_sockets(spamassassin_t) + sendmail_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets(spamassassin_t) ') ######################################## @@ -206,15 +246,32 @@ allow spamc_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow spamc_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow spamc_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +can_exec(spamc_t, spamc_exec_t) + manage_dirs_pattern(spamc_t, spamc_tmp_t, spamc_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(spamc_t, spamc_tmp_t, spamc_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(spamc_t, spamc_tmp_t, { file dir }) +manage_dirs_pattern(spamc_t, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(spamc_t, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(spamc_t, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(spamc_t, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(spamc_t, spamc_home_t, spamc_home_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(spamc_t, spamc_home_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) +userdom_append_user_home_content_files(spamc_t) + +list_dirs_pattern(spamc_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) +read_files_pattern(spamc_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) + # Allow connecting to a local spamd allow spamc_t spamd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow spamc_t spamd_tmp_t:sock_file rw_sock_file_perms; +spamd_stream_connect(spamc_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(spamc_t) +kernel_read_system_state(spamc_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(spamc_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(spamc_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(spamc_t) @@ -226,6 +283,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(spamc_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(spamc_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(spamc_t) corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(spamc_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_spamd_port(spamc_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(spamc_t) @@ -244,9 +302,14 @@ files_read_usr_files(spamc_t) files_dontaudit_search_var(spamc_t) # cjp: this may be removable: files_list_home(spamc_t) +files_list_var_lib(spamc_t) + +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(spamc_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(spamc_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(spamc_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(spamc_t) # cjp: this should probably be removed: @@ -254,27 +317,35 @@ seutil_read_config(spamc_t) sysnet_read_config(spamc_t) +userdom_home_manager(spamc_t) + optional_policy(` - # Allow connection to spamd socket above - evolution_stream_connect(spamc_t) + abrt_stream_connect(spamc_t) ') optional_policy(` - # Needed for pyzor/razor called from spamd - milter_manage_spamass_state(spamc_t) + # Allow connection to spamd socket above + evolution_stream_connect(spamc_t) ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(spamc_t) + milter_manage_spamass_state(spamc_t) ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(spamc_t) + postfix_domtrans_postdrop(spamc_t) + postfix_search_spool(spamc_t) + postfix_rw_local_pipes(spamc_t) + postfix_rw_master_pipes(spamc_t) ') optional_policy(` + mta_send_mail(spamc_t) mta_read_config(spamc_t) + mta_read_queue(spamc_t) sendmail_stub(spamc_t) + sendmail_rw_pipes(spamc_t) + sendmail_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets(spamc_t) ') ######################################## @@ -286,7 +357,7 @@ optional_policy(` # setuids to the user running spamc. Comment this if you are not # using this ability. -allow spamd_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override sys_tty_config }; +allow spamd_t self:capability { kill setuid setgid dac_override sys_tty_config }; dontaudit spamd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow spamd_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; allow spamd_t self:fd use; @@ -302,10 +373,17 @@ allow spamd_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; allow spamd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow spamd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow spamd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; -allow spamd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; + +can_exec(spamd_t, spamd_compiled_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_compiled_t, spamd_compiled_t) +manage_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_compiled_t, spamd_compiled_t) + +manage_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_log_t, spamd_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(spamd_t, spamd_log_t, file) manage_dirs_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_spool_t, spamd_spool_t) manage_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_spool_t, spamd_spool_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_spool_t, spamd_spool_t) files_spool_filetrans(spamd_t, spamd_spool_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_tmp_t, spamd_tmp_t) @@ -314,11 +392,15 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(spamd_t, spamd_tmp_t, { file dir }) # var/lib files for spamd allow spamd_t spamd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; -read_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) manage_dirs_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_var_run_t, spamd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_var_run_t, spamd_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(spamd_t, spamd_var_run_t, { dir file }) +manage_sock_files_pattern(spamd_t, spamd_var_run_t, spamd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(spamd_t, spamd_var_run_t, { file dir }) + +can_exec(spamd_t, spamd_exec_t) kernel_read_all_sysctls(spamd_t) kernel_read_system_state(spamd_t) @@ -367,23 +449,23 @@ files_read_var_lib_files(spamd_t) init_dontaudit_rw_utmp(spamd_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(spamd_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(spamd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(spamd_t) -sysnet_read_config(spamd_t) -sysnet_use_ldap(spamd_t) -sysnet_dns_name_resolve(spamd_t) - userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(spamd_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(spamd_t) +userdom_home_manager(spamd_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_files(spamd_t) +optional_policy(` + clamav_stream_connect(spamd_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_files(spamd_t) +optional_policy(` + exim_manage_spool_dirs(spamd_t) + exim_manage_spool_files(spamd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -399,7 +481,9 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + dcc_domtrans_cdcc(spamd_t) dcc_domtrans_client(spamd_t) + dcc_signal_client(spamd_t) dcc_stream_connect_dccifd(spamd_t) ') @@ -408,25 +492,17 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - corenet_tcp_connect_mysqld_port(spamd_t) - corenet_sendrecv_mysqld_client_packets(spamd_t) - + mysql_tcp_connect(spamd_t) mysql_search_db(spamd_t) mysql_stream_connect(spamd_t) ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(spamd_t) -') - -optional_policy(` postfix_read_config(spamd_t) ') optional_policy(` - corenet_tcp_connect_postgresql_port(spamd_t) - corenet_sendrecv_postgresql_client_packets(spamd_t) - + postgresql_tcp_connect(spamd_t) postgresql_stream_connect(spamd_t) ') @@ -437,6 +513,10 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` razor_domtrans(spamd_t) + razor_read_lib_files(spamd_t) + tunable_policy(`spamd_enable_home_dirs',` + razor_manage_user_home_files(spamd_t) + ') ') optional_policy(` @@ -444,6 +524,7 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + mta_send_mail(spamd_t) sendmail_stub(spamd_t) mta_read_config(spamd_t) ') @@ -451,3 +532,51 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` udev_read_db(spamd_t) ') + +######################################## +# +# spamd_update local policy +# + +allow spamd_update_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; +allow spamd_update_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +dontaudit spamd_update_t self:capability dac_override; + +manage_dirs_pattern(spamd_update_t, spamd_tmp_t, spamd_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(spamd_update_t, spamd_tmp_t, spamd_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(spamd_update_t, spamd_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +allow spamd_update_t spamd_var_lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; +manage_files_pattern(spamd_update_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(spamd_update_t, spamd_var_lib_t, spamd_var_lib_t) + +allow spamd_update_t spamd_tmp_t:file read_file_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(spamd_update_t) + +# for updating rules +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(spamd_update_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(spamd_update_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(spamd_update_t) + +dev_read_urand(spamd_update_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(spamd_update_t) + +files_read_etc_files(spamd_update_t) +files_read_usr_files(spamd_update_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(spamd_update_t) +auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(spamd_update_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(spamd_update_t) + +mta_read_config(spamd_update_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(spamd_update_t) + +optional_policy(` + gpg_domtrans(spamd_update_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/squid.fc b/policy/modules/services/squid.fc index 6cc4a90..2015152 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/squid.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/squid.fc @@ -2,7 +2,6 @@ /etc/squid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_conf_t,s0) /usr/lib/squid/cachemgr\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_squid_script_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/squid/cachemgr\.cgi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_squid_script_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/squid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_exec_t,s0) /usr/share/squid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:squid_conf_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/squid.if b/policy/modules/services/squid.if index d2496bd..c7614d7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/squid.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/squid.if @@ -71,7 +71,7 @@ interface(`squid_rw_stream_sockets',` type squid_t; ') - allow $1 squid_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; + allow $1 squid_t:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -83,7 +83,6 @@ interface(`squid_rw_stream_sockets',` ## Domain to not audit. ##     ## -## # interface(`squid_dontaudit_search_cache',` gen_require(` @@ -207,12 +206,14 @@ interface(`squid_use',` interface(`squid_admin',` gen_require(` type squid_t, squid_cache_t, squid_conf_t; - type squid_log_t, squid_var_run_t; - type squid_initrc_exec_t; + type squid_log_t, squid_var_run_t, squid_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 squid_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 squid_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, squid_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 squid_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, squid_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/squid.te b/policy/modules/services/squid.te index 4b2230e..51dc8d8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/squid.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/squid.te @@ -6,17 +6,17 @@ policy_module(squid, 1.10.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow squid to connect to all ports, not just -## HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports. -##

    +##

    +## Allow squid to connect to all ports, not just +## HTTP, FTP, and Gopher ports. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(squid_connect_any, false) ## -##

    -## Allow squid to run as a transparent proxy (TPROXY) -##

    +##

    +## Allow squid to run as a transparent proxy (TPROXY) +##

    ##     gen_tunable(squid_use_tproxy, false) @@ -29,7 +29,7 @@ type squid_cache_t; files_type(squid_cache_t) type squid_conf_t; -files_type(squid_conf_t) +files_config_file(squid_conf_t) type squid_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(squid_initrc_exec_t) @@ -40,6 +40,9 @@ logging_log_file(squid_log_t) type squid_tmpfs_t; files_tmpfs_file(squid_tmpfs_t) +type squid_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(squid_tmp_t) + type squid_var_run_t; files_pid_file(squid_var_run_t) @@ -85,11 +88,16 @@ logging_log_filetrans(squid_t, squid_log_t, { file dir }) manage_files_pattern(squid_t, squid_tmpfs_t, squid_tmpfs_t) fs_tmpfs_filetrans(squid_t, squid_tmpfs_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(squid_t, squid_tmp_t, squid_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(squid_t, squid_tmp_t, squid_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(squid_t, squid_tmp_t, { file dir }) + manage_files_pattern(squid_t, squid_var_run_t, squid_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(squid_t, squid_var_run_t, file) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(squid_t) kernel_read_system_state(squid_t) +kernel_read_network_state(squid_t) files_dontaudit_getattr_boot_dirs(squid_t) @@ -169,7 +177,8 @@ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(squid_t) tunable_policy(`squid_connect_any',` corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(squid_t) corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(squid_t) - corenet_sendrecv_all_packets(squid_t) + corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(squid_t) + corenet_sendrecv_all_server_packets(squid_t) ') tunable_policy(`squid_use_tproxy',` @@ -185,6 +194,7 @@ optional_policy(` corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(httpd_squid_script_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(httpd_squid_script_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_cache_port(httpd_squid_script_t) + corenet_tcp_connect_squid_port(httpd_squid_script_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(httpd_squid_script_t) @@ -206,3 +216,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` udev_read_db(squid_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + kerberos_manage_host_rcache(squid_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.fc b/policy/modules/services/ssh.fc index 078bcd7..21ff471 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.fc @@ -1,9 +1,19 @@ HOME_DIR/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.shosts gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0) + +/var/lib/amanda/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0) +/var/lib/gitolite/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0) +/var/lib/nocpulse/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/sshd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/ssh/primes -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_key_t,s0) /etc/ssh/ssh_host_key -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_key_t,s0) /etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_key_t,s0) /etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_key_t,s0) +/etc/ssh/ssh_host_key.pub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_key_t,s0) +/etc/ssh/ssh_host_dsa_key.pub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_key_t,s0) +/etc/ssh/ssh_host_rsa_key.pub -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_key_t,s0) /usr/bin/ssh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/ssh-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_agent_exec_t,s0) @@ -14,3 +24,7 @@ HOME_DIR/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0) /usr/sbin/sshd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_exec_t,s0) /var/run/sshd\.init\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/sshd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sshd_var_run_t,s0) + +/root/\.ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0) +/root/\.shosts gen_context(system_u:object_r:ssh_home_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.if b/policy/modules/services/ssh.if index 22adaca..7f010a4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.if @@ -32,10 +32,11 @@ ## # template(`ssh_basic_client_template',` - gen_require(` attribute ssh_server; type ssh_exec_t, sshd_key_t, sshd_tmp_t; + type ssh_keysign_exec_t, ssh_keysign_t; + type ssh_home_t; ') ############################## @@ -47,10 +48,6 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',` application_domain($1_ssh_t, ssh_exec_t) role $3 types $1_ssh_t; - type $1_ssh_home_t; - files_type($1_ssh_home_t) - typealias $1_ssh_home_t alias $1_home_ssh_t; - ############################## # # Client local policy @@ -89,22 +86,26 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',` # or "regular" (not special like sshd_extern_t) servers allow $2 ssh_server:unix_stream_socket rw_stream_socket_perms; + # derived domain can execute ssh-keysign + domtrans_pattern($1_ssh_t, ssh_keysign_exec_t, ssh_keysign_t) + role $3 types ssh_keysign_t; + # allow ps to show ssh ps_process_pattern($2, $1_ssh_t) # user can manage the keys and config - manage_files_pattern($2, $1_ssh_home_t, $1_ssh_home_t) - manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, $1_ssh_home_t, $1_ssh_home_t) - manage_sock_files_pattern($2, $1_ssh_home_t, $1_ssh_home_t) + manage_files_pattern($2, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) + manage_sock_files_pattern($2, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) # ssh client can manage the keys and config - manage_files_pattern($1_ssh_t, $1_ssh_home_t, $1_ssh_home_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern($1_ssh_t, $1_ssh_home_t, $1_ssh_home_t) + manage_files_pattern($1_ssh_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1_ssh_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) # ssh servers can read the user keys and config - allow ssh_server $1_ssh_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; - read_files_pattern(ssh_server, $1_ssh_home_t, $1_ssh_home_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern(ssh_server, $1_ssh_home_t, $1_ssh_home_t) + allow ssh_server ssh_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern(ssh_server, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern(ssh_server, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_ssh_t) kernel_read_system_state($1_ssh_t) @@ -116,6 +117,8 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',` corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_ssh_t) corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port($1_ssh_t) corenet_sendrecv_ssh_client_packets($1_ssh_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node($1_ssh_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports($1_ssh_t) dev_read_urand($1_ssh_t) @@ -148,6 +151,29 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',` ') ') +###################################### +## +## The template to define a domain to which sshd dyntransition. +## +## +## +## The prefix of the dyntransition domain +## +## +# +template(`ssh_dyntransition_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + attribute ssh_dyntransition_domain; + ') + + type $1, ssh_dyntransition_domain; + domain_type($1) + role system_r types $1; + + optional_policy(` + ssh_dyntransition_to($1) + ') +') ####################################### ## ## The template to define a ssh server. @@ -168,7 +194,7 @@ template(`ssh_basic_client_template',` ## ## # -template(`ssh_server_template', ` +template(`ssh_server_template',` type $1_t, ssh_server; auth_login_pgm_domain($1_t) @@ -181,16 +207,18 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', ` type $1_var_run_t; files_pid_file($1_var_run_t) - allow $1_t self:capability { kill sys_chroot sys_nice sys_resource chown dac_override fowner fsetid setgid setuid sys_tty_config }; + allow $1_t self:capability { kill sys_chroot sys_nice sys_resource chown dac_override fowner fsetid net_admin setgid setuid sys_tty_config }; allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - allow $1_t self:process { signal getsched setsched setrlimit setexec setkeycreate }; + allow $1_t self:process { getcap signal getsched setsched setrlimit setexec }; + allow $1_t self:process { signal getcap getsched setsched setrlimit setexec }; allow $1_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow $1_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + allow $1_t self:tun_socket { create_socket_perms relabelfrom relabelto }; # ssh agent connections: allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow $1_t self:shm create_shm_perms; - allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr getattr relabelfrom }; + allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms getattr_chr_file_perms relabelfrom }; term_create_pty($1_t, $1_devpts_t) manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, $1_tmpfs_t) @@ -206,6 +234,7 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', ` kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t) kernel_read_network_state($1_t) + kernel_request_load_module($1_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_t) @@ -220,10 +249,13 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', ` corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node($1_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node($1_t) corenet_tcp_bind_ssh_port($1_t) - corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_t) corenet_sendrecv_ssh_server_packets($1_t) + # -R qualifier + corenet_sendrecv_ssh_server_packets($1_t) + # tunnel feature and -w (net_admin capability also) + corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev($1_t) - fs_dontaudit_getattr_all_fs($1_t) + fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t) auth_rw_login_records($1_t) auth_rw_faillog($1_t) @@ -234,6 +266,7 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', ` corecmd_getattr_bin_files($1_t) domain_interactive_fd($1_t) + domain_dyntrans_type($1_t) files_read_etc_files($1_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_t) @@ -243,31 +276,31 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', ` miscfiles_read_localization($1_t) - userdom_create_all_users_keys($1_t) userdom_dontaudit_relabelfrom_user_ptys($1_t) - userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1_t) + userdom_read_user_home_content_files($1_t) # Allow checking users mail at login mta_getattr_spool($1_t) - tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_read_nfs_files($1_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks($1_t) - ') - - tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_read_cifs_files($1_t) - ') + userdom_home_manager($1_t) optional_policy(` kerberos_use($1_t) - kerberos_manage_host_rcache($1_t) + #kerberos_manage_host_rcache($1_t) ') optional_policy(` files_read_var_lib_symlinks($1_t) nx_spec_domtrans_server($1_t) ') + + optional_policy(` + rlogin_read_home_content($1_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + shutdown_getattr_exec_files($1_t) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -290,14 +323,15 @@ template(`ssh_server_template', ` ## User domain for the role ## ## +## # template(`ssh_role_template',` gen_require(` attribute ssh_server, ssh_agent_type; - type ssh_t, ssh_exec_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, ssh_home_t; type ssh_agent_exec_t, ssh_keysign_t, ssh_tmpfs_t; type ssh_agent_tmp_t; + type cache_home_t; ') ############################## @@ -327,17 +361,20 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',` # allow ps to show ssh ps_process_pattern($3, ssh_t) - allow $3 ssh_t:process signal; + allow $3 ssh_t:process signal_perms; # for rsync allow ssh_t $3:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; allow ssh_t $3:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow ssh_t $3:key manage_key_perms; + allow $3 ssh_t:key read; # user can manage the keys and config manage_files_pattern($3, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern($3, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) manage_sock_files_pattern($3, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1_t) + userdom_manage_tmp_role($2, ssh_t) ############################## # @@ -357,9 +394,10 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',` # for ssh-add stream_connect_pattern($3, ssh_agent_tmp_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t, $1_ssh_agent_t) + stream_connect_pattern($3, cache_home_t, cache_home_t, $1_ssh_agent_t) # Allow the user shell to signal the ssh program. - allow $3 $1_ssh_agent_t:process signal; + allow $3 $1_ssh_agent_t:process signal_perms; # allow ps to show ssh ps_process_pattern($3, $1_ssh_agent_t) @@ -381,7 +419,6 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',` files_read_etc_files($1_ssh_agent_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_ssh_agent_t) - files_search_home($1_ssh_agent_t) libs_read_lib_files($1_ssh_agent_t) @@ -393,28 +430,15 @@ template(`ssh_role_template',` seutil_dontaudit_read_config($1_ssh_agent_t) # Write to the user domain tty. - userdom_use_user_terminals($1_ssh_agent_t) + userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals($1_ssh_agent_t) # for the transition back to normal privs upon exec userdom_search_user_home_content($1_ssh_agent_t) userdom_user_home_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $3) - allow $3 $1_ssh_agent_t:fd use; - allow $3 $1_ssh_agent_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms; - allow $3 $1_ssh_agent_t:process sigchld; - - tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_files($1_ssh_agent_t) - - # transition back to normal privs upon exec - fs_nfs_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $3) - ') - tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_files($1_ssh_agent_t) + ssh_exec_keygen($3) - # transition back to normal privs upon exec - fs_cifs_domtrans($1_ssh_agent_t, $3) - ') + userdom_home_manager($1_ssh_agent_t) optional_policy(` nis_use_ypbind($1_ssh_agent_t) @@ -464,6 +488,24 @@ interface(`ssh_signal',` ######################################## ## +## Send a null signal to sshd processes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_signull',` + gen_require(` + type sshd_t; + ') + + allow $1 sshd_t:process signull; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read a ssh server unnamed pipe. ## ## @@ -477,8 +519,27 @@ interface(`ssh_read_pipes',` type sshd_t; ') - allow $1 sshd_t:fifo_file { getattr read }; + allow $1 sshd_t:fifo_file read_fifo_file_perms; ') + +###################################### +## +## Read and write ssh server unix dgram sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_rw_dgram_sockets',` + gen_require(` + type sshd_t; + ') + + allow $1 sshd_t:unix_dgram_socket rw_stream_socket_perms; +') + ######################################## ## ## Read and write a ssh server unnamed pipe. @@ -494,7 +555,7 @@ interface(`ssh_rw_pipes',` type sshd_t; ') - allow $1 sshd_t:fifo_file { write read getattr ioctl }; + allow $1 sshd_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -586,6 +647,24 @@ interface(`ssh_domtrans',` ######################################## ## +## Execute sshd server in the sshd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type sshd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, sshd_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute the ssh client in the caller domain. ## ## @@ -618,7 +697,7 @@ interface(`ssh_setattr_key_files',` type sshd_key_t; ') - allow $1 sshd_key_t:file setattr; + allow $1 sshd_key_t:file setattr_file_perms; files_search_pids($1) ') @@ -643,6 +722,42 @@ interface(`ssh_agent_exec',` ######################################## ## +## Getattr ssh home directory +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_getattr_user_home_dir',` + gen_require(` + type ssh_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 ssh_home_t:dir getattr; +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit search ssh home directory +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_dontaudit_search_user_home_dir',` + gen_require(` + type ssh_home_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 ssh_home_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read ssh home directory content ## ## @@ -682,6 +797,50 @@ interface(`ssh_domtrans_keygen',` ######################################## ## +## Execute the ssh key generator in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_exec_keygen',` + gen_require(` + type ssh_keygen_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, ssh_keygen_exec_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute ssh-keygen in the iptables domain, and +## allow the specified role the ssh-keygen domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_run_keygen',` + gen_require(` + type ssh_keygen_t; + ') + + role $2 types ssh_keygen_t; + ssh_domtrans_keygen($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read ssh server keys ## ## @@ -695,7 +854,7 @@ interface(`ssh_dontaudit_read_server_keys',` type sshd_key_t; ') - dontaudit $1 sshd_key_t:file { getattr read }; + dontaudit $1 sshd_key_t:file read_file_perms; ') ###################################### @@ -735,3 +894,64 @@ interface(`ssh_delete_tmp',` files_search_tmp($1) delete_files_pattern($1, sshd_tmp_t, sshd_tmp_t) ') + +##################################### +## +## Allow domain dyntransition to chroot_user_t domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_dyntransition_to',` + gen_require(` + type sshd_t; + ') + + allow sshd_t $1:process dyntransition; + allow $1 sshd_t:process sigchld; + allow sshd_t $1:process { getattr sigkill sigstop signull signal }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create .ssh directory in the /root directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_filetrans_admin_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type ssh_home_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, ssh_home_t, dir, ".ssh") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, ssh_home_t, dir, ".shosts") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create .ssh directory in the user home directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`ssh_filetrans_home_content',` + + gen_require(` + type ssh_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, ssh_home_t, dir, ".ssh") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, ssh_home_t, dir, ".shosts") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te index 2dad3c8..6dbec51 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ssh.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ssh.te @@ -6,26 +6,37 @@ policy_module(ssh, 2.2.0) # ## -##

    -## allow host key based authentication -##

    +##

    +## allow host key based authentication +##

    ##     gen_tunable(allow_ssh_keysign, false) ## +##

    +## Allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(ssh_sysadm_login, false) + +## ##

    -## Allow ssh logins as sysadm_r:sysadm_t +## Allow ssh with chroot env to read and write files +## in the user home directories ##

    ##     -gen_tunable(ssh_sysadm_login, false) +gen_tunable(ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs, false) +attribute ssh_dyntransition_domain; attribute ssh_server; attribute ssh_agent_type; +ssh_dyntransition_domain_template(chroot_user_t) +ssh_dyntransition_domain_template(sshd_sandbox_t) + type ssh_keygen_t; type ssh_keygen_exec_t; init_system_domain(ssh_keygen_t, ssh_keygen_exec_t) -role system_r types ssh_keygen_t; type sshd_exec_t; corecmd_executable_file(sshd_exec_t) @@ -33,17 +44,12 @@ corecmd_executable_file(sshd_exec_t) ssh_server_template(sshd) init_daemon_domain(sshd_t, sshd_exec_t) +type sshd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(sshd_initrc_exec_t) + type sshd_key_t; files_type(sshd_key_t) -type sshd_tmp_t; -files_tmp_file(sshd_tmp_t) -files_poly_parent(sshd_tmp_t) - -ifdef(`enable_mcs',` - init_ranged_daemon_domain(sshd_t, sshd_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) -') - type ssh_t; type ssh_exec_t; typealias ssh_t alias { user_ssh_t staff_ssh_t sysadm_ssh_t }; @@ -76,8 +82,12 @@ ubac_constrained(ssh_tmpfs_t) type ssh_home_t; typealias ssh_home_t alias { home_ssh_t user_ssh_home_t user_home_ssh_t staff_home_ssh_t sysadm_home_ssh_t }; typealias ssh_home_t alias { auditadm_home_ssh_t secadm_home_ssh_t }; -files_type(ssh_home_t) userdom_user_home_content(ssh_home_t) +files_poly_parent(ssh_home_t) + +ifdef(`enable_mcs',` + init_ranged_daemon_domain(sshd_t, sshd_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) +') ############################## # @@ -88,6 +98,7 @@ allow ssh_t self:capability { setuid setgid dac_override dac_read_search }; allow ssh_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; allow ssh_t self:fd use; allow ssh_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow ssh_t self:key read; allow ssh_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow ssh_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; allow ssh_t self:shm create_shm_perms; @@ -95,15 +106,11 @@ allow ssh_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow ssh_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; allow ssh_t self:msg { send receive }; allow ssh_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +can_exec(ssh_t, ssh_exec_t) # Read the ssh key file. allow ssh_t sshd_key_t:file read_file_perms; -# Access the ssh temporary files. -allow ssh_t sshd_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms; -allow ssh_t sshd_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; -files_tmp_filetrans(ssh_t, sshd_tmp_t, { file dir }) - manage_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, ssh_tmpfs_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, ssh_tmpfs_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, ssh_tmpfs_t) @@ -113,20 +120,26 @@ fs_tmpfs_filetrans(ssh_t, ssh_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file } manage_dirs_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(ssh_t, ssh_home_t, { dir sock_file }) +userdom_read_all_users_keys(ssh_t) +userdom_stream_connect(ssh_t) +userdom_search_admin_dir(sshd_t) +userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(ssh_t, ssh_home_t, { dir sock_file }) # Allow the ssh program to communicate with ssh-agent. stream_connect_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t, ssh_agent_tmp_t, ssh_agent_type) allow ssh_t sshd_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; +allow ssh_t sshd_t:peer recv; # ssh client can manage the keys and config manage_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) # ssh servers can read the user keys and config -allow ssh_server ssh_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; -read_files_pattern(ssh_server, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) -read_lnk_files_pattern(ssh_server, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(ssh_server, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(ssh_server, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(ssh_server, ssh_home_t, dir) +userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(ssh_server, ssh_home_t, dir) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ssh_t) kernel_read_system_state(ssh_t) @@ -138,7 +151,11 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(ssh_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(ssh_t) corenet_tcp_connect_ssh_port(ssh_t) corenet_sendrecv_ssh_client_packets(ssh_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ssh_t) +#corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(ssh_t) +corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(ssh_t) +dev_read_rand(ssh_t) dev_read_urand(ssh_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(ssh_t) @@ -162,37 +179,36 @@ logging_read_generic_logs(ssh_t) auth_use_nsswitch(ssh_t) miscfiles_read_localization(ssh_t) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(ssh_t) seutil_read_config(ssh_t) userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(ssh_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(ssh_t) +userdom_search_admin_dir(ssh_t) # Write to the user domain tty. -userdom_use_user_terminals(ssh_t) -# needs to read krb tgt +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ssh_t) +# needs to read krb/write tgt userdom_read_user_tmp_files(ssh_t) +userdom_write_user_tmp_files(ssh_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(ssh_t) +userdom_rw_inherited_user_home_content_files(ssh_t) +userdom_read_home_certs(ssh_t) +userdom_home_manager(ssh_t) tunable_policy(`allow_ssh_keysign',` - domain_auto_trans(ssh_t, ssh_keysign_exec_t, ssh_keysign_t) - allow ssh_keysign_t ssh_t:fd use; - allow ssh_keysign_t ssh_t:process sigchld; - allow ssh_keysign_t ssh_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms; -') - -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(ssh_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(ssh_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(ssh_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(ssh_t) + domtrans_pattern(ssh_t, ssh_keysign_exec_t, ssh_keysign_t) ') # for port forwarding tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',` corenet_tcp_bind_ssh_port(ssh_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ssh_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(ssh_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_stream_connect_gkeyringd(ssh_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -200,6 +216,7 @@ optional_policy(` xserver_domtrans_xauth(ssh_t) ') + ############################## # # ssh_keysign_t local policy @@ -209,19 +226,14 @@ tunable_policy(`allow_ssh_keysign',` allow ssh_keysign_t self:capability { setgid setuid }; allow ssh_keysign_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms; - allow ssh_keysign_t sshd_key_t:file { getattr read }; + allow ssh_keysign_t sshd_key_t:file read_file_perms; + dev_read_rand(ssh_keysign_t) dev_read_urand(ssh_keysign_t) files_read_etc_files(ssh_keysign_t) ') -optional_policy(` - tunable_policy(`allow_ssh_keysign',` - nscd_socket_use(ssh_keysign_t) - ') -') - ################################# # # sshd local policy @@ -232,33 +244,46 @@ optional_policy(` # so a tunnel can point to another ssh tunnel allow sshd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; allow sshd_t self:key { search link write }; - -manage_dirs_pattern(sshd_t, sshd_tmp_t, sshd_tmp_t) -manage_files_pattern(sshd_t, sshd_tmp_t, sshd_tmp_t) -manage_sock_files_pattern(sshd_t, sshd_tmp_t, sshd_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(sshd_t, sshd_tmp_t, { dir file sock_file }) +allow sshd_t self:process setcurrent; kernel_search_key(sshd_t) kernel_link_key(sshd_t) term_use_all_ptys(sshd_t) term_setattr_all_ptys(sshd_t) +term_setattr_all_ttys(sshd_t) term_relabelto_all_ptys(sshd_t) +term_use_ptmx(sshd_t) # for X forwarding corenet_tcp_bind_xserver_port(sshd_t) corenet_sendrecv_xserver_server_packets(sshd_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(sshd_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(sshd_t) +userdom_manage_tmp_role(system_r, sshd_t) +userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users(sshd_t) +userdom_signal_unpriv_users(sshd_t) +userdom_dyntransition_unpriv_users(sshd_t) +userdom_dyntransition_admin_users(sshd_t) + tunable_policy(`ssh_sysadm_login',` # Relabel and access ptys created by sshd # ioctl is necessary for logout() processing for utmp entry and for w to # display the tty. # some versions of sshd on the new SE Linux require setattr - userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users(sshd_t) userdom_signal_all_users(sshd_t) -',` - userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users(sshd_t) - userdom_signal_unpriv_users(sshd_t) + userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users(sshd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + amanda_search_var_lib(sshd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + condor_rw_lib_files(sshd_t) + condor_rw_tcp_sockets_startd(sshd_t) + condor_rw_tcp_sockets_schedd(sshd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -266,11 +291,24 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + kerberos_keytab_template(sshd, sshd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ftp_dyntrans_sftpd(sshd_t) + ftp_dyntrans_anon_sftpd(sshd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gitosis_manage_lib_files(sshd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` inetd_tcp_service_domain(sshd_t, sshd_exec_t) ') optional_policy(` - kerberos_keytab_template(sshd, sshd_t) + nx_read_home_files(sshd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -284,6 +322,15 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + systemd_exec_systemctl(sshd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + usermanage_domtrans_passwd(sshd_t) + usermanage_read_crack_db(sshd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` unconfined_shell_domtrans(sshd_t) ') @@ -292,26 +339,26 @@ optional_policy(` ') ifdef(`TODO',` -tunable_policy(`ssh_sysadm_login',` - # Relabel and access ptys created by sshd - # ioctl is necessary for logout() processing for utmp entry and for w to - # display the tty. - # some versions of sshd on the new SE Linux require setattr - allow sshd_t ptyfile:chr_file relabelto; - - optional_policy(` - domain_trans(sshd_t, xauth_exec_t, userdomain) + tunable_policy(`ssh_sysadm_login',` + # Relabel and access ptys created by sshd + # ioctl is necessary for logout() processing for utmp entry and for w to + # display the tty. + # some versions of sshd on the new SE Linux require setattr + allow sshd_t ptyfile:chr_file relabelto; + + optional_policy(` + domain_trans(sshd_t, xauth_exec_t, userdomain) + ') + ',` + optional_policy(` + domain_trans(sshd_t, xauth_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain) + ') + # Relabel and access ptys created by sshd + # ioctl is necessary for logout() processing for utmp entry and for w to + # display the tty. + # some versions of sshd on the new SE Linux require setattr + allow sshd_t userpty_type:chr_file { relabelto rw_inherited_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms }; ') -',` - optional_policy(` - domain_trans(sshd_t, xauth_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain) - ') - # Relabel and access ptys created by sshd - # ioctl is necessary for logout() processing for utmp entry and for w to - # display the tty. - # some versions of sshd on the new SE Linux require setattr - allow sshd_t userpty_type:chr_file { relabelto read write getattr ioctl setattr }; -') ') dnl endif TODO ######################################## @@ -322,19 +369,26 @@ tunable_policy(`ssh_sysadm_login',` # ssh_keygen_t is the type of the ssh-keygen program when run at install time # and by sysadm_t +allow ssh_keygen_t self:capability dac_override; dontaudit ssh_keygen_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow ssh_keygen_t self:process { sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal }; - allow ssh_keygen_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow ssh_keygen_t sshd_key_t:file manage_file_perms; files_etc_filetrans(ssh_keygen_t, sshd_key_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(ssh_keygen_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(ssh_keygen_t, ssh_home_t, ssh_home_t) +userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(ssh_keygen_t, ssh_home_t, dir) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(ssh_keygen_t, ssh_home_t, dir) + +kernel_read_system_state(ssh_keygen_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ssh_keygen_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ssh_keygen_t) dev_read_sysfs(ssh_keygen_t) +dev_read_rand(ssh_keygen_t) dev_read_urand(ssh_keygen_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(ssh_keygen_t) @@ -351,9 +405,11 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(ssh_keygen_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(ssh_keygen_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(ssh_keygen_t) +userdom_use_user_terminals(ssh_keygen_t) -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(ssh_keygen_t) +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_nfs_files(ssh_keygen_t) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(ssh_keygen_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -363,3 +419,76 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` udev_read_db(ssh_keygen_t) ') + +#################################### +# +# ssh_dyntransition domain local policy +# + +allow ssh_dyntransition_domain self:capability { setuid sys_chroot setgid }; + +allow ssh_dyntransition_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +optional_policy(` + ssh_rw_stream_sockets(ssh_dyntransition_domain) + ssh_rw_tcp_sockets(ssh_dyntransition_domain) +') + +##################################### +# +# ssh_sandbox local policy +# + +allow sshd_t sshd_sandbox_t:process signal; + +init_ioctl_stream_sockets(sshd_sandbox_t) + +logging_send_audit_msgs(sshd_sandbox_t) + +###################################### +# +# chroot_user_t local policy +# + +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(chroot_user_t) +userdom_read_inherited_user_home_content_files(chroot_user_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(chroot_user_t) +userdom_exec_user_home_content_files(chroot_user_t) + +tunable_policy(`ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs',` + files_list_home(chroot_user_t) + userdom_read_user_home_content_files(chroot_user_t) + userdom_manage_user_home_content(chroot_user_t) +', ` + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_pattern(chroot_user_t, { dir file lnk_file }) +') + +tunable_policy(`ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs && use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(chroot_user_t) + fs_manage_nfs_files(chroot_user_t) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(chroot_user_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs && use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(chroot_user_t) + fs_manage_cifs_files(chroot_user_t) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(chroot_user_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`ssh_chroot_rw_homedirs && use_fusefs_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(chroot_user_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_files(chroot_user_t) + fs_manage_fusefs_symlinks(chroot_user_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_read_cifs_files(chroot_user_t) + fs_read_cifs_symlinks(chroot_user_t) +') + +userdom_home_manager(chroot_user_t) + +optional_policy(` + ssh_rw_dgram_sockets(chroot_user_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sssd.fc b/policy/modules/services/sssd.fc index 4271815..4bc00ea 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sssd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/sssd.fc @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ /var/lib/sss(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/sss/mc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_public_t,s0) + /var/lib/sss/pubconf(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_public_t,s0) /var/log/sssd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sssd_var_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sssd.if b/policy/modules/services/sssd.if index 941380a..e1095f0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sssd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/sssd.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run sssd. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`sssd_domtrans',` @@ -89,6 +89,7 @@ interface(`sssd_manage_pids',` type sssd_var_run_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) manage_dirs_pattern($1, sssd_var_run_t, sssd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern($1, sssd_var_run_t, sssd_var_run_t) ') @@ -128,7 +129,6 @@ interface(`sssd_dontaudit_search_lib',` ') dontaudit $1 sssd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; - files_search_var_lib($1) ') ######################################## @@ -148,6 +148,7 @@ interface(`sssd_read_lib_files',` files_search_var_lib($1) read_files_pattern($1, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t) ') ######################################## @@ -168,6 +169,7 @@ interface(`sssd_manage_lib_files',` files_search_var_lib($1) manage_files_pattern($1, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t) ') ######################################## @@ -193,7 +195,7 @@ interface(`sssd_dbus_chat',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to sssd over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to sssd over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -225,21 +227,18 @@ interface(`sssd_stream_connect',` ## The role to be allowed to manage the sssd domain. ## ## -## -## -## The type of the user terminal. -## -## ## # interface(`sssd_admin',` gen_require(` - type sssd_t, sssd_public_t; - type sssd_initrc_exec_t; + type sssd_t, sssd_public_t, sssd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 sssd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; - read_files_pattern($1, sssd_t, sssd_t) + allow $1 sssd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, sssd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 sssd_t:process ptrace; + ') # Allow sssd_t to restart the apache service sssd_initrc_domtrans($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sssd.te b/policy/modules/services/sssd.te index 8ffa257..1dfa5ce 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sssd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/sssd.te @@ -17,6 +17,7 @@ files_pid_file(sssd_public_t) type sssd_var_lib_t; files_type(sssd_var_lib_t) +mls_trusted_object(sssd_var_lib_t) type sssd_var_log_t; logging_log_file(sssd_var_log_t) @@ -28,9 +29,11 @@ files_pid_file(sssd_var_run_t) # # sssd local policy # -allow sssd_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override kill sys_nice setgid setuid }; -allow sssd_t self:process { setfscreate setsched sigkill signal getsched }; -allow sssd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + +allow sssd_t self:capability { chown dac_read_search dac_override kill net_admin sys_nice setgid setuid sys_admin sys_resource }; +allow sssd_t self:process { setfscreate setsched sigkill signal getsched setrlimit }; +allow sssd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow sssd_t self:key manage_key_perms; allow sssd_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; manage_dirs_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_public_t, sssd_public_t) @@ -38,8 +41,9 @@ manage_files_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_public_t, sssd_public_t) manage_dirs_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_lib_t, sssd_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(sssd_t, sssd_var_lib_t, { file dir } ) +files_var_lib_filetrans(sssd_t, sssd_var_lib_t, { file dir }) manage_files_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_log_t, sssd_var_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(sssd_t, sssd_var_log_t, file) @@ -48,18 +52,25 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_run_t, sssd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(sssd_t, sssd_var_run_t, sssd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(sssd_t, sssd_var_run_t, { file dir }) +kernel_read_network_state(sssd_t) kernel_read_system_state(sssd_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_port(sssd_t) +corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_ports(sssd_t) + corecmd_exec_bin(sssd_t) dev_read_urand(sssd_t) +dev_read_sysfs(sssd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(sssd_t) domain_obj_id_change_exemption(sssd_t) files_list_tmp(sssd_t) files_read_etc_files(sssd_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(sssd_t) files_read_usr_files(sssd_t) +files_list_var_lib(sssd_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(sssd_t) @@ -68,10 +79,14 @@ selinux_validate_context(sssd_t) seutil_read_file_contexts(sssd_t) mls_file_read_to_clearance(sssd_t) +mls_socket_read_to_clearance(sssd_t) +mls_socket_write_to_clearance(sssd_t) +mls_trusted_object(sssd_t) -auth_use_nsswitch(sssd_t) +# auth_use_nsswitch(sssd_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(sssd_t) auth_domtrans_upd_passwd(sssd_t) +auth_manage_cache(sssd_t) init_read_utmp(sssd_t) @@ -79,6 +94,12 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(sssd_t) logging_send_audit_msgs(sssd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(sssd_t) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(sssd_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(sssd_t) +sysnet_use_ldap(sssd_t) + +userdom_manage_tmp_role(system_r, sssd_t) optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(sssd_t) @@ -87,4 +108,18 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` kerberos_manage_host_rcache(sssd_t) + kerberos_read_home_content(sssd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dirsrv_stream_connect(sssd_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + ldap_stream_connect(sssd_t) +') + +userdom_home_reader(sssd_t) + + + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/stunnel.if b/policy/modules/services/stunnel.if index 6073656..eaf49b2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/stunnel.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/stunnel.if @@ -20,6 +20,6 @@ interface(`stunnel_service_domain',` type stunnel_t; ') - domtrans_pattern(stunnel_t,$2,$1) + domtrans_pattern(stunnel_t, $2, $1) allow $1 stunnel_t:tcp_socket rw_socket_perms; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/stunnel.te b/policy/modules/services/stunnel.te index f646c66..5370bb8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/stunnel.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/stunnel.te @@ -6,17 +6,9 @@ policy_module(stunnel, 1.10.0) # type stunnel_t; -domain_type(stunnel_t) -role system_r types stunnel_t; - type stunnel_exec_t; -domain_entry_file(stunnel_t, stunnel_exec_t) - -ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` - init_daemon_domain(stunnel_t, stunnel_exec_t) -',` - inetd_tcp_service_domain(stunnel_t, stunnel_exec_t) -') +init_daemon_domain(stunnel_t, stunnel_exec_t) +inetd_tcp_service_domain(stunnel_t, stunnel_exec_t) type stunnel_etc_t; files_config_file(stunnel_etc_t) @@ -40,7 +32,7 @@ allow stunnel_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow stunnel_t stunnel_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow stunnel_t stunnel_etc_t:file read_file_perms; -allow stunnel_t stunnel_etc_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow stunnel_t stunnel_etc_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(stunnel_t, stunnel_tmp_t, stunnel_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(stunnel_t, stunnel_tmp_t, stunnel_tmp_t) @@ -77,7 +69,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(stunnel_t) sysnet_read_config(stunnel_t) -ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` +ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` dontaudit stunnel_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow stunnel_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -120,4 +112,5 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` gen_require(` type stunnel_port_t; ') + allow stunnel_t stunnel_port_t:tcp_socket name_bind; diff --git a/policy/modules/services/svnserve.fc b/policy/modules/services/svnserve.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..5ab0840 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/svnserve.fc @@ -0,0 +1,12 @@ +/etc/rc.d/init.d/svnserve -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:svnserve_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/svnserve -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:svnserve_exec_t,s0) + +/lib/systemd/system/svnserve\.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:svnserve_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/svnserve\.service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:svnserve_unit_file_t,s0) + +/var/run/svnserve(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:svnserve_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/svnserve.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:svnserve_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/subversion/repo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:svnserve_content_t,s0) +/var/lib/subversion/repo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:svnserve_content_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/svnserve.if b/policy/modules/services/svnserve.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..bab5617 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/svnserve.if @@ -0,0 +1,125 @@ + +## policy for svnserve + + +######################################## +## +## Transition to svnserve. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`svnserve_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type svnserve_t, svnserve_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, svnserve_exec_t, svnserve_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute svnserve server in the svnserve domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`svnserve_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type svnserve_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, svnserve_initrc_exec_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute svnserve server in the svnserve domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`svnserve_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type svnserve_t; + type svnserve_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_password_run($1) + allow $1 svnserve_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 svnserve_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, svnserve_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read svnserve PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`svnserve_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type svnserve_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 svnserve_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an svnserve environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`svnserve_admin',` + gen_require(` + type svnserve_t; + type svnserve_var_run_t; + type svnserve_unit_file_t; + ') + + allow $1 svnserve_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, svnserve_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, svnserve_var_run_t) + + svnserve_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, svnserve_unit_file_t) + allow $1 svnserve_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/svnserve.te b/policy/modules/services/svnserve.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df04e25 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/svnserve.te @@ -0,0 +1,54 @@ +policy_module(svnserve, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type svnserve_t; +type svnserve_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(svnserve_t, svnserve_exec_t) + +type svnserve_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(svnserve_initrc_exec_t) + +type svnserve_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(svnserve_var_run_t) + +type svnserve_content_t; +files_type(svnserve_content_t) + +type svnserve_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(svnserve_unit_file_t) + +######################################## +# +# svnserve local policy +# + +allow svnserve_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow svnserve_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(svnserve_t, svnserve_content_t, svnserve_content_t) +manage_files_pattern(svnserve_t, svnserve_content_t, svnserve_content_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(svnserve_t, svnserve_var_run_t, svnserve_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(svnserve_t, svnserve_var_run_t, svnserve_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(svnserve_t, svnserve_var_run_t, { dir file }) + +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(svnserve_t) +#corenet_tcp_connect_svn_port(svnserve_t) +#corenet_tcp_bind_svn_port(svnserve_t) +#corenet_udp_bind_svn_port(svnserve_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(svnserve_t) + +files_read_etc_files(svnserve_t) +files_read_usr_files(svnserve_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(svnserve_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(svnserve_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(svnserve_t) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sysstat.fc b/policy/modules/services/sysstat.fc index 08d999c..bca4388 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sysstat.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/sysstat.fc @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ -/usr/lib(64)?/atsar/atsa.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/sa/sa.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/sysstat/sa.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/atsar/atsa.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/sa/sa.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/sysstat/sa.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_exec_t,s0) /var/log/atsar(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_log_t,s0) /var/log/sa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:sysstat_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/sysstat.te b/policy/modules/services/sysstat.te index 52f0d6c..1473d95 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/sysstat.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/sysstat.te @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ policy_module(sysstat, 1.6.0) type sysstat_t; type sysstat_exec_t; init_system_domain(sysstat_t, sysstat_exec_t) -role system_r types sysstat_t; type sysstat_log_t; logging_log_file(sysstat_log_t) @@ -18,8 +17,7 @@ logging_log_file(sysstat_log_t) # Local policy # -allow sysstat_t self:capability { dac_override sys_resource sys_tty_config }; -dontaudit sysstat_t self:capability sys_admin; +allow sysstat_t self:capability { dac_override sys_admin sys_resource sys_tty_config }; allow sysstat_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; can_exec(sysstat_t, sysstat_exec_t) @@ -36,6 +34,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(sysstat_t) kernel_read_fs_sysctls(sysstat_t) kernel_read_rpc_sysctls(sysstat_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(sysstat_t) corecmd_exec_bin(sysstat_t) dev_read_urand(sysstat_t) @@ -51,12 +50,16 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(sysstat_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(sysstat_t) term_use_console(sysstat_t) -term_use_all_terms(sysstat_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(sysstat_t) init_use_fds(sysstat_t) locallogin_use_fds(sysstat_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(sysstat_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(sysstat_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(sysstat_t) userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(sysstat_t) @@ -64,7 +67,3 @@ userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs(sysstat_t) optional_policy(` cron_system_entry(sysstat_t, sysstat_exec_t) ') - -optional_policy(` - logging_send_syslog_msg(sysstat_t) -') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tcpd.te b/policy/modules/services/tcpd.te index 7038b55..4e84f23 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tcpd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/tcpd.te @@ -7,7 +7,6 @@ policy_module(tcpd, 1.4.0) type tcpd_t; type tcpd_exec_t; inetd_tcp_service_domain(tcpd_t, tcpd_exec_t) -role system_r types tcpd_t; type tcpd_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(tcpd_tmp_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tcsd.if b/policy/modules/services/tcsd.if index 595f5a7..0f12947 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tcsd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/tcsd.if @@ -137,8 +137,11 @@ interface(`tcsd_admin',` type tcsd_var_lib_t; ') - allow $1 tcsd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 tcsd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, tcsd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 tcsd_t:process ptrace; + ') tcsd_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -147,4 +150,5 @@ interface(`tcsd_admin',` files_search_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, tcsd_var_lib_t) + ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tcsd.te b/policy/modules/services/tcsd.te index ee9f3c6..30d2c75 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tcsd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/tcsd.te @@ -29,13 +29,11 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(tcsd_t, tcsd_var_lib_t, tcsd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(tcsd_t, tcsd_var_lib_t, tcsd_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(tcsd_t, tcsd_var_lib_t, { file dir }) -# Accept connections on the TCS port over loopback. corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(tcsd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(tcsd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_tcs_port(tcsd_t) dev_read_urand(tcsd_t) -# Access /dev/tpm0. dev_rw_tpm(tcsd_t) files_read_etc_files(tcsd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/telnet.if b/policy/modules/services/telnet.if index 58e7ec0..e4119f7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/telnet.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/telnet.if @@ -1 +1,19 @@ ## Telnet daemon + +######################################## +## +## Read and write a telnetd domain pty. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`telnet_use_ptys',` + gen_require(` + type telnetd_devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 telnetd_devpts_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/telnet.te b/policy/modules/services/telnet.te index f40e67b..8d1e658 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/telnet.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/telnet.te @@ -8,7 +8,6 @@ policy_module(telnet, 1.10.0) type telnetd_t; type telnetd_exec_t; inetd_service_domain(telnetd_t, telnetd_exec_t) -role system_r types telnetd_t; type telnetd_devpts_t; #, userpty_type; term_login_pty(telnetd_devpts_t) @@ -24,21 +23,19 @@ files_pid_file(telnetd_var_run_t) # Local policy # -allow telnetd_t self:capability { fsetid chown fowner sys_tty_config dac_override }; +allow telnetd_t self:capability { fsetid chown fowner setuid setgid sys_tty_config dac_override }; allow telnetd_t self:process signal_perms; allow telnetd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow telnetd_t self:tcp_socket connected_stream_socket_perms; allow telnetd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; # for identd; cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules? allow telnetd_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; -allow telnetd_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; -allow telnetd_t telnetd_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr }; +allow telnetd_t telnetd_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms }; term_create_pty(telnetd_t, telnetd_devpts_t) manage_dirs_pattern(telnetd_t, telnetd_tmp_t, telnetd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(telnetd_t, telnetd_tmp_t, telnetd_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(telnetd_t, telnetd_tmp_t, { file dir }) manage_files_pattern(telnetd_t, telnetd_var_run_t, telnetd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(telnetd_t, telnetd_var_run_t, file) @@ -70,8 +67,6 @@ corecmd_search_bin(telnetd_t) files_read_usr_files(telnetd_t) files_read_etc_files(telnetd_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(telnetd_t) -# for identd; cjp: this should probably only be inetd_child rules? -files_search_home(telnetd_t) init_rw_utmp(telnetd_t) @@ -81,15 +76,10 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(telnetd_t) seutil_read_config(telnetd_t) -remotelogin_domtrans(telnetd_t) - userdom_search_user_home_dirs(telnetd_t) userdom_setattr_user_ptys(telnetd_t) - -optional_policy(` - kerberos_keytab_template(telnetd, telnetd_t) - kerberos_manage_host_rcache(telnetd_t) -') +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(telnetd_t) +userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp(telnetd_t, file) tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` fs_search_nfs(telnetd_t) @@ -98,3 +88,12 @@ tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` fs_search_cifs(telnetd_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + kerberos_keytab_template(telnetd, telnetd_t) + kerberos_manage_host_rcache(telnetd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + remotelogin_domtrans(telnetd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tftp.fc b/policy/modules/services/tftp.fc index 25eee43..621f343 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tftp.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/tftp.fc @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ +/etc/xinetd\.d/tftp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tftpd_etc_t,s0) /usr/sbin/atftpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tftpd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/in\.tftpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tftpd_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tftp.if b/policy/modules/services/tftp.if index 38bb312..4b691ac 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tftp.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/tftp.if @@ -13,9 +13,33 @@ interface(`tftp_read_content',` gen_require(` type tftpdir_t; + type tftpdir_rw_t; ') read_files_pattern($1, tftpdir_t, tftpdir_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, tftpdir_t, tftpdir_t) + + read_files_pattern($1, tftpdir_rw_t, tftpdir_rw_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, tftpdir_rw_t, tftpdir_rw_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search tftp /var/lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`tftp_search_rw_content',` + gen_require(` + type tftpdir_rw_t; + ') + + search_dirs_pattern($1, tftpdir_rw_t, tftpdir_rw_t) + files_search_var_lib($1) ') ######################################## @@ -40,6 +64,91 @@ interface(`tftp_manage_rw_content',` ######################################## ## +## Read tftp config files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`tftp_read_config',` + gen_require(` + type tftpd_etc_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, tftpd_etc_t, tftpd_etc_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage tftp config files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`tftp_manage_config',` + gen_require(` + type tftpd_etc_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, tftpd_etc_t, tftpd_etc_t) + files_etc_filetrans($1, tftpd_etc_t, file, "tftp") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in tftpdir directories +## with specified types. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Private file type. +## +## +## +## +## Class of the object being created. +## +## +# +interface(`tftp_filetrans_tftpdir',` + gen_require(` + type tftpdir_rw_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, tftpdir_rw_t, $2, $3) + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to tftp named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`tftp_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type tftpd_etc_t; + ') + + files_etc_filetrans($1, tftpd_etc_t, file, "tftp") +') + +######################################## +## ## All of the rules required to administrate ## an tftp environment ## @@ -55,13 +164,19 @@ interface(`tftp_admin',` type tftpd_t, tftpdir_t, tftpdir_rw_t, tftpd_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 tftpd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 tftpd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, tftpd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 tftp_t:process ptrace; + ') + files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, tftpdir_rw_t) admin_pattern($1, tftpdir_t) files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, tftpd_var_run_t) + + tftp_manage_config($1) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tftp.te b/policy/modules/services/tftp.te index d50c10d..e0c6d19 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tftp.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/tftp.te @@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ policy_module(tftp, 1.12.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow tftp to modify public files -## used for public file transfer services. -##

    +##

    +## Allow tftp to modify public files +## used for public file transfer services. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(tftp_anon_write, false) @@ -26,21 +26,26 @@ files_type(tftpdir_t) type tftpdir_rw_t; files_type(tftpdir_rw_t) +type tftpd_etc_t; +files_config_file(tftpd_etc_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy # allow tftpd_t self:capability { setgid setuid sys_chroot }; +dontaudit tftpd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow tftpd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow tftpd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow tftpd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow tftpd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -dontaudit tftpd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow tftpd_t tftpdir_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow tftpd_t tftpdir_t:file read_file_perms; -allow tftpd_t tftpdir_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; +allow tftpd_t tftpdir_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + +read_files_pattern(tftpd_t, tftpd_etc_t, tftpd_etc_t) manage_dirs_pattern(tftpd_t, tftpdir_rw_t, tftpdir_rw_t) manage_files_pattern(tftpd_t, tftpdir_rw_t, tftpdir_rw_t) @@ -94,6 +99,10 @@ tunable_policy(`tftp_anon_write',` ') optional_policy(` + cobbler_read_lib_files(tftpd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` inetd_udp_service_domain(tftpd_t, tftpd_exec_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tgtd.fc b/policy/modules/services/tgtd.fc index 8294f6f..4847b43 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tgtd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/tgtd.fc @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/tgtd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tgtd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/tgtd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tgtd_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/tgtd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tgtd_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/run/tgtd.* -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:tgtd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tgtd.te b/policy/modules/services/tgtd.te index 665bf7c..55c5868 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tgtd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/tgtd.te @@ -21,6 +21,9 @@ files_tmpfs_file(tgtd_tmpfs_t) type tgtd_var_lib_t; files_type(tgtd_var_lib_t) +type tgtd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(tgtd_var_run_t) + ######################################## # # TGTD personal policy. @@ -29,7 +32,7 @@ files_type(tgtd_var_lib_t) allow tgtd_t self:capability sys_resource; allow tgtd_t self:process { setrlimit signal }; allow tgtd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -allow tgtd_t self:netlink_route_socket { create_socket_perms nlmsg_read }; +allow tgtd_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; allow tgtd_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow tgtd_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow tgtd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -46,6 +49,12 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_lib_t, tgtd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_lib_t, tgtd_var_lib_t) files_var_lib_filetrans(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_lib_t, { dir file }) +manage_dirs_pattern(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_run_t,tgtd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_run_t,tgtd_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(tgtd_t, tgtd_var_run_t,tgtd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(tgtd_t,tgtd_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(tgtd_t) kernel_read_fs_sysctls(tgtd_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(tgtd_t) @@ -57,10 +66,18 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(tgtd_t) corenet_tcp_bind_iscsi_port(tgtd_t) corenet_sendrecv_iscsi_server_packets(tgtd_t) +dev_read_sysfs(tgtd_t) + files_read_etc_files(tgtd_t) +fs_read_anon_inodefs_files(tgtd_t) + storage_manage_fixed_disk(tgtd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(tgtd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(tgtd_t) + +optional_policy(` + iscsi_manage_semaphores(tgtd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tor.fc b/policy/modules/services/tor.fc index e2e06b2..6752bc3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tor.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/tor.fc @@ -4,6 +4,8 @@ /usr/bin/tor -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tor_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/tor -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tor_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/tor.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tor_unit_file_t,s0) + /var/lib/tor(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tor_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/tor-data(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tor_var_lib_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tor.if b/policy/modules/services/tor.if index 904f13e..26f16dd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tor.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/tor.if @@ -18,6 +18,30 @@ interface(`tor_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, tor_exec_t, tor_t) ') +####################################### +## +## Execute tor server in the tor domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`tor_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type tor_t; + type tor_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_password_run($1) + allow $1 tor_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 tor_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, tor_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## All of the rules required to administrate @@ -40,10 +64,14 @@ interface(`tor_admin',` type tor_t, tor_var_log_t, tor_etc_t; type tor_var_lib_t, tor_var_run_t; type tor_initrc_exec_t; + type tor_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 tor_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 tor_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, tor_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 tor_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, tor_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -61,4 +89,13 @@ interface(`tor_admin',` files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, tor_var_run_t) + + tor_systemctl($1) + admin_pattern($1, tor_unit_file_t) + allow $1 tor_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; + + optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_exec($1) + systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run($1) + ') ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tor.te b/policy/modules/services/tor.te index c842cad..799fac3 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tor.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/tor.te @@ -36,12 +36,16 @@ logging_log_file(tor_var_log_t) type tor_var_run_t; files_pid_file(tor_var_run_t) +type tor_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(tor_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # tor local policy # allow tor_t self:capability { setgid setuid sys_tty_config }; +allow tor_t self:process signal; allow tor_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow tor_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow tor_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; @@ -87,6 +91,7 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_reserved_ports(tor_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(tor_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(tor_t) corenet_tcp_bind_tor_port(tor_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_tor_socks_port(tor_t) corenet_udp_bind_dns_port(tor_t) corenet_sendrecv_tor_server_packets(tor_t) corenet_sendrecv_dns_server_packets(tor_t) @@ -95,9 +100,11 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(tor_t) corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(tor_t) # ... especially including port 80 and other privileged ports corenet_tcp_connect_all_reserved_ports(tor_t) +corenet_udp_bind_dns_port(tor_t) # tor uses crypto and needs random dev_read_urand(tor_t) +dev_read_sysfs(tor_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(tor_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tuned.fc b/policy/modules/services/tuned.fc index 639c962..8488152 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tuned.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/tuned.fc @@ -1,8 +1,12 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/tuned -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tuned_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/tuned(/.)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tuned_etc_t,s0) +/etc/tuned/active_profile -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tuned_rw_etc_t,s0) + /usr/sbin/tuned -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tuned_exec_t,s0) /var/log/tuned(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tuned_log_t,s0) /var/log/tuned\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tuned_log_t,s0) +/var/run/tuned(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:tuned_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/tuned\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:tuned_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tuned.if b/policy/modules/services/tuned.if index 54b8605..a04f013 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tuned.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/tuned.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run tuned. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`tuned_domtrans',` @@ -112,18 +112,20 @@ interface(`tuned_initrc_domtrans',` # interface(`tuned_admin',` gen_require(` - type tuned_t, tuned_var_run_t; - type tuned_initrc_exec_t; + type tuned_t, tuned_var_run_t, tuned_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 tuned_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 tuned_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, tuned_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 tuned_t:process ptrace; + ') tuned_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 tuned_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; - files_search_pids($1) + files_list_pids($1) admin_pattern($1, tuned_var_run_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/tuned.te b/policy/modules/services/tuned.te index db9d2a5..da20967 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/tuned.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/tuned.te @@ -12,6 +12,12 @@ init_daemon_domain(tuned_t, tuned_exec_t) type tuned_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(tuned_initrc_exec_t) +type tuned_etc_t; +files_config_file(tuned_etc_t) + +type tuned_rw_etc_t; +files_config_file(tuned_rw_etc_t) + type tuned_log_t; logging_log_file(tuned_log_t) @@ -23,23 +29,38 @@ files_pid_file(tuned_var_run_t) # tuned local policy # +allow tuned_t self:process signal; + dontaudit tuned_t self:capability { dac_override sys_tty_config }; +allow tuned_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow tuned_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +read_files_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_etc_t, tuned_etc_t) + +manage_files_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_etc_t, tuned_rw_etc_t) manage_dirs_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_log_t, tuned_log_t) manage_files_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_log_t, tuned_log_t) -logging_log_filetrans(tuned_t, tuned_log_t, file) +logging_log_filetrans(tuned_t, tuned_log_t, file, "tuned.log") manage_files_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_var_run_t, tuned_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(tuned_t, tuned_var_run_t, file) +manage_dirs_pattern(tuned_t, tuned_var_run_t, tuned_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(tuned_t, tuned_var_run_t, { dir file }) corecmd_exec_shell(tuned_t) corecmd_exec_bin(tuned_t) kernel_read_system_state(tuned_t) kernel_read_network_state(tuned_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(tuned_t) +kernel_rw_hotplug_sysctls(tuned_t) +kernel_rw_vm_sysctls(tuned_t) +dev_getattr_all_blk_files(tuned_t) +dev_getattr_all_chr_files(tuned_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(tuned_t) dev_read_urand(tuned_t) -dev_read_sysfs(tuned_t) +dev_rw_sysfs(tuned_t) # to allow cpu tuning dev_rw_netcontrol(tuned_t) @@ -47,6 +68,10 @@ files_read_etc_files(tuned_t) files_read_usr_files(tuned_t) files_dontaudit_search_home(tuned_t) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(tuned_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(tuned_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(tuned_t) miscfiles_read_localization(tuned_t) @@ -58,6 +83,14 @@ optional_policy(` fstools_domtrans(tuned_t) ') +optional_policy(` + gnome_dontaudit_search_config(tuned_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_domtrans(tuned_t) +') + # to allow network interface tuning optional_policy(` sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(tuned_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ucspitcp.if b/policy/modules/services/ucspitcp.if index c1feba4..1f6f55b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ucspitcp.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ucspitcp.if @@ -20,7 +20,7 @@ ## ## # -interface(`ucspitcp_service_domain', ` +interface(`ucspitcp_service_domain',` gen_require(` type ucspitcp_t; role system_r; @@ -31,8 +31,5 @@ interface(`ucspitcp_service_domain', ` role system_r types $1; - domain_auto_trans(ucspitcp_t, $2, $1) - allow $1 ucspitcp_t:fd use; - allow $1 ucspitcp_t:process sigchld; - allow $1 ucspitcp_t:tcp_socket rw_stream_socket_perms; + domtrans_pattern(ucspitcp_t, $2, $1) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ucspitcp.te b/policy/modules/services/ucspitcp.te index a0794bf..37c056b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ucspitcp.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ucspitcp.te @@ -8,12 +8,10 @@ policy_module(ucspitcp, 1.3.0) type rblsmtpd_t; type rblsmtpd_exec_t; init_system_domain(rblsmtpd_t, rblsmtpd_exec_t) -role system_r types rblsmtpd_t; type ucspitcp_t; type ucspitcp_exec_t; init_system_domain(ucspitcp_t, ucspitcp_exec_t) -role system_r types ucspitcp_t; ######################################## # @@ -89,5 +87,7 @@ sysnet_read_config(ucspitcp_t) optional_policy(` daemontools_service_domain(ucspitcp_t, ucspitcp_exec_t) + daemontools_sigchld_run(ucspitcp_t) daemontools_read_svc(ucspitcp_t) ') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ulogd.fc b/policy/modules/services/ulogd.fc index 831b4a3..8590730 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ulogd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/ulogd.fc @@ -1,7 +1,7 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ulogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ulogd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/ulogd.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ulogd_etc_t,s0) -/usr/lib/ulogd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ulogd_modules_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ulogd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ulogd_modules_t,s0) /usr/sbin/ulogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ulogd_exec_t,s0) /var/log/ulogd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ulogd_var_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ulogd.if b/policy/modules/services/ulogd.if index d23be5c..a05cd68 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ulogd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/ulogd.if @@ -123,8 +123,11 @@ interface(`ulogd_admin',` type ulogd_var_log_t, ulogd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 ulogd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 ulogd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, ulogd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 ulogd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, ulogd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/ulogd.te b/policy/modules/services/ulogd.te index 3b953f5..70f687a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/ulogd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/ulogd.te @@ -11,7 +11,7 @@ init_daemon_domain(ulogd_t, ulogd_exec_t) # config files type ulogd_etc_t; -files_type(ulogd_etc_t) +files_config_file(ulogd_etc_t) type ulogd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(ulogd_initrc_exec_t) @@ -29,8 +29,13 @@ logging_log_file(ulogd_var_log_t) # ulogd local policy # -allow ulogd_t self:capability net_admin; +allow ulogd_t self:capability { net_admin sys_nice }; +allow ulogd_t self:process { setsched }; allow ulogd_t self:netlink_nflog_socket create_socket_perms; +allow ulogd_t self:netlink_route_socket r_netlink_socket_perms; +allow ulogd_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; +allow ulogd_t self:tcp_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connect }; +allow ulogd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; # config files read_files_pattern(ulogd_t, ulogd_etc_t, ulogd_etc_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/uptime.te b/policy/modules/services/uptime.te index c2cf97e..1f8f768 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/uptime.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/uptime.te @@ -13,7 +13,7 @@ type uptimed_etc_t alias etc_uptimed_t; files_config_file(uptimed_etc_t) type uptimed_spool_t; -files_type(uptimed_spool_t) +files_spool_file(uptimed_spool_t) type uptimed_var_run_t; files_pid_file(uptimed_var_run_t) @@ -25,7 +25,7 @@ files_pid_file(uptimed_var_run_t) dontaudit uptimed_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow uptimed_t self:process signal_perms; -allow uptimed_t self:fifo_file write_file_perms; +allow uptimed_t self:fifo_file write_fifo_file_perms; allow uptimed_t uptimed_etc_t:file read_file_perms; files_search_etc(uptimed_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/usbmuxd.te b/policy/modules/services/usbmuxd.te index 4440aa6..34ffbfd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/usbmuxd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/usbmuxd.te @@ -40,3 +40,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(usbmuxd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(usbmuxd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(usbmuxd_t) + +optional_policy(` + virt_dontaudit_read_chr_dev(usbmuxd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/uucp.if b/policy/modules/services/uucp.if index ebc5414..8f8ac45 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/uucp.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/uucp.if @@ -99,8 +99,11 @@ interface(`uucp_admin',` type uucpd_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 uucpd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 uucpd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, uucpd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 uucpd_t:process ptrace; + ') logging_list_logs($1) admin_pattern($1, uucpd_log_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/uucp.te b/policy/modules/services/uucp.te index d4349e9..f14d337 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/uucp.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/uucp.te @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ type uucpd_ro_t; files_type(uucpd_ro_t) type uucpd_spool_t; -files_type(uucpd_spool_t) +files_spool_file(uucpd_spool_t) type uucpd_log_t; logging_log_file(uucpd_log_t) @@ -125,6 +125,8 @@ optional_policy(` allow uux_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; allow uux_t self:fifo_file write_fifo_file_perms; +domtrans_pattern(uux_t, uucpd_exec_t, uucpd_t) + uucp_append_log(uux_t) uucp_manage_spool(uux_t) @@ -145,5 +147,5 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(uux_t) + postfix_rw_master_pipes(uux_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/uuidd.fc b/policy/modules/services/uuidd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..d810232 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/uuidd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,8 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/uuidd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:uuidd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/uuidd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:uuidd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/libuuid(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:uuidd_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/run/uuidd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:uuidd_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/uuidd.if b/policy/modules/services/uuidd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2c30e5b --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/uuidd.if @@ -0,0 +1,194 @@ +## policy for uuidd + +######################################## +## +## Transition to uuidd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`uuidd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type uuidd_t, uuidd_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, uuidd_exec_t, uuidd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute uuidd server in the uuidd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`uuidd_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type uuidd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, uuidd_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search uuidd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`uuidd_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type uuidd_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 uuidd_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read uuidd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`uuidd_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type uuidd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, uuidd_var_lib_t, uuidd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage uuidd lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`uuidd_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type uuidd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, uuidd_var_lib_t, uuidd_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage uuidd lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`uuidd_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type uuidd_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, uuidd_var_lib_t, uuidd_var_lib_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read uuidd PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`uuidd_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type uuidd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 uuidd_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to uuidd over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`uuidd_stream_connect_manager',` + gen_require(` + type uuidd_t, uuidd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, uuidd_var_run_t, uuidd_var_run_t, uuidd_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an uuidd environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`uuidd_admin',` + gen_require(` + type uuidd_t, uuidd_initrc_exec_t; + type uuidd_var_run_t, uuidd_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 uuidd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, uuidd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 uuidd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + uuidd_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 uuidd_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, uuidd_var_lib_t) + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, uuidd_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/uuidd.te b/policy/modules/services/uuidd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..04589dc --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/uuidd.te @@ -0,0 +1,44 @@ +policy_module(uuidd, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type uuidd_t; +type uuidd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(uuidd_t, uuidd_exec_t) + +type uuidd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(uuidd_initrc_exec_t) + +type uuidd_var_lib_t; +files_type(uuidd_var_lib_t) + +type uuidd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(uuidd_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# uuidd local policy +# +allow uuidd_t self:capability setuid; +allow uuidd_t self:process signal; +allow uuidd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow uuidd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow uuidd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(uuidd_t, uuidd_var_lib_t, uuidd_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(uuidd_t, uuidd_var_lib_t, uuidd_var_lib_t) + +manage_dirs_pattern(uuidd_t, uuidd_var_run_t, uuidd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(uuidd_t, uuidd_var_run_t, uuidd_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(uuidd_t, uuidd_var_run_t, uuidd_var_run_t) + +dev_read_urand(uuidd_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(uuidd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(uuidd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(uuidd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/varnishd.if b/policy/modules/services/varnishd.if index 93975d6..7a665ff 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/varnishd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/varnishd.if @@ -155,8 +155,11 @@ interface(`varnishd_admin_varnishlog',` type varnishlog_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 varnishlog_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 varnishlog_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, varnishlog_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 varnishd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, varnishlog_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -194,8 +197,11 @@ interface(`varnishd_admin',` type varnishd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 varnishd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 varnishd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, varnishd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 varnishd_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, varnishd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/varnishd.te b/policy/modules/services/varnishd.te index f9310f3..a6ed441 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/varnishd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/varnishd.te @@ -6,10 +6,10 @@ policy_module(varnishd, 1.2.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow varnishd to connect to all ports, -## not just HTTP. -##

    +##

    +## Allow varnishd to connect to all ports, +## not just HTTP. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(varnishd_connect_any, false) @@ -21,7 +21,7 @@ type varnishd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(varnishd_initrc_exec_t) type varnishd_etc_t; -files_type(varnishd_etc_t) +files_config_file(varnishd_etc_t) type varnishd_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(varnishd_tmp_t) @@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ type varnishlog_var_run_t; files_pid_file(varnishlog_var_run_t) type varnishlog_log_t; -files_type(varnishlog_log_t) +logging_log_file(varnishlog_log_t) ######################################## # @@ -87,6 +87,8 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(varnishd_t) dev_read_urand(varnishd_t) +files_read_usr_files(varnishd_t) + fs_getattr_all_fs(varnishd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(varnishd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/vdagent.fc b/policy/modules/services/vdagent.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..2ba852c --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/vdagent.fc @@ -0,0 +1,10 @@ +/usr/sbin/spice-vdagentd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_exec_t,s0) + +/var/log/spice-vdagentd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_log_t,s0) +/var/log/spice-vdagentd\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/spice-vdagentd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/spice-vdagentd.\pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vdagent_var_run_t,s0) + + + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/vdagent.if b/policy/modules/services/vdagent.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8c74340 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/vdagent.if @@ -0,0 +1,122 @@ + +## policy for vdagent + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run vdagent. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`vdagent_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type vdagent_t, vdagent_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, vdagent_exec_t, vdagent_t) +') + +##################################### +## +## Getattr on vdagent executable. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`vdagent_getattr_exec_files',` + gen_require(` + type vdagent_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 vdagent_exec_t:file getattr; +') + +####################################### +## +## Get the attributes of vdagent logs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`vdagent_getattr_log',` + gen_require(` + type vdagent_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + allow $1 vdagent_log_t:file getattr_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read vdagent PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`vdagent_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type vdagent_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 vdagent_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +##################################### +## +## Connect to vdagent over a unix domain +## stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`vdagent_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type vdagent_var_run_t, vdagent_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, vdagent_var_run_t, vdagent_var_run_t, vdagent_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an vdagent environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`vdagent_admin',` + gen_require(` + type vdagent_t, vdagent_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 vdagent_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, vdagent_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 vdagent_t:process ptrace; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + admin_pattern($1, vdagent_var_run_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/vdagent.te b/policy/modules/services/vdagent.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..16033bd --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/vdagent.te @@ -0,0 +1,62 @@ +policy_module(vdagent,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type vdagent_t; +type vdagent_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(vdagent_t, vdagent_exec_t) + +type vdagent_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(vdagent_var_run_t) + +type vdagent_log_t; +logging_log_file(vdagent_log_t) + +######################################## +# +# vdagent local policy +# + +dontaudit vdagent_t self:capability sys_admin; +allow vdagent_t self:process signal; + +allow vdagent_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow vdagent_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(vdagent_t, vdagent_var_run_t, vdagent_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(vdagent_t, vdagent_var_run_t, vdagent_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(vdagent_t, vdagent_var_run_t, vdagent_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(vdagent_t, vdagent_var_run_t, { dir file sock_file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(vdagent_t, vdagent_log_t, vdagent_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(vdagent_t, vdagent_log_t, vdagent_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(vdagent_t, vdagent_log_t, { file }) + +dev_rw_input_dev(vdagent_t) +dev_read_sysfs(vdagent_t) +dev_dontaudit_write_mtrr(vdagent_t) + +files_read_etc_files(vdagent_t) + +init_read_state(vdagent_t) + +systemd_read_logind_sessions_files(vdagent_t) +systemd_login_read_pid_files(vdagent_t) + +term_use_virtio_console(vdagent_t) + +userdom_read_all_users_state(vdagent_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(vdagent_t) + +optional_policy(` + consolekit_dbus_chat(vdagent_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(vdagent_t) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/vhostmd.if b/policy/modules/services/vhostmd.if index 1f872b5..88a8157 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/vhostmd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/vhostmd.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run vhostmd. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`vhostmd_domtrans',` @@ -52,7 +52,7 @@ interface(`vhostmd_read_tmpfs_files',` ') allow $1 vhostmd_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms; - files_search_tmp($1) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) ') ######################################## @@ -90,7 +90,7 @@ interface(`vhostmd_rw_tmpfs_files',` ') rw_files_pattern($1, vhostmd_tmpfs_t, vhostmd_tmpfs_t) - files_search_tmp($1) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) ') ######################################## @@ -109,7 +109,7 @@ interface(`vhostmd_manage_tmpfs_files',` ') manage_files_pattern($1, vhostmd_tmpfs_t, vhostmd_tmpfs_t) - files_search_tmp($1) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) ') ######################################## @@ -146,12 +146,13 @@ interface(`vhostmd_manage_pid_files',` type vhostmd_var_run_t; ') - manage_files_pattern($1, vhostmd_var_run_t, vhostmd_var_run_t) + files_search_pids($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, vhostmd_var_run_t, vhostmd_var_run_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Connect to vhostmd over an unix domain stream socket. +## Connect to vhostmd over a unix domain stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -171,7 +172,7 @@ interface(`vhostmd_stream_connect',` ####################################### ## ## Dontaudit read and write to vhostmd -## over an unix domain stream socket. +## over a unix domain stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -209,8 +210,11 @@ interface(`vhostmd_admin',` type vhostmd_t, vhostmd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 vhostmd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms getattr }; + allow $1 vhostmd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, vhostmd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 vhostmd_t:process ptrace; + ') vhostmd_initrc_domtrans($1) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -220,5 +224,4 @@ interface(`vhostmd_admin',` vhostmd_manage_tmpfs_files($1) vhostmd_manage_pid_files($1) - ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/vhostmd.te b/policy/modules/services/vhostmd.te index 32a3c13..803eea6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/vhostmd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/vhostmd.te @@ -24,8 +24,8 @@ files_pid_file(vhostmd_var_run_t) # allow vhostmd_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock setuid setgid }; -allow vhostmd_t self:process { setsched getsched }; -allow vhostmd_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow vhostmd_t self:process { setsched getsched signal }; +allow vhostmd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(vhostmd_t, vhostmd_tmpfs_t, vhostmd_tmpfs_t) manage_files_pattern(vhostmd_t, vhostmd_tmpfs_t, vhostmd_tmpfs_t) @@ -35,6 +35,7 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(vhostmd_t, vhostmd_var_run_t, vhostmd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(vhostmd_t, vhostmd_var_run_t, vhostmd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(vhostmd_t, vhostmd_var_run_t, { file dir }) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(vhostmd_t) kernel_read_system_state(vhostmd_t) kernel_read_network_state(vhostmd_t) kernel_write_xen_state(vhostmd_t) @@ -44,9 +45,16 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(vhostmd_t) corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(vhostmd_t) +dev_read_rand(vhostmd_t) +dev_read_urand(vhostmd_t) +dev_read_sysfs(vhostmd_t) + +# 579803 +files_list_tmp(vhostmd_t) files_read_etc_files(vhostmd_t) files_read_usr_files(vhostmd_t) +dev_read_rand(vhostmd_t) dev_read_sysfs(vhostmd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(vhostmd_t) @@ -66,6 +74,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` virt_stream_connect(vhostmd_t) + virt_write_content(vhostmd_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/virt.fc b/policy/modules/services/virt.fc index 2124b6a..5072bd7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/virt.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/virt.fc @@ -1,5 +1,7 @@ -HOME_DIR/.virtinst(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_content_t,s0) -HOME_DIR/VirtualMachines(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_image_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/.libvirt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/.libvirt/qemu(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:svirt_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/.virtinst(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/VirtualMachines(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/VirtualMachines/isos(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_content_t,s0) /etc/libvirt -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_etc_t,s0) @@ -12,18 +14,49 @@ HOME_DIR/VirtualMachines/isos(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_content_t /etc/xen/[^/]* -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_etc_rw_t,s0) /etc/xen/.*/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_etc_rw_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/libvirt_lxc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_lxc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/qemu-bridge-helper gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_bridgehelper_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/libvirt-qmf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_qmf_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/libvirtd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/virsh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virsh_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/condor_vm-gahp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_exec_t,s0) -/var/cache/libvirt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:svirt_cache_t,s0) +/var/cache/libvirt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_cache_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) /var/lib/libvirt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/libvirt/boot(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_content_t,s0) /var/lib/libvirt/images(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_image_t,s0) /var/lib/libvirt/isos(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_content_t,s0) -/var/lib/libvirt/qemu(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:svirt_var_run_t,s0) +/var/lib/libvirt/qemu(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_var_run_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) +/var/log/log(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_log_t,s0) /var/log/libvirt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_log_t,s0) +/var/log/vdsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_log_t,s0) /var/run/libvirt(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_run_t,s0) -/var/run/libvirt/qemu(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:svirt_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/libvirt/qemu(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_var_run_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) +/var/run/libvirt/lxc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_lxc_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/libvirt-sandbox(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_lxc_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/vdsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_run_t,s0) /var/vdsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_run_t,s0) + +# support for AEOLUS project +/usr/bin/imagefactory -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/imgfac\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_exec_t,s0) +/var/cache/oz(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_cache_t,s0) +/var/lib/imagefactory/images(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_image_t,s0) +/var/lib/oz(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/oz/isos(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_content_t,s0) +/var/lib/vdsm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:virt_content_t,s0) + +# add support vios-proxy-* +/usr/bin/vios-proxy-host -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/vios-proxy-guest -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_exec_t,s0) + +# support for nova-stack +/usr/bin/nova-compute -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:virtd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/qemu -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/qemu-system-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/qemu-kvm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_exec_t,s0) +/usr/libexec/qemu.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/virt.if b/policy/modules/services/virt.if index 7c5d8d8..85b7d8b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/virt.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/virt.if @@ -13,39 +13,45 @@ # template(`virt_domain_template',` gen_require(` - type virtd_t; - attribute virt_image_type; - attribute virt_domain; + attribute virt_image_type, virt_domain; + attribute virt_tmpfs_type; + attribute virt_ptynode; + type qemu_exec_t; ') type $1_t, virt_domain; - domain_type($1_t) + application_domain($1_t, qemu_exec_t) domain_user_exemption_target($1_t) + mls_rangetrans_target($1_t) + mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t) role system_r types $1_t; - type $1_devpts_t; + type $1_devpts_t, virt_ptynode; term_pty($1_devpts_t) type $1_tmp_t; files_tmp_file($1_tmp_t) - type $1_tmpfs_t; + type $1_tmpfs_t, virt_tmpfs_type; files_tmpfs_file($1_tmpfs_t) type $1_image_t, virt_image_type; files_type($1_image_t) dev_node($1_image_t) + dev_associate_sysfs($1_image_t) - type $1_var_run_t; - files_pid_file($1_var_run_t) + auth_use_nsswitch($1_t) - allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr }; + allow $1_t $1_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_chr_file_perms setattr_chr_file_perms }; term_create_pty($1_t, $1_devpts_t) manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t) manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t) + manage_fifo_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t) read_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t) + rw_chr_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t) rw_blk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_image_t, $1_image_t) + fs_hugetlbfs_filetrans($1_t, $1_image_t, file) manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t) @@ -57,18 +63,6 @@ template(`virt_domain_template',` manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, $1_tmpfs_t) fs_tmpfs_filetrans($1_t, $1_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file }) - stream_connect_pattern(virtd_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t, virt_domain) - manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) - manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) - manage_sock_files_pattern(virtd_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) - - manage_dirs_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) - manage_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) - manage_sock_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) - manage_lnk_files_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t) - files_pid_filetrans($1_t, $1_var_run_t, { dir file }) - stream_connect_pattern($1_t, $1_var_run_t, $1_var_run_t, virtd_t) - optional_policy(` xserver_rw_shm($1_t) ') @@ -96,14 +90,32 @@ interface(`virt_image',` dev_node($1) ') +####################################### +## +## Getattr on virt executable. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_getattr_exec',` + gen_require(` + type virtd_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 virtd_exec_t:file getattr; +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute a domain transition to run virt. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`virt_domtrans',` @@ -114,9 +126,45 @@ interface(`virt_domtrans',` domtrans_pattern($1, virtd_exec_t, virtd_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Transition to virt_qmf. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_domtrans_qmf',` + gen_require(` + type virt_qmf_t, virt_qmf_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, virt_qmf_exec_t, virt_qmf_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to virt_bridgehelper. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +interface(`virt_domtrans_bridgehelper',` + gen_require(` + type virt_bridgehelper_t, virt_bridgehelper_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, virt_bridgehelper_exec_t, virt_bridgehelper_t) +') + ####################################### ## -## Connect to virt over an unix domain stream socket. +## Connect to virt over a unix domain stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -164,13 +212,13 @@ interface(`virt_attach_tun_iface',` # interface(`virt_read_config',` gen_require(` - type virt_etc_t; - type virt_etc_rw_t; + type virt_etc_t, virt_etc_rw_t; ') files_search_etc($1) read_files_pattern($1, virt_etc_t, virt_etc_t) read_files_pattern($1, virt_etc_rw_t, virt_etc_rw_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, virt_etc_rw_t, virt_etc_rw_t) ') ######################################## @@ -185,13 +233,13 @@ interface(`virt_read_config',` # interface(`virt_manage_config',` gen_require(` - type virt_etc_t; - type virt_etc_rw_t; + type virt_etc_t, virt_etc_rw_t; ') files_search_etc($1) manage_files_pattern($1, virt_etc_t, virt_etc_t) manage_files_pattern($1, virt_etc_rw_t, virt_etc_rw_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, virt_etc_rw_t, virt_etc_rw_t) ') ######################################## @@ -231,6 +279,24 @@ interface(`virt_read_content',` ######################################## ## +## Allow domain to write virt image files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_write_content',` + gen_require(` + type virt_content_t; + ') + + allow $1 virt_content_t:file write_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read virt PID files. ## ## @@ -250,6 +316,28 @@ interface(`virt_read_pid_files',` ######################################## ## +## Manage virt pid directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_manage_pid_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type virt_var_run_t; + type virt_lxc_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, virt_var_run_t, virt_var_run_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t) + virt_filetrans_named_content($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Manage virt pid files. ## ## @@ -261,10 +349,42 @@ interface(`virt_read_pid_files',` interface(`virt_manage_pid_files',` gen_require(` type virt_var_run_t; + type virt_lxc_var_run_t; ') files_search_pids($1) manage_files_pattern($1, virt_var_run_t, virt_var_run_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in the pid directory +## with a private type with a type transition. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Type to which the created node will be transitioned. +## +## +## +## +## Object class(es) (single or set including {}) for which this +## the transition will occur. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_pid_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type virt_var_run_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, virt_var_run_t, $2, $3, $4) ') ######################################## @@ -308,6 +428,24 @@ interface(`virt_read_lib_files',` ######################################## ## +## Dontaudit inherited read virt lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_dontaudit_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type virt_var_lib_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 virt_var_lib_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Create, read, write, and delete ## virt lib files. ## @@ -352,9 +490,9 @@ interface(`virt_read_log',` ## virt log files. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`virt_append_log',` @@ -388,6 +526,25 @@ interface(`virt_manage_log',` ######################################## ## +## Allow domain to search virt image direcories +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_search_images',` + gen_require(` + attribute virt_image_type; + ') + + virt_search_lib($1) + allow $1 virt_image_type:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Allow domain to read virt image files ## ## @@ -408,6 +565,7 @@ interface(`virt_read_images',` read_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) read_blk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) + read_chr_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',` fs_list_nfs($1) @@ -424,6 +582,24 @@ interface(`virt_read_images',` ######################################## ## +## Allow domain to read virt blk image files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_read_blk_images',` + gen_require(` + attribute virt_image_type; + ') + + read_blk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) +') + +######################################## +## ## Create, read, write, and delete ## svirt cache files. ## @@ -433,15 +609,15 @@ interface(`virt_read_images',` ## ## # -interface(`virt_manage_svirt_cache',` +interface(`virt_manage_cache',` gen_require(` - type svirt_cache_t; + type virt_cache_t; ') files_search_var($1) - manage_dirs_pattern($1, svirt_cache_t, svirt_cache_t) - manage_files_pattern($1, svirt_cache_t, svirt_cache_t) - manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, svirt_cache_t, svirt_cache_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, virt_cache_t, virt_cache_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, virt_cache_t, virt_cache_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, virt_cache_t, virt_cache_t) ') ######################################## @@ -466,6 +642,7 @@ interface(`virt_manage_images',` manage_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) rw_blk_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) + rw_chr_files_pattern($1, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',` fs_manage_nfs_dirs($1) @@ -500,10 +677,19 @@ interface(`virt_manage_images',` interface(`virt_admin',` gen_require(` type virtd_t, virtd_initrc_exec_t; + attribute virt_domain; + type virt_lxc_t; ') - allow $1 virtd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 virtd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, virtd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 virtd_t:process ptrace_perms_perms; + allow $1 virt_lxc_t:process ptrace_perms_perms; + ') + + allow $1 virt_lxc_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, virt_lxc_t) init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, virtd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -515,4 +701,248 @@ interface(`virt_admin',` virt_manage_lib_files($1) virt_manage_log($1) + + virt_manage_images($1) + + allow $1 virt_domain:process signal_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute qemu in the svirt domain, and +## allow the specified role the svirt domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the sandbox domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`virt_transition_svirt',` + gen_require(` + type svirt_t; + ') + + allow $1 svirt_t:process transition; + role $2 types svirt_t; + + optional_policy(` + ptchown_run(svirt_t, $2) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to write virt daemon unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_dontaudit_write_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type virtd_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 virtd_t:fd use; + dontaudit $1 virtd_t:fifo_file write_fifo_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send a sigkill to virtual machines +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_kill_svirt',` + gen_require(` + attribute virt_domain; + ') + + allow $1 virt_domain:process sigkill; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send a signal to virtual machines +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_signal_svirt',` + gen_require(` + attribute virt_domain; + ') + + allow $1 virt_domain:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage virt home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_manage_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type virt_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, virt_home_t, virt_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## allow domain to read +## virt tmpfs files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`virt_read_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute virt_tmpfs_type; + ') + + allow $1 virt_tmpfs_type:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## allow domain to manage +## virt tmpfs files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +# +interface(`virt_manage_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute virt_tmpfs_type; + ') + + allow $1 virt_tmpfs_type:file manage_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create .virt directory in the user home directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type virt_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, ".libvirt") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, virt_home_t, dir, ".virtinst") +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit attempts to Read virt_image_type devices. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_dontaudit_read_chr_dev',` + gen_require(` + attribute virt_image_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 virt_image_type:chr_file read_chr_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Creates types and rules for a basic +## virt_lxc process domain. +## +## +## +## Prefix for the domain. +## +## +# +template(`virt_lxc_domain_template',` + gen_require(` + attribute svirt_lxc_domain; + ') + + type $1_t, svirt_lxc_domain; + domain_type($1_t) + domain_user_exemption_target($1_t) + mls_rangetrans_target($1_t) + mcs_untrusted_proc($1_t) + role system_r types $1_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a qemu_exec_t in the callers domain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_exec_qemu',` + gen_require(` + type qemu_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, qemu_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to virt named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`virt_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type virt_lxc_var_run_t; + ') + + files_pid_filetrans($1, virt_lxc_var_run_t, dir, "libvirt-sandbox") ') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/virt.te b/policy/modules/services/virt.te index 3eca020..96f86b2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/virt.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/virt.te @@ -5,56 +5,87 @@ policy_module(virt, 1.4.0) # Declarations # +attribute virsh_transition_domain; +attribute virt_ptynode; + ## -##

    -## Allow virt to use serial/parallell communication ports -##

    +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to use serial/parallel communication ports +##

    ##     gen_tunable(virt_use_comm, false) ## -##

    -## Allow virt to read fuse files -##

    +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to use executable memory and executable stack +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(virt_use_execmem, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to read fuse files +##

    ##     gen_tunable(virt_use_fusefs, false) ## -##

    -## Allow virt to manage nfs files -##

    +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to manage nfs files +##

    ##     gen_tunable(virt_use_nfs, false) ## -##

    -## Allow virt to manage cifs files -##

    +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to manage cifs files +##

    ##     gen_tunable(virt_use_samba, false) ## -##

    -## Allow virt to manage device configuration, (pci) -##

    +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to manage device configuration, (pci) +##

    ##     gen_tunable(virt_use_sysfs, false) ## -##

    -## Allow virt to use usb devices -##

    +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to interact with the sanlock +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(virt_use_sanlock, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to interact with the xserver +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(virt_use_xserver, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow confined virtual guests to use usb devices +##

    ##     gen_tunable(virt_use_usb, true) virt_domain_template(svirt) role system_r types svirt_t; +typealias svirt_t alias qemu_t; -type svirt_cache_t; -files_type(svirt_cache_t) +virt_domain_template(svirt_prot_exec) +role system_r types svirt_prot_exec_t; attribute virt_domain; attribute virt_image_type; +attribute virt_tmpfs_type; + +type qemu_exec_t; + +type virt_cache_t alias svirt_cache_t; +files_type(virt_cache_t) type virt_etc_t; files_config_file(virt_etc_t) @@ -62,23 +93,34 @@ files_config_file(virt_etc_t) type virt_etc_rw_t; files_type(virt_etc_rw_t) +type virt_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(virt_home_t) + +type svirt_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(svirt_home_t) + # virt Image files type virt_image_t; # customizable virt_image(virt_image_t) +files_mountpoint(virt_image_t) # virt Image files type virt_content_t; # customizable virt_image(virt_content_t) userdom_user_home_content(virt_content_t) +type virt_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(virt_tmp_t) + type virt_log_t; logging_log_file(virt_log_t) +mls_trusted_object(virt_log_t) type virt_var_run_t; files_pid_file(virt_var_run_t) type virt_var_lib_t; -files_type(virt_var_lib_t) +files_mountpoint(virt_var_lib_t) type virtd_t; type virtd_exec_t; @@ -89,6 +131,11 @@ domain_subj_id_change_exemption(virtd_t) type virtd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(virtd_initrc_exec_t) +type qemu_var_run_t; +typealias qemu_var_run_t alias svirt_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(qemu_var_run_t) +mls_trusted_object(qemu_var_run_t) + ifdef(`enable_mcs',` init_ranged_daemon_domain(virtd_t, virtd_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) ') @@ -97,6 +144,35 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',` init_ranged_daemon_domain(virtd_t, virtd_exec_t, s0 - mls_systemhigh) ') +type virt_qmf_t; +type virt_qmf_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(virt_qmf_t, virt_qmf_exec_t) + +type virt_bridgehelper_t; +domain_type(virt_bridgehelper_t) + +type virt_bridgehelper_exec_t; +domain_entry_file(virt_bridgehelper_t, virt_bridgehelper_exec_t) +role system_r types virt_bridgehelper_t; + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# +attribute svirt_lxc_domain; + +type virtd_lxc_t; +type virtd_lxc_exec_t; +init_system_domain(virtd_lxc_t, virtd_lxc_exec_t) + +type virt_lxc_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(virt_lxc_var_run_t) +typealias virt_lxc_var_run_t alias virtd_lxc_var_run_t; + +# virt lxc container files +type svirt_lxc_file_t; +files_mountpoint(svirt_lxc_file_t) + ######################################## # # svirt local policy @@ -104,15 +180,12 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',` allow svirt_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; -manage_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_cache_t, svirt_cache_t) -manage_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_cache_t, svirt_cache_t) -files_var_filetrans(svirt_t, svirt_cache_t, { file dir }) - read_lnk_files_pattern(svirt_t, virt_image_t, virt_image_t) allow svirt_t svirt_image_t:dir search_dir_perms; manage_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t) manage_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, svirt_image_t) fs_hugetlbfs_filetrans(svirt_t, svirt_image_t, file) list_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, virt_content_t, virt_content_t) @@ -130,9 +203,17 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(svirt_t) dev_list_sysfs(svirt_t) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(svirt_t) + userdom_search_user_home_content(svirt_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(svirt_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(svirt_t) +append_files_pattern(svirt_t, virt_home_t, virt_home_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t) +filetrans_pattern(svirt_t, virt_home_t, svirt_home_t, { dir sock_file file }) +stream_connect_pattern(svirt_t, svirt_home_t, svirt_home_t, virtd_t) tunable_policy(`virt_use_comm',` term_use_unallocated_ttys(svirt_t) @@ -147,11 +228,15 @@ tunable_policy(`virt_use_fusefs',` tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',` fs_manage_nfs_dirs(svirt_t) fs_manage_nfs_files(svirt_t) + fs_manage_nfs_named_sockets(svirt_t) + fs_read_nfs_symlinks(svirt_t) ') tunable_policy(`virt_use_samba',` fs_manage_cifs_dirs(svirt_t) fs_manage_cifs_files(svirt_t) + fs_manage_cifs_named_sockets(svirt_t) + fs_read_cifs_symlinks(virtd_t) ') tunable_policy(`virt_use_sysfs',` @@ -160,11 +245,28 @@ tunable_policy(`virt_use_sysfs',` tunable_policy(`virt_use_usb',` dev_rw_usbfs(svirt_t) + dev_read_sysfs(svirt_t) fs_manage_dos_dirs(svirt_t) fs_manage_dos_files(svirt_t) ') optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`virt_use_sanlock',` + sanlock_stream_connect(svirt_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`virt_use_xserver',` + xserver_stream_connect(svirt_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_domtrans_bridgehelper(svirt_t) +') + +optional_policy(` xen_rw_image_files(svirt_t) ') @@ -173,22 +275,41 @@ optional_policy(` # virtd local policy # -allow virtd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner ipc_lock kill mknod net_admin net_raw setpcap setuid setgid sys_admin sys_nice sys_ptrace }; -allow virtd_t self:process { getcap getsched setcap sigkill signal signull execmem setexec setfscreate setsched }; +allow virtd_t self:capability { chown dac_override fowner ipc_lock kill mknod net_admin net_raw setpcap setuid setgid sys_admin sys_nice }; +allow virtd_t self:process { getcap getsched setcap sigkill signal signull execmem setexec setfscreate setsockcreate setsched }; +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + # caused by some bogus kernel code + dontaudit virtd_t self:capability sys_module; +') -allow virtd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -allow virtd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow virtd_t self:fifo_file { manage_fifo_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto }; +allow virtd_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; allow virtd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -allow virtd_t self:tun_socket create_socket_perms; +allow virtd_t self:tun_socket { create_socket_perms relabelfrom relabelto }; +allow virtd_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; +allow virtd_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; allow virtd_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +allow virtd_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; -manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, svirt_cache_t, svirt_cache_t) -manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, svirt_cache_t, svirt_cache_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, virt_cache_t, virt_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_cache_t, virt_cache_t) manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, virt_content_t, virt_content_t) manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_content_t, virt_content_t) allow virtd_t virt_domain:process { getattr getsched setsched transition signal signull sigkill }; +allow virt_domain virtd_t:fd use; +dontaudit virt_domain virtd_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; + +can_exec(virtd_t, qemu_exec_t) +can_exec(virt_domain, qemu_exec_t) + +allow virtd_t qemu_var_run_t:file relabel_file_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(virtd_t, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t) +stream_connect_pattern(virtd_t, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t, virt_domain) +filetrans_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t, dir, "qemu") read_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_etc_t, virt_etc_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_etc_t, virt_etc_t) @@ -199,9 +320,18 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_etc_rw_t, virt_etc_rw_t) filetrans_pattern(virtd_t, virt_etc_t, virt_etc_rw_t, dir) manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) +manage_chr_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) manage_blk_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) -allow virtd_t virt_image_type:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; -allow virtd_t virt_image_type:blk_file { relabelfrom relabelto }; +manage_lnk_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) +allow virtd_t virt_image_type:file relabel_file_perms; +allow virtd_t virt_image_type:blk_file relabel_blk_file_perms; +allow virtd_t virt_image_type:chr_file relabel_chr_file_perms; +allow virtd_t virt_ptynode:chr_file rw_term_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, virt_tmp_t, virt_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_tmp_t, virt_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(virtd_t, virt_tmp_t, { file dir }) +can_exec(virtd_t, virt_tmp_t) manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, virt_log_t, virt_log_t) manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_log_t, virt_log_t) @@ -217,9 +347,15 @@ manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t, virt_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t, virt_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t, { file dir }) +manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t) +filetrans_pattern(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, dir, "lxc") +stream_connect_pattern(virtd_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virtd_lxc_t) + kernel_read_system_state(virtd_t) kernel_read_network_state(virtd_t) kernel_rw_net_sysctls(virtd_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(virtd_t) kernel_request_load_module(virtd_t) kernel_search_debugfs(virtd_t) @@ -239,22 +375,32 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(virtd_t) corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(virtd_t) dev_rw_sysfs(virtd_t) +dev_read_urand(virtd_t) dev_read_rand(virtd_t) dev_rw_kvm(virtd_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(virtd_t) dev_rw_mtrr(virtd_t) +dev_rw_vhost(virtd_t) +dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev(virtd_t) +dev_relabel_generic_usb_dev(virtd_t) # Init script handling domain_use_interactive_fds(virtd_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(virtd_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(virtd_t) files_read_usr_files(virtd_t) files_read_etc_files(virtd_t) +files_read_usr_files(virtd_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(virtd_t) files_search_all(virtd_t) files_read_kernel_modules(virtd_t) files_read_usr_src_files(virtd_t) -files_manage_etc_files(virtd_t) +files_relabelto_system_conf_files(virtd_t) +files_relabelfrom_system_conf_files(virtd_t) + +# Manages /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall +files_manage_system_conf_files(virtd_t) fs_list_auto_mountpoints(virtd_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(virtd_t) @@ -262,6 +408,18 @@ fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(virtd_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(virtd_t) fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(virtd_t) fs_rw_cgroup_files(virtd_t) +fs_manage_hugetlbfs_dirs(virtd_t) +fs_rw_hugetlbfs_files(virtd_t) + +mls_fd_share_all_levels(virtd_t) +mls_file_read_to_clearance(virtd_t) +mls_file_write_to_clearance(virtd_t) +mls_process_read_to_clearance(virtd_t) +mls_process_write_to_clearance(virtd_t) +mls_net_write_within_range(virtd_t) +mls_socket_write_to_clearance(virtd_t) +mls_socket_read_to_clearance(virtd_t) +mls_rangetrans_source(virtd_t) mcs_process_set_categories(virtd_t) @@ -276,6 +434,8 @@ term_use_ptmx(virtd_t) auth_use_nsswitch(virtd_t) +init_dbus_chat(virtd_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(virtd_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs(virtd_t) miscfiles_read_hwdata(virtd_t) @@ -285,16 +445,32 @@ modutils_read_module_config(virtd_t) modutils_manage_module_config(virtd_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(virtd_t) +logging_send_audit_msgs(virtd_t) +selinux_validate_context(virtd_t) + +seutil_read_config(virtd_t) seutil_read_default_contexts(virtd_t) +seutil_read_file_contexts(virtd_t) +sysnet_signull_ifconfig(virtd_t) +sysnet_signal_ifconfig(virtd_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(virtd_t) sysnet_read_config(virtd_t) +userdom_list_admin_dir(virtd_t) userdom_getattr_all_users(virtd_t) userdom_list_user_home_content(virtd_t) userdom_read_all_users_state(virtd_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(virtd_t) +userdom_relabel_user_home_files(virtd_t) +userdom_setattr_user_home_content_files(virtd_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_t, virt_home_t, virt_home_t) +manage_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_home_t, virt_home_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_home_t, virt_home_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(virtd_t, virt_home_t, virt_home_t) +#userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(virtd_t, virt_home_t, { dir file }) +virt_filetrans_home_content(virtd_t) tunable_policy(`virt_use_nfs',` fs_manage_nfs_dirs(virtd_t) @@ -313,6 +489,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + consoletype_exec(virtd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(virtd_t) optional_policy(` @@ -326,6 +506,14 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` hal_dbus_chat(virtd_t) ') + + optional_policy(` + networkmanager_dbus_chat(virtd_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + dmidecode_domtrans(virtd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -334,11 +522,14 @@ optional_policy(` dnsmasq_kill(virtd_t) dnsmasq_read_pid_files(virtd_t) dnsmasq_signull(virtd_t) + dnsmasq_create_pid_dirs(virtd_t) + dnsmasq_filetrans_named_content_fromdir(virtd_t, virt_var_run_t); ') optional_policy(` iptables_domtrans(virtd_t) iptables_initrc_domtrans(virtd_t) + iptables_systemctl(virtd_t) # Manages /etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall iptables_manage_config(virtd_t) @@ -353,6 +544,12 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + # Run mount in the mount_t domain. + mount_domtrans(virtd_t) + mount_signal(virtd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` policykit_dbus_chat(virtd_t) policykit_domtrans_auth(virtd_t) policykit_domtrans_resolve(virtd_t) @@ -360,11 +557,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - qemu_domtrans(virtd_t) - qemu_read_state(virtd_t) - qemu_signal(virtd_t) - qemu_kill(virtd_t) - qemu_setsched(virtd_t) + qemu_exec(virtd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sanlock_stream_connect(virtd_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -394,20 +591,36 @@ optional_policy(` # virtual domains common policy # -allow virt_domain self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override kill }; -allow virt_domain self:process { execmem execstack signal getsched signull }; -allow virt_domain self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow virt_domain self:process { signal getsched signull }; +allow virt_domain self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow virt_domain self:shm create_shm_perms; allow virt_domain self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow virt_domain self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow virt_domain self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(virt_domain, virt_cache_t, virt_cache_t) +manage_files_pattern(virt_domain, virt_cache_t, virt_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(virt_domain, virt_cache_t, { file dir }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(virt_domain, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(virt_domain, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(virt_domain, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(virt_domain, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(virt_domain, qemu_var_run_t, { dir file }) +stream_connect_pattern(virt_domain, qemu_var_run_t, qemu_var_run_t, virtd_t) + +dontaudit virtd_t virt_domain:process { siginh noatsecure rlimitinh }; + +dontaudit virt_domain virt_tmpfs_type:file { read write }; + append_files_pattern(virt_domain, virt_log_t, virt_log_t) append_files_pattern(virt_domain, virt_var_lib_t, virt_var_lib_t) kernel_read_system_state(virt_domain) +fs_getattr_xattr_fs(virt_domain) + corecmd_exec_bin(virt_domain) corecmd_exec_shell(virt_domain) @@ -418,10 +631,12 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(virt_domain) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(virt_domain) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(virt_domain) corenet_tcp_bind_vnc_port(virt_domain) -corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(virt_domain) corenet_tcp_bind_virt_migration_port(virt_domain) corenet_tcp_connect_virt_migration_port(virt_domain) +corenet_rw_inherited_tun_tap_dev(virt_domain) +dev_getattr_fs(virt_domain) +dev_read_generic_symlinks(virt_domain) dev_read_rand(virt_domain) dev_read_sound(virt_domain) dev_read_urand(virt_domain) @@ -429,10 +644,12 @@ dev_write_sound(virt_domain) dev_rw_ksm(virt_domain) dev_rw_kvm(virt_domain) dev_rw_qemu(virt_domain) +dev_rw_inherited_vhost(virt_domain) domain_use_interactive_fds(virt_domain) files_read_etc_files(virt_domain) +files_read_mnt_symlinks(virt_domain) files_read_usr_files(virt_domain) files_read_var_files(virt_domain) files_search_all(virt_domain) @@ -440,25 +657,428 @@ files_search_all(virt_domain) fs_getattr_tmpfs(virt_domain) fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(virt_domain) fs_rw_tmpfs_files(virt_domain) +fs_getattr_hugetlbfs(virt_domain) +fs_rw_inherited_nfs_files(virt_domain) +fs_rw_inherited_cifs_files(virt_domain) +fs_rw_inherited_noxattr_fs_files(virt_domain) -term_use_all_terms(virt_domain) +# I think we need these for now. +miscfiles_read_public_files(virt_domain) +storage_raw_read_removable_device(virt_domain) + +term_use_all_inherited_terms(virt_domain) term_getattr_pty_fs(virt_domain) term_use_generic_ptys(virt_domain) term_use_ptmx(virt_domain) -auth_use_nsswitch(virt_domain) - logging_send_syslog_msg(virt_domain) miscfiles_read_localization(virt_domain) +tunable_policy(`virt_use_execmem',` + allow virt_domain self:process { execmem execstack }; +') + optional_policy(` ptchown_domtrans(virt_domain) ') optional_policy(` + pulseaudio_dontaudit_exec(virt_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` virt_read_config(virt_domain) virt_read_lib_files(virt_domain) virt_read_content(virt_domain) virt_stream_connect(virt_domain) ') + +######################################## +# +# xm local policy +# +type virsh_t; +type virsh_exec_t; +init_system_domain(virsh_t, virsh_exec_t) +typealias virsh_t alias xm_t; +typealias virsh_exec_t alias xm_exec_t; + +allow virsh_t self:capability { setpcap dac_override ipc_lock sys_tty_config }; +allow virsh_t self:process { getcap getsched setsched setcap signal }; +allow virsh_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow virsh_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; +allow virsh_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_files_pattern(virsh_t, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) +manage_blk_files_pattern(virsh_t, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(virsh_t, virt_image_type, virt_image_type) + +dontaudit virsh_t virt_var_lib_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(virsh_t) +kernel_read_network_state(virsh_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(virsh_t) +kernel_read_sysctl(virsh_t) +kernel_read_xen_state(virsh_t) +kernel_write_xen_state(virsh_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(virsh_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(virsh_t) + +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(virsh_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(virsh_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(virsh_t) + +dev_read_rand(virsh_t) +dev_read_urand(virsh_t) +dev_read_sysfs(virsh_t) + +files_read_etc_runtime_files(virsh_t) +files_read_usr_files(virsh_t) +files_list_mnt(virsh_t) +# Some common macros (you might be able to remove some) +files_read_etc_files(virsh_t) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(virsh_t) +fs_manage_xenfs_dirs(virsh_t) +fs_manage_xenfs_files(virsh_t) +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(virsh_t) + +storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(virsh_t) + +term_use_all_inherited_terms(virsh_t) + +init_stream_connect_script(virsh_t) +init_rw_script_stream_sockets(virsh_t) +init_use_fds(virsh_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(virsh_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(virsh_t) + +optional_policy(` + xen_manage_image_dirs(virsh_t) + xen_append_log(virsh_t) + xen_domtrans(virsh_t) + xen_read_pid_files_xenstored(virsh_t) + xen_stream_connect(virsh_t) + xen_stream_connect_xenstore(virsh_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(virsh_t) + + optional_policy(` + hal_dbus_chat(virsh_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + vhostmd_rw_tmpfs_files(virsh_t) + vhostmd_stream_connect(virsh_t) + vhostmd_dontaudit_rw_stream_connect(virsh_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_domtrans(virsh_t) + virt_manage_images(virsh_t) + virt_manage_config(virsh_t) + virt_stream_connect(virsh_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_basic_client_template(virsh, virsh_t, system_r) + + kernel_read_xen_state(virsh_ssh_t) + kernel_write_xen_state(virsh_ssh_t) + + dontaudit virsh_ssh_t virsh_transition_domain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + files_search_tmp(virsh_ssh_t) + + fs_manage_xenfs_dirs(virsh_ssh_t) + fs_manage_xenfs_files(virsh_ssh_t) + + userdom_search_admin_dir(virsh_ssh_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# virt_lxc local policy +# +allow virtd_lxc_t self:capability { dac_override net_admin net_raw setpcap chown sys_admin sys_resource }; +allow virtd_lxc_t self:process { setexec setrlimit setsched getcap setcap signal_perms }; +allow virtd_lxc_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow virtd_lxc_t self:netlink_route_socket rw_netlink_socket_perms; +allow virtd_lxc_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow virtd_lxc_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; + +allow virtd_lxc_t virt_image_type:dir mounton; +manage_files_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, virt_image_t, virt_image_t) + +domtrans_pattern(virtd_t, virtd_lxc_exec_t, virtd_lxc_t) +allow virtd_t virtd_lxc_t:process { signal signull sigkill }; + +allow virtd_lxc_t virt_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(virtd_lxc_t, virt_lxc_var_run_t, { file dir }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +manage_files_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +manage_chr_files_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(virtd_lxc_t, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +allow virtd_lxc_t svirt_lxc_file_t:dir_file_class_set { relabelto relabelfrom }; +allow virtd_lxc_t svirt_lxc_file_t:filesystem { relabelto relabelfrom }; +files_associate_rootfs(svirt_lxc_file_t) + +storage_manage_fixed_disk(virtd_lxc_t) + +kernel_read_network_state(virtd_lxc_t) +kernel_search_network_sysctl(virtd_lxc_t) +kernel_read_sysctl(virtd_lxc_t) +kernel_read_system_state(virtd_lxc_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(virtd_lxc_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(virtd_lxc_t) + +dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(virtd_lxc_t) +dev_rw_sysfs(virtd_lxc_t) +dev_read_sysfs(virtd_lxc_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(virtd_lxc_t) + +files_search_all(virtd_lxc_t) +files_getattr_all_files(virtd_lxc_t) +files_read_etc_files(virtd_lxc_t) +files_read_usr_files(virtd_lxc_t) +files_relabel_rootfs(virtd_lxc_t) +files_mounton_non_security(virtd_lxc_t) +files_mount_all_file_type_fs(virtd_lxc_t) +files_unmount_all_file_type_fs(virtd_lxc_t) +files_list_isid_type_dirs(virtd_lxc_t) +files_root_filetrans(virtd_lxc_t, svirt_lxc_file_t, dir_file_class_set) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_manage_tmpfs_chr_files(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_manage_tmpfs_symlinks(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_mounton_tmpfs(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_remount_all_fs(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_rw_cgroup_files(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_unmount_xattr_fs(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_unmount_configfs(virtd_lxc_t) +fs_relabelfrom_tmpfs(virtd_lxc_t) + +selinux_mount_fs(virtd_lxc_t) +selinux_unmount_fs(virtd_lxc_t) +seutil_read_config(virtd_lxc_t) + +term_use_generic_ptys(virtd_lxc_t) +term_use_ptmx(virtd_lxc_t) +term_relabel_pty_fs(virtd_lxc_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(virtd_lxc_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(virtd_lxc_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(virtd_lxc_t) + +seutil_domtrans_setfiles(virtd_lxc_t) +seutil_read_default_contexts(virtd_lxc_t) + +selinux_get_enforce_mode(virtd_lxc_t) +selinux_get_fs_mount(virtd_lxc_t) +selinux_validate_context(virtd_lxc_t) +selinux_compute_access_vector(virtd_lxc_t) +selinux_compute_create_context(virtd_lxc_t) +selinux_compute_relabel_context(virtd_lxc_t) +selinux_compute_user_contexts(virtd_lxc_t) +seutil_read_default_contexts(virtd_lxc_t) + +sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(virtd_lxc_t) + +#optional_policy(` +# unconfined_shell_domtrans(virtd_lxc_t) +# unconfined_signal(virtd_t) +#') + +######################################## +# +# virt_lxc_domain local policy +# +allow svirt_lxc_domain self:capability { kill setuid setgid dac_override }; + +allow virtd_t svirt_lxc_domain:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; +allow virtd_t svirt_lxc_domain:process { signal_perms }; +allow virtd_lxc_t svirt_lxc_domain:process { getattr getsched setsched transition signal signull sigkill }; +allow svirt_lxc_domain virtd_lxc_t:process sigchld; +allow svirt_lxc_domain virtd_lxc_t:fd use; +allow svirt_lxc_domain virt_lxc_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_domain virt_lxc_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_domain virtd_lxc_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_socket_perms }; + +allow svirt_lxc_domain self:process { execstack execmem getattr signal_perms getsched setsched setcap setpgid }; +allow svirt_lxc_domain self:fifo_file manage_file_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_domain self:sem create_sem_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_domain self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_domain self:msgq create_msgq_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_domain self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; +allow svirt_lxc_domain self:unix_dgram_socket { sendto create_socket_perms }; +dontaudit svirt_lxc_domain self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay }; + +manage_dirs_pattern(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +manage_files_pattern(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +rw_chr_files_pattern(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +rw_blk_files_pattern(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t, svirt_lxc_file_t) +can_exec(svirt_lxc_domain, svirt_lxc_file_t) +allow svirt_lxc_net_t svirt_lxc_file_t:dir mounton; +allow svirt_lxc_net_t svirt_lxc_file_t:filesystem getattr; + +kernel_getattr_proc(svirt_lxc_domain) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(svirt_lxc_domain) +kernel_read_net_sysctls(svirt_lxc_domain) +kernel_read_system_state(svirt_lxc_domain) +kernel_dontaudit_search_kernel_sysctl(svirt_lxc_domain) + +corecmd_exec_all_executables(svirt_lxc_domain) + +files_read_kernel_modules(svirt_lxc_net_t) +files_dontaudit_list_all_mountpoints(svirt_lxc_domain) +files_dontaudit_write_etc_runtime_files(svirt_lxc_domain) +files_entrypoint_all_files(svirt_lxc_domain) +files_search_all(svirt_lxc_domain) +files_read_config_files(svirt_lxc_domain) +files_read_usr_files(svirt_lxc_domain) +files_read_usr_symlinks(svirt_lxc_domain) +files_search_locks(svirt_lxc_domain) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(svirt_lxc_domain) +fs_list_inotifyfs(svirt_lxc_domain) + +auth_dontaudit_read_passwd(svirt_lxc_domain) +auth_dontaudit_read_login_records(svirt_lxc_domain) +auth_dontaudit_write_login_records(svirt_lxc_domain) +auth_search_pam_console_data(svirt_lxc_domain) + +clock_read_adjtime(svirt_lxc_domain) + +init_read_utmp(svirt_lxc_domain) +init_dontaudit_write_utmp(svirt_lxc_domain) + +libs_dontaudit_setattr_lib_files(svirt_lxc_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(svirt_lxc_domain) +miscfiles_dontaudit_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs(svirt_lxc_domain) +miscfiles_read_fonts(svirt_lxc_domain) + +mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(svirt_lxc_domain) + +optional_policy(` + udev_read_pid_files(svirt_lxc_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + apache_exec_modules(svirt_lxc_domain) +') + +virt_lxc_domain_template(svirt_lxc_net) + +allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:capability { net_raw net_admin net_bind_service sys_nice chown dac_read_search dac_override fowner }; +allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:socket create_socket_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:netlink_tcpdiag_socket create_socket_perms; +allow svirt_lxc_net_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; + +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(svirt_lxc_net_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(svirt_lxc_net_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(svirt_lxc_net_t) + +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(svirt_lxc_net_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(svirt_lxc_net_t) +corenet_udp_bind_all_ports(svirt_lxc_net_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_all_ports(svirt_lxc_net_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(svirt_lxc_net_t) +kernel_read_network_state(svirt_lxc_net_t) + +fs_noxattr_type(svirt_lxc_file_t) +term_pty(svirt_lxc_file_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(svirt_lxc_net_t) + +####################################### +# +# svirt_prot_exec local policy +# + +allow svirt_prot_exec_t self:process { execmem execstack }; + +######################################## +# +# virt_qmf local policy +# +allow virt_qmf_t self:capability { sys_nice sys_tty_config }; +allow virt_qmf_t self:process { setsched signal }; +allow virt_qmf_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow virt_qmf_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow virt_qmf_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow virt_qmf_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; + +can_exec(virt_qmf_t, virtd_exec_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(virt_qmf_t) +kernel_read_network_state(virt_qmf_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(virt_qmf_t) +dev_read_rand(virt_qmf_t) +dev_read_urand(virt_qmf_t) + +corenet_tcp_connect_matahari_port(virt_qmf_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(virt_qmf_t) + +files_read_etc_files(virt_qmf_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(virt_qmf_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(virt_qmf_t) + +sysnet_read_config(virt_qmf_t) + +optional_policy(` + dbus_read_lib_files(virt_qmf_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_stream_connect(virt_qmf_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# virt_bridgehelper local policy +# +allow virt_bridgehelper_t self:process { setcap getcap }; +allow virt_bridgehelper_t self:capability { setpcap setgid setuid net_admin }; +allow virt_bridgehelper_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow virt_bridgehelper_t self:tun_socket create_socket_perms; +allow virt_bridgehelper_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_network_state(virt_bridgehelper_t) + +corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(virt_bridgehelper_t) + +files_read_etc_files(virt_bridgehelper_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys(virt_bridgehelper_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.fc b/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.fc index 11533cc..4d81b99 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.fc @@ -1,3 +1,4 @@ + /usr/bin/vnstat -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vnstat_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/vnstatd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:vnstatd_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.if b/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.if index 727fe95..adbb3fb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.if @@ -113,6 +113,7 @@ interface(`vnstatd_manage_lib_files',` manage_files_pattern($1, vnstatd_var_lib_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t) ') + ######################################## ## ## All of the rules required to administrate @@ -135,8 +136,11 @@ interface(`vnstatd_admin',` type vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t; ') - allow $1 vnstatd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 vnstatd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, vnstatd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 vnstatd_t:process ptrace; + ') files_list_var_lib($1) admin_pattern($1, vnstatd_var_lib_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.te b/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.te index 8121937..275409f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/vnstatd.te @@ -28,9 +28,13 @@ allow vnstatd_t self:process signal; allow vnstatd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow vnstatd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +manage_files_pattern(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_run_t, vnstatd_var_run_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_run_t, vnstatd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_run_t, { dir file }) + manage_dirs_pattern(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t, { dir file }) +files_var_lib_filetrans(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t, dir) manage_files_pattern(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_run_t, vnstatd_var_run_t) manage_dirs_pattern(vnstatd_t, vnstatd_var_run_t, vnstatd_var_run_t) @@ -62,9 +66,9 @@ allow vnstat_t self:process signal; allow vnstat_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow vnstat_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +files_search_var_lib(vnstat_t) manage_dirs_pattern(vnstat_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(vnstat_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(vnstat_t, vnstatd_var_lib_t, { dir file }) kernel_read_network_state(vnstat_t) kernel_read_system_state(vnstat_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/w3c.te b/policy/modules/services/w3c.te index 1174ad8..f4c4c1b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/w3c.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/w3c.te @@ -7,11 +7,18 @@ policy_module(w3c, 1.0.0) apache_content_template(w3c_validator) +type httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t) + ######################################## # # Local policy # +manage_dirs_pattern(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t, httpd_w3c_validator_tmp_t, { file dir }) + corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_ftp_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t) @@ -22,3 +29,5 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_http_cache_port(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t) + +apache_dontaudit_rw_tmp_files(httpd_w3c_validator_script_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/wdmd.fc b/policy/modules/services/wdmd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..ad47e05 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/wdmd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,6 @@ + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/wdmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wdmd_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/wdmd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:wdmd_var_run_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/wdmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wdmd_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/wdmd.if b/policy/modules/services/wdmd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..8e3570d --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/wdmd.if @@ -0,0 +1,113 @@ + +## watchdog multiplexing daemon + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run wdmd. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`wdmd_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type wdmd_t, wdmd_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, wdmd_exec_t, wdmd_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute wdmd server in the wdmd domain. +## +## +## +## The type of the process performing this action. +## +## +# +interface(`wdmd_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type wdmd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, wdmd_initrc_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an wdmd environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`wdmd_admin',` + gen_require(` + type wdmd_t; + type wdmd_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + allow $1 wdmd_t:process signal_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, wdmd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 wdmd_t:process ptrace; + ') + + wdmd_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 wdmd_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + +') + +###################################### +## +## Create, read, write, and delete wdmd PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`wdmd_manage_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type wdmd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, wdmd_var_run_t, wdmd_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to wdmd over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`wdmd_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type wdmd_t, wdmd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, wdmd_var_run_t, wdmd_var_run_t, wdmd_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/wdmd.te b/policy/modules/services/wdmd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..df9a759 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/wdmd.te @@ -0,0 +1,46 @@ +policy_module(wdmd,1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +type wdmd_t; +type wdmd_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(wdmd_t, wdmd_exec_t) + +type wdmd_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(wdmd_var_run_t) + +type wdmd_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(wdmd_initrc_exec_t) + +######################################## +# +# wdmd local policy +# +allow wdmd_t self:capability { chown sys_nice ipc_lock }; +allow wdmd_t self:process { setsched signal }; + +allow wdmd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow wdmd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(wdmd_t, wdmd_var_run_t, wdmd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(wdmd_t, wdmd_var_run_t, wdmd_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(wdmd_t, wdmd_var_run_t, wdmd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(wdmd_t, wdmd_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file }) + +dev_read_watchdog(wdmd_t) +dev_write_watchdog(wdmd_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(wdmd_t) + +files_read_etc_files(wdmd_t) + +fs_read_anon_inodefs_files(wdmd_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(wdmd_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(wdmd_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(wdmd_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/xfs.if b/policy/modules/services/xfs.if index aa6e5a8..42a0efb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/xfs.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/xfs.if @@ -1,4 +1,4 @@ -## X Windows Font Server +## X Windows Font Server ######################################## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/services/xserver.fc b/policy/modules/services/xserver.fc index 4966c94..587ddea 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/xserver.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/xserver.fc @@ -2,13 +2,34 @@ # HOME_DIR # HOME_DIR/\.fonts\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_config_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.fonts\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_config_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.fonts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.fontconfig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_cache_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.fonts/auto(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_cache_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.fonts\.cache-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_cache_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.DCOP.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceauth_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.ICEauthority.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceauth_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.serverauth.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.xauth.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.Xauth.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) HOME_DIR/\.Xauthority.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.xsession-errors.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.dmrc.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_home_t,s0) + +/root/\.fonts\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_config_t,s0) +/root/\.fonts\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_config_t,s0) +/root/\.fonts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_t,s0) +/root/\.fontconfig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_cache_t,s0) +/root/\.fonts/auto(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_cache_t,s0) +/root/\.fonts\.cache-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_cache_t,s0) +/root/\.DCOP.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceauth_home_t,s0) +/root/\.ICEauthority.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceauth_home_t,s0) +/root/\.serverauth.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) +/root/\.xauth.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) +/root/\.Xauth.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) +/root/\.Xauthority.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) +/root/\.xsession-errors.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_home_t,s0) +/root/\.dmrc.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_home_t,s0) # # /dev @@ -21,11 +42,18 @@ HOME_DIR/\.Xauthority.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) /etc/init\.d/xfree86-common -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_exec_t,s0) +/etc/gdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_etc_t,s0) +/etc/gdm/Init(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_unconfined_exec_t,s0) +/etc/gdm/PostLogin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_unconfined_exec_t,s0) +/etc/gdm/PostSession(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_unconfined_exec_t,s0) +/etc/gdm/PreSession(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_unconfined_exec_t,s0) + /etc/kde3?/kdm/Xstartup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0) /etc/kde3?/kdm/Xreset -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0) /etc/kde3?/kdm/Xsession -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0) /etc/kde3?/kdm/backgroundrc gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/etc/opt/VirtualGL(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_rw_etc_t,s0) /etc/X11/[wx]dm/Xreset.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0) /etc/X11/[wxg]dm/Xsession -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0) /etc/X11/wdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_rw_etc_t,s0) @@ -33,11 +61,6 @@ HOME_DIR/\.Xauthority.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) /etc/X11/wdm/Xstartup.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0) /etc/X11/Xsession[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0) -ifdef(`distro_redhat',` -/etc/gdm/PostSession/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0) -/etc/gdm/PreSession/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xsession_exec_t,s0) -') - # # /opt # @@ -48,28 +71,35 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # /tmp # -/tmp/\.ICE-unix -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_tmp_t,s0) -/tmp/\.ICE-unix/.* -s <> -/tmp/\.X0-lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_tmp_t,s0) -/tmp/\.X11-unix -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_tmp_t,s0) -/tmp/\.X11-unix/.* -s <> +/tmp/\.X0-lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_tmp_t,s0) +/tmp/\.X11-unix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_tmp_t,s0) +/tmp/\.ICE-unix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_tmp_t,s0) +/tmp/\.font-unix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_fonts_t,s0) # # /usr # -/usr/(s)?bin/gdm-binary -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) -/usr/(s)?bin/[xgkw]dm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/gdm-binary -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lxdm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lxdm-binary -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/[xgkw]dm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/gdm-binary -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/lxdm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/lxdm-binary -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/[xgkw]dm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/gpe-dm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/iceauth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iceauth_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/slim -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/Xair -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/Xephyr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/xauth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/Xorg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_exec_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_debian', ` /usr/sbin/gdm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_exec_t,s0) ') -/usr/lib(64)?/qt-.*/etc/settings(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/usr/lib/qt-.*/etc/settings(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) /usr/var/[xgkw]dm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0) @@ -90,17 +120,45 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian', ` /var/[xgk]dm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0) -/var/lib/[xkw]dm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/[gxkw]dm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/lxdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/xkb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xkb_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/xorg(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/cache/gdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_lib_t,s0) -/var/log/[kw]dm\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0) -/var/log/gdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0) +/var/log/gdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_log_t,s0) +/var/log/slim\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_log_t,s0) +/var/log/(l)?xdm\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_log_t,s0) +/var/log/[kw]dm\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0) /var/log/XFree86.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0) /var/log/Xorg.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0) +/var/log/nvidia-installer\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_log_t,s0) +/var/spool/gdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_spool_t,s0) + +/var/run/slim(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/kdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/gdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/gdm_socket -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/[gx]dm\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/lxdm\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/xdmctl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/xauth(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/slim.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/lxdm\.auth -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/lxdm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/run/video.rom -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/xorg(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xserver_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/systemd/multi-session-x(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_run_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_suse',` /var/lib/pam_devperm/:0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xdm_var_lib_t,s0) ') + +/var/lib/nxserver/home/\.xauth.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) +/var/lib/nxserver/home/\.Xauthority.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) +/var/lib/pqsql/\.xauth.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) +/var/lib/pqsql/\.Xauthority.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xauth_home_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/xserver.if b/policy/modules/services/xserver.if index 130ced9..56cb1f8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/xserver.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/xserver.if @@ -19,9 +19,10 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',` gen_require(` type xserver_t, xserver_exec_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmpfs_t; - type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t; + type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_config_t, xdm_tmp_t; type iceauth_t, iceauth_exec_t, iceauth_home_t; type xauth_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_home_t; + class dbus send_msg; ') role $1 types { xserver_t xauth_t iceauth_t }; @@ -30,12 +31,13 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',` allow xserver_t $2:fd use; allow xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms; - allow xserver_t $2:process signal; + allow xserver_t $2:process { getpgid signal }; allow xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms; allow $2 user_fonts_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $2 user_fonts_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $2 user_fonts_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; allow $2 user_fonts_config_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $2 user_fonts_config_t:file read_file_perms; @@ -44,6 +46,8 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',` manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) stream_connect_pattern($2, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t) + allow $2 xserver_tmp_t:sock_file delete_sock_file_perms; + dontaudit $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file setattr_sock_file_perms; files_search_tmp($2) # Communicate via System V shared memory. @@ -69,17 +73,21 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',` # for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the system allow $2 xdm_t:fd use; - allow $2 xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl }; - allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:dir search; - allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write }; + allow $2 xdm_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file rw_inherited_sock_file_perms; dontaudit $2 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $2 xdm_tmp_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; + + allow $2 xdm_t:dbus send_msg; + allow xdm_t $2:dbus send_msg; # Client read xserver shm allow $2 xserver_t:fd use; allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file read_file_perms; # Read /tmp/.X0-lock - allow $2 xserver_tmp_t:file { getattr read }; + allow $2 xserver_tmp_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; dev_rw_xserver_misc($2) dev_rw_power_management($2) @@ -88,15 +96,17 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',` dev_write_misc($2) # open office is looking for the following dev_getattr_agp_dev($2) - dev_dontaudit_rw_dri($2) + # GNOME checks for usb and other devices: dev_rw_usbfs($2) miscfiles_read_fonts($2) + miscfiles_setattr_fonts_cache_dirs($2) + miscfiles_read_hwdata($2) xserver_common_x_domain_template(user, $2) xserver_domtrans($2) - xserver_unconfined($2) + #xserver_unconfined($2) xserver_xsession_entry_type($2) xserver_dontaudit_write_log($2) xserver_stream_connect_xdm($2) @@ -106,12 +116,26 @@ interface(`xserver_restricted_role',` xserver_create_xdm_tmp_sockets($2) # Needed for escd, remove if we get escd policy xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_files($2) + xserver_read_xdm_etc_files($2) + xserver_xdm_append_log($2) + + term_use_virtio_console($2) + + modutils_run_insmod(xserver_t, $1) # Client write xserver shm tunable_policy(`allow_write_xshm',` allow $2 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms; allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; ') + + tunable_policy(`user_direct_dri',` + dev_rw_dri($2) + ') + + optional_policy(` + gnome_read_gconf_config($2) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -143,13 +167,15 @@ interface(`xserver_role',` allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms; - allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; + allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file relabel_file_perms; allow $2 xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms; - allow $2 xauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto }; + allow $2 xauth_home_t:file relabel_file_perms; + mls_xwin_read_to_clearance($2) manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + allow $2 user_fonts_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; relabel_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) relabel_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) @@ -162,7 +188,6 @@ interface(`xserver_role',` manage_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_config_t, user_fonts_config_t) relabel_dirs_pattern($2, user_fonts_config_t, user_fonts_config_t) relabel_files_pattern($2, user_fonts_config_t, user_fonts_config_t) - ') ####################################### @@ -197,7 +222,7 @@ interface(`xserver_ro_session',` allow $1 xserver_t:process signal; # Read /tmp/.X0-lock - allow $1 xserver_tmp_t:file { getattr read }; + allow $1 xserver_tmp_t:file read_file_perms; # Client read xserver shm allow $1 xserver_t:fd use; @@ -227,7 +252,7 @@ interface(`xserver_rw_session',` type xserver_t, xserver_tmpfs_t; ') - xserver_ro_session($1,$2) + xserver_ro_session($1, $2) allow $1 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms; allow $1 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; ') @@ -255,7 +280,7 @@ interface(`xserver_non_drawing_client',` allow $1 self:x_gc { create setattr }; - allow $1 xdm_var_run_t:dir search; + allow $1 xdm_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; allow $1 xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow $1 xextension_t:x_extension { query use }; @@ -291,13 +316,13 @@ interface(`xserver_user_client',` allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; # Read .Xauthority file - allow $1 xauth_home_t:file { getattr read }; - allow $1 iceauth_home_t:file { getattr read }; + allow $1 xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 iceauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; # for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the system allow $1 xdm_t:fd use; - allow $1 xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl }; - allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir search; + allow $1 xdm_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; + allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms; allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write }; dontaudit $1 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write }; @@ -342,19 +367,23 @@ interface(`xserver_user_client',` # template(`xserver_common_x_domain_template',` gen_require(` - type root_xdrawable_t; + type root_xdrawable_t, xdm_t, xserver_t; type xproperty_t, $1_xproperty_t; type xevent_t, client_xevent_t; type input_xevent_t, $1_input_xevent_t; - attribute x_domain; + attribute x_domain, input_xevent_type; attribute xdrawable_type, xcolormap_type; - attribute input_xevent_type; class x_drawable all_x_drawable_perms; class x_property all_x_property_perms; class x_event all_x_event_perms; class x_synthetic_event all_x_synthetic_event_perms; + class x_client destroy; + class x_server manage; + class x_screen { saver_setattr saver_hide saver_show }; + class x_pointer { get_property set_property manage }; + class x_keyboard { read manage }; ') ############################## @@ -386,6 +415,15 @@ template(`xserver_common_x_domain_template',` allow $2 xevent_t:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } receive; # dont audit send failures dontaudit $2 input_xevent_type:x_event send; + + allow $2 xdm_t:x_drawable { hide read add_child manage }; + allow $2 xdm_t:x_client destroy; + + allow $2 root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable write; + allow $2 xserver_t:x_server manage; + allow $2 xserver_t:x_screen { saver_setattr saver_hide saver_show }; + allow $2 xserver_t:x_pointer { get_property set_property manage }; + allow $2 xserver_t:x_keyboard { read manage }; ') ####################################### @@ -444,8 +482,9 @@ template(`xserver_object_types_template',` # template(`xserver_user_x_domain_template',` gen_require(` - type xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t; - type xauth_home_t, iceauth_home_t, xserver_t, xserver_tmpfs_t; + type xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, xserver_tmpfs_t; + type xdm_home_t; + type xauth_home_t, iceauth_home_t, xserver_t; ') allow $2 self:shm create_shm_perms; @@ -456,11 +495,24 @@ template(`xserver_user_x_domain_template',` allow $2 xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; allow $2 iceauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, iceauth_home_t, file, ".DCOP") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, iceauth_home_t, file, ".ICEauthority") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, iceauth_home_t, file, ".ICEauthority-c") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, iceauth_home_t, file, ".ICEauthority-n") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority-l") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority-c") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, xauth_home_t, file, ".xauth") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, xdm_home_t, file, ".xsession-errors") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, xdm_home_t, file, ".xsession-errors-stamped") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, xdm_home_t, file, ".xsession-errors-stamped.old") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($2, xdm_home_t, file, ".dmrc") + # for when /tmp/.X11-unix is created by the system allow $2 xdm_t:fd use; - allow $2 xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write ioctl }; + allow $2 xdm_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms; - allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file { read write }; + allow $2 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file rw_inherited_sock_file_perms; dontaudit $2 xdm_t:tcp_socket { read write }; # Allow connections to X server. @@ -472,20 +524,26 @@ template(`xserver_user_x_domain_template',` # for .xsession-errors userdom_dontaudit_write_user_home_content_files($2) - xserver_ro_session($2,$3) + xserver_ro_session($2, $3) xserver_use_user_fonts($2) xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files($2) + xserver_read_xdm_pid($2) + xserver_xdm_append_log($2) # X object manager xserver_object_types_template($1) - xserver_common_x_domain_template($1,$2) + xserver_common_x_domain_template($1, $2) # Client write xserver shm tunable_policy(`allow_write_xshm',` allow $2 xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms; allow $2 xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; ') + + tunable_policy(`user_direct_dri',` + dev_rw_dri($2) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -517,6 +575,7 @@ interface(`xserver_use_user_fonts',` # Read per user fonts allow $1 user_fonts_t:dir list_dir_perms; allow $1 user_fonts_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 user_fonts_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; # Manipulate the global font cache manage_dirs_pattern($1, user_fonts_cache_t, user_fonts_cache_t) @@ -547,6 +606,42 @@ interface(`xserver_domtrans_xauth',` domtrans_pattern($1, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t) ') +###################################### +## +## Allow exec of Xauthority program.. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_exec_xauth',` + gen_require(` + type xauth_t, xauth_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, xauth_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit exec of Xauthority program. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_dontaudit_exec_xauth',` + gen_require(` + type xauth_exec_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 xauth_exec_t:file execute; +') + ######################################## ## ## Create a Xauthority file in the user home directory. @@ -598,6 +693,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_user_xauth',` allow $1 xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + xserver_read_xdm_pid($1) ') ######################################## @@ -615,7 +711,7 @@ interface(`xserver_setattr_console_pipes',` type xconsole_device_t; ') - allow $1 xconsole_device_t:fifo_file setattr; + allow $1 xconsole_device_t:fifo_file setattr_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -638,6 +734,25 @@ interface(`xserver_rw_console',` ######################################## ## +## Read XDM state files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_read_state_xdm',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_t; + ') + + kernel_search_proc($1) + ps_process_pattern($1, xdm_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Use file descriptors for xdm. ## ## @@ -651,7 +766,7 @@ interface(`xserver_use_xdm_fds',` type xdm_t; ') - allow $1 xdm_t:fd use; + allow $1 xdm_t:fd use; ') ######################################## @@ -670,7 +785,7 @@ interface(`xserver_dontaudit_use_xdm_fds',` type xdm_t; ') - dontaudit $1 xdm_t:fd use; + dontaudit $1 xdm_t:fd use; ') ######################################## @@ -688,7 +803,7 @@ interface(`xserver_rw_xdm_pipes',` type xdm_t; ') - allow $1 xdm_t:fifo_file { getattr read write }; + allow $1 xdm_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -703,12 +818,11 @@ interface(`xserver_rw_xdm_pipes',` ## # interface(`xserver_dontaudit_rw_xdm_pipes',` - gen_require(` type xdm_t; ') - dontaudit $1 xdm_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 xdm_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -724,11 +838,31 @@ interface(`xserver_dontaudit_rw_xdm_pipes',` # interface(`xserver_stream_connect_xdm',` gen_require(` - type xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t; + type xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_var_run_t; ') files_search_tmp($1) - stream_connect_pattern($1, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_t) + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, { xdm_tmp_t xdm_var_run_t }, { xdm_tmp_t xdm_var_run_t }, xdm_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read XDM files in user home directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_read_xdm_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + allow $1 xdm_home_t:file read_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -752,6 +886,25 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xdm_rw_config',` ######################################## ## +## Search XDM temporary directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_search_xdm_tmp_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Set the attributes of XDM temporary directories. ## ## @@ -765,7 +918,7 @@ interface(`xserver_setattr_xdm_tmp_dirs',` type xdm_tmp_t; ') - allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir setattr; + allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -805,7 +958,26 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xdm_pid',` ') files_search_pids($1) - allow $1 xdm_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, xdm_var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Dontaudit Read XDM pid files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_dontaudit_read_xdm_pid',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_var_run_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 xdm_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; + dontaudit $1 xdm_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -828,6 +1000,24 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xdm_lib_files',` ######################################## ## +## Read inherited XDM var lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_read_inherited_xdm_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_var_lib_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Make an X session script an entrypoint for the specified domain. ## ## @@ -897,7 +1087,7 @@ interface(`xserver_getattr_log',` ') logging_search_logs($1) - allow $1 xserver_log_t:file getattr; + allow $1 xserver_log_t:file getattr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -916,7 +1106,7 @@ interface(`xserver_dontaudit_write_log',` type xserver_log_t; ') - dontaudit $1 xserver_log_t:file { append write }; + dontaudit $1 xserver_log_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -963,6 +1153,45 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xkb_libs',` ######################################## ## +## Read xdm config files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_read_xdm_etc_files',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_etc_t; + ') + + files_search_etc($1) + read_files_pattern($1, xdm_etc_t, xdm_etc_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, xdm_etc_t, xdm_etc_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage xdm config files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_manage_xdm_etc_files',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_etc_t; + ') + + files_search_etc($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, xdm_etc_t, xdm_etc_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read xdm temporary files. ## ## @@ -976,7 +1205,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_xdm_tmp_files',` type xdm_tmp_t; ') - files_search_tmp($1) + files_search_tmp($1) read_files_pattern($1, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) ') @@ -1038,6 +1267,42 @@ interface(`xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_files',` ######################################## ## +## Create, read, write, and delete xdm temporary dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_relabel_xdm_tmp_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir relabel_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete xdm temporary dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_tmp_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes of ## xdm temporary named sockets. ## @@ -1052,7 +1317,7 @@ interface(`xserver_dontaudit_getattr_xdm_tmp_sockets',` type xdm_tmp_t; ') - dontaudit $1 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file getattr; + dontaudit $1 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file getattr_sock_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1070,8 +1335,10 @@ interface(`xserver_domtrans',` type xserver_t, xserver_exec_t; ') - allow $1 xserver_t:process siginh; + allow $1 xserver_t:process siginh; domtrans_pattern($1, xserver_exec_t, xserver_t) + + allow xserver_t $1:process getpgid; ') ######################################## @@ -1185,6 +1452,26 @@ interface(`xserver_stream_connect',` files_search_tmp($1) stream_connect_pattern($1, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t) + allow xserver_t $1:shm rw_shm_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## Dontaudit attempts to connect to xserver +## over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_dontaudit_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t; + ') + + stream_connect_pattern($1, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t) ') ######################################## @@ -1210,7 +1497,7 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',` ## ## Interface to provide X object permissions on a given X server to ## an X client domain. Gives the domain permission to read the -## virtual core keyboard and virtual core pointer devices. +## virtual core keyboard and virtual core pointer devices. ## ## ## @@ -1220,13 +1507,23 @@ interface(`xserver_read_tmp_files',` # interface(`xserver_manage_core_devices',` gen_require(` - type xserver_t; + type xserver_t, root_xdrawable_t; class x_device all_x_device_perms; class x_pointer all_x_pointer_perms; class x_keyboard all_x_keyboard_perms; + class x_screen all_x_screen_perms; + class x_drawable { manage }; + attribute x_domain; + class x_drawable { read manage setattr show }; + class x_resource { write read }; ') allow $1 xserver_t:{ x_device x_pointer x_keyboard } *; + allow $1 xserver_t:{ x_screen } setattr; + + allow $1 x_domain:x_drawable { read manage setattr show }; + allow $1 x_domain:x_resource { write read }; + allow $1 root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable { manage read }; ') ######################################## @@ -1243,10 +1540,533 @@ interface(`xserver_manage_core_devices',` # interface(`xserver_unconfined',` gen_require(` - attribute x_domain; - attribute xserver_unconfined_type; + attribute x_domain, xserver_unconfined_type; ') typeattribute $1 x_domain; typeattribute $1 xserver_unconfined_type; ') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit append to .xsession-errors file +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_dontaudit_append_xdm_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_home_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 xdm_home_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + + tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_dontaudit_rw_nfs_files($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_dontaudit_rw_cifs_files($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## append to .xsession-errors file +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_append_xdm_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_home_t, xserver_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_home_t:file append_file_perms; + allow $1 xserver_tmp_t:file append_file_perms; + + tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_append_nfs_files($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_append_cifs_files($1) + ') +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow search the xdm_spool files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_xdm_search_spool',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + search_dirs_pattern($1, xdm_spool_t, xdm_spool_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow read the xdm_spool files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_xdm_read_spool',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + read_files_pattern($1, xdm_spool_t, xdm_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage the xdm_spool files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_xdm_manage_spool',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, xdm_spool_t, xdm_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## xdm over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_dbus_chat_xdm',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_t:dbus send_msg; + allow xdm_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read xserver files created in /var/run +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_read_pid',` + gen_require(` + type xserver_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + read_files_pattern($1, xserver_var_run_t, xserver_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute xserver files created in /var/run +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_exec_pid',` + gen_require(` + type xserver_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + exec_files_pattern($1, xserver_var_run_t, xserver_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Write xserver files created in /var/run +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_write_pid',` + gen_require(` + type xserver_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + write_files_pattern($1, xserver_var_run_t, xserver_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow append the xdm +## log files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_xdm_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_log_t; + attribute xdmhomewriter; + ') + + typeattribute $1 xdmhomewriter; + allow $1 xdm_log_t:file append_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow append the xdm +## tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_append_xdm_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:file append_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read a user Iceauthority domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_read_user_iceauth',` + gen_require(` + type iceauth_home_t; + ') + + # Read .Iceauthority file + allow $1 iceauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read/write inherited user homedir fonts. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_rw_inherited_user_fonts',` + gen_require(` + type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_config_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_fonts_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; + allow $1 user_fonts_t:file read_lnk_file_perms; + + allow $1 user_fonts_config_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Search XDM var lib dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_search_xdm_lib',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 xdm_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Make an X executable an entrypoint for the specified domain. +## +## +## +## The domain for which the shell is an entrypoint. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_entry_type',` + gen_require(` + type xserver_exec_t; + ') + + domain_entry_file($1, xserver_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute xsever in the xserver domain, and +## allow the specified role the xserver domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the xserver domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_run',` + gen_require(` + type xserver_t; + ') + + xserver_domtrans($1) + role $2 types xserver_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute xsever in the xserver domain, and +## allow the specified role the xserver domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the xserver domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_run_xauth',` + gen_require(` + type xauth_t; + ') + + xserver_domtrans_xauth($1) + role $2 types xauth_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read user homedir fonts. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_read_home_fonts',` + gen_require(` + type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_config_t; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + read_files_pattern($1, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + + read_files_pattern($1, user_fonts_config_t, user_fonts_config_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage user fonts dir. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_manage_user_fonts_dir',` + gen_require(` + type user_fonts_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + files_tmp_filetrans($1, user_fonts_t, dir, ".font-unix") +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage user homedir fonts. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_manage_home_fonts',` + gen_require(` + type user_fonts_t, user_fonts_config_t, user_fonts_cache_t; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + + manage_files_pattern($1, user_fonts_config_t, user_fonts_config_t) + +# userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_t, dir, ".fonts.d") +# userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_t, dir, ".fonts") +# userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_cache_t, dir, ".fontconfig") +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to xserver named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_home_t, xauth_home_t, iceauth_home_t; + type user_home_t, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t; + type user_fonts_config_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, xdm_home_t, file, ".dmrc") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, xdm_home_t, file, ".xsession-errors") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, iceauth_home_t, file, ".DCOP") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, iceauth_home_t, file, ".ICEauthority") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority-l") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority-c") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".xauth") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauth") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_config_t, file, ".fonts.conf") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_config_t, dir, ".fonts.d") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_t, dir, ".fonts") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_cache_t, dir, ".fontconfig") + filetrans_pattern($1, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t, dir, "auto") + files_tmp_filetrans($1, user_fonts_t, dir, ".font-unix") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create xserver content in admin home +## directory with a named file transition. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_filetrans_admin_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_home_t, xauth_home_t, iceauth_home_t; + type user_home_t, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_cache_t; + type user_fonts_config_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, xdm_home_t, file, ".dmrc") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, xdm_home_t, file, ".xsession-errors") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, iceauth_home_t, file, ".DCOP") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, iceauth_home_t, file, ".ICEauthority") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority-l") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauthority-c") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".xauth") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, xauth_home_t, file, ".Xauth") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_config_t, file, ".fonts.conf") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_config_t, dir, ".fonts.d") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_t, dir, ".fonts") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, user_fonts_cache_t, dir, ".fontconfig") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in a xdm temporary directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## a specified private type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the object to create. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`xserver_xdm_tmp_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type xdm_tmp_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, xdm_tmp_t, $2, $3, $4) + files_search_tmp($1) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/xserver.te b/policy/modules/services/xserver.te index 143c893..a4cacbf 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/xserver.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/xserver.te @@ -26,27 +26,50 @@ gen_require(` # ## -##

    -## Allows clients to write to the X server shared -## memory segments. -##

    +##

    +## Allows clients to write to the X server shared +## memory segments. +##

    ##     gen_tunable(allow_write_xshm, false) ## +##

    +## Allows XServer to execute writable memory +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(allow_xserver_execmem, false) + +## ##

    -## Allow xdm logins as sysadm +## Allow the graphical login program to execute bootloader ##

    ##     +gen_tunable(xdm_exec_bootloader, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow the graphical login program to login directly as sysadm_r:sysadm_t +##

    +##     gen_tunable(xdm_sysadm_login, false) ## -##

    -## Support X userspace object manager -##

    +##

    +## Support X userspace object manager +##

    ##     gen_tunable(xserver_object_manager, false) +## +##

    +## Allow regular users direct dri device access +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(user_direct_dri, false) + +attribute xdmhomewriter; +attribute x_userdomain; attribute x_domain; # X Events @@ -107,23 +130,29 @@ xserver_object_types_template(remote) xserver_common_x_domain_template(remote, remote_t) type user_fonts_t; -typealias user_fonts_t alias { staff_fonts_t sysadm_fonts_t }; +typealias user_fonts_t alias { staff_fonts_t sysadm_fonts_t xfs_fonts_t }; typealias user_fonts_t alias { auditadm_fonts_t secadm_fonts_t }; +typealias user_fonts_t alias { xguest_fonts_t unconfined_fonts_t user_fonts_home_t }; +typealias user_fonts_t alias xfs_tmp_t; userdom_user_home_content(user_fonts_t) +files_tmp_file(user_fonts_t) type user_fonts_cache_t; typealias user_fonts_cache_t alias { staff_fonts_cache_t sysadm_fonts_cache_t }; typealias user_fonts_cache_t alias { auditadm_fonts_cache_t secadm_fonts_cache_t }; +typealias user_fonts_cache_t alias { xguest_fonts_cache_t unconfined_fonts_cache_t }; userdom_user_home_content(user_fonts_cache_t) type user_fonts_config_t; typealias user_fonts_config_t alias { staff_fonts_config_t sysadm_fonts_config_t }; typealias user_fonts_config_t alias { auditadm_fonts_config_t secadm_fonts_config_t }; +typealias user_fonts_config_t alias { fonts_config_home_t xguest_fonts_config_t unconfined_fonts_config_t }; userdom_user_home_content(user_fonts_config_t) type iceauth_t; type iceauth_exec_t; typealias iceauth_t alias { user_iceauth_t staff_iceauth_t sysadm_iceauth_t }; +typealias iceauth_t alias { xguest_iceauth_t }; typealias iceauth_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_t secadm_iceauth_t }; application_domain(iceauth_t, iceauth_exec_t) ubac_constrained(iceauth_t) @@ -131,22 +160,26 @@ ubac_constrained(iceauth_t) type iceauth_home_t; typealias iceauth_home_t alias { user_iceauth_home_t staff_iceauth_home_t sysadm_iceauth_home_t }; typealias iceauth_home_t alias { auditadm_iceauth_home_t secadm_iceauth_home_t }; +typealias iceauth_home_t alias { xguest_iceauth_home_t }; userdom_user_home_content(iceauth_home_t) type xauth_t; type xauth_exec_t; typealias xauth_t alias { user_xauth_t staff_xauth_t sysadm_xauth_t }; typealias xauth_t alias { auditadm_xauth_t secadm_xauth_t }; +typealias xauth_t alias { xguest_xauth_t unconfined_xauth_t }; application_domain(xauth_t, xauth_exec_t) ubac_constrained(xauth_t) type xauth_home_t; typealias xauth_home_t alias { user_xauth_home_t staff_xauth_home_t sysadm_xauth_home_t }; typealias xauth_home_t alias { auditadm_xauth_home_t secadm_xauth_home_t }; +typealias xauth_home_t alias { xguest_xauth_home_t unconfined_xauth_home_t }; userdom_user_home_content(xauth_home_t) type xauth_tmp_t; typealias xauth_tmp_t alias { user_xauth_tmp_t staff_xauth_tmp_t sysadm_xauth_tmp_t }; +typealias xauth_tmp_t alias { xguest_xauth_tmp_t unconfined_xauth_tmp_t }; typealias xauth_tmp_t alias { auditadm_xauth_tmp_t secadm_xauth_tmp_t }; files_tmp_file(xauth_tmp_t) ubac_constrained(xauth_tmp_t) @@ -157,19 +190,28 @@ files_type(xconsole_device_t) fs_associate_tmpfs(xconsole_device_t) files_associate_tmp(xconsole_device_t) +type xdm_unconfined_exec_t; +application_executable_file(xdm_unconfined_exec_t) + type xdm_t; type xdm_exec_t; auth_login_pgm_domain(xdm_t) init_domain(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t) -init_daemon_domain(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t) +init_system_domain(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t) xserver_object_types_template(xdm) xserver_common_x_domain_template(xdm, xdm_t) type xdm_lock_t; files_lock_file(xdm_lock_t) +type xdm_etc_t; +files_config_file(xdm_etc_t) + type xdm_rw_etc_t; -files_type(xdm_rw_etc_t) +files_config_file(xdm_rw_etc_t) + +type xdm_spool_t; +files_spool_file(xdm_spool_t) type xdm_var_lib_t; files_type(xdm_var_lib_t) @@ -177,13 +219,27 @@ files_type(xdm_var_lib_t) type xdm_var_run_t; files_pid_file(xdm_var_run_t) +type xserver_var_lib_t; +files_type(xserver_var_lib_t) + +type xserver_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(xserver_var_run_t) + type xdm_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(xdm_tmp_t) -typealias xdm_tmp_t alias ice_tmp_t; +typealias xdm_tmp_t alias { xserver_tmp_t user_xserver_tmp_t staff_xserver_tmp_t sysadm_xserver_tmp_t ice_tmp_t }; +typealias xdm_tmp_t alias { auditadm_xserver_tmp_t secadm_xserver_tmp_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t }; +ubac_constrained(xdm_tmp_t) type xdm_tmpfs_t; files_tmpfs_file(xdm_tmpfs_t) +type xdm_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(xdm_home_t) + +type xdm_log_t; +logging_log_file(xdm_log_t) + # type for /var/lib/xkb type xkb_var_lib_t; files_type(xkb_var_lib_t) @@ -196,15 +252,9 @@ typealias xserver_t alias { auditadm_xserver_t secadm_xserver_t xdm_xserver_t }; init_system_domain(xserver_t, xserver_exec_t) ubac_constrained(xserver_t) -type xserver_tmp_t; -typealias xserver_tmp_t alias { user_xserver_tmp_t staff_xserver_tmp_t sysadm_xserver_tmp_t }; -typealias xserver_tmp_t alias { auditadm_xserver_tmp_t secadm_xserver_tmp_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t }; -files_tmp_file(xserver_tmp_t) -ubac_constrained(xserver_tmp_t) - type xserver_tmpfs_t; -typealias xserver_tmpfs_t alias { user_xserver_tmpfs_t staff_xserver_tmpfs_t sysadm_xserver_tmpfs_t }; -typealias xserver_tmpfs_t alias { auditadm_xserver_tmpfs_t secadm_xserver_tmpfs_t xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t }; +typealias xserver_tmpfs_t alias { user_xserver_tmpfs_t staff_xserver_tmpfs_t sysadm_xserver_tmpfs_t xguest_xserver_tmpfs_t unconfined_xserver_tmpfs_t xdm_xserver_tmpfs_t }; +typealias xserver_tmpfs_t alias { auditadm_xserver_tmpfs_t secadm_xserver_tmpfs_t }; files_tmpfs_file(xserver_tmpfs_t) ubac_constrained(xserver_tmpfs_t) @@ -234,17 +284,30 @@ userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(iceauth_t, iceauth_home_t, file) allow xdm_t iceauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; +dev_read_rand(iceauth_t) + fs_search_auto_mountpoints(iceauth_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(iceauth_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(iceauth_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_files(iceauth_t) - -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_files(iceauth_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_files(iceauth_t) +userdom_read_all_users_state(iceauth_t) +userdom_home_manager(iceauth_t) + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + dev_dontaudit_read_urand(iceauth_t) + dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(iceauth_t) + dev_dontaudit_rw_generic_dev_nodes(iceauth_t) + fs_dontaudit_list_inotifyfs(iceauth_t) + fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(iceauth_t) + term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(iceauth_t) + + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files(iceauth_t) + userdom_dontaudit_write_user_home_content_files(iceauth_t) + userdom_dontaudit_write_user_tmp_files(iceauth_t) + + optional_policy(` + mozilla_dontaudit_rw_user_home_files(iceauth_t) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -252,45 +315,78 @@ tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` # Xauth local policy # +allow xauth_t self:capability dac_override; allow xauth_t self:process signal; +allow xauth_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow xauth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow xauth_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +allow xauth_t xdm_t:process sigchld; +allow xauth_t xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + +corenet_tcp_connect_xserver_port(xauth_t) allow xauth_t xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms; userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(xauth_t, xauth_home_t, file) +userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(xauth_t, xauth_home_t, file) + +manage_dirs_pattern(xauth_t, xdm_var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(xauth_t, xdm_var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t) manage_dirs_pattern(xauth_t, xauth_tmp_t, xauth_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(xauth_t, xauth_tmp_t, xauth_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(xauth_t, xauth_tmp_t, { file dir }) -allow xdm_t xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms; -userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(xdm_t, xauth_home_t, file) +stream_connect_pattern(xauth_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t) +kernel_read_network_state(xauth_t) +kernel_read_system_state(xauth_t) kernel_request_load_module(xauth_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(xauth_t) +domain_dontaudit_leaks(xauth_t) files_read_etc_files(xauth_t) +files_read_usr_files(xauth_t) files_search_pids(xauth_t) +files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(xauth_t) +files_dontaudit_leaks(xauth_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(xauth_t, xauth_home_t, file) -fs_getattr_xattr_fs(xauth_t) +fs_dontaudit_leaks(xauth_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(xauth_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(xauth_t) -# cjp: why? -term_use_ptmx(xauth_t) +# Probably a leak +term_dontaudit_use_ptmx(xauth_t) +term_dontaudit_use_console(xauth_t) auth_use_nsswitch(xauth_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(xauth_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(xauth_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_files(xauth_t) +userdom_read_all_users_state(xauth_t) xserver_rw_xdm_tmp_files(xauth_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_files(xauth_t) +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + fs_dontaudit_rw_anon_inodefs_files(xauth_t) + fs_dontaudit_list_inotifyfs(xauth_t) + userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(xauth_t) + userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(xauth_t) + dev_dontaudit_rw_generic_dev_nodes(xauth_t) + miscfiles_read_fonts(xauth_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_files(xauth_t) +userdom_home_manager(xauth_t) + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(xauth_t) + dev_dontaudit_rw_dri(xauth_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + nx_var_lib_filetrans(xauth_t, xauth_home_t, file) ') optional_policy(` @@ -304,20 +400,38 @@ optional_policy(` # XDM Local policy # -allow xdm_t self:capability { setgid setuid sys_resource kill sys_tty_config mknod chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid ipc_owner sys_nice sys_rawio net_bind_service }; -allow xdm_t self:process { setexec setpgid getsched setsched setrlimit signal_perms setkeycreate }; +allow xdm_t self:capability { setgid setuid sys_resource kill sys_tty_config mknod chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid ipc_owner sys_nice sys_rawio net_bind_service sys_ptrace }; +dontaudit xdm_t self:capability sys_admin; + +allow xdm_t self:process { setexec setpgid getattr getcap setcap getsched getsession setsched setrlimit signal_perms setkeycreate }; allow xdm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow xdm_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow xdm_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow xdm_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; -allow xdm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; +allow xdm_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow xdm_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow xdm_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow xdm_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; allow xdm_t self:socket create_socket_perms; allow xdm_t self:appletalk_socket create_socket_perms; allow xdm_t self:key { search link write }; -allow xdm_t xconsole_device_t:fifo_file { getattr setattr }; +allow xdm_t xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms; + +allow xdm_t xconsole_device_t:fifo_file { getattr_fifo_file_perms setattr_fifo_file_perms }; +manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t) + +manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_home_t, xdm_home_t) +userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_home_t, file) +userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_home_t, file) +xserver_filetrans_home_content(xdm_t) +xserver_filetrans_admin_home_content(xdm_t) + +#Handle mislabeled files in homedir +userdom_delete_user_home_content_files(xdm_t) +userdom_signull_unpriv_users(xdm_t) +userdom_dontaudit_read_admin_home_lnk_files(xdm_t) # Allow gdm to run gdm-binary can_exec(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t) @@ -325,43 +439,63 @@ can_exec(xdm_t, xdm_exec_t) allow xdm_t xdm_lock_t:file manage_file_perms; files_lock_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_lock_t, file) +read_lnk_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_etc_t, xdm_etc_t) +read_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_etc_t, xdm_etc_t) # wdm has its own config dir /etc/X11/wdm # this is ugly, daemons should not create files under /etc! manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_rw_etc_t, xdm_rw_etc_t) manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) -files_tmp_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file }) +files_tmp_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file lnk_file }) +relabelfrom_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) +relabelfrom_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) +can_exec(xdm_t, xdm_tmp_t) manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmpfs_t, xdm_tmpfs_t) manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmpfs_t, xdm_tmpfs_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmpfs_t, xdm_tmpfs_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmpfs_t, xdm_tmpfs_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_tmpfs_t, xdm_tmpfs_t) -fs_tmpfs_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + +manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, user_fonts_t, user_fonts_t) + +files_search_spool(xdm_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_spool_t, xdm_spool_t) +manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_spool_t, xdm_spool_t) +files_spool_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_spool_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_var_lib_t, xdm_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_var_lib_t, xdm_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_var_lib_t, file) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_var_lib_t, xdm_var_lib_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_var_lib_t, xdm_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_var_lib_t, { file dir }) +# Read machine-id +files_read_var_lib_files(xdm_t) manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_var_run_t, { dir file fifo_file }) +manage_sock_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_var_run_t, { dir file fifo_file sock_file }) -allow xdm_t xserver_t:process signal; +allow xdm_t xserver_t:process { signal signull }; allow xdm_t xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow xdm_t xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_sock_file_perms; -allow xdm_t xserver_tmp_t:dir { setattr list_dir_perms }; +allow xdm_t xserver_tmp_t:dir { setattr_dir_perms list_dir_perms }; # transition to the xdm xserver domtrans_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_exec_t, xserver_t) + +ps_process_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_t) allow xserver_t xdm_t:process signal; allow xdm_t xserver_t:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh signal sigkill }; allow xdm_t xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms; +read_files_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_t, xserver_t) # connect to xdm xserver over stream socket stream_connect_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t) @@ -370,18 +504,26 @@ stream_connect_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_t) delete_files_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t) delete_sock_files_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_log_t, xdm_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_log_t, xdm_log_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_log_t, xdm_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_log_t, { dir file }) + manage_dirs_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_log_t, xserver_log_t) manage_files_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_log_t, xserver_log_t) manage_fifo_files_pattern(xdm_t, xserver_log_t, xserver_log_t) -logging_log_filetrans(xdm_t, xserver_log_t, file) kernel_read_system_state(xdm_t) +kernel_read_device_sysctls(xdm_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(xdm_t) kernel_read_net_sysctls(xdm_t) kernel_read_network_state(xdm_t) +kernel_request_load_module(xdm_t) +kernel_stream_connect(xdm_t) corecmd_exec_shell(xdm_t) corecmd_exec_bin(xdm_t) +corecmd_dontaudit_access_all_executables(xdm_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(xdm_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(xdm_t) @@ -393,38 +535,48 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(xdm_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(xdm_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(xdm_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(xdm_t) +corenet_udp_bind_ipp_port(xdm_t) +corenet_udp_bind_xdmcp_port(xdm_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(xdm_t) corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(xdm_t) # xdm tries to bind to biff_port_t corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_ports(xdm_t) +dev_rwx_zero(xdm_t) dev_read_rand(xdm_t) -dev_read_sysfs(xdm_t) +dev_rw_sysfs(xdm_t) dev_getattr_framebuffer_dev(xdm_t) dev_setattr_framebuffer_dev(xdm_t) dev_getattr_mouse_dev(xdm_t) dev_setattr_mouse_dev(xdm_t) dev_rw_apm_bios(xdm_t) +dev_rw_input_dev(xdm_t) dev_setattr_apm_bios_dev(xdm_t) dev_rw_dri(xdm_t) dev_rw_agp(xdm_t) dev_getattr_xserver_misc_dev(xdm_t) dev_setattr_xserver_misc_dev(xdm_t) +dev_rw_xserver_misc(xdm_t) dev_getattr_misc_dev(xdm_t) dev_setattr_misc_dev(xdm_t) dev_dontaudit_rw_misc(xdm_t) -dev_getattr_video_dev(xdm_t) +dev_read_video_dev(xdm_t) +dev_write_video_dev(xdm_t) dev_setattr_video_dev(xdm_t) dev_getattr_scanner_dev(xdm_t) dev_setattr_scanner_dev(xdm_t) -dev_getattr_sound_dev(xdm_t) -dev_setattr_sound_dev(xdm_t) +dev_read_sound(xdm_t) +dev_write_sound(xdm_t) dev_getattr_power_mgmt_dev(xdm_t) dev_setattr_power_mgmt_dev(xdm_t) +dev_getattr_null_dev(xdm_t) +dev_setattr_null_dev(xdm_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(xdm_t) # Do not audit denied probes of /proc. domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(xdm_t) +domain_dontaudit_signal_all_domains(xdm_t) +domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_entry_files(xdm_t) files_read_etc_files(xdm_t) files_read_var_files(xdm_t) @@ -435,9 +587,25 @@ files_list_mnt(xdm_t) files_read_usr_files(xdm_t) # Poweroff wants to create the /poweroff file when run from xdm files_create_boot_flag(xdm_t) +files_dontaudit_getattr_boot_dirs(xdm_t) +files_dontaudit_write_usr_files(xdm_t) +files_dontaudit_access_check_etc(xdm_t) +files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs(xdm_t) +files_dontaudit_getattr_all_symlinks(xdm_t) +files_dontaudit_getattr_all_tmp_sockets(xdm_t) +files_dontaudit_all_access_check(xdm_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(xdm_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(xdm_t) +fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(xdm_t) +fs_mount_tmpfs(xdm_t) +fs_list_inotifyfs(xdm_t) +fs_dontaudit_list_noxattr_fs(xdm_t) +fs_dontaudit_read_noxattr_fs_files(xdm_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(xdm_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_files(xdm_t) + +mls_socket_write_to_clearance(xdm_t) storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk(xdm_t) storage_dontaudit_write_fixed_disk(xdm_t) @@ -446,28 +614,38 @@ storage_dontaudit_raw_read_removable_device(xdm_t) storage_dontaudit_raw_write_removable_device(xdm_t) storage_dontaudit_setattr_removable_dev(xdm_t) storage_dontaudit_rw_scsi_generic(xdm_t) +storage_dontaudit_rw_fuse(xdm_t) term_setattr_console(xdm_t) +term_use_console(xdm_t) +term_use_virtio_console(xdm_t) term_use_unallocated_ttys(xdm_t) term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(xdm_t) +term_relabel_all_ttys(xdm_t) +term_relabel_unallocated_ttys(xdm_t) auth_domtrans_pam_console(xdm_t) -auth_manage_pam_pid(xdm_t) +#auth_manage_pam_pid(xdm_t) auth_manage_pam_console_data(xdm_t) +auth_signal_pam(xdm_t) auth_rw_faillog(xdm_t) auth_write_login_records(xdm_t) # Run telinit->init to shutdown. init_telinit(xdm_t) +init_dbus_chat(xdm_t) +init_pid_filetrans(xdm_t, xdm_var_run_t, dir, "multi-session-x") libs_exec_lib_files(xdm_t) logging_read_generic_logs(xdm_t) +miscfiles_search_man_pages(xdm_t) miscfiles_read_localization(xdm_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(xdm_t) - -sysnet_read_config(xdm_t) +miscfiles_manage_fonts_cache(xdm_t) +miscfiles_manage_localization(xdm_t) +miscfiles_read_hwdata(xdm_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(xdm_t) userdom_create_all_users_keys(xdm_t) @@ -476,24 +654,43 @@ userdom_read_user_home_content_files(xdm_t) # Search /proc for any user domain processes. userdom_read_all_users_state(xdm_t) userdom_signal_all_users(xdm_t) +userdom_stream_connect(xdm_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(xdm_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(xdm_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(xdm_t) +userdom_manage_tmpfs_role(system_r, xdm_t) +userdom_home_manager(xdm_t) + +application_signal(xdm_t) xserver_rw_session(xdm_t, xdm_tmpfs_t) xserver_unconfined(xdm_t) +xserver_domtrans_xauth(xdm_t) + +ifndef(`distro_redhat',` + allow xdm_t self:process { execheap execmem }; +') + +ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` + allow xdm_t self:process { execheap execmem }; +') tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(xdm_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(xdm_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(xdm_t) fs_exec_nfs_files(xdm_t) ') tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(xdm_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(xdm_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(xdm_t) fs_exec_cifs_files(xdm_t) ') +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`xdm_exec_bootloader',` + bootloader_exec(xdm_t) + files_read_boot_files(xdm_t) + files_read_boot_symlinks(xdm_t) + ') +') + tunable_policy(`xdm_sysadm_login',` userdom_xsession_spec_domtrans_all_users(xdm_t) # FIXME: @@ -507,11 +704,21 @@ tunable_policy(`xdm_sysadm_login',` ') optional_policy(` + accountsd_read_lib_files(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + acct_dontaudit_list_data(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` alsa_domtrans(xdm_t) + alsa_read_rw_config(xdm_t) ') optional_policy(` consolekit_dbus_chat(xdm_t) + consolekit_read_log(xdm_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -519,12 +726,63 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + # Use dbus to start other processes as xdm_t + dbus_role_template(xdm, system_r, xdm_t) + + #fixes for xfce4-notifyd + allow xdm_dbusd_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; + allow xdm_dbusd_t xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + + dontaudit xdm_dbusd_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + xserver_xdm_append_log(xdm_dbusd_t) + xserver_read_xdm_pid(xdm_dbusd_t) + + miscfiles_read_fonts(xdm_dbusd_t) + + corecmd_bin_entry_type(xdm_t) + + dbus_system_bus_client(xdm_t) + + optional_policy(` + bluetooth_dbus_chat(xdm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + cpufreqselector_dbus_chat(xdm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + devicekit_dbus_chat_disk(xdm_t) + devicekit_dbus_chat_power(xdm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + hal_dbus_chat(xdm_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + networkmanager_dbus_chat(xdm_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` # Talk to the console mouse server. gpm_stream_connect(xdm_t) gpm_setattr_gpmctl(xdm_t) ') optional_policy(` + gnome_exec_keyringd(xdm_t) + gnome_manage_config(xdm_t) + gnome_manage_gconf_home_files(xdm_t) + gnome_filetrans_home_content(xdm_t) + gnome_read_config(xdm_t) + gnome_read_usr_config(xdm_t) + gnome_read_gconf_config(xdm_t) + gnome_transition_gkeyringd(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` hostname_exec(xdm_t) ') @@ -542,28 +800,69 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + policykit_dbus_chat(xdm_t) + policykit_domtrans_auth(xdm_t) + policykit_read_lib(xdm_t) + policykit_read_reload(xdm_t) + policykit_signal_auth(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + pcscd_stream_connect(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + plymouthd_search_spool(xdm_t) + plymouthd_exec_plymouth(xdm_t) + plymouthd_stream_connect(xdm_t) + plymouthd_read_log(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + pulseaudio_exec(xdm_t) + pulseaudio_dbus_chat(xdm_t) + pulseaudio_stream_connect(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` resmgr_stream_connect(xdm_t) ') optional_policy(` + rhev_stream_connect_agentd(xdm_t) + rhev_read_pid_files_agentd(xdm_t) +') + +# On crash gdm execs gdb to dump stack +optional_policy(` + rpm_exec(xdm_t) + rpm_read_db(xdm_t) + rpm_dontaudit_manage_db(xdm_t) + rpm_dontaudit_dbus_chat(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rtkit_scheduled(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(xdm_t) ') optional_policy(` - udev_read_db(xdm_t) + ssh_signull(xdm_t) ') optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(xdm_t) - unconfined_domtrans(xdm_t) + shutdown_domtrans(xdm_t) +') - ifndef(`distro_redhat',` - allow xdm_t self:process { execheap execmem }; - ') +optional_policy(` + udev_read_db(xdm_t) +') - ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` - allow xdm_t self:process { execheap execmem }; - ') +optional_policy(` + unconfined_signal(xdm_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -575,6 +874,14 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + vdagent_stream_connect(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + wm_exec(xdm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` xfs_stream_connect(xdm_t) ') @@ -599,7 +906,8 @@ allow xserver_t input_xevent_t:x_event send; # execheap needed until the X module loader is fixed. # NVIDIA Needs execstack -allow xserver_t self:capability { dac_override fowner fsetid setgid setuid ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config mknod net_bind_service }; +allow xserver_t self:capability { sys_ptrace dac_override fowner fsetid setgid setuid ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config mknod net_bind_service }; + dontaudit xserver_t self:capability chown; allow xserver_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; allow xserver_t self:fd use; @@ -613,8 +921,15 @@ allow xserver_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; allow xserver_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; allow xserver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow xserver_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow xserver_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms; allow xserver_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +allow xserver_t { input_xevent_t input_xevent_type }:x_event send; + +domtrans_pattern(xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t) + +allow xserver_t xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; + manage_dirs_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_tmp_t, xserver_tmp_t) @@ -633,12 +948,19 @@ manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t, xkb_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib(xserver_t) -domtrans_pattern(xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, xauth_t) -allow xserver_t xauth_home_t:file read_file_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_var_lib_t, xserver_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_var_lib_t, xserver_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(xserver_t, xserver_var_lib_t, dir) + +manage_dirs_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_var_run_t, xserver_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_var_run_t, xserver_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(xserver_t, xserver_var_run_t, { file dir }) # Create files in /var/log with the xserver_log_t type. manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xserver_log_t, xserver_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(xserver_t, xserver_log_t, file) +manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_log_t, xdm_log_t) kernel_read_system_state(xserver_t) kernel_read_device_sysctls(xserver_t) @@ -646,6 +968,7 @@ kernel_read_modprobe_sysctls(xserver_t) # Xorg wants to check if kernel is tainted kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(xserver_t) kernel_write_proc_files(xserver_t) +kernel_request_load_module(xserver_t) # Run helper programs in xserver_t. corecmd_exec_bin(xserver_t) @@ -672,21 +995,28 @@ dev_rw_apm_bios(xserver_t) dev_rw_agp(xserver_t) dev_rw_framebuffer(xserver_t) dev_manage_dri_dev(xserver_t) -dev_filetrans_dri(xserver_t) dev_create_generic_dirs(xserver_t) dev_setattr_generic_dirs(xserver_t) # raw memory access is needed if not using the frame buffer dev_read_raw_memory(xserver_t) dev_wx_raw_memory(xserver_t) # for other device nodes such as the NVidia binary-only driver -dev_rw_xserver_misc(xserver_t) +dev_manage_xserver_misc(xserver_t) +dev_filetrans_xserver_misc(xserver_t) + # read events - the synaptics touchpad driver reads raw events dev_rw_input_dev(xserver_t) +dev_read_raw_memory(xserver_t) +dev_write_raw_memory(xserver_t) dev_rwx_zero(xserver_t) +domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(xserver_t) +domain_signal_all_domains(xserver_t) + files_read_etc_files(xserver_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(xserver_t) files_read_usr_files(xserver_t) +files_rw_tmpfs_files(xserver_t) # brought on by rhgb files_search_mnt(xserver_t) @@ -697,8 +1027,13 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(xserver_t) fs_search_nfs(xserver_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(xserver_t) fs_search_ramfs(xserver_t) +fs_rw_tmpfs_files(xserver_t) mls_xwin_read_to_clearance(xserver_t) +mls_process_write_to_clearance(xserver_t) +mls_file_read_to_clearance(xserver_t) +mls_file_write_all_levels(xserver_t) +mls_file_upgrade(xserver_t) selinux_validate_context(xserver_t) selinux_compute_access_vector(xserver_t) @@ -711,8 +1046,6 @@ init_getpgid(xserver_t) term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(xserver_t) term_use_unallocated_ttys(xserver_t) -getty_use_fds(xserver_t) - locallogin_use_fds(xserver_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(xserver_t) @@ -720,11 +1053,12 @@ logging_send_audit_msgs(xserver_t) miscfiles_read_localization(xserver_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(xserver_t) - -modutils_domtrans_insmod(xserver_t) +miscfiles_read_hwdata(xserver_t) # read x_contexts seutil_read_default_contexts(xserver_t) +seutil_read_config(xserver_t) +seutil_read_file_contexts(xserver_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(xserver_t) userdom_use_user_ttys(xserver_t) @@ -778,16 +1112,40 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + consolekit_read_state(xserver_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + devicekit_signal_power(xserver_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + getty_use_fds(xserver_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(xserver_t) +') + +optional_policy(` rhgb_getpgid(xserver_t) rhgb_signal(xserver_t) ') optional_policy(` + setrans_translate_context(xserver_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sandbox_rw_xserver_tmpfs_files(xserver_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_read_db(xserver_t) ') optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain_noaudit(xserver_t) + unconfined_domain(xserver_t) unconfined_domtrans(xserver_t) ') @@ -796,6 +1154,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + wine_rw_shm(xserver_t) +') + +optional_policy(` xfs_stream_connect(xserver_t) ') @@ -811,10 +1173,10 @@ allow xserver_t xdm_t:shm rw_shm_perms; # NB we do NOT allow xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir, only access to an open # handle of a file inside the dir!!! -allow xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:file { getattr read }; -dontaudit xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir search; +allow xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:file read_file_perms; +dontaudit xserver_t xdm_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; -allow xserver_t xdm_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +read_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_var_run_t, xdm_var_run_t) # Label pid and temporary files with derived types. manage_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) @@ -822,7 +1184,7 @@ manage_lnk_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(xserver_t, xdm_tmp_t, xdm_tmp_t) # Run xkbcomp. -allow xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file read; +allow xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; can_exec(xserver_t, xkb_var_lib_t) # VNC v4 module in X server @@ -835,26 +1197,21 @@ init_use_fds(xserver_t) # to read ROLE_home_t - examine this in more detail # (xauth?) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(xserver_t) +userdom_read_all_users_state(xserver_t) +userdom_home_manager(xserver_t) -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_nfs_dirs(xserver_t) - fs_manage_nfs_files(xserver_t) - fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(xserver_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_manage_cifs_dirs(xserver_t) - fs_manage_cifs_files(xserver_t) - fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(xserver_t) -') +xserver_use_user_fonts(xserver_t) optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(xserver_t) - hal_dbus_chat(xserver_t) + + optional_policy(` + hal_dbus_chat(xserver_t) + ') ') optional_policy(` - resmgr_stream_connect(xdm_t) + mono_rw_shm(xserver_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -862,6 +1219,10 @@ optional_policy(` rhgb_rw_tmpfs_files(xserver_t) ') +optional_policy(` + userhelper_search_config(xserver_t) +') + ######################################## # # Rules common to all X window domains @@ -905,7 +1266,7 @@ allow x_domain xproperty_t:x_property { getattr create read write append destroy allow x_domain root_xdrawable_t:x_drawable { getattr setattr list_child add_child remove_child send receive hide show }; # operations allowed on my windows allow x_domain self:x_drawable { create destroy getattr setattr read write show hide list_child add_child remove_child manage send receive }; -allow x_domain self:x_drawable { blend }; +allow x_domain self:x_drawable blend; # operations allowed on all windows allow x_domain x_domain:x_drawable { getattr get_property set_property remove_child }; @@ -959,11 +1320,31 @@ allow x_domain self:x_resource { read write }; # can mess with the screensaver allow x_domain xserver_t:x_screen { getattr saver_getattr }; +# Device rules +allow x_domain xserver_t:x_device { read getattr use setattr setfocus grab bell }; +allow x_domain xserver_t:x_screen getattr; + ######################################## # # Rules for unconfined access to this module # +allow xserver_unconfined_type xserver_t:x_server *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type xdrawable_type:x_drawable *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type xserver_t:x_screen *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_gc *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type xcolormap_type:x_colormap *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type xproperty_type:x_property *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type xselection_type:x_selection *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_cursor *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_client *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_pointer *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_keyboard *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type xextension_type:x_extension *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_resource *; +allow xserver_unconfined_type xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *; + tunable_policy(`! xserver_object_manager',` # should be xserver_unconfined(x_domain), # but typeattribute doesnt work in conditionals @@ -985,18 +1366,43 @@ tunable_policy(`! xserver_object_manager',` allow x_domain xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *; ') -allow xserver_unconfined_type xserver_t:x_server *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type xdrawable_type:x_drawable *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type xserver_t:x_screen *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_gc *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type xcolormap_type:x_colormap *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type xproperty_type:x_property *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type xselection_type:x_selection *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_cursor *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type x_domain:x_client *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_device *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_pointer *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_keyboard *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type xextension_type:x_extension *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type { x_domain xserver_t }:x_resource *; -allow xserver_unconfined_type xevent_type:{ x_event x_synthetic_event } *; +tunable_policy(`allow_xserver_execmem',` + allow xserver_t self:process { execheap execmem execstack }; +') + +# Hack to handle the problem of using the nvidia blobs +tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` + allow xdm_t self:process execmem; +') + +tunable_policy(`allow_execstack',` + allow xdm_t self:process { execstack execmem }; +') + +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_append_nfs_files(xdmhomewriter) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_append_nfs_files(xdmhomewriter) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_rw_shm(xserver_t) + + # xserver signals unconfined user on startx + unconfined_signal(xserver_t) + unconfined_getpgid(xserver_t) +') + +can_exec(xdm_t, xdm_unconfined_exec_t) + +optional_policy(` + type xdm_unconfined_t; + domain_type(xdm_unconfined_t) + domain_entry_file(xdm_unconfined_t, xdm_unconfined_exec_t) + role system_r types xdm_unconfined_t; + + domtrans_pattern(xdm_t, xdm_unconfined_exec_t, xdm_unconfined_t) + unconfined_domain(xdm_unconfined_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zabbix.fc b/policy/modules/services/zabbix.fc index 664cd7a..e3eaec5 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zabbix.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/zabbix.fc @@ -1,8 +1,10 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix-agentd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zabbix-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/usr/(s)?bin/zabbix_server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_exec_t,s0) -/usr/(s)?bin/zabbix_agentd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_agent_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/zabbix_server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/zabbix_server_mysql -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/zabbix_server_pgsql -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/zabbix_server_sqlite3 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_exec_t,s0) /var/log/zabbix(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:zabbix_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zabbix.if b/policy/modules/services/zabbix.if index c9981d1..75a7d17 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zabbix.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/zabbix.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run zabbix. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`zabbix_domtrans',` @@ -61,13 +61,33 @@ interface(`zabbix_read_log',` ######################################## ## +## Allow the specified domain to read zabbix's tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`zabbix_read_tmp',` + gen_require(` + type zabbix_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + read_files_pattern($1, zabbix_tmp_t, zabbix_tmp_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Allow the specified domain to append ## zabbix log files. ## ## -## +## ## Domain allowed access. -## +## ## # interface(`zabbix_append_log',` @@ -110,7 +130,7 @@ interface(`zabbix_read_pid_files',` # interface(`zabbix_agent_tcp_connect',` gen_require(` - type zabbix_agent_t; + type zabbix_t, zabbix_agent_t; ') corenet_sendrecv_zabbix_agent_client_packets($1) @@ -142,8 +162,11 @@ interface(`zabbix_admin',` type zabbix_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 zabbix_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 zabbix_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, zabbix_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 zabbix_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, zabbix_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zabbix.te b/policy/modules/services/zabbix.te index 7f88f5f..67a111c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zabbix.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/zabbix.te @@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ policy_module(zabbix, 1.3.1) # Declarations # +## +##

    +## Allow zabbix to connect to unreserved ports +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(zabbix_can_network, false) + type zabbix_t; type zabbix_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(zabbix_t, zabbix_exec_t) @@ -23,6 +30,10 @@ init_script_file(zabbix_agent_initrc_exec_t) type zabbix_log_t; logging_log_file(zabbix_log_t) +# tmp files +type zabbix_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(zabbix_tmp_t) + # shared memory type zabbix_tmpfs_t; files_tmpfs_file(zabbix_tmpfs_t) @@ -36,19 +47,25 @@ files_pid_file(zabbix_var_run_t) # zabbix local policy # -allow zabbix_t self:capability { setuid setgid }; -allow zabbix_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; -allow zabbix_t self:process { setsched getsched signal }; +allow zabbix_t self:capability { dac_read_search dac_override setuid setgid }; +allow zabbix_t self:process setsched; +allow zabbix_t self:sem create_sem_perms; +allow zabbix_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow zabbix_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow zabbix_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow zabbix_t self:shm create_shm_perms; allow zabbix_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; # log files -allow zabbix_t zabbix_log_t:dir setattr; +allow zabbix_t zabbix_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; manage_files_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_log_t, zabbix_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(zabbix_t, zabbix_log_t, file) +# tmp files +manage_dirs_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_tmp_t, zabbix_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_tmp_t, zabbix_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(zabbix_t, zabbix_tmp_t, { dir file }) + # shared memory rw_files_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_tmpfs_t, zabbix_tmpfs_t) fs_tmpfs_filetrans(zabbix_t, zabbix_tmpfs_t, file) @@ -58,25 +75,54 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_var_run_t, zabbix_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(zabbix_t, zabbix_var_run_t, zabbix_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(zabbix_t, zabbix_var_run_t, { dir file }) +kernel_read_system_state(zabbix_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(zabbix_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(zabbix_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(zabbix_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(zabbix_t) corenet_tcp_bind_zabbix_port(zabbix_t) +# needed by zabbix-server-mysql +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(zabbix_t) +# to monitor ftp urls +corenet_tcp_connect_ftp_port(zabbix_t) + +dev_read_urand(zabbix_t) files_read_etc_files(zabbix_t) +files_read_usr_files(zabbix_t) -miscfiles_read_localization(zabbix_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(zabbix_t) -sysnet_dns_name_resolve(zabbix_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(zabbix_t) zabbix_agent_tcp_connect(zabbix_t) +tunable_policy(`zabbix_can_network',` + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(zabbix_t) +') + optional_policy(` mysql_stream_connect(zabbix_t) ') optional_policy(` + netutils_domtrans_ping(zabbix_t) +') + +optional_policy(` postgresql_stream_connect(zabbix_t) ') +optional_policy(` + snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_dirs(zabbix_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(zabbix_t) +') + ######################################## # # zabbix agent local policy @@ -134,3 +180,4 @@ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(zabbix_agent_t) # Network access to zabbix server zabbix_tcp_connect(zabbix_agent_t) + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zarafa.fc b/policy/modules/services/zarafa.fc index 3defaa1..7436a1c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zarafa.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/zarafa.fc @@ -8,8 +8,10 @@ /usr/bin/zarafa-server -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_server_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/zarafa-spooler -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_spooler_exec_t,s0) -/var/lib/zarafa-.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/zarafa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/zarafa-webaccess(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_var_lib_t,s0) +/var/log/zarafa/dagent\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_deliver_log_t,s0) /var/log/zarafa/gateway\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_gateway_log_t,s0) /var/log/zarafa/ical\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_ical_log_t,s0) /var/log/zarafa/indexer\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_indexer_log_t,s0) @@ -18,9 +20,11 @@ /var/log/zarafa/spooler\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_spooler_log_t,s0) /var/run/zarafa -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_server_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/zarafa-dagent\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_deliver_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/zarafa-gateway\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_gateway_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/zarafa-ical\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_ical_var_run_t,s0) -/var/run/zarafa-indexer -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_indexer_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/zarafa-indexer -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_indexer_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/zarafa-indexer\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_indexer_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/zarafa-monitor\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_monitor_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/zarafa-server\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_server_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/zarafa-spooler\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zarafa_spooler_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zarafa.if b/policy/modules/services/zarafa.if index 21ae664..cb3a098 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zarafa.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/zarafa.if @@ -42,6 +42,8 @@ template(`zarafa_domain_template',` manage_files_pattern(zarafa_$1_t, zarafa_$1_log_t, zarafa_$1_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(zarafa_$1_t, zarafa_$1_log_t, { file }) + + auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_$1_t) ') ###################################### @@ -118,3 +120,25 @@ interface(`zarafa_stream_connect_server',` files_search_var_lib($1) stream_connect_pattern($1, zarafa_server_var_run_t, zarafa_server_var_run_t, zarafa_server_t) ') + +#################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to manage +## zarafa /var/lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zarafa_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type zarafa_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zarafa.te b/policy/modules/services/zarafa.te index 9fb4747..bd73b2a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zarafa.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/zarafa.te @@ -18,6 +18,10 @@ files_config_file(zarafa_etc_t) zarafa_domain_template(gateway) zarafa_domain_template(ical) zarafa_domain_template(indexer) + +type zarafa_indexer_tmp_t; +files_tmp_file(zarafa_indexer_tmp_t) + zarafa_domain_template(monitor) zarafa_domain_template(server) @@ -57,6 +61,21 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(zarafa_gateway_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(zarafa_gateway_t) corenet_tcp_bind_pop_port(zarafa_gateway_t) +###################################### +# +# zarafa-indexer local policy +# + +allow zarafa_indexer_t self:capability chown; + +manage_dirs_pattern(zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_indexer_tmp_t, zarafa_indexer_tmp_t) +manage_files_pattern(zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_indexer_tmp_t, zarafa_indexer_tmp_t) +files_tmp_filetrans(zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_indexer_tmp_t, { file dir }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(zarafa_indexer_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t) + ####################################### # # zarafa-ical local policy @@ -93,7 +112,8 @@ files_tmp_filetrans(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_server_tmp_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t) -files_var_lib_filetrans(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, { file dir }) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, zarafa_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_var_lib_t, { file dir lnk_file }) stream_connect_pattern(zarafa_server_t, zarafa_indexer_var_run_t, zarafa_indexer_var_run_t, zarafa_indexer_t) @@ -107,7 +127,6 @@ corenet_tcp_bind_zarafa_port(zarafa_server_t) files_read_usr_files(zarafa_server_t) -logging_send_syslog_msg(zarafa_server_t) logging_send_audit_msgs(zarafa_server_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(zarafa_server_t) @@ -138,6 +157,32 @@ corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(zarafa_spooler_t) ######################################## # +# zarafa_gateway local policy +# + +allow zarafa_gateway_t self:capability { chown kill }; +allow zarafa_gateway_t self:process setrlimit; + +corenet_tcp_bind_pop_port(zarafa_gateway_t) + +####################################### +# +# zarafa-ical local policy +# + +allow zarafa_ical_t self:capability chown; + +corenet_tcp_bind_http_cache_port(zarafa_ical_t) + +###################################### +# +# zarafa-monitor local policy +# + +allow zarafa_monitor_t self:capability chown; + +######################################## +# # zarafa domains local policy # @@ -152,10 +197,13 @@ stream_connect_pattern(zarafa_domain, zarafa_server_var_run_t, zarafa_server_var read_files_pattern(zarafa_domain, zarafa_etc_t, zarafa_etc_t) +dev_read_rand(zarafa_domain) +dev_read_urand(zarafa_domain) + kernel_read_system_state(zarafa_domain) files_read_etc_files(zarafa_domain) -auth_use_nsswitch(zarafa_domain) +logging_send_syslog_msg(zarafa_domain) miscfiles_read_localization(zarafa_domain) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zebra.if b/policy/modules/services/zebra.if index 6b87605..c745e03 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zebra.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/zebra.if @@ -24,7 +24,7 @@ interface(`zebra_read_config',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to zebra over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to zebra over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -38,8 +38,7 @@ interface(`zebra_stream_connect',` ') files_search_pids($1) - allow $1 zebra_var_run_t:sock_file write; - allow $1 zebra_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + stream_connect_pattern($1, zebra_var_run_t, zebra_var_run_t, zebra_t) ') ######################################## @@ -62,12 +61,14 @@ interface(`zebra_stream_connect',` interface(`zebra_admin',` gen_require(` type zebra_t, zebra_tmp_t, zebra_log_t; - type zebra_conf_t, zebra_var_run_t; - type zebra_initrc_exec_t; + type zebra_conf_t, zebra_var_run_t, zebra_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 zebra_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 zebra_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, zebra_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 zebra_t:process ptrace; + ') init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, zebra_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zebra.te b/policy/modules/services/zebra.te index ade6c2c..08479b0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zebra.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/zebra.te @@ -6,11 +6,10 @@ policy_module(zebra, 1.12.0) # ## -##

    -## Allow zebra daemon to write it configuration files -##

    +##

    +## Allow zebra daemon to write it configuration files +##

    ##     -# gen_tunable(allow_zebra_write_config, false) type zebra_t; @@ -18,7 +17,7 @@ type zebra_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(zebra_t, zebra_exec_t) type zebra_conf_t; -files_type(zebra_conf_t) +files_config_file(zebra_conf_t) type zebra_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(zebra_initrc_exec_t) @@ -52,7 +51,7 @@ allow zebra_t zebra_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms; read_files_pattern(zebra_t, zebra_conf_t, zebra_conf_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(zebra_t, zebra_conf_t, zebra_conf_t) -allow zebra_t zebra_log_t:dir setattr; +allow zebra_t zebra_log_t:dir setattr_dir_perms; manage_files_pattern(zebra_t, zebra_log_t, zebra_log_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(zebra_t, zebra_log_t, zebra_log_t) logging_log_filetrans(zebra_t, zebra_log_t, { sock_file file dir }) @@ -106,6 +105,8 @@ files_search_etc(zebra_t) files_read_etc_files(zebra_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(zebra_t) +auth_read_passwd(zebra_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(zebra_t) miscfiles_read_localization(zebra_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zoneminder.fc b/policy/modules/services/zoneminder.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..47e388a --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/zoneminder.fc @@ -0,0 +1,22 @@ +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/motion -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zoneminder_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/zoneminder -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zoneminder_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/motion -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zoneminder_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/zmpkg.pl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zoneminder_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/libexec/zoneminder/cgi-bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:httpd_zoneminder_script_exec_t,s0) + +/var/lib/zoneminder(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:zoneminder_var_lib_t,s0) + +/var/log/zoneminder(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:zoneminder_log_t,s0) + +/var/log/motion\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zoneminder_log_t,s0) + +/var/run/motion\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zoneminder_var_run_t,s0) + +/var/spool/zoneminder-upload(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:zoneminder_spool_t,s0) + + + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zoneminder.if b/policy/modules/services/zoneminder.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..b34b8b4 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/zoneminder.if @@ -0,0 +1,339 @@ + +## policy for zoneminder + + +######################################## +## +## Transition to zoneminder. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_t, zoneminder_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, zoneminder_exec_t, zoneminder_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Execute zoneminder server in the zoneminder domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_initrc_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_initrc_exec_t; + ') + + init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, zoneminder_initrc_exec_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Read zoneminder's log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_read_log',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + read_files_pattern($1, zoneminder_log_t, zoneminder_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to zoneminder log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_append_log',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + append_files_pattern($1, zoneminder_log_t, zoneminder_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage zoneminder log files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_manage_log',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_log_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, zoneminder_log_t, zoneminder_log_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, zoneminder_log_t, zoneminder_log_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, zoneminder_log_t, zoneminder_log_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Search zoneminder lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_search_lib',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_var_lib_t; + ') + + allow $1 zoneminder_var_lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_var_lib($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read zoneminder lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_read_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + read_files_pattern($1, zoneminder_var_lib_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage zoneminder lib files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_manage_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, zoneminder_var_lib_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage zoneminder lib directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_manage_lib_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, zoneminder_var_lib_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Search zoneminder spool directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_search_spool',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_spool_t; + ') + + allow $1 zoneminder_spool_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_spool($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read zoneminder spool files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_read_spool_files',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + read_files_pattern($1, zoneminder_spool_t, zoneminder_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage zoneminder spool files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_manage_spool_files',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + manage_files_pattern($1, zoneminder_spool_t, zoneminder_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage zoneminder spool dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_manage_spool_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_spool_t; + ') + + files_search_spool($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, zoneminder_spool_t, zoneminder_spool_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to zoneminder over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, zoneminder_var_lib_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t, zoneminder_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Read/write zonerimender tmpfs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_rw_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_tmpfs_t; + ') + + fs_search_tmpfs($1) + rw_files_pattern($1, zoneminder_tmpfs_t, zoneminder_tmpfs_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## All of the rules required to administrate +## an zoneminder environment +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## Role allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`zoneminder_admin',` + gen_require(` + type zoneminder_t; + type zoneminder_initrc_exec_t; + type zoneminder_log_t; + type zoneminder_var_lib_t; + type zoneminder_spool_t; + ') + + allow $1 zoneminder_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + ps_process_pattern($1, zoneminder_t) + + zoneminder_initrc_domtrans($1) + domain_system_change_exemption($1) + role_transition $2 zoneminder_initrc_exec_t system_r; + allow $2 system_r; + + logging_search_logs($1) + admin_pattern($1, zoneminder_log_t) + + files_search_var_lib($1) + admin_pattern($1, zoneminder_var_lib_t) + + files_search_spool($1) + admin_pattern($1, zoneminder_spool_t) + +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zoneminder.te b/policy/modules/services/zoneminder.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..9562539 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/services/zoneminder.te @@ -0,0 +1,124 @@ +policy_module(zoneminder, 1.0.0) + +######################################## +# +# Declarations +# + +## +##

    +## Allow ZoneMinder to modify public files +## used for public file transfer services. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(zoneminder_anon_write, false) + +type zoneminder_t; +type zoneminder_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_exec_t) + +type zoneminder_initrc_exec_t; +init_script_file(zoneminder_initrc_exec_t) + +type zoneminder_log_t; +logging_log_file(zoneminder_log_t) + +type zoneminder_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(zoneminder_tmpfs_t) + +type zoneminder_spool_t; +files_type(zoneminder_spool_t) + +type zoneminder_var_lib_t; +files_type(zoneminder_var_lib_t) + +type zoneminder_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(zoneminder_var_run_t) + +######################################## +# +# zoneminder local policy +# +allow zoneminder_t self:capability { chown dac_override }; +allow zoneminder_t self:process { signal_perms setpgid }; +allow zoneminder_t self:shm create_shm_perms; +allow zoneminder_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow zoneminder_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; + +manage_dirs_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_log_t, zoneminder_log_t) +manage_files_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_log_t, zoneminder_log_t) +logging_log_filetrans(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_log_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_tmpfs_t, zoneminder_tmpfs_t) +manage_files_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_tmpfs_t, zoneminder_tmpfs_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_tmpfs_t, zoneminder_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t) +files_var_lib_filetrans(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t, { dir file sock_file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_var_run_t, zoneminder_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_var_run_t, zoneminder_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_var_run_t, { dir file }) + +manage_dirs_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_spool_t, zoneminder_spool_t) +manage_files_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_spool_t, zoneminder_spool_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_spool_t, zoneminder_spool_t) +files_spool_filetrans(zoneminder_t, zoneminder_spool_t, { dir file }) + +kernel_read_system_state(zoneminder_t) + +corecmd_exec_bin(zoneminder_t) +corecmd_exec_shell(zoneminder_t) + +corenet_tcp_bind_http_cache_port(zoneminder_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_transproxy_port(zoneminder_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(zoneminder_t) +dev_read_rand(zoneminder_t) +dev_read_urand(zoneminder_t) +dev_read_video_dev(zoneminder_t) +dev_write_video_dev(zoneminder_t) + +files_read_etc_files(zoneminder_t) +files_read_usr_files(zoneminder_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(zoneminder_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(zoneminder_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(zoneminder_t) + +tunable_policy(`zoneminder_anon_write',` + miscfiles_manage_public_files(zoneminder_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mysql_stream_connect(zoneminder_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# zoneminder cgi local policy +# + +optional_policy(` + apache_content_template(zoneminder) + + # need more testing + #allow httpd_zoneminder_script_t self:shm create_shm_perms; + + manage_sock_files_pattern(httpd_zoneminder_script_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t, zoneminder_var_lib_t) + zoneminder_stream_connect(httpd_zoneminder_script_t) + + files_search_var_lib(httpd_zoneminder_script_t) + + logging_send_syslog_msg(httpd_zoneminder_script_t) + + optional_policy(` + mysql_stream_connect(httpd_zoneminder_script_t) + ') + +') diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zosremote.fc b/policy/modules/services/zosremote.fc index d719d0b..7a7fc61 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zosremote.fc +++ b/policy/modules/services/zosremote.fc @@ -1 +1,3 @@ /sbin/audispd-zos-remote -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zos_remote_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/audispd-zos-remote -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:zos_remote_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zosremote.if b/policy/modules/services/zosremote.if index 702e768..13f0eef 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zosremote.if +++ b/policy/modules/services/zosremote.if @@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ ## Execute a domain transition to run audispd-zos-remote. ##     ## -## +## ## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## ## # interface(`zosremote_domtrans',` @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ interface(`zosremote_domtrans',` ## Role allowed access. ##     ## +## # interface(`zosremote_run',` gen_require(` diff --git a/policy/modules/services/zosremote.te b/policy/modules/services/zosremote.te index f9a06d2..3d407c6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/services/zosremote.te +++ b/policy/modules/services/zosremote.te @@ -16,7 +16,7 @@ logging_dispatcher_domain(zos_remote_t, zos_remote_exec_t) # allow zos_remote_t self:process signal; -allow zos_remote_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +allow zos_remote_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow zos_remote_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; files_read_etc_files(zos_remote_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/application.if b/policy/modules/system/application.if index 1b6619e..3aed6ad 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/application.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/application.if @@ -189,6 +189,24 @@ interface(`application_dontaudit_signal',` ######################################## ## +## Send kill signals to all application domains. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`application_sigkill',` + gen_require(` + attribute application_domain_type; + ') + + allow $1 application_domain_type:process sigkill; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to send kill signals ## to all application domains. ## @@ -205,3 +223,21 @@ interface(`application_dontaudit_sigkill',` dontaudit $1 application_domain_type:process sigkill; ') + +####################################### +## +## Getattr all application sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`application_getattr_socket',` + gen_require(` + attribute application_domain_type; + ') + + allow $1 application_domain_type:socket_class_set getattr; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/application.te b/policy/modules/system/application.te index c6fdab7..32f45fa 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/application.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/application.te @@ -6,6 +6,28 @@ attribute application_domain_type; # Executables to be run by user attribute application_exec_type; +domain_use_interactive_fds(application_domain_type) + +userdom_inherit_append_user_home_content_files(application_domain_type) +userdom_inherit_append_admin_home_files(application_domain_type) +userdom_inherit_append_user_tmp_files(application_domain_type) +logging_inherit_append_all_logs(application_domain_type) + +files_dontaudit_search_all_dirs(application_domain_type) + +optional_policy(` + afs_rw_udp_sockets(application_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + cfengine_append_inherited_log(application_domain_type) +') + +optional_policy(` + cron_rw_inherited_user_spool_files(application_domain_type) + cron_sigchld(application_domain_type) +') + optional_policy(` cron_sigchld(application_domain_type) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.fc b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.fc index 28ad538..82def3d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.fc @@ -1,3 +1,7 @@ +HOME_DIR/\.google_authenticator gen_context(system_u:object_r:auth_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.google_authenticator~ gen_context(system_u:object_r:auth_home_t,s0) +/root/\.google_authenticator gen_context(system_u:object_r:auth_home_t,s0) +/root/\.google_authenticator~ gen_context(system_u:object_r:auth_home_t,s0) /bin/login -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:login_exec_t,s0) @@ -5,7 +9,12 @@ /etc/group\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0) /etc/gshadow.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0) /etc/passwd\.lock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0) +/etc/passwd\.adjunct.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0) /etc/shadow.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:shadow_t,s0) +/etc/passwd[-\+]? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0) +/etc/passwd\.OLD -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0) +/etc/ptmptmp -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0) +/etc/group[-\+]? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:passwd_file_t,s0) /sbin/pam_console_apply -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_console_exec_t,s0) /sbin/pam_timestamp_check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_exec_t,s0) @@ -16,13 +25,22 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /sbin/unix2_chkpwd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0) ') +/usr/bin/login -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:login_exec_t,s0) + /usr/kerberos/sbin/login\.krb5 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:login_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/utempter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:utempter_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/validate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pam_console_apply -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_console_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pam_timestamp_check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/unix_update -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:updpwd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/unix_verify -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` /usr/sbin/unix_chkpwd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0) ') +/usr/sbin/utempter -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:utempter_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/validate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:chkpwd_exec_t,s0) + +/var/ace(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0) /var/cache/coolkey(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:auth_cache_t,s0) @@ -30,6 +48,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` /var/lib/abl(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0) /var/lib/pam_ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0) +/var/lib/pam_shield(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0) +/var/lib/google-authenticator(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0) /var/log/btmp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:faillog_t,s0) /var/log/dmesg -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) @@ -39,11 +59,13 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` /var/log/tallylog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:faillog_t,s0) /var/log/wtmp.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:wtmp_t,s0) +/var/lib/rsa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0) +/var/rsa(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0) + /var/run/console(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_var_console_t,s0) /var/run/faillock(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:faillog_t,s0) /var/run/pam_mount(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/pam_ssh(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0) /var/run/sepermit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/sudo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_var_run_t,s0) -/var/run/user(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_auth_t,s0) /var/(db|lib|adm)/sudo(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:pam_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if index 73554ec..a0bd29b 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.if @@ -23,11 +23,17 @@ interface(`auth_role',` role $1 types chkpwd_t; # Transition from the user domain to this domain. - domtrans_pattern($2, chkpwd_exec_t, chkpwd_t) + auth_domtrans_chkpwd($2) ps_process_pattern($2, chkpwd_t) dontaudit $2 shadow_t:file read_file_perms; + + logging_send_syslog_msg($2) + logging_send_audit_msgs($2) + + usermanage_read_crack_db($2) + ') ######################################## @@ -57,6 +63,8 @@ interface(`auth_use_pam',` auth_exec_pam($1) auth_use_nsswitch($1) + init_rw_stream_sockets($1) + logging_send_audit_msgs($1) logging_send_syslog_msg($1) @@ -78,8 +86,19 @@ interface(`auth_use_pam',` ') optional_policy(` + locallogin_getattr_home_content($1) + ') + + optional_policy(` nis_authenticate($1) ') + + optional_policy(` + systemd_dbus_chat_logind($1) + systemd_use_fds_logind($1) + systemd_write_inherited_logind_sessions_pipes($1) + systemd_read_logind_sessions_files($1) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -95,9 +114,13 @@ interface(`auth_use_pam',` interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',` gen_require(` type var_auth_t, auth_cache_t; + attribute polydomain; + type auth_home_t; ') domain_type($1) + typeattribute $1 polydomain; + domain_subj_id_change_exemption($1) domain_role_change_exemption($1) domain_obj_id_change_exemption($1) @@ -105,14 +128,17 @@ interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',` # Needed for pam_selinux_permit to cleanup properly domain_read_all_domains_state($1) + corecmd_getattr_all_executables($1) domain_kill_all_domains($1) # pam_keyring allow $1 self:capability ipc_lock; allow $1 self:process setkeycreate; allow $1 self:key manage_key_perms; + userdom_manage_all_users_keys($1) files_list_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, var_auth_t, var_auth_t) manage_files_pattern($1, var_auth_t, var_auth_t) manage_dirs_pattern($1, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t) @@ -120,16 +146,29 @@ interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',` manage_sock_files_pattern($1, auth_cache_t, auth_cache_t) files_var_filetrans($1, auth_cache_t, dir) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, auth_home_t, auth_home_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, auth_home_t, auth_home_t) + auth_filetrans_admin_home_content($1) + auth_filetrans_home_content($1) + # needed for afs - https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=253321 kernel_rw_afs_state($1) + kernel_search_network_sysctl($1) + + tunable_policy(`authlogin_radius',` + corenet_udp_bind_all_unreserved_ports($1) + ') + corenet_tcp_connect_pki_ca_port($1) # for fingerprint readers dev_rw_input_dev($1) dev_rw_generic_usb_dev($1) - files_read_etc_files($1) + files_read_config_files($1) fs_list_auto_mountpoints($1) + fs_manage_cgroup_dirs($1) + fs_manage_cgroup_files($1) selinux_get_fs_mount($1) selinux_validate_context($1) @@ -145,6 +184,8 @@ interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',` mls_process_set_level($1) mls_fd_share_all_levels($1) + auth_manage_faillog($1) + auth_manage_pam_pid($1) auth_use_pam($1) init_rw_utmp($1) @@ -155,9 +196,83 @@ interface(`auth_login_pgm_domain',` seutil_read_config($1) seutil_read_default_contexts($1) - tunable_policy(`allow_polyinstantiation',` - files_polyinstantiate_all($1) + userdom_set_rlimitnh($1) + userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks($1) + userdom_delete_user_tmp_files($1) + userdom_search_admin_dir($1) + userdom_stream_connect($1) + userdom_manage_user_tmp_files($1) + + optional_policy(` + afs_rw_udp_sockets($1) + ') + + optional_policy(` + kerberos_read_config($1) + ') + + optional_policy(` + oddjob_dbus_chat($1) + oddjob_domtrans_mkhomedir($1) + ') + + optional_policy(` + openct_stream_connect($1) + openct_signull($1) + openct_read_pid_files($1) + ') + + optional_policy(` + corecmd_exec_bin($1) + storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev($1) + mount_domtrans($1) + ') + + optional_policy(` + fprintd_dbus_chat($1) + ') + + optional_policy(` + ssh_agent_exec($1) + ssh_read_user_home_files($1) + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Read authlogin state files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`authlogin_read_state',` + gen_require(` + attribute polydomain; + ') + + kernel_search_proc($1) + ps_process_pattern($1, polydomain) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write a authlogin unnamed pipe. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`authlogin_rw_pipes',` + gen_require(` + attribute polydomain; ') + + allow $1 polydomain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -368,13 +483,15 @@ interface(`auth_domtrans_chk_passwd',` ') optional_policy(` - pcscd_read_pub_files($1) + pcscd_manage_pub_files($1) + pcscd_manage_pub_pipes($1) pcscd_stream_connect($1) ') optional_policy(` samba_stream_connect_winbind($1) ') + auth_domtrans_upd_passwd($1) ') ######################################## @@ -421,6 +538,25 @@ interface(`auth_run_chk_passwd',` auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1) role $2 types chkpwd_t; + auth_run_upd_passwd($1, $2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send generic signals to chkpwd processes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_signal_chk_passwd',` + gen_require(` + type chkpwd_t; + ') + + allow $1 chkpwd_t:process signal; ') ######################################## @@ -440,7 +576,6 @@ interface(`auth_domtrans_upd_passwd',` domtrans_pattern($1, updpwd_exec_t, updpwd_t) auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1) - ') ######################################## @@ -637,6 +772,10 @@ interface(`auth_manage_shadow',` allow $1 shadow_t:file manage_file_perms; typeattribute $1 can_read_shadow_passwords, can_write_shadow_passwords; + files_var_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "shadow") + files_var_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "shadow-") + files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, ".pwd.lock") + files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "gshadow") ') ####################################### @@ -736,7 +875,50 @@ interface(`auth_rw_faillog',` ') logging_search_logs($1) - allow $1 faillog_t:file rw_file_perms; + rw_files_pattern($1, faillog_t, faillog_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Relabel the login failure log. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_relabel_faillog',` + gen_require(` + type faillog_t; + ') + + allow $1 faillog_t:dir relabel_dir_perms; + allow $1 faillog_t:file relabel_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage the login failure log. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_manage_faillog',` + gen_require(` + type faillog_t; + ') + + logging_search_logs($1) + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 faillog_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1 faillog_t:file manage_file_perms; + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, faillog_t, file, "tallylog") + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, faillog_t, file, "faillog") + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, faillog_t, file, "btmp") ') ####################################### @@ -932,9 +1114,30 @@ interface(`auth_manage_var_auth',` ') files_search_var($1) - allow $1 var_auth_t:dir manage_dir_perms; - allow $1 var_auth_t:file rw_file_perms; - allow $1 var_auth_t:lnk_file rw_lnk_file_perms; + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, var_auth_t, var_auth_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, var_auth_t, var_auth_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, var_auth_t, var_auth_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Relabel all var auth files. Used by various other applications +## and pam applets etc. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_relabel_var_auth_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type var_auth_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, var_auth_t, var_auth_t) ') ######################################## @@ -1013,6 +1216,10 @@ interface(`auth_manage_pam_pid',` files_search_pids($1) allow $1 pam_var_run_t:dir manage_dir_perms; allow $1 pam_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "pam_mount") + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "pam_ssh") + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "sepermit") + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "sudo") ') ######################################## @@ -1130,6 +1337,7 @@ interface(`auth_manage_pam_console_data',` files_search_pids($1) manage_files_pattern($1, pam_var_console_t, pam_var_console_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, pam_var_console_t, pam_var_console_t) + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_console_t, dir, "console") ') ####################################### @@ -1387,6 +1595,25 @@ interface(`auth_setattr_login_records',` ######################################## ## +## Relabel login record files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_relabel_login_records',` + gen_require(` + type wtmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 wtmp_t:file relabel_file_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## ## Read login records files (/var/log/wtmp). ## ## @@ -1537,37 +1764,49 @@ interface(`auth_manage_login_records',` logging_rw_generic_log_dirs($1) allow $1 wtmp_t:file manage_file_perms; + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, wtmp_t, file, "wtmp") ') ######################################## ## -## Relabel login record files. +## Use nsswitch to look up user, password, group, or +## host information. ## +## +##

    +## Allow the specified domain to look up user, password, +## group, or host information using the name service. +## The most common use of this interface is for services +## that do host name resolution (usually DNS resolution). +##

    +##     ## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## +## # -interface(`auth_relabel_login_records',` +interface(`auth_use_nsswitch',` gen_require(` - type wtmp_t; + attribute nsswitch_domain; ') - allow $1 wtmp_t:file relabel_file_perms; + typeattribute $1 nsswitch_domain; ') ######################################## ## -## Use nsswitch to look up user, password, group, or -## host information. +## Unconfined access to the authlogin module. ## ## ##

    -## Allow the specified domain to look up user, password, -## group, or host information using the name service. -## The most common use of this interface is for services -## that do host name resolution (usually DNS resolution). +## Unconfined access to the authlogin module. +##

    +##

    +## Currently, this only allows assertions for +## the shadow passwords file (/etc/shadow) to +## be passed. No access is granted yet. ##

    ##     ## @@ -1575,87 +1814,206 @@ interface(`auth_relabel_login_records',` ## Domain allowed access. ##     ## -## # -interface(`auth_use_nsswitch',` - - files_list_var_lib($1) +interface(`auth_unconfined',` + gen_require(` + attribute can_read_shadow_passwords; + attribute can_write_shadow_passwords; + attribute can_relabelto_shadow_passwords; + ') - # read /etc/nsswitch.conf - files_read_etc_files($1) + typeattribute $1 can_read_shadow_passwords; + typeattribute $1 can_write_shadow_passwords; + typeattribute $1 can_relabelto_shadow_passwords; +') - miscfiles_read_generic_certs($1) +######################################## +## +## Transition to authlogin named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type shadow_t; + type passwd_file_t; + type faillog_t; + type lastlog_t; + type wtmp_t; + type pam_var_console_t; + type pam_var_run_t; + ') - sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1) - sysnet_use_ldap($1) + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group") + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group-") + #files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group+") + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd") + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd-") + #files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd+") + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd.OLD") + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "ptmptmp") + files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "group.lock") + files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "passwd.lock") + files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "passwd.adjunct") + files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "shadow") + files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "shadow-") + files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, ".pwd.lock") + files_etc_filetrans($1, shadow_t, file, "gshadow") + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, lastlog_t, file, "lastlog") + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, faillog_t, file, "tallylog") + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, faillog_t, file, "faillog") + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, faillog_t, file, "btmp") + files_pid_filetrans($1, faillog_t, file, "faillog") + files_pid_filetrans($1, faillog_t, dir, "faillock") + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_console_t, dir, "console") + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "pam_mount") + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "pam_ssh") + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "sepermit") + files_pid_filetrans($1, pam_var_run_t, dir, "sudo") + logging_log_named_filetrans($1, wtmp_t, file, "wtmp") +') - optional_policy(` - avahi_stream_connect($1) +######################################## +## +## Get the attributes of the passwd passwords file. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_getattr_passwd',` + gen_require(` + type passwd_file_t; ') - optional_policy(` - ldap_stream_connect($1) - ') + files_search_etc($1) + allow $1 passwd_file_t:file getattr; +') - optional_policy(` - likewise_stream_connect_lsassd($1) +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to get the attributes +## of the passwd passwords file. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_dontaudit_getattr_passwd',` + gen_require(` + type passwd_file_t; ') - optional_policy(` - kerberos_use($1) - ') + dontaudit $1 passwd_file_t:file getattr; +') - optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind($1) +######################################## +## +## Read the passwd passwords file (/etc/passwd) +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_read_passwd',` + gen_require(` + type passwd_file_t; ') - optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use($1) - ') + allow $1 passwd_file_t:file read_file_perms; +') - optional_policy(` - nslcd_stream_connect($1) +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read the passwd +## password file (/etc/passwd). +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_dontaudit_read_passwd',` + gen_require(` + type passwd_file_t; ') - optional_policy(` - sssd_stream_connect($1) + dontaudit $1 passwd_file_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete the passwd +## password file. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_manage_passwd',` + gen_require(` + type passwd_file_t; ') - optional_policy(` - samba_stream_connect_winbind($1) - samba_read_var_files($1) - samba_dontaudit_write_var_files($1) + files_rw_etc_dirs($1) + allow $1 passwd_file_t:file manage_file_perms; + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd") + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "passwd-") + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "ptmptmp") + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group") + files_etc_filetrans($1, passwd_file_t, file, "group-") +') + +######################################## +## +## Create auth directory in the /root directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`auth_filetrans_admin_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type auth_home_t; ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, auth_home_t, file, ".google_authenticator") + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, auth_home_t, file, ".google_authenticator~") ') ######################################## ## -## Unconfined access to the authlogin module. +## Create auth directory in the user home directory +## with an correct label. ## -## -##

    -## Unconfined access to the authlogin module. -##

    -##

    -## Currently, this only allows assertions for -## the shadow passwords file (/etc/shadow) to -## be passed. No access is granted yet. -##

    -##     ## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`auth_unconfined',` +interface(`auth_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` - attribute can_read_shadow_passwords; - attribute can_write_shadow_passwords; - attribute can_relabelto_shadow_passwords; + type auth_home_t; ') - typeattribute $1 can_read_shadow_passwords; - typeattribute $1 can_write_shadow_passwords; - typeattribute $1 can_relabelto_shadow_passwords; + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, auth_home_t, file, ".google_authenticator") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, auth_home_t, file, ".google_authenticator~") ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te index b7a5f00..27ad087 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/authlogin.te @@ -5,22 +5,42 @@ policy_module(authlogin, 2.2.1) # Declarations # +## +##

    +## Allow users to login using a radius server +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(authlogin_radius, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow users to resolve user passwd entries directly from ldap rather then using a sssd server +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap, false) + attribute can_read_shadow_passwords; attribute can_write_shadow_passwords; attribute can_relabelto_shadow_passwords; +attribute polydomain; +attribute nsswitch_domain; type auth_cache_t; logging_log_file(auth_cache_t) +type auth_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(auth_home_t) + type chkpwd_t, can_read_shadow_passwords; type chkpwd_exec_t; typealias chkpwd_t alias { user_chkpwd_t staff_chkpwd_t sysadm_chkpwd_t }; -typealias chkpwd_t alias { auditadm_chkpwd_t secadm_chkpwd_t }; +typealias chkpwd_t alias { auditadm_chkpwd_t secadm_chkpwd_t system_chkpwd_t }; application_domain(chkpwd_t, chkpwd_exec_t) role system_r types chkpwd_t; type faillog_t; logging_log_file(faillog_t) +mls_trusted_object(faillog_t) type lastlog_t; logging_log_file(lastlog_t) @@ -55,6 +75,9 @@ neverallow ~can_read_shadow_passwords shadow_t:file read; neverallow ~can_write_shadow_passwords shadow_t:file { create write }; neverallow ~can_relabelto_shadow_passwords shadow_t:file relabelto; +type passwd_file_t; +files_type(passwd_file_t) + type updpwd_t; type updpwd_exec_t; domain_type(updpwd_t) @@ -100,6 +123,8 @@ dev_read_urand(chkpwd_t) files_read_etc_files(chkpwd_t) # for nscd files_dontaudit_search_var(chkpwd_t) +files_read_usr_symlinks(chkpwd_t) +files_list_tmp(chkpwd_t) fs_dontaudit_getattr_xattr_fs(chkpwd_t) @@ -118,7 +143,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(chkpwd_t) seutil_read_config(chkpwd_t) seutil_dontaudit_use_newrole_fds(chkpwd_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(chkpwd_t) +userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys(chkpwd_t) ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` optional_policy(` @@ -332,6 +357,7 @@ kernel_read_system_state(updpwd_t) dev_read_urand(updpwd_t) files_manage_etc_files(updpwd_t) +auth_manage_passwd(updpwd_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(updpwd_t) term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(updpwd_t) @@ -343,7 +369,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(updpwd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(updpwd_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(updpwd_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(updpwd_t) ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` optional_policy(` @@ -371,13 +397,15 @@ term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(utempter_t) term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(utempter_t) term_dontaudit_use_ptmx(utempter_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(utempter_t) + init_rw_utmp(utempter_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(utempter_t) logging_search_logs(utempter_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(utempter_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(utempter_t) # Allow utemper to write to /tmp/.xses-* userdom_write_user_tmp_files(utempter_t) @@ -388,10 +416,75 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(utempter_t) + xserver_use_xdm_fds(utempter_t) + xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(utempter_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`allow_polyinstantiation',` + files_polyinstantiate_all(polydomain) ') optional_policy(` - xserver_use_xdm_fds(utempter_t) - xserver_rw_xdm_pipes(utempter_t) + tunable_policy(`allow_polyinstantiation',` + namespace_init_domtrans(polydomain) + ') +') + + +auth_read_passwd(nsswitch_domain) + +# read /etc/nsswitch.conf +files_read_etc_files(nsswitch_domain) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(nsswitch_domain) + +tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',` + files_list_var_lib(nsswitch_domain) + + miscfiles_read_generic_certs(nsswitch_domain) + sysnet_use_ldap(nsswitch_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',` + dirsrv_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`authlogin_nsswitch_use_ldap',` + ldap_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + likewise_stream_connect_lsassd(nsswitch_domain) +') + +# can not wrap nis_use_ypbind or kerberos_use, but they both have booleans you can turn off. +optional_policy(` + kerberos_use(nsswitch_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + nis_use_ypbind(nsswitch_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + nscd_use(nsswitch_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + nslcd_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + sssd_stream_connect(nsswitch_domain) + sssd_read_public_files(nsswitch_domain) +') + +optional_policy(` + samba_stream_connect_winbind(nsswitch_domain) + samba_read_var_files(nsswitch_domain) + samba_dontaudit_write_var_files(nsswitch_domain) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/clock.fc b/policy/modules/system/clock.fc index c5e05ca..c9ddbee 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/clock.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/clock.fc @@ -3,3 +3,5 @@ /sbin/hwclock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hwclock_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/hwclock -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hwclock_exec_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/system/clock.if b/policy/modules/system/clock.if index e2f6d93..c78ccc6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/clock.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/clock.if @@ -82,6 +82,25 @@ interface(`clock_dontaudit_write_adjtime',` ######################################## ## +## Read clock drift adjustments. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`clock_read_adjtime',` + gen_require(` + type adjtime_t; + ') + + allow $1 adjtime_t:file read_file_perms; + files_list_etc($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read and write clock drift adjustments. ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/system/clock.te b/policy/modules/system/clock.te index b9ed25b..39e1dc1 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/clock.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/clock.te @@ -46,11 +46,13 @@ fs_search_auto_mountpoints(hwclock_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(hwclock_t) term_use_unallocated_ttys(hwclock_t) -term_use_all_ttys(hwclock_t) -term_use_all_ptys(hwclock_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ttys(hwclock_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ptys(hwclock_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(hwclock_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(hwclock_t) + init_use_fds(hwclock_t) init_use_script_ptys(hwclock_t) @@ -65,10 +67,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(hwclock_t) -') - -optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(hwclock_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/daemontools.if b/policy/modules/system/daemontools.if index ce3e676..0158314 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/daemontools.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/daemontools.if @@ -210,3 +210,4 @@ interface(`daemontools_manage_svc',` allow $1 svc_svc_t:file manage_file_perms; allow $1 svc_svc_t:lnk_file { read create }; ') + diff --git a/policy/modules/system/daemontools.te b/policy/modules/system/daemontools.te index dcc5f1c..5610417 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/daemontools.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/daemontools.te @@ -38,7 +38,10 @@ files_type(svc_svc_t) # multilog creates /service/*/log/status manage_files_pattern(svc_multilog_t, svc_svc_t, svc_svc_t) +term_write_console(svc_multilog_t) + init_use_fds(svc_multilog_t) +init_dontaudit_use_script_fds(svc_multilog_t) # writes to /var/log/*/* logging_manage_generic_logs(svc_multilog_t) @@ -69,6 +72,8 @@ dev_read_urand(svc_run_t) corecmd_exec_bin(svc_run_t) corecmd_exec_shell(svc_run_t) +term_write_console(svc_run_t) + files_read_etc_files(svc_run_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(svc_run_t) files_search_pids(svc_run_t) @@ -99,17 +104,28 @@ allow svc_start_t self:unix_stream_socket create_socket_perms; can_exec(svc_start_t, svc_start_exec_t) +mmap_files_pattern(svc_start_t, svc_svc_t, svc_svc_t) + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(svc_start_t) kernel_read_system_state(svc_start_t) corecmd_exec_bin(svc_start_t) corecmd_exec_shell(svc_start_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(svc_start_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(svc_start_t) + +term_write_console(svc_start_t) + files_read_etc_files(svc_start_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(svc_start_t) files_search_var(svc_start_t) files_search_pids(svc_start_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(svc_start_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(svc_start_t) + daemontools_domtrans_run(svc_start_t) daemontools_manage_svc(svc_start_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/fstools.fc b/policy/modules/system/fstools.fc index a97a096..e1b5cd8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/fstools.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/fstools.fc @@ -1,4 +1,3 @@ -/sbin/badblocks -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/blkid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/blockdev -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/cfdisk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) @@ -23,7 +22,6 @@ /sbin/mkfs.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/mkraid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/mkreiserfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) -/sbin/mkswap -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/parted -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/partprobe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/partx -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) @@ -41,7 +39,44 @@ /usr/bin/scsi_unique_id -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/syslinux -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-fsck -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/blkid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/blockdev -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cfdisk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/clubufflush -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/dosfsck -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/dump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/dumpe2fs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/e2fsck -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/e4fsck -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/e2label -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/fdisk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/findfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/fsck.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/hdparm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/install-mbr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/jfs_.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/losetup.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lsraid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/make_reiser4 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mkdosfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mke2fs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mke4fs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mkfs.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mkraid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mkreiserfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/parted -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/partprobe -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/partx -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/raidautorun -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/raidstart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/reiserfs(ck|tune) -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/resize.*fs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/scsi_info -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/sfdisk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/smartctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/swapon.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/tune2fs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_exec_t,s0) /var/log/fsck(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:fsadm_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/fstools.te b/policy/modules/system/fstools.te index c28da1c..1c68a7f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/fstools.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/fstools.te @@ -44,6 +44,8 @@ can_exec(fsadm_t, fsadm_exec_t) allow fsadm_t fsadm_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms; allow fsadm_t fsadm_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; files_tmp_filetrans(fsadm_t, fsadm_tmp_t, { file dir }) +files_create_boot_flag(fsadm_t) +files_setattr_root_dirs(fsadm_t) # log files allow fsadm_t fsadm_log_t:dir setattr; @@ -101,6 +103,8 @@ files_read_usr_files(fsadm_t) files_read_etc_files(fsadm_t) files_manage_lost_found(fsadm_t) files_manage_isid_type_dirs(fsadm_t) +# /etc/mtab is a link +files_read_etc_runtime_files(fsadm_t) # Write to /etc/mtab. files_manage_etc_runtime_files(fsadm_t) files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(fsadm_t, file) @@ -120,11 +124,16 @@ fs_list_auto_mountpoints(fsadm_t) fs_search_tmpfs(fsadm_t) fs_getattr_tmpfs_dirs(fsadm_t) fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(fsadm_t) +fs_manage_nfs_files(fsadm_t) +fs_manage_cifs_files(fsadm_t) +fs_rw_hugetlbfs_files(fsadm_t) # Recreate /mnt/cdrom. files_manage_mnt_dirs(fsadm_t) # for tune2fs files_search_all(fsadm_t) +mcs_file_read_all(fsadm_t) + mls_file_read_all_levels(fsadm_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(fsadm_t) @@ -133,13 +142,16 @@ storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(fsadm_t) storage_raw_read_removable_device(fsadm_t) storage_raw_write_removable_device(fsadm_t) storage_read_scsi_generic(fsadm_t) +storage_rw_fuse(fsadm_t) storage_swapon_fixed_disk(fsadm_t) term_use_console(fsadm_t) +init_read_state(fsadm_t) init_use_fds(fsadm_t) init_use_script_ptys(fsadm_t) init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(fsadm_t) +init_stream_connect(fsadm_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(fsadm_t) @@ -147,7 +159,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(fsadm_t) seutil_read_config(fsadm_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(fsadm_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(fsadm_t) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` optional_policy(` @@ -166,6 +178,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + devicekit_dontaudit_read_pid_files(fsadm_t) + devicekit_dontaudit_rw_log(fsadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` hal_dontaudit_write_log(fsadm_t) ') @@ -192,6 +209,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + virt_read_blk_images(fsadm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` xen_append_log(fsadm_t) xen_rw_image_files(fsadm_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/getty.fc b/policy/modules/system/getty.fc index e1a1848..909af45 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/getty.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/getty.fc @@ -3,6 +3,8 @@ /sbin/.*getty -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:getty_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/.*getty -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:getty_exec_t,s0) + /var/log/mgetty\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:getty_log_t,s0) /var/log/vgetty\.log\..* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:getty_log_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/getty.te b/policy/modules/system/getty.te index ede3231..c8c15bd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/getty.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/getty.te @@ -83,8 +83,10 @@ term_use_unallocated_ttys(getty_t) term_setattr_all_ttys(getty_t) term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(getty_t) term_setattr_console(getty_t) +term_use_console(getty_t) auth_rw_login_records(getty_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(getty_t) init_rw_utmp(getty_t) init_use_script_ptys(getty_t) @@ -125,10 +127,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(getty_t) -') - -optional_policy(` ppp_domtrans(getty_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/hostname.fc b/policy/modules/system/hostname.fc index 9dfecf7..6d00f5c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/hostname.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/hostname.fc @@ -1,2 +1,4 @@ /bin/hostname -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hostname_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/hostname -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hostname_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/hostname.te b/policy/modules/system/hostname.te index c310775..d172193 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/hostname.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/hostname.te @@ -23,29 +23,34 @@ dontaudit hostname_t self:capability sys_tty_config; kernel_list_proc(hostname_t) kernel_read_proc_symlinks(hostname_t) +kernel_read_network_state(hostname_t) dev_read_sysfs(hostname_t) # Early devtmpfs, before udev relabel dev_dontaudit_rw_generic_chr_files(hostname_t) +domain_dontaudit_leaks(hostname_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(hostname_t) files_read_etc_files(hostname_t) +files_dontaudit_leaks(hostname_t) files_dontaudit_search_var(hostname_t) # for when /usr is not mounted: files_dontaudit_search_isid_type_dirs(hostname_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(hostname_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(hostname_t) +fs_dontaudit_leaks(hostname_t) fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev(hostname_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(hostname_t) -term_use_all_ttys(hostname_t) -term_use_all_ptys(hostname_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ttys(hostname_t) +term_use_all_inherited_ptys(hostname_t) init_use_fds(hostname_t) init_use_script_fds(hostname_t) init_use_script_ptys(hostname_t) +init_rw_inherited_script_tmp_files(hostname_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(hostname_t) @@ -55,6 +60,10 @@ sysnet_read_config(hostname_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(hostname_t) optional_policy(` + mock_dontaudit_write_lib_chr_files(hostname_t) +') + +optional_policy(` nis_use_ypbind(hostname_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/hotplug.fc b/policy/modules/system/hotplug.fc index caf736b..91c4c6f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/hotplug.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/hotplug.fc @@ -7,5 +7,8 @@ /sbin/hotplug -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hotplug_exec_t,s0) /sbin/netplugd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hotplug_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/hotplug -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hotplug_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/netplugd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:hotplug_exec_t,s0) + /var/run/usb(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hotplug_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/hotplug(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:hotplug_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/hotplug.if b/policy/modules/system/hotplug.if index 40eb10c..2a0a32c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/hotplug.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/hotplug.if @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ interface(`hotplug_domtrans',` # interface(`hotplug_exec',` gen_require(` - type hotplug_t; + type hotplug_exec_t; ') corecmd_search_bin($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/hotplug.te b/policy/modules/system/hotplug.te index 1a3d970..0995a02 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/hotplug.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/hotplug.te @@ -23,7 +23,7 @@ files_pid_file(hotplug_var_run_t) # allow hotplug_t self:capability { net_admin sys_tty_config mknod sys_rawio }; -dontaudit hotplug_t self:capability { sys_module sys_admin sys_ptrace sys_tty_config }; +dontaudit hotplug_t self:capability { sys_module sys_admin sys_tty_config }; # for access("/etc/bashrc", X_OK) on Red Hat dontaudit hotplug_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search }; allow hotplug_t self:process { setpgid getsession getattr signal_perms }; @@ -96,6 +96,8 @@ init_domtrans_script(hotplug_t) # kernel threads inherit from shared descriptor table used by init init_dontaudit_rw_initctl(hotplug_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(hotplug_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(hotplug_t) logging_search_logs(hotplug_t) @@ -164,14 +166,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(hotplug_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(hotplug_t) -') - -optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(hotplug_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/init.fc b/policy/modules/system/init.fc index 354ce93..abe4723 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/init.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/init.fc @@ -2,6 +2,7 @@ # /etc # /etc/init\.d/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) +/etc/machine-id -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:machineid_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/rc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/rc\.[^/]+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) @@ -33,6 +34,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` # # /sbin # +/bin/systemd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_exec_t,s0) + +# +# /sbin +# /sbin/init(ng)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_exec_t,s0) # because nowadays, /sbin/init is often a symlink to /sbin/upstart /sbin/upstart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_exec_t,s0) @@ -50,11 +56,23 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` # /usr/bin/sepg_ctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/init(ng)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_exec_t,s0) +# because nowadays, /sbin/init is often a symlink to /sbin/upstart +/usr/sbin/upstart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/fedora[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system-generators/[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_exec_t,s0) + /usr/libexec/dcc/start-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/dcc/stop-.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/apachectl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/open_init_pty -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/startx -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/systemd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/share/system-config-services/system-config-services-mechanism\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_exec_t,s0) # # /var @@ -63,6 +81,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` /var/run/runlevel\.dir gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/random-seed -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/setmixer_flag -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/systemd/machine-id -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:machineid_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_gentoo', ` /var/lib/init\.d(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_state_t,s0) @@ -76,3 +95,4 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /var/run/setleds-on -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/sysconfig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:initrc_var_run_t,s0) ') +/var/run/systemd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:init_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/init.if b/policy/modules/system/init.if index 94fd8dd..5f91350 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/init.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/init.if @@ -79,6 +79,44 @@ interface(`init_script_domain',` domtrans_pattern(init_run_all_scripts_domain, $2, $1) ') + +####################################### +## +## Create a domain which can be started by init. +## +## +## +## Type to be used as a domain. +## +## +## +## +## Type of the program to be used as an entry point to this domain. +## +## +# +interface(`init_systemd_domain',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + role system_r; + ') + + domain_type($1) + domain_entry_file($1,$2) + + role system_r types $1; + + tunable_policy(`init_systemd',` + domtrans_pattern(init_t,$2,$1) + allow init_t $1:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + allow init_t $1:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket ioctl; + allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; + # need write to /var/run/systemd/notify + init_write_pid_socket($1) + ') +') + ######################################## ## ## Create a domain which can be started by init. @@ -105,7 +143,11 @@ interface(`init_domain',` role system_r types $1; - domtrans_pattern(init_t, $2, $1) + tunable_policy(`init_systemd',`', ` + domtrans_pattern(init_t, $2, $1) + allow init_t $1:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; + ') ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` # RHEL4 systems seem to have a stray @@ -193,8 +235,10 @@ interface(`init_daemon_domain',` gen_require(` attribute direct_run_init, direct_init, direct_init_entry; type initrc_t; + type init_t; role system_r; attribute daemon; + attribute initrc_transition_domain; ') typeattribute $1 daemon; @@ -202,39 +246,20 @@ interface(`init_daemon_domain',` domain_type($1) domain_entry_file($1, $2) - role system_r types $1; - - domtrans_pattern(initrc_t, $2, $1) - - # daemons started from init will - # inherit fds from init for the console - init_dontaudit_use_fds($1) - term_dontaudit_use_console($1) - - # init script ptys are the stdin/out/err - # when using run_init - init_use_script_ptys($1) + domtrans_pattern(initrc_t,$2,$1) ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',` domtrans_pattern(direct_run_init, $2, $1) - allow direct_run_init $1:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; typeattribute $1 direct_init; typeattribute $2 direct_init_entry; - userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals($1) +# userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals($1) ') - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - # RHEL4 systems seem to have a stray - # fds open from the initrd - ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` - kernel_dontaudit_use_fds($1) - ') - ') - - optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use($1) + tunable_policy(`init_upstart || init_systemd',` + # Handle upstart direct transition to a executable + domtrans_pattern(init_t,$2,$1) ') ') @@ -283,17 +308,20 @@ interface(`init_daemon_domain',` interface(`init_ranged_daemon_domain',` gen_require(` type initrc_t; + type init_t; ') - init_daemon_domain($1, $2) +# init_daemon_domain($1, $2) ifdef(`enable_mcs',` range_transition initrc_t $2:process $3; + range_transition init_t $2:process $3; ') ifdef(`enable_mls',` range_transition initrc_t $2:process $3; mls_rangetrans_target($1) + range_transition init_t $2:process $3; ') ') @@ -336,22 +364,23 @@ interface(`init_ranged_daemon_domain',` # interface(`init_system_domain',` gen_require(` + type init_t; type initrc_t; role system_r; + attribute initrc_transition_domain; + attribute systemprocess; ') + typeattribute $1 systemprocess; application_domain($1, $2) role system_r types $1; - domtrans_pattern(initrc_t, $2, $1) + domtrans_pattern(initrc_t,$2,$1) - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - # RHEL4 systems seem to have a stray - # fds open from the initrd - ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` - kernel_dontaudit_use_fds($1) - ') + tunable_policy(`init_systemd',` + # Handle upstart/systemd direct transition to a executable + domtrans_pattern(init_t,$2,$1) ') ') @@ -401,20 +430,41 @@ interface(`init_system_domain',` interface(`init_ranged_system_domain',` gen_require(` type initrc_t; + type init_t; ') init_system_domain($1, $2) ifdef(`enable_mcs',` range_transition initrc_t $2:process $3; + range_transition init_t $2:process $3; ') ifdef(`enable_mls',` range_transition initrc_t $2:process $3; + range_transition init_t $2:process $3; mls_rangetrans_target($1) ') ') +###################################### +## +## Allow domain dyntransition to init_t domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`init_dyntrans',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + dyntrans_pattern($1, init_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Execute init (/sbin/init) with a domain transition. @@ -442,7 +492,6 @@ interface(`init_domtrans',` ## Domain allowed access. ## ## -## # interface(`init_exec',` gen_require(` @@ -451,6 +500,29 @@ interface(`init_exec',` corecmd_search_bin($1) can_exec($1, init_exec_t) + + tunable_policy(`init_systemd',` + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + ') +') + +####################################### +## +## Dontaudit getattr on the init program. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`init_dontaudit_getattr_exec',` + gen_require(` + type init_exec_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 init_exec_t:file getattr; ') ######################################## @@ -509,6 +581,24 @@ interface(`init_sigchld',` ######################################## ## +## Send generic signals to init. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_signal',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## ## Connect to init with a unix socket. ## ## @@ -519,10 +609,66 @@ interface(`init_sigchld',` # interface(`init_stream_connect',` gen_require(` - type init_t; + type init_t, init_var_run_t; ') - allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t, init_t) + allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket getattr; +') + +####################################### +## +## Dontaudit Connect to init with a unix socket. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`init_dontaudit_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; +') + +###################################### +## +## Dontaudit getattr to init with a unix socket. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`init_dontaudit_getattr_stream_socket',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket getattr; +') + +###################################### +## +## Dontaudit read and write to init with a unix socket. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`init_dontaudit_rw_stream_socket',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket { getattr read write }; ') ######################################## @@ -688,19 +834,25 @@ interface(`init_telinit',` type initctl_t; ') + corecmd_exec_bin($1) + dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) allow $1 initctl_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; init_exec($1) - tunable_policy(`init_upstart',` + tunable_policy(`init_upstart || init_systemd',` gen_require(` type init_t; ') + ps_process_pattern($1, init_t) + allow $1 init_t:process signal; # upstart uses a datagram socket instead of initctl pipe allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; + #576913 + allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; ') ') @@ -730,7 +882,7 @@ interface(`init_rw_initctl',` ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain to not audit. ## ## # @@ -773,18 +925,19 @@ interface(`init_script_file_entry_type',` # interface(`init_spec_domtrans_script',` gen_require(` - type initrc_t, initrc_exec_t; + type initrc_t; + attribute init_script_file_type; ') files_list_etc($1) - spec_domtrans_pattern($1, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t) + spec_domtrans_pattern($1, init_script_file_type, initrc_t) ifdef(`enable_mcs',` - range_transition $1 initrc_exec_t:process s0; + range_transition $1 init_script_file_type:process s0; ') ifdef(`enable_mls',` - range_transition $1 initrc_exec_t:process s0 - mls_systemhigh; + range_transition $1 init_script_file_type:process s0 - mls_systemhigh; ') ') @@ -800,19 +953,41 @@ interface(`init_spec_domtrans_script',` # interface(`init_domtrans_script',` gen_require(` - type initrc_t, initrc_exec_t; + type initrc_t; + attribute init_script_file_type; + attribute initrc_transition_domain; ') + typeattribute $1 initrc_transition_domain; files_list_etc($1) - domtrans_pattern($1, initrc_exec_t, initrc_t) + domtrans_pattern($1, init_script_file_type, initrc_t) ifdef(`enable_mcs',` - range_transition $1 initrc_exec_t:process s0; + range_transition $1 init_script_file_type:process s0; ') ifdef(`enable_mls',` - range_transition $1 initrc_exec_t:process s0 - mls_systemhigh; + range_transition $1 init_script_file_type:process s0 - mls_systemhigh; + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a file in a bin directory +## in the initrc_t domain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_bin_domtrans_spec',` + gen_require(` + type initrc_t; ') + + corecmd_bin_domtrans($1, initrc_t) ') ######################################## @@ -868,9 +1043,14 @@ interface(`init_script_file_domtrans',` interface(`init_labeled_script_domtrans',` gen_require(` type initrc_t; + attribute initrc_transition_domain; ') + typeattribute $1 initrc_transition_domain; + # service script searches all filesystems via mountpoint + fs_search_all($1) domtrans_pattern($1, $2, initrc_t) + allow $1 $2:file ioctl; files_search_etc($1) ') @@ -961,7 +1141,9 @@ interface(`init_ptrace',` type init_t; ') - allow $1 init_t:process ptrace; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 init_t:process ptrace; + ') ') ######################################## @@ -1079,6 +1261,24 @@ interface(`init_read_all_script_files',` ####################################### ## +## Dontaudit getattr all init script files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`init_dontaudit_getattr_all_script_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute init_script_file_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 init_script_file_type:file getattr; +') + +####################################### +## ## Dontaudit read all init script files. ## ## @@ -1130,12 +1330,7 @@ interface(`init_read_script_state',` ') kernel_search_proc($1) - read_files_pattern($1, initrc_t, initrc_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern($1, initrc_t, initrc_t) - list_dirs_pattern($1, initrc_t, initrc_t) - - # should move this to separate interface - allow $1 initrc_t:process getattr; + ps_process_pattern($1, initrc_t) ') ######################################## @@ -1375,6 +1570,27 @@ interface(`init_dbus_send_script',` ######################################## ## ## Send and receive messages from +## init over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_dbus_chat',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:dbus send_msg; + allow init_t $1:dbus send_msg; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from ## init scripts over dbus. ## ## @@ -1461,6 +1677,25 @@ interface(`init_getattr_script_status_files',` ######################################## ## +## Manage init script +## status files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_manage_script_status_files',` + gen_require(` + type initrc_state_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, initrc_state_t, initrc_state_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read init script ## status files. ## @@ -1519,6 +1754,24 @@ interface(`init_rw_script_tmp_files',` ######################################## ## +## Read and write init script inherited temporary data. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_rw_inherited_script_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type initrc_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 initrc_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Create files in a init script ## temporary data directory. ## @@ -1586,6 +1839,43 @@ interface(`init_read_utmp',` ######################################## ## +## Read utmp. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_read_machineid',` + gen_require(` + type machineid_t; + ') + + files_search_etc($1) + allow $1 machineid_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read utmp. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`init_dontaudit_read_utmp',` + gen_require(` + type initrc_var_run_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 initrc_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to write utmp. ## ## @@ -1674,7 +1964,7 @@ interface(`init_dontaudit_rw_utmp',` type initrc_var_run_t; ') - dontaudit $1 initrc_var_run_t:file { getattr read write append lock }; + dontaudit $1 initrc_var_run_t:file rw_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1715,6 +2005,128 @@ interface(`init_pid_filetrans_utmp',` files_pid_filetrans($1, initrc_var_run_t, file) ') +###################################### +## +## Allow search directory in the /run/systemd directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_search_pid_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type init_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow listing of the /run/systemd directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_list_pid_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type init_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Create a directory in the /run/systemd directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_create_pid_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type init_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms; + create_dirs_pattern($1, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Create objects in /run/systemd directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## a specified private type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the object to create. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`init_pid_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type init_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + filetrans_pattern($1, init_var_run_t, $2, $3, $4) +') + +####################################### +## +## Create objects in /run/systemd directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## a specified private type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the object to create. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +## +## +## The name of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`init_named_pid_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type init_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + filetrans_pattern($1, init_var_run_t, $2, $3, $4) +') + ######################################## ## ## Allow the specified domain to connect to daemon with a tcp socket @@ -1749,3 +2161,284 @@ interface(`init_udp_recvfrom_all_daemons',` ') corenet_udp_recvfrom_labeled($1, daemon) ') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to system_r when execute an init script +## +## +##

    +## Execute a init script in a specified role +##

    +##

    +## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Role to transition from. +## +## +# +interface(`init_script_role_transition',` + gen_require(` + attribute init_script_file_type; + ') + + role_transition $1 init_script_file_type system_r; +') + +######################################## +## +## dontaudit read and write an leaked init scrip file descriptors +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`init_dontaudit_script_leaks',` + gen_require(` + type initrc_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 initrc_t:tcp_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 initrc_t:udp_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 initrc_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 initrc_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; + dontaudit $1 initrc_t:shm rw_shm_perms; + init_dontaudit_use_script_ptys($1) + init_dontaudit_use_script_fds($1) +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to ioctl an +## init with a unix domain stream sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_ioctl_stream_sockets',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket ioctl; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to read/write to +## init with a unix domain stream sockets. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_rw_stream_sockets',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket rw_stream_socket_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow the specified domain to write to +## init sock file. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_write_pid_socket',` + gen_require(` + type init_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_var_run_t:sock_file write; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send a message to init over a unix domain +## datagram socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_dgram_send',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send a message to init over a unix domain +## stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_stream_send',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:unix_stream_socket sendto; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create a file type used for init socket files. +## +## +##

    +## This defines a type that init can create sock_file within for +## impersonation purposes +##

    +##     +## +## +## Type to be used for a sock file. +## +## +## +# +interface(`init_sock_file',` + gen_require(` + attribute init_sock_file_type; + ') + + typeattribute $1 init_sock_file_type; + +') + +######################################## +## +## Read init unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_read_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type init_var_run_t; + ') + + read_fifo_files_pattern($1, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read/Write init unnamed pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_rw_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type init_var_run_t; + ') + + rw_fifo_files_pattern($1, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Get the system status information from init +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_status',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:system status; +') + +######################################## +## +## Tell init to reboot the system. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_reboot',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:system reboot; +') + +######################################## +## +## Tell init to halt the system. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_halt',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:system halt; +') + +######################################## +## +## Tell init to do an unknown access. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`init_undefined',` + gen_require(` + type init_t; + ') + + allow $1 init_t:system undefined; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/init.te b/policy/modules/system/init.te index 29a9565..289edda 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/init.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/init.te @@ -16,6 +16,34 @@ gen_require(` ## gen_tunable(init_upstart, false) +## +##

    +## Enable support for systemd as the init program. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(init_systemd, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow all daemons to use tcp wrappers. +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(allow_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow all daemons the ability to read/write terminals +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(allow_daemons_use_tty, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow all daemons to write corefiles to / +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(allow_daemons_dump_core, false) + # used for direct running of init scripts # by admin domains attribute direct_run_init; @@ -25,14 +53,18 @@ attribute direct_init_entry; attribute init_script_domain_type; attribute init_script_file_type; attribute init_run_all_scripts_domain; +attribute initrc_transition_domain; +# Attribute used for systemd so domains can allow systemd to create sock_files +attribute init_sock_file_type; # Mark process types as daemons attribute daemon; +attribute systemprocess; # # init_t is the domain of the init process. # -type init_t; +type init_t, initrc_transition_domain; type init_exec_t; domain_type(init_t) domain_entry_file(init_t, init_exec_t) @@ -45,6 +77,9 @@ role system_r types init_t; type init_var_run_t; files_pid_file(init_var_run_t) +type machineid_t; +files_config_file(machineid_t) + # # initctl_t is the type of the named pipe created # by init during initialization. This pipe is used @@ -63,6 +98,8 @@ role system_r types initrc_t; # of the below init_upstart tunable # but this has a typeattribute in it corecmd_shell_entry_type(initrc_t) +corecmd_bin_entry_type(initrc_t) +corecmd_bin_domtrans(init_t, initrc_t) type initrc_devpts_t; term_pty(initrc_devpts_t) @@ -87,7 +124,7 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',` # # Use capabilities. old rule: -allow init_t self:capability ~sys_module; +allow init_t self:capability ~{ sys_ptrace audit_control audit_write sys_module }; # is ~sys_module really needed? observed: # sys_boot # sys_tty_config @@ -99,12 +136,25 @@ allow init_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; # Re-exec itself can_exec(init_t, init_exec_t) - -allow init_t initrc_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; - -# For /var/run/shutdown.pid. -allow init_t init_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; -files_pid_filetrans(init_t, init_var_run_t, file) +# executing content in /run/initramfs +manage_files_pattern(init_t, initrc_state_t, initrc_state_t) +can_exec(init_t, initrc_state_t) + +allow init_t initrc_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; +allow initrc_t init_t:unix_stream_socket { connectto rw_stream_socket_perms sendto }; +allow initrc_t init_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(init_t, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(init_t, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(init_t, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(init_t, init_var_run_t, init_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(init_t, init_var_run_t, { dir file }) +allow init_t init_var_run_t:dir mounton; + +allow init_t machineid_t:file manage_file_perms; +files_pid_filetrans(init_t, machineid_t, file, "machine-id") +files_etc_filetrans(init_t, machineid_t, file, "machine-id") +allow init_t machineid_t:file mounton; allow init_t initctl_t:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; dev_filetrans(init_t, initctl_t, fifo_file) @@ -114,25 +164,34 @@ allow init_t initrc_var_run_t:file { rw_file_perms setattr }; kernel_read_system_state(init_t) kernel_share_state(init_t) +kernel_stream_connect(init_t) corecmd_exec_chroot(init_t) corecmd_exec_bin(init_t) -dev_read_sysfs(init_t) +dev_rw_sysfs(init_t) +dev_read_urand(init_t) # Early devtmpfs dev_rw_generic_chr_files(init_t) +dev_filetrans_all_named_dev(init_t) domain_getpgid_all_domains(init_t) domain_kill_all_domains(init_t) domain_signal_all_domains(init_t) domain_signull_all_domains(init_t) domain_sigstop_all_domains(init_t) +domain_sigstop_all_domains(init_t) domain_sigchld_all_domains(init_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(init_t) files_read_etc_files(init_t) +files_read_all_pids(init_t) +files_read_system_conf_files(init_t) files_rw_generic_pids(init_t) files_dontaudit_search_isid_type_dirs(init_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(init_t) files_manage_etc_runtime_files(init_t) +files_manage_etc_symlinks(init_t) files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(init_t, file) # Run /etc/X11/prefdm: files_exec_etc_files(init_t) @@ -144,6 +203,8 @@ fs_list_inotifyfs(init_t) # cjp: this may be related to /dev/log fs_write_ramfs_sockets(init_t) +mcs_file_read_all(init_t) +mcs_file_write_all(init_t) mcs_process_set_categories(init_t) mcs_killall(init_t) @@ -151,34 +212,54 @@ mls_file_read_all_levels(init_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(init_t) mls_process_write_down(init_t) mls_fd_use_all_levels(init_t) +mls_socket_read_all_levels(init_t) +mls_socket_write_all_levels(init_t) + +mls_rangetrans_source(initrc_t) selinux_set_all_booleans(init_t) +selinux_load_policy(init_t) +selinux_mounton_fs(init_t) +allow init_t security_t:security load_policy; -term_use_all_terms(init_t) +term_use_unallocated_ttys(init_t) +term_use_console(init_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(init_t) # Run init scripts. init_domtrans_script(init_t) libs_rw_ld_so_cache(init_t) +logging_create_devlog_dev(init_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(init_t) +logging_send_audit_msgs(init_t) logging_rw_generic_logs(init_t) seutil_read_config(init_t) +seutil_read_module_store(init_t) miscfiles_read_localization(init_t) +miscfiles_manage_localization(init_t) +miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(init_t) + +userdom_use_user_ttys(init_t) + +allow init_t self:process setsched; ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` allow init_t self:process { getcap setcap }; ') ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + fs_manage_tmpfs_files(init_t) + fs_exec_tmpfs_files(init_t) fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(init_t) fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(init_t) fs_tmpfs_filetrans(init_t, initctl_t, fifo_file) ') -tunable_policy(`init_upstart',` +tunable_policy(`init_upstart || init_systemd',` corecmd_shell_domtrans(init_t, initrc_t) ',` # Run the shell in the sysadm role for single-user mode. @@ -186,16 +267,146 @@ tunable_policy(`init_upstart',` sysadm_shell_domtrans(init_t) ') +storage_raw_rw_fixed_disk(init_t) + optional_policy(` - auth_rw_login_records(init_t) + modutils_domtrans_insmod(init_t) ') optional_policy(` + postfix_exec(init_t) + postfix_list_spool(init_t) + mta_read_aliases(init_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`init_systemd',` + allow init_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; + allow init_t self:process { setsockcreate setfscreate setrlimit }; + allow init_t self:process { getcap setcap }; + allow init_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; + allow init_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; + # Until systemd is fixed + allow daemon init_t:socket_class_set { getopt read getattr ioctl setopt write }; + allow init_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + allow init_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; + + allow init_t initrc_t:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + + kernel_list_unlabeled(init_t) + kernel_read_network_state(init_t) + kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(init_t) + kernel_rw_net_sysctls(init_t) + kernel_read_all_sysctls(init_t) + kernel_read_software_raid_state(init_t) + kernel_unmount_debugfs(init_t) + kernel_setsched(init_t) + + dev_write_kmsg(init_t) + dev_write_urand(init_t) + dev_rw_lvm_control(init_t) + dev_rw_autofs(init_t) + dev_manage_generic_symlinks(init_t) + dev_manage_generic_dirs(init_t) + dev_manage_generic_files(init_t) + dev_read_generic_chr_files(init_t) + dev_relabel_generic_dev_dirs(init_t) + dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(init_t) + dev_relabel_all_dev_files(init_t) + dev_manage_sysfs_dirs(init_t) + dev_relabel_sysfs_dirs(init_t) + + files_search_all(init_t) + files_mounton_all_mountpoints(init_t) + files_unmount_all_file_type_fs(init_t) + files_manage_all_pid_dirs(init_t) + files_manage_generic_tmp_dirs(init_t) + files_relabel_all_pid_dirs(init_t) + files_relabel_all_pid_files(init_t) + files_create_all_pid_sockets(init_t) + files_delete_all_pids(init_t) + files_exec_generic_pid_files(init_t) + files_create_all_pid_pipes(init_t) + files_create_all_spool_sockets(init_t) + files_delete_all_spool_sockets(init_t) + files_manage_urandom_seed(init_t) + files_list_locks(init_t) + files_list_spool(init_t) + files_list_var(init_t) + files_create_lock_dirs(init_t) + files_relabel_all_lock_dirs(init_t) + + fs_getattr_all_fs(init_t) + fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(init_t) + fs_manage_cgroup_files(init_t) + fs_manage_hugetlbfs_dirs(init_t) + fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(init_t) + fs_relabel_tmpfs_dirs(init_t) + fs_relabel_tmpfs_files(init_t) + fs_mount_all_fs(init_t) + fs_unmount_all_fs(init_t) + fs_remount_all_fs(init_t) + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(init_t) + fs_relabel_cgroup_dirs(init_t) + fs_search_cgroup_dirs(daemon) + + selinux_compute_create_context(init_t) + selinux_validate_context(init_t) + selinux_unmount_fs(init_t) + + storage_getattr_removable_dev(init_t) + + term_relabel_ptys_dirs(init_t) + + auth_relabel_login_records(init_t) + auth_relabel_pam_console_data_dirs(init_t) + + clock_read_adjtime(init_t) + + init_read_script_state(init_t) + + seutil_read_file_contexts(init_t) + + systemd_exec_systemctl(init_t) + systemd_manage_unit_dirs(init_t) + systemd_manage_all_unit_files(init_t) + systemd_logger_stream_connect(init_t) + + create_sock_files_pattern(init_t, init_sock_file_type, init_sock_file_type) + +') + +auth_use_nsswitch(init_t) +auth_rw_login_records(init_t) + +optional_policy(` + systemd_filetrans_named_content(init_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + lvm_rw_pipes(init_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + consolekit_manage_log(init_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_connect_system_bus(init_t) dbus_system_bus_client(init_t) + dbus_delete_pid_files(init_t) ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(init_t) + # /var/run/dovecot/login/ssl-parameters.dat is a hard link to + # /var/lib/dovecot/ssl-parameters.dat and init tries to clean up + # the directory. But we do not want to allow this. + # The master process of dovecot will manage this file. + dovecot_dontaudit_unlink_lib_files(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + plymouthd_stream_connect(init_t) + plymouthd_exec_plymouth(init_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -203,6 +414,17 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + udev_read_db(init_t) + udev_relabelto_db(init_t) + udev_create_kobject_uevent_socket(init_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_relabel_xdm_tmp_dirs(init_t) + xserver_manage_xdm_tmp_dirs(init_t) +') + +optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(init_t) ') @@ -212,8 +434,8 @@ optional_policy(` # allow initrc_t self:process { getpgid setsched setpgid setrlimit getsched }; -allow initrc_t self:capability ~{ sys_admin sys_module }; -dontaudit initrc_t self:capability sys_module; # sysctl is triggering this +allow initrc_t self:capability ~{ sys_ptrace audit_control audit_write sys_admin sys_module }; +dontaudit initrc_t self:capability { sys_ptrace sys_module }; # sysctl is triggering this allow initrc_t self:passwd rootok; allow initrc_t self:key manage_key_perms; @@ -241,12 +463,15 @@ manage_fifo_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_state_t, initrc_state_t) allow initrc_t initrc_var_run_t:file manage_file_perms; files_pid_filetrans(initrc_t, initrc_var_run_t, file) +files_manage_generic_pids_symlinks(initrc_t) +files_create_var_run_dirs(initrc_t) can_exec(initrc_t, initrc_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_tmp_t, initrc_tmp_t) manage_dirs_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_tmp_t, initrc_tmp_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(initrc_t, initrc_tmp_t, initrc_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(initrc_t, initrc_tmp_t, { file dir }) +allow initrc_t initrc_tmp_t:dir relabelfrom; init_write_initctl(initrc_t) @@ -258,20 +483,34 @@ kernel_change_ring_buffer_level(initrc_t) kernel_clear_ring_buffer(initrc_t) kernel_get_sysvipc_info(initrc_t) kernel_read_all_sysctls(initrc_t) +kernel_request_load_module(initrc_t) kernel_rw_all_sysctls(initrc_t) # for lsof which is used by alsa shutdown: kernel_dontaudit_getattr_message_if(initrc_t) +kernel_stream_connect(initrc_t) +files_read_kernel_modules(initrc_t) +files_read_config_files(initrc_t) +files_read_var_lib_symlinks(initrc_t) +files_setattr_pid_dirs(initrc_t) files_read_kernel_symbol_table(initrc_t) +files_exec_etc_files(initrc_t) +files_manage_etc_symlinks(initrc_t) +files_manage_system_conf_files(initrc_t) + +fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(initrc_t) +fs_manage_tmpfs_symlinks(initrc_t) +fs_delete_tmpfs_files(initrc_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(initrc_t, initrc_state_t, file) corecmd_exec_all_executables(initrc_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(initrc_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(initrc_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(initrc_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if(initrc_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(initrc_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes(initrc_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(initrc_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(initrc_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(initrc_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(initrc_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(initrc_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(initrc_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(initrc_t) @@ -279,6 +518,7 @@ corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets(initrc_t) dev_read_rand(initrc_t) dev_read_urand(initrc_t) +dev_dontaudit_read_kmsg(initrc_t) dev_write_kmsg(initrc_t) dev_write_rand(initrc_t) dev_write_urand(initrc_t) @@ -289,8 +529,10 @@ dev_write_framebuffer(initrc_t) dev_read_realtime_clock(initrc_t) dev_read_sound_mixer(initrc_t) dev_write_sound_mixer(initrc_t) +dev_setattr_generic_dirs(initrc_t) dev_setattr_all_chr_files(initrc_t) dev_rw_lvm_control(initrc_t) +dev_rw_generic_chr_files(initrc_t) dev_delete_lvm_control_dev(initrc_t) dev_manage_generic_symlinks(initrc_t) dev_manage_generic_files(initrc_t) @@ -298,17 +540,16 @@ dev_manage_generic_files(initrc_t) dev_delete_generic_symlinks(initrc_t) dev_getattr_all_blk_files(initrc_t) dev_getattr_all_chr_files(initrc_t) -# Early devtmpfs -dev_rw_generic_chr_files(initrc_t) +dev_rw_xserver_misc(initrc_t) domain_kill_all_domains(initrc_t) domain_signal_all_domains(initrc_t) domain_signull_all_domains(initrc_t) domain_sigstop_all_domains(initrc_t) +domain_sigstop_all_domains(initrc_t) domain_sigchld_all_domains(initrc_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(initrc_t) domain_getattr_all_domains(initrc_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(initrc_t) domain_getsession_all_domains(initrc_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(initrc_t) # for lsof which is used by alsa shutdown: @@ -316,6 +557,7 @@ domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_udp_sockets(initrc_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_tcp_sockets(initrc_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_dgram_sockets(initrc_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(initrc_t) +domain_obj_id_change_exemption(initrc_t) files_getattr_all_dirs(initrc_t) files_getattr_all_files(initrc_t) @@ -323,8 +565,10 @@ files_getattr_all_symlinks(initrc_t) files_getattr_all_pipes(initrc_t) files_getattr_all_sockets(initrc_t) files_purge_tmp(initrc_t) -files_delete_all_locks(initrc_t) +files_manage_all_locks(initrc_t) +files_manage_boot_files(initrc_t) files_read_all_pids(initrc_t) +files_delete_root_files(initrc_t) files_delete_all_pids(initrc_t) files_delete_all_pid_dirs(initrc_t) files_read_etc_files(initrc_t) @@ -340,8 +584,12 @@ files_list_isid_type_dirs(initrc_t) files_mounton_isid_type_dirs(initrc_t) files_list_default(initrc_t) files_mounton_default(initrc_t) +files_manage_mnt_dirs(initrc_t) +files_manage_mnt_files(initrc_t) -fs_write_cgroup_files(initrc_t) +fs_delete_cgroup_dirs(initrc_t) +fs_list_cgroup_dirs(initrc_t) +fs_rw_cgroup_files(initrc_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(initrc_t) fs_register_binary_executable_type(initrc_t) # rhgb-console writes to ramfs @@ -351,9 +599,12 @@ fs_mount_all_fs(initrc_t) fs_unmount_all_fs(initrc_t) fs_remount_all_fs(initrc_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(initrc_t) +fs_search_all(initrc_t) +fs_getattr_nfsd_files(initrc_t) # initrc_t needs to do a pidof which requires ptrace -mcs_ptrace_all(initrc_t) +mcs_file_read_all(initrc_t) +mcs_file_write_all(initrc_t) mcs_killall(initrc_t) mcs_process_set_categories(initrc_t) @@ -363,6 +614,7 @@ mls_process_read_up(initrc_t) mls_process_write_down(initrc_t) mls_rangetrans_source(initrc_t) mls_fd_share_all_levels(initrc_t) +mls_socket_write_to_clearance(initrc_t) selinux_get_enforce_mode(initrc_t) @@ -374,6 +626,7 @@ term_use_all_terms(initrc_t) term_reset_tty_labels(initrc_t) auth_rw_login_records(initrc_t) +auth_manage_faillog(initrc_t) auth_setattr_login_records(initrc_t) auth_rw_lastlog(initrc_t) auth_read_pam_pid(initrc_t) @@ -394,18 +647,17 @@ logging_read_audit_config(initrc_t) miscfiles_read_localization(initrc_t) # slapd needs to read cert files from its initscript -miscfiles_read_generic_certs(initrc_t) +miscfiles_manage_generic_cert_files(initrc_t) -modutils_read_module_config(initrc_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(initrc_t) seutil_read_config(initrc_t) +userdom_read_admin_home_files(initrc_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(initrc_t) # Allow access to the sysadm TTYs. Note that this will give access to the # TTYs to any process in the initrc_t domain. Therefore, daemons and such # started from init should be placed in their own domain. -userdom_use_user_terminals(initrc_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(initrc_t) ifdef(`distro_debian',` dev_setattr_generic_dirs(initrc_t) @@ -458,6 +710,10 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` sysnet_setattr_config(initrc_t) optional_policy(` + abrt_manage_pid_files(initrc_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` alsa_read_lib(initrc_t) ') @@ -478,7 +734,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # Red Hat systems seem to have a stray # fd open from the initrd - kernel_dontaudit_use_fds(initrc_t) + kernel_use_fds(initrc_t) files_dontaudit_read_root_files(initrc_t) # These seem to be from the initrd @@ -493,6 +749,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` files_create_boot_dirs(initrc_t) files_create_boot_flag(initrc_t) files_rw_boot_symlinks(initrc_t) + # wants to read /.fonts directory files_read_default_files(initrc_t) files_mountpoint(initrc_tmp_t) @@ -513,6 +770,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` miscfiles_rw_localization(initrc_t) miscfiles_setattr_localization(initrc_t) miscfiles_relabel_localization(initrc_t) + miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(initrc_t) miscfiles_read_fonts(initrc_t) miscfiles_read_hwdata(initrc_t) @@ -522,8 +780,35 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + abrt_manage_pid_files(initrc_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` bind_manage_config_dirs(initrc_t) + bind_manage_config(initrc_t) bind_write_config(initrc_t) + bind_setattr_zone_dirs(initrc_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + devicekit_append_inherited_log_files(initrc_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + dirsrvadmin_read_config(initrc_t) + dirsrv_manage_var_run(initrc_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + gnome_manage_gconf_config(initrc_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + ldap_read_db_files(initrc_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + pulseaudio_stream_connect(initrc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -531,14 +816,27 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` rpc_write_exports(initrc_t) rpc_manage_nfs_state_data(initrc_t) ') + optional_policy(` + rpcbind_stream_connect(initrc_t) + ') optional_policy(` sysnet_rw_dhcp_config(initrc_t) sysnet_manage_config(initrc_t) + sysnet_manage_dhcpc_state(initrc_t) + sysnet_relabelfrom_dhcpc_state(initrc_t) + sysnet_relabelfrom_net_conf(initrc_t) + sysnet_relabelto_net_conf(initrc_t) + sysnet_filetrans_named_content(initrc_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + wdmd_manage_pid_files(initrc_t) ') optional_policy(` xserver_delete_log(initrc_t) + xserver_manage_user_fonts_dir(initrc_t) ') ') @@ -549,6 +847,39 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse',` ') ') +domain_dontaudit_use_interactive_fds(daemon) + +userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(daemon) +userdom_dontaudit_search_user_tmp(daemon) + +tunable_policy(`allow_daemons_use_tcp_wrapper',` + corenet_tcp_connect_auth_port(daemon) +') + +tunable_policy(`allow_daemons_use_tty',` + term_use_unallocated_ttys(daemon) + term_use_generic_ptys(daemon) + term_use_all_ttys(daemon) + term_use_all_ptys(daemon) +',` + term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(daemon) + term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys(daemon) + term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(daemon) + term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(daemon) + ') + +# system-config-services causes avc messages that should be dontaudited +tunable_policy(`allow_daemons_dump_core',` + files_manage_root_files(daemon) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_dontaudit_rw_pipes(daemon) + unconfined_dontaudit_rw_stream(daemon) + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files(daemon) + userdom_dontaudit_write_user_tmp_files(daemon) +') + optional_policy(` amavis_search_lib(initrc_t) amavis_setattr_pid_files(initrc_t) @@ -561,6 +892,8 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` apache_read_config(initrc_t) apache_list_modules(initrc_t) + # webmin seems to cause this. + apache_search_sys_content(daemon) ') optional_policy(` @@ -577,6 +910,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` cgroup_stream_connect_cgred(initrc_t) + domain_setpriority_all_domains(initrc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -589,6 +923,17 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + chronyd_append_keys(initrc_t) + chronyd_read_keys(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + cron_read_pipes(initrc_t) + # managing /etc/cron.d/mailman content + cron_manage_system_spool(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` dev_getattr_printer_dev(initrc_t) cups_read_log(initrc_t) @@ -605,9 +950,13 @@ optional_policy(` dbus_connect_system_bus(initrc_t) dbus_system_bus_client(initrc_t) dbus_read_config(initrc_t) + dbus_manage_lib_files(initrc_t) + + init_dbus_chat(initrc_t) optional_policy(` consolekit_dbus_chat(initrc_t) + consolekit_manage_log(initrc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -632,6 +981,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + glance_manage_pid_files(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` gpm_setattr_gpmctl(initrc_t) ') @@ -649,6 +1002,15 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + firewalld_dbus_chat(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_read_module_config(initrc_t) + modutils_domtrans_insmod(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` inn_exec_config(initrc_t) ') @@ -689,6 +1051,7 @@ optional_policy(` lpd_list_spool(initrc_t) lpd_read_config(initrc_t) + lpd_manage_spool(init_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -706,7 +1069,13 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + milter_delete_dkim_pid_files(initrc_t) + milter_setattr_all_dirs(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` mta_read_config(initrc_t) + mta_write_config(initrc_t) mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks(initrc_t) ') @@ -729,6 +1098,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + plymouthd_stream_connect(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` postgresql_manage_db(initrc_t) postgresql_read_config(initrc_t) ') @@ -738,10 +1111,20 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + psad_setattr_fifo_file(initrc_t) + psad_setattr_log(initrc_t) + psad_write_log(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` puppet_rw_tmp(initrc_t) ') optional_policy(` + qpidd_manage_var_run(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` quota_manage_flags(initrc_t) ') @@ -750,6 +1133,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + ricci_manage_lib_files(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` fs_write_ramfs_sockets(initrc_t) fs_search_ramfs(initrc_t) @@ -771,8 +1158,6 @@ optional_policy(` # bash tries ioctl for some reason files_dontaudit_ioctl_all_pids(initrc_t) - # why is this needed: - rpm_manage_db(initrc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -781,6 +1166,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + sendmail_setattr_pid_files(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` # shorewall-init script run /var/lib/shorewall/firewall shorewall_lib_domtrans(initrc_t) ') @@ -790,10 +1179,12 @@ optional_policy(` squid_manage_logs(initrc_t) ') +ifdef(`enabled_mls',` optional_policy(` # allow init scripts to su su_restricted_domain_template(initrc, initrc_t, system_r) ') +') optional_policy(` ssh_dontaudit_read_server_keys(initrc_t) @@ -805,7 +1196,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - udev_rw_db(initrc_t) udev_manage_pid_files(initrc_t) udev_manage_rules_files(initrc_t) ') @@ -815,11 +1205,30 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - virt_manage_svirt_cache(initrc_t) + virt_manage_pid_dirs(initrc_t) + virt_manage_cache(initrc_t) + virt_manage_lib_files(initrc_t) +') + +# Cron jobs used to start and stop services +optional_policy(` + cron_rw_pipes(daemon) + cron_rw_inherited_user_spool_files(daemon) +') + +optional_policy(` + cfengine_append_inherited_log(daemon) ') optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(initrc_t) + domain_role_change_exemption(initrc_t) + mcs_file_read_all(initrc_t) + mcs_file_write_all(initrc_t) + mcs_socket_write_all_levels(initrc_t) + mcs_killall(initrc_t) + + files_tmp_filetrans(initrc_t, initrc_tmp_t, { dir_file_class_set }) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # system-config-services causes avc messages that should be dontaudited @@ -829,6 +1238,18 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` mono_domtrans(initrc_t) ') + + # Allow SELinux aware applications to request rpm_script_t execution + rpm_transition_script(initrc_t) + + optional_policy(` + rtkit_scheduled(initrc_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + rpm_read_db(initrc_t) + rpm_delete_db(initrc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -844,6 +1265,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + sanlock_manage_pid_files(initrc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` # Set device ownerships/modes. xserver_setattr_console_pipes(initrc_t) @@ -854,3 +1279,165 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` zebra_read_config(initrc_t) ') + +userdom_inherit_append_user_home_content_files(daemon) +userdom_inherit_append_user_tmp_files(daemon) +userdom_dontaudit_rw_stream(daemon) + +logging_inherit_append_all_logs(daemon) + +optional_policy(` + # sudo service restart causes this + unconfined_signull(daemon) +') + + +optional_policy(` + xserver_dontaudit_append_xdm_home_files(daemon) + tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_dontaudit_rw_nfs_files(daemon) + ') + tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_dontaudit_rw_cifs_files(daemon) + ') +') + +init_rw_script_stream_sockets(daemon) + +optional_policy(` + abrt_stream_connect(daemon) +') + +optional_policy(` + fail2ban_read_lib_files(daemon) +') + +optional_policy(` + firstboot_dontaudit_leaks(daemon) +') + +init_rw_stream_sockets(daemon) + +allow init_t var_run_t:dir relabelto; + +init_stream_connect(initrc_t) + +allow initrc_t daemon:process siginh; +allow daemon initrc_transition_domain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +allow daemon initrc_transition_domain:fd use; + +tunable_policy(`init_systemd',` + allow init_t daemon:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + allow init_t daemon:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + allow init_t daemon:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + allow init_t daemon:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + allow daemon init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; + # need write to /var/run/systemd/notify + init_write_pid_socket(daemon) + allow daemon init_t:unix_stream_socket { append write read getattr ioctl }; +') + +# daemons started from init will +# inherit fds from init for the console +init_dontaudit_use_fds(daemon) +term_dontaudit_use_console(daemon) +# init script ptys are the stdin/out/err +# when using run_init +init_use_script_ptys(daemon) + +allow init_t daemon:process siginh; + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + # RHEL4 systems seem to have a stray + # fds open from the initrd + ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` + kernel_dontaudit_use_fds(daemon) + ') + + dontaudit daemon init_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +optional_policy(` + nscd_socket_use(daemon) +') + +optional_policy(` + puppet_rw_tmp(daemon) +') + +allow direct_run_init daemon:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; + +allow initrc_t systemprocess:process siginh; +allow systemprocess initrc_transition_domain:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +allow systemprocess initrc_transition_domain:fd use; + +dontaudit systemprocess init_t:unix_stream_socket getattr; + + +tunable_policy(`init_systemd',` + # Handle upstart/systemd direct transition to a executable + allow init_t systemprocess:process { dyntransition siginh }; + allow init_t systemprocess:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + allow init_t systemprocess:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + allow systemprocess init_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; + allow systemprocess init_t:unix_stream_socket { append write read getattr ioctl }; +') + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + # RHEL4 systems seem to have a stray + # fds open from the initrd + ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` + kernel_dontaudit_use_fds(systemprocess) + ') +') + +userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(systemprocess) +userdom_dontaudit_rw_stream(systemprocess) +userdom_dontaudit_write_user_tmp_files(systemprocess) + +tunable_policy(`allow_daemons_use_tty',` + term_use_all_ttys(systemprocess) + term_use_all_ptys(systemprocess) +',` + term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(systemprocess) + term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(systemprocess) +') + +# these apps are often redirect output to random log files +logging_inherit_append_all_logs(systemprocess) + +optional_policy(` + abrt_stream_connect(systemprocess) +') + +optional_policy(` + cfengine_append_inherited_log(systemprocess) +') + +optional_policy(` + cron_rw_pipes(systemprocess) +') + +optional_policy(` + puppet_rw_tmp(systemprocess) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_dontaudit_append_xdm_home_files(systemprocess) +') + +optional_policy(` + unconfined_dontaudit_rw_pipes(systemprocess) + unconfined_dontaudit_rw_stream(systemprocess) + userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files(systemprocess) +') + +init_rw_script_stream_sockets(systemprocess) + +role system_r types systemprocess; +role system_r types daemon; + +#ifdef(`enable_mls',` +# mls_rangetrans_target(systemprocess) +#') + diff --git a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.fc b/policy/modules/system/ipsec.fc index fb09b9e..e25c6b6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/ipsec.fc @@ -12,12 +12,12 @@ /sbin/setkey -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:setkey_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ipsec/_plutoload -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_mgmt_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ipsec/_plutorun -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_mgmt_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ipsec/eroute -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ipsec/klipsdebug -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ipsec/pluto -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ipsec/spi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ipsec/_plutoload -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_mgmt_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ipsec/_plutorun -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_mgmt_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ipsec/eroute -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ipsec/klipsdebug -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ipsec/pluto -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ipsec/spi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/ipsec/_plutoload -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_mgmt_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/ipsec/_plutorun -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_mgmt_exec_t,s0) @@ -27,10 +27,10 @@ /usr/libexec/ipsec/spi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) /usr/libexec/nm-openswan-service -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_mgmt_exec_t,s0) -/usr/local/lib(64)?/ipsec/eroute -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) -/usr/local/lib(64)?/ipsec/klipsdebug -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) -/usr/local/lib(64)?/ipsec/pluto -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) -/usr/local/lib(64)?/ipsec/spi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/local/lib/ipsec/eroute -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/local/lib/ipsec/klipsdebug -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/local/lib/ipsec/pluto -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) +/usr/local/lib/ipsec/spi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/ipsec -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ipsec_mgmt_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/racoon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:racoon_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.if b/policy/modules/system/ipsec.if index 0d4c8d3..9d66bf7 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/ipsec.if @@ -120,7 +120,6 @@ interface(`ipsec_exec_mgmt',` ##     ## # -# interface(`ipsec_signal_mgmt',` gen_require(` type ipsec_mgmt_t; @@ -139,7 +138,6 @@ interface(`ipsec_signal_mgmt',` ##     ## # -# interface(`ipsec_signull_mgmt',` gen_require(` type ipsec_mgmt_t; @@ -158,7 +156,6 @@ interface(`ipsec_signull_mgmt',` ##     ## # -# interface(`ipsec_kill_mgmt',` gen_require(` type ipsec_mgmt_t; @@ -225,6 +222,7 @@ interface(`ipsec_match_default_spd',` allow $1 ipsec_spd_t:association polmatch; allow $1 self:association sendto; + allow $1 self:peer recv; ') ######################################## diff --git a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.te b/policy/modules/system/ipsec.te index 55a6cd8..02378d2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/ipsec.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/ipsec.te @@ -73,13 +73,15 @@ role system_r types setkey_t; # allow ipsec_t self:capability { net_admin dac_override dac_read_search setpcap sys_nice }; -dontaudit ipsec_t self:capability { sys_ptrace sys_tty_config }; +dontaudit ipsec_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow ipsec_t self:process { getcap setcap getsched signal setsched }; allow ipsec_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow ipsec_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow ipsec_t self:key_socket create_socket_perms; allow ipsec_t self:fifo_file read_fifo_file_perms; allow ipsec_t self:netlink_xfrm_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_write }; +allow ipsec_t self:netlink_selinux_socket create_socket_perms; +allow ipsec_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow ipsec_t ipsec_initrc_exec_t:file read_file_perms; @@ -128,19 +130,21 @@ corecmd_exec_bin(ipsec_t) # Pluto needs network access corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(ipsec_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(ipsec_t) -corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if(ipsec_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(ipsec_t) -corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes(ipsec_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(ipsec_t) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(ipsec_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(ipsec_t) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(ipsec_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(ipsec_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(ipsec_t) -corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes(ipsec_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(ipsec_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(ipsec_t) corenet_tcp_bind_reserved_port(ipsec_t) corenet_tcp_bind_isakmp_port(ipsec_t) corenet_udp_bind_isakmp_port(ipsec_t) corenet_udp_bind_ipsecnat_port(ipsec_t) corenet_sendrecv_generic_server_packets(ipsec_t) corenet_sendrecv_isakmp_server_packets(ipsec_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(ipsec_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_ldap_port(ipsec_t) dev_read_sysfs(ipsec_t) dev_read_rand(ipsec_t) @@ -156,6 +160,8 @@ files_dontaudit_search_home(ipsec_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(ipsec_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ipsec_t) +selinux_compute_access_vector(ipsec_t) + term_use_console(ipsec_t) term_dontaudit_use_all_ttys(ipsec_t) @@ -169,6 +175,8 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(ipsec_t) miscfiles_read_localization(ipsec_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(ipsec_t) +sysnet_manage_config(ipsec_t) +sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(ipsec_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(ipsec_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(ipsec_t) @@ -186,9 +194,9 @@ optional_policy(` # ipsec_mgmt Local policy # -allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search net_admin setpcap sys_nice }; -dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t self:capability { sys_ptrace sys_tty_config }; -allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:process { getsched ptrace setrlimit setsched signal }; +allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search net_admin setpcap sys_nice sys_ptrace }; +dontaudit ipsec_mgmt_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:process { getsched setrlimit setsched signal }; allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow ipsec_mgmt_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -245,6 +253,16 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(ipsec_mgmt_t) kernel_getattr_core_if(ipsec_mgmt_t) kernel_getattr_message_if(ipsec_mgmt_t) +domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(ipsec_mgmt_t) +domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(ipsec_mgmt_t) + +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files(ipsec_mgmt_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(ipsec_mgmt_t) + +dev_read_sysfs(ipsec_mgmt_t) + +files_dontaudit_getattr_all_files(ipsec_mgmt_t) +files_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(ipsec_mgmt_t) files_read_kernel_symbol_table(ipsec_mgmt_t) files_getattr_kernel_modules(ipsec_mgmt_t) @@ -254,6 +272,8 @@ files_getattr_kernel_modules(ipsec_mgmt_t) corecmd_exec_bin(ipsec_mgmt_t) corecmd_exec_shell(ipsec_mgmt_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_rndc_port(ipsec_mgmt_t) + dev_read_rand(ipsec_mgmt_t) dev_read_urand(ipsec_mgmt_t) @@ -277,9 +297,10 @@ fs_getattr_xattr_fs(ipsec_mgmt_t) fs_list_tmpfs(ipsec_mgmt_t) term_use_console(ipsec_mgmt_t) -term_dontaudit_getattr_unallocated_ttys(ipsec_mgmt_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(ipsec_mgmt_t) auth_dontaudit_read_login_records(ipsec_mgmt_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(ipsec_mgmt_t) init_read_utmp(ipsec_mgmt_t) init_use_script_ptys(ipsec_mgmt_t) @@ -297,7 +318,12 @@ sysnet_manage_config(ipsec_mgmt_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(ipsec_mgmt_t) sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(ipsec_mgmt_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(ipsec_mgmt_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ipsec_mgmt_t) + +optional_policy(` + bind_read_dnssec_keys(ipsec_mgmt_t) + bind_read_config(ipsec_mgmt_t) +') optional_policy(` consoletype_exec(ipsec_mgmt_t) @@ -324,10 +350,6 @@ optional_policy(` modutils_domtrans_insmod(ipsec_mgmt_t) ') -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(ipsec_mgmt_t) -') - ifdef(`TODO',` # ideally it would not need this. It wants to write to /root/.rnd file_type_auto_trans(ipsec_mgmt_t, sysadm_home_dir_t, sysadm_home_t, file) @@ -377,12 +399,12 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(racoon_t) corecmd_exec_bin(racoon_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(racoon_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(racoon_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if(racoon_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(racoon_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes(racoon_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(racoon_t) -corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes(racoon_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(racoon_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(racoon_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(racoon_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(racoon_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(racoon_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(racoon_t) corenet_udp_bind_isakmp_port(racoon_t) corenet_udp_bind_ipsecnat_port(racoon_t) @@ -411,6 +433,8 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(racoon_t) sysnet_exec_ifconfig(racoon_t) +auth_use_pam(racoon_t) + auth_can_read_shadow_passwords(racoon_t) tunable_policy(`racoon_read_shadow',` auth_tunable_read_shadow(racoon_t) @@ -448,5 +472,6 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(setkey_t) seutil_read_config(setkey_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(setkey_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(setkey_t) +userdom_read_user_tmp_files(setkey_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/iptables.fc b/policy/modules/system/iptables.fc index 05fb364..5effebe 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/iptables.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/iptables.fc @@ -1,7 +1,8 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ip6?tables -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ebtables -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_initrc_exec_t,s0) -/etc/sysconfig/ip6?tables.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_conf_t,s0) -/etc/sysconfig/system-config-firewall.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_conf_t,s0) +/etc/rc\.d/init\.d/ebtables -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_initrc_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system/iptables.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/ip6tables.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_unit_file_t,s0) /sbin/ebtables -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) /sbin/ebtables-restore -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) @@ -12,8 +13,15 @@ /sbin/ipvsadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) /sbin/ipvsadm-restore -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) /sbin/ipvsadm-save -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/xtables-multi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ebtables -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ebtables-restore -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/ipchains.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/iptables -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/iptables-multi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/iptables-restore -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ip6?tables -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ip6?tables-restore -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ip6?tables-multi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ipvsadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ipvsadm-restore -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ipvsadm-save -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/xtables-multi -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iptables_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/iptables.if b/policy/modules/system/iptables.if index 7ba53db..f4a49a0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/iptables.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/iptables.if @@ -17,10 +17,6 @@ interface(`iptables_domtrans',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, iptables_exec_t, iptables_t) - - ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms', ` - dontaudit iptables_t $1:socket_class_set { read write }; - ') ') ######################################## @@ -92,6 +88,29 @@ interface(`iptables_initrc_domtrans',` init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, iptables_initrc_exec_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Execute iptables server in the iptables domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`iptables_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type iptables_unit_file_t; + type iptables_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 iptables_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 iptables_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, iptables_t) +') + ##################################### ## ## Set the attributes of iptables config files. diff --git a/policy/modules/system/iptables.te b/policy/modules/system/iptables.te index f3e1b57..d7fd7fb 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/iptables.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/iptables.te @@ -13,15 +13,15 @@ role system_r types iptables_t; type iptables_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(iptables_initrc_exec_t) -type iptables_conf_t; -files_config_file(iptables_conf_t) - type iptables_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(iptables_tmp_t) type iptables_var_run_t; files_pid_file(iptables_var_run_t) +type iptables_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(iptables_unit_file_t) + ######################################## # # Iptables local policy @@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ allow iptables_t self:process { sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal }; allow iptables_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; allow iptables_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; -manage_files_pattern(iptables_t, iptables_conf_t, iptables_conf_t) -files_etc_filetrans(iptables_t, iptables_conf_t, file) +files_manage_system_conf_files(iptables_t) +files_etc_filetrans_system_conf(iptables_t) manage_files_pattern(iptables_t, iptables_var_run_t, iptables_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(iptables_t, iptables_var_run_t, file) @@ -46,6 +46,7 @@ allow iptables_t iptables_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms; allow iptables_t iptables_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; files_tmp_filetrans(iptables_t, iptables_tmp_t, { file dir }) +kernel_getattr_proc(iptables_t) kernel_request_load_module(iptables_t) kernel_read_system_state(iptables_t) kernel_read_network_state(iptables_t) @@ -61,6 +62,9 @@ corenet_relabelto_all_packets(iptables_t) corenet_dontaudit_rw_tun_tap_dev(iptables_t) dev_read_sysfs(iptables_t) +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + dev_dontaudit_write_mtrr(iptables_t) +') fs_getattr_xattr_fs(iptables_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(iptables_t) @@ -69,11 +73,13 @@ fs_list_inotifyfs(iptables_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(iptables_t) term_dontaudit_use_console(iptables_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(iptables_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(iptables_t) files_read_etc_files(iptables_t) -files_read_etc_runtime_files(iptables_t) +files_rw_etc_runtime_files(iptables_t) +files_read_usr_files(iptables_t) auth_use_nsswitch(iptables_t) @@ -82,6 +88,7 @@ init_use_script_ptys(iptables_t) # to allow rules to be saved on reboot: init_rw_script_tmp_files(iptables_t) init_rw_script_stream_sockets(iptables_t) +init_dontaudit_script_leaks(iptables_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(iptables_t) @@ -90,7 +97,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(iptables_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(iptables_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(iptables_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(iptables_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(iptables_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(iptables_t) ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` @@ -99,6 +106,8 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` optional_policy(` fail2ban_append_log(iptables_t) + fail2ban_dontaudit_leaks(iptables_t) + fail2ban_rw_inherited_tmp_files(iptables_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -121,6 +130,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` psad_rw_tmp_files(iptables_t) + psad_write_log(iptables_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -134,6 +144,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` shorewall_read_tmp_files(iptables_t) shorewall_rw_lib_files(iptables_t) + shorewall_read_tmp_files(iptables_t) shorewall_read_config(iptables_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/iscsi.fc b/policy/modules/system/iscsi.fc index 14d9670..358255e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/iscsi.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/iscsi.fc @@ -1,7 +1,16 @@ /sbin/iscsid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0) /sbin/brcm_iscsiuio -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/iscsiuio -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/iscsi(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsi_var_lib_t,s0) + /var/lock/iscsi(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsi_lock_t,s0) + /var/log/brcm-iscsi\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsi_log_t,s0) +/var/log/iscsiuio\.log.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsi_log_t,s0) + /var/run/iscsid\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsi_var_run_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/iscsid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/brcm_iscsiuio -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/iscsiuio -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:iscsid_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/iscsi.te b/policy/modules/system/iscsi.te index ddbd8be..fad18e0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/iscsi.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/iscsi.te @@ -31,7 +31,6 @@ files_pid_file(iscsi_var_run_t) # allow iscsid_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock net_admin net_raw sys_admin sys_nice sys_resource }; -dontaudit iscsid_t self:capability sys_ptrace; allow iscsid_t self:process { setrlimit setsched signal }; allow iscsid_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow iscsid_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; @@ -66,6 +65,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(iscsid_t, iscsi_var_run_t, file) kernel_read_network_state(iscsid_t) kernel_read_system_state(iscsid_t) +kernel_setsched(iscsid_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(iscsid_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(iscsid_t) @@ -75,9 +75,12 @@ corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(iscsid_t) corenet_tcp_connect_http_port(iscsid_t) corenet_tcp_connect_iscsi_port(iscsid_t) corenet_tcp_connect_isns_port(iscsid_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_winshadow_port(iscsid_t) dev_rw_sysfs(iscsid_t) dev_rw_userio_dev(iscsid_t) +dev_read_raw_memory(iscsid_t) +dev_write_raw_memory(iscsid_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(iscsid_t) domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(iscsid_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/libraries.fc b/policy/modules/system/libraries.fc index 560dc48..e644b1e 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/libraries.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/libraries.fc @@ -28,26 +28,24 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # /etc # /etc/ld\.so\.cache -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_cache_t,s0) +/etc/ld\.so\.cache~ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_cache_t,s0) /etc/ld\.so\.preload -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_cache_t,s0) +/etc/ld\.so\.preload~ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_cache_t,s0) /etc/ppp/plugins/rp-pppoe\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) # # /lib(64)? # -/lib -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/lib gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/lib64 gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) /lib/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/lib64 -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/lib64/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) /lib/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0) -/lib64/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0) /lib/security/pam_poldi\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/lib64/security/pam_poldi\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_debian',` /lib32 -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/lib64 -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) ') ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` @@ -60,9 +58,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` # # /opt # -/opt/.*\.so gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/opt/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) /opt/(.*/)?lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/opt/(.*/)?lib64(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) /opt/(.*/)?java/.+\.jar -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) /opt/(.*/)?jre.*/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /opt/(.*/)?jre/.+\.jar -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) @@ -111,6 +108,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # # /usr # +/usr/lib -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/security/pam_poldi\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + /usr/(.*/)?/HelixPlayer/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/(.*/)?/RealPlayer/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) @@ -119,64 +122,63 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /usr/(.*/)?java/.+\.jsa -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) /usr/(.*/)?lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/usr/(.*/)?lib64(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/usr/(.*/)?lib(64)?(/.*)?/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0) +/usr/(.*/)?lib(/.*)?/ld-[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0) /usr/(.*/)?nvidia/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/altivec/libavcodec\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/cedega/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/altivec/libavcodec\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/cedega/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/vlc/video_chroma/libi420_rgb_mmx_plugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/vlc/codec/librealvideo_plugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/vlc/codec/libdmo_plugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib/vlc/codec/librealaudio_plugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/vlc/codec/librealvideo_plugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/vlc/codec/libdmo_plugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/vlc/codec/librealaudio_plugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libtfmessbsp\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/xorg/libGL\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/vlc/.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libtfmessbsp\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xorg/libGL\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/X11R6/lib/libGL\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libGL\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/catalyst/libGL\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libADM5.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libatiadlxx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/win32/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libGL\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/catalyst/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libADM5.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libatiadlxx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/win32/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/ADM_plugins/videoFilter/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/(.*/)?lib(64)?(/.*)?/nvidia/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?(/.*)?/nvidia/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libsipphoneapi\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ati-fglrx/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/fglrx/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libjs\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/sse2/libx264\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?(/.*)?/libnvidia.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?(/.*)?/nvidia_drv.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nero/plug-ins/libMP3\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libGL(core)?\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libnvidia.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libXvMCNVIDIA\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/nvidia/libGL(core)?\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/xorg/modules/glesx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/(.*/)?lib(/.*)?/nvidia/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib(/.*)?/nvidia/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libsipphoneapi\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ati-fglrx/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/fglrx/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libjs\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/sse2/libx264\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libzita-convolver\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib(/.*)?/libnvidia.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib(/.*)?/nvidia_drv.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nero/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nvidia/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libGL(core)?\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libnvidia.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nvidia-graphics(-[^/]*/)?libXvMCNVIDIA\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/nvidia/libGL(core)?\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xorg/modules/glesx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/(local/)?.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/usr/(local/)?lib(64)?/wine/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/(local/)?lib(64)?/(sse2/)?libfame-.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/(local/)?lib/wine/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/(local/)?lib/(sse2/)?libfame-.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/NX/lib/libXcomp\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/NX/lib/libjpeg\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/X11R6/lib/libXvMCNVIDIA\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/xorg/modules/drivers/fglrx_drv\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/xorg/modules/drivers/nvidia_drv\.o -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/xorg/modules/extensions/nvidia(-[^/]*)?/libglx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/xorg/modules/extensions/libglx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xorg/modules/drivers/fglrx_drv\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xorg/modules/drivers/nvidia_drv\.o -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xorg/modules/extensions/nvidia(-[^/]*)?/libglx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xorg/modules/extensions/libglx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/x11R6/lib/modules/extensions/libglx\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_debian',` /usr/lib32 -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/lib -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) ') ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` @@ -195,7 +197,6 @@ HOME_DIR/.*/plugins/nppdf\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t /usr/lib/allegro/(.*/)?alleg-vga\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/firefox-[^/]*/extensions(/.*)?/libqfaservices.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/firefox-[^/]*/plugins/nppdf.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/firefox/plugins/libractrl\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/libFLAC\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/libfglrx_gamma\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/mozilla/plugins/nppdf\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) @@ -203,86 +204,87 @@ HOME_DIR/.*/plugins/nppdf\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t /usr/lib/nx/libXcomp\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/nx/libjpeg\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/VBoxVMM\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/mozilla/plugins/libvlcplugin\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) - -/usr/lib(64)?/libstdc\+\+\.so\.2\.7\.2\.8 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libg\+\+\.so\.2\.7\.2\.8 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libgpac\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libglide3\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libglide3-v[0-9]*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/helix/plugins/[^/]*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/helix/codecs/[^/]*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libstdc\+\+\.so\.2\.7\.2\.8 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libg\+\+\.so\.2\.7\.2\.8 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libgpac\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libglide3\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libglide3-v[0-9]*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/helix/plugins/[^/]*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/helix/codecs/[^/]*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/X11R6/lib/libfglrx_gamma\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libHermes\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/valgrind/hp2ps -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/valgrind/stage2 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/valgrind/vg.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/program/libicudata\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/program/libsts645li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/program/libvclplug_gen645li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/program/libwrp645li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/program/libswd680li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/program/librecentfile\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/program/libsvx680li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/program/libcomphelp4gcc3\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/program/libsoffice\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libHermes\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/valgrind/hp2ps -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/valgrind/stage2 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/valgrind/vg.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program/libicudata\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program/libsts645li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program/libvclplug_gen645li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program/libwrp645li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program/libswd680li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program/librecentfile\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program/libsvx680li\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program/libcomphelp4gcc3\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program/libsoffice\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/(.*/)?pcsc/drivers(/.*)?/lib(cm2020|cm4000|SCR24x)\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) # Fedora Extras packages: ladspa, imlib2, ocaml -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/analogue_osc_1416\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/bandpass_a_iir_1893\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/bandpass_iir_1892\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/butterworth_1902\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/fm_osc_1415\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/gsm_1215\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/gverb_1216\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/hermes_filter_1200\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/highpass_iir_1890\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/lowpass_iir_1891\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/notch_iir_1894\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/pitch_scale_1193\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/pitch_scale_1194\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/sc1_1425\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/sc2_1426\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/sc3_1427\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/sc4_1882\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ladspa/se4_1883\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/sane/libsane-epkowa\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/ocaml/stublibs/dllnums\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/analogue_osc_1416\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/bandpass_a_iir_1893\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/bandpass_iir_1892\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/butterworth_1902\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/fm_osc_1415\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/gsm_1215\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/gverb_1216\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/hermes_filter_1200\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/highpass_iir_1890\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/lowpass_iir_1891\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/notch_iir_1894\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/pitch_scale_1193\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/pitch_scale_1194\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/sc1_1425\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/sc2_1426\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/sc3_1427\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/sc4_1882\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ladspa/se4_1883\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/sane/libsane-epkowa\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/ocaml/stublibs/dllnums\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libffmpegsumo\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) # Livna.org packages: xmms-mp3, ffmpeg, xvidcore, xine-lib, gsm, lame -/usr/lib(64)?.*/libmpg123\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib.*/libmpg123\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/local(/.*)?/libmpg123\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/codecs/drv[1-9c]\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/codecs/drv[1-9c]\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/local/lib/codecs/drv[1-9c]\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) HOME_DIR/.*/plugins/nppdf\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) HOME_DIR/.mozilla/plugins/nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/.*/nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/local/(.*/)?nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) # Jai, Sun Microsystems (Jpackage SPRM) -/usr/lib(64)?/libmlib_jai\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libdivxdecore\.so\.0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libdivxencore\.so\.0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libmlib_jai\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libdivxdecore\.so\.0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libdivxencore\.so\.0 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/libdvdcss\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libdvdcss\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/python2.4/site-packages/M2Crypto/__m2crypto\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/python2.4/site-packages/M2Crypto/__m2crypto\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) # vmware -/usr/lib(64)?/vmware/lib(/.*)?/libgdk-x11-.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/vmware/lib(/.*)?/HConfig\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/vmware/(.*/)?VmPerl\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/vmware/lib(/.*)?/libvmware-gksu.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/vmware/lib(/.*)?/libgdk-x11-.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/vmware/lib(/.*)?/HConfig\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/vmware/(.*/)?VmPerl\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/vmware/lib(/.*)?/libvmware-gksu.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/(virtualbox(-ose)?/)?(components/)?VBox.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/virtualbox/.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/(virtualbox(-ose)?/)?(components/)?VBox.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/virtualbox/.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) # Java, Sun Microsystems (JPackage SRPM) /usr/(.*/)?jre.*/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/local/(.*/)?jre.*/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/(.*/)?jre.*/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/(.*/)?jre.*/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/(local/)?Adobe/(.*/)?intellinux/nppdf\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/(local/)?Adobe/(.*/)?intellinux/sidecars/* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) @@ -303,8 +305,7 @@ HOME_DIR/.mozilla/plugins/nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:te /usr/lib/acroread/(.*/)?lib/[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/acroread/.+\.api -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) /usr/lib/acroread/(.*/)?ADMPlugin\.apl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) -/usr/lib/.*/program(/.*)?\.so gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/usr/lib64/.*/program(/.*)?\.so gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/program(/.*)?\.so gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) ') dnl end distro_redhat # @@ -312,17 +313,157 @@ HOME_DIR/.mozilla/plugins/nprhapengine\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:te # /var/cache/ldconfig(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:ldconfig_cache_t,s0) -/var/ftp/lib(64)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/var/ftp/lib(64)?/ld[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0) - -/var/lib/spamassassin/compiled/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/var/ftp/lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/var/ftp/lib/ld[^/]*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0) /var/mailman/pythonlib(/.*)?/.+\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/pgsql/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/pgsql/test/regress/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/var/lib/spamassassin/compiled/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xfce4/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) + ifdef(`distro_suse',` /var/lib/samba/bin/.+\.so(\.[^/]*)* -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) ') -/var/spool/postfix/lib(64)?(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/usr/share/hplip/prnt/plugins(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/usr/share/squeezeboxserver/CPAN/arch/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/var/spool/postfix/lib(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) +/var/spool/postfix/lib64(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) /var/spool/postfix/usr(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) -/var/spool/postfix/lib(64)?/ld.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0) +/var/spool/postfix/lib/ld.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ld_so_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libmyth[^/]+\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/mythtv/filters/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/jvm/java(.*/)bin(/.*)?/.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/oracle/.*/lib/libnnz10\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/opt/altera9.1/quartus/linux/libccl_err\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/opt/novell/groupwise/client/lib/libgwapijni\.so\.1 -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/sse2/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/i686/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/local/google-earth/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/googleearth/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/google-earth/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/google-earth/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/google-earth/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/google/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/google/chrome/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/nspluginwrapper/np.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/oracle/.*/lib/libnnz.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/oracle/.*/lib/libclntsh\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/opt/(.*/)?oracle/(.*/)?libnnz.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libnnz11.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libxvidcore\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + + +/opt/matlab.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/matlab.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/local/matlab.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/local/matlab.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/local/Zend/lib/ZendExtensionManager\.so gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libcncpmslld328\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/ICAClient/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/midori/.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libav.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/xine/plugins/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/yafaray/libDarkSky.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libpostproc\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libswscale\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libADM.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/gstreamer-.*/[^/]*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gstreamer-.*/plugins/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libx264\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libmp3lame\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libmpeg2\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +HOME_DIR/\.mozilla(/.*)?/plugins/libflashplayer\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/.*/libflashplayer\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/local/(.*/)?libflashplayer\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +ifdef(`fixed',` +/usr/lib/libavfilter\.so(\..*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libavdevice\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libavformat.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libavcodec.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libavutil.*\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libdv\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libGLU\.so(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libgsm\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libImlib2\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libjackserver\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/X11R6/lib/libOSMesa.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libOSMesa.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/libSDL-.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xulrunner-[^/]*/libgtkembedmoz\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xulrunner-[^/]*/libxul\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +# Flash plugin, Macromedia +/usr/lib/php/modules/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/xorg/modules/dri/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/X11R6/lib/modules/dri/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/dri/.+\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/lib/httpd/modules/libphp5\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +') +/opt/VBoxGuestAdditions.*/lib/VBox.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/nmm/liba52\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/lampp/lib/libct\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/lampp/lib/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/VirtualBox(/.*)?/VBox.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/chromium-browser/.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/local/zend/lib/apache2/libphp5\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/python.*/site-packages/pymedia/muxer\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/usr/local/games/darwinia/lib/libSDL.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/octagaplayer/libapplication\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/AutoScan/usr/lib/libvte\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/bsnes -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/firefox/plugins/libractrl\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libGLcore\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libkmplayercommon\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/opt/Unify/SQLBase/libgptsblmsui11\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/opt/real/RealPlayer/plugins(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/opt/real/RealPlayer/codecs(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/vdpau/libvdpau_nvidia\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/libGTL.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/nsr/(.*/)?.*\.so -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/lgtonmc/bin/.*\.so(\.[0-9])? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/google/picasa/.*\.dll -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/google/picasa/.*\.yti -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) +/opt/google/talkplugin/.*\.so.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:textrel_shlib_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/ldconfig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ldconfig_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/libraries.if b/policy/modules/system/libraries.if index 808ba93..f94b80a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/libraries.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/libraries.if @@ -147,6 +147,7 @@ interface(`libs_manage_ld_so',` type lib_t, ld_so_t; ') + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, lib_t, lib_t) manage_files_pattern($1, lib_t, ld_so_t) ') @@ -205,8 +206,26 @@ interface(`libs_search_lib',` type lib_t; ') + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, lib_t, lib_t) allow $1 lib_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') +######################################## +## +## dontaudit attempts to setattr on library files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`libs_dontaudit_setattr_lib_files',` + gen_require(` + type lib_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 lib_t:file setattr; +') ######################################## ## @@ -248,29 +267,12 @@ interface(`libs_manage_lib_dirs',` type lib_t; ') + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, lib_t, lib_t) allow $1 lib_t:dir manage_dir_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## dontaudit attempts to setattr on library files -## -## -## -## Domain to not audit. -## -## -# -interface(`libs_dontaudit_setattr_lib_files',` - gen_require(` - type lib_t; - ') - - dontaudit $1 lib_t:file setattr; -') - -######################################## -## ## Read files in the library directories, such ## as static libraries. ## @@ -345,6 +347,7 @@ interface(`libs_manage_lib_files',` type lib_t; ') + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, lib_t, lib_t) manage_files_pattern($1, lib_t, lib_t) ') @@ -421,7 +424,8 @@ interface(`libs_manage_shared_libs',` type lib_t, textrel_shlib_t; ') - manage_files_pattern($1, lib_t, { lib_t textrel_shlib_t }) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, lib_t, lib_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, { textrel_shlib_t lib_t }, { lib_t textrel_shlib_t }) ') ######################################## @@ -440,9 +444,9 @@ interface(`libs_use_shared_libs',` ') files_search_usr($1) - allow $1 lib_t:dir list_dir_perms; - read_lnk_files_pattern($1, lib_t, { lib_t textrel_shlib_t }) - mmap_files_pattern($1, lib_t, { lib_t textrel_shlib_t }) + allow $1 { textrel_shlib_t lib_t }:dir list_dir_perms; + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, { textrel_shlib_t lib_t }, { lib_t textrel_shlib_t }) + mmap_files_pattern($1, { textrel_shlib_t lib_t }, { lib_t textrel_shlib_t }) allow $1 textrel_shlib_t:file execmod; ') @@ -483,7 +487,7 @@ interface(`libs_relabel_shared_libs',` type lib_t, textrel_shlib_t; ') - relabel_files_pattern($1, lib_t, { lib_t textrel_shlib_t }) + relabel_files_pattern($1, { textrel_shlib_t lib_t }, { lib_t textrel_shlib_t }) ') ######################################## @@ -534,3 +538,26 @@ interface(`lib_filetrans_shared_lib',` interface(`files_lib_filetrans_shared_lib',` refpolicywarn(`$0($*) has been deprecated.') ') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to lib named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`libs_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type ld_so_cache_t; + type ldconfig_cache_t; + ') + + files_var_filetrans($1, ldconfig_cache_t, dir, "ldconfig") + files_etc_filetrans($1, ld_so_cache_t, file, "ld.so.cache") + files_etc_filetrans($1, ld_so_cache_t, file, "ld.so.cache~") + files_etc_filetrans($1, ld_so_cache_t, file, "ld.so.preload") + files_etc_filetrans($1, ld_so_cache_t, file, "ld.so.preload~") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/libraries.te b/policy/modules/system/libraries.te index e5836d3..648d152 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/libraries.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/libraries.te @@ -59,9 +59,11 @@ optional_policy(` allow ldconfig_t self:capability { dac_override sys_chroot }; +manage_dirs_pattern(ldconfig_t, ldconfig_cache_t, ldconfig_cache_t) manage_files_pattern(ldconfig_t, ldconfig_cache_t, ldconfig_cache_t) +files_var_filetrans(ldconfig_t, ldconfig_cache_t, dir, "ldconfig") -allow ldconfig_t ld_so_cache_t:file manage_file_perms; +manage_files_pattern(ldconfig_t, ld_so_cache_t, ld_so_cache_t) files_etc_filetrans(ldconfig_t, ld_so_cache_t, file) manage_dirs_pattern(ldconfig_t, ldconfig_tmp_t, ldconfig_tmp_t) @@ -75,10 +77,14 @@ kernel_read_system_state(ldconfig_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(ldconfig_t) +files_list_var_lib(ldconfig_t) +files_manage_var_lib_symlinks(ldconfig_t) + corecmd_search_bin(ldconfig_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(ldconfig_t) +files_search_home(ldconfig_t) files_search_var_lib(ldconfig_t) files_read_etc_files(ldconfig_t) files_read_usr_files(ldconfig_t) @@ -94,7 +100,8 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(ldconfig_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(ldconfig_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(ldconfig_t) +term_use_console(ldconfig_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ldconfig_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(ldconfig_t) ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` @@ -103,6 +110,12 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` ') ') +userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir(ldconfig_t) +userdom_list_user_home_dirs(ldconfig_t) +userdom_manage_user_home_content_files(ldconfig_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(ldconfig_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_symlinks(ldconfig_t) + ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` # leaked fds from portage @@ -114,6 +127,9 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` ') ') + dev_dontaudit_rw_lvm_control(ldconfig_t) + term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(ldconfig_t) + optional_policy(` unconfined_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets(ldconfig_t) ') @@ -131,6 +147,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + gnome_append_generic_cache_files(ldconfig_t) +') + +optional_policy(` puppet_rw_tmp(ldconfig_t) ') @@ -141,6 +161,3 @@ optional_policy(` rpm_manage_script_tmp_files(ldconfig_t) ') -optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(ldconfig_t) -') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.fc b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.fc index be6a81b..a5303e9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.fc @@ -1,3 +1,8 @@ +HOME_DIR/\.hushlogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:local_login_home_t,s0) +/root/\.hushlogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:local_login_home_t,s0) /sbin/sulogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sulogin_exec_t,s0) /sbin/sushell -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sulogin_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/sulogin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sulogin_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/sushell -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:sulogin_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.if b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.if index 0e3c2a9..40adf5a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.if @@ -129,3 +129,59 @@ interface(`locallogin_domtrans_sulogin',` domtrans_pattern($1, sulogin_exec_t, sulogin_t) ') + +####################################### +## +## Allow domain to gettatr local login home content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`locallogin_getattr_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type local_login_home_t; + ') + + getattr_files_pattern($1, local_login_home_t, local_login_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## create local login content in the in the /root directory +## with an correct label. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`locallogin_filetrans_admin_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type local_login_home_t; + ') + + userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans($1, local_login_home_t, file, ".hushlogin") +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to local login named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`locallogin_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type local_login_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, local_login_home_t, file, ".hushlogin") +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te index a0b379d..362176f 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/locallogin.te @@ -13,9 +13,8 @@ auth_login_entry_type(local_login_t) type local_login_lock_t; files_lock_file(local_login_lock_t) -type local_login_tmp_t; -files_tmp_file(local_login_tmp_t) -files_poly_parent(local_login_tmp_t) +type local_login_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(local_login_home_t) type sulogin_t; type sulogin_exec_t; @@ -32,9 +31,8 @@ role system_r types sulogin_t; # Local login local policy # -allow local_login_t self:capability { dac_override chown fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_nice sys_resource sys_tty_config }; -allow local_login_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; -allow local_login_t self:process { setrlimit setexec }; +allow local_login_t self:capability { dac_override chown fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid sys_admin sys_nice sys_resource sys_tty_config }; +allow local_login_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setfscreate execmem execstack execheap }; allow local_login_t self:fd use; allow local_login_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow local_login_t self:sock_file read_sock_file_perms; @@ -51,9 +49,7 @@ allow local_login_t self:key { search write link }; allow local_login_t local_login_lock_t:file manage_file_perms; files_lock_filetrans(local_login_t, local_login_lock_t, file) -allow local_login_t local_login_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms; -allow local_login_t local_login_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; -files_tmp_filetrans(local_login_t, local_login_tmp_t, { file dir }) +allow local_login_t local_login_home_t:file read_file_perms; kernel_read_system_state(local_login_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(local_login_t) @@ -73,6 +69,8 @@ dev_getattr_power_mgmt_dev(local_login_t) dev_setattr_power_mgmt_dev(local_login_t) dev_getattr_sound_dev(local_login_t) dev_setattr_sound_dev(local_login_t) +dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(local_login_t) +dev_read_video_dev(local_login_t) dev_dontaudit_getattr_apm_bios_dev(local_login_t) dev_dontaudit_setattr_apm_bios_dev(local_login_t) dev_dontaudit_read_framebuffer(local_login_t) @@ -120,11 +118,13 @@ term_setattr_unallocated_ttys(local_login_t) auth_rw_login_records(local_login_t) auth_rw_faillog(local_login_t) -auth_manage_pam_pid(local_login_t) +#auth_manage_pam_pid(local_login_t) auth_manage_pam_console_data(local_login_t) auth_domtrans_pam_console(local_login_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(local_login_t) init_dontaudit_use_fds(local_login_t) +init_stream_connect(local_login_t) miscfiles_read_localization(local_login_t) @@ -146,14 +146,14 @@ tunable_policy(`console_login',` term_relabel_console(local_login_t) ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_read_nfs_files(local_login_t) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks(local_login_t) -') +userdom_home_reader(local_login_t) +userdom_manage_tmp_files(local_login_t) +userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp(local_login_t, file) -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_read_cifs_files(local_login_t) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks(local_login_t) +tunable_policy(`allow_console_login',` + term_use_console(local_login_t) + term_relabel_console(local_login_t) + term_setattr_console(local_login_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -177,14 +177,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(local_login_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(local_login_t) -') - -optional_policy(` unconfined_shell_domtrans(local_login_t) ') @@ -215,6 +207,7 @@ allow sulogin_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow sulogin_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; allow sulogin_t self:msg { send receive }; +kernel_read_crypto_sysctls(sulogin_t) kernel_read_system_state(sulogin_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(sulogin_t) @@ -223,13 +216,17 @@ fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(sulogin_t) files_read_etc_files(sulogin_t) # because file systems are not mounted: files_dontaudit_search_isid_type_dirs(sulogin_t) +files_search_pids(sulogin_t) auth_read_shadow(sulogin_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(sulogin_t) init_getpgid_script(sulogin_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(sulogin_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(sulogin_t) + seutil_read_config(sulogin_t) seutil_read_default_contexts(sulogin_t) @@ -238,14 +235,24 @@ userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(sulogin_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(sulogin_t) userdom_use_user_ptys(sulogin_t) -sysadm_shell_domtrans(sulogin_t) +term_use_console(sulogin_t) +term_use_unallocated_ttys(sulogin_t) +term_use_generic_ptys(sulogin_t) + +ifdef(`enable_mls',` + sysadm_shell_domtrans(sulogin_t) +',` + optional_policy(` + unconfined_shell_domtrans(sulogin_t) + ') +') # suse and debian do not use pam with sulogin... ifdef(`distro_suse', `define(`sulogin_no_pam')') ifdef(`distro_debian', `define(`sulogin_no_pam')') +allow sulogin_t self:capability sys_tty_config; ifdef(`sulogin_no_pam', ` - allow sulogin_t self:capability sys_tty_config; init_getpgid(sulogin_t) ', ` allow sulogin_t self:process setexec; @@ -256,11 +263,3 @@ ifdef(`sulogin_no_pam', ` selinux_compute_relabel_context(sulogin_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts(sulogin_t) ') - -optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(sulogin_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(sulogin_t) -') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/logging.fc b/policy/modules/system/logging.fc index 02f4c97..54c74fe 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/logging.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/logging.fc @@ -6,6 +6,8 @@ /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/auditd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditd_initrc_exec_t,s0) /etc/rc\.d/init\.d/rsyslog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_initrc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/system/auditd.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditd_unit_file_t,s0) + /sbin/audispd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:audisp_exec_t,s0) /sbin/audisp-remote -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:audisp_remote_exec_t,s0) /sbin/auditctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditctl_exec_t,s0) @@ -17,12 +19,25 @@ /sbin/syslogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) /sbin/syslog-ng -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) +/opt/zimbra/log(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) +/opt/Symantec/scspagent/IDS/system(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-journald -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-kmsg-syslogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/local/centreon/log(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/audispd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:audisp_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/audisp-remote -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:audisp_remote_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/auditctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditctl_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/auditd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/klogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:klogd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/metalog -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/minilogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rklogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:klogd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/rsyslogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/syslog-ng -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/syslogd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/syslog-ng -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_exec_t,s0) /var/lib/syslog-ng(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lib/r?syslog(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_lib_t,s0) @@ -34,11 +49,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /var/axfrdns/log/main(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) /var/dnscache/log/main(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) -/var/cfengine/outputs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) +#/var/cfengine/outputs(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) /var/log -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) /var/log/.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) -/var/log/boot\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh) +/var/log/boot\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/log/messages[^/]* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/log/secure[^/]* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/log/cron[^/]* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh) @@ -46,6 +61,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_suse', ` /var/log/spooler[^/]* gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/log/audit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditd_log_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/log/syslog-ng(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh) +/var/run/log(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh) ifndef(`distro_gentoo',` /var/log/audit\.log -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditd_log_t,mls_systemhigh) @@ -54,6 +70,7 @@ ifndef(`distro_gentoo',` ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /var/named/chroot/var/log -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) /var/named/chroot/dev/log -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:devlog_t,s0) +/var/spool/postfix/dev/log -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:devlog_t,s0) ') /var/run/audit_events -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:auditd_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh) @@ -66,6 +83,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /var/run/syslogd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/run/syslog-ng.ctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/syslog-ng(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:syslogd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/systemd/journal/syslog -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:devlog_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/spool/audit(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:audit_spool_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/spool/bacula/log(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) @@ -73,4 +91,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` /var/spool/plymouth/boot\.log gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,mls_systemhigh) /var/spool/rsyslog(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) +/var/stockmaniac/templates_cache(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) + /var/tinydns/log/main(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) + +/var/webmin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:var_log_t,s0) + diff --git a/policy/modules/system/logging.if b/policy/modules/system/logging.if index 831b909..b9cff6d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/logging.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/logging.if @@ -233,7 +233,7 @@ interface(`logging_run_auditd',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to auditdstored over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to auditdstored over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -318,7 +318,7 @@ interface(`logging_dispatcher_domain',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to the audit dispatcher over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to the audit dispatcher over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -491,6 +491,63 @@ interface(`logging_log_filetrans',` filetrans_pattern($1, var_log_t, $2, $3) ') +####################################### +## +## Create an object in the log directory, with a private type. +## +## +##

    +## Allow the specified domain to create an object +## in the general system log directories (e.g., /var/log) +## with a private type. Typically this is used for creating +## private log files in /var/log with the private type instead +## of the general system log type. To accomplish this goal, +## either the program must be SELinux-aware, or use this interface. +##

    +##

    +## Related interfaces: +##

    +##
      +##
    • logging_log_file()
      • +##
    +##

    +## Example usage with a domain that can create +## and append to a private log file stored in the +## general directories (e.g., /var/log): +##

    +##

    +## type mylogfile_t; +## logging_log_file(mylogfile_t) +## allow mydomain_t mylogfile_t:file { create_file_perms append_file_perms }; +## logging_log_filetrans(mydomain_t, mylogfile_t, file) +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the object to be created. +## +## +## +## +## The object class of the object being created. +## +## +## +# +interface(`logging_log_named_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type var_log_t; + ') + + files_search_var($1) + filetrans_pattern($1, var_log_t, $2, $3, $4) +') + ######################################## ## ## Send system log messages. @@ -545,6 +602,45 @@ interface(`logging_send_syslog_msg',` ######################################## ## +## Connect to the syslog control unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`logging_create_devlog_dev',` + gen_require(` + type devlog_t; + ') + + allow $1 devlog_t:sock_file manage_sock_file_perms; + dev_filetrans($1, devlog_t, sock_file) + init_pid_filetrans($1, devlog_t, sock_file, "syslog") +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to the syslog control unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`logging_stream_connect_syslog',` + gen_require(` + type syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + stream_connect_pattern($1, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read the auditd configuration files. ## ## @@ -734,7 +830,25 @@ interface(`logging_append_all_logs',` ') files_search_var($1) - append_files_pattern($1, var_log_t, logfile) + append_files_pattern($1, logfile, logfile) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append to all log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`logging_inherit_append_all_logs',` + gen_require(` + attribute logfile; + ') + + allow $1 logfile:file { getattr append ioctl lock }; ') ######################################## @@ -817,7 +931,7 @@ interface(`logging_manage_all_logs',` files_search_var($1) manage_files_pattern($1, logfile, logfile) - read_lnk_files_pattern($1, logfile, logfile) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, logfile, logfile) ') ######################################## @@ -843,6 +957,44 @@ interface(`logging_read_generic_logs',` ######################################## ## +## Link generic log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`logging_link_generic_logs',` + gen_require(` + type var_log_t; + ') + + allow $1 var_log_t:file link; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete generic log files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`logging_delete_generic_logs',` + gen_require(` + type var_log_t; + ') + + allow $1 var_log_t:file unlink; +') + +######################################## +## ## Write generic log files. ## ## @@ -942,11 +1094,16 @@ interface(`logging_admin_audit',` type auditd_t, auditd_etc_t, auditd_log_t; type auditd_var_run_t; type auditd_initrc_exec_t; + type auditd_unit_file_t; ') - allow $1 auditd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 auditd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, auditd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 auditd_t:process ptrace; + ') + manage_dirs_pattern($1, auditd_etc_t, auditd_etc_t) manage_files_pattern($1, auditd_etc_t, auditd_etc_t) @@ -962,6 +1119,33 @@ interface(`logging_admin_audit',` domain_system_change_exemption($1) role_transition $2 auditd_initrc_exec_t system_r; allow $2 system_r; + + logging_systemctl_audit($1) + admin_pattern($1, auditd_unit_file_t) + allow $1 auditd_unit_file_t:service all_service_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute auditd server in the auditd domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`logging_systemctl_audit',` + gen_require(` + type auditd_t; + type auditd_unit_file_t; + ') + + systemd_exec_systemctl($1) + allow $1 auditd_unit_file_t:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 auditd_unit_file_t:service manage_service_perms; + + ps_process_pattern($1, auditd_t) ') ######################################## @@ -990,10 +1174,15 @@ interface(`logging_admin_syslog',` type syslogd_initrc_exec_t; ') - allow $1 syslogd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; - allow $1 klogd_t:process { ptrace signal_perms }; + allow $1 self:capability2 syslog; + allow $1 syslogd_t:process signal_perms; + allow $1 klogd_t:process signal_perms; ps_process_pattern($1, syslogd_t) ps_process_pattern($1, klogd_t) + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 syslogd_t:process ptrace; + allow $1 klogd_t:process ptrace; + ') manage_dirs_pattern($1, klogd_var_run_t, klogd_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern($1, klogd_var_run_t, klogd_var_run_t) @@ -1015,6 +1204,8 @@ interface(`logging_admin_syslog',` manage_files_pattern($1, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_var_run_t) logging_manage_all_logs($1) + allow $1 logfile:dir relabel_dir_perms; + allow $1 logfile:file relabel_file_perms; init_labeled_script_domtrans($1, syslogd_initrc_exec_t) domain_system_change_exemption($1) @@ -1043,3 +1234,25 @@ interface(`logging_admin',` logging_admin_audit($1, $2) logging_admin_syslog($1, $2) ') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to logging named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`logging_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type var_log_t; + type audit_spool_t; + ') + + files_var_filetrans($1, var_log_t, dir, "webmin") + files_spool_filetrans($1, var_log_t, dir, "rsyslog") + files_spool_filetrans($1, var_log_t, dir, "log") + files_spool_filetrans($1, audit_spool_t, dir, "audit") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/logging.te b/policy/modules/system/logging.te index b6ec597..dec9390 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/logging.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/logging.te @@ -5,6 +5,20 @@ policy_module(logging, 1.17.2) # Declarations # +## +##

    +## Allow syslogd daemon to send mail +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(logging_syslogd_can_sendmail, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow syslogd the ability to read/write terminals +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(logging_syslogd_use_tty, false) + attribute logfile; type auditctl_t; @@ -20,6 +34,7 @@ files_security_file(auditd_log_t) files_security_mountpoint(auditd_log_t) type audit_spool_t; +files_spool_file(audit_spool_t) files_security_file(audit_spool_t) files_security_mountpoint(audit_spool_t) @@ -33,6 +48,9 @@ init_script_file(auditd_initrc_exec_t) type auditd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(auditd_var_run_t) +type auditd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(auditd_unit_file_t) + type audisp_t; type audisp_exec_t; init_system_domain(audisp_t, audisp_exec_t) @@ -64,6 +82,7 @@ files_config_file(syslog_conf_t) type syslogd_t; type syslogd_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(syslogd_t, syslogd_exec_t) +mls_trusted_object(syslogd_t) type syslogd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(syslogd_initrc_exec_t) @@ -94,6 +113,8 @@ ifdef(`enable_mls',` allow auditctl_t self:capability { fsetid dac_read_search dac_override }; allow auditctl_t self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_readpriv; +allow auditctl_t self:process getcap; + read_files_pattern(auditctl_t, auditd_etc_t, auditd_etc_t) allow auditctl_t auditd_etc_t:dir list_dir_perms; @@ -111,7 +132,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(auditctl_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(auditctl_t) -term_use_all_terms(auditctl_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(auditctl_t) init_dontaudit_use_fds(auditctl_t) @@ -148,6 +169,7 @@ kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(auditd_t) # Needs to be able to run dispatcher. see /etc/audit/auditd.conf # Probably want a transition, and a new auditd_helper app kernel_read_system_state(auditd_t) +kernel_read_network_state(auditd_t) dev_read_sysfs(auditd_t) @@ -183,16 +205,19 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(auditd_t) logging_domtrans_dispatcher(auditd_t) logging_signal_dispatcher(auditd_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(auditd_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(auditd_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(auditd_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(auditd_t) # Need to be able to write to /var/run/ directory +mls_socket_write_all_levels(auditd_t) seutil_dontaudit_read_config(auditd_t) sysnet_dns_name_resolve(auditd_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(auditd_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(auditd_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(auditd_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(auditd_t) @@ -237,10 +262,17 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(audisp_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(audisp_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(audisp_t) + files_read_etc_files(audisp_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(audisp_t) +mls_file_read_all_levels(audisp_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(audisp_t) +mls_socket_write_all_levels(audisp_t) +mls_dbus_send_all_levels(audisp_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(audisp_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(audisp_t) @@ -250,6 +282,10 @@ sysnet_dns_name_resolve(audisp_t) optional_policy(` dbus_system_bus_client(audisp_t) + + optional_policy(` + setroubleshoot_dbus_chat(audisp_t) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -280,11 +316,20 @@ corenet_sendrecv_audit_client_packets(audisp_remote_t) files_read_etc_files(audisp_remote_t) +mls_socket_write_all_levels(audisp_remote_t) + logging_send_syslog_msg(audisp_remote_t) logging_send_audit_msgs(audisp_remote_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(audisp_remote_t) +auth_append_login_records(audisp_remote_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(audisp_remote_t) +init_telinit(audisp_remote_t) +init_read_utmp(audisp_remote_t) +init_dontaudit_write_utmp(audisp_remote_t) + sysnet_dns_name_resolve(audisp_remote_t) ######################################## @@ -354,11 +399,12 @@ optional_policy(` # chown fsetid for syslog-ng # sys_admin for the integrated klog of syslog-ng and metalog # cjp: why net_admin! -allow syslogd_t self:capability { dac_override sys_resource sys_tty_config net_admin sys_admin chown fsetid }; +allow syslogd_t self:capability { sys_ptrace dac_override sys_resource sys_tty_config ipc_lock net_admin sys_admin sys_nice chown fsetid setuid setgid }; dontaudit syslogd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow syslogd_t self:capability2 syslog; # setpgid for metalog # setrlimit for syslog-ng -allow syslogd_t self:process { signal_perms setpgid setrlimit }; +allow syslogd_t self:process { signal_perms getcap setcap setpgid setsched setrlimit }; # receive messages to be logged allow syslogd_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow syslogd_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -376,6 +422,7 @@ files_pid_filetrans(syslogd_t, devlog_t, sock_file) # create/append log files. manage_files_pattern(syslogd_t, var_log_t, var_log_t) rw_fifo_files_pattern(syslogd_t, var_log_t, var_log_t) +files_search_spool(syslogd_t) # Allow access for syslog-ng allow syslogd_t var_log_t:dir { create setattr }; @@ -385,9 +432,15 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_tmp_t, syslogd_tmp_t) manage_files_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_tmp_t, syslogd_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(syslogd_t, syslogd_tmp_t, { dir file }) +manage_sock_files_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_lib_t, syslogd_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_lib_t, syslogd_var_lib_t) files_search_var_lib(syslogd_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t, { file dir }) + # manage pid file manage_files_pattern(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t, syslogd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(syslogd_t, syslogd_var_run_t, file) @@ -426,10 +479,27 @@ corenet_sendrecv_syslogd_server_packets(syslogd_t) corenet_sendrecv_postgresql_client_packets(syslogd_t) corenet_sendrecv_mysqld_client_packets(syslogd_t) +tunable_policy(`logging_syslogd_use_tty',` + term_use_all_ttys(syslogd_t) + term_use_all_ptys(syslogd_t) +') + +tunable_policy(`logging_syslogd_can_sendmail',` + # support for ommail module to send logs via mail + corenet_tcp_connect_smtp_port(syslogd_t) +') + dev_filetrans(syslogd_t, devlog_t, sock_file) dev_read_sysfs(syslogd_t) +dev_read_rand(syslogd_t) +dev_read_urand(syslogd_t) +# relating to systemd-kmsg-syslogd +dev_write_kmsg(syslogd_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(syslogd_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(syslogd_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(syslogd_t) +domain_getattr_all_domains(syslogd_t) files_read_etc_files(syslogd_t) files_read_usr_files(syslogd_t) @@ -447,7 +517,9 @@ mls_file_write_all_levels(syslogd_t) # Need to be able to write to /var/run/ and term_write_console(syslogd_t) # Allow syslog to a terminal term_write_unallocated_ttys(syslogd_t) +term_use_generic_ptys(syslogd_t) +init_stream_connect(syslogd_t) # for sending messages to logged in users init_read_utmp(syslogd_t) init_dontaudit_write_utmp(syslogd_t) @@ -459,6 +531,7 @@ init_use_fds(syslogd_t) # cjp: this doesnt make sense logging_send_syslog_msg(syslogd_t) +logging_manage_all_logs(syslogd_t) miscfiles_read_localization(syslogd_t) @@ -492,15 +565,29 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + mysql_read_config(syslogd_t) mysql_stream_connect(syslogd_t) ') optional_policy(` + plymouthd_manage_log(syslogd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + postfix_search_spool(syslogd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` postgresql_stream_connect(syslogd_t) ') optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(syslogd_t) + snmp_read_snmp_var_lib_files(syslogd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + daemontools_search_svc_dir(syslogd_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.fc b/policy/modules/system/lvm.fc index 879bb1e..101d1c0 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.fc @@ -28,23 +28,27 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` # /lib/lvm-10/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /lib/lvm-200/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) # # /sbin # +/sbin/mount\.crypt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/cryptsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/dmraid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/dmsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/dmsetup\.static -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/e2fsadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/kpartx -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvchange -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvcreate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvdisplay -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvextend -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) -/sbin/lvm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/lvm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvm\.static -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvmchange -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvmdiskscan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/lvmetad -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvmiopversion -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvmsadc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/lvmsar -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) @@ -88,8 +92,67 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` # # /usr # -/usr/sbin/clvmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clvmd_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/lvm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/clvmd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clvmd_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cryptsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/dmraid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/dmsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/dmsetup\.static -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/e2fsadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/kpartx -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvchange -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvcreate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvdisplay -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvextend -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvm\.static -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvmchange -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvmdiskscan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvmetad -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvmiopversion -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvmsadc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvmsar -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvreduce -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvremove -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvrename -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvresize -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/lvscan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mount\.crypt -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/multipathd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/multipath\.static -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pvchange -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pvcreate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pvdata -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pvdisplay -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pvmove -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pvremove -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pvs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pvscan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgcfgbackup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgcfgrestore -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgchange -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgchange\.static -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgck -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgcreate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgdisplay -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgexport -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgextend -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgimport -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgmerge -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgmknodes -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgreduce -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgremove -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgrename -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgscan -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgscan\.static -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgsplit -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/vgwrapper -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/lvm-10/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/lvm-200/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/udisks-lvm-pv-export -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-cryptsetup -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_exec_t,s0) # # /var @@ -97,5 +160,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /var/cache/multipathd(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_metadata_t,s0) /var/lib/multipath(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_var_lib_t,s0) /var/lock/lvm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_lock_t,s0) +/var/run/lvm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/multipathd\.sock -s gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/clvmd\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:clvmd_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/dmevent.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:lvm_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.if b/policy/modules/system/lvm.if index 58bc27f..51e9872 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.if @@ -123,3 +123,94 @@ interface(`lvm_domtrans_clvmd',` corecmd_search_bin($1) domtrans_pattern($1, clvmd_exec_t, clvmd_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write to lvm temporary file system. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lvm_rw_clvmd_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type clvmd_tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 clvmd_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete lvm temporary file system. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lvm_delete_clvmd_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type clvmd_tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 clvmd_tmpfs_t:file unlink; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send lvm a null signal. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lvm_signull',` + gen_require(` + type lvm_t; + ') + + allow $1 lvm_t:process signull; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send a message to lvm over the +## datagram socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lvm_dgram_send',` + gen_require(` + type lvm_t; + ') + + allow $1 lvm_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write a lvm unnamed pipe. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`lvm_rw_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type lvm_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 lvm_var_run_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te index a0a0ebf..c5c9312 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/lvm.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/lvm.te @@ -12,6 +12,9 @@ init_daemon_domain(clvmd_t, clvmd_exec_t) type clvmd_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(clvmd_initrc_exec_t) +type clvmd_tmpfs_t alias clmvd_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(clvmd_tmpfs_t) + type clvmd_var_run_t; files_pid_file(clvmd_var_run_t) @@ -24,7 +27,7 @@ domain_obj_id_change_exemption(lvm_t) role system_r types lvm_t; type lvm_etc_t; -files_type(lvm_etc_t) +files_config_file(lvm_etc_t) type lvm_lock_t; files_lock_file(lvm_lock_t) @@ -49,13 +52,16 @@ files_tmp_file(lvm_tmp_t) allow clvmd_t self:capability { sys_nice chown ipc_lock sys_admin mknod }; dontaudit clvmd_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow clvmd_t self:process { signal_perms setsched }; -dontaudit clvmd_t self:process ptrace; allow clvmd_t self:socket create_socket_perms; allow clvmd_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow clvmd_t self:unix_stream_socket { connectto create_stream_socket_perms }; allow clvmd_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow clvmd_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +manage_dirs_pattern(clvmd_t, clvmd_tmpfs_t, clvmd_tmpfs_t) +manage_files_pattern(clvmd_t, clvmd_tmpfs_t,clvmd_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(clvmd_t, clvmd_tmpfs_t, { dir file }) + manage_files_pattern(clvmd_t, clvmd_var_run_t, clvmd_var_run_t) files_pid_filetrans(clvmd_t, clvmd_var_run_t, file) @@ -141,6 +147,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + aisexec_stream_connect(clvmd_t) + corosync_stream_connect(clvmd_t) +') + +optional_policy(` ccs_stream_connect(clvmd_t) ') @@ -167,9 +178,10 @@ optional_policy(` # net_admin for multipath allow lvm_t self:capability { dac_override fowner ipc_lock sys_admin sys_nice mknod chown sys_resource sys_rawio net_admin }; dontaudit lvm_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow lvm_t self:process { sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal }; +allow lvm_t self:process { setfscreate sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal }; # LVM will complain a lot if it cannot set its priority. allow lvm_t self:process setsched; +allow lvm_t self:sem create_sem_perms; allow lvm_t self:file rw_file_perms; allow lvm_t self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; allow lvm_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; @@ -191,8 +203,9 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_exec_t, lvm_exec_t) can_exec(lvm_t, lvm_exec_t) # Creating lock files +manage_dirs_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_lock_t, lvm_lock_t) manage_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_lock_t, lvm_lock_t) -files_lock_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_lock_t, file) +files_lock_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_lock_t, { file dir }) manage_dirs_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_lib_t, lvm_var_lib_t) manage_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_lib_t, lvm_var_lib_t) @@ -200,8 +213,9 @@ files_var_lib_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_var_lib_t, { dir file }) manage_dirs_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_run_t, lvm_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_run_t, lvm_var_run_t) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_run_t, lvm_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_var_run_t, lvm_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(lvm_t, lvm_var_run_t, { dir file fifo_file sock_file }) read_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_etc_t, lvm_etc_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(lvm_t, lvm_etc_t, lvm_etc_t) @@ -213,11 +227,13 @@ files_search_mnt(lvm_t) kernel_get_sysvipc_info(lvm_t) kernel_read_system_state(lvm_t) +kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(lvm_t) # Read system variables in /proc/sys kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(lvm_t) # it has no reason to need this kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(lvm_t) kernel_use_fds(lvm_t) +kernel_request_load_module(lvm_t) kernel_search_debugfs(lvm_t) corecmd_exec_bin(lvm_t) @@ -228,11 +244,13 @@ dev_delete_generic_dirs(lvm_t) dev_read_rand(lvm_t) dev_read_urand(lvm_t) dev_rw_lvm_control(lvm_t) +dev_write_kmsg(lvm_t) dev_manage_generic_symlinks(lvm_t) dev_relabel_generic_dev_dirs(lvm_t) dev_manage_generic_blk_files(lvm_t) # Read /sys/block. Device mapper metadata is kept there. -dev_read_sysfs(lvm_t) +# cryptsetup writes read_ahead_kb +dev_rw_sysfs(lvm_t) # cjp: this has no effect since LVM does not # have lnk_file relabelto for anything else. # perhaps this should be blk_files? @@ -244,6 +262,7 @@ dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_chr_files(lvm_t) dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_blk_files(lvm_t) dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_pipes(lvm_t) dev_create_generic_dirs(lvm_t) +dev_rw_generic_files(lvm_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(lvm_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(lvm_t) @@ -253,17 +272,21 @@ files_read_etc_files(lvm_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(lvm_t) # for when /usr is not mounted: files_dontaudit_search_isid_type_dirs(lvm_t) +files_dontaudit_getattr_tmpfs_files(lvm_t) -fs_getattr_xattr_fs(lvm_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(lvm_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(lvm_t) fs_list_tmpfs(lvm_t) fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(lvm_t) fs_dontaudit_read_removable_files(lvm_t) fs_dontaudit_getattr_tmpfs_files(lvm_t) fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(lvm_t) +fs_list_auto_mountpoints(lvm_t) +fs_list_hugetlbfs(lvm_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(lvm_t) mls_file_write_to_clearance(lvm_t) +mls_file_upgrade(lvm_t) selinux_get_fs_mount(lvm_t) selinux_validate_context(lvm_t) @@ -283,7 +306,7 @@ storage_dev_filetrans_fixed_disk(lvm_t) # Access raw devices and old /dev/lvm (c 109,0). Is this needed? storage_manage_fixed_disk(lvm_t) -term_use_all_terms(lvm_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(lvm_t) init_use_fds(lvm_t) init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(lvm_t) @@ -292,6 +315,8 @@ init_read_script_state(lvm_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(lvm_t) +authlogin_rw_pipes(lvm_t) + miscfiles_read_localization(lvm_t) seutil_read_config(lvm_t) @@ -299,7 +324,10 @@ seutil_read_file_contexts(lvm_t) seutil_search_default_contexts(lvm_t) seutil_sigchld_newrole(lvm_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(lvm_t) userdom_use_user_terminals(lvm_t) +userdom_rw_semaphores(lvm_t) +userdom_search_user_home_dirs(lvm_t) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # this is from the initrd: @@ -311,6 +339,11 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` ') optional_policy(` + aisexec_stream_connect(lvm_t) + corosync_stream_connect(lvm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` bootloader_rw_tmp_files(lvm_t) ') @@ -331,14 +364,27 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + livecd_rw_semaphores(lvm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` modutils_domtrans_insmod(lvm_t) ') optional_policy(` + raid_read_mdadm_pid(lvm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` rpm_manage_script_tmp_files(lvm_t) ') optional_policy(` + #systemd_passwd_agent_dev_template(lvm) + systemd_manage_passwd_run(lvm_t) +') + +optional_policy(` udev_read_db(lvm_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc index 172287e..88fc786 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.fc @@ -9,8 +9,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` # /etc # /etc/avahi/etc/localtime -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0) -/etc/httpd/alias/[^/]*\.db(\.[^/]*)* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0) +/etc/httpd/alias(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0) /etc/localtime -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0) +/etc/locale.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0) /etc/pki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cert_t,s0) /etc/timezone -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0) @@ -34,7 +35,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # /usr/lib/locale(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:locale_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/perl5/man(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:man_t,s0) +/usr/lib/perl5/man(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:man_t,s0) /usr/local/man(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:man_t,s0) /usr/local/share/man(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:man_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if index 926ba65..b2a1675 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.if @@ -582,6 +582,26 @@ interface(`miscfiles_manage_man_pages',` ######################################## ## +## Allow process to relabel man_pages info +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`miscfiles_relabel_man_pages',` + gen_require(` + type man_t; + ') + + files_search_usr($1) + relabel_dirs_pattern($1, man_t, man_t) + relabel_files_pattern($1, man_t, man_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read public files used for file ## transfer services. ## @@ -745,7 +765,6 @@ interface(`miscfiles_etc_filetrans_localization',` ') files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file) - ') ######################################## @@ -769,3 +788,43 @@ interface(`miscfiles_manage_localization',` manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, locale_t, locale_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Transition to miscfiles named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`miscfiles_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type locale_t; + type man_t; + type cert_t; + type fonts_t; + type fonts_cache_t; + type hwdata_t; + type tetex_data_t; + type public_content_t; + ') + + files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "localtime") + files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "locale.conf") + files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "locale.conf.new") + files_var_filetrans($1, man_t, dir, "man") + files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "timezone") + files_etc_filetrans($1, locale_t, file, "clock") + files_etc_filetrans($1, cert_t, dir, "pki") + files_usr_filetrans($1, locale_t, dir, "locale") + files_usr_filetrans($1, locale_t, dir, "zoneinfo") + files_usr_filetrans($1, cert_t, dir, "certs") + files_usr_filetrans($1, fonts_t, dir, "fonts") + files_usr_filetrans($1, hwdata_t, dir, "hwdata") + files_var_filetrans($1, fonts_cache_t, dir, "fontconfig") + files_var_filetrans($1, tetex_data_t, dir, "fonts") + files_spool_filetrans($1, tetex_data_t, dir, "texmf") + files_var_lib_filetrans($1, tetex_data_t, dir, "texmf") + files_var_filetrans($1, public_content_t, dir, "ftp") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.te b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.te index 703944c..1d3a6a9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/miscfiles.te @@ -4,7 +4,6 @@ policy_module(miscfiles, 1.9.0) # # Declarations # - attribute cert_type; # diff --git a/policy/modules/system/modutils.fc b/policy/modules/system/modutils.fc index 532181a..3457437 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/modutils.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/modutils.fc @@ -9,11 +9,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /etc/modprobe.devfs.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_conf_t,s0) ') -/lib/modules/[^/]+/modules\..+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_dep_t,s0) -/lib64/modules/[^/]+/modules\..+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_dep_t,s0) - /lib/modules/modprobe\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_conf_t,s0) -/lib64/modules/modprobe\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_conf_t,s0) /sbin/depmod.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:depmod_exec_t,s0) /sbin/generate-modprobe\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:update_modules_exec_t,s0) @@ -22,3 +18,15 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /sbin/modules-update -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:update_modules_exec_t,s0) /sbin/rmmod.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t,s0) /sbin/update-modules -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:update_modules_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/kmod -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/depmod.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:depmod_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/generate-modprobe\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:update_modules_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/insmod.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/modprobe.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/modules-update -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:update_modules_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/rmmod.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:insmod_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/update-modules -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:update_modules_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/modules/modprobe\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:modules_conf_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/modutils.if b/policy/modules/system/modutils.if index 9c0faab..91360ac 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/modutils.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/modutils.if @@ -12,7 +12,7 @@ # interface(`modutils_getattr_module_deps',` gen_require(` - type modules_dep_t; + type modules_dep_t, modules_object_t; ') getattr_files_pattern($1, modules_object_t, modules_dep_t) @@ -39,6 +39,44 @@ interface(`modutils_read_module_deps',` ######################################## ## +## Read the dependencies of kernel modules. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`modutils_delete_module_deps',` + gen_require(` + type modules_dep_t; + ') + + delete_files_pattern($1, modules_dep_t, modules_dep_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## list the configuration options used when +## loading modules. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`modutils_list_module_config',` + gen_require(` + type modules_conf_t; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, modules_conf_t, modules_conf_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Read the configuration options used when ## loading modules. ## @@ -152,13 +190,7 @@ interface(`modutils_domtrans_insmod_uncond',` ## # interface(`modutils_domtrans_insmod',` - gen_require(` - bool secure_mode_insmod; - ') - - if (!secure_mode_insmod) { - modutils_domtrans_insmod_uncond($1) - } + modutils_domtrans_insmod_uncond($1) ') ######################################## @@ -335,3 +367,25 @@ interface(`modutils_exec_update_mods',` corecmd_search_bin($1) can_exec($1, update_modules_exec_t) ') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to modutils named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`modules_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type modules_dep_t; + type modules_conf_t; + ') + + files_etc_filetrans($1, modules_conf_t, file, "modprobe.conf") + files_etc_filetrans($1, modules_conf_t, file, "modules.conf") + files_kernel_modules_filetrans($1, modules_dep_t, file, "modules.dep") + files_kernel_modules_filetrans($1, modules_dep_t, file, "modules.dep.bin") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/modutils.te b/policy/modules/system/modutils.te index a0eef20..ff9ad67 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/modutils.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/modutils.te @@ -1,9 +1,5 @@ policy_module(modutils, 1.10.1) -gen_require(` - bool secure_mode_insmod; -') - ######################################## # # Declarations @@ -18,11 +14,12 @@ type insmod_t; type insmod_exec_t; application_domain(insmod_t, insmod_exec_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(insmod_t) +mls_process_write_down(insmod_t) role system_r types insmod_t; # module loading config type modules_conf_t; -files_type(modules_conf_t) +files_config_file(modules_conf_t) # module dependencies type modules_dep_t; @@ -36,6 +33,9 @@ role system_r types update_modules_t; type update_modules_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(update_modules_tmp_t) +type insmod_tmpfs_t; +files_tmpfs_file(insmod_tmpfs_t) + ######################################## # # depmod local policy @@ -55,12 +55,15 @@ corecmd_search_bin(depmod_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(depmod_t) +files_delete_kernel_modules(depmod_t) files_read_kernel_symbol_table(depmod_t) files_read_kernel_modules(depmod_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(depmod_t) files_read_etc_files(depmod_t) files_read_usr_src_files(depmod_t) files_list_usr(depmod_t) +files_append_var_files(depmod_t) +files_read_boot_files(depmod_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(depmod_t) @@ -70,10 +73,12 @@ init_use_fds(depmod_t) init_use_script_fds(depmod_t) init_use_script_ptys(depmod_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(depmod_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(depmod_t) # Read System.map from home directories. files_list_home(depmod_t) userdom_read_user_home_content_files(depmod_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(depmod_t) +userdom_home_reader(depmod_t) ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` optional_policy(` @@ -81,12 +86,8 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` ') ') -tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_read_nfs_files(depmod_t) -') - -tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_read_cifs_files(depmod_t) +optional_policy(` + bootloader_rw_tmp_files(insmod_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -95,7 +96,6 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - # Read System.map from home directories. unconfined_domain(depmod_t) ') @@ -104,11 +104,12 @@ optional_policy(` # insmod local policy # -allow insmod_t self:capability { dac_override net_raw sys_nice sys_tty_config }; +allow insmod_t self:capability { dac_override mknod net_raw sys_nice sys_tty_config }; allow insmod_t self:process { execmem sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal }; allow insmod_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow insmod_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; +allow insmod_t self:shm create_shm_perms; # Read module config and dependency information list_dirs_pattern(insmod_t, modules_conf_t, modules_conf_t) @@ -118,7 +119,11 @@ read_files_pattern(insmod_t, modules_dep_t, modules_dep_t) can_exec(insmod_t, insmod_exec_t) +manage_files_pattern(insmod_t,insmod_tmpfs_t,insmod_tmpfs_t) +fs_tmpfs_filetrans(insmod_t,insmod_tmpfs_t,file) + kernel_load_module(insmod_t) +files_manage_kernel_modules(insmod_t) kernel_request_load_module(insmod_t) kernel_read_system_state(insmod_t) kernel_read_network_state(insmod_t) @@ -126,6 +131,7 @@ kernel_write_proc_files(insmod_t) kernel_mount_debugfs(insmod_t) kernel_mount_kvmfs(insmod_t) kernel_read_debugfs(insmod_t) +kernel_request_load_module(insmod_t) # Rules for /proc/sys/kernel/tainted kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(insmod_t) kernel_rw_kernel_sysctl(insmod_t) @@ -143,6 +149,7 @@ dev_rw_agp(insmod_t) dev_read_sound(insmod_t) dev_write_sound(insmod_t) dev_rw_apm_bios(insmod_t) +dev_create_generic_chr_files(insmod_t) domain_signal_all_domains(insmod_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(insmod_t) @@ -152,20 +159,30 @@ files_read_etc_runtime_files(insmod_t) files_read_etc_files(insmod_t) files_read_usr_files(insmod_t) files_exec_etc_files(insmod_t) +files_read_kernel_symbol_table(insmod_t) # for nscd: files_dontaudit_search_pids(insmod_t) # for when /var is not mounted early in the boot: files_dontaudit_search_isid_type_dirs(insmod_t) # for locking: (cjp: ????) files_write_kernel_modules(insmod_t) +allow insmod_t modules_dep_t:file manage_file_perms; +files_kernel_modules_filetrans(depmod_t, modules_dep_t, file) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(insmod_t) fs_dontaudit_use_tmpfs_chr_dev(insmod_t) +fs_mount_rpc_pipefs(insmod_t) +fs_search_rpc(insmod_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(insmod_t) init_rw_initctl(insmod_t) init_use_fds(insmod_t) init_use_script_fds(insmod_t) init_use_script_ptys(insmod_t) +init_spec_domtrans_script(insmod_t) +init_rw_script_tmp_files(insmod_t) +init_dontaudit_getattr_stream_socket(insmod_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(insmod_t) logging_search_logs(insmod_t) @@ -174,41 +191,38 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(insmod_t) seutil_read_file_contexts(insmod_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(insmod_t) - +term_use_all_inherited_terms(insmod_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(insmod_t) -if( ! secure_mode_insmod ) { - kernel_domtrans_to(insmod_t, insmod_exec_t) -} +kernel_domtrans_to(insmod_t, insmod_exec_t) optional_policy(` alsa_domtrans(insmod_t) ') optional_policy(` - firstboot_dontaudit_rw_pipes(insmod_t) - firstboot_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(insmod_t) + devicekit_use_fds_disk(insmod_t) + devicekit_dontaudit_read_pid_files(insmod_t) ') optional_policy(` - hal_write_log(insmod_t) + firstboot_dontaudit_leaks(insmod_t) ') optional_policy(` - hotplug_search_config(insmod_t) + firewallgui_dontaudit_rw_pipes(insmod_t) ') optional_policy(` - mount_domtrans(insmod_t) + hal_write_log(insmod_t) ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(insmod_t) + hotplug_search_config(insmod_t) ') optional_policy(` - nscd_socket_use(insmod_t) + mount_domtrans(insmod_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -228,6 +242,7 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` rpm_rw_pipes(insmod_t) + rpm_manage_script_tmp_files(insmod_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -236,6 +251,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + virt_dontaudit_write_pipes(insmod_t) +') + +optional_policy(` # cjp: why is this needed: dev_rw_xserver_misc(insmod_t) @@ -296,7 +315,7 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(update_modules_t) miscfiles_read_localization(update_modules_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(update_modules_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(update_modules_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(update_modules_t) ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` diff --git a/policy/modules/system/mount.fc b/policy/modules/system/mount.fc index 72c746e..fa210cd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/mount.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/mount.fc @@ -1,4 +1,21 @@ +/bin/fusermount -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fusermount_exec_t,s0) /bin/mount.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_exec_t,s0) /bin/umount.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_exec_t,s0) -/usr/bin/fusermount -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_exec_t,s0) +/dev/\.mount(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_var_run_t,s0) +/run/mount(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_var_run_t,s0) + +/sbin/mount.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_exec_t,s0) +/sbin/umount.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/fusermount -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:fusermount_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/mount.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/umount.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/mount.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/umount.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/showmount -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:showmount_exec_t,s0) + +/var/cache/davfs2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/davfs2(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/mount(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mount_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/mount.if b/policy/modules/system/mount.if index 8b5c196..da41726 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/mount.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/mount.if @@ -16,6 +16,12 @@ interface(`mount_domtrans',` ') domtrans_pattern($1, mount_exec_t, mount_t) + mount_domtrans_fusermount($1) + + allow $1 mount_t:fd use; + ps_process_pattern(mount_t, $1) + + allow mount_t $1:unix_stream_socket { read write }; ') ######################################## @@ -45,12 +51,77 @@ interface(`mount_run',` role $2 types mount_t; optional_policy(` - samba_run_smbmount($1, $2) + fstools_run(mount_t, $2) + ') + + # Needed for mount crypt https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=418711 + optional_policy(` + lvm_run(mount_t, $2) + ') + + optional_policy(` + modutils_run_insmod(mount_t, $2) + ') + + optional_policy(` + rpc_run_rpcd(mount_t, $2) + ') + + optional_policy(` + samba_run_smbmount(mount_t, $2) ') ') ######################################## ## +## Execute fusermount in the mount domain, and +## allow the specified role the mount domain, +## and use the caller's terminal. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the mount domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`mount_run_fusermount',` + gen_require(` + type mount_t; + ') + + mount_domtrans_fusermount($1) + role $2 types mount_t; + + fstools_run(mount_t, $2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read mount PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mount_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type mount_var_run_t; + ') + + allow $1 mount_var_run_t:file read_file_perms; + files_search_pids($1) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute mount in the caller domain. ## ## @@ -95,7 +166,7 @@ interface(`mount_signal',` ##     ## ## -## The type of the process performing this action. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## # @@ -135,45 +206,119 @@ interface(`mount_send_nfs_client_request',` ######################################## ## -## Execute mount in the unconfined mount domain. +## Read the mount tmp directory ## ## ## -## Domain allowed to transition. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## # -interface(`mount_domtrans_unconfined',` +interface(`mount_list_tmp',` gen_require(` - type unconfined_mount_t, mount_exec_t; + type mount_tmp_t; ') - domtrans_pattern($1, mount_exec_t, unconfined_mount_t) + allow $1 mount_tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## Execute mount in the unconfined mount domain, and -## allow the specified role the unconfined mount domain, -## and use the caller's terminal. +## Execute fusermount in the mount domain. ## ## ## -## Domain allowed to transition. +## Domain allowed access. ## ## -## +# +interface(`mount_domtrans_fusermount',` + gen_require(` + type mount_t, fusermount_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, fusermount_exec_t, mount_t) + ps_process_pattern(mount_t, $1) + + allow mount_t $1:unix_stream_socket { read write }; + allow $1 mount_t:fd use; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute fusermount. +## +## ## -## Role allowed access. +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`mount_exec_fusermount',` + gen_require(` + type fusermount_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, fusermount_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## dontaudit Execute fusermount. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. ## ## -## # -interface(`mount_run_unconfined',` +interface(`mount_dontaudit_exec_fusermount',` gen_require(` - type unconfined_mount_t; + type fusermount_exec_t; ') - mount_domtrans_unconfined($1) - role $2 types unconfined_mount_t; + dontaudit $1 fusermount_exec_t:file exec_file_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## Execute a domain transition to run showmount. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`mount_domtrans_showmount',` + gen_require(` + type showmount_t, showmount_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, showmount_exec_t, showmount_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Execute showmount in the showmount domain, and +## allow the specified role the showmount domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the showmount domain. +## +## +# +interface(`mount_run_showmount',` + gen_require(` + type showmount_t; + ') + + mount_domtrans_showmount($1) + role $2 types showmount_t; ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/mount.te b/policy/modules/system/mount.te index 15832c7..5c5ecf6 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/mount.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/mount.te @@ -17,17 +17,29 @@ type mount_exec_t; init_system_domain(mount_t, mount_exec_t) role system_r types mount_t; +type fusermount_exec_t; +domain_entry_file(mount_t, fusermount_exec_t) + +typealias mount_t alias mount_ntfs_t; +typealias mount_exec_t alias mount_ntfs_exec_t; + type mount_loopback_t; # customizable files_type(mount_loopback_t) +typealias mount_loopback_t alias mount_loop_t; type mount_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(mount_tmp_t) -# causes problems with interfaces when -# this is optionally declared in monolithic -# policy--duplicate type declaration -type unconfined_mount_t; -application_domain(unconfined_mount_t, mount_exec_t) +type mount_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(mount_var_run_t) +dev_associate(mount_var_run_t) + +# showmount - show mount information for an NFS server + +type showmount_t; +type showmount_exec_t; +application_domain(showmount_t, showmount_exec_t) +role system_r types showmount_t; ######################################## # @@ -35,7 +47,11 @@ application_domain(unconfined_mount_t, mount_exec_t) # # setuid/setgid needed to mount cifs -allow mount_t self:capability { ipc_lock sys_rawio sys_admin dac_override chown sys_tty_config setuid setgid }; +allow mount_t self:capability { fsetid fowner ipc_lock setpcap sys_rawio sys_resource sys_admin dac_override dac_read_search chown sys_tty_config setuid setgid sys_nice }; +allow mount_t self:process { getcap getsched setsched setcap setrlimit signal }; +allow mount_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow mount_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow mount_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; allow mount_t mount_loopback_t:file read_file_perms; @@ -46,9 +62,24 @@ can_exec(mount_t, mount_exec_t) files_tmp_filetrans(mount_t, mount_tmp_t, { file dir }) +manage_dirs_pattern(mount_t,mount_var_run_t,mount_var_run_t) +manage_files_pattern(mount_t,mount_var_run_t,mount_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(mount_t,mount_var_run_t,dir) +files_var_filetrans(mount_t,mount_var_run_t,dir) +dev_filetrans(mount_t, mount_var_run_t, dir) + +# In order to mount reiserfs_t +kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(mount_t) +kernel_list_unlabeled(mount_t) +kernel_mount_unlabeled(mount_t) +kernel_unmount_unlabeled(mount_t) kernel_read_system_state(mount_t) +kernel_read_network_state(mount_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mount_t) -kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(mount_t) +kernel_manage_debugfs(mount_t) +kernel_setsched(mount_t) +kernel_use_fds(mount_t) +kernel_request_load_module(mount_t) kernel_dontaudit_write_debugfs_dirs(mount_t) kernel_dontaudit_write_proc_dirs(mount_t) # To load binfmt_misc kernel module @@ -57,65 +88,94 @@ kernel_request_load_module(mount_t) # required for mount.smbfs corecmd_exec_bin(mount_t) +dev_getattr_generic_blk_files(mount_t) dev_getattr_all_blk_files(mount_t) dev_list_all_dev_nodes(mount_t) +dev_read_usbfs(mount_t) +dev_read_rand(mount_t) +dev_read_urand(mount_t) dev_read_sysfs(mount_t) dev_dontaudit_write_sysfs_dirs(mount_t) dev_rw_lvm_control(mount_t) dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files(mount_t) dev_dontaudit_getattr_memory_dev(mount_t) dev_getattr_sound_dev(mount_t) + +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + dev_rw_generic_blk_files(mount_t) +') + # Early devtmpfs, before udev relabel dev_dontaudit_rw_generic_chr_files(mount_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(mount_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(mount_t) files_search_all(mount_t) files_read_etc_files(mount_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(mount_t) files_manage_etc_runtime_files(mount_t) files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(mount_t, file) +# for when /etc/mtab loses its type +files_delete_etc_files(mount_t) files_mounton_all_mountpoints(mount_t) +files_setattr_all_mountpoints(mount_t) +# ntfs-3g checks whether the mountpoint is writable before mounting +files_write_all_mountpoints(mount_t) files_unmount_rootfs(mount_t) + # These rules need to be generalized. Only admin, initrc should have it: -files_relabelto_all_file_type_fs(mount_t) +files_relabel_all_file_type_fs(mount_t) files_mount_all_file_type_fs(mount_t) files_unmount_all_file_type_fs(mount_t) -# for when /etc/mtab loses its type -# cjp: this seems wrong, the type should probably be etc files_read_isid_type_files(mount_t) # For reading cert files files_read_usr_files(mount_t) files_list_mnt(mount_t) +files_write_all_dirs(mount_t) files_dontaudit_write_root_dirs(mount_t) -fs_getattr_xattr_fs(mount_t) -fs_getattr_cifs(mount_t) +fs_list_all(mount_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(mount_t) fs_mount_all_fs(mount_t) fs_unmount_all_fs(mount_t) fs_remount_all_fs(mount_t) fs_relabelfrom_all_fs(mount_t) -fs_list_auto_mountpoints(mount_t) +fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(mount_t) fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(mount_t) +fs_rw_nfsd_fs(mount_t) +fs_rw_removable_blk_files(mount_t) +#fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(mount_t) fs_read_tmpfs_symlinks(mount_t) +fs_read_fusefs_files(mount_t) +fs_manage_nfs_dirs(mount_t) +fs_read_nfs_symlinks(mount_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(mount_t) +fs_manage_cgroup_files(mount_t) fs_dontaudit_write_tmpfs_dirs(mount_t) -mls_file_read_all_levels(mount_t) -mls_file_write_all_levels(mount_t) +mls_file_read_to_clearance(mount_t) +mls_file_write_to_clearance(mount_t) +mls_process_write_to_clearance(mount_t) selinux_get_enforce_mode(mount_t) +selinux_mounton_fs(mount_t) storage_raw_read_fixed_disk(mount_t) storage_raw_write_fixed_disk(mount_t) storage_raw_read_removable_device(mount_t) storage_raw_write_removable_device(mount_t) +storage_rw_fuse(mount_t) -term_use_all_terms(mount_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(mount_t) auth_use_nsswitch(mount_t) init_use_fds(mount_t) init_use_script_ptys(mount_t) init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(mount_t) +init_stream_connect_script(mount_t) +init_rw_script_stream_sockets(mount_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(mount_t) @@ -126,6 +186,8 @@ sysnet_use_portmap(mount_t) seutil_read_config(mount_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(mount_t) +userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs(mount_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(mount_t) ifdef(`distro_redhat',` optional_policy(` @@ -141,26 +203,28 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` ') ') +corecmd_exec_shell(mount_t) + tunable_policy(`allow_mount_anyfile',` - auth_read_all_dirs_except_shadow(mount_t) - auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(mount_t) + files_read_non_security_files(mount_t) files_mounton_non_security(mount_t) + files_rw_all_inherited_files(mount_t) ') optional_policy(` # for nfs corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(mount_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(mount_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(mount_t) - corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if(mount_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if(mount_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(mount_t) - corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes(mount_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes(mount_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(mount_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(mount_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(mount_t) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(mount_t) + corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(mount_t) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(mount_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(mount_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(mount_t) - corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(mount_t) - corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes(mount_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(mount_t) + corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(mount_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port(mount_t) corenet_udp_bind_generic_port(mount_t) corenet_tcp_bind_reserved_port(mount_t) @@ -174,6 +238,8 @@ optional_policy(` fs_search_rpc(mount_t) rpc_stub(mount_t) + + rpc_domtrans_rpcd(mount_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -181,6 +247,28 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(mount_t, mount_exec_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + devicekit_read_state_power(mount_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(mount_t) + + optional_policy(` + hal_dbus_chat(mount_t) + ') +') + +optional_policy(` + hal_write_log(mount_t) + hal_use_fds(mount_t) + hal_dontaudit_rw_pipes(mount_t) +') + +optional_policy(` ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` # for a bug in the X server rhgb_dontaudit_rw_stream_sockets(mount_t) @@ -188,21 +276,88 @@ optional_policy(` ') ') +optional_policy(` + livecd_rw_tmp_files(mount_t) +') + +# Needed for mount crypt https://bugzilla.redhat.com/show_bug.cgi?id=418711 +optional_policy(` + lvm_domtrans(mount_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(mount_t) + modutils_read_module_deps(mount_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + fstools_domtrans(mount_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rhcs_stream_connect_gfs_controld(mount_t) +') + # for kernel package installation optional_policy(` rpm_rw_pipes(mount_t) + rpm_dontaudit_leaks(mount_t) ') optional_policy(` samba_domtrans_smbmount(mount_t) + samba_read_config(mount_t) ') -######################################## -# -# Unconfined mount local policy -# +optional_policy(` + ssh_exec(mount_t) +') optional_policy(` - files_etc_filetrans_etc_runtime(unconfined_mount_t, file) - unconfined_domain(unconfined_mount_t) + usbmuxd_stream_connect(mount_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + userhelper_exec_console(mount_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_read_blk_images(mount_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + vmware_exec_host(mount_t) +') + +###################################### +# +# showmount local policy +# + +allow showmount_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; +allow showmount_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_system_state(showmount_t) + +corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(showmount_t) +corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(showmount_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(showmount_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(showmount_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(showmount_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(showmount_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(showmount_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(showmount_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(showmount_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(showmount_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_all_rpc_ports(showmount_t) +corenet_udp_bind_all_rpc_ports(showmount_t) +corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(showmount_t) + +files_read_etc_files(showmount_t) +files_read_etc_runtime_files(showmount_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(showmount_t) + +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(showmount_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(showmount_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/netlabel.fc b/policy/modules/system/netlabel.fc index b263a8a..9348c8c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/netlabel.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/netlabel.fc @@ -1 +1,3 @@ /sbin/netlabelctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:netlabel_mgmt_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/netlabelctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:netlabel_mgmt_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/netlabel.te b/policy/modules/system/netlabel.te index cbbda4a..8dcc346 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/netlabel.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/netlabel.te @@ -23,6 +23,11 @@ kernel_read_network_state(netlabel_mgmt_t) files_read_etc_files(netlabel_mgmt_t) +term_use_all_inherited_terms(netlabel_mgmt_t) + seutil_use_newrole_fds(netlabel_mgmt_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(netlabel_mgmt_t) +term_use_all_terms(netlabel_mgmt_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(netlabel_mgmt_t) + diff --git a/policy/modules/system/pcmcia.fc b/policy/modules/system/pcmcia.fc index 9cf0e56..2b5260a 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/pcmcia.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/pcmcia.fc @@ -4,6 +4,9 @@ /sbin/cardctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardctl_exec_t,s0) /sbin/cardmgr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cardctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardctl_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/cardmgr -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_exec_t,s0) + /var/lib/pcmcia(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_var_run_t,s0) /var/run/cardmgr\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:cardmgr_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/pcmcia.te b/policy/modules/system/pcmcia.te index 4d06ae3..3f7c716 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/pcmcia.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/pcmcia.te @@ -62,9 +62,7 @@ dev_read_urand(cardmgr_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(cardmgr_t) # Read /proc/PID directories for all domains (for fuser). -domain_read_confined_domains_state(cardmgr_t) -domain_getattr_confined_domains(cardmgr_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_confined_domains(cardmgr_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(cardmgr_t) # cjp: these look excessive: domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_pipes(cardmgr_t) domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets(cardmgr_t) @@ -98,18 +96,20 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(cardmgr_t) miscfiles_read_localization(cardmgr_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(cardmgr_t) - sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(cardmgr_t) # for /etc/resolv.conf sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(cardmgr_t) sysnet_manage_config(cardmgr_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(cardmgr_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(cardmgr_t) userdom_dontaudit_use_unpriv_user_fds(cardmgr_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(cardmgr_t) optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(cardmgr_t) +') + +optional_policy(` seutil_dontaudit_read_config(cardmgr_t) seutil_sigchld_newrole(cardmgr_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/raid.fc b/policy/modules/system/raid.fc index ed9c70d..c298507 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/raid.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/raid.fc @@ -1,6 +1,14 @@ -/dev/.mdadm.map -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_map_t,s0) +/dev/.mdadm\.map -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_var_run_t,s0) +/dev/md/.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_var_run_t,s0) /sbin/mdadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) /sbin/mdmpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/iprdump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/iprinit -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/iprupdate -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mdadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mdmpd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/raid-check -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_exec_t,s0) + /var/run/mdadm(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:mdadm_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/raid.if b/policy/modules/system/raid.if index b1a85b5..db0d815 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/raid.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/raid.if @@ -47,6 +47,24 @@ interface(`raid_run_mdadm',` ######################################## ## +## read the mdadm pid files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`raid_read_mdadm_pid',` + gen_require(` + type mdadm_var_run_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, mdadm_var_run_t, mdadm_var_run_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Create, read, write, and delete the mdadm pid files. ## ## diff --git a/policy/modules/system/raid.te b/policy/modules/system/raid.te index a19ecea..486d7f2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/raid.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/raid.te @@ -10,11 +10,9 @@ type mdadm_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(mdadm_t, mdadm_exec_t) role system_r types mdadm_t; -type mdadm_map_t; -files_type(mdadm_map_t) - -type mdadm_var_run_t; +type mdadm_var_run_t alias mdadm_map_t; files_pid_file(mdadm_var_run_t) +dev_associate(mdadm_var_run_t) ######################################## # @@ -23,18 +21,20 @@ files_pid_file(mdadm_var_run_t) allow mdadm_t self:capability { dac_override sys_admin ipc_lock }; dontaudit mdadm_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow mdadm_t self:process { sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal }; +allow mdadm_t self:process { getsched setsched sigchld sigkill sigstop signull signal }; allow mdadm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow mdadm_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; -# create .mdadm files in /dev -allow mdadm_t mdadm_map_t:file manage_file_perms; -dev_filetrans(mdadm_t, mdadm_map_t, file) - +manage_dirs_pattern(mdadm_t, mdadm_var_run_t, mdadm_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(mdadm_t, mdadm_var_run_t, mdadm_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(mdadm_t, mdadm_var_run_t, file) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(mdadm_t, mdadm_var_run_t, mdadm_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(mdadm_t, mdadm_var_run_t, mdadm_var_run_t) +files_pid_filetrans(mdadm_t, mdadm_var_run_t, { file dir }) +dev_filetrans(mdadm_t, mdadm_var_run_t, { file dir sock_file }) kernel_read_system_state(mdadm_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(mdadm_t) +kernel_request_load_module(mdadm_t) kernel_rw_software_raid_state(mdadm_t) kernel_getattr_core_if(mdadm_t) @@ -52,13 +52,17 @@ dev_dontaudit_getattr_generic_blk_files(mdadm_t) dev_read_realtime_clock(mdadm_t) # unfortunately needed for DMI decoding: dev_read_raw_memory(mdadm_t) +dev_read_generic_files(mdadm_t) +domain_read_all_domains_state(mdadm_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(mdadm_t) files_read_etc_files(mdadm_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(mdadm_t) +files_dontaudit_getattr_tmpfs_files(mdadm_t) -fs_search_auto_mountpoints(mdadm_t) +fs_list_hugetlbfs(mdadm_t) +fs_list_auto_mountpoints(mdadm_t) fs_dontaudit_list_tmpfs(mdadm_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(mdadm_t) @@ -68,9 +72,12 @@ mls_file_write_all_levels(mdadm_t) storage_manage_fixed_disk(mdadm_t) storage_dev_filetrans_fixed_disk(mdadm_t) storage_read_scsi_generic(mdadm_t) +storage_write_scsi_generic(mdadm_t) term_dontaudit_list_ptys(mdadm_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(mdadm_t) + init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(mdadm_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(mdadm_t) @@ -84,6 +91,10 @@ userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals(mdadm_t) mta_send_mail(mdadm_t) optional_policy(` + cron_system_entry(mdadm_t, mdadm_exec_t) +') + +optional_policy(` gpm_dontaudit_getattr_gpmctl(mdadm_t) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.fc b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.fc index 2cc4bda..bd86c17 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.fc @@ -6,13 +6,13 @@ /etc/selinux(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:selinux_config_t,s0) /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:default_context_t,s0) /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?contexts/files(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:file_context_t,s0) -/etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?policy(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:policy_config_t,mls_systemhigh) +/etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?policy(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_store_t,s0) /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?setrans\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:selinux_config_t,mls_systemhigh) -/etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?seusers -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:selinux_config_t,mls_systemhigh) +/etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?seusers -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:selinux_config_t,s0) /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/(active|tmp|previous)(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_store_t,s0) /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/semanage\.read\.LOCK -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_read_lock_t,s0) /etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?modules/semanage\.trans\.LOCK -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_trans_lock_t,s0) -/etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?users(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:selinux_config_t,mls_systemhigh) +/etc/selinux/([^/]*/)?users(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:selinux_config_t,s0) # # /root @@ -32,17 +32,27 @@ /usr/bin/checkpolicy -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:checkpolicy_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/newrole -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:newrole_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/selinux(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:policy_src_t,s0) +/usr/lib/selinux(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:policy_src_t,s0) /usr/sbin/load_policy -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:load_policy_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/restorecon -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:setfiles_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/restorecond -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:restorecond_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/run_init -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:run_init_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/setfiles.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:setfiles_exec_t,s0) -/usr/sbin/setsebool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/setsebool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:setsebool_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/semanage -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/semodule -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_exec_t,s0) +/usr/share/system-config-selinux/system-config-selinux-dbus\.py -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_exec_t,s0) # # /var/run # /var/run/restorecond\.pid -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:restorecond_var_run_t,s0) + +# +# /var/lib +# +/var/lib/selinux(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:selinux_var_lib_t,s0) + +/etc/share/selinux/targeted(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_store_t,s0) +/etc/share/selinux/mls(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:semanage_store_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if index 170e2c7..6c56785 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.if @@ -199,6 +199,10 @@ interface(`seutil_run_newrole',` role $2 types newrole_t; auth_run_upd_passwd(newrole_t, $2) + + optional_policy(` + namespace_init_run(newrole_t, $2) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -361,6 +365,27 @@ interface(`seutil_exec_restorecon',` ######################################## ## +## Execute restorecond in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`seutil_exec_restorecond',` + gen_require(` + type restorecond_exec_t; + ') + + files_search_usr($1) + corecmd_search_bin($1) + can_exec($1, restorecond_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute run_init in the run_init domain. ## ## @@ -545,6 +570,53 @@ interface(`seutil_run_setfiles',` ######################################## ## +## Execute setfiles in the setfiles domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`seutil_domtrans_setfiles_mac',` + gen_require(` + type setfiles_mac_t, setfiles_exec_t; + ') + + files_search_usr($1) + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, setfiles_exec_t, setfiles_mac_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute setfiles in the setfiles_mac domain, and +## allow the specified role the setfiles_mac domain, +## and use the caller's terminal. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the setfiles_mac domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`seutil_run_setfiles_mac',` + gen_require(` + type setfiles_mac_t; + ') + + seutil_domtrans_setfiles_mac($1) + role $2 types setfiles_mac_t; +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute setfiles in the caller domain. ## ## @@ -690,6 +762,7 @@ interface(`seutil_manage_config',` ') files_search_etc($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, selinux_config_t, selinux_config_t) manage_files_pattern($1, selinux_config_t, selinux_config_t) read_lnk_files_pattern($1, selinux_config_t, selinux_config_t) ') @@ -756,6 +829,29 @@ interface(`seutil_read_default_contexts',` read_files_pattern($1, default_context_t, default_context_t) ') +####################################### +## +## Read and write the default_contexts files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`seutil_rw_default_contexts',` + gen_require(` + type default_context_t; + type selinux_config_t; + ') + + files_search_etc($1) + allow $1 selinux_config_t:dir list_dir_perms; + allow $1 default_context_t:dir list_dir_perms; + rw_files_pattern($1, default_context_t, default_context_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Create, read, write, and delete the default_contexts files. @@ -1009,6 +1105,26 @@ interface(`seutil_domtrans_semanage',` ######################################## ## +## Execute a domain transition to run setsebool. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# +interface(`seutil_domtrans_setsebool',` + gen_require(` + type setsebool_t, setsebool_exec_t; + ') + + files_search_usr($1) + corecmd_search_bin($1) + domtrans_pattern($1, setsebool_exec_t, setsebool_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Execute semanage in the semanage domain, and ## allow the specified role the semanage domain, ## and use the caller's terminal. @@ -1038,6 +1154,54 @@ interface(`seutil_run_semanage',` ######################################## ## +## Execute setsebool in the semanage domain, and +## allow the specified role the semanage domain, +## and use the caller's terminal. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the setsebool domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`seutil_run_setsebool',` + gen_require(` + type semanage_t; + ') + + seutil_domtrans_setsebool($1) + role $2 types setsebool_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Full management of the semanage +## module store. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`seutil_read_module_store',` + gen_require(` + type selinux_config_t, semanage_store_t; + ') + + files_search_etc($1) + list_dirs_pattern($1, selinux_config_t, semanage_store_t) + read_files_pattern($1, semanage_store_t, semanage_store_t) +') + +######################################## +## ## Full management of the semanage ## module store. ## @@ -1149,3 +1313,107 @@ interface(`seutil_dontaudit_libselinux_linked',` selinux_dontaudit_get_fs_mount($1) seutil_dontaudit_read_config($1) ') + +####################################### +## +## All rules necessary to run semanage command +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`seutil_semanage_policy',` + gen_require(` + type semanage_tmp_t; + type policy_config_t; + ') + allow $1 self:capability { dac_override sys_resource }; + dontaudit $1 self:capability sys_tty_config; + allow $1 self:process signal; + allow $1 self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + allow $1 self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + logging_send_audit_msgs($1) + + # Running genhomedircon requires this for finding all users + auth_use_nsswitch($1) + + allow $1 policy_config_t:file { read write }; + + allow $1 semanage_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms; + allow $1 semanage_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; + files_tmp_filetrans($1, semanage_tmp_t, { file dir }) + + kernel_read_system_state($1) + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1) + + corecmd_exec_bin($1) + corecmd_exec_shell($1) + + dev_read_urand($1) + + domain_use_interactive_fds($1) + + files_read_etc_files($1) + files_read_etc_runtime_files($1) + files_read_usr_files($1) + files_list_pids($1) + fs_list_inotifyfs($1) + fs_getattr_all_fs($1) + + mls_file_write_all_levels($1) + mls_file_read_all_levels($1) + + selinux_getattr_fs($1) + selinux_validate_context($1) + selinux_get_enforce_mode($1) + + term_use_all_inherited_terms($1) + + locallogin_use_fds($1) + + logging_send_syslog_msg($1) + + miscfiles_read_localization($1) + + seutil_search_default_contexts($1) + seutil_domtrans_loadpolicy($1) + seutil_read_config($1) + seutil_manage_bin_policy($1) + seutil_use_newrole_fds($1) + seutil_manage_module_store($1) + seutil_get_semanage_trans_lock($1) + seutil_get_semanage_read_lock($1) + + userdom_dontaudit_write_user_home_content_files($1) +') + + +####################################### +## +## All rules necessary to run setfiles command +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`seutil_setfiles',` + + gen_require(` + attribute setfiles_domain; + ') + typeattribute $1 setfiles_domain; + + files_relabel_all_files($1) + + mls_file_read_all_levels($1) + mls_file_write_all_levels($1) + mls_file_upgrade($1) + mls_file_downgrade($1) + + # this is to satisfy the assertion: + auth_relabelto_shadow($1) +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te index 7ed9819..c0109fd 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/selinuxutil.te @@ -11,6 +11,7 @@ gen_require(` attribute can_write_binary_policy; attribute can_relabelto_binary_policy; +attribute setfiles_domain; # # selinux_config_t is the type applied to @@ -22,6 +23,9 @@ attribute can_relabelto_binary_policy; type selinux_config_t; files_type(selinux_config_t) +type selinux_var_lib_t; +files_type(selinux_var_lib_t) + type checkpolicy_t, can_write_binary_policy; type checkpolicy_exec_t; application_domain(checkpolicy_t, checkpolicy_exec_t) @@ -57,8 +61,13 @@ domain_interactive_fd(newrole_t) # policy_config_t is the type of /etc/security/selinux/* # the security server policy configuration. # -type policy_config_t; -files_type(policy_config_t) +#type policy_config_t; +#files_type(policy_config_t) +gen_require(` + type semanage_store_t; +') + +typealias semanage_store_t alias policy_config_t; neverallow ~can_relabelto_binary_policy policy_config_t:file relabelto; #neverallow ~can_write_binary_policy policy_config_t:file { write append }; @@ -74,7 +83,6 @@ type restorecond_t; type restorecond_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(restorecond_t, restorecond_exec_t) domain_obj_id_change_exemption(restorecond_t) -role system_r types restorecond_t; type restorecond_var_run_t; files_pid_file(restorecond_var_run_t) @@ -88,26 +96,37 @@ role system_r types run_init_t; type semanage_t; type semanage_exec_t; application_domain(semanage_t, semanage_exec_t) +dbus_system_domain(semanage_t, semanage_exec_t) +init_daemon_domain(semanage_t, semanage_exec_t) domain_interactive_fd(semanage_t) role system_r types semanage_t; +type setsebool_t; +type setsebool_exec_t; +init_system_domain(setsebool_t, setsebool_exec_t) + type semanage_store_t; files_type(semanage_store_t) type semanage_read_lock_t; -files_type(semanage_read_lock_t) +files_lock_file(semanage_read_lock_t) type semanage_tmp_t; files_tmp_file(semanage_tmp_t) type semanage_trans_lock_t; -files_type(semanage_trans_lock_t) +files_lock_file(semanage_trans_lock_t) type setfiles_t alias restorecon_t, can_relabelto_binary_policy; type setfiles_exec_t alias restorecon_exec_t; init_system_domain(setfiles_t, setfiles_exec_t) domain_obj_id_change_exemption(setfiles_t) +type setfiles_mac_t; +domain_type(setfiles_mac_t) +domain_entry_file(setfiles_mac_t, setfiles_exec_t) +domain_obj_id_change_exemption(setfiles_mac_t) + ######################################## # # Checkpolicy local policy @@ -139,7 +158,7 @@ term_use_console(checkpolicy_t) init_use_fds(checkpolicy_t) init_use_script_ptys(checkpolicy_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(checkpolicy_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(checkpolicy_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(checkpolicy_t) ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` @@ -176,13 +195,15 @@ term_list_ptys(load_policy_t) init_use_script_fds(load_policy_t) init_use_script_ptys(load_policy_t) +init_write_script_pipes(load_policy_t) miscfiles_read_localization(load_policy_t) seutil_libselinux_linked(load_policy_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(load_policy_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(load_policy_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(load_policy_t) +userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files(load_policy_t) ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` optional_policy(` @@ -204,7 +225,7 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` # Newrole local policy # -allow newrole_t self:capability { fowner setuid setgid dac_override }; +allow newrole_t self:capability { fowner setpcap setuid setgid dac_override }; allow newrole_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execheap execstack }; allow newrole_t self:process setexec; allow newrole_t self:fd use; @@ -216,7 +237,7 @@ allow newrole_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; allow newrole_t self:msg { send receive }; allow newrole_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; allow newrole_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; -allow newrole_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay }; +logging_send_audit_msgs(newrole_t) read_files_pattern(newrole_t, default_context_t, default_context_t) read_lnk_files_pattern(newrole_t, default_context_t, default_context_t) @@ -233,6 +254,7 @@ domain_use_interactive_fds(newrole_t) # for when the user types "exec newrole" at the command line: domain_sigchld_interactive_fds(newrole_t) +files_list_var(newrole_t) files_read_etc_files(newrole_t) files_read_var_files(newrole_t) files_read_var_symlinks(newrole_t) @@ -260,25 +282,30 @@ term_relabel_all_ptys(newrole_t) term_getattr_unallocated_ttys(newrole_t) term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(newrole_t) -auth_use_nsswitch(newrole_t) -auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(newrole_t) -auth_domtrans_upd_passwd(newrole_t) -auth_rw_faillog(newrole_t) +auth_use_pam(newrole_t) # Write to utmp. init_rw_utmp(newrole_t) init_use_fds(newrole_t) -logging_send_syslog_msg(newrole_t) - miscfiles_read_localization(newrole_t) seutil_libselinux_linked(newrole_t) +userdom_use_unpriv_users_fds(newrole_t) # for some PAM modules and for cwd userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(newrole_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs(newrole_t) +# need to talk with dbus +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(newrole_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_dontaudit_exec_xauth(newrole_t) +') + ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(newrole_t) @@ -312,9 +339,13 @@ kernel_use_fds(restorecond_t) kernel_rw_pipes(restorecond_t) kernel_read_system_state(restorecond_t) +dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(restorecond_t) + +files_dontaudit_read_all_symlinks(restorecond_t) + fs_relabelfrom_noxattr_fs(restorecond_t) fs_dontaudit_list_nfs(restorecond_t) -fs_getattr_xattr_fs(restorecond_t) +fs_getattr_all_fs(restorecond_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(restorecond_t) selinux_validate_context(restorecond_t) @@ -323,8 +354,8 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(restorecond_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context(restorecond_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts(restorecond_t) -auth_relabel_all_files_except_shadow(restorecond_t ) -auth_read_all_files_except_shadow(restorecond_t) +files_relabel_all_files(restorecond_t ) +files_read_non_security_files(restorecond_t) auth_use_nsswitch(restorecond_t) locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(restorecond_t) @@ -335,6 +366,8 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(restorecond_t) seutil_libselinux_linked(restorecond_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks(restorecond_t) + ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(restorecond_t) @@ -353,16 +386,19 @@ optional_policy(` allow run_init_t self:process setexec; allow run_init_t self:capability setuid; allow run_init_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; -allow run_init_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay }; +logging_send_audit_msgs(run_init_t) # often the administrator runs such programs from a directory that is owned # by a different user or has restrictive SE permissions, do not want to audit # the failed access to the current directory dontaudit run_init_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search }; +kernel_dontaudit_getattr_core_if(run_init_t) + corecmd_exec_bin(run_init_t) corecmd_exec_shell(run_init_t) +dev_dontaudit_getattr_all(run_init_t) dev_dontaudit_list_all_dev_nodes(run_init_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(run_init_t) @@ -380,6 +416,8 @@ selinux_compute_create_context(run_init_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context(run_init_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts(run_init_t) +term_use_console(run_init_t) + auth_use_nsswitch(run_init_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd(run_init_t) auth_domtrans_upd_passwd(run_init_t) @@ -388,6 +426,7 @@ auth_dontaudit_read_shadow(run_init_t) init_spec_domtrans_script(run_init_t) # for utmp init_rw_utmp(run_init_t) +init_dontaudit_getattr_initctl(run_init_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(run_init_t) @@ -396,7 +435,7 @@ miscfiles_read_localization(run_init_t) seutil_libselinux_linked(run_init_t) seutil_read_default_contexts(run_init_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(run_init_t) +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(run_init_t) ifndef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',` ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` @@ -405,6 +444,19 @@ ifndef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',` ') ') +# need to talk with dbus +optional_policy(` + dbus_system_bus_client(run_init_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gpm_dontaudit_getattr_gpmctl(run_init_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpm_domtrans(run_init_t) +') + ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` optional_policy(` unconfined_domain(run_init_t) @@ -420,185 +472,203 @@ optional_policy(` # semodule local policy # -allow semanage_t self:capability { dac_override audit_write }; -allow semanage_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; -allow semanage_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; -allow semanage_t self:netlink_audit_socket { create_netlink_socket_perms nlmsg_relay }; - -allow semanage_t policy_config_t:file rw_file_perms; - -allow semanage_t semanage_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms; -allow semanage_t semanage_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; -files_tmp_filetrans(semanage_t, semanage_tmp_t, { file dir }) - -kernel_read_system_state(semanage_t) -kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(semanage_t) +seutil_semanage_policy(semanage_t) +allow semanage_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -corecmd_exec_bin(semanage_t) +manage_dirs_pattern(semanage_t, selinux_var_lib_t, selinux_var_lib_t) +manage_files_pattern(semanage_t, selinux_var_lib_t, selinux_var_lib_t) -dev_read_urand(semanage_t) - -domain_use_interactive_fds(semanage_t) - -files_read_etc_files(semanage_t) -files_read_etc_runtime_files(semanage_t) -files_read_usr_files(semanage_t) -files_list_pids(semanage_t) - -mls_file_write_all_levels(semanage_t) -mls_file_read_all_levels(semanage_t) - -selinux_validate_context(semanage_t) -selinux_get_enforce_mode(semanage_t) -selinux_getattr_fs(semanage_t) -# for setsebool: selinux_set_all_booleans(semanage_t) +can_exec(semanage_t, semanage_exec_t) -term_use_all_terms(semanage_t) - -# Running genhomedircon requires this for finding all users -auth_use_nsswitch(semanage_t) - -locallogin_use_fds(semanage_t) +# Admins are creating pp files in random locations +files_read_non_security_files(semanage_t) -logging_send_syslog_msg(semanage_t) - -miscfiles_read_localization(semanage_t) - -seutil_libselinux_linked(semanage_t) seutil_manage_file_contexts(semanage_t) seutil_manage_config(semanage_t) seutil_domtrans_setfiles(semanage_t) -seutil_domtrans_loadpolicy(semanage_t) -seutil_manage_bin_policy(semanage_t) -seutil_use_newrole_fds(semanage_t) -seutil_manage_module_store(semanage_t) -seutil_get_semanage_trans_lock(semanage_t) -seutil_get_semanage_read_lock(semanage_t) + # netfilter_contexts: seutil_manage_default_contexts(semanage_t) # Handle pp files created in homedir and /tmp userdom_read_user_home_content_files(semanage_t) userdom_read_user_tmp_files(semanage_t) +userdom_home_reader(semanage_t) ifdef(`distro_debian',` files_read_var_lib_files(semanage_t) files_read_var_lib_symlinks(semanage_t) ') -ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` - optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(semanage_t) - ') +optional_policy(` + mock_manage_lib_files(semanage_t) + mock_manage_lib_dirs(semanage_t) ') -######################################## -# -# Setfiles local policy -# - -allow setfiles_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner }; -dontaudit setfiles_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow setfiles_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(semanage_t) +') -allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t default_context_t }:dir list_dir_perms; -allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t default_context_t }:file read_file_perms; -allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t default_context_t }:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms ioctl lock }; -kernel_read_system_state(setfiles_t) -kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_dirs(setfiles_t) -kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_files(setfiles_t) -kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_symlinks(setfiles_t) -kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_pipes(setfiles_t) -kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_sockets(setfiles_t) -kernel_use_fds(setfiles_t) -kernel_rw_pipes(setfiles_t) -kernel_rw_unix_dgram_sockets(setfiles_t) -kernel_dontaudit_list_all_proc(setfiles_t) -kernel_dontaudit_list_all_sysctls(setfiles_t) +####################################n#### +# +# setsebool local policy +# +seutil_semanage_policy(setsebool_t) +selinux_set_all_booleans(setsebool_t) -dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(setfiles_t) +init_dontaudit_use_fds(setsebool_t) -domain_use_interactive_fds(setfiles_t) -domain_dontaudit_search_all_domains_state(setfiles_t) +# Bug in semanage +seutil_domtrans_setfiles(setsebool_t) +seutil_manage_file_contexts(setsebool_t) +seutil_manage_default_contexts(setsebool_t) +seutil_manage_config(setsebool_t) -files_read_etc_runtime_files(setfiles_t) -files_read_etc_files(setfiles_t) -files_list_all(setfiles_t) -files_relabel_all_files(setfiles_t) -files_read_usr_symlinks(setfiles_t) +######################################## +# +# Setfiles mac local policy +# +seutil_setfiles(setfiles_mac_t) +allow setfiles_mac_t self:capability2 mac_admin; +kernel_relabelto_unlabeled(setfiles_mac_t) -fs_getattr_xattr_fs(setfiles_t) -fs_list_all(setfiles_t) -fs_search_auto_mountpoints(setfiles_t) -fs_relabelfrom_noxattr_fs(setfiles_t) +optional_policy(` + files_dontaudit_write_isid_chr_files(setfiles_mac_t) + livecd_dontaudit_leaks(setfiles_mac_t) + livecd_rw_tmp_files(setfiles_mac_t) + dev_dontaudit_write_all_chr_files(setfiles_mac_t) +') -mls_file_read_all_levels(setfiles_t) -mls_file_write_all_levels(setfiles_t) -mls_file_upgrade(setfiles_t) -mls_file_downgrade(setfiles_t) +optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(setfiles_mac_t) +') -selinux_validate_context(setfiles_t) -selinux_compute_access_vector(setfiles_t) -selinux_compute_create_context(setfiles_t) -selinux_compute_relabel_context(setfiles_t) -selinux_compute_user_contexts(setfiles_t) +######################################## +# +# Setfiles local policy +# -term_use_all_ttys(setfiles_t) -term_use_all_ptys(setfiles_t) -term_use_unallocated_ttys(setfiles_t) +seutil_setfiles(setfiles_t) +# During boot in Rawhide +term_use_generic_ptys(setfiles_t) -# this is to satisfy the assertion: -auth_relabelto_shadow(setfiles_t) +# needs to be able to read symlinks to make restorecon on symlink working +files_read_all_symlinks(setfiles_t) -init_use_fds(setfiles_t) -init_use_script_fds(setfiles_t) -init_use_script_ptys(setfiles_t) -init_exec_script_files(setfiles_t) +optional_policy(` + devicekit_dontaudit_read_pid_files(setfiles_t) + devicekit_dontaudit_rw_log(setfiles_t) +') -logging_send_syslog_msg(setfiles_t) +optional_policy(` + xserver_append_xdm_tmp_files(setfiles_t) +') -miscfiles_read_localization(setfiles_t) +ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + optional_policy(` + hal_dontaudit_leaks(setfiles_t) + ') -seutil_libselinux_linked(setfiles_t) + optional_policy(` + setroubleshoot_fixit_dontaudit_leaks(setfiles_t) + setroubleshoot_fixit_dontaudit_leaks(setsebool_t) + ') +') +ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` + optional_policy(` + unconfined_domain(setfiles_t) + ') +') -userdom_use_all_users_fds(setfiles_t) +######################################## +# +# Setfiles common policy +# +allow setfiles_domain self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner }; +dontaudit setfiles_domain self:capability sys_tty_config; +allow setfiles_domain self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; +dontaudit setfiles_domain self:dir relabelfrom; +dontaudit setfiles_domain self:file relabelfrom; +dontaudit setfiles_domain self:lnk_file relabelfrom; + +domain_relabelfrom(setfiles_domain) + +allow setfiles_domain { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t default_context_t }:dir list_dir_perms; +allow setfiles_domain { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t default_context_t }:file read_file_perms; +allow setfiles_domain { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t default_context_t }:lnk_file { read_lnk_file_perms ioctl lock }; + +logging_send_audit_msgs(setfiles_domain) + +kernel_read_system_state(setfiles_domain) +kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_dirs(setfiles_domain) +kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_files(setfiles_domain) +kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_symlinks(setfiles_domain) +kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_pipes(setfiles_domain) +kernel_relabelfrom_unlabeled_sockets(setfiles_domain) +kernel_use_fds(setfiles_domain) +kernel_rw_pipes(setfiles_domain) +kernel_rw_unix_dgram_sockets(setfiles_domain) +kernel_dontaudit_list_all_proc(setfiles_domain) +kernel_read_all_sysctls(setfiles_domain) +kernel_read_network_state_symlinks(setfiles_domain) + +dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(setfiles_domain) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(setfiles_domain) +domain_read_all_domains_state(setfiles_domain) + +files_read_etc_runtime_files(setfiles_domain) +files_read_etc_files(setfiles_domain) +files_list_all(setfiles_domain) +files_list_isid_type_dirs(setfiles_domain) +files_read_isid_type_files(setfiles_domain) +files_dontaudit_read_all_symlinks(setfiles_domain) + +fs_getattr_all_fs(setfiles_domain) +fs_list_all(setfiles_domain) +fs_getattr_all_files(setfiles_domain) +fs_search_auto_mountpoints(setfiles_domain) +fs_relabelfrom_noxattr_fs(setfiles_domain) + +selinux_validate_context(setfiles_domain) +selinux_compute_access_vector(setfiles_domain) +selinux_compute_create_context(setfiles_domain) +selinux_compute_relabel_context(setfiles_domain) +selinux_compute_user_contexts(setfiles_domain) + +term_use_all_inherited_terms(setfiles_domain) + +init_use_fds(setfiles_domain) +init_use_script_fds(setfiles_domain) +init_use_script_ptys(setfiles_domain) +init_exec_script_files(setfiles_domain) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(setfiles_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(setfiles_domain) + +seutil_libselinux_linked(setfiles_domain) + +userdom_use_all_users_fds(setfiles_domain) # for config files in a home directory -userdom_read_user_home_content_files(setfiles_t) +userdom_read_user_home_content_files(setfiles_domain) ifdef(`distro_debian',` # udev tmpfs is populated with static device nodes # and then relabeled afterwards; thus # /dev/console has the tmpfs type - fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(setfiles_t) -') - -ifdef(`distro_redhat', ` - fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(setfiles_t) - fs_rw_tmpfs_blk_files(setfiles_t) - fs_relabel_tmpfs_blk_file(setfiles_t) - fs_relabel_tmpfs_chr_file(setfiles_t) + fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(setfiles_domain) ') -ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` - optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(setfiles_t) - ') -') - -ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` - optional_policy(` - udev_dontaudit_rw_dgram_sockets(setfiles_t) - ') - - # cjp: cover up stray file descriptors. - optional_policy(` - unconfined_dontaudit_read_pipes(setfiles_t) - unconfined_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets(setfiles_t) - ') +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + fs_rw_tmpfs_chr_files(setfiles_domain) + fs_rw_tmpfs_blk_files(setfiles_domain) + fs_relabel_tmpfs_blk_file(setfiles_domain) + fs_relabel_tmpfs_chr_file(setfiles_domain) ') optional_policy(` - hotplug_use_fds(setfiles_t) + hotplug_use_fds(setfiles_domain) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/setrans.fc b/policy/modules/system/setrans.fc index bea4629..06e2834 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/setrans.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/setrans.fc @@ -2,4 +2,7 @@ /sbin/mcstransd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:setrans_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mcstransd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:setrans_exec_t,s0) + /var/run/setrans(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:setrans_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh) +/var/run/mcstransd\.pid gen_context(system_u:object_r:setrans_var_run_t,mls_systemhigh) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/setrans.te b/policy/modules/system/setrans.te index 1447687..cdc0223 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/setrans.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/setrans.te @@ -12,6 +12,7 @@ gen_require(` type setrans_t; type setrans_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(setrans_t, setrans_exec_t) +mls_trusted_object(setrans_t) type setrans_initrc_exec_t; init_script_file(setrans_initrc_exec_t) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.fc b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.fc index 694fd94..ff9af99 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.fc @@ -10,10 +10,10 @@ /etc/dhclient.*conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcp_etc_t,s0) /etc/dhclient-script -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcp_etc_t,s0) /etc/dhcpc.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcp_etc_t,s0) -/etc/dhcpd\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcp_etc_t,s0) -/etc/dhcp/dhcpd\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcp_etc_t,s0) +/etc/dhcpd(6)?\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcp_etc_t,s0) +/etc/dhcp/dhcpd(6)?\.conf -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcp_etc_t,s0) /etc/ethers -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:net_conf_t,s0) -/etc/hosts -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:net_conf_t,s0) +/etc/hosts[^/]* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:net_conf_t,s0) /etc/hosts\.deny.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:net_conf_t,s0) /etc/denyhosts.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:net_conf_t,s0) /etc/resolv\.conf.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:net_conf_t,s0) @@ -48,6 +48,20 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` # # /usr # +/usr/bin/ip -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/dhclient.* -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/dhcdbd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/dhcpcd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpc_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ethtool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ifconfig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ip -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ipx_configure -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ipx_interface -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/ipx_internal_net -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/iwconfig -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/mii-tool -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/pump -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpc_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/tc -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:ifconfig_exec_t,s0) # @@ -64,3 +78,5 @@ ifdef(`distro_redhat',` ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` /var/lib/dhcpc(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpc_state_t,s0) ') + +/etc/firestarter/firestarter\.sh gen_context(system_u:object_r:dhcpc_helper_exec_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if index ff80d0a..b8c1b90 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.if @@ -49,10 +49,6 @@ interface(`sysnet_run_dhcpc',` sysnet_run_ifconfig(dhcpc_t, $2) optional_policy(` - consoletype_run(dhcpc_t, $2) - ') - - optional_policy(` hostname_run(dhcpc_t, $2) ') @@ -60,6 +56,24 @@ interface(`sysnet_run_dhcpc',` netutils_run(dhcpc_t, $2) netutils_run_ping(dhcpc_t, $2) ') + + optional_policy(` + networkmanager_run(dhcpc_t, $2) + ') + + optional_policy(` + nis_run_ypbind(dhcpc_t, $2) + ') + + optional_policy(` + nscd_run(dhcpc_t, $2) + ') + + optional_policy(` + ntp_run(dhcpc_t, $2) + ') + + seutil_run_setfiles(dhcpc_t, $2) ') ######################################## @@ -269,6 +283,43 @@ interface(`sysnet_delete_dhcpc_state',` delete_files_pattern($1, dhcpc_state_t, dhcpc_state_t) ') +######################################## +## +## Allow caller to relabel dhcpc_state files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sysnet_relabelfrom_dhcpc_state',` + + gen_require(` + type dhcpc_state_t; + ') + + allow $1 dhcpc_state_t:file relabelfrom; +') + +####################################### +## +## Manage the dhcp client state files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sysnet_manage_dhcpc_state',` + gen_require(` + type dhcpc_state_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, dhcpc_state_t, dhcpc_state_t) +') + ####################################### ## ## Set the attributes of network config files. @@ -290,6 +341,44 @@ interface(`sysnet_setattr_config',` ####################################### ## +## Allow caller to relabel net_conf files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sysnet_relabelfrom_net_conf',` + + gen_require(` + type net_conf_t; + ') + + allow $1 net_conf_t:file relabelfrom; +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow caller to relabel net_conf files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sysnet_relabelto_net_conf',` + + gen_require(` + type net_conf_t; + ') + + allow $1 net_conf_t:file relabelto; +') + +####################################### +## ## Read network config files. ## ## @@ -405,7 +494,7 @@ interface(`sysnet_etc_filetrans_config',` type net_conf_t; ') - files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file) + files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file, $2) ') ####################################### @@ -426,6 +515,7 @@ interface(`sysnet_manage_config',` allow $1 net_conf_t:file manage_file_perms; ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + allow $1 net_conf_t:dir list_dir_perms; manage_files_pattern($1, net_conf_t, net_conf_t) ') ') @@ -464,6 +554,7 @@ interface(`sysnet_delete_dhcpc_pid',` type dhcpc_var_run_t; ') + files_rw_pid_dirs($1) allow $1 dhcpc_var_run_t:file unlink; ') @@ -554,6 +645,45 @@ interface(`sysnet_signal_ifconfig',` ######################################## ## +## Send a null signal to ifconfig. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access.pwd + +## +## +## +# +interface(`sysnet_signull_ifconfig',` + gen_require(` + type ifconfig_t; + ') + + allow $1 ifconfig_t:process signull; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send a kill signal to iconfig. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`sysnet_kill_ifconfig',` + gen_require(` + type ifconfig_t; + ') + + allow $1 ifconfig_t:process sigkill; +') + +######################################## +## ## Read the DHCP configuration files. ## ## @@ -661,6 +791,8 @@ interface(`sysnet_dns_name_resolve',` corenet_tcp_connect_dns_port($1) corenet_sendrecv_dns_client_packets($1) + miscfiles_read_generic_certs($1) + sysnet_read_config($1) optional_policy(` @@ -698,6 +830,9 @@ interface(`sysnet_use_ldap',` corenet_sendrecv_ldap_client_packets($1) sysnet_read_config($1) + + # LDAP Configuration using encrypted requires + dev_read_urand($1) ') ######################################## @@ -731,3 +866,73 @@ interface(`sysnet_use_portmap',` sysnet_read_config($1) ') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to use +## the dhcp file descriptors. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`sysnet_dontaudit_dhcpc_use_fds',` + gen_require(` + type dhcpc_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 dhcpc_t:fd use; +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to system_r when execute an dhclient script +## +## +##

    +## Execute dhclient script in a specified role +##

    +##

    +## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Role to transition from. +## +## +interface(`sysnet_role_transition_dhcpc',` + gen_require(` + type dhcpc_exec_t; + ') + + role_transition $1 dhcpc_exec_t system_r; +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to sysnet named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`sysnet_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type net_conf_t; + ') + + files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file, "resolv.conf") + files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file, "resolv.conf.tmp") + files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file, "denyhosts") + files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file, "hosts") + files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file, "hosts.deny") + files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file, "ethers") + files_etc_filetrans($1, net_conf_t, file, "yp.conf") +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.te b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.te index 34d0ec5..92fa1e9 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/sysnetwork.te @@ -5,6 +5,13 @@ policy_module(sysnetwork, 1.11.2) # Declarations # +## +##

    +## Allow dhcpc client applications to execute iptables commands +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(dhcpc_exec_iptables, false) + # this is shared between dhcpc and dhcpd: type dhcp_etc_t; typealias dhcp_etc_t alias { etc_dhcp_t etc_dhcpc_t etc_dhcpd_t }; @@ -19,6 +26,9 @@ type dhcpc_exec_t; init_daemon_domain(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_exec_t) role system_r types dhcpc_t; +type dhcpc_helper_exec_t; +init_script_file(dhcpc_helper_exec_t) + type dhcpc_state_t; files_type(dhcpc_state_t) @@ -34,17 +44,17 @@ init_system_domain(ifconfig_t, ifconfig_exec_t) role system_r types ifconfig_t; type net_conf_t alias resolv_conf_t; -files_type(net_conf_t) +files_config_file(net_conf_t) ######################################## # # DHCP client local policy # allow dhcpc_t self:capability { dac_override fsetid net_admin net_raw net_bind_service setpcap sys_nice sys_resource sys_tty_config }; -dontaudit dhcpc_t self:capability { sys_tty_config sys_ptrace }; +dontaudit dhcpc_t self:capability sys_tty_config; # for access("/etc/bashrc", X_OK) on Red Hat dontaudit dhcpc_t self:capability { dac_read_search sys_module }; -allow dhcpc_t self:process { getsched getcap setcap setfscreate ptrace signal_perms }; +allow dhcpc_t self:process { getsched setsched getcap setcap setfscreate signal_perms }; allow dhcpc_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow dhcpc_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -57,8 +67,11 @@ read_lnk_files_pattern(dhcpc_t, dhcp_etc_t, dhcp_etc_t) exec_files_pattern(dhcpc_t, dhcp_etc_t, dhcp_etc_t) allow dhcpc_t dhcp_state_t:file read_file_perms; +allow dhcpc_t dhcp_state_t:file relabel_file_perms; + manage_files_pattern(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_state_t, dhcpc_state_t) filetrans_pattern(dhcpc_t, dhcp_state_t, dhcpc_state_t, file) +allow dhcpc_t dhcpc_state_t:file relabel_file_perms; # create pid file manage_files_pattern(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_var_run_t, dhcpc_var_run_t) @@ -66,6 +79,8 @@ files_pid_filetrans(dhcpc_t, dhcpc_var_run_t, file) # Allow read/write to /etc/resolv.conf and /etc/ntp.conf. Note that any files # in /etc created by dhcpcd will be labelled net_conf_t. +allow dhcpc_t net_conf_t:file manage_file_perms; +allow dhcpc_t net_conf_t:file relabel_file_perms; sysnet_manage_config(dhcpc_t) files_etc_filetrans(dhcpc_t, net_conf_t, file) @@ -91,25 +106,28 @@ corecmd_exec_shell(dhcpc_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled(dhcpc_t) corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel(dhcpc_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_if(dhcpc_t) -corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_if(dhcpc_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_if(dhcpc_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes(dhcpc_t) -corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes(dhcpc_t) -corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes(dhcpc_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(dhcpc_t) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if(dhcpc_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if(dhcpc_t) +corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(dhcpc_t) +corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_node(dhcpc_t) +corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node(dhcpc_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports(dhcpc_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports(dhcpc_t) -corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes(dhcpc_t) -corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes(dhcpc_t) +corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node(dhcpc_t) +corenet_udp_bind_generic_node(dhcpc_t) corenet_udp_bind_dhcpc_port(dhcpc_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports(dhcpc_t) corenet_sendrecv_dhcpd_client_packets(dhcpc_t) corenet_sendrecv_dhcpc_server_packets(dhcpc_t) +corenet_dontaudit_udp_bind_all_reserved_ports(dhcpc_t) +corenet_udp_bind_all_unreserved_ports(dhcpc_t) dev_read_sysfs(dhcpc_t) # for SSP: dev_read_urand(dhcpc_t) +domain_obj_id_change_exemption(dhcpc_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(dhcpc_t) domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(dhcpc_t) @@ -129,14 +147,17 @@ term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(dhcpc_t) term_dontaudit_use_unallocated_ttys(dhcpc_t) term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys(dhcpc_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(dhcpc_t) + init_rw_utmp(dhcpc_t) +init_stream_connect(dhcpc_t) +init_stream_send(dhcpc_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(dhcpc_t) +miscfiles_read_generic_certs(dhcpc_t) miscfiles_read_localization(dhcpc_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(dhcpc_t) - userdom_use_user_terminals(dhcpc_t) userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(dhcpc_t) @@ -151,7 +172,18 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` ') optional_policy(` - consoletype_domtrans(dhcpc_t) + consoletype_exec(dhcpc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + chronyd_initrc_domtrans(dhcpc_t) + chronyd_systemctl(dhcpc_t) + chronyd_read_keys(dhcpc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + devicekit_dontaudit_rw_log(dhcpc_t) + devicekit_dontaudit_read_pid_files(dhcpc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -171,6 +203,8 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` hal_dontaudit_rw_dgram_sockets(dhcpc_t) + hal_dontaudit_read_pid_files(dhcpc_t) + hal_dontaudit_write_log(dhcpc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -192,17 +226,31 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(dhcpc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + networkmanager_domtrans(dhcpc_t) + networkmanager_read_pid_files(dhcpc_t) + networkmanager_read_lib_files(dhcpc_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + nis_initrc_domtrans_ypbind(dhcpc_t) nis_read_ypbind_pid(dhcpc_t) + nis_systemctl_ypbind(dhcpc_t) ') optional_policy(` nscd_initrc_domtrans(dhcpc_t) + nscd_systemctl(dhcpc_t) nscd_domtrans(dhcpc_t) nscd_read_pid(dhcpc_t) ') optional_policy(` ntp_initrc_domtrans(dhcpc_t) + ntp_systemctl(dhcpc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -213,6 +261,11 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` seutil_sigchld_newrole(dhcpc_t) seutil_dontaudit_search_config(dhcpc_t) + seutil_domtrans_setfiles(dhcpc_t) +') +optional_policy(` + systemd_passwd_agent_domtrans(dhcpc_t) + systemd_signal_passwd_agent(dhcpc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -255,6 +308,7 @@ allow ifconfig_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; allow ifconfig_t self:msg { send receive }; # Create UDP sockets, necessary when called from dhcpc allow ifconfig_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; +allow ifconfig_t self:appletalk_socket create_socket_perms; # for /sbin/ip allow ifconfig_t self:packet_socket create_socket_perms; allow ifconfig_t self:netlink_route_socket create_netlink_socket_perms; @@ -273,11 +327,17 @@ corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev(ifconfig_t) dev_read_sysfs(ifconfig_t) # for IPSEC setup: dev_read_urand(ifconfig_t) +# needed by tuned +dev_rw_netcontrol(ifconfig_t) domain_use_interactive_fds(ifconfig_t) +read_files_pattern(ifconfig_t, dhcpc_state_t, dhcpc_state_t) + +files_dontaudit_read_root_files(ifconfig_t) files_read_etc_files(ifconfig_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(ifconfig_t) +files_read_usr_files(ifconfig_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs(ifconfig_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints(ifconfig_t) @@ -290,7 +350,7 @@ term_dontaudit_use_all_ptys(ifconfig_t) term_dontaudit_use_ptmx(ifconfig_t) term_dontaudit_use_generic_ptys(ifconfig_t) -files_dontaudit_read_root_files(ifconfig_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(ifconfig_t) init_use_fds(ifconfig_t) init_use_script_ptys(ifconfig_t) @@ -301,11 +361,11 @@ logging_send_syslog_msg(ifconfig_t) miscfiles_read_localization(ifconfig_t) -modutils_domtrans_insmod(ifconfig_t) - seutil_use_runinit_fds(ifconfig_t) -userdom_use_user_terminals(ifconfig_t) +sysnet_dns_name_resolve(ifconfig_t) + +userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals(ifconfig_t) userdom_use_all_users_fds(ifconfig_t) ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` @@ -314,7 +374,22 @@ ifdef(`distro_ubuntu',` ') ') +optional_policy(` + brctl_domtrans(ifconfig_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + cfengine_dontaudit_write_log(ifconfig_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + ctdbd_read_lib_files(ifconfig_t) +') + ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` + # caused by some bogus kernel code + dontaudit ifconfig_t self:capability sys_module; + optional_policy(` dev_dontaudit_rw_cardmgr(ifconfig_t) ') @@ -325,8 +400,14 @@ ifdef(`hide_broken_symptoms',` ') optional_policy(` + devicekit_dontaudit_read_pid_files(ifconfig_t) +') + +optional_policy(` hal_dontaudit_rw_pipes(ifconfig_t) hal_dontaudit_rw_dgram_sockets(ifconfig_t) + hal_dontaudit_read_pid_files(ifconfig_t) + hal_write_log(ifconfig_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -335,7 +416,15 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` - nis_use_ypbind(ifconfig_t) + kdump_dontaudit_read_config(ifconfig_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod(ifconfig_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + netutils_domtrans(dhcpc_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -356,3 +445,9 @@ optional_policy(` xen_append_log(ifconfig_t) xen_dontaudit_rw_unix_stream_sockets(ifconfig_t) ') + +optional_policy(` + tunable_policy(`dhcpc_exec_iptables',` + iptables_domtrans(dhcpc_t) + ') +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc b/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc new file mode 100644 index 0000000..161f271 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.fc @@ -0,0 +1,23 @@ +/bin/systemd-notify -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_notify_exec_t,s0) +/bin/systemctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_systemctl_exec_t,s0) +/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t,s0) +/bin/systemd-tmpfiles -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/bin/systemctl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_systemctl_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/systemd-gnome-ask-password-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/systemd-notify -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_notify_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/systemd-tmpfiles -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/systemd-tty-ask-password-agent -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/system(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_unit_file_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-logger -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logger_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-tmpfiles -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t,s0) + +/var/run/nologin gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/systemd/seats(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/systemd/sessions(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_sessions_t,s0) +/var/run/systemd/users(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_logind_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/systemd/ask-password-block(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_passwd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/systemd/ask-password(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:systemd_passwd_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/initramfs(/.*)? <> diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.if b/policy/modules/system/systemd.if new file mode 100644 index 0000000..0898030 --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.if @@ -0,0 +1,696 @@ +## SELinux policy for systemd components + +####################################### +## +## Create a domain for processes which are started +## exuting systemctl. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_systemctl_domain',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_systemctl_exec_t; + role system_r; + attribute systemctl_domain; + ') + + type $1_systemctl_t, systemctl_domain; + domain_type($1_systemctl_t) + domain_entry_file($1_systemctl_t, systemd_systemctl_exec_t) + + role system_r types $1_systemctl_t; + + domtrans_pattern($1_t, systemd_systemctl_exec_t , $1_systemctl_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute systemctl in the caller domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_exec_systemctl',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_systemctl_exec_t; + ') + + corecmd_search_bin($1) + can_exec($1, systemd_systemctl_exec_t) + + fs_list_cgroup_dirs($1) + fs_read_cgroup_files($1) + systemd_list_unit_dirs($1) + init_list_pid_dirs($1) + init_read_state($1) + init_stream_send($1) + init_stream_connect($1) + + systemd_login_list_pid_dirs($1) + systemd_login_read_pid_files($1) +') + +####################################### +## +## Create a file type used for systemd unit files. +## +## +## +## Type to be used for an unit file. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_unit_file',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + typeattribute $1 systemd_unit_file_type; + files_type($1) +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow domain to search systemd unit dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_search_unit_dirs',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow domain to list systemd unit dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_list_unit_dirs',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +##################################### +## +## Allow domain to getattr all systemd unit files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_getattr_unit_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:file getattr_file_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow domain to read all systemd unit files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_read_unit_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + files_search_var_lib($1) + allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:file read_file_perms; + allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +##################################### +## +## Dontaudit domain to read all systemd unit files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_dontaudit_read_unit_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 systemd_unit_file_type:file read_file_perms; +') + +###################################### +## +## Read systemd_login PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_login_read_pid_files',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + read_files_pattern($1, systemd_logind_var_run_t, systemd_logind_var_run_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Read systemd_login PID files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_login_list_pid_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + list_dirs_pattern($1, systemd_logind_var_run_t, systemd_logind_var_run_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Use and and inherited systemd +## logind file descriptors. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_use_fds_logind',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_t; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_logind_t:fd use; +') + +###################################### +## +## Read logind sessions files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_read_logind_sessions_files',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_sessions_t; + ') + + init_search_pid_dirs($1) + allow $1 systemd_logind_sessions_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, systemd_logind_sessions_t, systemd_logind_sessions_t) +') + +###################################### +## +## Write inherited logind sessions pipes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_write_inherited_logind_sessions_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_sessions_t; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_logind_sessions_t:fifo_file write; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send and receive messages from +## systemd logind over dbus. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_dbus_chat_logind',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_t; + class dbus send_msg; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_logind_t:dbus send_msg; + allow systemd_logind_t $1:dbus send_msg; + ps_process_pattern(systemd_logind_t, $1) + allow systemd_logind_t $1:process signal; +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute a domain transition to run systemd-tmpfiles. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_tmpfiles_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_tmpfiles_t, systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t, systemd_tmpfiles_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run systemd-tty-ask-password-agent. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_passwd_agent_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t, systemd_passwd_agent_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute systemd-tty-ask-password-agent in the caller domain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_passwd_agent_exec',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t; + ') + + can_exec($1, systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a domain transition to run systemd_notify. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_notify_domtrans',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_notify_t, systemd_notify_exec_t; + ') + + domtrans_pattern($1, systemd_notify_exec_t, systemd_notify_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute systemd-tty-ask-password-agent in the systemd_passwd_agent domain, and +## allow the specified role the systemd_passwd_agent domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the systemd_passwd_agent domain. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_passwd_agent_run',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_passwd_agent_t; + ') + + systemd_passwd_agent_domtrans($1) + role $2 types systemd_passwd_agent_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Role access for systemd_passwd_agent +## +## +## +## Role allowed access +## +## +## +## +## User domain for the role +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_passwd_agent_role',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_passwd_agent_t; + ') + + role $1 types systemd_passwd_agent_t; + + systemd_passwd_agent_domtrans($2) + + ps_process_pattern($2, systemd_passwd_agent_t) + allow $2 systemd_passwd_agent_t:process signal; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send generic signals to systemd_passwd_agent processes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_signal_passwd_agent',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_passwd_agent_t; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_passwd_agent_t:process signal; +') + +###################################### +## +## Allow to domain to read systemd-passwd pipe +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_read_fifo_file_passwd_run',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_passwd_var_run_t; + ') + + read_sock_files_pattern($1, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t) +') + +####################################### +## +## Send generic signals to systemd_passwd_agent processes. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_manage_passwd_run',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_passwd_agent_t; + type systemd_passwd_var_run_t; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t) + manage_sock_files_pattern($1, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t) + + allow systemd_passwd_agent_t $1:process signull; + allow systemd_passwd_agent_t $1:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +') + +###################################### +## +## Template for temporary sockets and files in /dev/.systemd/ask-password +## which are used by systemd-passwd-agent +## +## +## +## The prefix of the domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_passwd_agent_dev_template',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_passwd_agent_t; + ') + + type systemd_$1_device_t; + files_type(systemd_$1_device_t) + dev_associate(systemd_$1_device_t) + + dev_filetrans($1_t, systemd_$1_device_t, { file sock_file }) + init_pid_filetrans($1_t, systemd_$1_device_t, { file sock_file }) + allow $1_t systemd_$1_device_t:file manage_file_perms; + allow $1_t systemd_$1_device_t:sock_file manage_sock_file_perms; + + allow systemd_passwd_agent_t $1_t:process signull; + allow systemd_passwd_agent_t $1_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; + allow systemd_passwd_agent_t systemd_$1_device_t:sock_file write; + allow systemd_passwd_agent_t systemd_$1_device_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to connect to +## systemd_logger with a unix socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_logger_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logger_t; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_logger_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; +') + +######################################## +## +## manage systemd unit dirs +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_manage_unit_dirs',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, systemd_unit_file_type, systemd_unit_file_type) +') + +######################################## +## +## manage all systemd unit files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_manage_all_unit_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + manage_files_pattern($1, systemd_unit_file_type, systemd_unit_file_type) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, systemd_unit_file_type, systemd_unit_file_type) +') + +######################################## +## +## manage all systemd unit lnk_files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_manage_all_unit_lnk_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, systemd_unit_file_type, systemd_unit_file_type) +') + + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to connect to +## systemd_logger with a unix socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_config_all_services',` + gen_require(` + attribute systemd_unit_file_type; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_unit_file_type:service all_service_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## Transition to systemd named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_filetrans_named_content',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_passwd_var_run_t; + type systemd_logind_var_run_t; + ') + + files_pid_filetrans($1, systemd_logind_var_run_t, file, "nologin") + init_named_pid_filetrans($1, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, dir, "ask-password-block") + init_named_pid_filetrans($1, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, dir, "ask-password") +') + +######################################## +## +## Get the system status information from systemd_login +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_login_status',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_t; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_logind_t:system status; +') + +######################################## +## +## Tell systemd_login to reboot the system. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_login_reboot',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_t; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_logind_t:system reboot; +') + +######################################## +## +## Tell systemd_login to halt the system. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_login_halt',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_t; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_logind_t:system halt; +') + +######################################## +## +## Tell systemd_login to do an unknown access. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`systemd_login_undefined',` + gen_require(` + type systemd_logind_t; + ') + + allow $1 systemd_logind_t:system undefined; +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/system/systemd.te b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te new file mode 100644 index 0000000..c41fc7c --- /dev/null +++ b/policy/modules/system/systemd.te @@ -0,0 +1,421 @@ +policy_module(systemd, 1.0.0) + +####################################### +# +# Declarations +# + +attribute systemd_unit_file_type; +attribute systemd_domain; +attribute systemctl_domain; + +type systemd_logger_t; +type systemd_logger_exec_t; +init_systemd_domain(systemd_logger_t, systemd_logger_exec_t) + +type systemd_logind_t; +type systemd_logind_exec_t; +init_systemd_domain(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_exec_t) + +# /run/systemd/sessions +type systemd_logind_sessions_t; +files_pid_file(systemd_logind_sessions_t) + +# /run/systemd/{seats, users} +type systemd_logind_var_run_t; +files_pid_file(systemd_logind_var_run_t) + +# domain for systemd-tty-ask-password-agent and systemd-gnome-ask-password-agent +# systemd components + +type systemd_passwd_agent_t; +type systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t; +init_daemon_domain(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_agent_exec_t) + +type systemd_passwd_var_run_t alias systemd_device_t; +files_pid_file(systemd_passwd_var_run_t) + +# domain for systemd-tmpfiles component +type systemd_tmpfiles_t; +type systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t; +init_systemd_domain(systemd_tmpfiles_t, systemd_tmpfiles_exec_t) + +type systemd_notify_t; +type systemd_notify_exec_t; +init_systemd_domain(systemd_notify_t, systemd_notify_exec_t) + +# type for systemd unit files +type systemd_unit_file_t; +systemd_unit_file(systemd_unit_file_t) + +# executable for systemctl +type systemd_systemctl_exec_t; +corecmd_executable_file(systemd_systemctl_exec_t) + +####################################### +# +# Systemd_logind local policy +# + +# dac_override is for /run/user/$USER ($USER ownership is $USER:$USER) +allow systemd_logind_t self:capability { chown kill dac_override fowner sys_tty_config }; +allow systemd_logind_t self:process getcap; +allow systemd_logind_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +allow systemd_logind_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(systemd_logind_t, { systemd_logind_sessions_t systemd_logind_var_run_t }, { systemd_logind_sessions_t systemd_logind_var_run_t }) +manage_files_pattern(systemd_logind_t, { systemd_logind_sessions_t systemd_logind_var_run_t }, { systemd_logind_var_run_t systemd_logind_sessions_t }) +manage_fifo_files_pattern(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_sessions_t, { systemd_logind_sessions_t systemd_logind_var_run_t }) +init_named_pid_filetrans(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_sessions_t, dir, "sessions") +init_pid_filetrans(systemd_logind_t, systemd_logind_var_run_t, dir) +init_status(systemd_logind_t) +init_reboot(systemd_logind_t) +init_halt(systemd_logind_t) +init_undefined(systemd_logind_t) + +kernel_read_system_state(systemd_logind_t) + +dev_getattr_all_chr_files(systemd_logind_t) +dev_getattr_all_blk_files(systemd_logind_t) +dev_rw_sysfs(systemd_logind_t) +dev_setattr_all_chr_files(systemd_logind_t) +dev_setattr_dri_dev(systemd_logind_t) +dev_setattr_generic_usb_dev(systemd_logind_t) +dev_setattr_input_dev(systemd_logind_t) +dev_setattr_kvm_dev(systemd_logind_t) +dev_setattr_mouse_dev(systemd_logind_t) +dev_setattr_sound_dev(systemd_logind_t) +dev_setattr_video_dev(systemd_logind_t) +dev_write_kmsg(systemd_logind_t) + +domain_read_all_domains_state(systemd_logind_t) + +# /etc/udev/udev.conf should probably have a private type if only for confined administration +# /etc/nsswitch.conf +files_read_etc_files(systemd_logind_t) + +# /sys/fs/cgroup/systemd/user +fs_manage_cgroup_dirs(systemd_logind_t) +# write getattr open setattr +fs_manage_cgroup_files(systemd_logind_t) + +mcs_killall(systemd_logind_t) + +storage_setattr_removable_dev(systemd_logind_t) +storage_setattr_scsi_generic_dev(systemd_logind_t) + +term_use_unallocated_ttys(systemd_logind_t) + +# /run/user/.* +# Actually only have proof of it creating dirs and symlinks (/run/user/$USER/X11/display) +auth_manage_var_auth(systemd_logind_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(systemd_logind_t) + +authlogin_read_state(systemd_logind_t) + +init_dbus_chat(systemd_logind_t) +init_dbus_chat_script(systemd_logind_t) +init_read_script_state(systemd_logind_t) +init_read_state(systemd_logind_t) +init_rw_stream_sockets(systemd_logind_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_logind_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_logind_t) + +udev_read_db(systemd_logind_t) +udev_manage_rules_files(systemd_logind_t) + +userdom_read_all_users_state(systemd_logind_t) +userdom_use_user_ttys(systemd_logind_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_dirs(systemd_logind_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_files(systemd_logind_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_symlinks(systemd_logind_t) +userdom_manage_user_tmp_sockets(systemd_logind_t) +userdom_signal_all_users(systemd_logind_t) +userdom_signull_all_users(systemd_logind_t) +userdom_kill_all_users(systemd_logind_t) + +application_signal(systemd_logind_t) +application_signull(systemd_logind_t) +application_sigkill(systemd_logind_t) + +optional_policy(` + cron_dbus_chat_crond(systemd_logind_t) + cron_read_state_crond(systemd_logind_t) + cron_signal(systemd_logind_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + dbus_connect_system_bus(systemd_logind_t) + dbus_system_bus_client(systemd_logind_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + devicekit_dbus_chat_power(systemd_logind_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + # we label /run/user/$USER/dconf as config_home_t + gnome_manage_home_config_dirs(systemd_logind_t) + gnome_manage_home_config(systemd_logind_t) + gnome_list_gkeyringd_tmp_dirs(systemd_logind_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + policykit_dbus_chat(systemd_logind_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + # It links /run/user/$USER/X11/display to /tmp/.X11-unix/X* sock_file + xserver_search_xdm_tmp_dirs(systemd_logind_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# Local policy +# + +allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:capability { chown sys_tty_config dac_override }; +allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:process { setfscreate setsockcreate signal }; +allow systemd_passwd_agent_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +manage_dirs_pattern(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t); +manage_files_pattern(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t); +manage_sock_files_pattern(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t); +manage_fifo_files_pattern(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t); +init_pid_filetrans(systemd_passwd_agent_t, systemd_passwd_var_run_t, { dir fifo_file file }) + +kernel_stream_connect(systemd_passwd_agent_t) + +files_read_etc_files(systemd_passwd_agent_t) + +dev_create_generic_dirs(systemd_passwd_agent_t) +dev_read_generic_files(systemd_passwd_agent_t) +dev_write_generic_sock_files(systemd_passwd_agent_t) + +term_read_console(systemd_passwd_agent_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(systemd_passwd_agent_t) + +init_create_pid_dirs(systemd_passwd_agent_t) +init_rw_pipes(systemd_passwd_agent_t) +init_read_utmp(systemd_passwd_agent_t) +init_stream_connect(systemd_passwd_agent_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_passwd_agent_t) + +userdom_use_user_ptys(systemd_passwd_agent_t) + +optional_policy(` + lvm_signull(systemd_passwd_agent_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + plymouthd_stream_connect(systemd_passwd_agent_t) +') + +####################################### +# +# Local policy +# + +allow systemd_tmpfiles_t self:capability { chown dac_override fsetid fowner mknod }; +allow systemd_tmpfiles_t self:process { setfscreate }; + +allow systemd_tmpfiles_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; + +kernel_read_network_state(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +kernel_request_load_module(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +dev_write_kmsg(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +dev_rw_sysfs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +dev_relabel_all_sysfs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +dev_relabel_cpu_online(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +dev_read_cpu_online(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +dev_manage_printer(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +dev_relabel_printer(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +domain_obj_id_change_exemption(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +# systemd-tmpfiles relabel /run/lock and creates /run/lock/lockdev +fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +fs_relabel_tmpfs_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +fs_list_all(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +files_read_etc_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_getattr_all_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_getattr_all_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_getattr_all_sockets(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_getattr_all_symlinks(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_relabel_all_lock_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_relabel_all_pid_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_relabel_all_pid_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_manage_all_pids(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_manage_all_pid_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_manage_all_locks(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_setattr_all_tmp_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_delete_boot_flag(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_delete_all_non_security_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_delete_all_pid_sockets(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_delete_all_pid_pipes(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_purge_tmp(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_manage_generic_tmp_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_manage_generic_tmp_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_relabelfrom_tmp_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_relabelfrom_tmp_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_relabel_all_tmp_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_relabel_all_tmp_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +files_list_lost_found(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +mcs_file_read_all(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +mcs_file_write_all(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +mls_file_read_all_levels(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +mls_file_write_all_levels(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +selinux_get_enforce_mode(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +auth_manage_faillog(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +auth_relabel_faillog(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +auth_manage_var_auth(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +auth_relabel_var_auth_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +auth_relabel_login_records(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +auth_setattr_login_records(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +auth_use_nsswitch(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +init_dgram_send(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +init_rw_stream_sockets(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +logging_create_devlog_dev(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +miscfiles_filetrans_named_content(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +miscfiles_manage_man_pages(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +miscfiles_relabel_man_pages(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +seutil_read_config(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +seutil_read_file_contexts(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + +ifdef(`distro_redhat',` + userdom_list_user_home_content(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_sock_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_symlinks(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + userdom_delete_admin_home_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + apache_delete_sys_content_rw(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + apache_list_cache(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + apache_delete_cache_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + apache_delete_cache_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + apache_setattr_cache_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +') + + +optional_policy(` + auth_rw_login_records(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + # we have /run/user/$USER/dconf + gnome_delete_home_config(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + gnome_delete_home_config_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + gnome_setattr_home_config_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + rpm_read_db(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + rpm_delete_db(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + sandbox_list(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + sandbox_delete_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + sandbox_delete_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + sandbox_delete_lnk_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + sandbox_delete_pipes(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + sandbox_delete_sock_files(systemd_tmpfiles_t) + sandbox_setattr_dirs(systemd_tmpfiles_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# systemd_notify local policy +# +allow systemd_notify_t self:capability chown; +allow systemd_notify_t self:process { fork setfscreate setsockcreate }; + +allow systemd_notify_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow systemd_notify_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +domain_use_interactive_fds(systemd_notify_t) + +files_read_etc_files(systemd_notify_t) +files_read_usr_files(systemd_notify_t) + +fs_getattr_cgroup_files(systemd_notify_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(systemd_notify_t) + +init_rw_stream_sockets(systemd_notify_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_notify_t) + +optional_policy(` + readahead_manage_pid_files(systemd_notify_t) +') + +######################################## +# +# systemd_logger local policy +# + +allow systemd_logger_t self:capability { sys_admin chown kill }; +allow systemd_logger_t self:process { fork setfscreate setsockcreate }; + +allow systemd_logger_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; +allow systemd_logger_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + +kernel_use_fds(systemd_logger_t) + +dev_write_kmsg(systemd_logger_t) + +domain_use_interactive_fds(systemd_logger_t) + +files_read_etc_files(systemd_logger_t) +files_read_usr_files(systemd_logger_t) + +# only needs write +term_use_generic_ptys(systemd_logger_t) + +auth_use_nsswitch(systemd_logger_t) + +# /run/systemd/notify +init_write_pid_socket(systemd_logger_t) + +logging_send_syslog_msg(systemd_logger_t) + +miscfiles_read_localization(systemd_logger_t) + + +######################################## +# +# systemd_sysctl domains local policy +# + +allow systemctl_domain systemd_unit_file_type:dir search_dir_perms; + +fs_list_cgroup_dirs(systemctl_domain) +fs_read_cgroup_files(systemctl_domain) + +# needed by systemctl +init_dgram_send(systemctl_domain) +init_stream_connect(systemctl_domain) +init_read_state(systemctl_domain) +init_list_pid_dirs(systemctl_domain) +init_use_fds(systemctl_domain) + +miscfiles_read_localization(systemctl_domain) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/udev.fc b/policy/modules/system/udev.fc index 0291685..3e3668c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/udev.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/udev.fc @@ -1,6 +1,8 @@ -/dev/\.udev(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_tbl_t,s0) -/dev/\.udevdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_tbl_t,s0) -/dev/udev\.tbl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_tbl_t,s0) +/bin/udevadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) + +/dev/\.udev(/.*)? -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_var_run_t,s0) +/dev/\.udevdb -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_var_run_t,s0) +/dev/udev\.tbl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_var_run_t,s0) /etc/dev\.d/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_helper_exec_t,s0) @@ -10,6 +12,7 @@ /etc/udev/scripts/.+ -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_helper_exec_t,s0) /lib/udev/udev-acl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/lib/udev/udevd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) /sbin/start_udev -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) /sbin/udev -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) @@ -20,5 +23,21 @@ /sbin/wait_for_sysfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) /usr/bin/udevinfo -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/usr/bin/udevadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/sbin/start_udev -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/udev -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/udevadm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/udevd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/udevsend -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/udevstart -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/wait_for_sysfs -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) + +/usr/lib/systemd/systemd-udevd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/udev-acl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) +/usr/lib/udev/udevd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_exec_t,s0) + -/var/run/PackageKit/udev(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/PackageKit/udev(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/libgpod(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_var_run_t,s0) +/var/run/udev(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:udev_var_run_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/udev.if b/policy/modules/system/udev.if index 025348a..c15e57c 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/udev.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/udev.if @@ -34,6 +34,7 @@ interface(`udev_domtrans',` ') domtrans_pattern($1, udev_exec_t, udev_t) + allow $1 udev_t:process noatsecure; ') ######################################## @@ -88,8 +89,7 @@ interface(`udev_read_state',` ') kernel_search_proc($1) - allow $1 udev_t:file read_file_perms; - allow $1 udev_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + ps_process_pattern($1, udev_t) ') ######################################## @@ -160,10 +160,10 @@ interface(`udev_manage_rules_files',` # interface(`udev_dontaudit_search_db',` gen_require(` - type udev_tbl_t; + type udev_var_run_t; ') - dontaudit $1 udev_tbl_t:dir search_dir_perms; + dontaudit $1 udev_var_run_t:dir search_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -183,19 +183,32 @@ interface(`udev_dontaudit_search_db',` ## # interface(`udev_read_db',` + udev_read_pid_files($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow process to modify list of devices. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`udev_rw_db',` gen_require(` - type udev_tbl_t; + type udev_var_run_t; ') + files_search_pids($1) dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) - allow $1 udev_tbl_t:dir list_dir_perms; - read_files_pattern($1, udev_tbl_t, udev_tbl_t) - read_lnk_files_pattern($1, udev_tbl_t, udev_tbl_t) + rw_files_pattern($1, udev_var_run_t, udev_var_run_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Allow process to modify list of devices. +## Allow process to modify relabelto udev database ## ## ## @@ -203,13 +216,36 @@ interface(`udev_read_db',` ## ## # -interface(`udev_rw_db',` +interface(`udev_relabelto_db',` + gen_require(` + type udev_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 udev_var_run_t:file relabelto_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete +## udev pid files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`udev_read_pid_files',` gen_require(` - type udev_tbl_t; + type udev_var_run_t; ') dev_list_all_dev_nodes($1) - allow $1 udev_tbl_t:file rw_file_perms; + files_search_pids($1) + allow $1 udev_var_run_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, udev_var_run_t, udev_var_run_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, udev_var_run_t, udev_var_run_t) ') ######################################## @@ -228,6 +264,84 @@ interface(`udev_manage_pid_files',` type udev_var_run_t; ') - files_search_var_lib($1) + files_search_pids($1) manage_files_pattern($1, udev_var_run_t, udev_var_run_t) ') + +####################################### +## +## Execute udev in the udev domain, and +## allow the specified role the udev domain. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The role to be allowed the iptables domain. +## +## +## +# +interface(`udev_run',` + gen_require(` + type udev_t; + ') + + udev_domtrans($1) + role $2 types udev_t; +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow caller to create kobject uevent socket for udev +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`udev_create_kobject_uevent_socket',` + gen_require(` + type udev_t; + role system_r; + ') + + allow $1 udev_t:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create a domain for processes +## which can be started by udev. +## +## +## +## Type to be used as a domain. +## +## +## +## +## Type of the program to be used as an entry point to this domain. +## +## +# +interface(`udev_system_domain',` + gen_require(` + type udev_t; + role system_r; + ') + + domain_type($1) + domain_entry_file($1, $2) + + role system_r types $1; + + domtrans_pattern(udev_t, $2, $1) + + dontaudit $1 udev_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/system/udev.te b/policy/modules/system/udev.te index d88f7c3..d0a8469 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/udev.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/udev.te @@ -17,14 +17,12 @@ init_daemon_domain(udev_t, udev_exec_t) type udev_etc_t alias etc_udev_t; files_config_file(udev_etc_t) -type udev_tbl_t alias udev_tdb_t; -files_type(udev_tbl_t) - type udev_rules_t; files_type(udev_rules_t) type udev_var_run_t; files_pid_file(udev_var_run_t) +typealias udev_var_run_t alias udev_tbl_t; ifdef(`enable_mcs',` kernel_ranged_domtrans_to(udev_t, udev_exec_t, s0 - mcs_systemhigh) @@ -36,9 +34,10 @@ ifdef(`enable_mcs',` # Local policy # -allow udev_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid sys_admin mknod net_raw net_admin sys_nice sys_rawio sys_resource setuid setgid sys_nice sys_ptrace }; +allow udev_t self:capability { chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid sys_admin mknod net_raw net_admin sys_nice sys_rawio sys_resource setuid setgid sys_nice }; dontaudit udev_t self:capability sys_tty_config; -allow udev_t self:process ~{ setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; + +allow udev_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; allow udev_t self:process { execmem setfscreate }; allow udev_t self:fd use; allow udev_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; @@ -52,6 +51,7 @@ allow udev_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; allow udev_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow udev_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; allow udev_t self:rawip_socket create_socket_perms; +allow udev_t self:netlink_socket create_socket_perms; allow udev_t udev_exec_t:file write; can_exec(udev_t, udev_exec_t) @@ -62,31 +62,35 @@ can_exec(udev_t, udev_helper_exec_t) # read udev config allow udev_t udev_etc_t:file read_file_perms; -# create udev database in /dev/.udevdb -allow udev_t udev_tbl_t:file manage_file_perms; -dev_filetrans(udev_t, udev_tbl_t, file) - list_dirs_pattern(udev_t, udev_rules_t, udev_rules_t) -read_files_pattern(udev_t, udev_rules_t, udev_rules_t) +manage_files_pattern(udev_t, udev_rules_t, udev_rules_t) +manage_lnk_files_pattern(udev_t, udev_rules_t, udev_rules_t) manage_dirs_pattern(udev_t, udev_var_run_t, udev_var_run_t) +manage_sock_files_pattern(udev_t, udev_var_run_t, udev_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(udev_t, udev_var_run_t, udev_var_run_t) manage_lnk_files_pattern(udev_t, udev_var_run_t, udev_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(udev_t, udev_var_run_t, { dir file }) +files_pid_filetrans(udev_t, udev_var_run_t, { file dir }) +allow udev_t udev_var_run_t:file mounton; +dev_filetrans(udev_t, udev_var_run_t, { file lnk_file } ) +kernel_load_module(udev_t) kernel_read_system_state(udev_t) kernel_request_load_module(udev_t) kernel_getattr_core_if(udev_t) kernel_use_fds(udev_t) kernel_read_device_sysctls(udev_t) +kernel_read_fs_sysctls(udev_t) kernel_read_hotplug_sysctls(udev_t) kernel_read_modprobe_sysctls(udev_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(udev_t) kernel_rw_hotplug_sysctls(udev_t) kernel_rw_unix_dgram_sockets(udev_t) kernel_dgram_send(udev_t) -kernel_signal(udev_t) kernel_search_debugfs(udev_t) +kernel_setsched(udev_t) +kernel_stream_connect(udev_t) +kernel_signal(udev_t) #https://bugzilla.redhat.com/bugzilla/show_bug.cgi?id=235182 kernel_rw_net_sysctls(udev_t) @@ -97,6 +101,7 @@ corecmd_exec_all_executables(udev_t) dev_rw_sysfs(udev_t) dev_manage_all_dev_nodes(udev_t) +dev_rw_generic_usb_dev(udev_t) dev_rw_generic_files(udev_t) dev_delete_generic_files(udev_t) dev_search_usbfs(udev_t) @@ -105,23 +110,31 @@ dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes(udev_t) # preserved, instead of short circuiting the relabel dev_relabel_generic_symlinks(udev_t) dev_manage_generic_symlinks(udev_t) +dev_filetrans_all_named_dev(udev_t) domain_read_all_domains_state(udev_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(udev_t) #pidof triggers these files_read_usr_files(udev_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files(udev_t) -files_read_etc_files(udev_t) +files_read_kernel_modules(udev_t) +files_read_system_conf_files(udev_t) + + +# console_init manages files in /etc/sysconfig +files_manage_etc_files(udev_t) files_exec_etc_files(udev_t) +files_exec_usr_files(udev_t) files_dontaudit_search_isid_type_dirs(udev_t) files_getattr_generic_locks(udev_t) files_search_mnt(udev_t) +files_list_tmp(udev_t) fs_getattr_all_fs(udev_t) fs_list_inotifyfs(udev_t) fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files(udev_t) - -mcs_ptrace_all(udev_t) +fs_list_auto_mountpoints(udev_t) +fs_list_hugetlbfs(udev_t) +fs_read_cgroup_files(udev_t) mls_file_read_all_levels(udev_t) mls_file_write_all_levels(udev_t) @@ -143,6 +156,7 @@ auth_use_nsswitch(udev_t) init_read_utmp(udev_t) init_dontaudit_write_utmp(udev_t) init_getattr_initctl(udev_t) +init_stream_connect(udev_t) logging_search_logs(udev_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(udev_t) @@ -154,6 +168,8 @@ miscfiles_read_hwdata(udev_t) modutils_domtrans_insmod(udev_t) # read modules.inputmap: modutils_read_module_deps(udev_t) +modutils_list_module_config(udev_t) +modutils_read_module_config(udev_t) seutil_read_config(udev_t) seutil_read_default_contexts(udev_t) @@ -169,6 +185,8 @@ sysnet_signal_dhcpc(udev_t) sysnet_manage_config(udev_t) sysnet_etc_filetrans_config(udev_t) +systemd_login_read_pid_files(udev_t) + userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content(udev_t) ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` @@ -178,16 +196,9 @@ ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` ') ifdef(`distro_redhat',` - fs_manage_tmpfs_dirs(udev_t) - fs_manage_tmpfs_files(udev_t) - fs_manage_tmpfs_symlinks(udev_t) - fs_manage_tmpfs_sockets(udev_t) - fs_manage_tmpfs_blk_files(udev_t) - fs_manage_tmpfs_chr_files(udev_t) - fs_relabel_tmpfs_blk_file(udev_t) - fs_relabel_tmpfs_chr_file(udev_t) + fs_manage_hugetlbfs_dirs(udev_t) - term_search_ptys(udev_t) + term_use_generic_ptys(udev_t) # for arping used for static IP addresses on PCMCIA ethernet netutils_domtrans(udev_t) @@ -216,11 +227,16 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + consolekit_read_pid_files(udev_t) +') + +optional_policy(` consoletype_exec(udev_t) ') optional_policy(` cups_domtrans_config(udev_t) + cups_read_config(udev_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -230,10 +246,20 @@ optional_policy(` optional_policy(` devicekit_read_pid_files(udev_t) devicekit_dgram_send(udev_t) + devicekit_domtrans_disk(udev_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_read_home_config(udev_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + gpsd_domtrans(udev_t) ') optional_policy(` lvm_domtrans(udev_t) + lvm_dgram_send(udev_t) ') optional_policy(` @@ -259,6 +285,10 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + networkmanager_dbus_chat(udev_t) +') + +optional_policy(` openct_read_pid_files(udev_t) openct_domtrans(udev_t) ') @@ -273,6 +303,11 @@ optional_policy(` ') optional_policy(` + usbmuxd_domtrans(udev_t) + usbmuxd_stream_connect(udev_t) +') + +optional_policy(` unconfined_signal(udev_t) ') @@ -285,6 +320,7 @@ optional_policy(` kernel_read_xen_state(udev_t) xen_manage_log(udev_t) xen_read_image_files(udev_t) + xen_stream_connect_xenstore(udev_t) ') optional_policy(` diff --git a/policy/modules/system/unconfined.fc b/policy/modules/system/unconfined.fc index ce2fbb9..8b34dbc 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/unconfined.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/unconfined.fc @@ -1,15 +1 @@ # Add programs here which should not be confined by SELinux -# e.g.: -# /usr/local/bin/appsrv -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_exec_t,s0) -# For the time being until someone writes a sane policy, we need initrc to transition to unconfined_t -/usr/bin/valgrind -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_execmem_exec_t,s0) -/usr/bin/vncserver -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_exec_t,s0) - -/usr/lib/ia32el/ia32x_loader -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_execmem_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib/openoffice\.org.*/program/.+\.bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_execmem_exec_t,s0) - -/usr/local/RealPlayer/realplay\.bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_execmem_exec_t,s0) - -ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` -/usr/lib32/openoffice/program/[^/]+\.bin -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:unconfined_execmem_exec_t,s0) -') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if b/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if index 416e668..6fc471d 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/unconfined.if @@ -12,53 +12,59 @@ # interface(`unconfined_domain_noaudit',` gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; class dbus all_dbus_perms; class nscd all_nscd_perms; class passwd all_passwd_perms; ') # Use any Linux capability. - allow $1 self:capability *; - allow $1 self:fifo_file manage_fifo_file_perms; + + allow $1 self:capability ~{ sys_module }; + allow $1 self:capability2 syslog; + allow $1 self:fifo_file { manage_fifo_file_perms relabelfrom relabelto }; # Transition to myself, to make get_ordered_context_list happy. - allow $1 self:process transition; + allow $1 self:process { dyntransition transition }; # Write access is for setting attributes under /proc/self/attr. allow $1 self:file rw_file_perms; + allow $1 self:dir rw_dir_perms; # Userland object managers - allow $1 self:nscd *; - allow $1 self:dbus *; - allow $1 self:passwd *; - allow $1 self:association *; + allow $1 self:nscd all_nscd_perms; + allow $1 self:dbus all_dbus_perms; + allow $1 self:passwd all_passwd_perms; + allow $1 self:association all_association_perms; + allow $1 self:socket_class_set create_socket_perms; kernel_unconfined($1) corenet_unconfined($1) dev_unconfined($1) domain_unconfined($1) - domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state($1) - domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains($1) files_unconfined($1) fs_unconfined($1) selinux_unconfined($1) + systemd_config_all_services($1) + + domain_mmap_low($1) + + mcs_file_read_all($1) + + ubac_process_exempt($1) tunable_policy(`allow_execheap',` # Allow making the stack executable via mprotect. allow $1 self:process execheap; ') - tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',` + tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`',` # Allow making anonymous memory executable, e.g. # for runtime-code generation or executable stack. allow $1 self:process execmem; ') tunable_policy(`allow_execstack',` - # Allow making the stack executable via mprotect; - # execstack implies execmem; - allow $1 self:process { execstack execmem }; + allow $1 self:process execstack; # auditallow $1 self:process execstack; ') @@ -69,6 +75,7 @@ interface(`unconfined_domain_noaudit',` optional_policy(` # Communicate via dbusd. dbus_system_bus_unconfined($1) + dbus_unconfined($1) ') optional_policy(` @@ -122,6 +129,10 @@ interface(`unconfined_domain_noaudit',` ## # interface(`unconfined_domain',` + gen_require(` + attribute unconfined_services; + ') + unconfined_domain_noaudit($1) tunable_policy(`allow_execheap',` @@ -150,7 +161,7 @@ interface(`unconfined_domain',` ## # interface(`unconfined_alias_domain',` - refpolicywarn(`$0($1) has been deprecated.') + refpolicywarn(`$0() has been deprecated.') ') ######################################## @@ -176,414 +187,5 @@ interface(`unconfined_alias_domain',` ## # interface(`unconfined_execmem_alias_program',` - refpolicywarn(`$0($1) has been deprecated.') -') - -######################################## -## -## Transition to the unconfined domain. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed to transition. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_domtrans',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t, unconfined_exec_t; - ') - - domtrans_pattern($1, unconfined_exec_t, unconfined_t) -') - -######################################## -## -## Execute specified programs in the unconfined domain. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed to transition. -## -## -## -## -## The role to allow the unconfined domain. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_run',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - unconfined_domtrans($1) - role $2 types unconfined_t; -') - -######################################## -## -## Transition to the unconfined domain by executing a shell. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed to transition. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_shell_domtrans',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - corecmd_shell_domtrans($1, unconfined_t) - allow unconfined_t $1:fd use; - allow unconfined_t $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; - allow unconfined_t $1:process sigchld; -') - -######################################## -## -## Allow unconfined to execute the specified program in -## the specified domain. -## -## -##

    -## Allow unconfined to execute the specified program in -## the specified domain. -##

    -##

    -## This is a interface to support third party modules -## and its use is not allowed in upstream reference -## policy. -##

    -##     -## -## -## Domain to execute in. -## -## -## -## -## Domain entry point file. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_domtrans_to',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - domtrans_pattern(unconfined_t,$2,$1) -') - -######################################## -## -## Allow unconfined to execute the specified program in -## the specified domain. Allow the specified domain the -## unconfined role and use of unconfined user terminals. -## -## -##

    -## Allow unconfined to execute the specified program in -## the specified domain. Allow the specified domain the -## unconfined role and use of unconfined user terminals. -##

    -##

    -## This is a interface to support third party modules -## and its use is not allowed in upstream reference -## policy. -##

    -##     -## -## -## Domain to execute in. -## -## -## -## -## Domain entry point file. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_run_to',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - role unconfined_r; - ') - - domtrans_pattern(unconfined_t,$2,$1) - role unconfined_r types $1; - userdom_use_user_terminals($1) -') - -######################################## -## -## Inherit file descriptors from the unconfined domain. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_use_fds',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:fd use; -') - -######################################## -## -## Send a SIGCHLD signal to the unconfined domain. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_sigchld',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:process sigchld; -') - -######################################## -## -## Send a SIGNULL signal to the unconfined domain. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_signull',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:process signull; -') - -######################################## -## -## Send generic signals to the unconfined domain. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_signal',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:process signal; -') - -######################################## -## -## Read unconfined domain unnamed pipes. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_read_pipes',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:fifo_file read_fifo_file_perms; -') - -######################################## -## -## Do not audit attempts to read unconfined domain unnamed pipes. -## -## -## -## Domain to not audit. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_dontaudit_read_pipes',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - dontaudit $1 unconfined_t:fifo_file read; -') - -######################################## -## -## Read and write unconfined domain unnamed pipes. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_rw_pipes',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -') - -######################################## -## -## Do not audit attempts to read and write -## unconfined domain unnamed pipes. -## -## -## -## Domain to not audit. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_dontaudit_rw_pipes',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - dontaudit $1 unconfined_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms; -') - -######################################## -## -## Connect to the unconfined domain using -## a unix domain stream socket. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_stream_connect',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; -') - -######################################## -## -## Do not audit attempts to read or write -## unconfined domain tcp sockets. -## -## -##

    -## Do not audit attempts to read or write -## unconfined domain tcp sockets. -##

    -##

    -## This interface was added due to a broken -## symptom in ldconfig. -##

    -##     -## -## -## Domain to not audit. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - dontaudit $1 unconfined_t:tcp_socket { read write }; -') - -######################################## -## -## Create keys for the unconfined domain. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_create_keys',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:key create; -') - -######################################## -## -## Send messages to the unconfined domain over dbus. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_dbus_send',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - class dbus send_msg; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:dbus send_msg; -') - -######################################## -## -## Send and receive messages from -## unconfined_t over dbus. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_dbus_chat',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - class dbus send_msg; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:dbus send_msg; - allow unconfined_t $1:dbus send_msg; -') - -######################################## -## -## Connect to the the unconfined DBUS -## for service (acquire_svc). -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`unconfined_dbus_connect',` - gen_require(` - type unconfined_t; - class dbus acquire_svc; - ') - - allow $1 unconfined_t:dbus acquire_svc; + refpolicywarn(`$0() has been deprecated.') ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te b/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te index eae5001..71e46b2 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/unconfined.te @@ -4,231 +4,4 @@ policy_module(unconfined, 3.3.0) # # Declarations # - -# usage in this module of types created by these -# calls is not correct, however we dont currently -# have another method to add access to these types -userdom_base_user_template(unconfined) -userdom_manage_home_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) -userdom_manage_tmp_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) -userdom_manage_tmpfs_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) - -type unconfined_exec_t; -init_system_domain(unconfined_t, unconfined_exec_t) - -type unconfined_execmem_t; -type unconfined_execmem_exec_t; -init_system_domain(unconfined_execmem_t, unconfined_execmem_exec_t) -role unconfined_r types unconfined_execmem_t; - -######################################## -# -# Local policy -# - -domtrans_pattern(unconfined_t, unconfined_execmem_exec_t, unconfined_execmem_t) - -files_create_boot_flag(unconfined_t) - -mcs_killall(unconfined_t) -mcs_ptrace_all(unconfined_t) - -init_run_daemon(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - -libs_run_ldconfig(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - -logging_send_syslog_msg(unconfined_t) -logging_run_auditctl(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - -mount_run_unconfined(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - -seutil_run_setfiles(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -seutil_run_semanage(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - -unconfined_domain(unconfined_t) - -userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_home_content(unconfined_t, { dir file lnk_file fifo_file sock_file }) - -ifdef(`distro_gentoo',` - seutil_run_runinit(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - seutil_init_script_run_runinit(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - ada_domtrans(unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - apache_run_helper(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - apache_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - bind_run_ndc(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - bootloader_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - cron_unconfined_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - init_dbus_chat_script(unconfined_t) - - dbus_stub(unconfined_t) - - optional_policy(` - avahi_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - bluetooth_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - consolekit_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - cups_dbus_chat_config(unconfined_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - hal_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - networkmanager_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) - ') - - optional_policy(` - oddjob_dbus_chat(unconfined_t) - ') -') - -optional_policy(` - firstboot_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - ftp_run_ftpdctl(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - hadoop_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - inn_domtrans(unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - java_run_unconfined(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - lpd_run_checkpc(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - modutils_run_update_mods(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - mono_domtrans(unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - mta_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - oddjob_domtrans_mkhomedir(unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - prelink_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - portmap_run_helper(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - postfix_run_map(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - # cjp: this should probably be removed: - postfix_domtrans_master(unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - pyzor_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - # cjp: this should probably be removed: - rpc_domtrans_nfsd(unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - rpm_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - samba_run_net(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - samba_run_winbind_helper(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - spamassassin_role(unconfined_r, unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - sysnet_run_dhcpc(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) - sysnet_dbus_chat_dhcpc(unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - tzdata_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - usermanage_run_admin_passwd(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - vpn_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - webalizer_run(unconfined_t, unconfined_r) -') - -optional_policy(` - wine_domtrans(unconfined_t) -') - -optional_policy(` - xserver_domtrans(unconfined_t) -') - -######################################## -# -# Unconfined Execmem Local policy -# - -allow unconfined_execmem_t self:process { execstack execmem }; -unconfined_domain_noaudit(unconfined_execmem_t) - -optional_policy(` - dbus_stub(unconfined_execmem_t) - - init_dbus_chat_script(unconfined_execmem_t) - unconfined_dbus_chat(unconfined_execmem_t) - - optional_policy(` - hal_dbus_chat(unconfined_execmem_t) - ') -') +attribute unconfined_services; diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.fc b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.fc index db75976..ce61aed 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.fc @@ -1,4 +1,20 @@ HOME_DIR -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) +HOME_DIR -l gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_home_dir_t,s0-mls_systemhigh) HOME_DIR/.+ gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_home_t,s0) - /tmp/gconfd-USER -d gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t,s0) +/root(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:admin_home_t,s0) +/root/\.cert(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:home_cert_t,s0) +/root/\.debug(/.*)? <> +/dev/shm/pulse-shm.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t,s0) +/dev/shm/mono.* gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_tmpfs_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:home_bin_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.local/bin(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:home_bin_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/Audio(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:audio_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/Music(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:audio_home_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.cert(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:home_cert_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/.kde/share/apps/networkmanagement/certificates(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:home_cert_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.pki(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:home_cert_t,s0) +HOME_DIR/\.gvfs/.* <> +HOME_DIR/\.debug(/.*)? <> + +/var/run/user(/.*)? gen_context(system_u:object_r:user_tmp_t,s0) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if index 4b2878a..b0c7451 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.if @@ -30,9 +30,11 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',` ') attribute $1_file_type; + attribute $1_usertype; - type $1_t, userdomain; + type $1_t, userdomain, $1_usertype; domain_type($1_t) + role $1_r; corecmd_shell_entry_type($1_t) corecmd_bin_entry_type($1_t) domain_user_exemption_target($1_t) @@ -43,79 +45,134 @@ template(`userdom_base_user_template',` term_user_pty($1_t, user_devpts_t) term_user_tty($1_t, user_tty_device_t) - - allow $1_t self:process { signal_perms getsched setsched share getpgid setpgid setcap getsession getattr }; - allow $1_t self:fd use; - allow $1_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; - allow $1_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; - allow $1_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; - allow $1_t self:shm create_shm_perms; - allow $1_t self:sem create_sem_perms; - allow $1_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms; - allow $1_t self:msg { send receive }; - allow $1_t self:context contains; - dontaudit $1_t self:socket create; - - allow $1_t user_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr rw_chr_file_perms }; - term_create_pty($1_t, user_devpts_t) + term_dontaudit_getattr_generic_ptys($1_t) + + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:process { signal_perms getsched setsched share getpgid setpgid getcap setcap getsession getattr }; + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:process ptrace; + ') + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:fd use; + allow $1_usertype $1_t:key { create view read write search link setattr }; + + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto }; + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:shm create_shm_perms; + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:sem create_sem_perms; + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:msgq create_msgq_perms; + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:msg { send receive }; + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:context contains; + dontaudit $1_usertype $1_usertype:socket create; + + allow $1_usertype user_devpts_t:chr_file { setattr rw_chr_file_perms }; + term_create_pty($1_usertype, user_devpts_t) # avoid annoying messages on terminal hangup on role change - dontaudit $1_t user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl; + dontaudit $1_usertype user_devpts_t:chr_file ioctl; - allow $1_t user_tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr rw_chr_file_perms }; + allow $1_usertype user_tty_device_t:chr_file { setattr rw_chr_file_perms }; # avoid annoying messages on terminal hangup on role change - dontaudit $1_t user_tty_device_t:chr_file ioctl; - - kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_t) - kernel_dontaudit_list_unlabeled($1_t) - kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_files($1_t) - kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_symlinks($1_t) - kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_pipes($1_t) - kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_sockets($1_t) - kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_blk_files($1_t) - kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_chr_files($1_t) - - dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files($1_t) - dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files($1_t) + dontaudit $1_usertype user_tty_device_t:chr_file ioctl; + + application_exec_all($1_usertype) + + kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_usertype) + kernel_read_all_sysctls($1_usertype) + kernel_dontaudit_list_unlabeled($1_usertype) + kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_files($1_usertype) + kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_symlinks($1_usertype) + kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_pipes($1_usertype) + kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_sockets($1_usertype) + kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_blk_files($1_usertype) + kernel_dontaudit_getattr_unlabeled_chr_files($1_usertype) + kernel_dontaudit_list_proc($1_usertype) + + dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_blk_files($1_usertype) + dev_dontaudit_getattr_all_chr_files($1_usertype) + dev_getattr_mtrr_dev($1_t) # When the user domain runs ps, there will be a number of access # denials when ps tries to search /proc. Do not audit these denials. - domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state($1_t) - domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_domains($1_t) - domain_dontaudit_getsession_all_domains($1_t) - - files_read_etc_files($1_t) - files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_t) - files_read_usr_files($1_t) + domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state($1_usertype) + domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_domains($1_usertype) + domain_dontaudit_getsession_all_domains($1_usertype) + dev_dontaudit_all_access_check($1_usertype) + + files_read_etc_files($1_usertype) + files_list_mnt($1_usertype) + files_list_var($1_usertype) + files_read_mnt_files($1_usertype) + files_dontaudit_access_check_mnt($1_usertype) + files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_usertype) + files_read_usr_files($1_usertype) + files_read_usr_src_files($1_usertype) # Read directories and files with the readable_t type. # This type is a general type for "world"-readable files. - files_list_world_readable($1_t) - files_read_world_readable_files($1_t) - files_read_world_readable_symlinks($1_t) - files_read_world_readable_pipes($1_t) - files_read_world_readable_sockets($1_t) + files_list_world_readable($1_usertype) + files_read_world_readable_files($1_usertype) + files_read_world_readable_symlinks($1_usertype) + files_read_world_readable_pipes($1_usertype) + files_read_world_readable_sockets($1_usertype) # old broswer_domain(): - files_dontaudit_list_non_security($1_t) - files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_files($1_t) - files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_symlinks($1_t) - files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_pipes($1_t) - files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_sockets($1_t) + files_dontaudit_getattr_all_dirs($1_usertype) + files_dontaudit_list_non_security($1_usertype) + files_dontaudit_getattr_all_files($1_usertype) + files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_symlinks($1_usertype) + files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_pipes($1_usertype) + files_dontaudit_getattr_non_security_sockets($1_usertype) + files_dontaudit_setattr_etc_runtime_files($1_usertype) + + files_exec_usr_files($1_t) + + fs_list_cgroup_dirs($1_usertype) + fs_dontaudit_rw_cgroup_files($1_usertype) + + storage_rw_fuse($1_usertype) + + auth_use_nsswitch($1_t) + + init_stream_connect($1_usertype) + # The library functions always try to open read-write first, + # then fall back to read-only if it fails. + init_dontaudit_rw_utmp($1_usertype) + + libs_exec_ld_so($1_usertype) - libs_exec_ld_so($1_t) + logging_send_audit_msgs($1_t) miscfiles_read_localization($1_t) miscfiles_read_generic_certs($1_t) - sysnet_read_config($1_t) + miscfiles_read_all_certs($1_usertype) + miscfiles_read_localization($1_usertype) + miscfiles_read_man_pages($1_usertype) + miscfiles_read_public_files($1_usertype) + + systemd_dbus_chat_logind($1_usertype) + systemd_read_logind_sessions_files($1_usertype) - tunable_policy(`allow_execmem',` + tunable_policy(`deny_execmem',`', ` # Allow loading DSOs that require executable stack. allow $1_t self:process execmem; ') - tunable_policy(`allow_execmem && allow_execstack',` + tunable_policy(`allow_execstack',` # Allow making the stack executable via mprotect. allow $1_t self:process execstack; ') + + optional_policy(` + abrt_stream_connect($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + fs_list_cgroup_dirs($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + ssh_rw_stream_sockets($1_usertype) + ssh_delete_tmp($1_t) + ssh_signal($1_t) + ') ') ####################################### @@ -149,6 +206,8 @@ interface(`userdom_ro_home_role',` type user_home_t, user_home_dir_t; ') + role $1 types { user_home_t user_home_dir_t }; + ############################## # # Domain access to home dir @@ -166,27 +225,6 @@ interface(`userdom_ro_home_role',` read_sock_files_pattern($2, { user_home_t user_home_dir_t }, user_home_t) files_list_home($2) - tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_list_nfs($2) - fs_read_nfs_files($2) - fs_read_nfs_symlinks($2) - fs_read_nfs_named_sockets($2) - fs_read_nfs_named_pipes($2) - ',` - fs_dontaudit_list_nfs($2) - fs_dontaudit_read_nfs_files($2) - ') - - tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_list_cifs($2) - fs_read_cifs_files($2) - fs_read_cifs_symlinks($2) - fs_read_cifs_named_sockets($2) - fs_read_cifs_named_pipes($2) - ',` - fs_dontaudit_list_cifs($2) - fs_dontaudit_read_cifs_files($2) - ') ') ####################################### @@ -218,8 +256,11 @@ interface(`userdom_ro_home_role',` interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',` gen_require(` type user_home_t, user_home_dir_t; + attribute user_home_type; ') + role $1 types { user_home_type user_home_dir_t }; + ############################## # # Domain access to home dir @@ -228,43 +269,47 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',` type_member $2 user_home_dir_t:dir user_home_dir_t; # full control of the home directory + allow $2 user_home_t:dir mounton; allow $2 user_home_t:file entrypoint; - manage_dirs_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - manage_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - manage_sock_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - manage_fifo_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - relabel_dirs_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - relabel_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - relabel_sock_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - relabel_fifo_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) + + allow $2 user_home_type:dir_file_class_set { relabelto relabelfrom }; + allow $2 user_home_dir_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + manage_dirs_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + manage_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + manage_sock_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + manage_fifo_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + relabel_dirs_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + relabel_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + relabel_sock_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + relabel_fifo_files_pattern($2, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) filetrans_pattern($2, user_home_dir_t, user_home_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + userdom_filetrans_home_content($2) + files_list_home($2) # cjp: this should probably be removed: allow $2 user_home_dir_t:dir { manage_dir_perms relabel_dir_perms }; tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_mount_nfs($2) + fs_mounton_nfs($2) fs_manage_nfs_dirs($2) fs_manage_nfs_files($2) fs_manage_nfs_symlinks($2) fs_manage_nfs_named_sockets($2) fs_manage_nfs_named_pipes($2) - ',` - fs_dontaudit_manage_nfs_dirs($2) - fs_dontaudit_manage_nfs_files($2) ') tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_mount_cifs($2) + fs_mounton_cifs($2) fs_manage_cifs_dirs($2) fs_manage_cifs_files($2) fs_manage_cifs_symlinks($2) fs_manage_cifs_named_sockets($2) fs_manage_cifs_named_pipes($2) - ',` - fs_dontaudit_manage_cifs_dirs($2) - fs_dontaudit_manage_cifs_files($2) ') ') @@ -272,6 +317,25 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',` ## ## Manage user temporary files ## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_manage_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Manage user temporary files +## ## ## ## Role allowed access. @@ -286,17 +350,64 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_home_role',` # interface(`userdom_manage_tmp_role',` gen_require(` + attribute user_tmp_type; type user_tmp_t; ') + role $1 types user_tmp_t; + files_poly_member_tmp($2, user_tmp_t) - manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) - manage_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) - manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) - manage_sock_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) - manage_fifo_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) + allow $2 user_tmp_type:dir mounton; + manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + manage_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + manage_sock_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + manage_fifo_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) files_tmp_filetrans($2, user_tmp_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + relabel_dirs_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + relabel_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + relabel_sock_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + relabel_fifo_files_pattern($2, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) +') + +####################################### +## +## Dontaudit search of user bin dirs. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_search_user_bin_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type home_bin_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 home_bin_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Execute user bin files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_exec_user_bin_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + type home_bin_t, user_home_dir_t; + ') + + exec_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, home_bin_t) + files_search_home($1) ') ####################################### @@ -316,6 +427,7 @@ interface(`userdom_exec_user_tmp_files',` ') exec_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) + dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:sock_file execute; files_search_tmp($1) ') @@ -347,59 +459,62 @@ interface(`userdom_exec_user_tmp_files',` # interface(`userdom_manage_tmpfs_role',` gen_require(` + attribute user_tmpfs_type; type user_tmpfs_t; ') - manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t) - manage_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t) - manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t) - manage_sock_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t) - manage_fifo_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t) + role $1 types user_tmpfs_t; + + manage_dirs_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + manage_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + manage_sock_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + manage_fifo_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) fs_tmpfs_filetrans($2, user_tmpfs_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + relabel_dirs_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + relabel_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + relabel_lnk_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + relabel_sock_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + relabel_fifo_files_pattern($2, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) ') ####################################### ## -## The template allowing the user basic +## The interface allowing the user basic ## network permissions ## -## +## ## -## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user -## is the prefix for user_t). +## The user domain ## ## ## # -template(`userdom_basic_networking_template',` - gen_require(` - type $1_t; - ') - - allow $1_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - allow $1_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; - - corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1_t) - corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node($1_t) - corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_t) - corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_t) - corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_t) - corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets($1_t) - - corenet_all_recvfrom_labeled($1_t, $1_t) +interface(`userdom_basic_networking',` + + allow $1 self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; + allow $1 self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; + + corenet_all_recvfrom_unlabeled($1) + corenet_all_recvfrom_netlabel($1) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node($1) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_node($1) + corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1) + corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1) + corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1) + corenet_sendrecv_all_client_packets($1) optional_policy(` - init_tcp_recvfrom_all_daemons($1_t) - init_udp_recvfrom_all_daemons($1_t) + init_tcp_recvfrom_all_daemons($1) + init_udp_recvfrom_all_daemons($1) ') optional_policy(` - ipsec_match_default_spd($1_t) + ipsec_match_default_spd($1) ') + ') ####################################### @@ -430,6 +545,7 @@ template(`userdom_xwindows_client_template',` dev_dontaudit_rw_dri($1_t) # GNOME checks for usb and other devices: dev_rw_usbfs($1_t) + dev_rw_generic_usb_dev($1_t) xserver_user_x_domain_template($1, $1_t, user_tmpfs_t) xserver_xsession_entry_type($1_t) @@ -462,8 +578,8 @@ template(`userdom_change_password_template',` ') optional_policy(` - usermanage_run_chfn($1_t, $1_r) - usermanage_run_passwd($1_t, $1_r) + usermanage_run_chfn($1_t,$1_r) + usermanage_run_passwd($1_t,$1_r) ') ') @@ -490,7 +606,7 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',` attribute unpriv_userdomain; ') - userdom_basic_networking_template($1) + userdom_basic_networking($1_usertype) ############################## # @@ -500,73 +616,83 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',` # evolution and gnome-session try to create a netlink socket dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown }; dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_route_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read nlmsg_write }; + allow $1_t self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; + allow $1_t self:socket create_socket_perms; - allow $1_t unpriv_userdomain:fd use; + allow $1_usertype unpriv_userdomain:fd use; - kernel_read_system_state($1_t) - kernel_read_network_state($1_t) - kernel_read_net_sysctls($1_t) + kernel_read_system_state($1_usertype) + kernel_read_network_state($1_usertype) + kernel_read_software_raid_state($1_usertype) + kernel_read_net_sysctls($1_usertype) # Very permissive allowing every domain to see every type: - kernel_get_sysvipc_info($1_t) + kernel_get_sysvipc_info($1_usertype) # Find CDROM devices: - kernel_read_device_sysctls($1_t) - - corecmd_exec_bin($1_t) + kernel_read_device_sysctls($1_usertype) + kernel_request_load_module($1_usertype) - corenet_udp_bind_generic_node($1_t) - corenet_udp_bind_generic_port($1_t) + corenet_udp_bind_generic_node($1_usertype) + corenet_udp_bind_generic_port($1_usertype) - dev_read_rand($1_t) - dev_write_sound($1_t) - dev_read_sound($1_t) - dev_read_sound_mixer($1_t) - dev_write_sound_mixer($1_t) + dev_read_rand($1_usertype) + dev_write_sound($1_usertype) + dev_read_sound($1_usertype) + dev_read_sound_mixer($1_usertype) + dev_write_sound_mixer($1_usertype) - files_exec_etc_files($1_t) - files_search_locks($1_t) + files_exec_etc_files($1_usertype) + files_search_locks($1_usertype) # Check to see if cdrom is mounted - files_search_mnt($1_t) + files_search_mnt($1_usertype) # cjp: perhaps should cut back on file reads: - files_read_var_files($1_t) - files_read_var_symlinks($1_t) - files_read_generic_spool($1_t) - files_read_var_lib_files($1_t) + files_read_var_files($1_usertype) + files_read_var_symlinks($1_usertype) + files_read_generic_spool($1_usertype) + files_read_var_lib_files($1_usertype) # Stat lost+found. - files_getattr_lost_found_dirs($1_t) + files_getattr_lost_found_dirs($1_usertype) + files_read_config_files($1_usertype) + fs_read_noxattr_fs_files($1_usertype) + fs_read_noxattr_fs_symlinks($1_usertype) + fs_rw_cgroup_files($1_usertype) - fs_rw_cgroup_files($1_t) + application_getattr_socket($1_usertype) + + logging_send_syslog_msg($1_usertype) + logging_send_audit_msgs($1_usertype) + selinux_get_enforce_mode($1_usertype) # cjp: some of this probably can be removed - selinux_get_fs_mount($1_t) - selinux_validate_context($1_t) - selinux_compute_access_vector($1_t) - selinux_compute_create_context($1_t) - selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_t) - selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_t) + selinux_get_fs_mount($1_usertype) + selinux_validate_context($1_usertype) + selinux_compute_access_vector($1_usertype) + selinux_compute_create_context($1_usertype) + selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_usertype) + selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_usertype) # for eject - storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev($1_t) + storage_getattr_fixed_disk_dev($1_usertype) - auth_use_nsswitch($1_t) - auth_read_login_records($1_t) - auth_search_pam_console_data($1_t) - auth_run_pam($1_t, $1_r) - auth_run_utempter($1_t, $1_r) + auth_read_login_records($1_usertype) + auth_run_pam($1_t,$1_r) + auth_run_utempter($1_t,$1_r) + auth_filetrans_admin_home_content($1_t) + auth_filetrans_home_content($1_t) - init_read_utmp($1_t) + init_read_utmp($1_usertype) - seutil_read_file_contexts($1_t) - seutil_read_default_contexts($1_t) - seutil_run_newrole($1_t, $1_r) + seutil_read_file_contexts($1_usertype) + seutil_read_default_contexts($1_usertype) + seutil_run_newrole($1_t,$1_r) seutil_exec_checkpolicy($1_t) - seutil_exec_setfiles($1_t) + seutil_exec_setfiles($1_usertype) # for when the network connection is killed # this is needed when a login role can change # to this one. seutil_dontaudit_signal_newrole($1_t) tunable_policy(`user_direct_mouse',` - dev_read_mouse($1_t) + dev_read_mouse($1_usertype) ') tunable_policy(`user_ttyfile_stat',` @@ -574,67 +700,113 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',` ') optional_policy(` - alsa_manage_home_files($1_t) - alsa_read_rw_config($1_t) - alsa_relabel_home_files($1_t) + # Allow graphical boot to check battery lifespan + apm_stream_connect($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - # Allow graphical boot to check battery lifespan - apm_stream_connect($1_t) + canna_stream_connect($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + chrome_role($1_r, $1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - canna_stream_connect($1_t) + colord_read_lib_files($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - dbus_system_bus_client($1_t) + dbus_system_bus_client($1_usertype) + + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:dbus send_msg; + + optional_policy(` + avahi_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + policykit_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + bluetooth_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + consolekit_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + consolekit_read_log($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + devicekit_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + devicekit_dbus_chat_power($1_usertype) + devicekit_dbus_chat_disk($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + evolution_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + evolution_alarm_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + gnome_dbus_chat_gconfdefault($1_usertype) + ') optional_policy(` - bluetooth_dbus_chat($1_t) + hal_dbus_chat($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - evolution_dbus_chat($1_t) - evolution_alarm_dbus_chat($1_t) + kde_dbus_chat_backlighthelper($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - cups_dbus_chat_config($1_t) + modemmanager_dbus_chat($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - hal_dbus_chat($1_t) + networkmanager_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + networkmanager_read_lib_files($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - networkmanager_dbus_chat($1_t) + vpn_dbus_chat($1_usertype) ') ') optional_policy(` - inetd_use_fds($1_t) - inetd_rw_tcp_sockets($1_t) + git_session_role($1_r, $1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + inetd_use_fds($1_usertype) + inetd_rw_tcp_sockets($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + inn_read_config($1_usertype) + inn_read_news_lib($1_usertype) + inn_read_news_spool($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - inn_read_config($1_t) - inn_read_news_lib($1_t) - inn_read_news_spool($1_t) + lircd_stream_connect($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - locate_read_lib_files($1_t) + locate_read_lib_files($1_usertype) ') # for running depmod as part of the kernel packaging process optional_policy(` - modutils_read_module_config($1_t) + modutils_read_module_config($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - mta_rw_spool($1_t) + mta_rw_spool($1_usertype) + mta_manage_queue($1_usertype) + mta_filetrans_home_content($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` @@ -650,40 +822,52 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',` optional_policy(` # to allow monitoring of pcmcia status - pcmcia_read_pid($1_t) + pcmcia_read_pid($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - pcscd_read_pub_files($1_t) - pcscd_stream_connect($1_t) + pcscd_read_pub_files($1_usertype) + pcscd_stream_connect($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` tunable_policy(`allow_user_postgresql_connect',` - postgresql_stream_connect($1_t) - postgresql_tcp_connect($1_t) + postgresql_stream_connect($1_usertype) + postgresql_tcp_connect($1_usertype) ') ') optional_policy(` - resmgr_stream_connect($1_t) + resmgr_stream_connect($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + rpc_dontaudit_getattr_exports($1_usertype) + rpc_manage_nfs_rw_content($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + rpcbind_stream_connect($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - rpc_dontaudit_getattr_exports($1_t) - rpc_manage_nfs_rw_content($1_t) + samba_stream_connect_winbind($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - samba_stream_connect_winbind($1_t) + sandbox_transition($1_usertype, $1_r) ') optional_policy(` - slrnpull_search_spool($1_t) + seunshare_role_template($1, $1_r, $1_t) ') optional_policy(` - usernetctl_run($1_t, $1_r) + slrnpull_search_spool($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + thumb_role($1_r, $1_usertype) ') ') @@ -708,17 +892,33 @@ template(`userdom_common_user_template',` template(`userdom_login_user_template', ` gen_require(` class context contains; + attribute login_userdomain; ') userdom_base_user_template($1) - userdom_manage_home_role($1_r, $1_t) + typeattribute $1_t login_userdomain; + + userdom_manage_home_role($1_r, $1_usertype) - userdom_manage_tmp_role($1_r, $1_t) - userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($1_r, $1_t) + userdom_manage_tmp_role($1_r, $1_usertype) + userdom_manage_tmpfs_role($1_r, $1_usertype) + + ifelse(`$1',`unconfined',`',` + gen_tunable(allow_$1_exec_content, true) + + tunable_policy(`allow_$1_exec_content',` + userdom_exec_user_tmp_files($1_usertype) + userdom_exec_user_home_content_files($1_usertype) + ') + tunable_policy(`allow_$1_exec_content && use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_exec_nfs_files($1_usertype) + ') - userdom_exec_user_tmp_files($1_t) - userdom_exec_user_home_content_files($1_t) + tunable_policy(`allow_$1_exec_content && use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_exec_cifs_files($1_usertype) + ') + ') userdom_change_password_template($1) @@ -727,81 +927,98 @@ template(`userdom_login_user_template', ` # User domain Local policy # - allow $1_t self:capability { setgid chown fowner }; + allow $1_t self:capability { setgid setuid chown fowner }; + allow $1_t self:process setcurrent; + domain_dyntrans_type($1_t) dontaudit $1_t self:capability { sys_nice fsetid }; - allow $1_t self:process ~{ setcurrent setexec setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; + allow $1_t self:process ~{ ptrace setrlimit execmem execstack execheap }; dontaudit $1_t self:process setrlimit; dontaudit $1_t self:netlink_route_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown nlmsg_read nlmsg_write }; allow $1_t self:context contains; - kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state($1_t) + kernel_dontaudit_read_system_state($1_usertype) + kernel_dontaudit_list_all_proc($1_usertype) - dev_read_sysfs($1_t) - dev_read_urand($1_t) + dev_read_sysfs($1_usertype) + dev_read_rand($1_usertype) + dev_read_urand($1_usertype) - domain_use_interactive_fds($1_t) + domain_use_interactive_fds($1_usertype) # Command completion can fire hundreds of denials - domain_dontaudit_exec_all_entry_files($1_t) + domain_dontaudit_exec_all_entry_files($1_usertype) - files_dontaudit_list_default($1_t) - files_dontaudit_read_default_files($1_t) + files_dontaudit_list_default($1_usertype) + files_dontaudit_read_default_files($1_usertype) # Stat lost+found. - files_getattr_lost_found_dirs($1_t) + files_getattr_lost_found_dirs($1_usertype) - fs_get_all_fs_quotas($1_t) - fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t) - fs_getattr_all_dirs($1_t) - fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_t) - fs_list_cgroup_dirs($1_t) - fs_list_inotifyfs($1_t) - fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files($1_t) - fs_dontaudit_rw_cgroup_files($1_t) + fs_get_all_fs_quotas($1_usertype) + fs_getattr_all_fs($1_usertype) + fs_search_all($1_usertype) + fs_list_inotifyfs($1_usertype) + fs_rw_anon_inodefs_files($1_usertype) + auth_role($1_r, $1_t) + auth_rw_cache($1_t) + auth_search_pam_console_data($1_t) + auth_dontaudit_read_login_records($1_t) auth_dontaudit_write_login_records($1_t) application_exec_all($1_t) - # The library functions always try to open read-write first, # then fall back to read-only if it fails. init_dontaudit_rw_utmp($1_t) + # Stop warnings about access to /dev/console - init_dontaudit_use_fds($1_t) - init_dontaudit_use_script_fds($1_t) + init_dontaudit_use_fds($1_usertype) + init_dontaudit_use_script_fds($1_usertype) - libs_exec_lib_files($1_t) + libs_exec_lib_files($1_usertype) - logging_dontaudit_getattr_all_logs($1_t) + logging_dontaudit_getattr_all_logs($1_usertype) - miscfiles_read_man_pages($1_t) # for running TeX programs - miscfiles_read_tetex_data($1_t) - miscfiles_exec_tetex_data($1_t) + miscfiles_read_tetex_data($1_usertype) + miscfiles_exec_tetex_data($1_usertype) + + seutil_read_config($1_usertype) + seutil_read_file_contexts($1_usertype) + seutil_read_default_contexts($1_usertype) + seutil_exec_setfiles($1_usertype) - seutil_read_config($1_t) + optional_policy(` + cups_read_config($1_usertype) + cups_stream_connect($1_usertype) + cups_stream_connect_ptal($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + kerberos_use($1_usertype) + kerberos_filetrans_home_content($1_usertype) + ') optional_policy(` - cups_read_config($1_t) - cups_stream_connect($1_t) - cups_stream_connect_ptal($1_t) + mysql_filetrans_named_content($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - kerberos_use($1_t) + mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - mta_dontaudit_read_spool_symlinks($1_t) + quota_dontaudit_getattr_db($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - quota_dontaudit_getattr_db($1_t) + rpm_read_db($1_usertype) + rpm_dontaudit_manage_db($1_usertype) + rpm_read_cache($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - rpm_read_db($1_t) - rpm_dontaudit_manage_db($1_t) + oddjob_run_mkhomedir($1_t, $1_r) ') ') @@ -833,6 +1050,12 @@ template(`userdom_restricted_user_template',` typeattribute $1_t unpriv_userdomain; domain_interactive_fd($1_t) + allow $1_usertype self:netlink_kobject_uevent_socket create_socket_perms; + dontaudit $1_usertype self:netlink_audit_socket create_socket_perms; + + seutil_read_file_contexts($1_t) + seutil_read_default_contexts($1_t) + ############################## # # Local policy @@ -873,46 +1096,115 @@ template(`userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template',` # Local policy # - auth_role($1_r, $1_t) - auth_search_pam_console_data($1_t) - - dev_read_sound($1_t) - dev_write_sound($1_t) + dev_read_sound($1_usertype) + dev_write_sound($1_usertype) # gnome keyring wants to read this. - dev_dontaudit_read_rand($1_t) + dev_dontaudit_read_rand($1_usertype) + # temporarily allow since openoffice requires this + dev_read_rand($1_usertype) - logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) + dev_read_video_dev($1_usertype) + dev_write_video_dev($1_usertype) + dev_rw_wireless($1_usertype) + + libs_dontaudit_setattr_lib_files($1_usertype) + + tunable_policy(`user_rw_noexattrfile',` + dev_rw_usbfs($1_t) + dev_rw_generic_usb_dev($1_usertype) + + fs_manage_noxattr_fs_files($1_usertype) + fs_manage_noxattr_fs_dirs($1_usertype) + fs_manage_dos_dirs($1_usertype) + fs_manage_dos_files($1_usertype) + storage_raw_read_removable_device($1_usertype) + storage_raw_write_removable_device($1_usertype) + ') + + logging_send_syslog_msg($1_usertype) logging_dontaudit_send_audit_msgs($1_t) # Need to to this just so screensaver will work. Should be moved to screensaver domain logging_send_audit_msgs($1_t) selinux_get_enforce_mode($1_t) + seutil_exec_restorecond($1_t) + seutil_read_file_contexts($1_t) + seutil_read_default_contexts($1_t) xserver_restricted_role($1_r, $1_t) optional_policy(` - alsa_read_rw_config($1_t) + alsa_read_rw_config($1_usertype) + ') + + # cjp: needed by KDE apps + # bug: #682499 + optional_policy(` + gnome_read_usr_config($1_usertype) + gnome_role_gkeyringd($1, $1_r, $1_usertype) + # cjp: telepathy F15 bugs + telepathy_role($1_r, $1_t, $1) + ') + + optional_policy(` + obex_role($1_r, $1_t, $1) ') optional_policy(` - dbus_role_template($1, $1_r, $1_t) - dbus_system_bus_client($1_t) + dbus_role_template($1, $1_r, $1_usertype) + dbus_system_bus_client($1_usertype) + allow $1_usertype $1_usertype:dbus send_msg; + + optional_policy(` + abrt_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + abrt_run_helper($1_usertype, $1_r) + ') + + optional_policy(` + consolekit_dontaudit_read_log($1_usertype) + consolekit_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + cups_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + cups_dbus_chat_config($1_usertype) + ') optional_policy(` - consolekit_dbus_chat($1_t) + devicekit_dbus_chat($1_usertype) + devicekit_dbus_chat_disk($1_usertype) + devicekit_dbus_chat_power($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - cups_dbus_chat($1_t) + fprintd_dbus_chat($1_t) ') ') optional_policy(` - java_role($1_r, $1_t) + policykit_role($1_r, $1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + pulseaudio_role($1_r, $1_usertype) + pulseaudio_filetrans_admin_home_content($1_usertype) + pulseaudio_filetrans_home_content($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + rtkit_scheduled($1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` setroubleshoot_dontaudit_stream_connect($1_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + udev_read_db($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + wm_role_template($1, $1_r, $1_t) ') ') @@ -947,7 +1239,7 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', ` # # Inherit rules for ordinary users. - userdom_restricted_user_template($1) + userdom_restricted_xwindows_user_template($1) userdom_common_user_template($1) ############################## @@ -956,12 +1248,15 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', ` # # port access is audited even if dac would not have allowed it, so dontaudit it here - corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports($1_t) +# corenet_dontaudit_tcp_bind_all_reserved_ports($1_t) # Need the following rule to allow users to run vpnc corenet_tcp_bind_xserver_port($1_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node($1_usertype) + + storage_rw_fuse($1_t) files_exec_usr_files($1_t) - # cjp: why? + # cjp: why? files_read_kernel_symbol_table($1_t) ifndef(`enable_mls',` @@ -978,23 +1273,60 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', ` ') ') - tunable_policy(`user_dmesg',` - kernel_read_ring_buffer($1_t) - ',` - kernel_dontaudit_read_ring_buffer($1_t) - ') + miscfiles_read_hwdata($1_usertype) # Allow users to run TCP servers (bind to ports and accept connection from # the same domain and outside users) disabling this forces FTP passive mode # and may change other protocols + + tunable_policy(`user_share_music',` + corenet_tcp_bind_daap_port($1_usertype) + ') + tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',` - corenet_tcp_bind_generic_node($1_t) - corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port($1_t) + corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports($1_usertype) + ') + + tunable_policy(`user_setrlimit',` + allow $1_usertype self:process setrlimit; + ') + + optional_policy(` + cdrecord_role($1_r, $1_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + cron_role($1_r, $1_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + games_rw_data($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + gpg_role($1_r, $1_usertype) ') optional_policy(` - netutils_run_ping_cond($1_t, $1_r) - netutils_run_traceroute_cond($1_t, $1_r) + gnomeclock_dbus_chat($1_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + gpm_stream_connect($1_usertype) + ') + + optional_policy(` + mount_run_fusermount($1_t, $1_r) + mount_read_pid_files($1_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + wine_role_template($1, $1_r, $1_t) + ') + + optional_policy(` + postfix_run_postdrop($1_t, $1_r) + postfix_search_spool($1_t) ') # Run pppd in pppd_t by default for user @@ -1003,7 +1335,9 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', ` ') optional_policy(` - setroubleshoot_stream_connect($1_t) + vdagent_getattr_log($1_t) + vdagent_getattr_exec_files($1_t) + vdagent_stream_connect($1_t) ') ') @@ -1039,7 +1373,7 @@ template(`userdom_unpriv_user_template', ` template(`userdom_admin_user_template',` gen_require(` attribute admindomain; - class passwd { passwd chfn chsh rootok }; + class passwd { passwd chfn chsh rootok crontab }; ') ############################## @@ -1066,6 +1400,7 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',` # allow $1_t self:capability ~{ sys_module audit_control audit_write }; + allow $1_t self:capability2 syslog; allow $1_t self:process { setexec setfscreate }; allow $1_t self:netlink_audit_socket nlmsg_readpriv; allow $1_t self:tun_socket create; @@ -1074,6 +1409,9 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',` # Skip authentication when pam_rootok is specified. allow $1_t self:passwd rootok; + # Manipulate other users crontab. + allow $1_t self:passwd crontab; + kernel_read_software_raid_state($1_t) kernel_getattr_core_if($1_t) kernel_getattr_message_if($1_t) @@ -1088,6 +1426,7 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',` kernel_sigstop_unlabeled($1_t) kernel_signull_unlabeled($1_t) kernel_sigchld_unlabeled($1_t) + kernel_signal($1_t) corenet_tcp_bind_generic_port($1_t) # allow setting up tunnels @@ -1105,10 +1444,13 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',` dev_rename_all_blk_files($1_t) dev_rename_all_chr_files($1_t) dev_create_generic_symlinks($1_t) + dev_rw_generic_usb_dev($1_t) + dev_rw_usbfs($1_t) domain_setpriority_all_domains($1_t) domain_read_all_domains_state($1_t) domain_getattr_all_domains($1_t) + domain_getcap_all_domains($1_t) domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains($1_t) # signal all domains: domain_kill_all_domains($1_t) @@ -1119,29 +1461,38 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',` domain_sigchld_all_domains($1_t) # for lsof domain_getattr_all_sockets($1_t) + domain_dontaudit_getattr_all_sockets($1_t) files_exec_usr_src_files($1_t) fs_getattr_all_fs($1_t) + fs_getattr_all_files($1_t) + fs_list_all($1_t) fs_set_all_quotas($1_t) fs_exec_noxattr($1_t) storage_raw_read_removable_device($1_t) storage_raw_write_removable_device($1_t) + storage_dontaudit_read_fixed_disk($1_t) - term_use_all_terms($1_t) + term_use_all_inherited_terms($1_t) + term_use_unallocated_ttys($1_t) auth_getattr_shadow($1_t) # Manage almost all files - auth_manage_all_files_except_shadow($1_t) + files_manage_non_security_dirs($1_t) + files_manage_non_security_files($1_t) # Relabel almost all files - auth_relabel_all_files_except_shadow($1_t) + files_relabel_non_security_files($1_t) init_telinit($1_t) logging_send_syslog_msg($1_t) - modutils_domtrans_insmod($1_t) + optional_policy(` + modutils_domtrans_insmod($1_t) + modutils_domtrans_depmod($1_t) + ') # The following rule is temporary until such time that a complete # policy management infrastructure is in place so that an administrator @@ -1151,6 +1502,8 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',` # But presently necessary for installing the file_contexts file. seutil_manage_bin_policy($1_t) + systemd_config_all_services($1_t) + userdom_manage_user_home_content_dirs($1_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_files($1_t) userdom_manage_user_home_content_symlinks($1_t) @@ -1165,6 +1518,10 @@ template(`userdom_admin_user_template',` fs_read_noxattr_fs_files($1_t) ') + tunable_policy(`user_tcp_server',` + corenet_tcp_bind_all_unreserved_ports($1_t) + ') + optional_policy(` postgresql_unconfined($1_t) ') @@ -1210,6 +1567,8 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',` dev_relabel_all_dev_nodes($1) files_create_boot_flag($1) + files_create_default_dir($1) + files_root_filetrans_default($1, dir) # Necessary for managing /boot/efi fs_manage_dos_files($1) @@ -1222,8 +1581,9 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',` selinux_set_enforce_mode($1) selinux_set_all_booleans($1) selinux_set_parameters($1) + selinux_read_policy($1) - auth_relabel_all_files_except_shadow($1) + files_relabel_all_files($1) auth_relabel_shadow($1) init_exec($1) @@ -1234,13 +1594,24 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',` logging_read_audit_config($1) seutil_manage_bin_policy($1) - seutil_run_checkpolicy($1, $2) - seutil_run_loadpolicy($1, $2) - seutil_run_semanage($1, $2) + seutil_manage_default_contexts($1) + seutil_manage_file_contexts($1) + seutil_manage_module_store($1) + seutil_manage_config($1) + seutil_run_checkpolicy($1,$2) + seutil_run_loadpolicy($1,$2) + seutil_run_semanage($1,$2) + seutil_run_setsebool($1,$2) seutil_run_setfiles($1, $2) + seutil_manage_bin_policy($1) + seutil_manage_default_contexts($1) + seutil_manage_file_contexts($1) + seutil_manage_module_store($1) + seutil_manage_config($1) + optional_policy(` - aide_run($1, $2) + aide_run($1,$2) ') optional_policy(` @@ -1251,12 +1622,12 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',` dmesg_exec($1) ') - optional_policy(` - ipsec_run_setkey($1, $2) + optional_policy(` + ipsec_run_setkey($1,$2) ') optional_policy(` - netlabel_run_mgmt($1, $2) + netlabel_run_mgmt($1,$2) ') optional_policy(` @@ -1279,25 +1650,74 @@ template(`userdom_security_admin_template',` interface(`userdom_user_home_content',` gen_require(` type user_home_t; + attribute user_home_type; ') allow $1 user_home_t:filesystem associate; files_type($1) - files_poly_member($1) ubac_constrained($1) + + files_poly_member($1) + typeattribute $1 user_home_type; ') ######################################## ## -## Allow domain to attach to TUN devices created by administrative users. +## Make the specified type usable in a +## generic temporary directory. ## -## +## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Type to be used as a file in the +## generic temporary directory. ## ## # -interface(`userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface',` +interface(`userdom_user_tmp_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_tmp_type; + ') + + typeattribute $1 user_tmp_type; + + files_tmp_file($1) + ubac_constrained($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Make the specified type usable in a +## generic tmpfs_t directory. +## +## +## +## Type to be used as a file in the +## generic temporary directory. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_user_tmpfs_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_tmpfs_type; + ') + + typeattribute $1 user_tmpfs_type; + + files_tmpfs_file($1) + ubac_constrained($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow domain to attach to TUN devices created by administrative users. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_attach_admin_tun_iface',` gen_require(` attribute admindomain; ') @@ -1395,11 +1815,31 @@ interface(`userdom_search_user_home_dirs',` ') allow $1 user_home_dir_t:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $1 user_home_dir_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; files_search_home($1) ') ######################################## ## +## Search user tmp directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_search_user_tmp_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + allow $1 user_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to search user home directories. ## ## @@ -1441,6 +1881,14 @@ interface(`userdom_list_user_home_dirs',` allow $1 user_home_dir_t:dir list_dir_perms; files_search_home($1) + + tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_list_nfs($1) + ') + + tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_list_cifs($1) + ') ') ######################################## @@ -1456,9 +1904,11 @@ interface(`userdom_list_user_home_dirs',` interface(`userdom_dontaudit_list_user_home_dirs',` gen_require(` type user_home_dir_t; + type user_home_t; ') dontaudit $1 user_home_dir_t:dir list_dir_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1515,6 +1965,42 @@ interface(`userdom_relabelto_user_home_dirs',` allow $1 user_home_dir_t:dir relabelto; ') + +######################################## +## +## Relabel to user home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_relabelto_user_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_t:file relabelto; +') +######################################## +## +## Relabel user home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_relabel_user_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_t:file relabel_file_perms; +') + ######################################## ## ## Create directories in the home dir root with @@ -1589,6 +2075,8 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content',` ') dontaudit $1 user_home_t:dir search_dir_perms; + fs_dontaudit_list_nfs($1) + fs_dontaudit_list_cifs($1) ') ######################################## @@ -1603,10 +2091,12 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_content',` # interface(`userdom_list_user_home_content',` gen_require(` - type user_home_t; + type user_home_dir_t; + attribute user_home_type; ') - allow $1 user_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; + files_list_home($1) + allow $1 { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }:dir list_dir_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1649,6 +2139,43 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_dirs',` ######################################## ## +## Delete all directories in a user home subdirectory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_dirs',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_type:dir delete_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Set the attributes of user home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_setattr_user_home_content_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_t:file setattr; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to set the ## attributes of user home files. ## @@ -1668,6 +2195,25 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_setattr_user_home_content_files',` ######################################## ## +## Set the attributes of all user home directories. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_setattr_all_user_home_content_dirs',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_type:dir setattr_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Mmap user home files. ## ## @@ -1698,14 +2244,36 @@ interface(`userdom_mmap_user_home_content_files',` interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_files',` gen_require(` type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t; + attribute user_home_type; ') - read_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) + allow $1 user_home_dir_t:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; + list_dirs_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }) + read_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) files_search_home($1) ') ######################################## ## +## Do not audit attempts to getattr user home files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_getattr_user_home_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 user_home_type:dir getattr; + dontaudit $1 user_home_type:file getattr; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to read user home files. ## ## @@ -1716,11 +2284,14 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_files',` # interface(`userdom_dontaudit_read_user_home_content_files',` gen_require(` - type user_home_t; + attribute user_home_type; + type user_home_dir_t; ') - dontaudit $1 user_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; - dontaudit $1 user_home_t:file read_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_home_dir_t:dir list_dir_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_home_type:dir list_dir_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_home_type:file read_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_home_type:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1779,6 +2350,60 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_files',` ######################################## ## +## Delete all files in a user home subdirectory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_type:file delete_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete sock files in a user home subdirectory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_sock_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_t:sock_file delete_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete all sock files in a user home subdirectory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_sock_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_type:sock_file delete_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Do not audit attempts to write user home files. ## ## @@ -1810,8 +2435,7 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks',` type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t; ') - read_lnk_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - files_search_home($1) + allow $1 { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -1827,20 +2451,14 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_home_content_symlinks',` # interface(`userdom_exec_user_home_content_files',` gen_require(` - type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t; + type user_home_dir_t; + attribute user_home_type; ') files_search_home($1) - exec_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }, user_home_t) - - tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` - fs_exec_nfs_files($1) - ') - - tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` - fs_exec_cifs_files($1) + exec_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + dontaudit $1 user_home_type:sock_file execute; ') -') ######################################## ## @@ -1941,6 +2559,24 @@ interface(`userdom_delete_user_home_content_symlinks',` ######################################## ## +## Delete all symbolic links in a user home directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_home_content_symlinks',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_type:lnk_file delete_lnk_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## ## Create, read, write, and delete named pipes ## in a user home subdirectory. ## @@ -2008,7 +2644,7 @@ interface(`userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans',` type user_home_dir_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, user_home_dir_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, user_home_dir_t, $2, $3, $4) files_search_home($1) ') @@ -2039,7 +2675,7 @@ interface(`userdom_user_home_content_filetrans',` type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, user_home_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, user_home_t, $2, $3, $4) allow $1 user_home_dir_t:dir search_dir_perms; files_search_home($1) ') @@ -2158,11 +2794,11 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_manage_user_tmp_dirs',` # interface(`userdom_read_user_tmp_files',` gen_require(` - type user_tmp_t; + attribute user_tmp_type; ') - read_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) - allow $1 user_tmp_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + allow $1 user_tmp_type:dir list_dir_perms; files_search_tmp($1) ') @@ -2182,7 +2818,7 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_read_user_tmp_files',` type user_tmp_t; ') - dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:file read_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -2390,7 +3026,7 @@ interface(`userdom_user_tmp_filetrans',` type user_tmp_t; ') - filetrans_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, $2, $3) + filetrans_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, $2, $3, $4) files_search_tmp($1) ') @@ -2419,6 +3055,25 @@ interface(`userdom_tmp_filetrans_user_tmp',` files_tmp_filetrans($1, user_tmp_t, $2) ') +####################################### +## +## Getattr user tmpfs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_getattr_user_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmpfs_t; + ') + + getattr_files_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) +') + ######################################## ## ## Read user tmpfs files. @@ -2435,13 +3090,14 @@ interface(`userdom_read_user_tmpfs_files',` ') read_files_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t) allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:dir list_dir_perms; fs_search_tmpfs($1) ') ######################################## ## -## Read user tmpfs files. +## Read/Write user tmpfs files. ## ## ## @@ -2462,7 +3118,7 @@ interface(`userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files',` ######################################## ## -## Create, read, write, and delete user tmpfs files. +## Read/Write inherited user tmpfs files. ## ## ## @@ -2470,14 +3126,30 @@ interface(`userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files',` ## ## # -interface(`userdom_manage_user_tmpfs_files',` +interface(`userdom_rw_inherited_user_tmpfs_files',` gen_require(` type user_tmpfs_t; ') - manage_files_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_t) - allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:dir list_dir_perms; - fs_search_tmpfs($1) + allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute user tmpfs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_execute_user_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:file execute; ') ######################################## @@ -2572,7 +3244,7 @@ interface(`userdom_use_user_ttys',` ######################################## ## -## Read and write a user domain pty. +## Read and write a inherited user domain tty. ## ## ## @@ -2580,32 +3252,62 @@ interface(`userdom_use_user_ttys',` ## ## # -interface(`userdom_use_user_ptys',` +interface(`userdom_use_inherited_user_ttys',` gen_require(` - type user_devpts_t; + type user_tty_device_t; ') - allow $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_term_perms; + allow $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; ') ######################################## ## -## Read and write a user TTYs and PTYs. +## Read and write a user domain pty. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_use_user_ptys',` + gen_require(` + type user_devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_term_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write a inherited user domain pty. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_use_inherited_user_ptys',` + gen_require(` + type user_devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read and write a inherited user TTYs and PTYs. ## ## ##

    -## Allow the specified domain to read and write user +## Allow the specified domain to read and write inherited user ## TTYs and PTYs. This will allow the domain to ## interact with the user via the terminal. Typically ## all interactive applications will require this ## access. ##

    -##

    -## However, this also allows the applications to spy -## on user sessions or inject information into the -## user session. Thus, this access should likely -## not be allowed for non-interactive domains. -##

    ##     ## ## @@ -2614,14 +3316,33 @@ interface(`userdom_use_user_ptys',` ## ## # -interface(`userdom_use_user_terminals',` +interface(`userdom_use_inherited_user_terminals',` gen_require(` type user_tty_device_t, user_devpts_t; ') - allow $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_term_perms; - allow $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_term_perms; - term_list_ptys($1) + allow $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; + allow $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow attempts to read and write +## a user domain tty and pty. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_use_user_terminals',` + gen_require(` + type user_tty_device_t, user_devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_term_perms; + allow $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_term_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -2640,8 +3361,27 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_terminals',` type user_tty_device_t, user_devpts_t; ') - dontaudit $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_term_perms; - dontaudit $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_term_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_inherited_term_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## Get attributes of user domain tty and pty. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_getattr_user_terminals',` + gen_require(` + type user_tty_device_t, user_devpts_t; + ') + + allow $1 { user_tty_device_t user_devpts_t }:chr_file getattr_chr_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -2713,69 +3453,68 @@ interface(`userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',` allow unpriv_userdomain $1:process sigchld; ') -######################################## +##################################### ## -## Execute an Xserver session in all unprivileged user domains. This -## is an explicit transition, requiring the -## caller to use setexeccon(). +## Allow domain dyntrans to unpriv userdomain. ## ## -## -## Domain allowed to transition. -## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## ## # -interface(`userdom_xsession_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',` - gen_require(` - attribute unpriv_userdomain; - ') +interface(`userdom_dyntransition_unpriv_users',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain; + ') - xserver_xsession_spec_domtrans($1, unpriv_userdomain) - allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fd use; - allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; - allow unpriv_userdomain $1:process sigchld; + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:process dyntransition; ') -####################################### +#################################### ## -## Read and write unpriviledged user SysV sempaphores. +## Allow domain dyntrans to admin userdomain. ## ## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## ## # -interface(`userdom_rw_unpriv_user_semaphores',` - gen_require(` - attribute unpriv_userdomain; - ') +interface(`userdom_dyntransition_admin_users',` + gen_require(` + attribute admindomain; + ') - allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:sem rw_sem_perms; + allow $1 admindomain:process dyntransition; ') ######################################## ## -## Manage unpriviledged user SysV sempaphores. +## Execute an Xserver session in all unprivileged user domains. This +## is an explicit transition, requiring the +## caller to use setexeccon(). ## ## ## -## Domain allowed access. +## Domain allowed to transition. ## ## # -interface(`userdom_manage_unpriv_user_semaphores',` +interface(`userdom_xsession_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',` gen_require(` attribute unpriv_userdomain; ') - allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:sem create_sem_perms; + xserver_xsession_spec_domtrans($1, unpriv_userdomain) + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fd use; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:process sigchld; ') -####################################### +######################################## ## -## Read and write unpriviledged user SysV shared -## memory segments. +## Manage unpriviledged user SysV sempaphores. ## ## ## @@ -2783,12 +3522,12 @@ interface(`userdom_manage_unpriv_user_semaphores',` ## ## # -interface(`userdom_rw_unpriv_user_shared_mem',` +interface(`userdom_manage_unpriv_user_semaphores',` gen_require(` attribute unpriv_userdomain; ') - allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:shm rw_shm_perms; + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:sem create_sem_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -2852,7 +3591,7 @@ interface(`userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',` domain_entry_file_spec_domtrans($1, unpriv_userdomain) allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fd use; - allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fifo_file rw_file_perms; + allow unpriv_userdomain $1:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow unpriv_userdomain $1:process sigchld; ') @@ -2868,29 +3607,13 @@ interface(`userdom_entry_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users',` # interface(`userdom_search_user_home_content',` gen_require(` - type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t; + type user_home_dir_t; + attribute user_home_type; ') files_list_home($1) - allow $1 { user_home_dir_t user_home_t }:dir search_dir_perms; -') - -######################################## -## -## Send signull to unprivileged user domains. -## -## -## -## Domain allowed access. -## -## -# -interface(`userdom_signull_unpriv_users',` - gen_require(` - attribute unpriv_userdomain; - ') - - allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:process signull; + allow $1 { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }:dir search_dir_perms; + allow $1 { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }:lnk_file read_lnk_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -2972,7 +3695,7 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ptys',` type user_devpts_t; ') - dontaudit $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_devpts_t:chr_file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -3027,7 +3750,45 @@ interface(`userdom_write_user_tmp_files',` type user_tmp_t; ') - allow $1 user_tmp_t:file write_file_perms; + write_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to write users +## temporary files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_write_user_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:file write; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read/write users +## temporary fifo files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_rw_user_tmp_pipes',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -3045,7 +3806,7 @@ interface(`userdom_dontaudit_use_user_ttys',` type user_tty_device_t; ') - dontaudit $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_file_perms; + dontaudit $1 user_tty_device_t:chr_file rw_inherited_file_perms; ') ######################################## @@ -3064,6 +3825,7 @@ interface(`userdom_read_all_users_state',` ') read_files_pattern($1, userdomain, userdomain) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1,userdomain,userdomain) kernel_search_proc($1) ') @@ -3140,6 +3902,42 @@ interface(`userdom_signal_all_users',` allow $1 userdomain:process signal; ') +####################################### +## +## Send signull to all user domains. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_signull_all_users',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 userdomain:process signull; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send kill signals to all user domains. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_kill_all_users',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 userdomain:process sigkill; +') + ######################################## ## ## Send a SIGCHLD signal to all user domains. @@ -3160,6 +3958,24 @@ interface(`userdom_sigchld_all_users',` ######################################## ## +## Read keys for all user domains. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_read_all_users_keys',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 userdomain:key read; +') + +######################################## +## ## Create keys for all user domains. ## ## @@ -3194,3 +4010,1292 @@ interface(`userdom_dbus_send_all_users',` allow $1 userdomain:dbus send_msg; ') + +######################################## +## +## Allow apps to set rlimits on userdomain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_set_rlimitnh',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 userdomain:process rlimitinh; +') + +######################################## +## +## Define this type as a Allow apps to set rlimits on userdomain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +template(`userdom_unpriv_usertype',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain, userdomain; + attribute $1_usertype; + ') + typeattribute $2 $1_usertype; + typeattribute $2 unpriv_userdomain; + typeattribute $2 userdomain; + + auth_use_nsswitch($2) + ubac_constrained($2) +') + +####################################### +## +## Define this type as a Allow apps to set rlimits on userdomain +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user +## is the prefix for user_t). +## +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +template(`userdom_unpriv_type',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain, userdomain; + ') + typeattribute $2 unpriv_userdomain; + typeattribute $2 userdomain; + + auth_use_nsswitch($2) + ubac_constrained($2) +') + +######################################## +## +## Connect to users over a unix stream socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_stream_connect',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + attribute userdomain; + ') + + stream_connect_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t, userdomain) +') + +######################################## +## +## Ptrace user domains. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_ptrace_all_users',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdomain; + ') + + tunable_policy(`deny_ptrace',`',` + allow $1 userdomain:process ptrace; + ') +') + +######################################## +## +## dontaudit Search /root +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_search_admin_dir',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 admin_home_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## dontaudit list /root +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_list_admin_dir',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 admin_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow domain to list /root +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_list_admin_dir',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 admin_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow Search /root +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_search_admin_dir',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 admin_home_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## RW unpriviledged user SysV sempaphores. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_rw_semaphores',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:sem rw_sem_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Send a message to unpriv users over a unix domain +## datagram socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dgram_send',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +') + +###################################### +## +## Send a message to users over a unix domain +## datagram socket. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_users_dgram_send',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 userdomain:unix_dgram_socket sendto; +') + +####################################### +## +## Allow execmod on files in homedirectory +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_execmod_user_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_type; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_type:file execmod; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read admin home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_read_admin_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + read_files_pattern($1, admin_home_t, admin_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete admin home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_delete_admin_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 admin_home_t:file delete_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute admin home files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_exec_admin_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + exec_files_pattern($1, admin_home_t, admin_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Append files inherited +## in the /root directory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_inherit_append_admin_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 admin_home_t:file { getattr append }; +') + + +####################################### +## +## Manage all files/directories in the homedir +## +## +## +## The user domain +## +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_manage_user_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t; + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + files_list_home($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + manage_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + manage_sock_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + manage_fifo_files_pattern($1, { user_home_dir_t user_home_type }, user_home_type) + filetrans_pattern($1, user_home_dir_t, user_home_t, { dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) + +') + + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in a user home directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## the user home file type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans_pattern',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t; + ') + + type_transition $1 user_home_dir_t:$2 user_home_t; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create objects in the /root directory +## with an automatic type transition to +## a specified private type. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the object to create. +## +## +## +## +## The class of the object to be created. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_admin_home_dir_filetrans',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + filetrans_pattern($1, admin_home_t, $2, $3, $4) +') + +######################################## +## +## Send signull to unprivileged user domains. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_signull_unpriv_users',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:process signull; +') + +######################################## +## +## Write all users files in /tmp +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_write_user_tmp_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + write_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage keys for all user domains. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_manage_all_users_keys',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 userdomain:key manage_key_perms; +') + + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read and write +## unserdomain stream. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_rw_stream',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdomain; + ') + + dontaudit $1 userdomain:unix_stream_socket rw_socket_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read and write +## unserdomain datagram socket. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_rw_dgram_socket',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdomain; + ') + + dontaudit $1 userdomain:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Append files +## in a user home subdirectory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_append_user_home_content_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_dir_t, user_home_t; + ') + + append_files_pattern($1, user_home_t, user_home_t) + allow $1 user_home_dir_t:dir search_dir_perms; + files_search_home($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read files inherited +## in a user home subdirectory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_read_inherited_user_home_content_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_type:file { getattr read }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read/Write files inherited +## in a user home subdirectory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_rw_inherited_user_home_content_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_type:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Append files inherited +## in a user home subdirectory. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_inherit_append_user_home_content_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_t:file { getattr append }; +') + +######################################## +## +## Append files inherited +## in a user tmp files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_inherit_append_user_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_tmp_t:file { getattr append }; +') + +###################################### +## +## Read audio files in the users homedir. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_read_home_audio_files',` + gen_require(` + type audio_home_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1) + allow $1 audio_home_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, audio_home_t, audio_home_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, audio_home_t, audio_home_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to write all user home content files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_write_all_user_home_content_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 user_home_type:file write_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to write all user tmp content files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_write_all_user_tmp_content_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_tmp_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 user_tmp_type:file write_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage all user temporary content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_manage_all_user_tmp_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_tmp_type; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + manage_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + manage_sock_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + manage_fifo_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + files_search_tmp($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## List all user temporary content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_list_all_user_tmp_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_tmp_type; + ') + + list_dirs_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + getattr_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + getattr_sock_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + getattr_fifo_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + files_search_var($1) + files_search_tmp($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage all user tmpfs content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_manage_all_user_tmpfs_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_tmpfs_type; + ') + + manage_dirs_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + manage_files_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + manage_sock_files_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + manage_fifo_files_pattern($1, user_tmpfs_type, user_tmpfs_type) + fs_search_tmpfs($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete all user temporary content. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_delete_all_user_tmp_content',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_tmp_type; + ') + + delete_dirs_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + delete_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + delete_lnk_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + delete_sock_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + delete_fifo_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_type, user_tmp_type) + # /var/tmp + files_search_var($1) + files_delete_tmp_dir_entry($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Read system SSL certificates in the users homedir. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_read_home_certs',` + gen_require(` + type home_cert_t; + ') + + userdom_search_user_home_content($1) + allow $1 home_cert_t:dir list_dir_perms; + read_files_pattern($1, home_cert_t, home_cert_t) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, home_cert_t, home_cert_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Manage system SSL certificates in the users homedir. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_manage_home_certs',` + gen_require(` + type home_cert_t; + ') + + allow $1 home_cert_t:dir list_dir_perms; + manage_dirs_pattern($1, home_cert_t, home_cert_t) + manage_files_pattern($1, home_cert_t, home_cert_t) + manage_lnk_files_pattern($1, home_cert_t, home_cert_t) + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, ".cert") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, ".pki") +') + +####################################### +## +## Dontaudit Write system SSL certificates in the users homedir. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_write_home_certs',` + gen_require(` + type home_cert_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 home_cert_t:file write; +') + +######################################## +## +## dontaudit Search getatrr /root files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_getattr_admin_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 admin_home_t:file getattr; +') + +######################################## +## +## dontaudit read /root lnk files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_read_admin_home_lnk_files',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 admin_home_t:lnk_file read; +') + +######################################## +## +## dontaudit read /root files +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_read_admin_home_files',` + gen_require(` + type admin_home_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 admin_home_t:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete user +## temporary chr files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_manage_user_tmp_chr_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + manage_chr_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) + files_search_tmp($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Create, read, write, and delete user +## temporary blk files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_manage_user_tmp_blk_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + manage_blk_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) + files_search_tmp($1) +') + +######################################## +## +## Dontaudit attempt to set attributes on user temporary directories. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_setattr_user_tmp',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:dir setattr; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read all inherited users files in /tmp +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_read_inherited_user_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_tmp_t:file read_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read/write all inherited users files in /tmp +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_rw_inherited_user_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_tmp_t:file rw_inherited_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Write all inherited users files in /tmp +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_write_inherited_user_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_tmp_t:file write; +') + +######################################## +## +## Write all inherited users home files +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_rw_inherited_user_home_sock_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_home_t:sock_file write; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete all users files in /tmp +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_delete_user_tmp_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_tmp_t:file delete_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Delete user tmpfs files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_delete_user_tmpfs_files',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmpfs_t; + ') + + allow $1 user_tmpfs_t:file delete_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Read/Write unpriviledged user SysV shared +## memory segments. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_rw_unpriv_user_shared_mem',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:shm rw_shm_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to search user +## temporary directories. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_search_user_tmp',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + dontaudit $1 user_tmp_t:dir search_dir_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a file in a user home directory +## in the specified domain. +## +## +##

    +## Execute a file in a user home directory +## in the specified domain. +##

    +##

    +## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_domtrans_user_home',` + gen_require(` + type user_home_t; + ') + + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, user_home_t, user_home_t) + domain_transition_pattern($1, user_home_t, $2) + type_transition $1 user_home_t:process $2; +') + +######################################## +## +## Execute a file in a user tmp directory +## in the specified domain. +## +## +##

    +## Execute a file in a user tmp directory +## in the specified domain. +##

    +##

    +## No interprocess communication (signals, pipes, +## etc.) is provided by this interface since +## the domains are not owned by this module. +##

    +##     +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +## +## +## The type of the new process. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_domtrans_user_tmp',` + gen_require(` + type user_tmp_t; + ') + + files_search_tmp($1) + read_lnk_files_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, user_tmp_t) + domain_transition_pattern($1, user_tmp_t, $2) + type_transition $1 user_tmp_t:process $2; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read all user home content files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_read_all_user_home_content_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_home_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 user_home_type:file read_file_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Do not audit attempts to read all user tmp content files. +## +## +## +## Domain to not audit. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_dontaudit_read_all_user_tmp_content_files',` + gen_require(` + attribute user_tmp_type; + ') + + dontaudit $1 user_tmp_type:file read_file_perms; +') + +####################################### +## +## Read and write unpriviledged user SysV sempaphores. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_rw_unpriv_user_semaphores',` + gen_require(` + attribute unpriv_userdomain; + ') + + allow $1 unpriv_userdomain:sem rw_sem_perms; +') + +######################################## +## +## Transition to userdom named content +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_filetrans_home_content',` + gen_require(` + type home_bin_t, home_cert_t; + type audio_home_t; + ') + + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, home_bin_t, dir, "bin") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, audio_home_t, dir, "Audio") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, audio_home_t, dir, "Music") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, ".cert") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, ".pki") + userdom_user_home_dir_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, "certificates") + gnome_config_filetrans($1, home_cert_t, dir, "certificates") + + #optional_policy(` + # gnome_admin_home_gconf_filetrans($1, home_bin_t, dir, "bin") + #') +') + +######################################## +## +## Make the specified type able to read content in user home dirs +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_home_reader',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdom_home_reader_type; + ') + + typeattribute $1 userdom_home_reader_type; +') + + +######################################## +## +## Make the specified type able to manage content in user home dirs +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`userdom_home_manager',` + gen_require(` + attribute userdom_home_manager_type; + ') + + typeattribute $1 userdom_home_manager_type; +') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te index 9b4a930..fd86f24 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/userdomain.te @@ -7,7 +7,7 @@ policy_module(userdomain, 4.5.2) ## ##

    -## Allow users to connect to mysql +## Allow users to connect to the local mysql server ##

    ##     gen_tunable(allow_user_mysql_connect, false) @@ -43,12 +43,27 @@ gen_tunable(user_rw_noexattrfile, false) ## ##

    +## Allow user music sharing +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(user_share_music, false) + +## +##

    +## Allow user processes to change their priority +##

    +##     +gen_tunable(user_setrlimit, false) + +## +##

    ## Allow w to display everyone ##

    ##     gen_tunable(user_ttyfile_stat, false) attribute admindomain; +attribute login_userdomain; # all user domains attribute userdomain; @@ -59,6 +74,22 @@ attribute unpriv_userdomain; attribute untrusted_content_type; attribute untrusted_content_tmp_type; +attribute userdom_home_reader_type; +attribute userdom_home_manager_type; + +# unprivileged user domains +attribute user_home_type; +attribute user_tmp_type; +attribute user_tmpfs_type; + +type admin_home_t; +files_type(admin_home_t) +files_associate_tmp(admin_home_t) +fs_associate_tmpfs(admin_home_t) +files_mountpoint(admin_home_t) +files_poly_member(admin_home_t) +files_poly_parent(admin_home_t) + type user_home_dir_t alias { staff_home_dir_t sysadm_home_dir_t secadm_home_dir_t auditadm_home_dir_t unconfined_home_dir_t }; fs_associate_tmpfs(user_home_dir_t) files_type(user_home_dir_t) @@ -71,26 +102,111 @@ ubac_constrained(user_home_dir_t) type user_home_t alias { staff_home_t sysadm_home_t secadm_home_t auditadm_home_t unconfined_home_t }; typealias user_home_t alias { staff_untrusted_content_t sysadm_untrusted_content_t secadm_untrusted_content_t auditadm_untrusted_content_t unconfined_untrusted_content_t }; +typeattribute user_home_t user_home_type; userdom_user_home_content(user_home_t) fs_associate_tmpfs(user_home_t) files_associate_tmp(user_home_t) +files_poly_member(user_home_t) files_poly_parent(user_home_t) files_mountpoint(user_home_t) +ubac_constrained(user_home_t) type user_devpts_t alias { staff_devpts_t sysadm_devpts_t secadm_devpts_t auditadm_devpts_t unconfined_devpts_t }; dev_node(user_devpts_t) files_type(user_devpts_t) ubac_constrained(user_devpts_t) -type user_tmp_t alias { staff_tmp_t sysadm_tmp_t secadm_tmp_t auditadm_tmp_t unconfined_tmp_t }; +type user_tmp_t, user_tmp_type; +typealias user_tmp_t alias { winbind_tmp_t sshd_tmp_t staff_tmp_t sysadm_tmp_t secadm_tmp_t auditadm_tmp_t unconfined_tmp_t }; typealias user_tmp_t alias { staff_untrusted_content_tmp_t sysadm_untrusted_content_tmp_t secadm_untrusted_content_tmp_t auditadm_untrusted_content_tmp_t unconfined_untrusted_content_tmp_t }; files_tmp_file(user_tmp_t) userdom_user_home_content(user_tmp_t) +files_poly_parent(user_tmp_t) -type user_tmpfs_t alias { staff_tmpfs_t sysadm_tmpfs_t secadm_tmpfs_t auditadm_tmpfs_t unconfined_tmpfs_t }; +type user_tmpfs_t, user_tmpfs_type; +typealias user_tmpfs_t alias { staff_tmpfs_t sysadm_tmpfs_t secadm_tmpfs_t auditadm_tmpfs_t unconfined_tmpfs_t }; files_tmpfs_file(user_tmpfs_t) userdom_user_home_content(user_tmpfs_t) type user_tty_device_t alias { staff_tty_device_t sysadm_tty_device_t secadm_tty_device_t auditadm_tty_device_t unconfined_tty_device_t }; dev_node(user_tty_device_t) ubac_constrained(user_tty_device_t) + +type audio_home_t; +userdom_user_home_content(audio_home_t) +ubac_constrained(audio_home_t) + +type home_bin_t; +userdom_user_home_content(home_bin_t) +ubac_constrained(home_bin_t) + +type home_cert_t; +miscfiles_cert_type(home_cert_t) +userdom_user_home_content(home_cert_t) +ubac_constrained(home_cert_t) + +tunable_policy(`allow_console_login',` + term_use_console(userdomain) +') + +allow userdomain userdomain:process signull; + +# Nautilus causes this avc +dontaudit unpriv_userdomain self:dir setattr; +allow unpriv_userdomain self:key manage_key_perms; + +optional_policy(` + alsa_read_rw_config(unpriv_userdomain) + alsa_manage_home_files(unpriv_userdomain) + alsa_relabel_home_files(unpriv_userdomain) +') + +optional_policy(` + gnome_filetrans_home_content(userdomain) +') + +optional_policy(` + ssh_filetrans_home_content(userdomain) + ssh_rw_tcp_sockets(userdomain) +') + +optional_policy(` + telepathy_filetrans_home_content(userdomain) +') + +optional_policy(` + xserver_filetrans_home_content(userdomain) +') + + +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_read_nfs_files(userdom_home_reader_type) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_read_cifs_files(userdom_home_reader_type) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_fusefs_home_dirs',` + fs_read_fusefs_files(userdom_home_reader_type) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` + fs_list_auto_mountpoints(userdom_home_manager_type) + fs_manage_nfs_dirs(userdom_home_manager_type) + fs_manage_nfs_files(userdom_home_manager_type) + fs_manage_nfs_symlinks(userdom_home_manager_type) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_cifs_dirs(userdom_home_manager_type) + fs_manage_cifs_files(userdom_home_manager_type) + fs_manage_cifs_symlinks(userdom_home_manager_type) +') + +tunable_policy(`use_fusefs_home_dirs',` + fs_manage_fusefs_dirs(userdom_home_manager_type) + fs_manage_fusefs_files(userdom_home_manager_type) + fs_manage_fusefs_symlinks(userdom_home_manager_type) +') + diff --git a/policy/modules/system/xen.fc b/policy/modules/system/xen.fc index a865da7..f22f770 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/xen.fc +++ b/policy/modules/system/xen.fc @@ -1,12 +1,10 @@ /dev/xen/tapctrl.* -p gen_context(system_u:object_r:xenctl_t,s0) -/usr/bin/virsh -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xm_exec_t,s0) - /usr/sbin/blktapctrl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:blktap_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/evtchnd -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:evtchnd_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/tapdisk -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:blktap_exec_t,s0) -/usr/lib(64)?/xen/bin/qemu-dm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_dm_exec_t,s0) +#/usr/lib/xen/bin/qemu-dm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:qemu_dm_exec_t,s0) ifdef(`distro_debian',` /usr/lib/xen-[^/]*/bin/xenconsoled -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xenconsoled_exec_t,s0) @@ -17,6 +15,7 @@ ifdef(`distro_debian',` /usr/sbin/xenconsoled -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xenconsoled_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/xend -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xend_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/xenstored -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xenstored_exec_t,s0) +/usr/sbin/xl -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xm_exec_t,s0) /usr/sbin/xm -- gen_context(system_u:object_r:xm_exec_t,s0) ') diff --git a/policy/modules/system/xen.if b/policy/modules/system/xen.if index 77d41b6..138efd8 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/xen.if +++ b/policy/modules/system/xen.if @@ -55,6 +55,26 @@ interface(`xen_dontaudit_use_fds',` dontaudit $1 xend_t:fd use; ') +####################################### +## +## Read xend pid files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed access. +## +## +# +interface(`xen_read_pid_files_xenstored',` + gen_require(` + type xenstored_var_run_t; + ') + + files_search_pids($1) + + read_files_pattern($1, xenstored_var_run_t, xenstored_var_run_t) +') + ######################################## ## ## Read xend image files. @@ -87,6 +107,26 @@ interface(`xen_read_image_files',` ## ## # +interface(`xen_manage_image_dirs',` + gen_require(` + type xend_var_lib_t; + ') + + files_list_var_lib($1) + manage_dirs_pattern($1, xend_var_lib_t, xend_var_lib_t) +') + +######################################## +## +## Allow the specified domain to read/write +## xend image files. +## +## +## +## Domain allowed to transition. +## +## +# interface(`xen_rw_image_files',` gen_require(` type xen_image_t, xend_var_lib_t; @@ -161,7 +201,7 @@ interface(`xen_dontaudit_rw_unix_stream_sockets',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to xenstored over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to xenstored over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -180,7 +220,7 @@ interface(`xen_stream_connect_xenstore',` ######################################## ## -## Connect to xend over an unix domain stream socket. +## Connect to xend over a unix domain stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -213,14 +253,15 @@ interface(`xen_stream_connect',` interface(`xen_domtrans_xm',` gen_require(` type xm_t, xm_exec_t; + attribute virsh_transition_domain; ') - + typeattribute $1 virsh_transition_domain; domtrans_pattern($1, xm_exec_t, xm_t) ') ######################################## ## -## Connect to xm over an unix stream socket. +## Connect to xm over a unix stream socket. ## ## ## @@ -230,7 +271,7 @@ interface(`xen_domtrans_xm',` # interface(`xen_stream_connect_xm',` gen_require(` - type xm_t; + type xm_t, xenstored_var_run_t; ') files_search_pids($1) diff --git a/policy/modules/system/xen.te b/policy/modules/system/xen.te index 4350ba0..74465c4 100644 --- a/policy/modules/system/xen.te +++ b/policy/modules/system/xen.te @@ -4,6 +4,7 @@ policy_module(xen, 1.10.1) # # Declarations # +attribute xm_transition_domain; ## ##

    @@ -65,6 +66,7 @@ type xen_image_t; # customizable files_type(xen_image_t) # xen_image_t can be assigned to blk devices dev_node(xen_image_t) +virt_image(xen_image_t) type xenctl_t; files_type(xenctl_t) @@ -121,11 +123,6 @@ init_daemon_domain(xenconsoled_t, xenconsoled_exec_t) type xenconsoled_var_run_t; files_pid_file(xenconsoled_var_run_t) -type xm_t; -type xm_exec_t; -domain_type(xm_t) -init_system_domain(xm_t, xm_exec_t) - ######################################## # # blktap local policy @@ -170,6 +167,10 @@ files_pid_filetrans(evtchnd_t, evtchnd_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir }) # # qemu-dm local policy # + +# TODO: This part of policy should be removed +# qemu-dm should run in xend_t domain + # Do we need to allow execution of qemu-dm? tunable_policy(`xend_run_qemu',` allow qemu_dm_t self:capability sys_resource; @@ -208,10 +209,13 @@ tunable_policy(`xend_run_qemu',` # xend local policy # -allow xend_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock net_admin setuid sys_nice sys_tty_config net_raw }; -dontaudit xend_t self:capability { sys_ptrace }; +allow xend_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock net_admin setuid sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config net_raw }; allow xend_t self:process { signal sigkill }; -dontaudit xend_t self:process ptrace; + +# needed by qemu_dm +allow xend_t self:capability sys_resource; +allow xend_t self:process setrlimit; + # internal communication is often done using fifo and unix sockets. allow xend_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow xend_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; @@ -299,7 +303,6 @@ dev_rw_sysfs(xend_t) dev_rw_xen(xend_t) domain_dontaudit_read_all_domains_state(xend_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(xend_t) files_read_etc_files(xend_t) files_read_kernel_symbol_table(xend_t) @@ -320,13 +323,9 @@ locallogin_dontaudit_use_fds(xend_t) logging_send_syslog_msg(xend_t) -lvm_domtrans(xend_t) - miscfiles_read_localization(xend_t) miscfiles_read_hwdata(xend_t) -mount_domtrans(xend_t) - sysnet_domtrans_dhcpc(xend_t) sysnet_signal_dhcpc(xend_t) sysnet_domtrans_ifconfig(xend_t) @@ -339,8 +338,6 @@ userdom_dontaudit_search_user_home_dirs(xend_t) xen_stream_connect_xenstore(xend_t) -netutils_domtrans(xend_t) - optional_policy(` brctl_domtrans(xend_t) ') @@ -349,6 +346,23 @@ optional_policy(` consoletype_exec(xend_t) ') +optional_policy(` + lvm_domtrans(xend_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + mount_domtrans(xend_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + netutils_domtrans(xend_t) +') + +optional_policy(` + virt_search_images(xend_t) + virt_read_config(xend_t) +') + ######################################## # # Xen console local policy @@ -374,8 +388,6 @@ dev_rw_xen(xenconsoled_t) dev_filetrans_xen(xenconsoled_t) dev_rw_sysfs(xenconsoled_t) -domain_dontaudit_ptrace_all_domains(xenconsoled_t) - files_read_etc_files(xenconsoled_t) files_read_usr_files(xenconsoled_t) @@ -413,9 +425,10 @@ manage_dirs_pattern(xenstored_t, xenstored_tmp_t, xenstored_tmp_t) files_tmp_filetrans(xenstored_t, xenstored_tmp_t, { file dir }) # pid file +manage_dirs_pattern(xenstored_t, xenstored_var_run_t, xenstored_var_run_t) manage_files_pattern(xenstored_t, xenstored_var_run_t, xenstored_var_run_t) manage_sock_files_pattern(xenstored_t, xenstored_var_run_t, xenstored_var_run_t) -files_pid_filetrans(xenstored_t, xenstored_var_run_t, { file sock_file }) +files_pid_filetrans(xenstored_t, xenstored_var_run_t, { file sock_file dir }) # log files manage_dirs_pattern(xenstored_t, xenstored_var_log_t, xenstored_var_log_t) @@ -442,9 +455,11 @@ files_read_etc_files(xenstored_t) files_read_usr_files(xenstored_t) +fs_search_xenfs(xenstored_t) fs_manage_xenfs_files(xenstored_t) term_use_generic_ptys(xenstored_t) +term_use_console(xenconsoled_t) init_use_fds(xenstored_t) init_use_script_ptys(xenstored_t) @@ -457,96 +472,9 @@ xen_append_log(xenstored_t) ######################################## # -# xm local policy -# - -allow xm_t self:capability { dac_override ipc_lock sys_tty_config }; -allow xm_t self:process { getsched signal }; - -# internal communication is often done using fifo and unix sockets. -allow xm_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; -allow xm_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto }; -allow xm_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; - -manage_files_pattern(xm_t, xend_var_lib_t, xend_var_lib_t) -manage_fifo_files_pattern(xm_t, xend_var_lib_t, xend_var_lib_t) -manage_sock_files_pattern(xm_t, xend_var_lib_t, xend_var_lib_t) -files_search_var_lib(xm_t) - -allow xm_t xen_image_t:dir rw_dir_perms; -allow xm_t xen_image_t:file read_file_perms; -allow xm_t xen_image_t:blk_file read_blk_file_perms; - -kernel_read_system_state(xm_t) -kernel_read_kernel_sysctls(xm_t) -kernel_read_sysctl(xm_t) -kernel_read_xen_state(xm_t) -kernel_write_xen_state(xm_t) - -corecmd_exec_bin(xm_t) -corecmd_exec_shell(xm_t) - -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if(xm_t) -corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_node(xm_t) -corenet_tcp_connect_soundd_port(xm_t) - -dev_read_urand(xm_t) -dev_read_sysfs(xm_t) - -files_read_etc_runtime_files(xm_t) -files_read_usr_files(xm_t) -files_list_mnt(xm_t) -# Some common macros (you might be able to remove some) -files_read_etc_files(xm_t) - -fs_getattr_all_fs(xm_t) -fs_manage_xenfs_dirs(xm_t) -fs_manage_xenfs_files(xm_t) - -term_use_all_terms(xm_t) - -init_stream_connect_script(xm_t) -init_rw_script_stream_sockets(xm_t) -init_use_fds(xm_t) - -miscfiles_read_localization(xm_t) - -sysnet_dns_name_resolve(xm_t) - -xen_append_log(xm_t) -xen_stream_connect(xm_t) -xen_stream_connect_xenstore(xm_t) - -optional_policy(` - dbus_system_bus_client(xm_t) - - optional_policy(` - hal_dbus_chat(xm_t) - ') -') - -optional_policy(` - virt_domtrans(xm_t) - virt_manage_images(xm_t) - virt_manage_config(xm_t) - virt_stream_connect(xm_t) -') - -######################################## -# # SSH component local policy # optional_policy(` - ssh_basic_client_template(xm, xm_t, system_r) - - kernel_read_xen_state(xm_ssh_t) - kernel_write_xen_state(xm_ssh_t) - - files_search_tmp(xm_ssh_t) - - fs_manage_xenfs_dirs(xm_ssh_t) - fs_manage_xenfs_files(xm_ssh_t) - #Should have a boolean wrapping these fs_list_auto_mountpoints(xend_t) files_search_mnt(xend_t) @@ -559,8 +487,4 @@ optional_policy(` fs_manage_nfs_files(xend_t) fs_read_nfs_symlinks(xend_t) ') - - optional_policy(` - unconfined_domain(xend_t) - ') ') diff --git a/policy/support/file_patterns.spt b/policy/support/file_patterns.spt index bdd500c..4719351 100644 --- a/policy/support/file_patterns.spt +++ b/policy/support/file_patterns.spt @@ -535,7 +535,7 @@ define(`filetrans_add_pattern',` define(`filetrans_pattern',` allow $1 $2:dir rw_dir_perms; - type_transition $1 $2:$4 $3; + type_transition $1 $2:$4 $3 $5; ') define(`admin_pattern',` diff --git a/policy/support/misc_patterns.spt b/policy/support/misc_patterns.spt index 22ca011..18e1b2f 100644 --- a/policy/support/misc_patterns.spt +++ b/policy/support/misc_patterns.spt @@ -4,7 +4,7 @@ define(`domain_transition_pattern',` allow $1 $2:file { getattr open read execute }; allow $1 $3:process transition; - dontaudit $1 $3:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; +# dontaudit $1 $3:process { noatsecure siginh rlimitinh }; ') # compatibility: @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ define(`spec_domtrans_pattern',` domain_transition_pattern($1,$2,$3) allow $3 $1:fd use; - allow $3 $1:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + allow $3 $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; allow $3 $1:process sigchld; ') @@ -34,7 +34,7 @@ define(`domtrans_pattern',` domain_auto_transition_pattern($1,$2,$3) allow $3 $1:fd use; - allow $3 $1:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; + allow $3 $1:fifo_file rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms; allow $3 $1:process sigchld; ') diff --git a/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt b/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt index f7380b3..cc007d8 100644 --- a/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt +++ b/policy/support/obj_perm_sets.spt @@ -28,8 +28,7 @@ define(`devfile_class_set', `{ chr_file blk_file }') # # All socket classes. # -define(`socket_class_set', `{ tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket unix_stream_socket unix_dgram_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_firewall_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_ip6fw_socket netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket }') - +define(`socket_class_set', `{ socket dccp_socket tcp_socket udp_socket rawip_socket netlink_socket packet_socket unix_stream_socket unix_dgram_socket appletalk_socket netlink_route_socket netlink_firewall_socket netlink_tcpdiag_socket netlink_nflog_socket netlink_xfrm_socket netlink_selinux_socket netlink_audit_socket netlink_ip6fw_socket netlink_dnrt_socket netlink_kobject_uevent_socket tun_socket }') # # Datagram socket classes. @@ -105,7 +104,7 @@ define(`mount_fs_perms', `{ mount remount unmount getattr }') # # Permissions for using sockets. # -define(`rw_socket_perms', `{ ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown }') +define(`rw_socket_perms', `{ ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown }') # # Permissions for creating and using sockets. @@ -199,12 +198,15 @@ define(`relabel_dir_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }') # define(`getattr_file_perms',`{ getattr }') define(`setattr_file_perms',`{ setattr }') -define(`read_file_perms',`{ getattr open read lock ioctl }') +define(`read_inherited_file_perms',`{ getattr read ioctl lock }') +define(`read_file_perms',`{ open read_inherited_file_perms }') define(`mmap_file_perms',`{ getattr open read execute ioctl }') define(`exec_file_perms',`{ getattr open read execute ioctl execute_no_trans }') -define(`append_file_perms',`{ getattr open append lock ioctl }') +define(`append_inherited_file_perms',`{ getattr append }') +define(`append_file_perms',`{ open lock ioctl append_inherited_file_perms }') define(`write_file_perms',`{ getattr open write append lock ioctl }') -define(`rw_file_perms',`{ getattr open read write append ioctl lock }') +define(`rw_inherited_file_perms',`{ getattr read write append ioctl lock }') +define(`rw_file_perms',`{ open rw_inherited_file_perms }') define(`create_file_perms',`{ getattr create open }') define(`rename_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }') define(`delete_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }') @@ -225,7 +227,7 @@ define(`rw_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr read write lock ioctl }') define(`create_lnk_file_perms',`{ create getattr }') define(`rename_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }') define(`delete_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }') -define(`manage_lnk_file_perms',`{ create read write getattr setattr link unlink rename }') +define(`manage_lnk_file_perms',`{ create getattr setattr read write append rename link unlink ioctl lock }') define(`relabelfrom_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom }') define(`relabelto_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelto }') define(`relabel_lnk_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }') @@ -238,7 +240,8 @@ define(`setattr_fifo_file_perms',`{ setattr }') define(`read_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr open read lock ioctl }') define(`append_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr open append lock ioctl }') define(`write_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr open write append lock ioctl }') -define(`rw_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr open read write append ioctl lock }') +define(`rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr read write append ioctl lock }') +define(`rw_fifo_file_perms',`{ open rw_inherited_fifo_file_perms }') define(`create_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr create open }') define(`rename_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }') define(`delete_fifo_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }') @@ -254,7 +257,8 @@ define(`getattr_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr }') define(`setattr_sock_file_perms',`{ setattr }') define(`read_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr open read }') define(`write_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr write open append }') -define(`rw_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr open read write append }') +define(`rw_inherited_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr read write append }') +define(`rw_sock_file_perms',`{ open rw_inherited_sock_file_perms }') define(`create_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr create open }') define(`rename_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }') define(`delete_sock_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }') @@ -271,7 +275,8 @@ define(`setattr_blk_file_perms',`{ setattr }') define(`read_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr open read lock ioctl }') define(`append_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr open append lock ioctl }') define(`write_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr open write append lock ioctl }') -define(`rw_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr open read write append ioctl lock }') +define(`rw_inherited_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr read write append ioctl lock }') +define(`rw_blk_file_perms',`{ open rw_inherited_blk_file_perms }') define(`create_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr create }') define(`rename_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }') define(`delete_blk_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }') @@ -288,7 +293,8 @@ define(`setattr_chr_file_perms',`{ setattr }') define(`read_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr open read lock ioctl }') define(`append_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr open append lock ioctl }') define(`write_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr open write append lock ioctl }') -define(`rw_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr open read write append ioctl lock }') +define(`rw_inherited_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr read write append ioctl lock }') +define(`rw_chr_file_perms',`{ open rw_inherited_chr_file_perms }') define(`create_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr create }') define(`rename_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr rename }') define(`delete_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr unlink }') @@ -305,7 +311,8 @@ define(`relabel_chr_file_perms',`{ getattr relabelfrom relabelto }') # # Use (read and write) terminals # -define(`rw_term_perms', `{ getattr open read write append ioctl }') +define(`rw_inherited_term_perms', `{ getattr read write append ioctl }') +define(`rw_term_perms', `{ rw_inherited_term_perms open }') # # Sockets @@ -317,3 +324,20 @@ define(`server_stream_socket_perms', `{ client_stream_socket_perms listen accept # Keys # define(`manage_key_perms', `{ create link read search setattr view write } ') + +# +# Service +# +define(`manage_service_perms', `{ start stop status reload kill load } ') + +# +# All +# +define(`all_capabilities', `{ chown dac_override dac_read_search fowner fsetid kill setgid setuid setpcap linux_immutable net_bind_service net_broadcast net_admin net_raw ipc_lock ipc_owner sys_module sys_rawio sys_chroot sys_ptrace sys_pacct sys_admin sys_boot sys_nice sys_resource sys_time sys_tty_config mknod lease audit_write audit_control setfcap } +') + +define(`all_nscd_perms', `{ getserv getpwd getgrp gethost getstat admin shmempwd shmemgrp shmemhost shmemserv } ') +define(`all_dbus_perms', `{ acquire_svc send_msg } ') +define(`all_passwd_perms', `{ passwd chfn chsh rootok crontab } ') +define(`all_service_perms', `{ enable disable manage_service_perms } ') +define(`all_association_perms', `{ sendto recvfrom setcontext polmatch } ') diff --git a/policy/users b/policy/users index c4ebc7e..30d6d7a 100644 --- a/policy/users +++ b/policy/users @@ -15,7 +15,7 @@ # and a user process should never be assigned the system user # identity. # -gen_user(system_u,, system_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) +gen_user(system_u,, system_r unconfined_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) # # user_u is a generic user identity for Linux users who have no @@ -24,12 +24,9 @@ gen_user(system_u,, system_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) # SELinux user identity for a Linux user. If you do not want to # permit any access to such users, then remove this entry. # -gen_user(user_u, user, user_r, s0, s0) -gen_user(staff_u, staff, staff_r sysadm_r ifdef(`enable_mls',`secadm_r auditadm_r'), s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) -gen_user(sysadm_u, sysadm, sysadm_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) - -# Until order dependence is fixed for users: -gen_user(unconfined_u, unconfined, unconfined_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) +gen_user(user_u, user, user_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) +gen_user(staff_u, user, staff_r system_r sysadm_r ifdef(`enable_mls',`secadm_r auditadm_r'), s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) +gen_user(sysadm_u, user, sysadm_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) # # The following users correspond to Unix identities. @@ -38,8 +35,4 @@ gen_user(unconfined_u, unconfined, unconfined_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_al # role should use the staff_r role instead of the user_r role when # not in the sysadm_r. # -ifdef(`direct_sysadm_daemon',` - gen_user(root, sysadm, sysadm_r staff_r ifdef(`enable_mls',`secadm_r auditadm_r') system_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) -',` - gen_user(root, sysadm, sysadm_r staff_r ifdef(`enable_mls',`secadm_r auditadm_r'), s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) -') +gen_user(root, user, unconfined_r sysadm_r staff_r ifdef(`enable_mls',`secadm_r auditadm_r') system_r, s0, s0 - mls_systemhigh, mcs_allcats) diff --git a/support/Makefile.devel b/support/Makefile.devel index c5e3ef3..182eeac 100644 --- a/support/Makefile.devel +++ b/support/Makefile.devel @@ -26,7 +26,6 @@ XMLLINT := $(BINDIR)/xmllint # set default build options if missing TYPE ?= standard DIRECT_INITRC ?= n -POLY ?= n QUIET ?= y genxml := $(PYTHON) $(HEADERDIR)/support/segenxml.py