## Run shells with substitute user and group ####################################### ## ## Restricted su domain template. ## ## ##

## This template creates a derived domain which is allowed ## to change the linux user id, to run shells as a different ## user. ##

##
## ## ## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user ## is the prefix for user_t). ## ## ## ## ## The type of the user domain. ## ## ## ## ## The role associated with the user domain. ## ## # template(`su_restricted_domain_template', ` gen_require(` type su_exec_t; ') type $1_su_t; domain_entry_file($1_su_t,su_exec_t) domain_type($1_su_t) domain_interactive_fd($1_su_t) role $3 types $1_su_t; allow $2 $1_su_t:process signal; allow $1_su_t self:capability { audit_control audit_write setuid setgid net_bind_service chown dac_override fowner sys_nice sys_resource }; dontaudit $1_su_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow $1_su_t self:key { search write }; allow $1_su_t self:process { setexec setsched setrlimit }; allow $1_su_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow $1_su_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_netlink_socket_perms }; allow $1_su_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; # Transition from the user domain to this domain. domtrans_pattern($2, su_exec_t, $1_su_t) # By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed. corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_su_t,$2) allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use; allow $2 $1_su_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow $2 $1_su_t:process sigchld; kernel_read_system_state($1_su_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_su_t) kernel_search_key($1_su_t) kernel_link_key($1_su_t) # for SSP dev_read_urand($1_su_t) files_read_etc_files($1_su_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_su_t) files_search_var_lib($1_su_t) files_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs($1_su_t) # for the rootok check selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t) auth_domtrans_chk_passwd($1_su_t) auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_su_t) auth_use_nsswitch($1_su_t) auth_rw_faillog($1_su_t) domain_use_interactive_fds($1_su_t) init_dontaudit_use_fds($1_su_t) init_dontaudit_use_script_ptys($1_su_t) # Write to utmp. init_rw_utmp($1_su_t) libs_use_ld_so($1_su_t) libs_use_shared_libs($1_su_t) logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t) miscfiles_read_localization($1_su_t) ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` domain_role_change_exemption($1_su_t) domain_subj_id_change_exemption($1_su_t) domain_obj_id_change_exemption($1_su_t) selinux_get_fs_mount($1_su_t) selinux_validate_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t) selinux_compute_create_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_su_t) seutil_read_config($1_su_t) seutil_read_default_contexts($1_su_t) # Only allow transitions to unprivileged user domains. userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_su_t) ') optional_policy(` cron_read_pipes($1_su_t) ') optional_policy(` kerberos_use($1_su_t) ') ifdef(`TODO',` # Caused by su - init scripts dontaudit $1_su_t initrc_devpts_t:chr_file { getattr ioctl }; ') dnl end TODO ') ####################################### ## ## The per role template for the su module. ## ## ##

## This template creates a derived domain which is allowed ## to change the linux user id, to run shells as a different ## user. ##

##

## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and ## generally does not need to be invoked directly ## by policy writers. ##

##
## ## ## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user ## is the prefix for user_t). ## ## ## ## ## The type of the user domain. ## ## ## ## ## The role associated with the user domain. ## ## # template(`su_per_role_template',` gen_require(` attribute su_domain_type; type su_exec_t; bool secure_mode; ') type $1_su_t, su_domain_type; domain_entry_file($1_su_t,su_exec_t) domain_type($1_su_t) domain_interactive_fd($1_su_t) role $3 types $1_su_t; allow $2 $1_su_t:process signal; allow $1_su_t self:capability { audit_control audit_write setuid setgid net_bind_service chown dac_override fowner sys_nice sys_resource }; dontaudit $1_su_t self:capability sys_tty_config; allow $1_su_t self:process { setexec setsched setrlimit }; allow $1_su_t self:fifo_file rw_fifo_file_perms; allow $1_su_t self:netlink_audit_socket { nlmsg_relay create_netlink_socket_perms }; allow $1_su_t self:key { search write }; # Transition from the user domain to this domain. domtrans_pattern($2, su_exec_t, $1_su_t) # By default, revert to the calling domain when a shell is executed. corecmd_shell_domtrans($1_su_t,$2) allow $2 $1_su_t:fd use; allow $2 $1_su_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow $2 $1_su_t:process sigchld; kernel_read_system_state($1_su_t) kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_su_t) kernel_search_key($1_su_t) kernel_link_key($1_su_t) # for SSP dev_read_urand($1_su_t) fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_su_t) # needed for pam_rootok selinux_compute_access_vector($1_su_t) auth_domtrans_user_chk_passwd($1,$1_su_t) auth_dontaudit_read_shadow($1_su_t) auth_use_nsswitch($1_su_t) corecmd_search_bin($1_su_t) corecmd_search_sbin($1_su_t) domain_use_interactive_fds($1_su_t) files_read_etc_files($1_su_t) files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_su_t) files_search_var_lib($1_su_t) files_dontaudit_getattr_tmp_dirs($1_su_t) init_dontaudit_use_fds($1_su_t) # Write to utmp. init_rw_utmp($1_su_t) mls_file_write_down($1_su_t) libs_use_ld_so($1_su_t) libs_use_shared_libs($1_su_t) logging_send_syslog_msg($1_su_t) miscfiles_read_localization($1_su_t) userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_su_t) userdom_search_user_home_dirs($1,$1_su_t) ifdef(`distro_rhel4',` domain_role_change_exemption($1_su_t) domain_subj_id_change_exemption($1_su_t) domain_obj_id_change_exemption($1_su_t) selinux_get_fs_mount($1_su_t) selinux_validate_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_create_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_relabel_context($1_su_t) selinux_compute_user_contexts($1_su_t) # Relabel ttys and ptys. term_relabel_all_user_ttys($1_su_t) term_relabel_all_user_ptys($1_su_t) # Close and re-open ttys and ptys to get the fd into the correct domain. term_use_all_user_ttys($1_su_t) term_use_all_user_ptys($1_su_t) seutil_read_config($1_su_t) seutil_read_default_contexts($1_su_t) ifdef(`strict_policy',` if(secure_mode) { # Only allow transitions to unprivileged user domains. userdom_spec_domtrans_unpriv_users($1_su_t) } else { # Allow transitions to all user domains userdom_spec_domtrans_all_users($1_su_t) } ') ifdef(`targeted_policy',` unconfined_domtrans($1_su_t) unconfined_signal($1_su_t) ') ') ifdef(`targeted_policy',` # allow user to suspend terminal. # does not work in strict since the # parent may not be able to use # the terminal if we newrole, # which relabels the terminal. allow $1_su_t self:process sigstop; corecmd_exec_bin($1_su_t) userdom_manage_all_users_home_content_files($1_su_t) userdom_manage_all_users_home_content_symlinks($1_su_t) ') tunable_policy(`allow_polyinstantiation',` fs_mount_xattr_fs($1_su_t) fs_unmount_xattr_fs($1_su_t) ') tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',` fs_search_nfs($1_su_t) ') tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',` fs_search_cifs($1_su_t) ') optional_policy(` cron_read_pipes($1_su_t) ') optional_policy(` kerberos_use($1_su_t) ') # Modify .Xauthority file (via xauth program). optional_policy(` xserver_user_home_dir_filetrans_user_xauth($1, su_domain_type) xserver_domtrans_user_xauth($1, $1_su_t) ') ifdef(`TODO',` allow $1_su_t $1_home_t:file manage_file_perms; # Access sshd cookie files. allow $1_su_t sshd_tmp_t:file rw_file_perms; file_type_auto_trans($1_su_t, sshd_tmp_t, $1_tmp_t) ') dnl end TODO ') ####################################### ## ## Execute su in the caller domain. ## ## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## # interface(`su_exec',` gen_require(` type su_exec_t; ') can_exec($1,su_exec_t) ')