# Copyright (C) 2005 Tresys Technology, LLC policy_module(kernel,1.0) attribute can_load_policy; attribute can_setenforce; attribute can_setsecparam; attribute can_load_kernmodule; attribute can_receive_kernel_messages; # # kernel_t is the domain of kernel threads. # It is also the target type when checking permissions in the system class. # type kernel_t, can_load_kernmodule, can_load_policy; role system_r types kernel_t; domain_make_domain(kernel_t) # # unlabeled_t is the type of unlabeled objects. # Objects that have no known labeling information or that # have labels that are no longer valid are treated as having this type. # type unlabeled_t; # # security_t is the target type when checking # the permissions in the security class. It is also # applied to selinuxfs inodes. # type security_t; filesystem_make_filesystem(security_t) genfscon selinuxfs / system_u:object_r:security_t # # sysfs_t is the type for /sys # type sysfs_t; files_make_mountpoint(sysfs_t) filesystem_make_filesystem(sysfs_t) genfscon sysfs / system_u:object_r:sysfs_t # # usbfs_t is the type for /proc/bus/usb # type usbfs_t alias usbdevfs_t; files_make_mountpoint(usbfs_t) filesystem_make_filesystem(usbfs_t) genfscon usbfs / system_u:object_r:usbfs_t genfscon usbdevfs / system_u:object_r:usbfs_t # # Procfs types # type proc_t; files_make_mountpoint(proc_t) genfscon proc / system_u:object_r:proc_t genfscon proc /sysvipc system_u:object_r:proc_t # kernel message interface type proc_kmsg_t; genfscon proc /kmsg system_u:object_r:proc_kmsg_t neverallow ~can_receive_kernel_messages proc_kmsg_t:file ~getattr; # /proc kcore: inaccessible type proc_kcore_t; neverallow * proc_kcore_t:file ~getattr; genfscon proc /kcore system_u:object_r:proc_kcore_t type proc_mdstat_t; genfscon proc /mdstat system_u:object_r:proc_mdstat_t type proc_net_t; genfscon proc /net system_u:object_r:proc_net_t # # Sysctl types # # /proc/irq directory and files type sysctl_irq_t; genfscon proc /irq system_u:object_r:sysctl_irq_t # /proc/net/rpc directory and files type sysctl_rpc_t; genfscon proc /net/rpc system_u:object_r:sysctl_rpc_t # /proc/sys directory, base directory of sysctls type sysctl_t; genfscon proc /sys system_u:object_r:sysctl_t # /proc/sys/fs directory and files type sysctl_fs_t; files_make_mountpoint(sysctl_fs_t) genfscon proc /sys/fs system_u:object_r:sysctl_fs_t # /proc/sys/kernel directory and files type sysctl_kernel_t; genfscon proc /sys/kernel system_u:object_r:sysctl_kernel_t # /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe file type sysctl_modprobe_t; genfscon proc /sys/kernel/modprobe system_u:object_r:sysctl_modprobe_t # /proc/sys/kernel/hotplug file type sysctl_hotplug_t; genfscon proc /sys/kernel/hotplug system_u:object_r:sysctl_hotplug_t # /proc/sys/net directory and files type sysctl_net_t; genfscon proc /sys/net system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_t # /proc/sys/net/unix directory and files type sysctl_net_unix_t; genfscon proc /sys/net/unix system_u:object_r:sysctl_net_unix_t # /proc/sys/vm directory and files type sysctl_vm_t; genfscon proc /sys/vm system_u:object_r:sysctl_vm_t # /proc/sys/dev directory and files type sysctl_dev_t; genfscon proc /sys/dev system_u:object_r:sysctl_dev_t ######################################## # # kernel local policy # # Use capabilities. need to investigate which capabilities are actually used allow kernel_t self:capability *; # Other possible mount points for the root fs are in files allow kernel_t unlabeled_t:dir mounton; # old general_domain_access() allow kernel_t self:shm { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write lock unix_read unix_write }; allow kernel_t self:sem { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write unix_read unix_write }; allow kernel_t self:msg { send receive }; allow kernel_t self:msgq { associate getattr setattr create destroy read write enqueue unix_read unix_write }; allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown }; allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket { create ioctl read getattr write setattr append bind connect getopt setopt shutdown listen accept }; allow kernel_t self:unix_dgram_socket sendto; allow kernel_t self:unix_stream_socket connectto; allow kernel_t self:fifo_file { read getattr lock ioctl write append }; allow kernel_t self:fd use; # old general_proc_read_access(): allow kernel_t proc_t:dir { getattr search read }; allow kernel_t proc_t:{ lnk_file file } { getattr read }; allow kernel_t proc_net_t:dir { getattr search read }; allow kernel_t proc_net_t:file { getattr read }; allow kernel_t proc_mdstat_t:file { getattr read }; allow kernel_t proc_kcore_t:file getattr; allow kernel_t proc_kmsg_t:file getattr; allow kernel_t sysctl_t:dir { getattr search read }; allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:dir { getattr search read }; allow kernel_t sysctl_kernel_t:file { getattr read }; # old base_file_read_access(): files_list_home_directories(kernel_t) files_read_general_application_resources(kernel_t) selinux_read_config(kernel_t) selinux_read_binary_policy(kernel_t) allow kernel_t security_t:dir { read search getattr }; allow kernel_t security_t:file { getattr read write }; allow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy; auditallow kernel_t security_t:security load_policy; libraries_use_dynamic_loader(kernel_t) libraries_read_shared_libraries(kernel_t) corecommands_execute_shell(kernel_t) terminal_use_console(kernel_t) domain_signal_all_domains(kernel_t) # Mount root file system. Used when loading a policy # from initrd, then mounting the root filesystem filesystem_mount_all_filesystems(kernel_t) # /proc/sys/kernel/modprobe is set to /bin/true if not using modules. corecommands_execute_general_programs(kernel_t) logging_send_system_log_message(kernel_t) # Kernel-generated traffic, e.g. ICMP replies. corenetwork_network_raw_on_all_interfaces(kernel_t) corenetwork_network_raw_on_all_nodes(kernel_t) # Kernel-generated traffic, e.g. TCP resets. corenetwork_network_tcp_on_all_interfaces(kernel_t) corenetwork_network_tcp_on_all_nodes(kernel_t) neverallow ~can_load_policy security_t:security load_policy; neverallow ~can_setenforce security_t:security setenforce; neverallow ~can_setsecparam security_t:security setsecparam; # enabling dyntransition breaks process tranquility. If you dont # know what this means or dont understand the implications of a # dynamic transition, you shouldnt be using it!!! neverallow * *:process { setcurrent dyntransition }; neverallow ~can_load_kernmodule *:capability sys_module;