## Policy for UML ####################################### ## ## The per user domain template for the uml module. ## ## ##

## This template creates a derived domains which are used ## for uml program. ##

##

## This template is invoked automatically for each user, and ## generally does not need to be invoked directly ## by policy writers. ##

##
## ## ## The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user ## is the prefix for user_t). ## ## ## ## ## The type of the user domain. ## ## ## ## ## The role associated with the user domain. ## ## # template(`uml_per_userdomain_template',` ######################################## # # Declarations # type $1_uml_t; domain_type($1_uml_t) role $3 types $1_uml_t; type $1_uml_exec_t; domain_entry_file($1_uml_t,$1_uml_exec_t) type $1_uml_ro_t; files_type($1_uml_ro_t) type $1_uml_rw_t; files_type($1_uml_rw_t) type $1_uml_tmp_t; files_tmp_file($1_uml_tmp_t) type $1_uml_tmpfs_t; files_tmpfs_file($1_uml_tmpfs_t) type $1_uml_devpts_t; term_pty($1_uml_devpts_t) ######################################## # # Local policy # allow $1_uml_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms; allow $1_uml_t self:process { fork signal_perms ptrace }; allow $1_uml_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow $1_uml_t self:unix_dgram_socket create_socket_perms; # Use the network. allow $1_uml_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms; allow $1_uml_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms; allow $1_uml_t $2:process sigchld; allow $1_uml_t $2:fifo_file { ioctl read write getattr lock append }; # allow the UML thing to happen allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_devpts_t:chr_file { rw_file_perms setattr }; term_create_pty($1_uml_t,$1_uml_devpts_t) allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmp_t:file create_file_perms; files_filetrans_tmp($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmp_t, { file dir }) can_exec($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmp_t) allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:dir { read getattr lock search ioctl add_name remove_name write }; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:lnk_file { create read getattr setattr link unlink rename }; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:sock_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_tmpfs_t:fifo_file { create ioctl read getattr lock write setattr append link unlink rename }; fs_filetrans_tmpfs($1_uml_t,$1_uml_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) can_exec($1_uml_t, $1_uml_tmpfs_t) # access config files allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:dir r_dir_perms; allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:file r_file_perms; allow $1_uml_t { $1_uml_ro_t uml_ro_t }:lnk_file { getattr read }; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:dir create_dir_perms; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:file create_file_perms; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:sock_file create_file_perms; allow $1_uml_t $1_uml_rw_t:fifo_file create_file_perms; userdom_filetrans_user_home_dir($1,$1_uml_t,$1_uml_rw_t,{ file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file }) allow $2 uml_ro_t:dir r_dir_perms; allow $2 uml_ro_t:file r_file_perms; allow $2 uml_ro_t:lnk_file { getattr read }; allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t }:{ file sock_file fifo_file } { relabelfrom relabelto create_file_perms }; allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t }:lnk_file { relabelfrom relabelto create_lnk_perms }; allow $2 { $1_uml_ro_t $1_uml_rw_t $1_uml_exec_t }:dir { relabelfrom relabelto create_dir_perms }; allow $2 $1_uml_exec_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto create_file_perms }; allow $2 $1_uml_t:process ptrace; allow $2 $1_uml_t:process signal_perms; # allow ps, ptrace, signal allow $2 $1_uml_t:dir { search getattr read }; allow $2 $1_uml_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr }; allow $2 $1_uml_t:process getattr; # We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access # /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels # (2.4 and 2.6). Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if # running in a privileged domain. dontaudit $2 $1_uml_t:process ptrace; allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms; allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:file create_file_perms; allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; allow $2 $1_uml_tmp_t:sock_file create_file_perms; # Transition from the user domain to this domain. domain_auto_trans($2, { uml_exec_t $1_uml_exec_t }, $1_uml_t) can_exec($1_uml_t, { uml_exec_t $1_uml_exec_t }) # for mconsole allow { $2 $1_uml_t } $1_uml_t:unix_dgram_socket sendto; allow $1_uml_t $2:unix_dgram_socket sendto; kernel_read_system_state($1_uml_t) # for SKAS - need something better kernel_write_proc_files($1_uml_t) # for xterm corecmd_exec_bin($1_uml_t) corecmd_exec_sbin($1_uml_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t) corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_uml_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t) corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_uml_t) corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_uml_t) corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_uml_t) corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_uml_t) corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_uml_t) corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_uml_t) corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_uml_t) corenet_rw_tun_tap_dev($1_uml_t) domain_use_interactive_fds($1_uml_t) # for xterm files_read_etc_files($1_uml_t) files_dontaudit_read_etc_runtime_files($1_uml_t) # putting uml data under /var is usual... files_search_var($1_uml_t) fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_uml_t) init_read_utmp($1_uml_t) init_dontaudit_write_utmp($1_uml_t) # for xterm libs_use_ld_so($1_uml_t) libs_use_shared_libs($1_uml_t) libs_exec_lib_files($1_uml_t) # Inherit and use descriptors from newrole. seutil_use_newrole_fds($1_uml_t) # Use the network. sysnet_read_config($1_uml_t) userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_uml_t) optional_policy(`mount',` mount_send_nfs_client_request($1_uml_t) ') optional_policy(`nis',` nis_use_ypbind($1_uml_t) ') optional_policy(`ssh',` ssh_tcp_connect($1_uml_t) ') ifdef(`TODO',` # for X optional_policy(`startx',` ifelse($1, sysadm,` ',` optional_policy(`xdm',` allow $1_uml_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir search; ') allow $1_uml_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file write; allow $1_uml_t $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto; ') ') optional_policy(`uml_net.te',` # for uml_net domain_auto_trans($1_uml_t, uml_net_exec_t, uml_net_t) allow uml_net_t $1_uml_t:unix_stream_socket { read write }; allow uml_net_t $1_uml_t:unix_dgram_socket { read write }; dontaudit uml_net_t privfd:fd use; can_access_pty(uml_net_t, $1_uml) dontaudit uml_net_t $1_uml_rw_t:dir { getattr search }; ') #TODO optional_policy(`xauth',` allow $1_uml_t $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read }; ') ') ') ######################################## ## ## Set attributes on uml utility socket files. ## ## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## # interface(`uml_setattr_util_sockets',` gen_require(` type uml_switch_var_run_t; ') allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:sock_file setattr; ') ######################################## ## ## Manage uml utility files. ## ## ## ## Domain allowed access. ## ## # interface(`uml_manage_util_files',` gen_require(` type uml_switch_var_run_t; ') allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:dir rw_dir_perms; allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:file create_file_perms; allow $1 uml_switch_var_run_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms; ')