## <summary>X Windows Server</summary>

template(`xserver_common_domain_template',`

	##############################
	#
	# Declarations
	#

	type $1_xserver_t;
	domain_type($1_xserver_t)

	type $1_xserver_tmp_t;
	files_tmp_file($1_xserver_tmp_t)

	type $1_xserver_tmpfs_t;
	files_tmpfs_file($1_xserver_tmpfs_t)

	##############################
	#
	# $1_xserver_t local policy
	#

	# setuid/setgid for the wrapper program to change UID
	# sys_rawio is for iopl access - should not be needed for frame-buffer
	# sys_admin, locking shared mem?  chowning IPC message queues or semaphores?
	# admin of APM bios?
	# sys_nice is so that the X server can set a negative nice value
	# execheap needed until the X module loader is fixed.

	allow $1_xserver_t self:capability { dac_override fsetid setgid setuid ipc_owner sys_rawio sys_admin sys_nice sys_tty_config mknod net_bind_service };
	dontaudit $1_xserver_t self:capability chown;
	allow $1_xserver_t self:process ~{ ptrace setcurrent setexec setfscreate setrlimit execmem execstack execheap };
	allow $1_xserver_t self:process { execmem execheap setsched };
	allow $1_xserver_t self:fd use;
	allow $1_xserver_t self:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t self:sock_file r_file_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t self:shm create_shm_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t self:sem create_sem_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t self:msgq create_msgq_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t self:msg { send receive };
	allow $1_xserver_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create_socket_perms sendto };
	allow $1_xserver_t self:unix_stream_socket { create_stream_socket_perms connectto };
	allow $1_xserver_t self:tcp_socket create_stream_socket_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t self:udp_socket create_socket_perms;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:file manage_file_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;
	files_filetrans_tmp($1_xserver_t, $1_xserver_tmp_t, { file dir sock_file })

	allow $1_xserver_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
	type_transition $1_xserver_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file $1_xserver_tmp_t;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:dir manage_dir_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file manage_file_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:sock_file manage_file_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:fifo_file manage_file_perms;
	fs_filetrans_tmpfs($1_xserver_t,$1_xserver_tmpfs_t,{ dir file lnk_file sock_file fifo_file })

	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:dir rw_dir_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:file manage_file_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t xkb_var_lib_t:lnk_file create_lnk_perms;
	files_search_var_lib($1_xserver_t)

	# Create files in /var/log with the xserver_log_t type.
	allow $1_xserver_t xserver_log_t:file manage_file_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t xserver_log_t:dir r_dir_perms;
	logging_filetrans_log($1_xserver_t,xserver_log_t,file)

	kernel_read_system_state($1_xserver_t)
	kernel_read_device_sysctls($1_xserver_t)
	kernel_read_modprobe_sysctls($1_xserver_t)
	# Xorg wants to check if kernel is tainted
	kernel_read_kernel_sysctls($1_xserver_t)

	# Run helper programs in $1_xserver_t.
	corecmd_search_sbin($1_xserver_t)
	corecmd_exec_bin($1_xserver_t)
	corecmd_exec_shell($1_xserver_t)

	corenet_non_ipsec_sendrecv($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_generic_if($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_raw_sendrecv_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_tcp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_udp_sendrecv_all_ports($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_tcp_bind_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_udp_bind_all_nodes($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_tcp_bind_xserver_port($1_xserver_t)
	corenet_tcp_connect_all_ports($1_xserver_t)

	dev_read_sysfs($1_xserver_t)
	dev_rw_mouse($1_xserver_t)
	dev_rw_mtrr($1_xserver_t)
	dev_rw_apm_bios($1_xserver_t)
	dev_rw_agp($1_xserver_t)
	dev_rw_framebuffer($1_xserver_t)
	dev_manage_dri_dev($1_xserver_t)
	dev_create_generic_dirs($1_xserver_t)
	dev_setattr_generic_dirs($1_xserver_t)
	# raw memory access is needed if not using the frame buffer
	dev_read_raw_memory($1_xserver_t)
	dev_write_raw_memory($1_xserver_t)
	# for other device nodes such as the NVidia binary-only driver
	dev_rw_xserver_misc($1_xserver_t)
	# read events - the synaptics touchpad driver reads raw events
	dev_rw_input_dev($1_xserver_t)

	files_read_etc_files($1_xserver_t)
	files_read_etc_runtime_files($1_xserver_t)
	# brought on by rhgb
	files_search_mnt($1_xserver_t)
	# for nscd
	files_dontaudit_search_pids($1_xserver_t)

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_xserver_t)
	fs_search_nfs($1_xserver_t)
	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_xserver_t)

	term_setattr_unallocated_ttys($1_xserver_t)
	term_use_unallocated_ttys($1_xserver_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_xserver_t)
	libs_use_shared_libs($1_xserver_t)

	logging_send_syslog_msg($1_xserver_t)

	miscfiles_read_localization($1_xserver_t)
	miscfiles_read_fonts($1_xserver_t)

	modutils_domtrans_insmod($1_xserver_t)

	seutil_dontaudit_search_config($1_xserver_t)

	sysnet_read_config($1_xserver_t)

	optional_policy(`authlogin',`
		auth_search_pam_console_data($1_xserver_t)
	')

	optional_policy(`nis',`
		nis_use_ypbind($1_xserver_t)
	')

	optional_policy(`nscd',`
		nscd_socket_use($1_xserver_t)
	')

	optional_policy(`xfs',`
		xfs_stream_connect($1_xserver_t)
	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`
	ifdef(`distro_redhat',`
		ifdef(`rpm.te', `
			allow $1_xserver_t rpm_t:shm { unix_read unix_write read write associate getattr };
			allow $1_xserver_t rpm_tmpfs_t:file { read write };
			rpm_use_fd($1_xserver_t)
		')
	')
	') dnl end TODO
')

#######################################
## <summary>
##	The per user domain template for the xserver module.
## </summary>
## <desc>
##	<p>
##	Define a derived domain for the X server when executed
##	by a user domain (e.g. via startx).  See the xdm module
##	if using an X Display Manager.
##	</p>
##	<p>
##	This is invoked automatically for each user and
##	generally does not need to be invoked directly
##	by policy writers.
##	</p>
## </desc>
## <param name="prefix">
##	The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
##	is the prefix for user_t).
## </param>
## <param name="user_domain">
##	The type of the user domain.
## </param>
## <param name="user_role">
##	The role associated with the user domain.
## </param>
#
template(`xserver_per_userdomain_template',`

	##############################
	#
	# Declarations
	#

	xserver_common_domain_template($1)
	role $3 types $1_xserver_t;

	type $1_iceauth_t;
	domain_type($1_iceauth_t)
	role $3 types $1_iceauth_t;

	type $1_iceauth_home_t alias $1_iceauth_rw_t;
	files_poly_member($1_iceauth_home_t)
	userdom_home_file($1,$1_iceauth_home_t)

	type $1_xauth_t;
	domain_type($1_xauth_t)
	role $3 types $1_xauth_t;

	type $1_xauth_home_t alias $1_xauth_rw_t;
	files_poly_member($1_xauth_home_t)
	userdom_home_file($1,$1_xauth_home_t)

	type $1_xauth_tmp_t;
	files_tmp_file($1_xauth_tmp_t)

	##############################
	#
	# $1_xserver_t Local policy
	#

	domain_auto_trans($1_xserver_t, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)
	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xauth_t:fd use;
	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:fd use;
	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xserver_t:process sigchld;

	allow $1_xserver_t $1_xauth_home_t:file { getattr read };

	domain_auto_trans($2, xserver_exec_t, $1_xserver_t)
	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:fd use;
	allow $1_xserver_t $2:fd use;
	allow $1_xserver_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
	allow $1_xserver_t $2:process { signal sigchld };

	allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmp_t:sock_file rw_file_perms;
	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	allow $2 $1_xserver_tmpfs_t:file rw_file_perms;

	# Communicate via System V shared memory.
	allow $1_xserver_t $2:shm rw_shm_perms;
	allow $2 $1_xserver_t:shm rw_shm_perms;

	getty_use_fd($1_xserver_t)

	locallogin_use_fd($1_xserver_t)

	userdom_search_user_home($1,$1_xserver_t)
	userdom_use_user_tty($1,$1_xserver_t)
	userdom_setattr_user_tty($1,$1_xserver_t)
	userdom_rw_user_tmpfs_files($1,$1_xserver_t)

	optional_policy(`userhelper',`
		userhelper_search_config($1_xserver_t)
	')

	ifdef(`TODO',`
	# Read fonts
	read_fonts($1_xserver_t, $1)

	allow $1_t xdm_xserver_tmp_t:dir r_dir_perms;
	allow $1_t xdm_xserver_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;

	ifdef(`xdm.te', `
		allow $1_t xdm_tmp_t:sock_file unlink;
		allow $1_xserver_t xdm_var_run_t:dir search;
	')
	') dnl end TODO

	##############################
	#
	# $1_xauth_t Local policy
	#

	allow $1_xauth_t self:process signal;
	allow $1_xauth_t self:unix_stream_socket create_stream_socket_perms;

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
	userdom_filetrans_user_home_dir($1,$1_xauth_t,$1_xauth_home_t,file)

	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_tmp_t:dir create_dir_perms;
	allow $1_xauth_t $1_xauth_tmp_t:file create_file_perms;
	files_filetrans_tmp($1_xauth_t, $1_xauth_tmp_t, { file dir })

	domain_auto_trans($2, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)
	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:fd use;
	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fd use;
	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
	allow $1_xauth_t $2:process sigchld;

	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:process signal;

	# allow ps to show xauth
	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:dir { search getattr read };
	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:process getattr;
	# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
	# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
	# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
	# running in a privileged domain.
	dontaudit $2 $1_xauth_t:process ptrace;

	allow $2 $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
	allow $2 $1_xauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

	allow xdm_t $1_xauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
	userdom_filetrans_user_home_dir($1,xdm_t,$1_xauth_home_t,file)

	domain_use_wide_inherit_fd($1_xauth_t)

	files_read_etc_files($1_xauth_t)
	files_search_pids($1_xauth_t)

	fs_getattr_xattr_fs($1_xauth_t)
	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_xauth_t)

	# cjp: why?
	term_use_ptmx($1_xauth_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_xauth_t)
	libs_use_shared_libs($1_xauth_t)

	sysnet_dns_name_resolve($1_xauth_t)

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_xauth_t)
	userdom_read_user_tmp_files($1,$1_xauth_t)

	tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
		fs_manage_nfs_files($1_xauth_t)
	')

	tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
		fs_manage_cifs_files($1_xauth_t)
	')

	optional_policy(`nis',`
		nis_use_ypbind($1_xauth_t)
	')

	optional_policy(`ssh',`
		ssh_sigchld($1_xauth_t)
		ssh_read_pipes($1_xauth_t)
		ssh_dontaudit_rw_tcp_sockets($1_xauth_t)
	')

	##############################
	#
	# $1_iceauth_t Local policy
	#

	domain_auto_trans($2, iceauth_exec_t, $1_iceauth_t)
	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:fd use;
	allow $1_iceauth_t $2:fd use;
	allow $1_iceauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
	allow $1_iceauth_t $2:process sigchld;

	allow $1_iceauth_t $1_iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
	userdom_filetrans_user_home_dir($1,$1_iceauth_t,$1_iceauth_home_t,file)

	# allow ps to show iceauth
	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:dir { search getattr read };
	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:{ file lnk_file } { read getattr };
	allow $2 $1_iceauth_t:process getattr;
	# We need to suppress this denial because procps tries to access
	# /proc/pid/environ and this now triggers a ptrace check in recent kernels
	# (2.4 and 2.6).  Might want to change procps to not do this, or only if
	# running in a privileged domain.
	dontaudit $2 $1_iceauth_t:process ptrace;

	allow $2 $1_iceauth_home_t:file manage_file_perms;
	allow $2 $1_iceauth_home_t:file { relabelfrom relabelto };

	fs_search_auto_mountpoints($1_iceauth_t)

	libs_use_ld_so($1_iceauth_t)
	libs_use_shared_libs($1_iceauth_t)

	userdom_use_user_terminals($1,$1_iceauth_t)

	tunable_policy(`use_nfs_home_dirs',`
		fs_manage_nfs_files($1_iceauth_t)
	')

	tunable_policy(`use_samba_home_dirs',`
		fs_manage_cifs_files($1_iceauth_t)
	')
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Transition to a user Xauthority domain.
## </summary>
## <desc>
##	<p>
##	Transition to a user Xauthority domain.
##	</p>
##	<p>
##	This is a templated interface, and should only
##	be called from a per-userdomain template.
##	</p>
## </desc>
## <param name="userdomain_prefix">
##	The prefix of the user domain (e.g., user
##	is the prefix for user_t).
## </param>
## <param name="domain">
##	Domain allowed access.
## </param>
#
template(`xserver_domtrans_user_xauth',`
	gen_require(`
		type $1_xauth_t, xauth_exec_t;
	')

	domain_auto_trans($2, xauth_exec_t, $1_xauth_t)
	allow $2 $1_xauth_t:fd use;
	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fd use;
	allow $1_xauth_t $2:fifo_file rw_file_perms;
	allow $1_xauth_t $2:process sigchld;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Connect to XDM over a unix domain
##	stream socket.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	Domain allowed access.
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_stream_connect_xdm',`
	gen_require(`
		type xdm_t;
	')

	allow $1 xdm_t:unix_stream_socket connectto;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Create a named socket in a XDM
##	temporary directory.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	Domain allowed access.
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_create_xdm_tmp_sockets',`
	gen_require(`
		type xdm_tmp_t;
	')

	files_search_tmp($1)
	allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:dir ra_dir_perms;
	allow $1 xdm_tmp_t:sock_file create;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Read XDM pid files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	Domain allowed access.
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_read_xdm_pid',`
	gen_require(`
		type xdm_var_run_t;
	')

	files_search_pids($1)
	allow $1 xdm_var_run_t:file r_file_perms;
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Make an X session script an entrypoint for the specified domain.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	The domain for which the shell is an entrypoint.
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_xsession_entry_type',`
	gen_require(`
		type xsession_exec_t;
	')

	domain_entry_file($1,xsession_exec_t)
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Execute an X session in the target domain.  This
##	is an explicit transition, requiring the
##	caller to use setexeccon().
## </summary>
## <desc>
##	<p>
##	Execute an Xsession in the target domain.  This
##	is an explicit transition, requiring the
##	caller to use setexeccon().
##	</p>
##	<p>
##	No interprocess communication (signals, pipes,
##	etc.) is provided by this interface since
##	the domains are not owned by this module.
##	</p>
## </desc>
## <param name="domain">
##	Domain allowed access.
## </param>
## <param name="target_domain">
##	The type of the shell process.
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_xsession_spec_domtrans',`
	gen_require(`
		type xsession_exec_t;
	')

	domain_trans($1,xsession_exec_t,$2)
')

########################################
## <summary>
##	Do not audit attempts to write the X server
##	log files.
## </summary>
## <param name="domain">
##	Domain to not audit
## </param>
#
interface(`xserver_dontaudit_write_log',`
	gen_require(`
		type xserver_log_t;
	')

	dontaudit $1 xserver_log_t:file { append write };
')