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s390utils/s390utils-2.29.0-rhel.patch

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- rebased to 2.29.0 (RHEL-11409) - KVM: Support AP Bindings in SE Header (RHEL-10573) - KVM: Userspace Tool for IBK Request Generation and Insertion (RHEL-10579) - zkey: support for key type PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES (RHEL-11441) - vmur: fix handling of option -t (RHEL-11479) - dbginfo.sh: global original Input Field Separator (IFS) (RHEL-16526) - Resolves: RHEL-11409 RHEL-10573 RHEL-10579 RHEL-11441 RHEL-11479 RHEL-16526
2023-11-24 09:27:03 +00:00
From a32824922cb273703bacd44e6a29cbc33ae48cf5 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 21 Jul 2023 14:06:18 +0200
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 01/18] zkey: Support EP11 AES keys with prepended header to
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
retain EP11 session (RHEL-11440)
- rebased to 2.29.0 (RHEL-11409) - KVM: Support AP Bindings in SE Header (RHEL-10573) - KVM: Userspace Tool for IBK Request Generation and Insertion (RHEL-10579) - zkey: support for key type PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES (RHEL-11441) - vmur: fix handling of option -t (RHEL-11479) - dbginfo.sh: global original Input Field Separator (IFS) (RHEL-16526) - Resolves: RHEL-11409 RHEL-10573 RHEL-10579 RHEL-11441 RHEL-11479 RHEL-16526
2023-11-24 09:27:03 +00:00
The pkey kernel module supports two key blob formats for EP11 AES keys.
The first one (PKEY_TYPE_EP11) contains a 16 bytes header that overlays
the first 32 bytes of the key blob which usually contain the ID of the
EP11 session to which the key is bound. For zkey/dm-crypt that session
ID used to be all zeros. The second blob format (PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES)
prepends the 16 bytes header to the blob, an thus does not overlay the
blob. This format can be used for key blobs that are session-bound, i.e.
have a non-zero session ID in the first 32 bytes.
Change zkey to generate EP11 keys using the new format (i.e. pkey type
PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES), but existing key blobs using the old format can
still be used.
Signed-off-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Joerg Schmidbauer <jschmidb@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 1b044b8a40ab59e4f5ffe66e3ad81499b0beccce)
---
zkey/ep11.c | 48 +++++++++-----
zkey/keystore.c | 4 +-
zkey/kmip/zkey-kmip.c | 76 ++++++++++++++++++----
zkey/kms.c | 9 ++-
zkey/pkey.c | 141 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
zkey/pkey.h | 45 +++++++++----
zkey/zkey-cryptsetup.c | 15 ++++-
zkey/zkey.c | 8 ++-
8 files changed, 295 insertions(+), 51 deletions(-)
diff --git a/zkey/ep11.c b/zkey/ep11.c
index 8359929..df8b57d 100644
--- a/zkey/ep11.c
+++ b/zkey/ep11.c
@@ -365,8 +365,9 @@ int select_ep11_apqn_by_mkvp(struct ep11_lib *ep11, u8 *mkvp,
* @param[in] target the target handle to use for the re-encipher operation
* @param[in] card the card that corresponds to the target handle
* @param[in] domain the domain that corresponds to the target handle
- * @param[in/out] ep11key the EP11 key token to reencipher. The re-enciphered
- * secure key will be returned in this buffer.
+ * @param[in/out] ep11key_blob the EP11 key token to reencipher. The
+ * re-enciphered secure key will be returned in this
+ * buffer.
* @param[in] ep11key_size the size of the secure key
* @param[in] verbose if true, verbose messages are printed
*
@@ -374,21 +375,29 @@ int select_ep11_apqn_by_mkvp(struct ep11_lib *ep11, u8 *mkvp,
*/
static int ep11_adm_reencrypt(struct ep11_lib *ep11, target_t target,
unsigned int card, unsigned int domain,
- struct ep11keytoken *ep11key,
+ u8 *ep11key_blob,
unsigned int ep11key_size, bool verbose)
{
+ struct ep11kblob_header *hdr = (struct ep11kblob_header *)ep11key_blob;
+ struct ep11keytoken *ep11key;
CK_BYTE resp[MAX_BLOBSIZE];
CK_BYTE req[MAX_BLOBSIZE];
- char ep11_token_header[sizeof(ep11key->head)];
+ char ep11_token_header[sizeof(ep11key->head)] = { 0 };
struct XCPadmresp lrb;
struct XCPadmresp rb;
+ bool with_header;
size_t resp_len;
size_t blob_len;
long req_len;
CK_RV rv;
int rc;
- blob_len = ep11key->head.length;
+ with_header = is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(ep11key_blob, ep11key_size);
+ ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)(with_header ?
+ ep11key_blob + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header) :
+ ep11key_blob);
+ blob_len = with_header ? hdr->len - sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header) :
+ ep11key->head.len;
if (blob_len > ep11key_size) {
pr_verbose(verbose, "Blob length larger than secure key size");
return -EINVAL;
@@ -397,9 +406,14 @@ static int ep11_adm_reencrypt(struct ep11_lib *ep11, target_t target,
rb.domain = domain;
lrb.domain = domain;
- /* The token header is an overlay over the (all zero) session field */
- memcpy(ep11_token_header, ep11key, sizeof(ep11_token_header));
- memset(ep11key->session, 0, sizeof(ep11key->session));
+ if (!with_header) {
+ /*
+ * The token header is an overlay over the (all zero) session
+ * field
+ */
+ memcpy(ep11_token_header, ep11key, sizeof(ep11_token_header));
+ memset(ep11key->session, 0, sizeof(ep11key->session));
+ }
resp_len = sizeof(resp);
req_len = ep11->dll_xcpa_cmdblock(req, sizeof(req), XCP_ADM_REENCRYPT,
@@ -446,7 +460,8 @@ static int ep11_adm_reencrypt(struct ep11_lib *ep11, target_t target,
}
memcpy(ep11key, lrb.payload, blob_len);
- memcpy(ep11key, ep11_token_header, sizeof(ep11_token_header));
+ if (!with_header)
+ memcpy(ep11key, ep11_token_header, sizeof(ep11_token_header));
return 0;
}
@@ -469,7 +484,6 @@ int reencipher_ep11_key(struct ep11_lib *ep11, target_t target,
unsigned int card, unsigned int domain, u8 *secure_key,
unsigned int secure_key_size, bool verbose)
{
- struct ep11keytoken *ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)secure_key;
CK_IBM_DOMAIN_INFO dinf;
CK_ULONG dinf_len = sizeof(dinf);
CK_RV rv;
@@ -493,17 +507,21 @@ int reencipher_ep11_key(struct ep11_lib *ep11, target_t target,
return -ENODEV;
}
- rc = ep11_adm_reencrypt(ep11, target, card, domain, ep11key,
+ rc = ep11_adm_reencrypt(ep11, target, card, domain, secure_key,
secure_key_size, verbose);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
if (is_xts_key(secure_key, secure_key_size)) {
- secure_key += EP11_KEY_SIZE;
- secure_key_size -= EP11_KEY_SIZE;
- ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)secure_key;
+ if (is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(secure_key, secure_key_size)) {
+ secure_key += EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE;
+ secure_key_size -= EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE;
+ } else {
+ secure_key += EP11_KEY_SIZE;
+ secure_key_size -= EP11_KEY_SIZE;
+ }
- rc = ep11_adm_reencrypt(ep11, target, card, domain, ep11key,
+ rc = ep11_adm_reencrypt(ep11, target, card, domain, secure_key,
secure_key_size, verbose);
if (rc != 0)
return rc;
diff --git a/zkey/keystore.c b/zkey/keystore.c
index 4efa2e4..c0a7037 100644
--- a/zkey/keystore.c
+++ b/zkey/keystore.c
@@ -3398,7 +3398,9 @@ static int _keystore_perform_reencipher(struct keystore *keystore,
"CURRENT master key", name);
if (!selected &&
!is_ep11_aes_key(secure_key,
- secure_key_size))
+ secure_key_size) &&
+ !is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(secure_key,
+ secure_key_size))
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure AES key");
}
diff --git a/zkey/kmip/zkey-kmip.c b/zkey/kmip/zkey-kmip.c
index a00c5dd..e7b7c73 100644
--- a/zkey/kmip/zkey-kmip.c
+++ b/zkey/kmip/zkey-kmip.c
@@ -5278,9 +5278,11 @@ static int _ep11_unwrap_key_rsa(struct plugin_handle *ph,
m_UnwrapKey_t dll_m_UnwrapKey;
const unsigned char *key_blob;
struct ep11keytoken *ep11key;
+ struct ep11kblob_header *hdr;
CK_MECHANISM mech = { 0 };
CK_BYTE csum[7] = { 0 };
CK_BBOOL ck_true = true;
+ int pkey_fd, rc;
CK_RV rv;
CK_ATTRIBUTE template[] = {
@@ -5306,7 +5308,8 @@ static int _ep11_unwrap_key_rsa(struct plugin_handle *ph,
pr_verbose(&ph->pd, "Wrap hashing algorithm: %d",
ph->profile->wrap_hashing_algo);
- if (*unwrapped_key_len < sizeof(struct ep11keytoken)) {
+ if (*unwrapped_key_len < sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header) +
+ sizeof(struct ep11keytoken)) {
_set_error(ph, "Key buffer is too small");
return -EINVAL;
}
@@ -5381,19 +5384,68 @@ static int _ep11_unwrap_key_rsa(struct plugin_handle *ph,
256 * 256 * csum[csum_len - 3] +
256 * 256 * 256 * csum[csum_len - 4];
- /* Setup the EP11 token header */
- ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)unwrapped_key;
- memset(&ep11key->session, 0, sizeof(ep11key->session));
- ep11key->head.type = TOKEN_TYPE_NON_CCA;
- ep11key->head.length = *unwrapped_key_len;
- ep11key->head.version = TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES;
- ep11key->head.keybitlen = bit_len;
-
- pr_verbose(&ph->pd, "unwrapped bit length: %u",
- ep11key->head.keybitlen);
+ /* Prepend and setup the EP11 token header */
+ hdr = (struct ep11kblob_header *)unwrapped_key;
+ ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)
+ (unwrapped_key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header));
+ memmove(ep11key, unwrapped_key, *unwrapped_key_len);
+ *unwrapped_key_len += sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header);
+ memset(hdr, 0, sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header));
+ hdr->type = TOKEN_TYPE_NON_CCA;
+ hdr->hver = 0;
+ hdr->len = *unwrapped_key_len;
+ hdr->version = TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES_WITH_HEADER;
+ hdr->bitlen = bit_len;
+
+ pr_verbose(&ph->pd, "unwrapped bit length: %u", hdr->bitlen);
/* return full length, blob is already zero padded */
- *unwrapped_key_len = sizeof(struct ep11keytoken);
+ *unwrapped_key_len =
+ sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header) + sizeof(struct ep11keytoken);
+
+ /*
+ * Check if the pkey module supports keys of type
+ * TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES_WITH_HEADER, older kernels may not support
+ * such keys. If it does not support such keys, convert the key to
+ * TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES type, if its session field is all zero
+ * (i.e. the key is not session bound).
+ */
+ pkey_fd = open_pkey_device(ph->pd.verbose);
+ if (pkey_fd < 0) {
+ _set_error(ph, "Failed to open pkey device");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ rc = validate_secure_key(pkey_fd, unwrapped_key, *unwrapped_key_len,
+ NULL, NULL, NULL, ph->pd.verbose);
+ close(pkey_fd);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL || rc == -ENODEV) {
+ pr_verbose(&ph->pd, "The pkey kernel module does not support "
+ "PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES, fall back to PKEY_TYPE_EP11");
+
+ if (is_ep11_key_session_bound(unwrapped_key,
+ *unwrapped_key_len)) {
+ _set_error(ph, "The unwrapped key is session bound. "
+ "Kernel support is required for such keys");
+ return -EIO;
+ }
+
+ key_blob_len = hdr->len;
+ *unwrapped_key_len -= sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header);
+ memmove(unwrapped_key,
+ unwrapped_key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header),
+ *unwrapped_key_len);
+ ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)unwrapped_key;
+ memset(&ep11key->session, 0, sizeof(ep11key->session));
+ ep11key->head.type = TOKEN_TYPE_NON_CCA;
+ ep11key->head.len = key_blob_len -
+ sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header);
+ ep11key->head.version = TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES;
+ ep11key->head.bitlen = bit_len;
+ } else if (rc != 0) {
+ _set_error(ph, "Failed to validate unwrapped key");
+ return rc;
+ }
return 0;
}
diff --git a/zkey/kms.c b/zkey/kms.c
index 9892a9e..2e33b22 100644
--- a/zkey/kms.c
+++ b/zkey/kms.c
@@ -2175,7 +2175,7 @@ int generate_kms_key(struct kms_info *kms_info, const char *name,
else if (strcasecmp(key_type, KEY_TYPE_CCA_AESCIPHER) == 0)
key_size = AESCIPHER_KEY_SIZE;
else if (strcasecmp(key_type, KEY_TYPE_EP11_AES) == 0)
- key_size = EP11_KEY_SIZE;
+ key_size = EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE;
else
return -ENOTSUP;
@@ -2248,6 +2248,9 @@ int generate_kms_key(struct kms_info *kms_info, const char *name,
if (verbose)
util_hexdump_grp(stderr, NULL, key_blob, 4, key_blob_size, 0);
+ if (is_ep11_aes_key(key_blob, key_blob_size))
+ key_size = EP11_KEY_SIZE;
+
/* Save ID and label of 1st key */
rc = properties_set(key_props, xts ? PROP_NAME_KMS_XTS_KEY1_ID :
PROP_NAME_KMS_KEY_ID, key1_id);
@@ -3132,6 +3135,8 @@ int import_kms_key(struct kms_info *kms_info, const char *key1_id,
key_size = AESCIPHER_KEY_SIZE;
else if (is_ep11_aes_key(key_blob, key_blob_size))
key_size = EP11_KEY_SIZE;
+ else if (is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key_blob, key_blob_size))
+ key_size = EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE;
if (key_size == 0 || key_blob_size > key_size) {
pr_verbose(verbose, "Key '%s' has an unknown or unsupported "
@@ -3366,6 +3371,8 @@ int refresh_kms_key(struct kms_info *kms_info, struct properties *key_props,
key_size = AESCIPHER_KEY_SIZE;
else if (is_ep11_aes_key(key_blob, key_blob_size))
key_size = EP11_KEY_SIZE;
+ else if (is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key_blob, key_blob_size))
+ key_size = EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE;
if (key_size == 0 || key_blob_size > key_size) {
pr_verbose(verbose, "Key '%s' has an unknown or unsupported "
diff --git a/zkey/pkey.c b/zkey/pkey.c
index e013e06..2582088 100644
--- a/zkey/pkey.c
+++ b/zkey/pkey.c
@@ -858,7 +858,7 @@ static enum pkey_key_type key_type_to_pkey_type(const char *key_type)
if (strcasecmp(key_type, KEY_TYPE_CCA_AESCIPHER) == 0)
return PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER;
if (strcasecmp(key_type, KEY_TYPE_EP11_AES) == 0)
- return PKEY_TYPE_EP11;
+ return PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES;
return 0;
}
@@ -879,6 +879,8 @@ static size_t key_size_for_type(enum pkey_key_type type)
return AESCIPHER_KEY_SIZE;
case PKEY_TYPE_EP11:
return EP11_KEY_SIZE;
+ case PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES:
+ return EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE;
default:
return 0;
}
@@ -924,6 +926,7 @@ int generate_secure_key_random(int pkey_fd, const char *keyfile,
return -ENOTSUP;
}
+retry:
genseck2.size = keybits_to_keysize(keybits);
if (genseck2.size == 0) {
warnx("Invalid value for '--keybits'/'-c': '%lu'", keybits);
@@ -957,10 +960,33 @@ int generate_secure_key_random(int pkey_fd, const char *keyfile,
genseck2.keylen = size;
rc = pkey_genseck2(pkey_fd, &genseck2, verbose);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL && genseck2.type == PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES) {
+ /*
+ * Older kernels may not support gensek2 with key type
+ * PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES, retry with PKEY_TYPE_EP11.
+ */
+ pr_verbose(verbose,
+ "ioctl PKEY_GENSECK2 does not support "
+ "PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES, fall back to PKEY_TYPE_EP11");
+
+ genseck2.type = PKEY_TYPE_EP11;
+ free(genseck2.apqns);
+ genseck2.apqns = NULL;
+ genseck2.apqn_entries = 0;
+ free(secure_key);
+ goto retry;
+ }
if (rc != 0) {
warnx("Failed to generate a secure key: %s", strerror(-rc));
goto out;
}
+ if (rc == 0 && genseck2.type == PKEY_TYPE_EP11) {
+ if (is_ep11_key_session_bound(secure_key, size)) {
+ warnx("The generated key is session bound. Kernel "
+ "support is required for such keys");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
if (xts) {
free(genseck2.apqns);
@@ -1062,6 +1088,7 @@ int generate_secure_key_clear(int pkey_fd, const char *keyfile,
return -ENOTSUP;
}
+retry:
clr2seck2.size = keybits_to_keysize(HALF_KEYSIZE_FOR_XTS(
clear_key_size * 8, xts));
if (clr2seck2.size == 0) {
@@ -1096,10 +1123,33 @@ int generate_secure_key_clear(int pkey_fd, const char *keyfile,
clr2seck2.keylen = size;
rc = pkey_clr2seck2(pkey_fd, &clr2seck2, verbose);
+ if (rc == -EINVAL && clr2seck2.type == PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES) {
+ /*
+ * Older kernels may not support clr2seck2 with key type
+ * PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES, retry with PKEY_TYPE_EP11.
+ */
+ pr_verbose(verbose,
+ "ioctl PKEY_CLR2SECK2 does not support "
+ "PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES, fall back to PKEY_TYPE_EP11");
+
+ clr2seck2.type = PKEY_TYPE_EP11;
+ free(clr2seck2.apqns);
+ clr2seck2.apqns = NULL;
+ clr2seck2.apqn_entries = 0;
+ free(secure_key);
+ goto retry;
+ }
if (rc != 0) {
warnx("Failed to generate a secure key: %s", strerror(-rc));
goto out;
}
+ if (rc == 0 && clr2seck2.type == PKEY_TYPE_EP11) {
+ if (is_ep11_key_session_bound(secure_key, size)) {
+ warnx("The generated key is session bound. Kernel "
+ "support is required for such keys");
+ goto out;
+ }
+ }
if (xts) {
free(clr2seck2.apqns);
@@ -1486,6 +1536,8 @@ int get_master_key_verification_pattern(const u8 *key, size_t key_size,
struct aesdatakeytoken *datakey = (struct aesdatakeytoken *)key;
struct aescipherkeytoken *cipherkey = (struct aescipherkeytoken *)key;
struct ep11keytoken *ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)key;
+ struct ep11keytoken *ep11key2 =
+ (struct ep11keytoken *)(key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header));
util_assert(key != NULL, "Internal error: secure_key is NULL");
util_assert(mkvp != NULL, "Internal error: mkvp is NULL");
@@ -1497,6 +1549,8 @@ int get_master_key_verification_pattern(const u8 *key, size_t key_size,
memcpy(mkvp, &cipherkey->kvp, sizeof(cipherkey->kvp));
else if (is_ep11_aes_key(key, key_size))
memcpy(mkvp, &ep11key->wkvp, sizeof(ep11key->wkvp));
+ else if (is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key, key_size))
+ memcpy(mkvp, &ep11key2->wkvp, sizeof(ep11key2->wkvp));
else
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1593,9 +1647,43 @@ bool is_ep11_aes_key(const u8 *key, size_t key_size)
if (ep11key->head.type != TOKEN_TYPE_NON_CCA)
return false;
+ if (ep11key->head.hver != 0)
+ return false;
if (ep11key->head.version != TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES)
return false;
- if (ep11key->head.length > key_size)
+ if (ep11key->head.len > key_size)
+ return false;
+
+ if (ep11key->version != 0x1234)
+ return false;
+
+ return true;
+}
+
+/**
+ * Check if the specified key is a EP11 AES key token with external header.
+ *
+ * @param[in] key the secure key token
+ * @param[in] key_size the size of the secure key
+ *
+ * @returns true if the key is an EP11 AES token with external header type
+ */
+bool is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(const u8 *key, size_t key_size)
+{
+ struct ep11kblob_header *header = (struct ep11kblob_header *)key;
+ struct ep11keytoken *ep11key =
+ (struct ep11keytoken *)(key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header));
+
+ if (key == NULL || key_size < EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE)
+ return false;
+
+ if (header->type != TOKEN_TYPE_NON_CCA)
+ return false;
+ if (header->hver != 0)
+ return false;
+ if (header->version != TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES_WITH_HEADER)
+ return false;
+ if (header->len > key_size)
return false;
if (ep11key->version != 0x1234)
@@ -1604,6 +1692,33 @@ bool is_ep11_aes_key(const u8 *key, size_t key_size)
return true;
}
+/**
+ * Check if the specified EP11 AES key is session bound.
+ *
+ * @param[in] key the secure key token
+ * @param[in] key_size the size of the secure key
+ *
+ * @returns true if the key is an EP11 AES token type
+ */
+bool is_ep11_key_session_bound(const u8 *key, size_t key_size)
+{
+ struct ep11keytoken *ep11key;
+
+ if (is_ep11_aes_key(key, key_size)) {
+ ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)key;
+ return memcmp(ep11key->session + sizeof(ep11key->head),
+ ZERO_SESSION, sizeof(ep11key->session) -
+ sizeof(ep11key->head)) != 0;
+ } else if (is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key, key_size)) {
+ ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)
+ (key + sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header));
+ return memcmp(ep11key->session, ZERO_SESSION,
+ sizeof(ep11key->session)) != 0;
+ } else {
+ return false;
+ }
+}
+
/**
* Check if the specified key is an XTS type key
*
@@ -1629,6 +1744,11 @@ bool is_xts_key(const u8 *key, size_t key_size)
is_ep11_aes_key(key + EP11_KEY_SIZE,
key_size - EP11_KEY_SIZE))
return true;
+ } else if (is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key, key_size)) {
+ if (key_size == 2 * EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE &&
+ is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key + EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE,
+ key_size - EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE))
+ return true;
}
return false;
@@ -1650,6 +1770,7 @@ int get_key_bit_size(const u8 *key, size_t key_size, size_t *bitsize)
struct aesdatakeytoken *datakey = (struct aesdatakeytoken *)key;
struct aescipherkeytoken *cipherkey = (struct aescipherkeytoken *)key;
struct ep11keytoken *ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)key;
+ struct ep11kblob_header *hdr = (struct ep11kblob_header *)key;
util_assert(bitsize != NULL, "Internal error: bitsize is NULL");
@@ -1672,10 +1793,17 @@ int get_key_bit_size(const u8 *key, size_t key_size, size_t *bitsize)
*bitsize += cipherkey->pl - 384;
}
} else if (is_ep11_aes_key(key, key_size)) {
- *bitsize = ep11key->head.keybitlen;
+ *bitsize = ep11key->head.bitlen;
if (key_size == 2 * EP11_KEY_SIZE) {
ep11key = (struct ep11keytoken *)(key + EP11_KEY_SIZE);
- *bitsize += ep11key->head.keybitlen;
+ *bitsize += ep11key->head.bitlen;
+ }
+ } else if (is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key, key_size)) {
+ *bitsize = hdr->bitlen;
+ if (key_size == 2 * EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE) {
+ hdr = (struct ep11kblob_header *)
+ (key + EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE);
+ *bitsize += hdr->bitlen;
}
} else {
return -EINVAL;
@@ -1700,6 +1828,8 @@ const char *get_key_type(const u8 *key, size_t key_size)
return KEY_TYPE_CCA_AESCIPHER;
if (is_ep11_aes_key(key, key_size))
return KEY_TYPE_EP11_AES;
+ if (is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(key, key_size))
+ return KEY_TYPE_EP11_AES;
return NULL;
}
@@ -2016,7 +2146,8 @@ int reencipher_secure_key(struct ext_lib *lib, u8 *secure_key,
return rc;
}
- if (is_ep11_aes_key(secure_key, secure_key_size)) {
+ if (is_ep11_aes_key(secure_key, secure_key_size) ||
+ is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(secure_key, secure_key_size)) {
/* EP11 secure key: need the EP11 host library */
if (lib->ep11->lib_ep11 == NULL) {
rc = load_ep11_library(lib->ep11, verbose);
diff --git a/zkey/pkey.h b/zkey/pkey.h
index 5a5bc3c..3b57c5f 100644
--- a/zkey/pkey.h
+++ b/zkey/pkey.h
@@ -39,6 +39,8 @@ struct tokenheader {
#define TOKEN_VERSION_PROTECTED_KEY 0x01
#define TOKEN_VERSION_CLEAR_KEY 0x02
#define TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES 0x03
+#define TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES_WITH_HEADER 0x06
+#define TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_ECC_WITH_HEADER 0x07
struct aesdatakeytoken {
u8 type; /* TOKEN_TYPE_INTERNAL (0x01) for internal key token */
@@ -89,17 +91,20 @@ struct aescipherkeytoken {
u8 varpart[80]; /* variable part */
} __packed;
+struct ep11kblob_header {
+ u8 type; /* always 0x00 */
+ u8 hver; /* header version, currently needs to be 0x00 */
+ u16 len; /* total length in bytes (including this header) */
+ u8 version; /* PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES or PKEY_TYPE_EP11_ECC */
+ u8 res0; /* unused */
+ u16 bitlen; /* clear key bit len, 0 for unknown */
+ u8 res1[8]; /* unused */
+} __packed;
+
struct ep11keytoken {
union {
u8 session[32];
- struct {
- u8 type; /* TOKEN_TYPE_NON_CCA (0x00) */
- u8 res0; /* unused */
- u16 length; /* length of token */
- u8 version; /* TOKEN_VERSION_EP11_AES (0x03) */
- u8 res1; /* unused */
- u16 keybitlen; /* clear key bit len, 0 for unknown */
- } head;
+ struct ep11kblob_header head;
};
u8 wkvp[16]; /* wrapping key verification pattern */
u64 attr; /* boolean key attributes */
@@ -111,18 +116,29 @@ struct ep11keytoken {
u8 padding[64];
} __packed;
+#define ZERO_SESSION \
+ "\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0\0"
+
#define AESDATA_KEY_SIZE sizeof(struct aesdatakeytoken)
#define AESCIPHER_KEY_SIZE sizeof(struct aescipherkeytoken)
#define EP11_KEY_SIZE sizeof(struct ep11keytoken)
+#define EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE (sizeof(struct ep11kblob_header) + \
+ sizeof(struct ep11keytoken))
/* MAX/MIN from zt_common.h produces warnings for variable length arrays */
#define _MIN(a, b) ((a) < (b) ? (a) : (b))
#define _MAX(a, b) ((a) > (b) ? (a) : (b))
-#define MAX_SECURE_KEY_SIZE _MAX(EP11_KEY_SIZE, \
- _MAX(AESDATA_KEY_SIZE, AESCIPHER_KEY_SIZE))
-#define MIN_SECURE_KEY_SIZE _MIN(EP11_KEY_SIZE, \
- _MIN(AESDATA_KEY_SIZE, AESCIPHER_KEY_SIZE))
+#define MAX_SECURE_KEY_SIZE _MAX( \
+ _MAX(EP11_KEY_SIZE, \
+ EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE), \
+ _MAX(AESDATA_KEY_SIZE, \
+ AESCIPHER_KEY_SIZE))
+#define MIN_SECURE_KEY_SIZE _MIN( \
+ _MIN(EP11_KEY_SIZE, \
+ EP11_AES_KEY_SIZE), \
+ _MIN(AESDATA_KEY_SIZE, \
+ AESCIPHER_KEY_SIZE))
struct pkey_seckey {
u8 seckey[AESDATA_KEY_SIZE]; /* the secure key blob */
@@ -175,6 +191,9 @@ enum pkey_key_type {
PKEY_TYPE_CCA_DATA = (u32) 1,
PKEY_TYPE_CCA_CIPHER = (u32) 2,
PKEY_TYPE_EP11 = (u32) 3,
+ PKEY_TYPE_CCA_ECC = (u32) 0x1f,
+ PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES = (u32) 6,
+ PKEY_TYPE_EP11_ECC = (u32) 7,
};
enum pkey_key_size {
@@ -321,6 +340,8 @@ int get_master_key_verification_pattern(const u8 *key, size_t key_size,
bool is_cca_aes_data_key(const u8 *key, size_t key_size);
bool is_cca_aes_cipher_key(const u8 *key, size_t key_size);
bool is_ep11_aes_key(const u8 *key, size_t key_size);
+bool is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(const u8 *key, size_t key_size);
+bool is_ep11_key_session_bound(const u8 *key, size_t key_size);
bool is_xts_key(const u8 *key, size_t key_size);
int get_key_bit_size(const u8 *key, size_t key_size, size_t *bitsize);
const char *get_key_type(const u8 *key, size_t key_size);
diff --git a/zkey/zkey-cryptsetup.c b/zkey/zkey-cryptsetup.c
index fae78c7..8b55f7d 100644
--- a/zkey/zkey-cryptsetup.c
+++ b/zkey/zkey-cryptsetup.c
@@ -1673,7 +1673,10 @@ static int reencipher_prepare(int token)
warnx("Failed to re-encipher the secure volume "
"key for device '%s'\n", g.pos_arg);
if (!selected &&
- !is_ep11_aes_key((u8 *)key, securekeysize))
+ !is_ep11_aes_key((u8 *)key,
+ securekeysize) &&
+ !is_ep11_aes_key_with_header((u8 *)key,
+ securekeysize))
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure AES volume key");
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1696,7 +1699,10 @@ static int reencipher_prepare(int token)
warnx("Failed to re-encipher the secure volume "
"key for device '%s'\n", g.pos_arg);
if (!selected &&
- !is_ep11_aes_key((u8 *)key, securekeysize))
+ !is_ep11_aes_key((u8 *)key,
+ securekeysize) &&
+ !is_ep11_aes_key_with_header((u8 *)key,
+ securekeysize))
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure AES volume key");
rc = -EINVAL;
@@ -1836,7 +1842,10 @@ static int reencipher_complete(int token)
warnx("Failed to re-encipher the secure volume "
"key for device '%s'\n", g.pos_arg);
if (!selected &&
- !is_ep11_aes_key((u8 *)key, securekeysize))
+ !is_ep11_aes_key((u8 *)key,
+ securekeysize) &&
+ !is_ep11_aes_key_with_header((u8 *)key,
+ securekeysize))
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure AES volume key");
rc = -EINVAL;
diff --git a/zkey/zkey.c b/zkey/zkey.c
index 3000290..843e554 100644
--- a/zkey/zkey.c
+++ b/zkey/zkey.c
@@ -1968,7 +1968,9 @@ static int command_reencipher_file(void)
"master key has failed\n");
if (!selected &&
!is_ep11_aes_key(secure_key,
- secure_key_size))
+ secure_key_size) &&
+ !is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(secure_key,
+ secure_key_size))
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure AES key");
}
@@ -1993,7 +1995,9 @@ static int command_reencipher_file(void)
"master key has failed\n");
if (!selected &&
!is_ep11_aes_key(secure_key,
- secure_key_size))
+ secure_key_size) &&
+ !is_ep11_aes_key_with_header(secure_key,
+ secure_key_size))
print_msg_for_cca_envvars(
"secure AES key");
}
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
- rebased to 2.29.0 (RHEL-11409) - KVM: Support AP Bindings in SE Header (RHEL-10573) - KVM: Userspace Tool for IBK Request Generation and Insertion (RHEL-10579) - zkey: support for key type PKEY_TYPE_EP11_AES (RHEL-11441) - vmur: fix handling of option -t (RHEL-11479) - dbginfo.sh: global original Input Field Separator (IFS) (RHEL-16526) - Resolves: RHEL-11409 RHEL-10573 RHEL-10579 RHEL-11441 RHEL-11479 RHEL-16526
2023-11-24 09:27:03 +00:00
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From df0819ca69dbef1f99321f51cd9c4d33c6374992 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 16:56:54 +0200
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 02/18] rust/Makefile: Fix use of Cargoflags for 'make clean'
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit ee669294650a2f96585357447fa5e93794e5b48f)
---
rust/Makefile | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/rust/Makefile b/rust/Makefile
index cf2fda7..420bafd 100644
--- a/rust/Makefile
+++ b/rust/Makefile
@@ -68,7 +68,7 @@ clean:
$(foreach target,$(CARGO_TARGETS),\
$(CARGO_CLEAN) --manifest-path=$(target)/Cargo.toml ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS} ;)
$(foreach target,$(PV_TARGETS),\
- $(CARGO_CLEAN) --manifest-path=$(target)/Cargo.toml ${CARGOFLAGS} ;)
+ $(CARGO_CLEAN) --manifest-path=$(target)/Cargo.toml ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS} ;)
$(RM) -- .check-dep-pvtools .detect-openssl.dep.c .check-cargo
rust-test: .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From b6ce8c7fc10c225c0b1d59af32edd323f5817ab7 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 7 Aug 2023 16:56:55 +0200
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 03/18] rust/README.md: Fix some typos
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit d5f806390012b1fe0afb52eb9d78a883cc5b4cdf)
---
rust/README.md | 14 +++++++-------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/README.md b/rust/README.md
index 2622bba..61b0af8 100644
--- a/rust/README.md
+++ b/rust/README.md
@@ -7,21 +7,21 @@ https://www.rust-lang.org/learn/get-started
## Building rust code
### s390-tools build system
If `cargo` is installed a simple `make` should do the job. Note that,
-compiling rust programs take significaltly longer than C code. To closely
-monitor the prgress use `make V=1` By default release builds are made.
+compiling rust programs take significantly longer than C code. To closely
+monitor the progress use `make V=1` By default release builds are made.
With `make CARGOFLAGS=<flags>` one can pass additional flags to cargo.
With `make HAVE_CARGO=0` one can turn of any compilation that requires cargo.
With `make CARGO=<...>` one can set the cargo binary
### cargo
-If you need to run cargo directly, cd to each project you want to build and
+If you need to run cargo directly, `cd` to each project you want to build and
issue your cargo commands. Do **NOT** forget to specify `--release` if you are
building tools for a release. The s390-tools expect the environment variable
`S390_TOOLS_RELEASE` to be present at build time. This is the version string the
rust tools provide.
-Tpp: You can use `make version` to get the version string.
+Tip: You can use `make version` to get the version string.
## Internal Libraries
* __utils__ _Library for rust tools that bundles common stuff for the 390-tools_
@@ -43,7 +43,7 @@ Exiting tools may be rewritten in Rust.
### What (third-party) crates can be used for s390-tools?
A huge list of libraries are made available through Rusts' ecosystem and is one
-of many upsides. However, just like with Coding Style Guidlines, it is
+of many upsides. However, just like with Coding Style Guidelines, it is
important to limit the usage of those libraries so that within a project,
everyone is on the same page and that code written in Rust uses similar
approaches. It makes it easier for code review and maintainability in general.
@@ -98,8 +98,8 @@ use utils::release_string;
fn print_version() {
println!(
"{} version {}\nCopyright IBM Corp. 2023",
- env!("CARGO_PKG_NAME"), // collapes into the crates name
- release_string!() // this (very likely) collapes into a compile time constant
+ env!("CARGO_PKG_NAME"), // collapses into the crates name
+ release_string!() // this (very likely) collapses into a compile time constant
);
}
```
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From 883d28afea6ea18b1001ebf9e3d921d86be9c593 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Mon, 4 Sep 2023 14:18:50 +0200
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 04/18] rust/**/*.rs: fix `cargo clippy` findings
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Automatically fixed by the command `cargo clippy --fix` and `cargo fmt`.
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 3849b2959414feae3e984d4cae0a0cfcb529006d)
---
rust/pv/src/brcb.rs | 4 +-
rust/pv/src/crypto.rs | 2 +-
rust/pv/src/req.rs | 2 +-
rust/pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs | 2 +-
rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs | 2 +-
rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs | 10 ++--
rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs | 72 ++++++++++++----------------
rust/pv/tests/add_secret_request.rs | 17 ++-----
8 files changed, 47 insertions(+), 64 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/brcb.rs b/rust/pv/src/brcb.rs
index 4bf5f16..9ef58e2 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/brcb.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/brcb.rs
@@ -205,7 +205,7 @@ mod tests {
#[test]
fn from_se_image_hdr() {
let bin_hdr = get_test_asset!("exp/secure_guest.hdr");
- let hdr_tags = BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(bin_hdr.clone())).unwrap();
+ let hdr_tags = BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(*bin_hdr)).unwrap();
assert_eq!(hdr_tags, EXP_HDR);
}
@@ -220,7 +220,7 @@ mod tests {
));
// mess up magic
- let mut bin_hdr_copy = bin_hdr.clone();
+ let mut bin_hdr_copy = *bin_hdr;
bin_hdr_copy.swap(0, 1);
assert!(matches!(
BootHdrTags::from_se_image(&mut Cursor::new(bin_hdr_copy)),
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/crypto.rs b/rust/pv/src/crypto.rs
index 910419e..8132e9d 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/crypto.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/crypto.rs
@@ -315,7 +315,7 @@ mod tests {
];
let res = encrypt_aes(
- &&SymKey::Aes256(aes_gcm_key.into()),
+ &SymKey::Aes256(aes_gcm_key.into()),
&aes_gcm_iv,
&aes_gcm_plain,
)
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/req.rs b/rust/pv/src/req.rs
index cda448b..b9acd73 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/req.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/req.rs
@@ -451,7 +451,7 @@ mod tests {
let ks = vec![
Keyslot::new(host_key.clone()),
Keyslot::new(host_key.clone()),
- Keyslot::new(host_key.clone()),
+ Keyslot::new(host_key),
];
let mut aad = Vec::<Aad>::new();
ks.iter().for_each(|ks| aad.push(Aad::Ks(ks)));
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs b/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs
index 8ad4fa5..8c44421 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/guest_secret.rs
@@ -105,7 +105,7 @@ mod test {
0xef, 0xc7, 0x3c, 0x62,
];
let name = "association secret".to_string();
- let secret = GuestSecret::association("association secret", secret_value.clone()).unwrap();
+ let secret = GuestSecret::association("association secret", secret_value).unwrap();
let exp = GuestSecret::Association {
name,
id: exp_id,
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs b/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs
index 724702a..6943bd3 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs
@@ -117,7 +117,7 @@ impl Display for SecretEntry {
writeln!(f, "{} {}:", self.index, stype_str(self.stype.get()))?;
write!(f, " ")?;
for b in self.id {
- write!(f, "{:02x}", b)?;
+ write!(f, "{b:02x}")?;
}
Ok(())
}
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs b/rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs
index 89f92b8..a2f313b 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs
@@ -484,20 +484,20 @@ mod test {
let ibm_wrong_subj = load_gen_cert("ibm_wrong_subject.crt");
let no_sign_crt = load_gen_cert("inter_ca.crt");
- assert!(super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(ibm_crt.clone())).is_ok());
+ assert!(super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[ibm_crt.clone()]).is_ok());
assert!(matches!(
- super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(ibm_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone())),
+ super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[ibm_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()]),
Err(Error::HkdVerify(ManyIbmSignKeys))
));
assert!(matches!(
- super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(ibm_wrong_subj)),
+ super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[ibm_wrong_subj]),
Err(Error::HkdVerify(NoIbmSignKey))
));
assert!(matches!(
- super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(no_sign_crt.clone())),
+ super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[no_sign_crt.clone()]),
Err(Error::HkdVerify(NoIbmSignKey))
));
- assert!(super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&vec!(ibm_crt.clone(), no_sign_crt.clone())).is_ok(),);
+ assert!(super::get_ibm_z_sign_key(&[ibm_crt, no_sign_crt]).is_ok(),);
}
#[test]
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs b/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs
index 8a6258d..1c0d2b5 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs
@@ -26,7 +26,7 @@ fn verify_sign_error(exp_raw: libc::c_int, obs: Error) {
}
fn verify_sign_error_slice(exp_raw: &[libc::c_int], obs: Error) {
if exp_raw
- .into_iter()
+ .iter()
.filter(|e| match &obs {
Error::HkdVerify(ty) => match ty {
IbmSignInvalid(err, _d) => &&err.as_raw() == e,
@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ fn store_setup() {
let ibm_str = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm.crt");
let inter_str = get_cert_asset_path_string("inter.crt");
- let store = helper::store_setup(&None, &vec![], &vec![ibm_str, inter_str]);
+ let store = helper::store_setup(&None, &[], &[ibm_str, inter_str]);
assert!(store.is_ok());
}
@@ -63,7 +63,7 @@ fn verify_chain_online() {
let mock_inter = mock_endpt("inter_ca.crl");
- let mut store = helper::store_setup(&Some(root_crt), &vec![], &vec![]).unwrap();
+ let mut store = helper::store_setup(&Some(root_crt), &[], &[]).unwrap();
download_crls_into_store(&mut store, slice::from_ref(&ibm_crt)).unwrap();
let store = store.build();
@@ -71,8 +71,8 @@ fn verify_chain_online() {
let mut sk = Stack::<X509>::new().unwrap();
sk.push(inter_crt).unwrap();
- verify_chain(&store, &sk, &vec![ibm_crt.clone()]).unwrap();
- assert!(verify_chain(&store, &sk, &vec!(ibm_crt)).is_ok());
+ verify_chain(&store, &sk, &[ibm_crt.clone()]).unwrap();
+ assert!(verify_chain(&store, &sk, &[ibm_crt]).is_ok());
}
#[test]
@@ -82,13 +82,13 @@ fn verify_chain_offline() {
let inter_crt = load_gen_cert("inter_ca.crt");
let root_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("root_ca.chained.crt");
- let store = helper::store_setup(&Some(root_crt), &vec![inter_crl], &vec![])
+ let store = helper::store_setup(&Some(root_crt), &[inter_crl], &[])
.unwrap()
.build();
let mut sk = Stack::<X509>::new().unwrap();
sk.push(inter_crt).unwrap();
- assert!(verify_chain(&store, &sk, &vec![ibm_crt]).is_ok());
+ assert!(verify_chain(&store, &sk, &[ibm_crt]).is_ok());
}
#[test]
@@ -107,8 +107,8 @@ fn verify_online() {
let inter_crl = get_cert_asset_path_string("inter_ca.crl");
let ibm_crl = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm.crl");
let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![ibm_crt, inter_crt],
- &vec![ibm_crl, inter_crl],
+ &[ibm_crt, inter_crt],
+ &[ibm_crl, inter_crl],
&Some(root_crt),
false,
)
@@ -148,8 +148,8 @@ fn verify_offline() {
let hkd = load_gen_cert("host.crt");
let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![ibm_crt, inter_crt],
- &vec![ibm_crl, inter_crl],
+ &[ibm_crt, inter_crt],
+ &[ibm_crl, inter_crl],
&Some(root_crt),
true,
)
@@ -186,25 +186,20 @@ fn verifier_new() {
let ibm_rev_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm_rev.crt");
// To many signing keys
- let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![ibm_crt.clone(), ibm_rev_crt.clone()],
- &vec![],
- &None,
- true,
- );
+ let verifier = CertVerifier::new(&[ibm_crt.clone(), ibm_rev_crt.clone()], &[], &None, true);
assert!(matches!(verifier, Err(Error::HkdVerify(ManyIbmSignKeys))));
// no CRL for each X509
let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
- &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
- &Some(root_crt.clone()),
+ &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
+ &[inter_crl.clone()],
+ &Some(root_crt),
false,
);
verify_sign_error(3, verifier.unwrap_err());
let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
- &vec![],
+ &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
+ &[],
&Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
false,
);
@@ -212,8 +207,8 @@ fn verifier_new() {
// wrong intermediate (or ibm key)
let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![inter_fake_crt, ibm_crt.clone()],
- &vec![inter_fake_crl],
+ &[inter_fake_crt, ibm_crt.clone()],
+ &[inter_fake_crl],
&Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
true,
);
@@ -222,8 +217,8 @@ fn verifier_new() {
//wrong root ca
let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
- &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
+ &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
+ &[inter_crl.clone()],
&None,
true,
);
@@ -231,33 +226,28 @@ fn verifier_new() {
//correct signing key + intermediate cert
let _verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
- &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
+ &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_crt.clone()],
+ &[inter_crl.clone()],
&Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
false,
)
.unwrap();
// no intermediate key
- let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![ibm_crt.clone()],
- &vec![],
- &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
- false,
- );
+ let verifier = CertVerifier::new(&[ibm_crt], &[], &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()), false);
verify_sign_error(20, verifier.unwrap_err());
//Ibm Sign outdated
let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_early_crt.clone()],
- &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
+ &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_early_crt],
+ &[inter_crl.clone()],
&Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
false,
);
assert!(matches!(verifier, Err(Error::HkdVerify(NoIbmSignKey))));
let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_late_crt.clone()],
- &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
+ &[inter_crt.clone(), ibm_late_crt],
+ &[inter_crl.clone()],
&Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
false,
);
@@ -265,9 +255,9 @@ fn verifier_new() {
// revoked
let verifier = CertVerifier::new(
- &vec![inter_crt.clone(), ibm_rev_crt.clone()],
- &vec![inter_crl.clone()],
- &Some(root_chn_crt.clone()),
+ &[inter_crt, ibm_rev_crt],
+ &[inter_crl],
+ &Some(root_chn_crt),
false,
);
verify_sign_error(23, verifier.unwrap_err());
diff --git a/rust/pv/tests/add_secret_request.rs b/rust/pv/tests/add_secret_request.rs
index 2b3e861..bf491c6 100644
--- a/rust/pv/tests/add_secret_request.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/tests/add_secret_request.rs
@@ -18,7 +18,7 @@ use pv::{
const TAGS: BootHdrTags = BootHdrTags::new([1; 64], [2; 64], [3; 64], [4; 16]);
const CUID: ConfigUid = [0x42u8; 16];
const ASSOC_SECRET: [u8; 32] = [0x11; 32];
-const ASSOC_ID: &'static str = "add_secret_request";
+const ASSOC_ID: &str = "add_secret_request";
fn create_asrcb(
guest_secret: GuestSecret,
@@ -38,7 +38,7 @@ fn create_asrcb(
};
asrcb.add_hostkey(hkd);
- Ok(asrcb.encrypt(ctx)?)
+ asrcb.encrypt(ctx)
}
fn get_crypto() -> (PKey<Public>, ReqEncrCtx) {
@@ -63,17 +63,10 @@ where
{
let (host_key, ctx) = get_crypto();
let cuid = match cuid {
- true => Some(CUID.into()),
+ true => Some(CUID),
false => None,
};
- create_asrcb(
- guest_secret,
- ext_secret.into(),
- flags,
- cuid.into(),
- host_key,
- &ctx,
- )
+ create_asrcb(guest_secret, ext_secret.into(), flags, cuid, host_key, &ctx)
}
fn association() -> GuestSecret {
@@ -156,7 +149,7 @@ fn null_none_default_cuid_seven() {
let mut asrcb =
AddSecretRequest::new(AddSecretVersion::One, GuestSecret::Null, TAGS, no_flag());
(0..7).for_each(|_| asrcb.add_hostkey(hkd.clone()));
- asrcb.set_cuid(CUID.into());
+ asrcb.set_cuid(CUID);
let asrcb = asrcb.encrypt(&ctx).unwrap();
let exp = get_test_asset!("exp/asrcb/null_none_default_cuid_seven");
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From 4c8072cebe9add441c42e62663d4089d14d32389 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2023 15:26:14 +0200
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 05/18] rust/pv: fix Invalid write of size 1
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
Fix a valgrind finding. Fix an invalid read/write of one byte after the
actual struct to clear. Not fixing this may result in a illegal write or
memory corruption of the program. Fortunately, for the actual only user,
pvsecret this is not the case.
Fixes: c6f621d0 ("rust: Add library for pv tools")
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 71b93d55effae6a74bbbbafe7057e1f97d692a74)
---
rust/pv/src/secret.rs | 2 +-
1 file changed, 1 insertion(+), 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/secret.rs b/rust/pv/src/secret.rs
index cdef9ef..88287c8 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/secret.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/secret.rs
@@ -34,8 +34,8 @@ impl Zeroize for Vec<u8> {
// * Vec allocated at least capacity elements continuously
// * dst points always to a valid location
unsafe {
+ std::ptr::write_volatile(dst, 0);
dst = dst.add(1);
- std::ptr::write_volatile(dst, 0)
}
}
std::sync::atomic::compiler_fence(std::sync::atomic::Ordering::SeqCst);
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From 49eabe2d13ea3909f4c522fefaf8db998c7ab888 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2023 10:59:34 +0200
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 06/18] rust: Create workspace
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
A workspaces simplifies the build and packaging process significantly.
All build artifacts and binaries are now built in a single location
(e.g., rust/target/release/*), and a unified dependency resolution is
used. Hence one Cargo.lock for all crates at rust/Cargo.lock.
Closes: https://github.com/ibm-s390-linux/s390-tools/issues/156
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 32b68a5fad652589c85eae098e799563b88864b5)
---
rust/Cargo.toml | 15 ++++++++++
rust/Makefile | 43 +++++++++++----------------
rust/README.md | 20 +++++++++++--
rust/pv/Cargo.toml | 8 ++---
rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml | 4 +--
rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml | 8 ++---
rust/utils/Cargo.toml | 4 +--
7 files changed, 59 insertions(+), 43 deletions(-)
create mode 100644 rust/Cargo.toml
diff --git a/rust/Cargo.toml b/rust/Cargo.toml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..65a70a9
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/Cargo.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,15 @@
+[workspace]
+members = [
+ "pv",
+ "pvsecret",
+ "utils",
+]
+resolver = "2"
+
+[workspace.package]
+edition = "2021"
+license = "MIT"
+
+[profile.release]
+lto = true
+panic = "abort"
diff --git a/rust/Makefile b/rust/Makefile
index 420bafd..e4e9885 100644
--- a/rust/Makefile
+++ b/rust/Makefile
@@ -15,16 +15,17 @@ ifneq (${HAVE_CARGO},0)
BUILD_TARGETS = $(CARGO_TARGETS)
INSTALL_TARGETS := install-rust-tools install-man
- CARGO_TEST_TARGETS = $(addsuffix, _test, $(CARGO_TARGETS))
+ CARGO_TEST_TARGETS = $(addsuffix .test, $(CARGO_TARGETS))
ifneq (${HAVE_OPENSSL},0)
ifneq (${HAVE_LIBCURL},0)
PV_TARGETS := pvsecret
- PV_BUILD_TARGETS = $(PV_TARGETS)
- CARGO_TEST_TARGETS += $(addsuffix, _test, $(PV_TARGETS)) pv
+ PV_BUILD_TARGETS := $(PV_TARGETS)
+ CARGO_TEST_TARGETS += $(addsuffix .test,pv $(PV_TARGETS))
endif #LIBCURL
endif #OPENSSL
+ TEST_TARGETS := $(addsuffix _build,$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS))
endif #CARGO
BUILD_TARGETS += $(PV_BUILD_TARGETS)
@@ -39,18 +40,15 @@ endif
$(BUILD_TARGETS) rust-test: CC = $(CC_SILENT)
$(BUILD_TARGETS) rust-test: AR = $(AR_SILENT)
-$(CARGO_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
- $(CARGO_BUILD) --manifest-path=$@/Cargo.toml $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
-.PHONY: $(CARGO_TARGETS)
+$(PV_TARGETS): .check-dep-pvtools
+$(PV_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
+ $(CARGO_BUILD) --bin $@ $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
+.PHONY: $(PV_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TARGETS)
-
-$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
- $(CARGO_TEST) --manifest-path=$@/Cargo.toml --all-features $(CARGOFLAGS)
-.PHONY: $(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS)
-
-$(PV_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile .check-dep-pvtools
- $(CARGO_BUILD) --manifest-path=$@/Cargo.toml $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
-.PHONY: $(PV_TARGETS)
+$(TEST_TARGETS): ALL_CARGOFLAGS += --no-run
+$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS) $(TEST_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
+ $(CARGO_TEST) --package $(basename $@) --all-features $(ALL_CARGOFLAGS)
+.PHONY: $(TEST_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS)
skip-build:
echo " SKIP rust-tools due to unresolved dependencies"
@@ -65,22 +63,17 @@ print-rust-targets:
echo $(BUILD_TARGETS)
clean:
- $(foreach target,$(CARGO_TARGETS),\
- $(CARGO_CLEAN) --manifest-path=$(target)/Cargo.toml ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS} ;)
- $(foreach target,$(PV_TARGETS),\
- $(CARGO_CLEAN) --manifest-path=$(target)/Cargo.toml ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS} ;)
+ $(CARGO_CLEAN) ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS}
$(RM) -- .check-dep-pvtools .detect-openssl.dep.c .check-cargo
-rust-test: .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
- $(foreach target,$(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS),\
- $(CARGO_TEST) --manifest-path=$(target)/Cargo.toml --all-features ${ALL_CARGOFLAGS} ;)
+rust-test: $(CARGO_TEST_TARGETS)
install-rust-tools: $(BUILD_TARGETS)
$(INSTALL) -d -m 755 $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR)
$(foreach target,$(CARGO_TARGETS),\
- $(INSTALL) $(target)/target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
+ $(INSTALL) target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
$(foreach target,$(PV_TARGETS),\
- $(INSTALL) $(target)/target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
+ $(INSTALL) target/release/$(target) $(DESTDIR)$(USRBINDIR);)
install-man:
$(foreach target,$(CARGO_TARGETS),\
@@ -118,13 +111,13 @@ endif
.check-dep-pvtools: .detect-openssl.dep.c
$(call check_dep, \
- "$(BIN_PROGRAM)", \
+ "Rust-pv", \
$^, \
"openssl-devel / libssl-dev version >= 1.1.1", \
"HAVE_OPENSSL=0", \
"-I.")
$(call check_dep, \
- "$(BIN_PROGRAM)", \
+ "Rust-pv", \
"curl/curl.h", \
"libcurl-devel", \
"HAVE_LIBCURL=0")
diff --git a/rust/README.md b/rust/README.md
index 61b0af8..16603bf 100644
--- a/rust/README.md
+++ b/rust/README.md
@@ -81,11 +81,27 @@ is a start, but can change over time.
Dependencies used by the crates listed above can be used, too.
### Add new tool
-To add a new tool issue `cargo new <TOOLNAME>` in the `rust` directory.
+To add a new tool issue `cargo new $TOOLNAME` in the `rust` directory.
Add the tool to the _s390-tools_ build system:
```Makefile
-CARGO_TARGETS := TOOLNAME
+CARGO_TARGETS := $TOOLNAME
+```
+Add the library to the _s390-tools_ test list:
+```Makefile
+CARGO_TEST_TARGETS := $LIBNAME
+```
+
+Add the tool/library to the cargo workspace:
+```toml
+[workspace]
+members = [
+ "pv",
+ "pvsecret",
+ "$TOOLNAME",
+ "$LIBNAME"
+ "utils",
+]
```
### Versions
diff --git a/rust/pv/Cargo.toml b/rust/pv/Cargo.toml
index 689d624..825386a 100644
--- a/rust/pv/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/pv/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[package]
name = "pv"
version = "0.9.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
[dependencies]
libc = "0.2"
@@ -30,7 +30,3 @@ lazy_static = "1"
default = []
request = ["dep:openssl", "dep:curl", "dep:openssl_extensions", "dep:serde", "dep:clap"]
uvsecret = ["dep:byteorder", "dep:serde"]
-
-[profile.release]
-lto = true
-panic = "abort" # release builds now do not clean up stack after panics. .1 Mb
diff --git a/rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml b/rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml
index 17d4c0e..90907ce 100644
--- a/rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[package]
name = "openssl_extensions"
version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
[dependencies]
foreign-types = "0.3"
diff --git a/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml b/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml
index da4deab..d1e75b1 100644
--- a/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,8 +1,8 @@
[package]
name = "pvsecret"
version = "0.9.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
[dependencies]
anyhow = { version = "1", features = ["std"] }
@@ -12,7 +12,3 @@ serde_yaml = "0.9"
pv = { path = "../pv", features = ["uvsecret", "request"] }
utils = { path = "../utils" }
-
-[profile.release]
-lto = true
-panic = "abort" # release builds now do not clean up stack after panics. .1 Mb
diff --git a/rust/utils/Cargo.toml b/rust/utils/Cargo.toml
index 30bbbc8..215381b 100644
--- a/rust/utils/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/utils/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,5 +1,5 @@
[package]
name = "utils"
version = "0.1.0"
-edition = "2021"
-license = "MIT"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From be47ce72f4ee7dc7ed2dafb9b89079b0c2b154fa Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 4 Oct 2023 11:08:20 +0200
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 07/18] rust: Update dependency files
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
With the last patch introducing the rust workspace the location of
Cargo.lock has changed. Therefore, remove all crate level lock-files and
add rust/Cargo.lock as the only lock-file.
Steps to reproduce:
```
cd rust
mv pvsecret/Cargo.lock .
cargo build
cargo update -p openssl
cargo update -p curl-sys
cargo update -p rustix
```
While at it update some dependencies to get fixes for security issues.
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit d1b61c37fa78c95d0512b417aa21fbc66bddcd4b)
---
rust/.gitignore | 3 -
rust/{pvsecret => }/Cargo.lock | 222 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--
2 files changed, 210 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
rename rust/{pvsecret => }/Cargo.lock (77%)
diff --git a/rust/.gitignore b/rust/.gitignore
index 4760f82..f9f3955 100644
--- a/rust/.gitignore
+++ b/rust/.gitignore
@@ -9,6 +9,3 @@ target/
# Generated during make build can be removed at any point
.check-dep-pvtools
.check-cargo
-
-# Ignore lock files by default
-Cargo.lock
diff --git a/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.lock b/rust/Cargo.lock
similarity index 77%
rename from rust/pvsecret/Cargo.lock
rename to rust/Cargo.lock
index 1db32c2..f7d1cf0 100644
--- a/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.lock
+++ b/rust/Cargo.lock
@@ -2,6 +2,15 @@
# It is not intended for manual editing.
version = 3
+[[package]]
+name = "aho-corasick"
+version = "1.1.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "b2969dcb958b36655471fc61f7e416fa76033bdd4bfed0678d8fee1e2d07a1f0"
+dependencies = [
+ "memchr",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "anstream"
version = "0.3.2"
@@ -57,6 +66,16 @@ version = "1.0.71"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9c7d0618f0e0b7e8ff11427422b64564d5fb0be1940354bfe2e0529b18a9d9b8"
+[[package]]
+name = "assert-json-diff"
+version = "2.0.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "47e4f2b81832e72834d7518d8487a0396a28cc408186a2e8854c0f98011faf12"
+dependencies = [
+ "serde",
+ "serde_json",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "autocfg"
version = "1.1.0"
@@ -69,6 +88,12 @@ version = "1.3.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "bef38d45163c2f1dde094a7dfd33ccf595c92905c8f8f4fdc18d06fb1037718a"
+[[package]]
+name = "bitflags"
+version = "2.4.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "327762f6e5a765692301e5bb513e0d9fef63be86bbc14528052b1cd3e6f03e07"
+
[[package]]
name = "byteorder"
version = "1.4.3"
@@ -106,7 +131,7 @@ checksum = "c1458a1df40e1e2afebb7ab60ce55c1fa8f431146205aa5f4887e0b111c27636"
dependencies = [
"anstream",
"anstyle",
- "bitflags",
+ "bitflags 1.3.2",
"clap_lex",
"strsim",
"terminal_size",
@@ -153,9 +178,9 @@ dependencies = [
[[package]]
name = "curl-sys"
-version = "0.4.63+curl-8.1.2"
+version = "0.4.68+curl-8.4.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "aeb0fef7046022a1e2ad67a004978f0e3cacb9e3123dc62ce768f92197b771dc"
+checksum = "b4a0d18d88360e374b16b2273c832b5e57258ffc1d4aa4f96b108e0738d5752f"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"libc",
@@ -163,7 +188,7 @@ dependencies = [
"openssl-sys",
"pkg-config",
"vcpkg",
- "winapi",
+ "windows-sys 0.48.0",
]
[[package]]
@@ -202,6 +227,26 @@ version = "0.1.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "00b0228411908ca8685dba7fc2cdd70ec9990a6e753e89b6ac91a84c40fbaf4b"
+[[package]]
+name = "form_urlencoded"
+version = "1.2.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a62bc1cf6f830c2ec14a513a9fb124d0a213a629668a4186f329db21fe045652"
+dependencies = [
+ "percent-encoding",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "getrandom"
+version = "0.2.10"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "be4136b2a15dd319360be1c07d9933517ccf0be8f16bf62a3bee4f0d618df427"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "libc",
+ "wasi",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "hashbrown"
version = "0.12.3"
@@ -220,6 +265,12 @@ version = "0.3.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "fed44880c466736ef9a5c5b5facefb5ed0785676d0c02d612db14e54f0d84286"
+[[package]]
+name = "httparse"
+version = "1.8.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d897f394bad6a705d5f4104762e116a75639e470d80901eed05a860a95cb1904"
+
[[package]]
name = "indexmap"
version = "1.9.3"
@@ -259,6 +310,12 @@ version = "1.0.6"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "453ad9f582a441959e5f0d088b02ce04cfe8d51a8eaf077f12ac6d3e94164ca6"
+[[package]]
+name = "lazy_static"
+version = "1.4.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e2abad23fbc42b3700f2f279844dc832adb2b2eb069b2df918f455c4e18cc646"
+
[[package]]
name = "libc"
version = "0.2.146"
@@ -289,6 +346,29 @@ version = "0.4.19"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "b06a4cde4c0f271a446782e3eff8de789548ce57dbc8eca9292c27f4a42004b4"
+[[package]]
+name = "memchr"
+version = "2.6.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f665ee40bc4a3c5590afb1e9677db74a508659dfd71e126420da8274909a0167"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "mockito"
+version = "0.31.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "80f9fece9bd97ab74339fe19f4bcaf52b76dcc18e5364c7977c1838f76b38de9"
+dependencies = [
+ "assert-json-diff",
+ "httparse",
+ "lazy_static",
+ "log",
+ "rand",
+ "regex",
+ "serde_json",
+ "serde_urlencoded",
+ "similar",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "once_cell"
version = "1.18.0"
@@ -297,11 +377,11 @@ checksum = "dd8b5dd2ae5ed71462c540258bedcb51965123ad7e7ccf4b9a8cafaa4a63576d"
[[package]]
name = "openssl"
-version = "0.10.54"
+version = "0.10.60"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "69b3f656a17a6cbc115b5c7a40c616947d213ba182135b014d6051b73ab6f019"
+checksum = "79a4c6c3a2b158f7f8f2a2fc5a969fa3a068df6fc9dbb4a43845436e3af7c800"
dependencies = [
- "bitflags",
+ "bitflags 2.4.1",
"cfg-if",
"foreign-types",
"libc",
@@ -329,9 +409,9 @@ checksum = "ff011a302c396a5197692431fc1948019154afc178baf7d8e37367442a4601cf"
[[package]]
name = "openssl-sys"
-version = "0.9.88"
+version = "0.9.96"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "c2ce0f250f34a308dcfdbb351f511359857d4ed2134ba715a4eadd46e1ffd617"
+checksum = "3812c071ba60da8b5677cc12bcb1d42989a65553772897a7e0355545a819838f"
dependencies = [
"cc",
"libc",
@@ -350,12 +430,24 @@ dependencies = [
"openssl-sys",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "percent-encoding"
+version = "2.3.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "9b2a4787296e9989611394c33f193f676704af1686e70b8f8033ab5ba9a35a94"
+
[[package]]
name = "pkg-config"
version = "0.3.27"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "26072860ba924cbfa98ea39c8c19b4dd6a4a25423dbdf219c1eca91aa0cf6964"
+[[package]]
+name = "ppv-lite86"
+version = "0.2.17"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5b40af805b3121feab8a3c29f04d8ad262fa8e0561883e7653e024ae4479e6de"
+
[[package]]
name = "proc-macro2"
version = "1.0.60"
@@ -373,11 +465,14 @@ dependencies = [
"cfg-if",
"clap",
"curl",
+ "lazy_static",
"libc",
"log",
+ "mockito",
"openssl",
"openssl_extensions",
"serde",
+ "serde_test",
"thiserror",
"zerocopy",
]
@@ -403,13 +498,72 @@ dependencies = [
"proc-macro2",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "rand"
+version = "0.8.5"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "34af8d1a0e25924bc5b7c43c079c942339d8f0a8b57c39049bef581b46327404"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "rand_chacha",
+ "rand_core",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "rand_chacha"
+version = "0.3.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e6c10a63a0fa32252be49d21e7709d4d4baf8d231c2dbce1eaa8141b9b127d88"
+dependencies = [
+ "ppv-lite86",
+ "rand_core",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "rand_core"
+version = "0.6.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ec0be4795e2f6a28069bec0b5ff3e2ac9bafc99e6a9a7dc3547996c5c816922c"
+dependencies = [
+ "getrandom",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "regex"
+version = "1.10.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "380b951a9c5e80ddfd6136919eef32310721aa4aacd4889a8d39124b026ab343"
+dependencies = [
+ "aho-corasick",
+ "memchr",
+ "regex-automata",
+ "regex-syntax",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "regex-automata"
+version = "0.4.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5f804c7828047e88b2d32e2d7fe5a105da8ee3264f01902f796c8e067dc2483f"
+dependencies = [
+ "aho-corasick",
+ "memchr",
+ "regex-syntax",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "regex-syntax"
+version = "0.8.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c08c74e62047bb2de4ff487b251e4a92e24f48745648451635cec7d591162d9f"
+
[[package]]
name = "rustix"
-version = "0.37.20"
+version = "0.37.27"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "b96e891d04aa506a6d1f318d2771bcb1c7dfda84e126660ace067c9b474bb2c0"
+checksum = "fea8ca367a3a01fe35e6943c400addf443c0f57670e6ec51196f71a4b8762dd2"
dependencies = [
- "bitflags",
+ "bitflags 1.3.2",
"errno",
"io-lifetimes",
"libc",
@@ -452,6 +606,38 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.18",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "serde_json"
+version = "1.0.99"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "46266871c240a00b8f503b877622fe33430b3c7d963bdc0f2adc511e54a1eae3"
+dependencies = [
+ "itoa",
+ "ryu",
+ "serde",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "serde_test"
+version = "1.0.176"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5a2f49ace1498612d14f7e0b8245519584db8299541dfe31a06374a828d620ab"
+dependencies = [
+ "serde",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "serde_urlencoded"
+version = "0.7.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d3491c14715ca2294c4d6a88f15e84739788c1d030eed8c110436aafdaa2f3fd"
+dependencies = [
+ "form_urlencoded",
+ "itoa",
+ "ryu",
+ "serde",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "serde_yaml"
version = "0.9.21"
@@ -465,6 +651,12 @@ dependencies = [
"unsafe-libyaml",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "similar"
+version = "2.3.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "2aeaf503862c419d66959f5d7ca015337d864e9c49485d771b732e2a20453597"
+
[[package]]
name = "socket2"
version = "0.4.9"
@@ -561,6 +753,12 @@ version = "0.2.15"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "accd4ea62f7bb7a82fe23066fb0957d48ef677f6eeb8215f372f52e48bb32426"
+[[package]]
+name = "wasi"
+version = "0.11.0+wasi-snapshot-preview1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "9c8d87e72b64a3b4db28d11ce29237c246188f4f51057d65a7eab63b7987e423"
+
[[package]]
name = "winapi"
version = "0.3.9"
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From c25115c0d605c9c79efd8e17d4917a35603c0766 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 21 Nov 2023 13:27:21 +0100
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 08/18] rust: Sanitize minimal dependencies
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
The crate dependencies were a bit to slack. Due to the rust dependency
resolver's strategy of always selecting the latest version this never
lead to any issues.
This has no impact on the workspaces Cargo.lock
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 9019c6864a4d39f940994b3858cc331983c605ee)
---
rust/pv/Cargo.toml | 16 ++++++++--------
rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml | 10 +++++-----
rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml | 4 ++--
3 files changed, 15 insertions(+), 15 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/pv/Cargo.toml b/rust/pv/Cargo.toml
index 825386a..22d5fd3 100644
--- a/rust/pv/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/pv/Cargo.toml
@@ -5,26 +5,26 @@ edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
[dependencies]
-libc = "0.2"
-log = { version = "0.4", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
-thiserror = "1"
+libc = "0.2.49"
+log = { version = "0.4.6", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
+thiserror = "1.0.33"
zerocopy = "0.6"
cfg-if = "1.0.0"
# dependencies for request feature
clap = { version ="4", features = ["derive", "wrap_help"], optional = true }
-curl = { version ="0.4", optional = true }
-openssl = {version = "0.10", optional = true }
+curl = { version ="0.4.7", optional = true }
+openssl = {version = "0.10.49", optional = true }
openssl_extensions = { path = "openssl_extensions", optional = true }
-serde = { version = "1", features = ["derive"], optional = true }
+serde = { version = "1.0.139", features = ["derive"], optional = true }
# misc optional dependencies
-byteorder = {version = "1", optional = true }
+byteorder = {version = "1.3", optional = true }
[dev-dependencies]
mockito = {version = "0.31", default-features = false }
serde_test = "1"
-lazy_static = "1"
+lazy_static = "1.1"
[features]
default = []
diff --git a/rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml b/rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml
index 90907ce..7bdeece 100644
--- a/rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/pv/openssl_extensions/Cargo.toml
@@ -5,8 +5,8 @@ edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
[dependencies]
-foreign-types = "0.3"
-libc = {version = "0.2", features = [ "extra_traits"] }
-log = { version = "0.4", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
-openssl = "0.10"
-openssl-sys = "0.9"
+foreign-types = "0.3.1"
+libc = {version = "0.2.49", features = [ "extra_traits"] }
+log = { version = "0.4.6", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
+openssl = "0.10.49"
+openssl-sys = "0.9.85"
diff --git a/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml b/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml
index d1e75b1..e236c00 100644
--- a/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/pvsecret/Cargo.toml
@@ -5,9 +5,9 @@ edition.workspace = true
license.workspace = true
[dependencies]
-anyhow = { version = "1", features = ["std"] }
+anyhow = { version = "1.0.70", features = ["std"] }
clap = { version ="4", features = ["derive", "wrap_help"]}
-log = { version = "0.4", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
+log = { version = "0.4.6", features = ["std", "release_max_level_debug"] }
serde_yaml = "0.9"
pv = { path = "../pv", features = ["uvsecret", "request"] }
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From b6009c80b112ad85ca2aa649126b913af5af253c Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 29 Nov 2023 17:06:50 +0100
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 09/18] rust: Use default panic behaviour
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <marc@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit ae0cbf00b11bfe195c9e6e3b4168a3dccacde983)
---
rust/Cargo.toml | 1 -
1 file changed, 1 deletion(-)
diff --git a/rust/Cargo.toml b/rust/Cargo.toml
index 65a70a9..7ba1faa 100644
--- a/rust/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/Cargo.toml
@@ -12,4 +12,3 @@ license = "MIT"
[profile.release]
lto = true
-panic = "abort"
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From c4e48d060b7d92d7c6cd150728ecb55b301afa62 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 30 Nov 2023 16:02:16 +0100
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 10/18] rust/pv: Update mockito to version 1
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 21662d38e68b58bad033cdb1fca99987dd07cf78)
---
rust/Cargo.lock | 468 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-
rust/pv/Cargo.toml | 2 +-
rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs | 4 +-
3 files changed, 465 insertions(+), 9 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/Cargo.lock b/rust/Cargo.lock
index f7d1cf0..067be05 100644
--- a/rust/Cargo.lock
+++ b/rust/Cargo.lock
@@ -2,6 +2,21 @@
# It is not intended for manual editing.
version = 3
+[[package]]
+name = "addr2line"
+version = "0.21.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8a30b2e23b9e17a9f90641c7ab1549cd9b44f296d3ccbf309d2863cfe398a0cb"
+dependencies = [
+ "gimli",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "adler"
+version = "1.0.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "f26201604c87b1e01bd3d98f8d5d9a8fcbb815e8cedb41ffccbeb4bf593a35fe"
+
[[package]]
name = "aho-corasick"
version = "1.1.2"
@@ -82,6 +97,21 @@ version = "1.1.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d468802bab17cbc0cc575e9b053f41e72aa36bfa6b7f55e3529ffa43161b97fa"
+[[package]]
+name = "backtrace"
+version = "0.3.69"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "2089b7e3f35b9dd2d0ed921ead4f6d318c27680d4a5bd167b3ee120edb105837"
+dependencies = [
+ "addr2line",
+ "cc",
+ "cfg-if",
+ "libc",
+ "miniz_oxide",
+ "object",
+ "rustc-demangle",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "bitflags"
version = "1.3.2"
@@ -100,6 +130,12 @@ version = "1.4.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "14c189c53d098945499cdfa7ecc63567cf3886b3332b312a5b4585d8d3a6a610"
+[[package]]
+name = "bytes"
+version = "1.5.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a2bd12c1caf447e69cd4528f47f94d203fd2582878ecb9e9465484c4148a8223"
+
[[package]]
name = "cc"
version = "1.0.79"
@@ -172,7 +208,7 @@ dependencies = [
"openssl-probe",
"openssl-sys",
"schannel",
- "socket2",
+ "socket2 0.4.9",
"winapi",
]
@@ -191,6 +227,12 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.48.0",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "equivalent"
+version = "1.0.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5443807d6dff69373d433ab9ef5378ad8df50ca6298caf15de6e52e24aaf54d5"
+
[[package]]
name = "errno"
version = "0.3.1"
@@ -212,6 +254,12 @@ dependencies = [
"libc",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "fnv"
+version = "1.0.7"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "3f9eec918d3f24069decb9af1554cad7c880e2da24a9afd88aca000531ab82c1"
+
[[package]]
name = "foreign-types"
version = "0.3.2"
@@ -236,6 +284,95 @@ dependencies = [
"percent-encoding",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "futures"
+version = "0.3.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "da0290714b38af9b4a7b094b8a37086d1b4e61f2df9122c3cad2577669145335"
+dependencies = [
+ "futures-channel",
+ "futures-core",
+ "futures-executor",
+ "futures-io",
+ "futures-sink",
+ "futures-task",
+ "futures-util",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-channel"
+version = "0.3.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ff4dd66668b557604244583e3e1e1eada8c5c2e96a6d0d6653ede395b78bbacb"
+dependencies = [
+ "futures-core",
+ "futures-sink",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-core"
+version = "0.3.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "eb1d22c66e66d9d72e1758f0bd7d4fd0bee04cad842ee34587d68c07e45d088c"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-executor"
+version = "0.3.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "0f4fb8693db0cf099eadcca0efe2a5a22e4550f98ed16aba6c48700da29597bc"
+dependencies = [
+ "futures-core",
+ "futures-task",
+ "futures-util",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-io"
+version = "0.3.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8bf34a163b5c4c52d0478a4d757da8fb65cabef42ba90515efee0f6f9fa45aaa"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-macro"
+version = "0.3.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "53b153fd91e4b0147f4aced87be237c98248656bb01050b96bf3ee89220a8ddb"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.18",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-sink"
+version = "0.3.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e36d3378ee38c2a36ad710c5d30c2911d752cb941c00c72dbabfb786a7970817"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-task"
+version = "0.3.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "efd193069b0ddadc69c46389b740bbccdd97203899b48d09c5f7969591d6bae2"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "futures-util"
+version = "0.3.29"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "a19526d624e703a3179b3d322efec918b6246ea0fa51d41124525f00f1cc8104"
+dependencies = [
+ "futures-channel",
+ "futures-core",
+ "futures-io",
+ "futures-macro",
+ "futures-sink",
+ "futures-task",
+ "memchr",
+ "pin-project-lite",
+ "pin-utils",
+ "slab",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "getrandom"
version = "0.2.10"
@@ -247,12 +384,43 @@ dependencies = [
"wasi",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "gimli"
+version = "0.28.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4271d37baee1b8c7e4b708028c57d816cf9d2434acb33a549475f78c181f6253"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "h2"
+version = "0.3.22"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4d6250322ef6e60f93f9a2162799302cd6f68f79f6e5d85c8c16f14d1d958178"
+dependencies = [
+ "bytes",
+ "fnv",
+ "futures-core",
+ "futures-sink",
+ "futures-util",
+ "http",
+ "indexmap 2.1.0",
+ "slab",
+ "tokio",
+ "tokio-util",
+ "tracing",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "hashbrown"
version = "0.12.3"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "8a9ee70c43aaf417c914396645a0fa852624801b24ebb7ae78fe8272889ac888"
+[[package]]
+name = "hashbrown"
+version = "0.14.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "290f1a1d9242c78d09ce40a5e87e7554ee637af1351968159f4952f028f75604"
+
[[package]]
name = "heck"
version = "0.4.1"
@@ -265,12 +433,64 @@ version = "0.3.1"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "fed44880c466736ef9a5c5b5facefb5ed0785676d0c02d612db14e54f0d84286"
+[[package]]
+name = "http"
+version = "0.2.11"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8947b1a6fad4393052c7ba1f4cd97bed3e953a95c79c92ad9b051a04611d9fbb"
+dependencies = [
+ "bytes",
+ "fnv",
+ "itoa",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "http-body"
+version = "0.4.5"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d5f38f16d184e36f2408a55281cd658ecbd3ca05cce6d6510a176eca393e26d1"
+dependencies = [
+ "bytes",
+ "http",
+ "pin-project-lite",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "httparse"
version = "1.8.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d897f394bad6a705d5f4104762e116a75639e470d80901eed05a860a95cb1904"
+[[package]]
+name = "httpdate"
+version = "1.0.3"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "df3b46402a9d5adb4c86a0cf463f42e19994e3ee891101b1841f30a545cb49a9"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "hyper"
+version = "0.14.27"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "ffb1cfd654a8219eaef89881fdb3bb3b1cdc5fa75ded05d6933b2b382e395468"
+dependencies = [
+ "bytes",
+ "futures-channel",
+ "futures-core",
+ "futures-util",
+ "h2",
+ "http",
+ "http-body",
+ "httparse",
+ "httpdate",
+ "itoa",
+ "pin-project-lite",
+ "socket2 0.4.9",
+ "tokio",
+ "tower-service",
+ "tracing",
+ "want",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "indexmap"
version = "1.9.3"
@@ -278,7 +498,17 @@ source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "bd070e393353796e801d209ad339e89596eb4c8d430d18ede6a1cced8fafbd99"
dependencies = [
"autocfg",
- "hashbrown",
+ "hashbrown 0.12.3",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "indexmap"
+version = "2.1.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d530e1a18b1cb4c484e6e34556a0d948706958449fca0cab753d649f2bce3d1f"
+dependencies = [
+ "equivalent",
+ "hashbrown 0.14.3",
]
[[package]]
@@ -340,6 +570,16 @@ version = "0.3.8"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "ef53942eb7bf7ff43a617b3e2c1c4a5ecf5944a7c1bc12d7ee39bbb15e5c1519"
+[[package]]
+name = "lock_api"
+version = "0.4.11"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "3c168f8615b12bc01f9c17e2eb0cc07dcae1940121185446edc3744920e8ef45"
+dependencies = [
+ "autocfg",
+ "scopeguard",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "log"
version = "0.4.19"
@@ -352,21 +592,61 @@ version = "2.6.4"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "f665ee40bc4a3c5590afb1e9677db74a508659dfd71e126420da8274909a0167"
+[[package]]
+name = "miniz_oxide"
+version = "0.7.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "e7810e0be55b428ada41041c41f32c9f1a42817901b4ccf45fa3d4b6561e74c7"
+dependencies = [
+ "adler",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "mio"
+version = "0.8.8"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "927a765cd3fc26206e66b296465fa9d3e5ab003e651c1b3c060e7956d96b19d2"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "wasi",
+ "windows-sys 0.48.0",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "mockito"
-version = "0.31.1"
+version = "1.2.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
-checksum = "80f9fece9bd97ab74339fe19f4bcaf52b76dcc18e5364c7977c1838f76b38de9"
+checksum = "f8d3038e23466858569c2d30a537f691fa0d53b51626630ae08262943e3bbb8b"
dependencies = [
"assert-json-diff",
- "httparse",
- "lazy_static",
+ "futures",
+ "hyper",
"log",
"rand",
"regex",
"serde_json",
"serde_urlencoded",
"similar",
+ "tokio",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "num_cpus"
+version = "1.16.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4161fcb6d602d4d2081af7c3a45852d875a03dd337a6bfdd6e06407b61342a43"
+dependencies = [
+ "hermit-abi",
+ "libc",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "object"
+version = "0.32.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "9cf5f9dd3933bd50a9e1f149ec995f39ae2c496d31fd772c1fd45ebc27e902b0"
+dependencies = [
+ "memchr",
]
[[package]]
@@ -430,12 +710,47 @@ dependencies = [
"openssl-sys",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "parking_lot"
+version = "0.12.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "3742b2c103b9f06bc9fff0a37ff4912935851bee6d36f3c02bcc755bcfec228f"
+dependencies = [
+ "lock_api",
+ "parking_lot_core",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "parking_lot_core"
+version = "0.9.9"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4c42a9226546d68acdd9c0a280d17ce19bfe27a46bf68784e4066115788d008e"
+dependencies = [
+ "cfg-if",
+ "libc",
+ "redox_syscall",
+ "smallvec",
+ "windows-targets",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "percent-encoding"
version = "2.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "9b2a4787296e9989611394c33f193f676704af1686e70b8f8033ab5ba9a35a94"
+[[package]]
+name = "pin-project-lite"
+version = "0.2.13"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8afb450f006bf6385ca15ef45d71d2288452bc3683ce2e2cacc0d18e4be60b58"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "pin-utils"
+version = "0.1.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8b870d8c151b6f2fb93e84a13146138f05d02ed11c7e7c54f8826aaaf7c9f184"
+
[[package]]
name = "pkg-config"
version = "0.3.27"
@@ -528,6 +843,15 @@ dependencies = [
"getrandom",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "redox_syscall"
+version = "0.4.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4722d768eff46b75989dd134e5c353f0d6296e5aaa3132e776cbdb56be7731aa"
+dependencies = [
+ "bitflags 1.3.2",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "regex"
version = "1.10.2"
@@ -557,6 +881,12 @@ version = "0.8.2"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "c08c74e62047bb2de4ff487b251e4a92e24f48745648451635cec7d591162d9f"
+[[package]]
+name = "rustc-demangle"
+version = "0.1.23"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d626bb9dae77e28219937af045c257c28bfd3f69333c512553507f5f9798cb76"
+
[[package]]
name = "rustix"
version = "0.37.27"
@@ -586,6 +916,12 @@ dependencies = [
"windows-sys 0.42.0",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "scopeguard"
+version = "1.2.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "94143f37725109f92c262ed2cf5e59bce7498c01bcc1502d7b9afe439a4e9f49"
+
[[package]]
name = "serde"
version = "1.0.164"
@@ -644,19 +980,43 @@ version = "0.9.21"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "d9d684e3ec7de3bf5466b32bd75303ac16f0736426e5a4e0d6e489559ce1249c"
dependencies = [
- "indexmap",
+ "indexmap 1.9.3",
"itoa",
"ryu",
"serde",
"unsafe-libyaml",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "signal-hook-registry"
+version = "1.4.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "d8229b473baa5980ac72ef434c4415e70c4b5e71b423043adb4ba059f89c99a1"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "similar"
version = "2.3.0"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "2aeaf503862c419d66959f5d7ca015337d864e9c49485d771b732e2a20453597"
+[[package]]
+name = "slab"
+version = "0.4.9"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "8f92a496fb766b417c996b9c5e57daf2f7ad3b0bebe1ccfca4856390e3d3bb67"
+dependencies = [
+ "autocfg",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "smallvec"
+version = "1.11.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4dccd0940a2dcdf68d092b8cbab7dc0ad8fa938bf95787e1b916b0e3d0e8e970"
+
[[package]]
name = "socket2"
version = "0.4.9"
@@ -667,6 +1027,16 @@ dependencies = [
"winapi",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "socket2"
+version = "0.5.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4031e820eb552adee9295814c0ced9e5cf38ddf1e8b7d566d6de8e2538ea989e"
+dependencies = [
+ "libc",
+ "windows-sys 0.48.0",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "strsim"
version = "0.10.0"
@@ -725,6 +1095,81 @@ dependencies = [
"syn 2.0.18",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "tokio"
+version = "1.33.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "4f38200e3ef7995e5ef13baec2f432a6da0aa9ac495b2c0e8f3b7eec2c92d653"
+dependencies = [
+ "backtrace",
+ "bytes",
+ "libc",
+ "mio",
+ "num_cpus",
+ "parking_lot",
+ "pin-project-lite",
+ "signal-hook-registry",
+ "socket2 0.5.4",
+ "tokio-macros",
+ "windows-sys 0.48.0",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "tokio-macros"
+version = "2.1.0"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "630bdcf245f78637c13ec01ffae6187cca34625e8c63150d424b59e55af2675e"
+dependencies = [
+ "proc-macro2",
+ "quote",
+ "syn 2.0.18",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "tokio-util"
+version = "0.7.10"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "5419f34732d9eb6ee4c3578b7989078579b7f039cbbb9ca2c4da015749371e15"
+dependencies = [
+ "bytes",
+ "futures-core",
+ "futures-sink",
+ "pin-project-lite",
+ "tokio",
+ "tracing",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "tower-service"
+version = "0.3.2"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "b6bc1c9ce2b5135ac7f93c72918fc37feb872bdc6a5533a8b85eb4b86bfdae52"
+
+[[package]]
+name = "tracing"
+version = "0.1.40"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c3523ab5a71916ccf420eebdf5521fcef02141234bbc0b8a49f2fdc4544364ef"
+dependencies = [
+ "pin-project-lite",
+ "tracing-core",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "tracing-core"
+version = "0.1.32"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "c06d3da6113f116aaee68e4d601191614c9053067f9ab7f6edbcb161237daa54"
+dependencies = [
+ "once_cell",
+]
+
+[[package]]
+name = "try-lock"
+version = "0.2.4"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "3528ecfd12c466c6f163363caf2d02a71161dd5e1cc6ae7b34207ea2d42d81ed"
+
[[package]]
name = "unicode-ident"
version = "1.0.9"
@@ -753,6 +1198,15 @@ version = "0.2.15"
source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
checksum = "accd4ea62f7bb7a82fe23066fb0957d48ef677f6eeb8215f372f52e48bb32426"
+[[package]]
+name = "want"
+version = "0.3.1"
+source = "registry+https://github.com/rust-lang/crates.io-index"
+checksum = "bfa7760aed19e106de2c7c0b581b509f2f25d3dacaf737cb82ac61bc6d760b0e"
+dependencies = [
+ "try-lock",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "wasi"
version = "0.11.0+wasi-snapshot-preview1"
diff --git a/rust/pv/Cargo.toml b/rust/pv/Cargo.toml
index 22d5fd3..ff84526 100644
--- a/rust/pv/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/pv/Cargo.toml
@@ -22,7 +22,7 @@ serde = { version = "1.0.139", features = ["derive"], optional = true }
byteorder = {version = "1.3", optional = true }
[dev-dependencies]
-mockito = {version = "0.31", default-features = false }
+mockito = {version = "1", default-features = false }
serde_test = "1"
lazy_static = "1.1"
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs b/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs
index 1c0d2b5..5ca2e71 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs
@@ -14,7 +14,9 @@ use crate::test_utils::*;
pub fn mock_endpt(res: &str) -> mockito::Mock {
let res_path = get_cert_asset_path(res);
- mockito::mock("GET", format!("/crl/{res}").as_str())
+ let mut server = mockito::Server::new();
+ server
+ .mock("GET", format!("/crl/{res}").as_str())
.with_header("content-type", "application/pkix-crl")
.with_body_from_file(res_path)
.create()
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From 66783f1901dcaca6f567ad13b05acc7dbe412ff0 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Dec 2023 13:31:18 +0100
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 11/18] rust/Makefile: Fix CC/AR variables for TEST_TARGETS
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 6fd02279da20acba882426496e3b87e556bdeabc)
---
rust/Makefile | 4 ++--
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+), 2 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/Makefile b/rust/Makefile
index e4e9885..fa3cf04 100644
--- a/rust/Makefile
+++ b/rust/Makefile
@@ -37,8 +37,8 @@ endif
# the cc crate uses these variables to compile c code. It does not open a shell
# to call the compiler, so no echo etc. allowed here, just a path to a program
-$(BUILD_TARGETS) rust-test: CC = $(CC_SILENT)
-$(BUILD_TARGETS) rust-test: AR = $(AR_SILENT)
+$(BUILD_TARGETS) $(TEST_TARGETS) rust-test: CC = $(CC_SILENT)
+$(BUILD_TARGETS) $(TEST_TARGETS) rust-test: AR = $(AR_SILENT)
$(PV_TARGETS): .check-dep-pvtools
$(PV_TARGETS) $(CARGO_TARGETS): .check-cargo .no-cross-compile
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From d54a8aa4d7b77338fd5511d895eadbb074b6024a Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 15 Dec 2023 11:30:14 +0100
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 12/18] rust/pv: Provide access for SecretList members
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
Adds getter for SecretList and SecretEntry.
Adds enum to represent secret types.
Add Iterator functionality for SecretList.
While at it, make the datatype of the capacity of the list transparent
for users.
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 0764460eafdfd91f78bbed5ac818f19d60e14b70)
---
rust/pv/src/lib.rs | 2 +-
rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs | 170 ++++++++++++++++++++++++----
2 files changed, 151 insertions(+), 21 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/lib.rs b/rust/pv/src/lib.rs
index d72ac93..ed89140 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/lib.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/lib.rs
@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ pub mod uv {
};
#[cfg(feature = "uvsecret")]
pub use crate::uvsecret::{
- secret_list::SecretList,
+ secret_list::{ListableSecretType, SecretEntry, SecretList},
uvc::{AddCmd, ListCmd, LockCmd},
};
}
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs b/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs
index 6943bd3..72a05b2 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/uvsecret/secret_list.rs
@@ -2,13 +2,14 @@
//
// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
-use crate::{misc::to_u16, uv::ListCmd, uvdevice::UvCmd, Error, Result};
+use crate::{assert_size, misc::to_u16, uv::ListCmd, uvdevice::UvCmd, Error, Result};
use byteorder::{BigEndian, ReadBytesExt, WriteBytesExt};
use serde::{Serialize, Serializer};
-use std::usize;
use std::{
fmt::Display,
io::{Cursor, Read, Seek, Write},
+ slice::Iter,
+ vec::IntoIter,
};
use zerocopy::{AsBytes, FromBytes, U16, U32};
@@ -19,16 +20,79 @@ use super::ser_gsid;
/// Requires the `uvsecret` feature.
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, Serialize)]
pub struct SecretList {
- total_num_secrets: u16,
+ total_num_secrets: usize,
secrets: Vec<SecretEntry>,
}
+impl<'a> IntoIterator for &'a SecretList {
+ type Item = &'a SecretEntry;
+ type IntoIter = Iter<'a, SecretEntry>;
+
+ fn into_iter(self) -> Self::IntoIter {
+ self.iter()
+ }
+}
+
+impl IntoIterator for SecretList {
+ type Item = SecretEntry;
+ type IntoIter = IntoIter<Self::Item>;
+
+ fn into_iter(self) -> Self::IntoIter {
+ self.secrets.into_iter()
+ }
+}
+
+impl FromIterator<SecretEntry> for SecretList {
+ fn from_iter<T: IntoIterator<Item = SecretEntry>>(iter: T) -> Self {
+ let secrets: Vec<_> = iter.into_iter().collect();
+ let total_num_secrets = secrets.len() as u16;
+ Self::new(total_num_secrets, secrets)
+ }
+}
+
impl SecretList {
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ /// For testing purposes.
+ pub fn new(total_num_secrets: u16, secrets: Vec<SecretEntry>) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ total_num_secrets: total_num_secrets as usize,
+ secrets,
+ }
+ }
+
+ /// Returns an iterator over the slice.
+ ///
+ /// The iterator yields all secret entries from start to end.
+ pub fn iter(&self) -> Iter<'_, SecretEntry> {
+ self.secrets.iter()
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the length of this [`SecretList`].
+ pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+ self.secrets.len()
+ }
+
+ /// Check for is_empty of this [`SecretList`].
+ pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+ self.secrets.is_empty()
+ }
+
+ /// Reports the number of secrets stored in UV
+ ///
+ /// This number may be not equal to the provided number of [`SecretEntry`]
+ pub fn total_num_secrets(&self) -> usize {
+ self.total_num_secrets
+ }
+
/// Encodes the list in the same binary format the UV would do
pub fn encode<T: Write>(&self, w: &mut T) -> Result<()> {
let num_s = to_u16(self.secrets.len()).ok_or(Error::ManySecrets)?;
w.write_u16::<BigEndian>(num_s)?;
- w.write_u16::<BigEndian>(self.total_num_secrets)?;
+ w.write_u16::<BigEndian>(
+ self.total_num_secrets
+ .try_into()
+ .map_err(|_| Error::ManySecrets)?,
+ )?;
w.write_all(&[0u8; 12])?;
for secret in &self.secrets {
w.write_all(secret.as_bytes())?;
@@ -39,10 +103,10 @@ impl SecretList {
/// Decodes the list from the binary format of the UV into this internal representation
pub fn decode<R: Read + Seek>(r: &mut R) -> std::io::Result<Self> {
let num_s = r.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
- let total_num_secrets = r.read_u16::<BigEndian>()?;
+ let total_num_secrets = r.read_u16::<BigEndian>()? as usize;
let mut v: Vec<SecretEntry> = Vec::with_capacity(num_s as usize);
r.seek(std::io::SeekFrom::Current(12))?; //skip reserved bytes
- let mut buf = [0u8; SECRET_ENTRY_SIZE];
+ let mut buf = [0u8; SecretEntry::STRUCT_SIZE];
for _ in 0..num_s {
r.read_exact(&mut buf)?;
//cannot fail. buffer has the same size as the secret entry
@@ -84,9 +148,56 @@ fn ser_u16<S: Serializer>(v: &U16<BigEndian>, ser: S) -> Result<S::Ok, S::Error>
ser.serialize_u16(v.get())
}
+/// Secret types that can appear in a [`SecretList`]
+#[non_exhaustive]
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ListableSecretType {
+ /// Association Secret
+ Association,
+ /// Invalid secret type, that should never appear in a list
+ ///
+ /// 0 is reserved
+ /// 1 is Null secret, with no id and not listable
+ Invalid(u16),
+ /// Unknown secret type
+ Unknown(u16),
+}
+impl ListableSecretType {
+ const ASSOCIATION: u16 = 0x0002;
+}
+
+impl Display for ListableSecretType {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
+ match self {
+ Self::Association => write!(f, "Association"),
+ Self::Invalid(n) => write!(f, "Invalid({n})"),
+ Self::Unknown(n) => write!(f, "Unknown({n})"),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl From<U16<BigEndian>> for ListableSecretType {
+ fn from(value: U16<BigEndian>) -> Self {
+ match value.get() {
+ 0x0000 => Self::Invalid(0),
+ 0x0001 => Self::Invalid(1),
+ Self::ASSOCIATION => ListableSecretType::Association,
+ n => Self::Unknown(n),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+impl From<ListableSecretType> for U16<BigEndian> {
+ fn from(value: ListableSecretType) -> Self {
+ match value {
+ ListableSecretType::Association => ListableSecretType::ASSOCIATION,
+ ListableSecretType::Invalid(n) | ListableSecretType::Unknown(n) => n,
+ }
+ .into()
+ }
+}
+
/// A secret in a [`SecretList`]
-///
-/// Fields are in big endian
#[repr(C)]
#[derive(Debug, PartialEq, Eq, AsBytes, FromBytes, Serialize)]
pub struct SecretEntry {
@@ -101,20 +212,43 @@ pub struct SecretEntry {
#[serde(serialize_with = "ser_gsid")]
id: [u8; 32],
}
-const SECRET_ENTRY_SIZE: usize = 0x30;
+assert_size!(SecretEntry, SecretEntry::STRUCT_SIZE);
+
+impl SecretEntry {
+ const STRUCT_SIZE: usize = 0x30;
+
+ #[doc(hidden)]
+ /// For testing purposes.
+ pub fn new(index: u16, stype: ListableSecretType, id: [u8; 32], secret_len: u32) -> Self {
+ Self {
+ index: index.into(),
+ stype: stype.into(),
+ len: secret_len.into(),
+ res_8: 0,
+ id,
+ }
+ }
-fn stype_str(stype: u16) -> String {
- match stype {
- // should never match (not incl in list), but here for completeness
- 1 => "Null".to_string(),
- 2 => "Association".to_string(),
- n => format!("Unknown {n}"),
+ /// Returns the index of this [`SecretEntry`].
+ pub fn index(&self) -> u16 {
+ self.index.get()
+ }
+
+ /// Returns the secret type of this [`SecretEntry`].
+ pub fn stype(&self) -> ListableSecretType {
+ self.stype.into()
+ }
+
+ /// Returns a reference to the id of this [`SecretEntry`].
+ pub fn id(&self) -> &[u8] {
+ &self.id
}
}
impl Display for SecretEntry {
fn fmt(&self, f: &mut std::fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> std::fmt::Result {
- writeln!(f, "{} {}:", self.index, stype_str(self.stype.get()))?;
+ let stype: ListableSecretType = self.stype.into();
+ writeln!(f, "{} {}:", self.index, stype)?;
write!(f, " ")?;
for b in self.id {
write!(f, "{b:02x}")?;
@@ -128,10 +262,6 @@ mod test {
use super::*;
use std::io::{BufReader, BufWriter, Cursor};
- #[test]
- fn secret_entry_size() {
- assert_eq!(::std::mem::size_of::<SecretEntry>(), SECRET_ENTRY_SIZE);
- }
#[test]
fn dump_secret_entry() {
const EXP: &[u8] = &[
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
From e75bbd754e5912d34c0aedfe35ccedd54ca850be Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Fri, 1 Dec 2023 12:10:20 +0100
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
Subject: [PATCH 13/18] rust/pvapconfig: Introduce new tool pvapconfig
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
pvapconfig is a new tool for automatically configuring the APQNs
within an Secure Execution KVM guest with AP pass-through support.
Based on a given AP configuration it tries to find a matching
APQN and bind and associate it with the correct secret.
Signed-off-by: Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Ingo Franzki <ifranzki@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Holger Dengler <dengler@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 94a38ebc3aec9ee954f1ae9a4a0a09ea7f29f11c)
---
rust/Cargo.lock | 16 +
rust/Cargo.toml | 1 +
rust/Makefile | 2 +-
rust/pvapconfig/Cargo.toml | 19 +
rust/pvapconfig/README.md | 9 +
rust/pvapconfig/man/pvapconfig.1 | 174 +++++++
rust/pvapconfig/src/ap.rs | 817 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
rust/pvapconfig/src/cli.rs | 63 +++
rust/pvapconfig/src/config.rs | 391 +++++++++++++++
rust/pvapconfig/src/helper.rs | 272 ++++++++++
rust/pvapconfig/src/main.rs | 668 +++++++++++++++++++++++++
rust/pvapconfig/src/uv.rs | 105 ++++
12 files changed, 2536 insertions(+), 1 deletion(-)
create mode 100644 rust/pvapconfig/Cargo.toml
create mode 100644 rust/pvapconfig/README.md
create mode 100644 rust/pvapconfig/man/pvapconfig.1
create mode 100644 rust/pvapconfig/src/ap.rs
create mode 100644 rust/pvapconfig/src/cli.rs
create mode 100644 rust/pvapconfig/src/config.rs
create mode 100644 rust/pvapconfig/src/helper.rs
create mode 100644 rust/pvapconfig/src/main.rs
create mode 100644 rust/pvapconfig/src/uv.rs
diff --git a/rust/Cargo.lock b/rust/Cargo.lock
index 067be05..3a6c423 100644
--- a/rust/Cargo.lock
+++ b/rust/Cargo.lock
@@ -792,6 +792,22 @@ dependencies = [
"zerocopy",
]
+[[package]]
+name = "pvapconfig"
+version = "0.9.0"
+dependencies = [
+ "clap",
+ "lazy_static",
+ "openssl",
+ "openssl-sys",
+ "pv",
+ "rand",
+ "regex",
+ "serde",
+ "serde_yaml",
+ "utils",
+]
+
[[package]]
name = "pvsecret"
version = "0.9.0"
diff --git a/rust/Cargo.toml b/rust/Cargo.toml
index 7ba1faa..f358dbd 100644
--- a/rust/Cargo.toml
+++ b/rust/Cargo.toml
@@ -1,6 +1,7 @@
[workspace]
members = [
"pv",
+ "pvapconfig",
"pvsecret",
"utils",
]
diff --git a/rust/Makefile b/rust/Makefile
index fa3cf04..818694d 100644
--- a/rust/Makefile
+++ b/rust/Makefile
@@ -19,7 +19,7 @@ ifneq (${HAVE_CARGO},0)
ifneq (${HAVE_OPENSSL},0)
ifneq (${HAVE_LIBCURL},0)
- PV_TARGETS := pvsecret
+ PV_TARGETS := pvsecret pvapconfig
PV_BUILD_TARGETS := $(PV_TARGETS)
CARGO_TEST_TARGETS += $(addsuffix .test,pv $(PV_TARGETS))
diff --git a/rust/pvapconfig/Cargo.toml b/rust/pvapconfig/Cargo.toml
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2a69468
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/pvapconfig/Cargo.toml
@@ -0,0 +1,19 @@
+[package]
+name = "pvapconfig"
+description = "A tool to configure the AP resources inside a SE guest based on UV secrets and an AP config file."
+authors = ["Harald Freudenberger <freude@linux.ibm.com>"]
+version = "0.9.0"
+edition.workspace = true
+license.workspace = true
+
+[dependencies]
+clap = { version ="4.1", features = ["derive", "wrap_help"]}
+lazy_static = "1.1"
+openssl = { version = "0.10" }
+openssl-sys = { version = "0.9" }
+pv = { path = "../pv", features = ["uvsecret", "request"] }
+rand = "0.8"
+regex = "1"
+serde = { version = "1.0", features = ["derive"] }
+serde_yaml = "0.9"
+utils = { path = "../utils" }
diff --git a/rust/pvapconfig/README.md b/rust/pvapconfig/README.md
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..d30cb76
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/pvapconfig/README.md
@@ -0,0 +1,9 @@
+<!--
+Copyright 2023 IBM Corp.
+s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+-->
+# pvapconfig
+## Description
+**pvapconfig** is used to automatically set up the AP configuration
+within an IBM Secure Execution guest.
diff --git a/rust/pvapconfig/man/pvapconfig.1 b/rust/pvapconfig/man/pvapconfig.1
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..73ce8ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/pvapconfig/man/pvapconfig.1
@@ -0,0 +1,174 @@
+.\" pvapconfig.1
+.\"
+.\" Copyright 2023 IBM Corp.
+.\" s390-tools is free software; you can redistribute it and/or modify
+.\" it under the terms of the MIT license. See LICENSE for details.
+.\"
+.\" use
+.\" groff -man -Tutf8 pvapconfig.1
+.\" or
+.\" nroff -man pvapconfig.1
+.\" to process this source
+.\"
+.TH PVAPCONFIG 1 "DEC 2023" "s390-tools"
+.SH NAME
+pvapconfig \- automatic configure APQNs within an SE KVM guest.
+.SH SYNOPSIS
+.TP 9
+.B pvapconfig [OPTIONS]
+.SH DESCRIPTION
+pvapconfig is a tool for automatically configuring the APQNs within an
+Secure Execution KVM guest with AP pass-through support. Based on a
+given AP configuration it tries to find matching APQNs and binds and
+associates them with the given secret(s).
+
+Here is a description of pvapconfig's process:
+.TP 3
+1. Check AP bus: Support for AP bus needs to be available and the AP
+bus needs to support APSB. APSB is only available within an KVM SE
+guest with AP pass-through support.
+.TP 3
+2. Check Ultravisor: UV support needs to be available and the UV needs
+to support the
+.I list secrets
+feature.
+.TP 3
+3. Read in and validate the AP configuration file. By default if not
+overwritten by the --config option the AP configuration is read from
+.I /etc/pvapconfig.yaml
+and syntactically verified. See section CONFIGFILE for details about
+the syntax and semantic of the configuration file.
+.TP 3
+4. Fetch the list of association secrets from the UV. Actually the
+index of the secret and the secret id for each entry is collected. The
+secret value is NOT fetched as it is NOT accessible but only usable
+within the UV firmware.
+.TP 3
+5. Gather all APQNs available within this KVM SE guest. Collect
+information about each APQN like online states, crypto card serial
+numbers and master key verification patterns (MKVP).
+.TP 3
+6. Go through all AP config entries. For each AP config entry try to
+find an APQN which is already configured (bound/associated) to
+satisfy this config entry. If such a match is found, the AP config
+entry is assumed to be fulfilled and marked as done.
+.TP 3
+7. All remaining APQNs which do not already satisfy an AP config entry
+are now examined for their bind and association state and maybe reset
+to unbound state.
+.TP 3
+8. Go through all AP config entries which are still not
+fulfilled. For each such AP config entry try to search for an APQN
+which would match to this entry and then prepare this APQN (bind,
+maybe associate). If successful, mark the AP config entry as done.
+.TP 3
+9. Evaluation of the applied AP config entries. Applied means the AP
+config entry has been fulfilled either in step 6 or in step 8. With
+the strict option given ALL AP config entries need to apply otherwise
+an error message is printed and pvapconfig returns with exit failure.
+If the strict option is not given, it is enough to satisfy at least one
+AP config entry from the configuration and pvapconfig will return
+successfully.
+.SH OPTIONS
+.TP 8
+.B -c, --config <configfile>
+Use <configfile> as the AP config file for pvapconfig. If pvapconfig
+is run without this option the default configuration file
+/etc/pvapconfig.yaml is used.
+.TP 8
+.B -h, --help
+Print pvapconfig usage information and exit.
+.TP 8
+.B -n, --dry-run
+Do not bind, unbind or associate APQNs but only process the
+configuration and the available APQNs and secrets and simulate the
+bind, unbind or associate action on the chosen APQN. Use it together
+with the verbose option to see which actions pvapconfig would do if
+unleashed.
+.TP 8
+.B -s, --strict
+All AP config entries need to be satisfied to have pvapconfig
+terminate with success. Without this option one applied AP config
+entry is enough to meet the expectations.
+.TP 8
+.B -v, --verbose
+Print out informational messages about what pvapconfig is actually
+doing.
+.TP 8
+.B -V, --version
+Print version information and exit.
+.SH CONFIGFILE
+The pvapconfig yaml configuration file consists of a list of AP config
+entries. Each entry may hold this information:
+.TP 2
+- mode: AP queue mode information, required, either "EP11" or "Accel".
+.TP 2
+- mkvp: AP queue Master Key Verification Pattern (MKVP), required for
+EP11, hex string optional prepented with 0x. The MKVP hex string value
+may hold either 16 bytes (32 hex characters) or 32 bytes (64 hex
+characters) but only the leftmost 16 bytes hold MKVP information and
+thus the rest is ignored.
+.TP 2
+- serialnr: Crypto Card Serial Number, string, optional for EP11,
+ignored for Accel. As this is a real ASCII string uppercase and
+lowercase character(s) count different.
+.TP 2
+- mingen: Card Minimal Generation, string "CEX4", "CEX5", "CEX6",
+"CEX7" or "CEX8" for Accelerator, string "CEC8" for EP11, optional. If
+given specifies the minimal accepted Crypto card generation.
+.TP 2
+- secretid: Secret id, hex string with optional 0x prepented, required
+for EP11, ignored for Accel. Details see the following text.
+.TP 2
+- name: ASCII string, optional, but see details below.
+.TP 2
+- description: Description of this AP config entry, string, ignored,
+ just for convenience for the reader or editor of the configuration.
+.PP
+The secret id uniquely identifies an association secret. However, it
+is a clumsy hex string of 64 characters which represent the readable
+sha256 value over the secret's name. So pvapconfig can use the name
+instead and calculate the secret id from the name. So the rule is:
+.TP 2
+- If name and secretid is given, the secretid needs to match to the
+sha256 hash over the given name for this AP config entry.
+.TP 2
+- If only name is given then the secretid is calculated with a sha256
+ hash over the given name.
+.TP 2
+- If only the secretid is given, there is nothing more to do but
+verify that the value is a hex string with 64 characters.
+.SH LOCKING
+Pvapconfig needs to have a consistent view of the AP resources
+during lifetime. There must not run multiple instances of pvapconfig
+or any manipulations of the AP resources in parallel. To prevent the
+execution of multiple pvapconfig instances the lock file
+/run/lock/pvapconfig.lock is established. A second instance of
+pvapconfig will detect this lock file and terminated with an error
+message. If for any reason this file still exists as a leftover from a
+previous pvapconfig crash for example, it needs to get removed by
+hand. The lock file contains the process id of the pvapconfig process
+which created this file.
+.SH RETURN VALUE
+.TP 8
+.B 0 - Successful termination.
+At least one AP config entry has been applied or at least one APQN has
+been found in a state matching to one AP config entry. If strict
+option is given, ALL AP config entries have been applied. An AP config
+entry is applied either by configuring the APQN accordingly or an APQN
+has been found which already fulfills the constrains.
+.RE
+.TP 8
+.B 1 - Failure.
+Either some kind of failure happened during processing the
+configuration or the configuration could not get applied
+successful. In all cases pvapconfig prints out a message to standard
+error with details about the failure. Also pvapconfig does NOT reset
+the APQNs to the state found at the startup when failing to apply the
+configuration.
+.SH NOTES
+For more information and details see the IBM documentation about
+Confidential Computing "Introducing IBM Secure Execution for Linux"
+available at https://www.ibm.com/docs/.
+.SH SEE ALSO
+\fBpvsecret\fR(1), \fBlszcrypt\fR(8), \fBchzcrypt\fR(8)
diff --git a/rust/pvapconfig/src/ap.rs b/rust/pvapconfig/src/ap.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..0b88235
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/pvapconfig/src/ap.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,817 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! AP support functions for pvapconfig
+//
+
+use crate::helper::*;
+use regex::Regex;
+use std::fmt;
+use std::path::Path;
+use std::slice::Iter;
+use std::thread;
+use std::time;
+
+const PATH_SYS_BUS_AP: &str = "/sys/bus/ap";
+const PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES: &str = "/sys/bus/ap/features";
+const PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS: &str = "/sys/bus/ap/bindings";
+const PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP: &str = "/sys/devices/ap";
+
+const RE_CARD_DIR: &str = r"^card([[:xdigit:]]{2})$";
+const RE_QUEUE_DIR: &str = r"^([[:xdigit:]]{2})\.([[:xdigit:]]{4})$";
+const RE_CARD_TYPE: &str = r"^CEX([3-8])([ACP])$";
+const RE_EP11_MKVP: &str = r"WK\s+CUR:\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)";
+const RE_CCA_AES_MKVP: &str = r"AES\s+CUR:\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)";
+const RE_CCA_APKA_MKVP: &str = r"APKA\s+CUR:\s+(\S+)\s+(\S+)";
+
+const SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS_POLL_MS: u64 = 500;
+
+const SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_POLL_MS: u64 = 500;
+const SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10000;
+
+const SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS: u64 = 500;
+const SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_TIMEOUT_MS: u64 = 10000;
+
+/// Check if AP bus support is available.
+/// Returns Result with Ok(()) or Err(failurestring).
+pub fn check_ap_bus_support() -> Result<(), String> {
+ if !Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "AP bus support missing (path {PATH_SYS_BUS_AP} is invalid)."
+ ));
+ }
+ Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Check if AP bus supports APSB.
+///
+/// When APSB support is available returns Result
+/// with Ok(()) or otherwise Err(failurestring).
+pub fn ap_bus_has_apsb_support() -> Result<(), String> {
+ if !Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES).is_file() {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "AP bus features support missing (file {PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES} does not exist)."
+ ));
+ }
+ let features = sysfs_read_string(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES).map_err(|err| {
+ format!("Failure reading AP bus features from {PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_FEATURES} ({err:?}).")
+ })?;
+ match features.find("APSB") {
+ Some(_) => Ok(()),
+ None => Err("Missing AP bus feature APSB (SE AP pass-through not enabled ?).".to_string()),
+ }
+}
+
+/// Wait for AP bus set up all it's devices.
+///
+/// This function loops until the AP bus reports that
+/// - all AP queue devices have been constructed
+/// - and all AP device have been bound to a device driver.
+/// This may take some time and even loop forever if there
+/// is something wrong with the kernel modules setup.
+/// Returns true when AP bus bindings are complete,
+/// otherwise false and a message is printed.
+/// When AP bus binding complete is not immediately reached
+/// and this function needs to loop, about every 5 seconds
+/// a message is printed "Waiting for ...".
+pub fn wait_for_ap_bus_bindings_complete() -> bool {
+ let mut counter = 0;
+ loop {
+ match sysfs_read_string(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS) {
+ Ok(s) => {
+ if s.contains("complete") {
+ return true;
+ }
+ }
+ Err(err) => {
+ eprintln!(
+ "Failure reading AP bus bindings from {} ({:?}).",
+ PATH_SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS, err
+ );
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ thread::sleep(time::Duration::from_millis(SYS_BUS_AP_BINDINGS_POLL_MS));
+ counter += 1;
+ if counter % 10 == 0 {
+ println!("Waiting for AP bus bindings complete.");
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone, PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum ApqnMode {
+ Accel,
+ Ep11,
+ Cca,
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApqnInfoAccel {
+ // empty
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApqnInfoEp11 {
+ pub serialnr: String,
+ pub mkvp: String, // may be an empty string if no WK set
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct ApqnInfoCca {
+ pub serialnr: String,
+ pub mkvp_aes: String, // may be an empty string if no MK set
+ pub mkvp_apka: String, // may be an empty string if no MK set
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub enum ApqnInfo {
+ Accel(ApqnInfoAccel),
+ Ep11(ApqnInfoEp11),
+ Cca(ApqnInfoCca),
+}
+
+impl ApqnInfo {
+ fn accel_info(_carddir: &str, _queuedir: &str) -> Result<ApqnInfo, String> {
+ Ok(ApqnInfo::Accel(ApqnInfoAccel {}))
+ }
+
+ fn cca_info(carddir: &str, queuedir: &str) -> Result<ApqnInfo, String> {
+ let serialnr = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{carddir}/serialnr")) {
+ Ok(r) => r,
+ Err(err) => {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure reading serialnr from {carddir}/serialnr: {:?}.",
+ err
+ ))
+ }
+ };
+ let mkvps = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{carddir}/{queuedir}/mkvps")) {
+ Ok(r) => r,
+ Err(err) => {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure reading mkvps from {carddir}/{queuedir}/mkvps: {:?}.",
+ err
+ ))
+ }
+ };
+ let mut aes_mkvp = String::new();
+ let re_cca_aes_mkvp = Regex::new(RE_CCA_AES_MKVP).unwrap();
+ if !re_cca_aes_mkvp.is_match(&mkvps) {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "APQN {} failure parsing mkvps string '{}'.",
+ queuedir, mkvps
+ ));
+ } else {
+ let caps = re_cca_aes_mkvp.captures(&mkvps).unwrap();
+ let valid = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+ if valid != "valid" {
+ eprintln!(
+ "Warning: APQN {} has no valid AES master key set.",
+ queuedir
+ );
+ } else {
+ aes_mkvp = caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+ if aes_mkvp.starts_with("0x") {
+ aes_mkvp = String::from(&aes_mkvp[2..]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ let mut apka_mkvp = String::new();
+ let re_cca_apka_mkvp = Regex::new(RE_CCA_APKA_MKVP).unwrap();
+ if !re_cca_apka_mkvp.is_match(&mkvps) {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "APQN {} failure parsing mkvps string '{}'.",
+ queuedir, mkvps
+ ));
+ } else {
+ let caps = re_cca_apka_mkvp.captures(&mkvps).unwrap();
+ let valid = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+ if valid != "valid" {
+ eprintln!(
+ "Warning: APQN {} has no valid APKA master key set.",
+ queuedir
+ );
+ } else {
+ apka_mkvp = caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+ if apka_mkvp.starts_with("0x") {
+ apka_mkvp = String::from(&apka_mkvp[2..]);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(ApqnInfo::Cca(ApqnInfoCca {
+ serialnr,
+ mkvp_aes: aes_mkvp,
+ mkvp_apka: apka_mkvp,
+ }))
+ }
+
+ fn ep11_info(carddir: &str, queuedir: &str) -> Result<ApqnInfo, String> {
+ let serialnr = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{carddir}/serialnr")) {
+ Ok(r) => r,
+ Err(err) => {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure reading serialnr from {carddir}/serialnr: {:?}.",
+ err
+ ))
+ }
+ };
+ let mkvps = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{carddir}/{queuedir}/mkvps")) {
+ Ok(r) => r,
+ Err(err) => {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure reading mkvps from {carddir}/{queuedir}/mkvps: {:?}.",
+ err
+ ))
+ }
+ };
+ let mut mkvp = String::new();
+ let re_ep11_mkvp = Regex::new(RE_EP11_MKVP).unwrap();
+ if !re_ep11_mkvp.is_match(&mkvps) {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "APQN {} failure parsing mkvps string '{}'.",
+ queuedir, mkvps
+ ));
+ } else {
+ let caps = re_ep11_mkvp.captures(&mkvps).unwrap();
+ let valid = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+ if valid != "valid" {
+ eprintln!("Warning: APQN {} has no valid wrapping key set.", queuedir);
+ } else {
+ mkvp = caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str().to_lowercase();
+ if mkvp.starts_with("0x") {
+ mkvp = String::from(&mkvp[2..]);
+ }
+ if mkvp.len() > 32 {
+ mkvp = String::from(&mkvp[..32])
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(ApqnInfo::Ep11(ApqnInfoEp11 { serialnr, mkvp }))
+ }
+
+ fn info(mode: &ApqnMode, carddir: &str, queuedir: &str) -> Result<ApqnInfo, String> {
+ match mode {
+ ApqnMode::Accel => ApqnInfo::accel_info(carddir, queuedir),
+ ApqnMode::Cca => ApqnInfo::cca_info(carddir, queuedir),
+ ApqnMode::Ep11 => ApqnInfo::ep11_info(carddir, queuedir),
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(Debug, Clone)]
+pub struct Apqn {
+ pub name: String,
+ pub card: u32,
+ pub domain: u32,
+ pub gen: u32,
+ pub mode: ApqnMode,
+ pub info: Option<ApqnInfo>,
+}
+
+impl fmt::Display for Apqn {
+ fn fmt(&self, f: &mut fmt::Formatter<'_>) -> fmt::Result {
+ write!(f, "({},{})", self.card, self.domain)
+ }
+}
+
+impl Apqn {
+ pub fn bind_state(&self) -> Result<BindState, String> {
+ get_apqn_bind_state(self.card, self.domain)
+ }
+
+ pub fn set_bind_state(&self, state: BindState) -> Result<(), String> {
+ set_apqn_bind_state(self.card, self.domain, state)
+ }
+
+ pub fn associate_state(&self) -> Result<AssocState, String> {
+ get_apqn_associate_state(self.card, self.domain)
+ }
+
+ pub fn set_associate_state(&self, state: AssocState) -> Result<(), String> {
+ set_apqn_associate_state(self.card, self.domain, state)
+ }
+}
+
+/// Wrapper object around Vector of Apqns
+pub struct ApqnList(Vec<Apqn>);
+
+impl ApqnList {
+ #[cfg(test)] // only used in test code
+ pub fn from_apqn_vec(apqns: Vec<Apqn>) -> ApqnList {
+ ApqnList(apqns)
+ }
+
+ #[cfg(test)] // only used in test code
+ pub fn to_apqn_vec(&self) -> Vec<Apqn> {
+ self.0.clone()
+ }
+
+ pub fn iter(&self) -> Iter<'_, Apqn> {
+ self.0.iter()
+ }
+
+ pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+ self.0.len()
+ }
+
+ pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+ self.0.is_empty()
+ }
+
+ /// Scan AP bus devices in sysfs and construct the Apqnlist.
+ ///
+ /// The list is a vector of struct Apqn for each APQN found in sysfs
+ /// which is online and the card type matches to the regular expression
+ /// RE_CARD_TYPE.
+ /// On success a vector of struct Apqn is returned. This list may be
+ /// empty if there are no APQNs available or do not match to the conditions.
+ /// On failure None is returned.
+ /// Fatal errors which should never happened like unable to compile a
+ /// static regular expression will result in calling panic.
+ /// # Panics
+ /// Panics if the compilation of a static regular expression fails.
+ pub fn gather_apqns() -> Option<ApqnList> {
+ let mut apqns: Vec<Apqn> = Vec::new();
+ let re_card_type = Regex::new(RE_CARD_TYPE).unwrap();
+ let re_queue_dir = Regex::new(RE_QUEUE_DIR).unwrap();
+ let card_dirs =
+ match sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex(PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, RE_CARD_DIR) {
+ Ok(r) => r,
+ Err(err) => {
+ eprintln!(
+ "Failure reading AP devices {} ({:?}).",
+ PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, err
+ );
+ return None;
+ }
+ };
+ for dir in card_dirs {
+ let path = format!("{PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP}/{dir}");
+ let card_type = match sysfs_read_string(&format!("{path}/type")) {
+ Ok(r) => r,
+ Err(err) => {
+ eprintln!("Failure reading card type from {} ({:?}).", path, err);
+ return None;
+ }
+ };
+ if !re_card_type.is_match(&card_type) {
+ eprintln!("Failure parsing card type string '{}'.", card_type);
+ return None;
+ }
+ let caps = re_card_type.captures(&card_type).unwrap();
+ let gen = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str().parse::<u32>().unwrap();
+ let mode = match caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str().parse::<char>().unwrap() {
+ 'A' => ApqnMode::Accel,
+ 'C' => ApqnMode::Cca,
+ 'P' => ApqnMode::Ep11,
+ _ => panic!("Code inconsistence between regex RE_CARD_TYPE and evaluation code."),
+ };
+ if pv::misc::pv_guest_bit_set() {
+ // the UV blocks requests to CCA cards within SE guest with
+ // AP pass-through support. However, filter out CCA cards as these
+ // cards cause hangs during information gathering.
+ if mode == ApqnMode::Cca {
+ continue;
+ }
+ }
+ let queue_dirs = match sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex(&path, RE_QUEUE_DIR) {
+ Ok(r) => r,
+ Err(err) => {
+ eprintln!(
+ "Failure reading AP queue directories in {} ({:?}).",
+ path, err
+ );
+ return None;
+ }
+ };
+ for queue_dir in queue_dirs {
+ let _online = match sysfs_read_i32(&format!("{path}/{queue_dir}/online")) {
+ Ok(1) => true,
+ _ => continue,
+ };
+ let caps = re_queue_dir.captures(&queue_dir).unwrap();
+ let cardstr = caps.get(1).unwrap().as_str();
+ let card = u32::from_str_radix(cardstr, 16).unwrap();
+ let domstr = caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
+ let dom = u32::from_str_radix(domstr, 16).unwrap();
+ // For the mpvk and serialnr to fetch from the APQN within a SE
+ // guest the APQN needs to be bound to the guest. So if the APQN
+ // is not bound, temporarily bind it here until the info has
+ // been retrieved.
+ let mut tempbound = false;
+ if pv::misc::pv_guest_bit_set() {
+ let cbs = match get_apqn_bind_state(card, dom) {
+ Ok(bs) => bs,
+ Err(err) => {
+ eprintln!(
+ "Error: Failure reading APQN ({},{}) bind state: {}",
+ card, dom, err
+ );
+ BindState::NotSupported
+ }
+ };
+ if cbs == BindState::Unbound {
+ let r = set_apqn_bind_state(card, dom, BindState::Bound);
+ if r.is_err() {
+ eprintln!(
+ "Warning: Failure to temp. bind APQN ({},{}): {}",
+ card,
+ dom,
+ r.unwrap_err()
+ );
+ continue;
+ } else {
+ tempbound = true;
+ }
+ };
+ };
+ let info = match ApqnInfo::info(&mode, &path, &queue_dir) {
+ Err(err) => {
+ // print the error but continue with info set to None
+ eprintln!(
+ "Warning: Failure to gather info for APQN ({},{}): {}",
+ card, dom, err
+ );
+ None
+ }
+ Ok(i) => Some(i),
+ };
+ if tempbound {
+ let r = set_apqn_bind_state(card, dom, BindState::Unbound);
+ if r.is_err() {
+ eprintln!(
+ "Warning: Failure to unbind temp. bound APQN ({},{}): {}",
+ card,
+ dom,
+ r.unwrap_err()
+ );
+ }
+ };
+ apqns.push(Apqn {
+ name: queue_dir.clone(),
+ card,
+ domain: dom,
+ gen,
+ mode: mode.clone(),
+ info,
+ });
+ }
+ }
+ Some(ApqnList(apqns))
+ }
+
+ /// Sort this Apqnlist by card generation:
+ /// newest generation first, older generations last.
+ pub fn sort_by_gen(&mut self) {
+ self.0.sort_unstable_by(|a, b| b.gen.cmp(&a.gen));
+ }
+
+ /// Check MK restriction
+ ///
+ /// Within one card there must not exist 2 APQNs with same
+ /// MK setup. This rule only applies to EP11 cards.
+ /// Returns true if this check passed,
+ /// otherwise false and a message is printed.
+ pub fn check_mk_restriction(&self) -> bool {
+ for a1 in self.0.iter() {
+ for a2 in self.0.iter() {
+ if a1.card == a2.card
+ && a1.domain < a2.domain
+ && a1.mode == ApqnMode::Ep11
+ && a1.info.is_some()
+ && a2.info.is_some()
+ {
+ let i1 = match a1.info.as_ref().unwrap() {
+ ApqnInfo::Ep11(i) => i,
+ _ => continue,
+ };
+ let i2 = match a2.info.as_ref().unwrap() {
+ ApqnInfo::Ep11(i) => i,
+ _ => continue,
+ };
+ if i1.mkvp.is_empty() || i2.mkvp.is_empty() {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if i1.mkvp == i2.mkvp {
+ eprintln!("APQN {} and APQN {} have same MPVK", a1, a2);
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ true
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum BindState {
+ Bound,
+ Unbound,
+ NotSupported,
+}
+
+/// Query bind state for this APQN.
+///
+/// Returns a BindState enum as defined above or on failure
+/// an error string. Does NOT print any error messages.
+pub fn get_apqn_bind_state(card: u32, dom: u32) -> Result<BindState, String> {
+ let path = format!(
+ "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_bind",
+ PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+ );
+ match sysfs_read_string(&path) {
+ Err(err) => Err(format!(
+ "Failure reading se_bind attribute for APQN({},{}): {:?}.",
+ card, dom, err
+ )),
+ Ok(str) => match str.as_str() {
+ "bound" => Ok(BindState::Bound),
+ "unbound" => Ok(BindState::Unbound),
+ "-" => Ok(BindState::NotSupported),
+ _ => Err(format!("Unknown bind state '{str}'.")),
+ },
+ }
+}
+
+/// Bind or unbind an APQN.
+///
+/// The action is determined by the BindState given in.
+/// But of course only Bound and Unbound is supported - otherwise
+/// this function panics!
+/// The function actively loops over the bind state until
+/// the requested bind state is reached or a timeout has
+/// occurred (SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_TIMEOUT_MS).
+/// On success () is returned, on failure an error string
+/// is returned. Does NOT print any error messages.
+/// # Panics
+/// Panics if a desired bind state other than Bund or Unbound is given.
+pub fn set_apqn_bind_state(card: u32, dom: u32, state: BindState) -> Result<(), String> {
+ let path = format!(
+ "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_bind",
+ PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+ );
+ let r = match state {
+ BindState::Bound => sysfs_write_i32(&path, 1),
+ BindState::Unbound => sysfs_write_i32(&path, 0),
+ _ => panic!("set_apqn_bind_state called with invalid BindState."),
+ };
+ if r.is_err() {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure writing se_bind attribute for APQN({},{}): {:?}.",
+ card,
+ dom,
+ r.unwrap_err()
+ ));
+ }
+ let mut ms: u64 = 0;
+ loop {
+ thread::sleep(time::Duration::from_millis(SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_POLL_MS));
+ ms += SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_POLL_MS;
+ if ms >= SYS_BUS_AP_BIND_TIMEOUT_MS {
+ break Err(format!(
+ "Timeout setting APQN({},{}) bind state.",
+ card, dom
+ ));
+ }
+ let newstate = match get_apqn_bind_state(card, dom) {
+ Err(err) => return Err(err),
+ Ok(s) => s,
+ };
+ if newstate == state {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+#[derive(PartialEq, Eq)]
+pub enum AssocState {
+ Associated(u16),
+ AssociationPending,
+ Unassociated,
+ NotSupported,
+}
+
+/// Query association state for this APQN.
+///
+/// Returns an AssocState enum as defined above or on failure
+/// an error string. Does NOT print any error messages.
+pub fn get_apqn_associate_state(card: u32, dom: u32) -> Result<AssocState, String> {
+ let path = format!(
+ "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_associate",
+ PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+ );
+ match sysfs_read_string(&path) {
+ Err(err) => Err(format!(
+ "Failure reading se_associate attribute for APQN({},{}: {:?}",
+ card, dom, err
+ )),
+ Ok(str) => {
+ if let Some(prefix) = str.strip_prefix("associated ") {
+ let value = &prefix.parse::<u16>();
+ match value {
+ Ok(v) => Ok(AssocState::Associated(*v)),
+ Err(_) => Err(format!("Invalid association index in '{str}'.")),
+ }
+ } else {
+ match str.as_str() {
+ "association pending" => Ok(AssocState::AssociationPending),
+ "unassociated" => Ok(AssocState::Unassociated),
+ "-" => Ok(AssocState::NotSupported),
+ _ => Err(format!("Unknown association state '{str}'.")),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+fn set_apqn_associate_state_associate(card: u32, dom: u32, idx: u16) -> Result<(), String> {
+ let path = format!(
+ "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_associate",
+ PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+ );
+ let r = sysfs_write_i32(&path, idx as i32);
+ if r.is_err() {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure writing se_associate attribute for APQN({},{}): {:?}.",
+ card,
+ dom,
+ r.unwrap_err()
+ ));
+ }
+ let mut ms: u64 = 0;
+ loop {
+ thread::sleep(time::Duration::from_millis(SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS));
+ ms += SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS;
+ if ms >= SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_TIMEOUT_MS {
+ break Err(format!(
+ "Timeout setting APQN({},{}) association idx {} state.",
+ card, dom, idx
+ ));
+ }
+ let newstate = match get_apqn_associate_state(card, dom) {
+ Err(err) => return Err(err),
+ Ok(s) => s,
+ };
+ if let AssocState::Associated(i) = newstate {
+ if idx == i {
+ return Ok(());
+ } else {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure: APQN({},{}) is associated with {} but it should be {}.",
+ card, dom, i, idx
+ ));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+fn set_apqn_associate_state_unbind(card: u32, dom: u32) -> Result<(), String> {
+ let bindpath = format!(
+ "{}/card{:02x}/{:02x}.{:04x}/se_bind",
+ PATH_SYS_DEVICES_AP, card, card, dom
+ );
+ let r = sysfs_write_i32(&bindpath, 0);
+ if r.is_err() {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure writing se_bind attribute for APQN({},{}): {:?}.",
+ card,
+ dom,
+ r.unwrap_err()
+ ));
+ }
+ let mut ms: u64 = 0;
+ loop {
+ thread::sleep(time::Duration::from_millis(SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS));
+ ms += SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_POLL_MS;
+ if ms >= SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_TIMEOUT_MS {
+ break Err(format!(
+ "Timeout setting APQN({},{}) association unbind state.",
+ card, dom
+ ));
+ }
+ let newstate = match get_apqn_associate_state(card, dom) {
+ Err(err) => return Err(err),
+ Ok(s) => s,
+ };
+ if newstate == AssocState::Unassociated {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ }
+}
+
+/// Associate or Unassociate an APQN.
+///
+/// The action is determined by the AssocState given in.
+/// But of course only Associated and Unassociated is supported
+/// otherwise this function panics!
+/// The function actively loops over the association state until
+/// the requested state is reached or a timeout has
+/// occurred (SYS_BUS_AP_ASSOC_TIMEOUT_MS).
+/// The unassociate is in fact a unbind. So the code triggers
+/// an unbind and then loops over the sysfs se_associate until
+/// "unassociated" is reached.
+/// On success () is returned, on failure an error string
+/// is returned. Does NOT print any error messages.
+/// # Panics
+/// Panics if a desired bind state other than Associated or
+/// Unassociated is given.
+pub fn set_apqn_associate_state(card: u32, dom: u32, state: AssocState) -> Result<(), String> {
+ match state {
+ AssocState::Associated(idx) => set_apqn_associate_state_associate(card, dom, idx),
+ AssocState::Unassociated => set_apqn_associate_state_unbind(card, dom),
+ _ => panic!("set_apqn_associate_state called with invalid AssocState."),
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+ use super::*;
+
+ // These tests assume, there is an AP bus available
+ // Also for each APQN which is online, it is assumed
+ // to have a valid master key set up (for Ep11 and CCA).
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_check_ap_bus_support() {
+ if Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+ assert!(check_ap_bus_support().is_ok());
+ } else {
+ assert!(check_ap_bus_support().is_err());
+ }
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_check_ap_bus_apsb_support() {
+ if Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+ // if we are inside a secure execution guest the
+ // apsb check should succeed. Outside an SE guest
+ // the check should fail.
+ if pv::misc::pv_guest_bit_set() {
+ assert!(ap_bus_has_apsb_support().is_ok());
+ } else {
+ assert!(ap_bus_has_apsb_support().is_err());
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(ap_bus_has_apsb_support().is_err());
+ }
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_wait_for_ap_bus_bindings_complete() {
+ let r = wait_for_ap_bus_bindings_complete();
+ if Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+ assert!(r);
+ } else {
+ assert!(!r);
+ }
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_gather_apqns() {
+ let r = ApqnList::gather_apqns();
+ if Path::new(PATH_SYS_BUS_AP).is_dir() {
+ assert!(r.is_some());
+ // fail if no entries found
+ let l = r.unwrap();
+ let v = l.to_apqn_vec();
+ for a in v {
+ match a.mode {
+ ApqnMode::Accel => {
+ // fail if no ApqnInfo is attached
+ assert!(a.info.is_some());
+ }
+ ApqnMode::Ep11 => {
+ // fail if no ApqnInfo is attached
+ assert!(a.info.is_some());
+ let info = a.info.unwrap();
+ let i = match &info {
+ ApqnInfo::Ep11(i) => i,
+ _ => panic!("ApqnInfo attached onto Ep11 APQN is NOT ApqnInfoEp11 ?!?"),
+ };
+ // fail if no serialnr
+ assert!(i.serialnr.len() > 0);
+ // mkvp is either empty (no WK set) or has exact 32 characters
+ assert!(i.mkvp.is_empty() || i.mkvp.len() == 32);
+ }
+ ApqnMode::Cca => {
+ // fail if no ApqnInfo is attached
+ assert!(a.info.is_some());
+ let info = a.info.unwrap();
+ let i = match &info {
+ ApqnInfo::Cca(i) => i,
+ _ => panic!("ApqnInfo attached onto Cca APQN is NOT ApqnInfoCca ?!?"),
+ };
+ // fail if no serialnr
+ assert!(i.serialnr.len() > 0);
+ // aes mkvp is either empty (no MK set) or exact 16 characters
+ assert!(i.mkvp_aes.is_empty() || i.mkvp_aes.len() == 16);
+ // apka mkvp is either empty (no MK set) or exact 16 characters
+ assert!(i.mkvp_apka.is_empty() || i.mkvp_apka.len() == 16);
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ } else {
+ assert!(r.is_none());
+ }
+ }
+}
diff --git a/rust/pvapconfig/src/cli.rs b/rust/pvapconfig/src/cli.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..e7fd283
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/pvapconfig/src/cli.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,63 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! Command line interface for pvapconfig
+//
+
+use clap::Parser;
+use lazy_static::lazy_static;
+
+/// The default pvapconfig config file
+pub const PATH_DEFAULT_CONFIG_FILE: &str = "/etc/pvapconfig.yaml";
+
+#[derive(Parser, Clone)]
+pub struct Cli {
+ /// Provide a custom config file (overwrites default /etc/pvapconfig.yaml).
+ #[arg(short, long, value_name = "FILE")]
+ pub config: Option<String>,
+
+ /// Dry run: display the actions but don't actually perform them on the APQNs.
+ #[arg(short = 'n', long = "dry-run")]
+ pub dryrun: bool,
+
+ /// Enforce strict match: All config entries need to be fullfilled.
+ ///
+ /// By default it is enough to successfully apply at least one config entry.
+ /// With the strict flag enabled, all config entries within a config file
+ /// need to be applied successful.
+ #[arg(long = "strict")]
+ pub strict: bool,
+
+ /// Provide more detailed output.
+ #[arg(short, long)]
+ pub verbose: bool,
+
+ /// Print version information and exit.
+ #[arg(short = 'V', long)]
+ pub version: bool,
+}
+
+lazy_static! {
+ pub static ref ARGS: Cli = Cli::parse();
+}
+
+impl Cli {
+ /// verbose returns true if the verbose command line option
+ /// was given, otherwise false is returned.
+ pub fn verbose(&self) -> bool {
+ self.verbose
+ }
+
+ /// dryrun returns true if the dry-run command line option
+ /// was given, otherwise false is returned.
+ pub fn dryrun(&self) -> bool {
+ self.dryrun
+ }
+
+ /// strict returns true if the strict flag was given, otherwise
+ /// false is returned.
+ pub fn strict(&self) -> bool {
+ self.strict
+ }
+}
diff --git a/rust/pvapconfig/src/config.rs b/rust/pvapconfig/src/config.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..28d2ac7
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/pvapconfig/src/config.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,391 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! Functions around handling the pvapconfig configuration file
+//
+
+use openssl::sha::sha256;
+use regex::Regex;
+use serde::{Deserialize, Serialize};
+use serde_yaml::{self};
+use std::fs::File;
+use std::slice::Iter;
+
+pub const STR_MODE_EP11: &str = "ep11";
+pub const STR_MODE_ACCEL: &str = "accel";
+
+const RE_EP11_MKVP_32: &str = r"^(0x)?([[:xdigit:]]{32})$";
+const RE_EP11_MKVP_64: &str = r"^(0x)?([[:xdigit:]]{64})$";
+const RE_SERIALNR: &str = r"^(\S{16})$";
+const RE_EP11_GEN: &str = r"^cex(8)$";
+const RE_ACCEL_GEN: &str = r"^cex([4-8])$";
+const RE_SECRETID: &str = r"^(0x)?([[:xdigit:]]{64})$";
+
+#[derive(Debug, Serialize, Deserialize, Default, Clone)]
+#[serde(default, deny_unknown_fields)]
+pub struct ApConfigEntry {
+ pub name: String, // name and description are unmodified from the config file
+ pub description: String, // accel after validation ep11 after validation
+ pub mode: String, // "accel" "ep11"
+ pub mkvp: String, // empty 32 hex lowercase characters
+ pub serialnr: String, // empty empty or 16 non-whitespace characters
+ pub mingen: String, // empty or "cex4"..."cex8" empty or "cex8"
+ pub secretid: String, // empty 64 hex lowercase characters
+}
+
+impl ApConfigEntry {
+ fn validate_secretid(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+ // either secret id or name may be given
+ if self.secretid.is_empty() && self.name.is_empty() {
+ return Err("Neither secretid nor name given.".to_string());
+ }
+ // if name is given, calculate sha256 digest for this name
+ // test for the hash calculated here can be done with openssl:
+ // echo -n "Hello" >in.bin; openssl dgst -sha256 -binary -out out.bin in.bin; hexdump -C out.bin
+ if self.name.is_empty() {
+ return Ok(());
+ }
+ let hash = sha256(self.name.as_bytes());
+ let hashstr = crate::helper::u8_to_hexstring(&hash);
+ // if there is a secretid given, this must match to the hash
+ if !self.secretid.is_empty() {
+ if self.secretid != hashstr {
+ return Err("Mismatch between sha256(name) and secretid.".to_string());
+ }
+ } else {
+ self.secretid = hashstr;
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// # Panics
+ /// Panics if the compilation of a static regular expression fails.
+ fn validate_ep11_entry(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+ // mkvp is required
+ let mut mkvp = self.mkvp.trim().to_lowercase();
+ if mkvp.is_empty() {
+ return Err("Mkvp value missing.".to_string());
+ }
+ // either 64 hex or 32 hex
+ if Regex::new(RE_EP11_MKVP_64).unwrap().is_match(&mkvp) {
+ // need to cut away the last 32 hex characters
+ mkvp = String::from(&mkvp[..mkvp.len() - 32])
+ } else if Regex::new(RE_EP11_MKVP_32).unwrap().is_match(&mkvp) {
+ // nothing to do here
+ } else {
+ return Err(format!("Mkvp value '{}' is not valid.", &self.mkvp));
+ }
+ self.mkvp = match mkvp.strip_prefix("0x") {
+ Some(rest) => String::from(rest),
+ None => mkvp,
+ };
+ // serialnr is optional
+ let serialnr = self.serialnr.trim().to_string();
+ if !serialnr.is_empty() && !Regex::new(RE_SERIALNR).unwrap().is_match(&serialnr) {
+ return Err(format!("Serialnr value '{}' is not valid.", &self.serialnr));
+ }
+ self.serialnr = serialnr;
+ // mingen is optional, but if given only CEX8 is valid
+ let mingen = self.mingen.trim().to_lowercase();
+ if !mingen.is_empty() && !Regex::new(RE_EP11_GEN).unwrap().is_match(&mingen) {
+ return Err(format!("Mingen value '{}' is not valid.", &self.mingen));
+ }
+ self.mingen = mingen;
+ // secretid or name is required
+ let secretid = self.secretid.trim().to_lowercase();
+ if !secretid.is_empty() && !Regex::new(RE_SECRETID).unwrap().is_match(&secretid) {
+ return Err(format!("Secretid value '{}' is not valid.", &self.secretid));
+ }
+ self.secretid = match secretid.strip_prefix("0x") {
+ Some(rest) => String::from(rest),
+ None => secretid,
+ };
+ // name is optional, ignored here
+ // description is optional, ignored here
+ // but the secretid needs some more validation
+ self.validate_secretid()
+ }
+
+ /// # Panics
+ /// Panics if the compilation of a static regular expression fails.
+ fn validate_accel_entry(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+ // mkvp is ignored
+ self.mkvp.clear();
+ // serialnr is ignored
+ self.serialnr.clear();
+ // mingen is optional, but if given must match to CEX4..CEX8
+ let mingen = self.mingen.trim().to_lowercase();
+ if !mingen.is_empty() && !Regex::new(RE_ACCEL_GEN).unwrap().is_match(&mingen) {
+ return Err(format!("Mingen value '{}' is not valid.", &self.mingen));
+ }
+ self.mingen = mingen;
+ // secretid is ignored
+ self.secretid.clear();
+ // name is optional, ignored here
+ // description is optional, ignored here
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ fn validate(&mut self) -> Result<(), String> {
+ // trim name
+ self.name = self.name.trim().to_string();
+ // mode is always required
+ let mode = self.mode.trim().to_lowercase();
+ match mode.as_str() {
+ STR_MODE_EP11 => {
+ self.mode = mode;
+ self.validate_ep11_entry()?;
+ }
+ STR_MODE_ACCEL => {
+ self.mode = mode;
+ self.validate_accel_entry()?;
+ }
+ _ => return Err(format!("Unknown or invalid mode '{}'.", mode)),
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+/// Wrapper object around Vector of ApConfigEntry
+pub struct ApConfigList(Vec<ApConfigEntry>);
+
+impl ApConfigList {
+ #[cfg(test)] // only used in test code
+ pub fn from_apconfigentry_vec(apconfigs: Vec<ApConfigEntry>) -> ApConfigList {
+ ApConfigList(apconfigs)
+ }
+
+ pub fn iter(&self) -> Iter<'_, ApConfigEntry> {
+ self.0.iter()
+ }
+
+ pub fn len(&self) -> usize {
+ self.0.len()
+ }
+
+ pub fn is_empty(&self) -> bool {
+ self.0.is_empty()
+ }
+
+ fn read_yaml_file(fname: &str) -> Result<Vec<ApConfigEntry>, String> {
+ let file = match File::open(fname) {
+ Ok(f) => f,
+ Err(err) => {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure to open AP config file {}: {:?}",
+ fname, err
+ ))
+ }
+ };
+ match serde_yaml::from_reader(file) {
+ Ok(cfg) => Ok(cfg),
+ Err(err) => Err(format!(
+ "Failure parsing AP config file {}: {:?}",
+ fname, err
+ )),
+ }
+ }
+
+ fn validate(config: &mut [ApConfigEntry]) -> Result<(), String> {
+ for (i, entry) in config.iter_mut().enumerate() {
+ let ename = if !entry.name.trim().is_empty() {
+ format!("AP config entry {} '{}'", i, entry.name.trim())
+ } else {
+ format!("AP config entry {}", i)
+ };
+ if let Err(err) = &entry.validate() {
+ return Err(format!("{}: {}", ename, err));
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+
+ /// Read in and validate the yaml configuration from a file.
+ /// Returns a Result with Ok(ApConfigList) on success
+ /// or an Err(errorstring) on failure.
+ pub fn read_and_validate_yaml_file(fname: &str) -> Result<ApConfigList, String> {
+ let mut apconfig = ApConfigList::read_yaml_file(fname)?;
+ ApConfigList::validate(&mut apconfig)?;
+ Ok(ApConfigList(apconfig))
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+ use super::*;
+ use std::env;
+ use std::fs;
+ use std::io::Write;
+
+ const GOOD_CONFIGS: [&str; 8] = [
+ "# good test 1
+- name: my Accelerator
+ mode: AcCel
+ mingen: Cex7\n",
+ "# good test 2
+- name: my Accelerator 2
+ description: Accelerator entry with description
+ mode: Accel\n",
+ "# good test 3
+- name: my EP11 APQN 1
+ mode: Ep11
+ mkvp: 0xDB3C3B3C3F097DD55EC7EB0E7FDBCB93
+ serialnr: 93AADFK719460083
+ secretid: 0xBC9d46c052BC3574454C5715757274629a283767ed237922cfb8651c0e77320A\n",
+ "# good test 4
+- name: my EP11 APQN 2
+ mode: EP11
+ mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+ serialnr: 93aaDHzu42082261
+ secretid: 0x2ca853f959fc5ce5f1888cb48dae39514a27bb66520ac85f6073a7f678d262c0\n",
+ "# good test 5
+- name: my EP11 APQN 3
+ mode: EP11
+ mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93db3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+ serialnr: 93aaDHzu42082261
+ secretid: 0xd146c9ae77cdff25fa87a5b3487587dc29a4e391b315c98570e8fa2e2ec91454\n",
+ "# no name but secretid given
+- mode: EP11
+ mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+ secretid: 0x0767668dd22f23fa675c4641e04bb4e991f443be4df13ce3896b8eeca59fcc10\n",
+ "# no secretid but name given
+- mode: EP11
+ name: My-EP11-AP-config
+ mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93\n",
+ "# secretid and name given
+- mode: EP11
+ name: My-EP11-AP-config
+ mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+ secretid: 0x0767668dd22f23fa675c4641e04bb4e991f443be4df13ce3896b8eeca59fcc10\n",
+ ];
+
+ const BAD_CONFIGS: [&str; 12] = [
+ "# mode missing
+- name: bad test 1
+ mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+ secretid: 0x0767668dd22f23fa675c4641e04bb4e991f443be4df13ce3896b8eeca59fcc10\n",
+ "# invalid mode
+- name: bad test 2
+ mode: CCA
+ mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93
+ secretid: 0x0767668dd22f23fa675c4641e04bb4e991f443be4df13ce3896b8eeca59fcc10\n",
+ "# Accelerator with wrong CEX3
+- name: bad test 3
+ mode: Accel
+ mingen: Cex3\n",
+ "# Accelerator with wrong CEX9
+- name: bad test 4
+ mode: Accel
+ mingen: CEX9\n",
+ "# EP11 with mkvp missing
+- name: bad test 5
+ mode: EP11
+ serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+ "# EP11 with non hex mkvp
+- name: bad test 6
+ mode: EP11
+ mkvp: 0xabcdefghijklmnopqqponmlkjihgfedcba
+ serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+ "# EP11 with mkvp too big
+- name: bad test 7
+ mode: EP11
+ mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93aa
+ serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+ "# EP11 with mkvp too small
+- name: bad test 8
+ mode: EP11
+ mkvp: 0xdb3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb
+ serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+ "# EP11 with invalid CEXx
+- name: bad test 9
+ mode: EP11
+ mingen: CEX7
+ mkvp: 0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
+ serialnr: 93AADHZU42082261\n",
+ "# EP11 with invalid Serialnr
+- name: bad test 10
+ mode: EP11
+ mkvp: 0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
+ serialnr: 93AADHZU4208226\n",
+ "# EP11 with invalid Serialnr
+- name: bad test 11
+ mode: EP11
+ mkvp: 0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
+ serialnr: 93AAD ZU42082261\n",
+ "# EP11 with sha256(name) != secretid
+- name: bad test 12
+ mode: EP11
+ mkvp: 0x00112233445566778899aabbccddeeff
+ serialnr: AABBCCDDEEFFGGHH
+ secretid: 0x2ca853f959fc5ce5f1888cb48dae39514a27bb66520ac85f6073a7f678d262c0\n",
+ ];
+
+ const BAD_DESERIALIZE: [&str; 2] = [
+ "/*\ntotal nonsense\n */\n",
+ "# wrong/unknown field
+- name: de-serialize failure 1
+ type: EP11\n",
+ ];
+
+ fn write_yaml_config_to_temp_file(content: &str) -> Result<String, String> {
+ let dir = env::temp_dir();
+ let rnd = rand::random::<u32>();
+ let fname = format!("{}/config-test-{}.yaml", dir.to_str().unwrap(), rnd);
+ let mut f = match File::create(&fname) {
+ Ok(f) => f,
+ Err(_) => return Err(format!("Failure creating temp file '{fname}'.")),
+ };
+ match f.write_all(content.as_bytes()) {
+ Ok(_) => Ok(fname),
+ Err(_) => {
+ fs::remove_file(&fname).ok();
+ Err(format!("Failure writing to temp file '{fname}'."))
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_good_yaml() {
+ for yaml in GOOD_CONFIGS {
+ let f = write_yaml_config_to_temp_file(yaml).unwrap();
+ let config = ApConfigList::read_and_validate_yaml_file(&f).unwrap();
+ assert!(config.len() > 0);
+ fs::remove_file(&f).ok();
+ }
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_bad_yaml() {
+ for yaml in BAD_CONFIGS {
+ let f = write_yaml_config_to_temp_file(yaml).unwrap();
+ let r = ApConfigList::read_and_validate_yaml_file(&f);
+ assert!(r.is_err());
+ fs::remove_file(&f).ok();
+ }
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_invalid_deserizalize() {
+ for yaml in BAD_DESERIALIZE {
+ let f = write_yaml_config_to_temp_file(yaml).unwrap();
+ let r = ApConfigList::read_and_validate_yaml_file(&f);
+ assert!(r.is_err());
+ fs::remove_file(&f).ok();
+ }
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_sha256() {
+ assert!(
+ crate::helper::u8_to_hexstring(&sha256("Hello".as_bytes()))
+ == "185f8db32271fe25f561a6fc938b2e264306ec304eda518007d1764826381969"
+ );
+ assert!(
+ crate::helper::u8_to_hexstring(&sha256("SECRET1".as_bytes()))
+ == "03153249db7ce46b0330ffb1a760b59710531af08ec4d7f8424a6870fae49360"
+ );
+ assert!(
+ crate::helper::u8_to_hexstring(&sha256("SECRET2".as_bytes()))
+ == "258499e710e0bd3bb878d6bac7e478b30f3f3e72566989f638c4143d14f6c0b6"
+ );
+ }
+}
diff --git a/rust/pvapconfig/src/helper.rs b/rust/pvapconfig/src/helper.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..c4670ce
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/pvapconfig/src/helper.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,272 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! Collection of helper functions for pvapconfig
+//
+
+use regex::Regex;
+use std::error::Error;
+use std::fs;
+use std::fs::{File, OpenOptions};
+use std::io::{Read, Write};
+use std::path::PathBuf;
+
+pub const PATH_PVAPCONFIG_LOCK: &str = "/run/lock/pvapconfig.lock";
+
+/// Convert u8 slice to (lowercase) hex string
+pub fn u8_to_hexstring(slice: &[u8]) -> String {
+ let s = String::with_capacity(2 * slice.len());
+ slice.iter().fold(s, |acc, e| acc + &format!("{e:02x}"))
+}
+
+/// Convert hexstring to u8 vector
+/// The hexstring may contain whitespaces which are ignored.
+/// If there are other characters in there or if the number
+/// of hex characters is uneven panic() is called.
+/// # Panics
+/// Panics if the given string contains characters other than
+/// hex digits and whitespace. Panics if the number of hex digits
+/// is not even.
+#[cfg(test)] // currently only used in test code
+pub fn hexstring_to_u8(hex: &str) -> Vec<u8> {
+ let mut s = String::new();
+ for c in hex.chars() {
+ if c.is_ascii_hexdigit() {
+ s.push(c);
+ } else if c.is_whitespace() {
+ // ignore
+ } else {
+ panic!("Invalid character '{c}'");
+ }
+ }
+ if s.len() % 2 == 1 {
+ panic!("Uneven # of hex characters in '{s}'");
+ }
+ let mut hex_bytes = s.as_bytes().iter().map_while(|b| match b {
+ b'0'..=b'9' => Some(b - b'0'),
+ b'a'..=b'f' => Some(b - b'a' + 10),
+ b'A'..=b'F' => Some(b - b'A' + 10),
+ _ => None,
+ });
+ let mut bytes = Vec::with_capacity(s.len());
+ while let (Some(h), Some(l)) = (hex_bytes.next(), hex_bytes.next()) {
+ bytes.push(h << 4 | l)
+ }
+ bytes
+}
+
+/// Read sysfs file into string
+pub fn sysfs_read_string(fname: &str) -> Result<String, Box<dyn Error>> {
+ let mut file = File::open(fname)?;
+ let mut content = String::new();
+ file.read_to_string(&mut content)?;
+ let trimmed_content = String::from(content.trim());
+ Ok(trimmed_content)
+}
+
+/// Write string into sysfs file
+pub fn sysfs_write_string(fname: &str, value: &str) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error>> {
+ let mut file = OpenOptions::new().write(true).open(fname)?;
+ file.write_all(value.as_bytes())?;
+ Ok(())
+}
+
+/// Read sysfs file content and parse as i32 value
+pub fn sysfs_read_i32(fname: &str) -> Result<i32, Box<dyn Error>> {
+ let content = sysfs_read_string(fname)?;
+ Ok(content.parse::<i32>()?)
+}
+
+/// Write an i32 value into a sysfs file
+pub fn sysfs_write_i32(fname: &str, value: i32) -> Result<(), Box<dyn Error>> {
+ return sysfs_write_string(fname, &value.to_string());
+}
+
+/// For a given (sysfs) directory construct a list of all subdirs
+/// and give it back as a vector of strings. If there is no subdir,
+/// the vector is empty.
+pub fn sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs(dname: &str) -> Result<Vec<String>, Box<dyn Error>> {
+ let mut v: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+ let entries = fs::read_dir(dname)?;
+ for entry in entries.flatten() {
+ let file_type = match entry.file_type() {
+ Ok(ft) => ft,
+ _ => continue,
+ };
+ if !file_type.is_dir() {
+ continue;
+ }
+ let fname = match entry.file_name().into_string() {
+ Ok(s) => s,
+ _ => continue,
+ };
+ v.push(fname);
+ }
+ Ok(v)
+}
+
+/// For a given (sysfs) directory construct a list of all subdirs which
+/// match to the given regular expression and give the list back as a
+/// vector of strings. If there is no subdir, the vector is empty.
+pub fn sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex(
+ dname: &str,
+ regex: &str,
+) -> Result<Vec<String>, Box<dyn Error>> {
+ let mut v: Vec<String> = Vec::new();
+ let re = Regex::new(regex)?;
+ let entries = sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs(dname)?;
+ for entry in entries {
+ if re.is_match(&entry) {
+ v.push(entry);
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(v)
+}
+
+/// LockFile for inter-process locking
+///
+/// Simple class for process locking for pvapconfig.
+/// The lock concept is simple: The existence of a file is used as the
+/// locking indicator. If the file exists something is locked, if it does
+/// not exist something is not locked. In the lock file the PID of the
+/// process created the file ("owning this file") is written in.
+/// With the ProcessLock object leaving scope the associated lock file
+/// is automatically deleted. It is assumed that the creation of a file
+/// is an atomic operation - that's true for most filesystems but may
+/// cause problems with network based filesystems.
+/// Example:
+/// ```
+/// let lock = LockFile::lock("/var/lock/process.lock");
+/// assert!(lock.is_ok());
+/// let lock2 = LockFile::lock("/var/lock/process.lock");
+/// assert!(lock2.is_err());
+/// drop(lock);
+/// let lock3 = LockFile::lock("/var/lock/process.lock");
+/// assert!(lock3.is_ok());
+/// ```
+#[derive(Debug)]
+pub struct LockFile {
+ lockfile: PathBuf,
+}
+
+impl LockFile {
+ /// Try to establish the lock file.
+ /// Upon success the given file is fresh created and has the pid of this
+ /// process written in. The function returns a new LockFile object
+ /// which has implemented the Drop Trait. So with this object going out
+ /// of scope the lock file is deleted. If establishing the lock file
+ /// fails for any reason (for example the file already exists), the
+ /// function fails with returning an Error string. This function does
+ /// NOT panic if establishing the lock file fails for any reason. If
+ /// the lock file could be esablished but writing in the PID fails, a
+ /// warning is printed but the function continues with returning a
+ /// LockFile object.
+ pub fn try_lock(fname: &str) -> Result<Self, String> {
+ let lockfile = PathBuf::from(fname);
+ let mut file = match OpenOptions::new()
+ .write(true)
+ .create_new(true)
+ .open(&lockfile)
+ {
+ Err(err) => {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure trying to create lock file {fname}: {err:?}."
+ ))
+ }
+ Ok(f) => f,
+ };
+ let _ = file
+ .write(format!("{}", std::process::id()).as_bytes())
+ .map_err(|err| {
+ println!("Warning: could not write PID into lockfile {fname}: {err:?}.")
+ });
+ Ok(LockFile { lockfile })
+ }
+}
+
+impl Drop for LockFile {
+ fn drop(&mut self) {
+ let _ = fs::remove_file(&self.lockfile).map_err(|err| {
+ println!(
+ "Warning: could not remove lockfile {}: {err:?}.",
+ self.lockfile.display()
+ )
+ });
+ }
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+ use super::*;
+
+ // Only very simple tests
+
+ const TEST_BYTES: [u8; 8] = [0x01, 0x23, 0x45, 0x67, 0x89, 0xab, 0xcd, 0xef];
+ const TEST_HEXSTR: &str = "0123456789abcdef";
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_u8_to_hexstring() {
+ let str = u8_to_hexstring(&TEST_BYTES);
+ assert!(str == TEST_HEXSTR);
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_hexstring_to_u8() {
+ let bytes = hexstring_to_u8(TEST_HEXSTR);
+ assert!(bytes.as_slice() == TEST_BYTES);
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_sysfs_read_string() {
+ let r = sysfs_read_string("/proc/cpuinfo");
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_sysfs_read_i32() {
+ let r = sysfs_read_i32("/proc/sys/kernel/random/entropy_avail");
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs() {
+ let r = sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs("/proc/self");
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ let v = r.unwrap();
+ assert!(!v.is_empty());
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex() {
+ let r = sysfs_get_list_of_subdirs_matching_regex("/proc/self", "fd.*");
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ let v = r.unwrap();
+ assert!(!v.is_empty());
+ for e in v {
+ assert!(e.strip_prefix("fd").is_some());
+ }
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_sysfs_write_i32() {
+ const TEST_PATH: &str = "/tmp/test_sysfs_write_i32";
+ let mut file = File::create(TEST_PATH).unwrap();
+ let _ = file.write_all(b"XYZ");
+ drop(file);
+ let r = sysfs_read_i32(TEST_PATH);
+ assert!(r.is_err());
+ let r = sysfs_write_i32(TEST_PATH, 999);
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ let r = sysfs_read_i32(TEST_PATH);
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ let v = r.unwrap();
+ assert!(v == 999);
+ let _ = fs::remove_file(TEST_PATH);
+ }
+ #[test]
+ fn test_lockfile() {
+ let r1 = LockFile::try_lock(PATH_PVAPCONFIG_LOCK);
+ assert!(r1.is_ok());
+ let r2 = LockFile::try_lock(PATH_PVAPCONFIG_LOCK);
+ assert!(r2.is_err());
+ drop(r1);
+ let r3 = LockFile::try_lock(PATH_PVAPCONFIG_LOCK);
+ assert!(r3.is_ok());
+ }
+}
diff --git a/rust/pvapconfig/src/main.rs b/rust/pvapconfig/src/main.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..07899cd
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/pvapconfig/src/main.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,668 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! pvapconfig - Tool to automatically set up the AP configuration
+//! within an IBM Secure Execution guest.
+//
+
+mod ap;
+mod cli;
+mod config;
+mod helper;
+mod uv;
+
+use ap::{Apqn, ApqnList};
+use cli::ARGS;
+use config::{ApConfigEntry, ApConfigList};
+use helper::{LockFile, PATH_PVAPCONFIG_LOCK};
+use pv::uv::{ListableSecretType, SecretList};
+use std::process::ExitCode;
+use utils::release_string;
+
+/// Simple macro for
+/// if Cli::verbose() {
+/// print!(...);
+/// }
+macro_rules! info {
+ ($($arg:tt)*) => {{
+ if ARGS.verbose() {
+ print!($($arg)*);
+ }
+ }};
+}
+
+/// Simple macro for the main function only
+/// Does a eprintln of the arguments and then
+/// return with exit failure.
+macro_rules! println_and_exit_failure {
+ ($($arg:tt)*) => {{
+ eprintln!($($arg)*);
+ return ExitCode::FAILURE;
+ }};
+}
+
+/// Simple macro for the main function only
+/// Check if given object has is_err() true and
+/// then eprintln the unwrapped error and
+/// returns with exit failure.
+macro_rules! on_error_print_and_exit {
+ ($r:expr) => {
+ if $r.is_err() {
+ eprintln!("{}", $r.unwrap_err());
+ return ExitCode::FAILURE;
+ }
+ };
+}
+
+fn main() -> ExitCode {
+ // handle version option
+ if cli::ARGS.version {
+ println!(
+ "{} version {}\nCopyright IBM Corp. 2023",
+ env!("CARGO_PKG_NAME"),
+ release_string!()
+ );
+ return ExitCode::SUCCESS;
+ }
+
+ // make sure only one pvapconfig instance is running
+ let r = LockFile::try_lock(PATH_PVAPCONFIG_LOCK);
+ on_error_print_and_exit!(r);
+ let _lockfile = r.unwrap();
+
+ // AP bus check
+ info!("Checking AP bus support and facilities...\n");
+ let r = ap::check_ap_bus_support();
+ on_error_print_and_exit!(r);
+ let r = ap::ap_bus_has_apsb_support();
+ on_error_print_and_exit!(r);
+ info!("AP bus support and facilities are ok.\n");
+
+ // UV check
+ info!("Checking UV support and environment...\n");
+ if !pv::misc::pv_guest_bit_set() {
+ println_and_exit_failure!("Failure: this is not a SE guest.");
+ }
+ let r = uv::has_list_secrets_facility();
+ on_error_print_and_exit!(r);
+ info!("UV support and environment is ok.\n");
+
+ // read configuration
+ let configfile: &str = match &cli::ARGS.config {
+ Some(f) => f,
+ _ => cli::PATH_DEFAULT_CONFIG_FILE,
+ };
+ info!(
+ "Reading AP configuration entries from file '{}'...\n",
+ configfile
+ );
+ let apconfig: ApConfigList = match ApConfigList::read_and_validate_yaml_file(configfile) {
+ Ok(apcfg) => apcfg,
+ Err(err) => println_and_exit_failure!("{}", err),
+ };
+ if apconfig.is_empty() {
+ println!(
+ "No AP configuration entries in config file '{}': Nothing to do.",
+ configfile
+ );
+ return ExitCode::SUCCESS;
+ }
+ info!("Found {} AP configuration entries.\n", apconfig.len());
+
+ // get list of secrets from UV
+ info!("Fetching list of secrets from UV...\n");
+ let secrets: SecretList = match uv::gather_secrets() {
+ Err(e) => println_and_exit_failure!("{}", e),
+ Ok(los) => los,
+ };
+ info!("Fetched {} Secret entries from UV.\n", secrets.len());
+
+ // Warning if no UV secrets given but AP config entries require it
+ let non_accel_apc = apconfig
+ .iter()
+ .filter(|apc| apc.mode != config::STR_MODE_ACCEL)
+ .count();
+ if non_accel_apc > 0 && secrets.is_empty() {
+ println!(
+ "Warning: No UV Secrets given but at least one AP config entry requires a Secret."
+ );
+ }
+
+ info!("Waiting for AP bus bindings complete...\n");
+ if !ap::wait_for_ap_bus_bindings_complete() {
+ return ExitCode::FAILURE;
+ }
+ info!("Fetching list of available APQNs...\n");
+ let mut apqns: ApqnList = match ApqnList::gather_apqns() {
+ Some(l) => l,
+ None => return ExitCode::FAILURE,
+ };
+ if apqns.is_empty() {
+ info!("List of available APQNs is empty: So there's nothing to do.\n");
+ return ExitCode::SUCCESS;
+ }
+ info!("Found {} APQNs.\n", apqns.len());
+ // check MK restriction
+ if !apqns.check_mk_restriction() {
+ return ExitCode::FAILURE;
+ }
+
+ // now the real work
+ info!("Applying AP configuration...\n");
+ let n = match do_ap_config(&mut apqns, &secrets, &apconfig, false) {
+ Err(e) => println_and_exit_failure!("{}", e),
+ Ok(n) => n,
+ };
+
+ if n == 0 {
+ println_and_exit_failure!(
+ "None out of {} AP config entries could be applied.",
+ apconfig.len()
+ );
+ } else if ARGS.strict() && n != apconfig.len() {
+ println_and_exit_failure!(
+ "Strict flag given and only {} out of {} AP config entries have been applied.",
+ n,
+ apconfig.len()
+ );
+ }
+
+ info!(
+ "Successfully applied {} out of {} AP config entries.\n",
+ n,
+ apconfig.len()
+ );
+
+ ExitCode::SUCCESS
+}
+
+/// The real worker function
+///
+/// This is the real algorithm which is trying to apply the
+/// AP configuration read from the config file to the existing
+/// APQNs with the info from the list of secrets from the UV.
+/// Returns the nr of AP config entries which are fullfilled
+/// after the function ended.
+/// apqns needs to be mutable as the function does a resort
+/// but content stays the same.
+fn do_ap_config(
+ apqns: &mut ApqnList,
+ secrets: &SecretList,
+ apconfig: &ApConfigList,
+ fntest: bool,
+) -> Result<usize, String> {
+ let mut resolved_entries = 0;
+ let mut apconfig_done = vec![false; apconfig.len()];
+ let mut apqn_done = vec![false; apqns.len()];
+
+ // Preparation: Sort APQNs by generation.
+ // All the following steps iterate through the list
+ // of APQNs. So by sorting the APQNs starting with
+ // highest card generation down to the older card
+ // generations we prefer newer card generations over
+ // older card generations.
+ apqns.sort_by_gen();
+
+ // Step 1:
+ // Go through all AP config entries and try to find an APQN
+ // which already matches to this entry. If such an APQN is
+ // found mark the AP config entry as done, and mark the APQN
+ // as used so that entry and APQN will get skipped over in
+ // the next steps.
+
+ for (ci, apc) in apconfig.iter().enumerate() {
+ let cistr = if !apc.name.is_empty() {
+ format!("#{} '{}'", ci + 1, apc.name)
+ } else {
+ format!("#{}", ci + 1)
+ };
+ for (ai, apqn) in apqns.iter().enumerate() {
+ if apqn_done[ai] {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if !config_and_apqn_match(apc, apqn) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if fntest {
+ continue;
+ }
+ match apqn.mode {
+ ap::ApqnMode::Accel => {
+ // check bind state of this APQN
+ let bind_state_ok = match apqn.bind_state() {
+ Err(err) => {
+ eprintln!("Warning: Failure reading APQN {apqn} bind state: {err}");
+ false
+ }
+ Ok(ap::BindState::Bound) => true,
+ Ok(_) => false,
+ };
+ if !bind_state_ok {
+ continue;
+ }
+ // This APQN matches to the current AP config entry and is already bound.
+ // So this AP config entry is satisfied: mark this config enty as done
+ // and mark this APQN as used.
+ info!("Accelerator APQN {apqn} already satisfies AP config entry {cistr}.\n");
+ apconfig_done[ci] = true;
+ apqn_done[ai] = true;
+ resolved_entries += 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ap::ApqnMode::Ep11 => {
+ // check association state of this APQN
+ let (assoc_state_ok, assoc_idx) = match apqn.associate_state() {
+ Err(err) => {
+ eprintln!(
+ "Warning: Failure reading APQN {apqn} associate state: {err}"
+ );
+ (false, 0)
+ }
+ Ok(ap::AssocState::Associated(idx)) => (true, idx),
+ Ok(_) => (false, 0),
+ };
+ if !assoc_state_ok {
+ continue;
+ }
+ // check association index
+ let r = secrets.iter().find(|&se| {
+ se.stype() == ListableSecretType::Association
+ && se.id().len() == uv::AP_ASSOC_SECRET_ID_SIZE
+ && se.index() == assoc_idx
+ && helper::u8_to_hexstring(se.id()) == apc.secretid
+ });
+ if r.is_none() {
+ continue;
+ }
+ // This APQN matches to the current AP config entry and is already
+ // associated with the right secret id. So this AP config entry is
+ // satisfied: mark this config enty as done and mark this APQN as used.
+ info!("EP11 APQN {apqn} already satisfies AP config entry {cistr}.\n");
+ apconfig_done[ci] = true;
+ apqn_done[ai] = true;
+ resolved_entries += 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ _ => {
+ // (currently) unknown/unsupported APQN mode
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Step 2:
+ // All APQNs NOT marked as done are now examined for their bind
+ // and association state and maybe reset to "unbound".
+
+ for (ai, apqn) in apqns.iter().enumerate() {
+ if apqn_done[ai] || fntest {
+ continue;
+ }
+ match apqn.bind_state() {
+ Err(err) => eprintln!("Warning: Failure reading APQN {apqn} bind state: {err}"),
+ Ok(ap::BindState::Bound) => {
+ info!("Unbind APQN {apqn} as this bind/associate does not match to any AP config entry.\n");
+ if !ARGS.dryrun() {
+ if let Err(err) = apqn.set_bind_state(ap::BindState::Unbound) {
+ return Err(format!("Failure unbinding APQN {apqn}: {err}"));
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Ok(_) => {}
+ };
+ }
+
+ // Step 3:
+ // Go through all remaining AP config entries and try to fullfill each
+ // by searching for an APQN which would match to this config entry and
+ // then prepare this APQN (bind, maybe associate).
+ for (ci, apc) in apconfig.iter().enumerate() {
+ let cistr = if !apc.name.is_empty() {
+ format!("#{} '{}'", ci + 1, apc.name)
+ } else {
+ format!("#{}", ci + 1)
+ };
+ if apconfig_done[ci] {
+ continue;
+ }
+ for (ai, apqn) in apqns.iter().enumerate() {
+ if apqn_done[ai] {
+ continue;
+ }
+ if !config_and_apqn_match(apc, apqn) {
+ continue;
+ }
+ match apqn.mode {
+ ap::ApqnMode::Accel => {
+ // try to bind this accelerator APQN
+ if ARGS.verbose() || fntest {
+ println!("Bind APQN {apqn} to match to AP config entry {cistr}.");
+ }
+ if !(ARGS.dryrun() || fntest) {
+ if let Err(err) = apqn.set_bind_state(ap::BindState::Bound) {
+ // bind failed, unbind/reset this apqn, return with failure
+ let _ = apqn.set_bind_state(ap::BindState::Unbound);
+ return Err(format!("Failure binding APQN {apqn}: {err}"));
+ }
+ }
+ apconfig_done[ci] = true;
+ apqn_done[ai] = true;
+ resolved_entries += 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ ap::ApqnMode::Ep11 => {
+ // EP11 needs bind and associate, but before doing this let's
+ // check out which secret index to use with the associate
+ let se = match secrets.iter().find(|&se| {
+ se.stype() == ListableSecretType::Association
+ && se.id().len() == uv::AP_ASSOC_SECRET_ID_SIZE
+ && helper::u8_to_hexstring(se.id()) == apc.secretid
+ }) {
+ None => {
+ eprintln!("Warning: Secret id '{}' from config entry {} not found in UV secrets list.",
+ apc.secretid, cistr);
+ break;
+ }
+ Some(se) => se,
+ };
+ // try to bind
+ if ARGS.verbose() || fntest {
+ println!(
+ "Bind APQN {apqn} to match to AP config entry {cistr} (step 1/2)."
+ );
+ }
+ if !(ARGS.dryrun() || fntest) {
+ if let Err(err) = apqn.set_bind_state(ap::BindState::Bound) {
+ // bind failed, unbind/reset this apqn, return with failure
+ let _ = apqn.set_bind_state(ap::BindState::Unbound);
+ return Err(format!("Failure binding APQN {}: {}", apqn, err));
+ }
+ }
+ // try to associate
+ if ARGS.verbose() || fntest {
+ println!(
+ "Associate APQN {} with uv secrets index {} to match AP config entry {} (step 2/2).",
+ apqn, se.index(), cistr
+ );
+ }
+ if !(ARGS.dryrun() || fntest) {
+ let apas = ap::AssocState::Associated(se.index());
+ apqn.set_associate_state(apas)
+ .map_err(|err| format!("Failure associating APQN {apqn}: {err}"))?;
+ }
+ apconfig_done[ci] = true;
+ apqn_done[ai] = true;
+ resolved_entries += 1;
+ break;
+ }
+ _ => {
+ // (currently) unknown/unsupported APQN mode
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ Ok(resolved_entries)
+}
+
+/// # Panics
+/// Panics if mingen for an accelerator has not a number as the 4th character.
+/// Panics if mingen for an ep11 has not a number as the 4th character.
+/// Please note this can not happen, as mingen is already checked via RE
+/// during storing the value into mingen.
+fn config_and_apqn_match(apc: &ApConfigEntry, apqn: &Apqn) -> bool {
+ if apc.mode == config::STR_MODE_ACCEL && apqn.mode == ap::ApqnMode::Accel {
+ // config and apqn are accelerators
+ // maybe check mingen
+ if !apc.mingen.is_empty() {
+ let mingen = &apc.mingen[3..].parse::<u32>().unwrap();
+ if mingen < &apqn.gen {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ return true;
+ } else if apc.mode == config::STR_MODE_EP11 && apqn.mode == ap::ApqnMode::Ep11 {
+ // config and apqn are ep11
+ let info = match &apqn.info {
+ Some(ap::ApqnInfo::Ep11(i)) => i,
+ _ => return false,
+ };
+ // maybe check mingen
+ if !apc.mingen.is_empty() {
+ let mingen = &apc.mingen[3..].parse::<u32>().unwrap();
+ if mingen < &apqn.gen {
+ return false;
+ }
+ }
+ // maybe check serialnr
+ if !apc.serialnr.is_empty() && apc.serialnr != info.serialnr {
+ return false;
+ }
+ // check mkvp, currently an ep11 config entry must state an mkvp value
+ // whereas an ep11 info from an APQN may have an empty mkvp value to
+ // indicate that there is no WK set on this APQN.
+ if apc.mkvp != info.mkvp {
+ return false;
+ }
+ return true;
+ }
+ false
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+ use super::*;
+ use helper::hexstring_to_u8;
+ use pv::uv::SecretEntry;
+
+ // This is more or less only a test for the do_ap_config() function
+ // However, this is THE main functionality of the whole application.
+
+ fn make_test_apqns() -> Vec<Apqn> {
+ let mut v = Vec::new();
+ v.push(ap::Apqn {
+ name: String::from("10.0007"),
+ card: 16,
+ domain: 7,
+ gen: 8,
+ mode: ap::ApqnMode::Accel,
+ info: Option::Some(ap::ApqnInfo::Accel(ap::ApqnInfoAccel {})),
+ });
+ v.push(ap::Apqn {
+ name: String::from("11.0008"),
+ card: 17,
+ domain: 8,
+ gen: 8,
+ mode: ap::ApqnMode::Ep11,
+ info: Option::Some(ap::ApqnInfo::Ep11(ap::ApqnInfoEp11 {
+ serialnr: String::from("93AADFK719460083"),
+ mkvp: String::from("db3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93"),
+ })),
+ });
+ v.push(ap::Apqn {
+ name: String::from("12.0009"),
+ card: 18,
+ domain: 9,
+ gen: 8,
+ mode: ap::ApqnMode::Ep11,
+ info: Option::Some(ap::ApqnInfo::Ep11(ap::ApqnInfoEp11 {
+ serialnr: String::from("93AADHZU42082261"),
+ mkvp: String::from("4a27bb66520ac85f6073a7f678d262c0"),
+ })),
+ });
+ v.push(ap::Apqn {
+ name: String::from("12.000a"),
+ card: 18,
+ domain: 10,
+ gen: 8,
+ mode: ap::ApqnMode::Ep11,
+ info: Option::Some(ap::ApqnInfo::Ep11(ap::ApqnInfoEp11 {
+ serialnr: String::from("93AADHZU42082261"),
+ mkvp: String::from("383d2a9ab781f35343554c5b3d9337cd"),
+ })),
+ });
+ v.push(ap::Apqn {
+ name: String::from("13.000d"),
+ card: 19,
+ domain: 13,
+ gen: 8,
+ mode: ap::ApqnMode::Ep11,
+ info: Option::Some(ap::ApqnInfo::Ep11(ap::ApqnInfoEp11 {
+ serialnr: String::from("87HU397G150TZGR"),
+ mkvp: String::new(),
+ })),
+ });
+ v.push(ap::Apqn {
+ name: String::from("13.000f"),
+ card: 19,
+ domain: 15,
+ gen: 8,
+ mode: ap::ApqnMode::Ep11,
+ info: Option::None,
+ });
+ return v;
+ }
+
+ fn make_assoc_secretentry(idx: u16, hexidstr: &str) -> SecretEntry {
+ let id = hexstring_to_u8(hexidstr);
+ let idlen: u32 = id.len().try_into().unwrap();
+ let idarray = <&[u8; 32]>::try_from(id.as_slice()).unwrap();
+ SecretEntry::new(idx, ListableSecretType::Association, *idarray, idlen)
+ }
+
+ fn make_test_secrets() -> Vec<SecretEntry> {
+ let mut v: Vec<SecretEntry> = Vec::new();
+ v.push(make_assoc_secretentry(
+ 33,
+ "3333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333333",
+ ));
+ v.push(make_assoc_secretentry(
+ 13,
+ "bc9d46c052bc3574454c5715757274629a283767ed237922cfb8651c0e77320a",
+ ));
+ v.push(make_assoc_secretentry(
+ 44,
+ "4444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444444",
+ ));
+ v.push(make_assoc_secretentry(
+ 15,
+ "06cdbbac76a595b481110d108154bc05ebbf900a0f16e36a24045998934fb1e9",
+ ));
+ v.push(make_assoc_secretentry(
+ 17,
+ "6831af07f8c8e7309a3ace9f3b5554d34e3eaa4a27a08fdee469e367c3fa3e9e",
+ ));
+ return v;
+ }
+
+ fn make_test_apconfigs() -> Vec<ApConfigEntry> {
+ let mut v: Vec<ApConfigEntry> = Vec::new();
+ v.push(config::ApConfigEntry {
+ name: String::from("test_1"),
+ description: String::from("test_1"),
+ mode: String::from("accel"),
+ mkvp: String::from(""),
+ serialnr: String::from(""),
+ mingen: String::from("cex8"),
+ secretid: String::from(""),
+ });
+ v.push(config::ApConfigEntry {
+ name: String::from("test_2"),
+ description: String::from("test_2"),
+ mode: String::from("ep11"),
+ mkvp: String::from("db3c3b3c3f097dd55ec7eb0e7fdbcb93"),
+ serialnr: String::from("93AADFK719460083"),
+ mingen: String::from("cex8"),
+ secretid: String::from(
+ "bc9d46c052bc3574454c5715757274629a283767ed237922cfb8651c0e77320a",
+ ),
+ });
+ v.push(config::ApConfigEntry {
+ name: String::from("test_3"),
+ description: String::from("test_3"),
+ mode: String::from("ep11"),
+ mkvp: String::from("4a27bb66520ac85f6073a7f678d262c0"),
+ serialnr: String::from(""),
+ mingen: String::from("cex8"),
+ secretid: String::from(
+ "06cdbbac76a595b481110d108154bc05ebbf900a0f16e36a24045998934fb1e9",
+ ),
+ });
+ v.push(config::ApConfigEntry {
+ name: String::from("test_4"),
+ description: String::from("test_4"),
+ mode: String::from("ep11"),
+ mkvp: String::from("8be1eaf5c44e2fa8b18804551b604b1b"),
+ serialnr: String::from(""),
+ mingen: String::from("cex8"),
+ secretid: String::from(
+ "6831af07f8c8e7309a3ace9f3b5554d34e3eaa4a27a08fdee469e367c3fa3e9e",
+ ),
+ });
+ return v;
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_do_ap_config_invocation_1() {
+ let test_apqns = make_test_apqns();
+ let mut apqns: Vec<Apqn> = Vec::new();
+ apqns.push(test_apqns[0].clone());
+ let secrets: Vec<SecretEntry> = Vec::new();
+ let secretlist = SecretList::new(secrets.len() as u16, secrets);
+ let test_apconfigs = make_test_apconfigs();
+ let mut apconfig: Vec<ApConfigEntry> = Vec::new();
+ apconfig.push(test_apconfigs[0].clone());
+ let apcfglist = ApConfigList::from_apconfigentry_vec(apconfig);
+ let mut apqnlist = ApqnList::from_apqn_vec(apqns);
+ let r = do_ap_config(&mut apqnlist, &secretlist, &apcfglist, true);
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ let n = r.unwrap();
+ assert!(n == 1);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_do_ap_config_invocation_2() {
+ let test_apqns = make_test_apqns();
+ let mut apqns: Vec<Apqn> = Vec::new();
+ apqns.push(test_apqns[1].clone());
+ let mut secrets = make_test_secrets();
+ while secrets.len() > 2 {
+ secrets.pop();
+ }
+ let secretlist = SecretList::new(secrets.len() as u16, secrets);
+ let test_apconfigs = make_test_apconfigs();
+ let mut apconfig: Vec<ApConfigEntry> = Vec::new();
+ apconfig.push(test_apconfigs[1].clone());
+ let apcfglist = ApConfigList::from_apconfigentry_vec(apconfig);
+ let mut apqnlist = ApqnList::from_apqn_vec(apqns);
+ let r = do_ap_config(&mut apqnlist, &secretlist, &apcfglist, true);
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ let n = r.unwrap();
+ assert!(n == 1);
+ }
+
+ #[test]
+ fn test_do_ap_config_invocation_3() {
+ let test_apqns = make_test_apqns();
+ let mut apqns: Vec<Apqn> = Vec::new();
+ for a in test_apqns.iter() {
+ apqns.push(a.clone());
+ }
+ apqns.reverse();
+ let secrets = make_test_secrets();
+ let secretlist = SecretList::new(secrets.len() as u16, secrets);
+ let test_apconfigs = make_test_apconfigs();
+ let mut apconfig: Vec<ApConfigEntry> = Vec::new();
+ for c in test_apconfigs.iter() {
+ apconfig.push(c.clone());
+ }
+ let apcfglist = ApConfigList::from_apconfigentry_vec(apconfig);
+ let mut apqnlist = ApqnList::from_apqn_vec(apqns);
+ let r = do_ap_config(&mut apqnlist, &secretlist, &apcfglist, true);
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ let n = r.unwrap();
+ assert!(n == 3, "n = {} != 3", n);
+ }
+}
diff --git a/rust/pvapconfig/src/uv.rs b/rust/pvapconfig/src/uv.rs
new file mode 100644
index 0000000..2f98bd5
--- /dev/null
+++ b/rust/pvapconfig/src/uv.rs
@@ -0,0 +1,105 @@
+// SPDX-License-Identifier: MIT
+//
+// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
+//
+//! UV related functions for pvapconfig
+//
+
+use pv::uv::{ListCmd, SecretList, UvDevice, UvcSuccess};
+use regex::Regex;
+use std::path::Path;
+
+/// The byte size of association secret of type 2 in struct SecretEntry
+pub const AP_ASSOC_SECRET_ID_SIZE: usize = 32;
+
+const PATH_SYS_FW_UV_FACILITIES: &str = "/sys/firmware/uv/query/facilities";
+
+const RE_UV_FACILITIES: &str = r"^(0x)?([[:xdigit:]]+)";
+const RE_UV_FAC_BIT_LIST_SECRETS: u32 = 30;
+
+/// Check UV facilities to offer the 'list secrets' call.
+/// Returns a Result with Ok(()) if the 'list secrets' feature
+/// is available, otherwise an Err(reasonstring) is returned where
+/// the string denotes a hint which can be displayed.
+/// # Panics
+/// Panics if the compilation of a static regular expression fails.
+/// Panics if RE_UV_FACILITIES does not match.
+pub fn has_list_secrets_facility() -> Result<(), String> {
+ if !Path::new(PATH_SYS_FW_UV_FACILITIES).is_file() {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "UV facilities sysfs attribute not found (file {} does not exist).",
+ PATH_SYS_FW_UV_FACILITIES
+ ));
+ }
+ let facstr = match crate::helper::sysfs_read_string(PATH_SYS_FW_UV_FACILITIES) {
+ Ok(s) => s,
+ Err(err) => {
+ return Err(format!(
+ "Failure reading UV facilities from {PATH_SYS_FW_UV_FACILITIES} ({:?}).",
+ err
+ ))
+ }
+ };
+ let re_uv_facilities = Regex::new(RE_UV_FACILITIES).unwrap();
+ if !re_uv_facilities.is_match(&facstr) {
+ Err(format!("Failure parsing UV facilities entry '{facstr}'."))
+ } else {
+ let caps = re_uv_facilities.captures(&facstr).unwrap();
+ let fachex = caps.get(2).unwrap().as_str();
+ let i: usize = RE_UV_FAC_BIT_LIST_SECRETS as usize / 4;
+ if i >= fachex.len() {
+ return Err(format!("Failure parsing UV facilities entry '{fachex}'."));
+ }
+ let nibble = u32::from_str_radix(&fachex[i..i + 1], 16).unwrap();
+ const THEBIT: u32 = 1 << (3 - (RE_UV_FAC_BIT_LIST_SECRETS % 4));
+ if nibble & THEBIT == 0 {
+ return Err("The 'list secret' feature is missing on this UV.".to_string());
+ }
+ Ok(())
+ }
+}
+
+/// Fetch the list of secrets from the UV.
+/// Returns Err(errorstring) on error or
+/// Ok(SecretList) on success.
+/// The list may be empty if the UV doesn't have any secrets stored.
+pub fn gather_secrets() -> Result<SecretList, String> {
+ let uv = match UvDevice::open() {
+ Err(e) => return Err(format!("Failed to open UV device: {:?}.", e)),
+ Ok(u) => u,
+ };
+ let mut cmd = ListCmd::default();
+ match uv.send_cmd(&mut cmd).map_err(|e| format!("{e:?}"))? {
+ UvcSuccess::RC_SUCCESS => (),
+ UvcSuccess::RC_MORE_DATA => println!("Warning: There is more data available than expected"),
+ };
+ cmd.try_into().map_err(|e| format!("{e:?}"))
+}
+
+#[cfg(test)]
+mod tests {
+
+ use super::*;
+
+ // As the name says: check for list secrets feature bit in UV facilities.
+ #[test]
+ fn test_has_list_secrets_facility() {
+ let r = has_list_secrets_facility();
+ if pv::misc::pv_guest_bit_set() {
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ } else {
+ assert!(r.is_err());
+ }
+ }
+
+ // Simple invocation of the list_secrets function. Should not fail
+ #[test]
+ fn test_list_secrets() {
+ let r = gather_secrets();
+ if pv::misc::pv_guest_bit_set() {
+ assert!(r.is_ok());
+ } else {
+ assert!(r.is_err());
+ }
+ }
+}
--
- SE-tooling: New IBM host-key subject locality (RHEL-30398) - dbginfo.sh: missing data of new ROCE cards (RHEL-24110) - Resolves: RHEL-30398 RHEL-24110
2024-04-10 12:20:49 +00:00
2.44.0
From 6b69de3c519971a88c5953075586b322e1efdc3e Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Joern Siglen <siglen@de.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 25 Oct 2023 15:01:11 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 14/18] dbginfo.sh: enhance ethtool collection for ROCE
(RHEL-24110)
MIME-Version: 1.0
Content-Type: text/plain; charset=UTF-8
Content-Transfer-Encoding: 8bit
collect module-info for new ROCE cards via ethtool
Suggested-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Niklas Schnelle <schnelle@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Joern Siglen <siglen@de.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Jan Höppner <hoeppner@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit d9034b01f1ddc69850a554d0077db34573560569)
---
scripts/dbginfo.sh | 2 ++
1 file changed, 2 insertions(+)
diff --git a/scripts/dbginfo.sh b/scripts/dbginfo.sh
index 9226a8b..f70cf6e 100755
--- a/scripts/dbginfo.sh
+++ b/scripts/dbginfo.sh
@@ -954,6 +954,8 @@ collect_ethtool() {
"${OUTPUT_FILE_ETHTOOL}"
call_run_command "ethtool -T ${network_device}" \
"${OUTPUT_FILE_ETHTOOL}"
+ call_run_command "ethtool --module-info ${network_device}" \
+ "${OUTPUT_FILE_ETHTOOL}"
done
else
pr_skip "ethtool: no devices"
--
2.44.0
From 90943f11e0feef6bc6cde3bf0b80ad0a21c55d72 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: =?UTF-8?q?Dan=20Hor=C3=A1k?= <dan@danny.cz>
Date: Wed, 10 Apr 2024 11:27:58 +0200
Subject: [PATCH 15/18] rust/pv: Support `Armonk` in IBM signing key subject
(RHEL-30398)
New IBM signing keys will have Armonk as locality in the subject.
Ensure that CRLs with Poughkeepsie as issuer locality are still
discovered if they are signed with the signing keys private key.
Also, drop the check for issuer/subject comparison and only rely on
validity period and cryptographic signatures.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <schlameuss@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(backported from commit 1a3d0b74f7819f5e087e6ecbf3ec879a05a88bbc)
---
rust/pv/src/verify.rs | 58 ++++++++++++++++++++++------
rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs | 74 +++++++++++++-----------------------
rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs | 12 ------
3 files changed, 73 insertions(+), 71 deletions(-)
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/verify.rs b/rust/pv/src/verify.rs
index 54fe435..3482f8c 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/verify.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/verify.rs
@@ -3,10 +3,11 @@
// Copyright IBM Corp. 2023
use core::slice;
-use log::debug;
+use log::{debug, trace};
+use openssl::error::ErrorStack;
use openssl::stack::Stack;
use openssl::x509::store::X509Store;
-use openssl::x509::{CrlStatus, X509Ref, X509StoreContext, X509};
+use openssl::x509::{CrlStatus, X509NameRef, X509Ref, X509StoreContext, X509StoreContextRef, X509};
use openssl_extensions::crl::StackableX509Crl;
use openssl_extensions::crl::X509StoreContextExtension;
@@ -76,8 +77,8 @@ impl HkdVerifier for CertVerifier {
if verified_crls.is_empty() {
bail_hkd_verify!(NoCrl);
}
- for crl in &verified_crls {
- match crl.get_by_cert(&hkd.to_owned()) {
+ for crl in verified_crls {
+ match crl.get_by_serial(hkd.serial_number()) {
CrlStatus::NotRevoked => (),
_ => bail_hkd_verify!(HdkRevoked),
}
@@ -88,21 +89,54 @@ impl HkdVerifier for CertVerifier {
}
impl CertVerifier {
+ fn quirk_crls(
+ ctx: &mut X509StoreContextRef,
+ subject: &X509NameRef,
+ ) -> Result<Stack<StackableX509Crl>, ErrorStack> {
+ match ctx.crls(subject) {
+ Ok(ret) if !ret.is_empty() => return Ok(ret),
+ _ => (),
+ }
+
+ // Armonk/Poughkeepsie fixup
+ trace!("quirk_crls: Try Locality");
+ if let Some(locality_subject) = helper::armonk_locality_fixup(subject) {
+ match ctx.crls(&locality_subject) {
+ Ok(ret) if !ret.is_empty() => return Ok(ret),
+ _ => (),
+ }
+
+ // reorder
+ trace!("quirk_crls: Try Locality+Reorder");
+ if let Ok(locality_ordered_subject) = helper::reorder_x509_names(&locality_subject) {
+ match ctx.crls(&locality_ordered_subject) {
+ Ok(ret) if !ret.is_empty() => return Ok(ret),
+ _ => (),
+ }
+ }
+ }
+
+ // reorder unchanged loaciliy subject
+ trace!("quirk_crls: Try Reorder");
+ if let Ok(ordered_subject) = helper::reorder_x509_names(subject) {
+ match ctx.crls(&ordered_subject) {
+ Ok(ret) if !ret.is_empty() => return Ok(ret),
+ _ => (),
+ }
+ }
+ // nothing found, return empty stack
+ Stack::new()
+ }
+
///Download the CLRs that a HKD refers to.
pub fn hkd_crls(&self, hkd: &X509Ref) -> Result<Stack<StackableX509Crl>> {
let mut ctx = X509StoreContext::new()?;
// Unfortunately we cannot use a dedicated function here and have to use a closure (E0434)
// Otherwise, we cannot refer to self
+ // Search for local CRLs
let mut crls = ctx.init_opt(&self.store, None, None, |ctx| {
let subject = self.ibm_z_sign_key.subject_name();
- match ctx.crls(subject) {
- Ok(crls) => Ok(crls),
- _ => {
- // reorder the name and try again
- let broken_subj = helper::reorder_x509_names(subject)?;
- ctx.crls(&broken_subj).or_else(helper::stack_err_hlp)
- }
- }
+ Self::quirk_crls(ctx, subject)
})?;
if !self.offline {
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs b/rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs
index a2f313b..732baef 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/verify/helper.rs
@@ -14,7 +14,7 @@ use openssl::{
error::ErrorStack,
nid::Nid,
ssl::SslFiletype,
- stack::{Stack, Stackable},
+ stack::Stack,
x509::{
store::{File, X509Lookup, X509StoreBuilder, X509StoreBuilderRef, X509StoreRef},
verify::{X509VerifyFlags, X509VerifyParam},
@@ -27,6 +27,7 @@ use openssl_extensions::{
crl::X509StoreExtension,
};
use std::cmp::Ordering;
+use std::str::from_utf8;
use std::time::Duration;
use std::usize;
@@ -42,7 +43,6 @@ const SECURITY_CHAIN_MAX_LEN: c_int = 2;
/// verifies that the HKD
/// * has enough security bits
/// * is inside its validity period
-/// * issuer name is the subject name of the [`sign_key`]
/// * the Authority Key ID matches the Signing Key ID of the [`sign_key`]
pub fn verify_hkd_options(hkd: &X509Ref, sign_key: &X509Ref) -> Result<()> {
let hk_pkey = hkd.public_key()?;
@@ -56,9 +56,6 @@ pub fn verify_hkd_options(hkd: &X509Ref, sign_key: &X509Ref) -> Result<()> {
// verify that the hkd is still valid
check_validity_period(hkd.not_before(), hkd.not_after())?;
- // check if hkd.issuer_name == issuer.subject
- check_x509_name_equal(sign_key.subject_name(), hkd.issuer_name())?;
-
// verify that the AKID of the hkd matches the SKID of the issuer
if let Some(akid) = hkd.akid() {
if akid.check(sign_key) != AkidCheckResult::OK {
@@ -78,9 +75,6 @@ pub fn verify_crl(crl: &X509CrlRef, issuer: &X509Ref) -> Option<()> {
return None;
}
}
-
- check_x509_name_equal(crl.issuer_name(), issuer.subject_name()).ok()?;
-
match crl.verify(issuer.public_key().ok()?.as_ref()).ok()? {
true => Some(()),
false => None,
@@ -210,7 +204,8 @@ pub fn download_crls_into_store(store: &mut X509StoreBuilderRef, crts: &[X509])
//Asn1StringRef::as_slice aka ASN1_STRING_get0_data gives a string without \0 delimiter
const IBM_Z_COMMON_NAME: &[u8; 43usize] = b"International Business Machines Corporation";
const IBM_Z_COUNTRY_NAME: &[u8; 2usize] = b"US";
-const IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME: &[u8; 12usize] = b"Poughkeepsie";
+const IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE: &[u8; 12usize] = b"Poughkeepsie";
+const IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK: &[u8; 6usize] = b"Armonk";
const IBM_Z_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT_NAME_SUFFIX: &str = "Key Signing Service";
const IBM_Z_ORGANIZATION_NAME: &[u8; 43usize] = b"International Business Machines Corporation";
const IBM_Z_STATE: &[u8; 8usize] = b"New York";
@@ -229,7 +224,8 @@ fn is_ibm_signing_cert(cert: &X509) -> bool {
if subj.entries().count() != IMB_Z_ENTRY_COUNT
|| !name_data_eq(subj, Nid::COUNTRYNAME, IBM_Z_COUNTRY_NAME)
|| !name_data_eq(subj, Nid::STATEORPROVINCENAME, IBM_Z_STATE)
- || !name_data_eq(subj, Nid::LOCALITYNAME, IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME)
+ || !(name_data_eq(subj, Nid::LOCALITYNAME, IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE)
+ || name_data_eq(subj, Nid::LOCALITYNAME, IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK))
|| !name_data_eq(subj, Nid::ORGANIZATIONNAME, IBM_Z_ORGANIZATION_NAME)
|| !name_data_eq(subj, Nid::COMMONNAME, IBM_Z_COMMON_NAME)
{
@@ -370,23 +366,6 @@ fn check_validity_period(not_before: &Asn1TimeRef, not_after: &Asn1TimeRef) -> R
}
}
-fn check_x509_name_equal(lhs: &X509NameRef, rhs: &X509NameRef) -> Result<()> {
- if lhs.entries().count() != rhs.entries().count() {
- bail_hkd_verify!(IssuerMismatch);
- }
-
- for l in lhs.entries() {
- let ldata = l.data().as_slice();
-
- // search for the matching value in the rhs names
- // found none? -> names are not equal
- if !rhs.entries().any(|r| memeq(ldata, r.data().as_slice())) {
- bail_hkd_verify!(IssuerMismatch);
- }
- }
- Ok(())
-}
-
const NIDS_CORRECT_ORDER: [Nid; 6] = [
Nid::COUNTRYNAME,
Nid::ORGANIZATIONNAME,
@@ -409,13 +388,28 @@ pub fn reorder_x509_names(subject: &X509NameRef) -> std::result::Result<X509Name
Ok(correct_subj.build())
}
-pub fn stack_err_hlp<T: Stackable>(
- e: ErrorStack,
-) -> std::result::Result<Stack<T>, openssl::error::ErrorStack> {
- match e.errors().len() {
- 0 => Stack::<T>::new(),
- _ => Err(e),
+/**
+* Workaround for potential locality mismatches between CRLs and Certs
+* # Return
+* fixed subject or none if locality was not Armonk or any OpenSSL error
+*/
+pub fn armonk_locality_fixup(subject: &X509NameRef) -> Option<X509Name> {
+ if !name_data_eq(subject, Nid::LOCALITYNAME, IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK) {
+ return None;
}
+
+ let mut ret = X509Name::builder().ok()?;
+ for entry in subject.entries() {
+ match entry.object().nid() {
+ nid @ Nid::LOCALITYNAME => ret
+ .append_entry_by_nid(nid, from_utf8(IBM_Z_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE).ok()?)
+ .ok()?,
+ _ => {
+ ret.append_entry(entry).ok()?;
+ }
+ }
+ }
+ Some(ret.build())
}
#[cfg(test)]
@@ -453,20 +447,6 @@ mod test {
));
}
- #[test]
- fn x509_name_equal() {
- let sign_crt = load_gen_cert("ibm.crt");
- let hkd = load_gen_cert("host.crt");
- let other = load_gen_cert("inter_ca.crt");
-
- assert!(super::check_x509_name_equal(sign_crt.subject_name(), hkd.issuer_name()).is_ok(),);
-
- assert!(matches!(
- super::check_x509_name_equal(other.subject_name(), hkd.subject_name()),
- Err(Error::HkdVerify(IssuerMismatch))
- ));
- }
-
#[test]
fn is_ibm_z_sign_key() {
let ibm_crt = load_gen_cert("ibm.crt");
diff --git a/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs b/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs
index 5ca2e71..e4c60c5 100644
--- a/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs
+++ b/rust/pv/src/verify/test.rs
@@ -99,7 +99,6 @@ fn verify_online() {
let inter_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("inter_ca.crt");
let ibm_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm.crt");
let hkd_revoked = load_gen_cert("host_rev.crt");
- let hkd_inv = load_gen_cert("host_invalid_signing_key.crt");
let hkd_exp = load_gen_cert("host_crt_expired.crt");
let hkd = load_gen_cert("host.crt");
@@ -126,11 +125,6 @@ fn verify_online() {
Err(Error::HkdVerify(HdkRevoked))
));
- assert!(matches!(
- verifier.verify(&hkd_inv),
- Err(Error::HkdVerify(IssuerMismatch))
- ));
-
assert!(matches!(
verifier.verify(&hkd_exp),
Err(Error::HkdVerify(AfterValidity))
@@ -145,7 +139,6 @@ fn verify_offline() {
let ibm_crt = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm.crt");
let ibm_crl = get_cert_asset_path_string("ibm.crl");
let hkd_revoked = load_gen_cert("host_rev.crt");
- let hkd_inv = load_gen_cert("host_invalid_signing_key.crt");
let hkd_exp = load_gen_cert("host_crt_expired.crt");
let hkd = load_gen_cert("host.crt");
@@ -163,11 +156,6 @@ fn verify_offline() {
Err(Error::HkdVerify(HdkRevoked))
));
- assert!(matches!(
- verifier.verify(&hkd_inv),
- Err(Error::HkdVerify(IssuerMismatch))
- ));
-
assert!(matches!(
verifier.verify(&hkd_exp),
Err(Error::HkdVerify(AfterValidity))
--
2.44.0
From e1423607a66ee37f8ae581fbf5fa013f5ab80ae8 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Thu, 14 Mar 2024 16:05:09 +0000
Subject: [PATCH 16/18] genprotimg: support `Armonk` in IBM signing key subject
(RHEL-30398)
New IBM signing certificates will have 'Armonk' as locality in the
subject. Make sure that certificate revocations lists (CRL) with
'Poughkeepsie' as issuer locality are still considered as valid as long
as they are signed with the IBM signing keys private key. In addition,
drop the check for 'issuer(HKD) == subject(HKSK)' as it doesn't improve
security. While at it, remove now unused functions and fix a memory leak
of @akid in `check_crl_issuer`.
Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <schlameuss@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit d14e7593cc6380911ca42b09e11c53477ae13d5c)
---
genprotimg/src/include/pv_crypto_def.h | 3 +-
genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.c | 210 ++++++++++++-------------
genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.h | 1 +
3 files changed, 104 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-)
diff --git a/genprotimg/src/include/pv_crypto_def.h b/genprotimg/src/include/pv_crypto_def.h
index 3635433..49710dc 100644
--- a/genprotimg/src/include/pv_crypto_def.h
+++ b/genprotimg/src/include/pv_crypto_def.h
@@ -17,7 +17,8 @@
/* IBM signing key subject */
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_COMMON_NAME "International Business Machines Corporation"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_COUNTRY_NAME "US"
-#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME "Poughkeepsie"
+#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE "Poughkeepsie"
+#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK "Armonk"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_ORGANIZATIONONAL_UNIT_NAME_SUFFIX "Key Signing Service"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_ORGANIZATION_NAME "International Business Machines Corporation"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_STATE "New York"
diff --git a/genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.c b/genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.c
index e3bbf1b..86565b9 100644
--- a/genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.c
+++ b/genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.c
@@ -664,62 +664,9 @@ static gboolean x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(X509_NAME *name, gint nid,
return memcmp(data, y, data_len) == 0;
}
-static gboolean own_X509_NAME_ENTRY_equal(const X509_NAME_ENTRY *x,
- const X509_NAME_ENTRY *y)
-{
- const ASN1_OBJECT *x_obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(x);
- const ASN1_STRING *x_data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(x);
- const ASN1_OBJECT *y_obj = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_object(y);
- const ASN1_STRING *y_data = X509_NAME_ENTRY_get_data(y);
- gint x_len = ASN1_STRING_length(x_data);
- gint y_len = ASN1_STRING_length(y_data);
-
- if (x_len < 0 || x_len != y_len)
- return FALSE;
-
- /* ASN1_STRING_cmp(x_data, y_data) == 0 doesn't work because it also
- * compares the type, which is sometimes different.
- */
- return OBJ_cmp(x_obj, y_obj) == 0 &&
- memcmp(ASN1_STRING_get0_data(x_data),
- ASN1_STRING_get0_data(y_data),
- (unsigned long)x_len) == 0;
-}
-
-static gboolean own_X509_NAME_equal(const X509_NAME *x, const X509_NAME *y)
-{
- gint x_count = X509_NAME_entry_count(x);
- gint y_count = X509_NAME_entry_count(y);
-
- if (x != y && (!x || !y))
- return FALSE;
-
- if (x_count != y_count)
- return FALSE;
-
- for (gint i = 0; i < x_count; i++) {
- const X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry_i = X509_NAME_get_entry(x, i);
- gboolean entry_found = FALSE;
-
- for (gint j = 0; j < y_count; j++) {
- const X509_NAME_ENTRY *entry_j =
- X509_NAME_get_entry(y, j);
-
- if (own_X509_NAME_ENTRY_equal(entry_i, entry_j)) {
- entry_found = TRUE;
- break;
- }
- }
-
- if (!entry_found)
- return FALSE;
- }
- return TRUE;
-}
-
/* Checks whether the subject of @cert is a IBM signing key subject. For this we
* must check that the subject is equal to: 'C = US, ST = New York, L =
- * Poughkeepsie, O = International Business Machines Corporation, CN =
+ * Poughkeepsie or Armonk, O = International Business Machines Corporation, CN =
* International Business Machines Corporation' and the organization unit (OUT)
* must end with the suffix ' Key Signing Service'.
*/
@@ -743,8 +690,10 @@ static gboolean has_ibm_signing_subject(X509 *cert)
PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_STATE))
return FALSE;
- if (!x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(subject, NID_localityName,
- PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME))
+ if (!(x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(subject, NID_localityName,
+ PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE) ||
+ x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(subject, NID_localityName,
+ PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK)))
return FALSE;
if (!x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(subject, NID_organizationName,
@@ -806,6 +755,39 @@ static X509_NAME *x509_name_reorder_attributes(const X509_NAME *name, const gint
return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
}
+/** Replace locality 'Armonk' with 'Pougkeepsie'. If Armonk was not set return
+ * `NULL`.
+ */
+static X509_NAME *x509_armonk_locality_fixup(const X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ g_autoptr(X509_NAME) ret = NULL;
+ int pos;
+
+ /* Check if ``L=Armonk`` */
+ if (!x509_name_data_by_nid_equal((X509_NAME *)name, NID_localityName,
+ PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK))
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = X509_NAME_dup(name);
+ if (!ret)
+ g_abort();
+
+ pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(ret, NID_localityName, -1);
+ if (pos == -1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(X509_NAME_delete_entry(ret, pos));
+
+ /* Create a new name entry at the same position as before */
+ if (X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(
+ ret, NID_localityName, MBSTRING_UTF8,
+ (const unsigned char *)&PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE,
+ sizeof(PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE) - 1, pos, 0) != 1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+}
+
/* In RFC 5280 the attributes of a (subject/issuer) name is not mandatory
* ordered. The problem is that our certificates are not consistent in the order
* (see https://tools.ietf.org/html/rfc5280#section-4.1.2.4 for details).
@@ -828,24 +810,10 @@ X509_NAME *c2b_name(const X509_NAME *name)
return X509_NAME_dup((X509_NAME *)name);
}
-/* Verify that: subject(issuer) == issuer(crl) and SKID(issuer) == AKID(crl) */
+/* Verify that SKID(issuer) == AKID(crl) if available */
static gint check_crl_issuer(X509_CRL *crl, X509 *issuer, GError **err)
{
- const X509_NAME *crl_issuer = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
- const X509_NAME *issuer_subject = X509_get_subject_name(issuer);
- AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid = NULL;
-
- if (!own_X509_NAME_equal(issuer_subject, crl_issuer)) {
- g_autofree char *issuer_subject_str = X509_NAME_oneline(issuer_subject,
- NULL, 0);
- g_autofree char *crl_issuer_str = X509_NAME_oneline(crl_issuer, NULL, 0);
-
- g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR,
- PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_CRL_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH,
- _("issuer mismatch:\n%s\n%s"),
- issuer_subject_str, crl_issuer_str);
- return -1;
- }
+ g_autoptr(AUTHORITY_KEYID) akid = NULL;
/* If AKID(@crl) is specified it must match with SKID(@issuer) */
akid = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
@@ -881,7 +849,6 @@ gint check_crl_valid_for_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509 *cert,
return -1;
}
- /* check that the @crl issuer matches with the subject name of @cert*/
if (check_crl_issuer(crl, cert, err) < 0)
return -1;
@@ -910,6 +877,60 @@ gint check_crl_valid_for_cert(X509_CRL *crl, X509 *cert,
return 0;
}
+/* This function contains work-arounds for some known subject(CRT)<->issuer(CRL)
+ * issues.
+ */
+static STACK_OF_X509_CRL *quirk_X509_STORE_ctx_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ const X509_NAME *subject, GError **err)
+{
+ g_autoptr(X509_NAME) fixed_subject = NULL;
+ g_autoptr(STACK_OF_X509_CRL) ret = NULL;
+
+ ret = Pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, subject);
+ if (ret && sk_X509_CRL_num(ret) > 0)
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+
+ /* Workaround to fix the mismatch between issuer name of the * IBM
+ * signing CRLs and the IBM signing key subject name. Locality name has
+ * changed from Poughkeepsie to Armonk.
+ */
+ fixed_subject = x509_armonk_locality_fixup(subject);
+ /* Was the locality replaced? */
+ if (fixed_subject) {
+ X509_NAME *tmp;
+
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(ret);
+ ret = Pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, fixed_subject);
+ if (ret && sk_X509_CRL_num(ret) > 0)
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+
+ /* Workaround to fix the ordering mismatch between issuer name
+ * of the IBM signing CRLs and the IBM signing key subject name.
+ */
+ tmp = fixed_subject;
+ fixed_subject = c2b_name(fixed_subject);
+ X509_NAME_free(tmp);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(ret);
+ ret = Pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, fixed_subject);
+ if (ret && sk_X509_CRL_num(ret) > 0)
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+ X509_NAME_free(fixed_subject);
+ fixed_subject = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Workaround to fix the ordering mismatch between issuer name of the
+ * IBM signing CRLs and the IBM signing key subject name.
+ */
+ fixed_subject = c2b_name(subject);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(ret);
+ ret = Pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, fixed_subject);
+ if (ret && sk_X509_CRL_num(ret) > 0)
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+
+ g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_NO_CRL, _("no CRL found"));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/* Given a certificate @cert try to find valid revocation lists in @ctx. If no
* valid CRL was found NULL is returned.
*/
@@ -927,20 +948,9 @@ STACK_OF_X509_CRL *store_ctx_find_valid_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
return NULL;
}
- ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, subject);
- if (!ret) {
- /* Workaround to fix the mismatch between issuer name of the
- * IBM Z signing CRLs and the IBM Z signing key subject name.
- */
- g_autoptr(X509_NAME) broken_subject = c2b_name(subject);
-
- ret = X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, broken_subject);
- if (!ret) {
- g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_NO_CRL,
- _("no CRL found"));
- return NULL;
- }
- }
+ ret = quirk_X509_STORE_ctx_get1_crls(ctx, subject, err);
+ if (!ret)
+ return NULL;
/* Filter out non-valid CRLs for @cert */
for (gint i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(ret); i++) {
@@ -1328,32 +1338,14 @@ gint check_chain_parameters(const STACK_OF_X509 *chain,
/* It's almost the same as X509_check_issed from OpenSSL does except that we
* don't check the key usage of the potential issuer. This means we check:
- * 1. issuer_name(cert) == subject_name(issuer)
- * 2. Check whether the akid(cert) (if available) matches the issuer skid
- * 3. Check that the cert algrithm matches the subject algorithm
- * 4. Verify the signature of certificate @cert is using the public key of
+ * 1. Check whether the akid(cert) (if available) matches the issuer skid
+ * 2. Check that the cert algrithm matches the subject algorithm
+ * 3. Verify the signature of certificate @cert is using the public key of
* @issuer.
*/
static gint check_host_key_issued(X509 *cert, X509 *issuer, GError **err)
{
- const X509_NAME *issuer_subject = X509_get_subject_name(issuer);
- const X509_NAME *cert_issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
- AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid = NULL;
-
- /* We cannot use X509_NAME_cmp() because it considers the order of the
- * X509_NAME_Entries.
- */
- if (!own_X509_NAME_equal(issuer_subject, cert_issuer)) {
- g_autofree char *issuer_subject_str =
- X509_NAME_oneline(issuer_subject, NULL, 0);
- g_autofree char *cert_issuer_str =
- X509_NAME_oneline(cert_issuer, NULL, 0);
- g_set_error(err, PV_CRYPTO_ERROR,
- PV_CRYPTO_ERROR_CERT_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH,
- _("Subject issuer mismatch:\n'%s'\n'%s'"),
- issuer_subject_str, cert_issuer_str);
- return -1;
- }
+ g_autoptr(AUTHORITY_KEYID) akid = NULL;
akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
if (akid && X509_check_akid(issuer, akid) != X509_V_OK) {
diff --git a/genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.h b/genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.h
index fdf66de..e45e57d 100644
--- a/genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.h
+++ b/genprotimg/src/utils/crypto.h
@@ -75,6 +75,7 @@ void x509_pair_free(x509_pair *pair);
/* Register auto cleanup functions */
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(ASN1_INTEGER, ASN1_INTEGER_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(ASN1_OCTET_STRING, ASN1_OCTET_STRING_free)
+WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(AUTHORITY_KEYID, AUTHORITY_KEYID_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(BIGNUM, BN_free)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(BIO, BIO_free_all)
WRAPPED_G_DEFINE_AUTOPTR_CLEANUP_FUNC(BN_CTX, BN_CTX_free)
--
2.44.0
From 1605e9c0033e245f8a6690e2ce95a27e383722df Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Tue, 12 Mar 2024 10:14:43 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 17/18] libpv: Support `Armonk` in IBM signing key subject
(RHEL-30398)
New IBM signing keys will have Armonk as locality in the subject.
Ensure that CRLs with Poughkeepsie as issuer locality are still
discovered if they are signed with the signing keys private key.
Also, drop the check for issuer/subject comparison and only rely on
validity period and cryptographic signatures.
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Reviewed-by: Christoph Schlameuss <schlameuss@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit d7c95265cdb6217b0203efa5893c3a27838af63c)
---
include/libpv/cert.h | 3 +-
libpv/cert.c | 148 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++--------------
2 files changed, 102 insertions(+), 49 deletions(-)
diff --git a/include/libpv/cert.h b/include/libpv/cert.h
index bceb3c6..aebe33b 100644
--- a/include/libpv/cert.h
+++ b/include/libpv/cert.h
@@ -16,7 +16,8 @@
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_COMMON_NAME "International Business Machines Corporation"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_COUNTRY_NAME "US"
-#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME "Poughkeepsie"
+#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE "Poughkeepsie"
+#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK "Armonk"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_ORGANIZATIONAL_UNIT_NAME_SUFFIX "Key Signing Service"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_ORGANIZATION_NAME "International Business Machines Corporation"
#define PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_STATE "New York"
diff --git a/libpv/cert.c b/libpv/cert.c
index c8bb8cc..f4774fc 100644
--- a/libpv/cert.c
+++ b/libpv/cert.c
@@ -857,7 +857,7 @@ static gboolean x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(X509_NAME *name, int nid, const char
/* Checks whether the subject of @cert is a IBM signing key subject. For this we
* must check that the subject is equal to: 'C = US, ST = New York, L =
- * Poughkeepsie, O = International Business Machines Corporation, CN =
+ * Poughkeepsie or Armonk, O = International Business Machines Corporation, CN =
* International Business Machines Corporation' and the organization unit (OUT)
* must end with the suffix ' Key Signing Service'.
*/
@@ -879,7 +879,10 @@ static gboolean has_ibm_signing_subject(X509 *cert)
if (!x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(subject, NID_stateOrProvinceName, PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_STATE))
return FALSE;
- if (!x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(subject, NID_localityName, PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME))
+ if (!(x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(subject, NID_localityName,
+ PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE) ||
+ x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(subject, NID_localityName,
+ PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK)))
return FALSE;
if (!x509_name_data_by_nid_equal(subject, NID_organizationName,
@@ -1085,10 +1088,9 @@ static int check_signature_algo_match(const EVP_PKEY *pkey, const X509 *subject,
/* It's almost the same as X509_check_issed from OpenSSL does except that we
* don't check the key usage of the potential issuer. This means we check:
- * 1. issuer_name(cert) == subject_name(issuer)
- * 2. Check whether the akid(cert) (if available) matches the issuer skid
- * 3. Check that the cert algrithm matches the subject algorithm
- * 4. Verify the signature of certificate @cert is using the public key of
+ * 1. Check whether the akid(cert) (if available) matches the issuer skid
+ * 2. Check that the cert algrithm matches the subject algorithm
+ * 3. Verify the signature of certificate @cert is using the public key of
* @issuer.
*/
static int check_host_key_issued(X509 *cert, X509 *issuer, GError **error)
@@ -1097,19 +1099,6 @@ static int check_host_key_issued(X509 *cert, X509 *issuer, GError **error)
const X509_NAME *cert_issuer = X509_get_issuer_name(cert);
g_autoptr(AUTHORITY_KEYID) akid = NULL;
- /* We cannot use X509_NAME_cmp() because it considers the order of the
- * X509_NAME_Entries.
- */
- if (!own_X509_NAME_equal(issuer_subject, cert_issuer)) {
- g_autofree char *issuer_subject_str = pv_X509_NAME_oneline(issuer_subject);
- g_autofree char *cert_issuer_str = pv_X509_NAME_oneline(cert_issuer);
-
- g_set_error(error, PV_CERT_ERROR, PV_CERT_ERROR_CERT_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH,
- _("Subject issuer mismatch:\n'%s'\n'%s'"), issuer_subject_str,
- cert_issuer_str);
- return -1;
- }
-
akid = X509_get_ext_d2i(cert, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
if (akid && X509_check_akid(issuer, akid) != X509_V_OK) {
g_set_error(error, PV_CERT_ERROR, PV_CERT_ERROR_SKID_AKID_MISMATCH,
@@ -1286,21 +1275,10 @@ int pv_verify_cert(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert, GError **error)
return 0;
}
-/* Verify that: subject(issuer) == issuer(crl) and SKID(issuer) == AKID(crl) */
+/* Verify that SKID(issuer) == AKID(crl) */
static int check_crl_issuer(X509_CRL *crl, X509 *issuer, GError **error)
{
- const X509_NAME *crl_issuer = X509_CRL_get_issuer(crl);
- const X509_NAME *issuer_subject = X509_get_subject_name(issuer);
- AUTHORITY_KEYID *akid = NULL;
-
- if (!own_X509_NAME_equal(issuer_subject, crl_issuer)) {
- g_autofree char *issuer_subject_str = pv_X509_NAME_oneline(issuer_subject);
- g_autofree char *crl_issuer_str = pv_X509_NAME_oneline(crl_issuer);
-
- g_set_error(error, PV_CERT_ERROR, PV_CERT_ERROR_CRL_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH,
- _("issuer mismatch:\n%s\n%s"), issuer_subject_str, crl_issuer_str);
- return -1;
- }
+ g_autoptr(AUTHORITY_KEYID) akid = NULL;
/* If AKID(@crl) is specified it must match with SKID(@issuer) */
akid = X509_CRL_get_ext_d2i(crl, NID_authority_key_identifier, NULL, NULL);
@@ -1325,7 +1303,6 @@ int pv_verify_crl(X509_CRL *crl, X509 *cert, int verify_flags, GError **error)
return -1;
}
- /* check that the @crl issuer matches with the subject name of @cert*/
if (check_crl_issuer(crl, cert, error) < 0)
return -1;
@@ -1393,6 +1370,93 @@ int pv_check_chain_parameters(const STACK_OF_X509 *chain, GError **error)
return 0;
}
+/** Replace locality 'Armonk' with 'Pougkeepsie'. If Armonk was not set return
+ * `NULL`.
+ */
+static X509_NAME *x509_armonk_locality_fixup(const X509_NAME *name)
+{
+ g_autoptr(X509_NAME) ret = NULL;
+ int pos;
+
+ /* Check if ``L=Armonk`` */
+ if (!x509_name_data_by_nid_equal((X509_NAME *)name, NID_localityName,
+ PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_ARMONK))
+ return NULL;
+
+ ret = X509_NAME_dup(name);
+ if (!ret)
+ g_abort();
+
+ pos = X509_NAME_get_index_by_NID(ret, NID_localityName, -1);
+ if (pos == -1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ X509_NAME_ENTRY_free(X509_NAME_delete_entry(ret, pos));
+
+ /* Create a new name entry at the same position as before */
+ if (X509_NAME_add_entry_by_NID(
+ ret, NID_localityName, MBSTRING_UTF8,
+ (const unsigned char *)&PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE,
+ sizeof(PV_IBM_Z_SUBJECT_LOCALITY_NAME_POUGHKEEPSIE) - 1, pos, 0) != 1)
+ return NULL;
+
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+}
+
+/* This function contains work-arounds for some known subject(CRT)<->issuer(CRL)
+ * issues.
+ */
+static STACK_OF_X509_CRL *quirk_X509_STORE_ctx_get1_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx,
+ const X509_NAME *subject, GError **err)
+{
+ g_autoptr(X509_NAME) fixed_subject = NULL;
+ g_autoptr(STACK_OF_X509_CRL) ret = NULL;
+
+ ret = pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, subject);
+ if (ret && sk_X509_CRL_num(ret) > 0)
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+
+ /* Workaround to fix the mismatch between issuer name of the * IBM
+ * signing CRLs and the IBM signing key subject name. Locality name has
+ * changed from Poughkeepsie to Armonk.
+ */
+ fixed_subject = x509_armonk_locality_fixup(subject);
+ /* Was the locality replaced? */
+ if (fixed_subject) {
+ X509_NAME *tmp;
+
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(ret);
+ ret = pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, fixed_subject);
+ if (ret && sk_X509_CRL_num(ret) > 0)
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+
+ /* Workaround to fix the ordering mismatch between issuer name
+ * of the IBM signing CRLs and the IBM signing key subject name.
+ */
+ tmp = fixed_subject;
+ fixed_subject = pv_c2b_name(fixed_subject);
+ X509_NAME_free(tmp);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(ret);
+ ret = pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, fixed_subject);
+ if (ret && sk_X509_CRL_num(ret) > 0)
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+ X509_NAME_free(fixed_subject);
+ fixed_subject = NULL;
+ }
+
+ /* Workaround to fix the ordering mismatch between issuer name of the
+ * IBM signing CRLs and the IBM signing key subject name.
+ */
+ fixed_subject = pv_c2b_name(subject);
+ sk_X509_CRL_free(ret);
+ ret = pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, fixed_subject);
+ if (ret && sk_X509_CRL_num(ret) > 0)
+ return g_steal_pointer(&ret);
+
+ g_set_error(err, PV_CERT_ERROR, PV_CERT_ERROR_NO_CRL, _("no CRL found"));
+ return NULL;
+}
+
/* Given a certificate @cert try to find valid revocation lists in @ctx. If no
* valid CRL was found NULL is returned.
*/
@@ -1412,21 +1476,9 @@ STACK_OF_X509_CRL *pv_store_ctx_find_valid_crls(X509_STORE_CTX *ctx, X509 *cert,
return NULL;
}
- ret = pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, subject);
- if (!ret) {
- /* Workaround to fix the mismatch between issuer name of the
- * IBM Z signing CRLs and the IBM Z signing key subject name.
- */
- g_autoptr(X509_NAME) broken_subject = pv_c2b_name(subject);
-
- ret = pv_X509_STORE_CTX_get1_crls(ctx, broken_subject);
- if (!ret) {
- g_set_error(error, PV_CERT_ERROR, PV_CERT_ERROR_NO_CRL, _("no CRL found"));
- g_info("ERROR: %s", (*error)->message);
- return NULL;
- }
- }
-
+ ret = quirk_X509_STORE_ctx_get1_crls(ctx, subject, error);
+ if (!ret)
+ return NULL;
/* Filter out non-valid CRLs for @cert */
for (int i = 0; i < sk_X509_CRL_num(ret); i++) {
X509_CRL *crl = sk_X509_CRL_value(ret, i);
--
2.44.0
From 3bd5cce64692d4b630b313cf465a55595971bed4 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
From: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
Date: Wed, 20 Mar 2024 15:36:52 +0100
Subject: [PATCH 18/18] pvattest: Fix root-ca parsing (RHEL-30398)
The parser setup falsely set the argument type as filename array, but
code expected a single filename. Fixed by setting up the parser
correctly to expect a single file name.
Fixes: 3ab06d77fb1b ("pvattest: Create, perform, and verify attestation measurements")
Reviewed-by: Marc Hartmayer <mhartmay@linux.ibm.com>
Signed-off-by: Steffen Eiden <seiden@linux.ibm.com>
(cherry picked from commit 2b5e7b049123aff094c7de79ba57a5df09471b2e)
---
pvattest/src/argparse.c | 14 +++++++-------
1 file changed, 7 insertions(+), 7 deletions(-)
diff --git a/pvattest/src/argparse.c b/pvattest/src/argparse.c
index fe5662f..5924ddc 100644
--- a/pvattest/src/argparse.c
+++ b/pvattest/src/argparse.c
@@ -192,13 +192,13 @@ static gboolean hex_str_toull(const char *nptr, uint64_t *dst, GError **error)
}
/* NOTE REQUIRED */
-#define _entry_root_ca(__arg_data, __indent) \
- { \
- .long_name = "root-ca", .short_name = 0, .flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE, \
- .arg = G_OPTION_ARG_FILENAME_ARRAY, .arg_data = __arg_data, \
- .description = "Use FILE as the trusted root CA instead the\n" __indent \
- "root CAs that are installed on the system (optional).\n", \
- .arg_description = "FILE", \
+#define _entry_root_ca(__arg_data, __indent) \
+ { \
+ .long_name = "root-ca", .short_name = 0, .flags = G_OPTION_FLAG_NONE, \
+ .arg = G_OPTION_ARG_FILENAME, .arg_data = __arg_data, \
+ .description = "Use FILE as the trusted root CA instead the\n" __indent \
+ "root CAs that are installed on the system (optional).\n", \
+ .arg_description = "FILE", \
}
/* NOTE REQUIRED */
--
2.44.0
SE: Secure guest tool to bind and associate APQNs (RHEL-10575) Resolves: RHEL-10575
2024-01-22 10:19:37 +00:00
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