## <summary>
##	Policy for kernel security interface, in particular, selinuxfs.
## </summary>
## <required val="true">
##	Contains the policy for the kernel SELinux security interface.
## </required>

########################################
## <summary>
##	Gets the caller the mountpoint of the selinuxfs filesystem.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	The process type requesting the selinuxfs mountpoint.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_get_fs_mount',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	# starting in libselinux 2.0.5, init_selinuxmnt() will
	# attempt to short circuit by checking if SELINUXMNT
	# (/selinux) is already a selinuxfs
	allow $1 security_t:filesystem getattr;

	# read /proc/filesystems to see if selinuxfs is supported
	# then read /proc/self/mount to see where selinuxfs is mounted
	kernel_read_system_state($1)
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Do not audit attempts to get the
##	attributes of the selinuxfs directory.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain to not audit.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_dontaudit_getattr_dir',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	dontaudit $1 security_t:dir getattr;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Search selinuxfs.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain allowed access.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_search_fs',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir search_dir_perms;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Do not audit attempts to search selinuxfs.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain to not audit.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_dontaudit_search_fs',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	dontaudit $1 security_t:dir search_dir_perms;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Do not audit attempts to read
##	generic selinuxfs entries
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain to not audit.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_dontaudit_read_fs',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	dontaudit $1 security_t:dir search_dir_perms;
	dontaudit $1 security_t:file { getattr read };
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Allows the caller to get the mode of policy enforcement
##	(enforcing or permissive mode).
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	The process type to allow to get the enforcing mode.
##	</summary>
## </param>
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`selinux_get_enforce_mode',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read };
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Allow caller to set the mode of policy enforcement
##	(enforcing or permissive mode).
## </summary>
## <desc>
##	<p>
##	Allow caller to set the mode of policy enforcement
##	(enforcing or permissive mode).
##	</p>
##	<p>
##	Since this is a security event, this action is
##	always audited.
##	</p>
## </desc>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	The process type to allow to set the enforcement mode.
##	</summary>
## </param>
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`selinux_set_enforce_mode',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
		attribute can_setenforce;
		bool secure_mode_policyload;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };
	typeattribute $1 can_setenforce;

	if(!secure_mode_policyload) {
		allow $1 security_t:security setenforce;

		ifdef(`distro_rhel4',`
			# needed for systems without audit support
			auditallow $1 security_t:security setenforce;
		')
	}
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Allow caller to load the policy into the kernel.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	The process type that will load the policy.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_load_policy',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
		attribute can_load_policy;
		bool secure_mode_policyload;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };
	typeattribute $1 can_load_policy;

	if(!secure_mode_policyload) {
		allow $1 security_t:security load_policy;

		ifdef(`distro_rhel4',`
			# needed for systems without audit support
			auditallow $1 security_t:security load_policy;
		')
	}
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Allow caller to set the state of Booleans to
##	enable or disable conditional portions of the policy.
## </summary>
## <desc>
##	<p>
##	Allow caller to set the state of Booleans to
##	enable or disable conditional portions of the policy.
##	</p>
##	<p>
##	Since this is a security event, this action is
##	always audited.
##	</p>
## </desc>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	The process type allowed to set the Boolean.
##	</summary>
## </param>
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`selinux_set_boolean',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
		bool secure_mode_policyload;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };

	if(!secure_mode_policyload) {
		allow $1 security_t:security setbool;

		ifdef(`distro_rhel4',`
			# needed for systems without audit support
			auditallow $1 security_t:security setbool;
		')
	}
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Allow caller to set SELinux access vector cache parameters.
## </summary>
## <desc>
##	<p>
##	Allow caller to set SELinux access vector cache parameters.
##	The allows the domain to set performance related parameters
##	of the AVC, such as cache threshold.
##	</p>
##	<p>
##	Since this is a security event, this action is
##	always audited.
##	</p>
## </desc>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	The process type to allow to set security parameters.
##	</summary>
## </param>
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`selinux_set_parameters',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
		attribute can_setsecparam;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };
	allow $1 security_t:security setsecparam;
	auditallow $1 security_t:security setsecparam;
	typeattribute $1 can_setsecparam;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Allows caller to validate security contexts.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	The process type permitted to validate contexts.
##	</summary>
## </param>
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`selinux_validate_context',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };
	allow $1 security_t:security check_context;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Allows caller to compute an access vector.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	The process type allowed to compute an access vector.
##	</summary>
## </param>
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`selinux_compute_access_vector',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };
	allow $1 security_t:security compute_av;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Calculate the default type for object creation.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain allowed access.
##	</summary>
## </param>
## <rolecap/>
#
interface(`selinux_compute_create_context',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };
	allow $1 security_t:security compute_create;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Allows caller to compute polyinstatntiated
##	directory members.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain allowed access.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_compute_member',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };
	allow $1 security_t:security compute_member;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Calculate the context for relabeling objects.
## </summary>
## <desc>
##	<p>
##	Calculate the context for relabeling objects.
##	This is determined by using the type_change
##	rules in the policy, and is generally used
##	for determining the context for relabeling
##	a terminal when a user logs in.
##	</p>
## </desc>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain allowed access.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_compute_relabel_context',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };
	allow $1 security_t:security compute_relabel;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Allows caller to compute possible contexts for a user.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	The process type allowed to compute user contexts.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_compute_user_contexts',`
	gen_require(`
		type security_t;
	')

	allow $1 security_t:dir list_dir_perms;
	allow $1 security_t:file { getattr read write };
	allow $1 security_t:security compute_user;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Unconfined access to the SELinux kernel security server.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	<summary>
##	Domain allowed access.
##	</summary>
## </param>
#
interface(`selinux_unconfined',`
	gen_require(`
		attribute selinux_unconfined_type;
	')

	typeattribute $1 selinux_unconfined_type;
')