policy_module(selinux,1.0)

########################################
#
# Declarations
#

attribute can_write_binary_policy;
attribute can_relabelto_binary_policy;

type checkpolicy_t, can_write_binary_policy;
domain_make_domain(checkpolicy_t)
role system_r types checkpolicy_t;

type checkpolicy_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(checkpolicy_t,checkpolicy_exec_t)

#
# default_context_t is the type applied to
# /etc/selinux/*/contexts/*
#
type default_context_t;
files_make_file(default_context_t) 

#
# file_context_t is the type applied to
# /etc/selinux/*/contexts/files
#
type file_context_t;
files_make_file(file_context_t)

type load_policy_t;
domain_make_domain(load_policy_t)
role system_r types load_policy_t;

type load_policy_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(load_policy_t,load_policy_exec_t)

type newrole_t; # nscd_client_domain, mlsfileread, mlsfilewrite, mlsfileupgrade, mlsfiledowngrade, mlsprocsetsl;
kernel_make_role_change_constraint_exception(newrole_t)
kernel_make_object_identity_change_constraint_exception(newrole_t)
domain_make_domain(newrole_t)
domain_make_file_descriptors_widely_inheritable(newrole_t)

type newrole_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(newrole_t,newrole_exec_t)

#
# policy_config_t is the type of /etc/security/selinux/*
# the security server policy configuration.
#
type policy_config_t;
files_make_file(policy_config_t)

neverallow ~can_relabelto_binary_policy policy_config_t:file relabelto;
neverallow ~can_write_binary_policy policy_config_t:file { write append };

#
# policy_src_t is the type of the policy source
# files.
#
type policy_src_t;
files_make_file(policy_src_t)

type restorecon_t, can_relabelto_binary_policy;
type restorecon_exec_t;
kernel_make_object_identity_change_constraint_exception(restorecon_t)
init_make_system_domain(restorecon_t,restorecon_exec_t)
role system_r types restorecon_t;

type run_init_t;
domain_make_domain(run_init_t)

type run_init_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(run_init_t,run_init_exec_t)

#
# selinux_config_t is the type applied to
# /etc/selinux/config
#
type selinux_config_t;
files_make_file(selinux_config_t)

type setfiles_t, can_relabelto_binary_policy;
kernel_make_object_identity_change_constraint_exception(setfiles_t)
domain_make_domain(setfiles_t)
role system_r types setfiles_t;

type setfiles_exec_t;
domain_make_entrypoint_file(setfiles_t,setfiles_exec_t)

########################################
#
# Checkpolicy local policy
#

allow checkpolicy_t self:capability dac_override;

# able to create and modify binary policy files
allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
allow checkpolicy_t policy_config_t:file create_file_perms;

# allow test policies to be created in src directories
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
type_transition checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:file policy_config_t;

# only allow read of policy source files
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:file r_file_perms;
allow checkpolicy_t policy_src_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;
allow checkpolicy_t selinux_config_t:dir search;

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(checkpolicy_t)

term_use_console(checkpolicy_t)

domain_use_widely_inheritable_file_descriptors(checkpolicy_t)

# directory search permissions for path to source and binary policy files
files_search_general_system_config_directory(checkpolicy_t)

init_use_file_descriptors(checkpolicy_t)
init_script_use_pseudoterminal(checkpolicy_t)

libraries_use_dynamic_loader(checkpolicy_t)
libraries_use_shared_libraries(checkpolicy_t)

userdomain_use_all_users_file_descriptors(checkpolicy_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`
# Read the devpts root directory.  
ifdef(`sshd.te',`allow checkpolicy_t sshd_devpts_t:dir r_dir_perms;')
') dnl endif TODO

########################################
#
# Load_policy local policy
#

allow load_policy_t self:capability dac_override;

# only allow read of policy config files
allow load_policy_t policy_src_t:dir search;
allow load_policy_t policy_config_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow load_policy_t policy_config_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;

allow load_policy_t selinux_config_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow load_policy_t selinux_config_t:file r_file_perms;
allow load_policy_t selinux_config_t:lnk_file r_file_perms;

kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(load_policy_t)
kernel_load_policy(load_policy_t)
kernel_set_boolean(load_policy_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(load_policy_t)

term_use_console(load_policy_t)
term_list_ptys(load_policy_t)

init_script_use_file_descriptors(load_policy_t)
init_script_use_pseudoterminal(load_policy_t)

domain_use_widely_inheritable_file_descriptors(load_policy_t)

files_search_general_system_config_directory(load_policy_t)

libraries_use_dynamic_loader(load_policy_t)
libraries_use_shared_libraries(load_policy_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(load_policy_t)

userdomain_use_all_users_file_descriptors(load_policy_t)

########################################
#
# Newrole local policy
#

allow newrole_t self:capability { setuid setgid net_bind_service dac_override };

allow newrole_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem dyntransition };
allow newrole_t self:process setexec;
allow newrole_t self:fd use;
allow newrole_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
allow newrole_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto;
allow newrole_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto;
allow newrole_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
allow newrole_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
allow newrole_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
allow newrole_t self:msg { send receive };

allow newrole_t { selinux_config_t default_context_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow newrole_t { selinux_config_t default_context_t }:file r_file_perms;
allow newrole_t { selinux_config_t default_context_t }:lnk_file r_file_perms;

kernel_read_system_state(newrole_t)
kernel_read_kernel_sysctl(newrole_t)
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(newrole_t)
kernel_validate_context(newrole_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector(newrole_t)
kernel_compute_create_context(newrole_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context(newrole_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(newrole_t)

devices_get_pseudorandom_data(newrole_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(newrole_t)

term_use_all_user_ttys(newrole_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys(newrole_t)

authlogin_check_password_transition(newrole_t)

domain_use_widely_inheritable_file_descriptors(newrole_t)

# Write to utmp.
init_script_modify_runtime_data(newrole_t)

files_read_general_system_config(newrole_t)

libraries_use_dynamic_loader(newrole_t)
libraries_use_shared_libraries(newrole_t)

logging_send_system_log_message(newrole_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(newrole_t)

userdomain_use_all_unprivileged_users_file_descriptors(newrole_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`

can_ypbind(newrole)
ifdef(`automount.te', `
allow newrole_t autofs_t:dir { search getattr };
')

# for when the user types "exec newrole" at the command line
allow newrole_t privfd:process sigchld;
 
# Execute /sbin/pwdb_chkpwd to check the password.
allow newrole_t sbin_t:dir r_dir_perms;

# Execute shells
allow newrole_t bin_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow newrole_t bin_t:lnk_file read;

# Allow newrole_t to transition to user domains.
bool secure_mode false;
domain_trans(newrole_t, shell_exec_t, unpriv_userdomain)
if(!secure_mode)
{
	# if we are not in secure mode then we can transition to sysadm_t
	domain_trans(newrole_t, shell_exec_t, sysadm_t)
}

# Read /var.
allow newrole_t var_t:dir r_dir_perms;
allow newrole_t var_t:notdevfile_class_set r_file_perms;

# Relabel terminals.
allow newrole_t { ttyfile ptyfile }:chr_file { relabelfrom relabelto };

ifdef(`gnome-pty-helper.te', `allow newrole_t gphdomain:fd use;')

# for some PAM modules and for cwd
dontaudit newrole_t { home_root_t home_type }:dir search;
') dnl ifdef TODO

########################################
#
# Restorecon local policy
#

allow restorecon_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner };

allow restorecon_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow restorecon_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:file r_file_perms;
allow restorecon_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:lnk_file r_file_perms;

kernel_use_fd(restorecon_t)
kernel_read_system_state(restorecon_t)
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(restorecon_t)
kernel_validate_context(restorecon_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector(restorecon_t)
kernel_compute_create_context(restorecon_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context(restorecon_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(restorecon_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(restorecon_t)

term_use_unallocated_tty(restorecon_t)

init_use_file_descriptors(restorecon_t)
init_script_use_pseudoterminal(restorecon_t)

domain_use_widely_inheritable_file_descriptors(restorecon_t)

files_read_runtime_system_config(restorecon_t)
files_read_general_system_config(restorecon_t)

libraries_use_dynamic_loader(restorecon_t)
libraries_use_shared_libraries(restorecon_t)

logging_send_system_log_message(restorecon_t)

userdomain_use_all_users_file_descriptors(restorecon_t)

optional_policy(`hotplug.te',`
	hotplug_use_file_descriptors(restorecon_t)
')

# relabeling rules
kernel_relabel_unlabeled(restorecon_t)
devices_manage_all_devices_labels(restorecon_t)
files_relabel_all_files(restorecon_t)
files_read_all_directories(restorecon_t)
# this is to satisfy the assertion:
authlogin_relabel_to_shadow_passwords(restorecon_t)

ifdef(`distro_redhat', `
fs_use_tmpfs_character_devices(restorecon_t)
fs_use_tmpfs_block_devices(restorecon_t)
fs_relabel_tmpfs_block_devices(restorecon_t)
fs_relabel_tmpfs_character_devices(restorecon_t)
')

ifdef(`TODO',`

# for upgrading glibc and other shared objects - without this the upgrade
# scripts will put things in a state such that restorecon can not be run!
allow restorecon_t lib_t:file { read execute };

allow restorecon_t fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;

allow restorecon_t device_t:file { read write };
allow restorecon_t kernel_t:fifo_file { read write };
') dnl endif TODO

#################################
#
# Run_init local policy
#

kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(run_init_t)
kernel_validate_context(run_init_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector(run_init_t)
kernel_compute_create_context(run_init_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context(run_init_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(run_init_t)

ifdef(`targeted_policy',`',`
	allow run_init_t self:process setexec;
	allow run_init_t self:capability setuid;

	allow run_init_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;

	# often the administrator runs such programs from a directory that is owned
	# by a different user or has restrictive SE permissions, do not want to audit
	# the failed access to the current directory
	dontaudit run_init_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search };

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs(run_init_t)

	devices_ignore_list_device_nodes(run_init_t)

	term_dontaudit_list_ptys(run_init_t)

	authlogin_check_password_transition(run_init_t)
	authlogin_ignore_read_shadow_passwords(run_init_t)

	corecommands_execute_general_programs(run_init_t)
	corecommands_execute_shell(run_init_t)

	domain_use_widely_inheritable_file_descriptors(run_init_t)

	files_read_general_system_config(run_init_t)
	files_ignore_search_all_directories(run_init_t)

	init_script_transition(run_init_t)
	# for utmp
	init_script_modify_runtime_data(run_init_t)

	libraries_use_dynamic_loader(run_init_t)
	libraries_use_shared_libraries(run_init_t)

	selinux_read_config(run_init_t)
	selinux_read_default_contexts(run_init_t)

	miscfiles_read_localization(run_init_t)

	logging_send_system_log_message(run_init_t)
') dnl end ifdef targeted policy

ifdef(`TODO',`

ifdef(`distro_gentoo', `
	# Gentoo integrated run_init+open_init_pty-runscript:
	domain_auto_trans(sysadm_t,initrc_exec_t,run_init_t)
	domain_make_entrypoint_file(run_init_t,initrc_exec_t)
')
') dnl end TODO

########################################
#
# Setfiles local policy
#

allow setfiles_t self:capability { dac_override dac_read_search fowner };

allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:dir r_dir_perms;
allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:file r_file_perms;
allow setfiles_t { policy_src_t policy_config_t file_context_t selinux_config_t default_context_t }:lnk_file r_file_perms;

kernel_read_system_state(setfiles_t)
kernel_get_selinuxfs_mount_point(setfiles_t)
kernel_validate_context(setfiles_t)
kernel_compute_access_vector(setfiles_t)
kernel_compute_create_context(setfiles_t)
kernel_compute_relabel_context(setfiles_t)
kernel_compute_reachable_user_contexts(setfiles_t)

fs_getattr_xattr_fs(setfiles_t)

term_use_all_user_ttys(setfiles_t)
term_use_all_user_ptys(setfiles_t)
term_use_unallocated_tty(setfiles_t)

init_use_file_descriptors(setfiles_t)
init_script_use_file_descriptors(setfiles_t)
init_script_use_pseudoterminal(setfiles_t)

domain_use_widely_inheritable_file_descriptors(setfiles_t)

libraries_use_dynamic_loader(setfiles_t)
libraries_use_shared_libraries(setfiles_t)

files_read_runtime_system_config(setfiles_t)
files_read_general_system_config(setfiles_t)

logging_send_system_log_message(setfiles_t)

miscfiles_read_localization(setfiles_t)

userdomain_use_all_users_file_descriptors(setfiles_t)
# for config files in a home directory
userdomain_read_all_users_data(setfiles_t)

# relabeling rules
kernel_relabel_unlabeled(setfiles_t)
devices_manage_all_devices_labels(setfiles_t)
files_read_all_directories(setfiles_t)
files_relabel_all_files(setfiles_t)
# this is to satisfy the assertion:
authlogin_relabel_to_shadow_passwords(setfiles_t)

ifdef(`TODO',`
# for upgrading glibc and other shared objects - without this the upgrade
# scripts will put things in a state such that setfiles can not be run!
allow setfiles_t lib_t:file { read execute };

allow setfiles_t unlabeled_t:dir read;

allow setfiles_t fs_type:dir r_dir_perms;

') dnl endif TODO