.gitignore

@@ -1 +1 @@
-SOURCES/runc-dc9208a.tar.gz
+SOURCES/runc-2abd837.tar.gz

.runc.metadata

@@ -1 +1 @@
-32859590dea35b77eed012c388d97fc12fdfdb93 SOURCES/runc-dc9208a.tar.gz
+cf7119a838db2963e7af6ecdba90a2cc95ec0d56 SOURCES/runc-2abd837.tar.gz

SOURCES/0001-Revert-Apply-cgroups-earlier.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,62 @@
+From dfb3496c174377b860b62872ce6af951364cc3ac Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Lokesh Mandvekar <lsm5@fedoraproject.org>
+Date: Tue, 12 Dec 2017 13:22:42 +0530
+Subject: [PATCH] Revert "Apply cgroups earlier"
+
+This reverts commit 7062c7556b71188abc18d7516441ff4b03fbc1fc.
+---
+ libcontainer/process_linux.go | 31 ++++++++++++++-----------------
+ 1 file changed, 14 insertions(+), 17 deletions(-)
+
+diff --git a/libcontainer/process_linux.go b/libcontainer/process_linux.go
+index 149b1126..b8a395af 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/process_linux.go
++++ b/libcontainer/process_linux.go
+@@ -272,6 +272,20 @@ func (p *initProcess) start() error {
+ 		p.process.ops = nil
+ 		return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "starting init process command")
+ 	}
++	if _, err := io.Copy(p.parentPipe, p.bootstrapData); err != nil {
++		return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "copying bootstrap data to pipe")
++	}
++	if err := p.execSetns(); err != nil {
++		return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "running exec setns process for init")
++	}
++	// Save the standard descriptor names before the container process
++	// can potentially move them (e.g., via dup2()).  If we don't do this now,
++	// we won't know at checkpoint time which file descriptor to look up.
++	fds, err := getPipeFds(p.pid())
++	if err != nil {
++		return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err, "getting pipe fds for pid %d", p.pid())
++	}
++	p.setExternalDescriptors(fds)
+ 	// Do this before syncing with child so that no children can escape the
+ 	// cgroup. We don't need to worry about not doing this and not being root
+ 	// because we'd be using the rootless cgroup manager in that case.
+@@ -292,23 +306,6 @@ func (p *initProcess) start() error {
+ 			}
+ 		}
+ 	}()
+-
+-	if _, err := io.Copy(p.parentPipe, p.bootstrapData); err != nil {
+-		return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "copying bootstrap data to pipe")
+-	}
+-
+-	if err := p.execSetns(); err != nil {
+-		return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "running exec setns process for init")
+-	}
+-
+-	// Save the standard descriptor names before the container process
+-	// can potentially move them (e.g., via dup2()).  If we don't do this now,
+-	// we won't know at checkpoint time which file descriptor to look up.
+-	fds, err := getPipeFds(p.pid())
+-	if err != nil {
+-		return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err, "getting pipe fds for pid %d", p.pid())
+-	}
+-	p.setExternalDescriptors(fds)
+ 	if err := p.createNetworkInterfaces(); err != nil {
+ 		return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "creating network interfaces")
+ 	}
+-- 
+2.14.3
+

SOURCES/0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b-runc.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,290 @@
+From bf6405284aa3870a39b402309003633a1c230ed9 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Date: Wed, 9 Jan 2019 13:40:01 +1100
+Subject: [PATCH 1/1] nsenter: clone /proc/self/exe to avoid exposing host
+ binary to container
+
+There are quite a few circumstances where /proc/self/exe pointing to a
+pretty important container binary is a _bad_ thing, so to avoid this we
+have to make a copy (preferably doing self-clean-up and not being
+writeable).
+
+As a hotfix we require memfd_create(2), but we can always extend this to
+use a scratch MNT_DETACH overlayfs or tmpfs. The main downside to this
+approach is no page-cache sharing for the runc binary (which overlayfs
+would give us) but this is far less complicated.
+
+This is only done during nsenter so that it happens transparently to the
+Go code, and any libcontainer users benefit from it. This also makes
+ExtraFiles and --preserve-fds handling trivial (because we don't need to
+worry about it).
+
+Fixes: CVE-2019-5736
+Co-developed-by: Christian Brauner <christian.brauner@ubuntu.com>
+Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <asarai@suse.de>
+Signed-off-by: Mrunal Patel <mrunalp@gmail.com>
+---
+ libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c | 221 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c        |  11 ++
+ 2 files changed, 232 insertions(+)
+ create mode 100644 libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+
+diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+new file mode 100644
+index 00000000..d9f6093a
+--- /dev/null
++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/cloned_binary.c
+@@ -0,0 +1,221 @@
++#define _GNU_SOURCE
++#include <unistd.h>
++#include <stdio.h>
++#include <stdlib.h>
++#include <stdbool.h>
++#include <string.h>
++#include <limits.h>
++#include <fcntl.h>
++#include <errno.h>
++
++#include <sys/types.h>
++#include <sys/stat.h>
++#include <sys/vfs.h>
++#include <sys/mman.h>
++#include <sys/sendfile.h>
++#include <sys/syscall.h>
++
++#include <linux/magic.h>
++#include <linux/memfd.h>
++
++/* Use our own wrapper for memfd_create. */
++#if !defined(SYS_memfd_create) && defined(__NR_memfd_create)
++#  define SYS_memfd_create __NR_memfd_create
++#endif
++#ifndef SYS_memfd_create
++#  error "memfd_create(2) syscall not supported by this glibc version"
++#endif
++int memfd_create(const char *name, unsigned int flags)
++{
++	return syscall(SYS_memfd_create, name, flags);
++}
++
++/* This comes directly from <linux/fcntl.h>. */
++#ifndef F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE
++#  define F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE 1024
++#endif
++#ifndef F_ADD_SEALS
++#  define F_ADD_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 9)
++#  define F_GET_SEALS (F_LINUX_SPECIFIC_BASE + 10)
++#endif
++#ifndef F_SEAL_SEAL
++#  define F_SEAL_SEAL   0x0001	/* prevent further seals from being set */
++#  define F_SEAL_SHRINK 0x0002	/* prevent file from shrinking */
++#  define F_SEAL_GROW   0x0004	/* prevent file from growing */
++#  define F_SEAL_WRITE  0x0008	/* prevent writes */
++#endif
++
++
++#define OUR_MEMFD_COMMENT "runc_cloned:/proc/self/exe"
++#define OUR_MEMFD_SEALS \
++	(F_SEAL_SEAL | F_SEAL_SHRINK | F_SEAL_GROW | F_SEAL_WRITE)
++
++static void *must_realloc(void *ptr, size_t size)
++{
++	void *old = ptr;
++	do {
++		ptr = realloc(old, size);
++	} while(!ptr);
++	return ptr;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Verify whether we are currently in a self-cloned program (namely, is
++ * /proc/self/exe a memfd). F_GET_SEALS will only succeed for memfds (or rather
++ * for shmem files), and we want to be sure it's actually sealed.
++ */
++static int is_self_cloned(void)
++{
++	int fd, seals;
++
++	fd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY|O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (fd < 0)
++		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
++
++	seals = fcntl(fd, F_GET_SEALS);
++	close(fd);
++	return seals == OUR_MEMFD_SEALS;
++}
++
++/*
++ * Basic wrapper around mmap(2) that gives you the file length so you can
++ * safely treat it as an ordinary buffer. Only gives you read access.
++ */
++static char *read_file(char *path, size_t *length)
++{
++	int fd;
++	char buf[4096], *copy = NULL;
++
++	if (!length)
++		return NULL;
++
++	fd = open(path, O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (fd < 0)
++		return NULL;
++
++	*length = 0;
++	for (;;) {
++		int n;
++
++		n = read(fd, buf, sizeof(buf));
++		if (n < 0)
++			goto error;
++		if (!n)
++			break;
++
++		copy = must_realloc(copy, (*length + n) * sizeof(*copy));
++		memcpy(copy + *length, buf, n);
++		*length += n;
++	}
++	close(fd);
++	return copy;
++
++error:
++	close(fd);
++	free(copy);
++	return NULL;
++}
++
++/*
++ * A poor-man's version of "xargs -0". Basically parses a given block of
++ * NUL-delimited data, within the given length and adds a pointer to each entry
++ * to the array of pointers.
++ */
++static int parse_xargs(char *data, int data_length, char ***output)
++{
++	int num = 0;
++	char *cur = data;
++
++	if (!data || *output != NULL)
++		return -1;
++
++	while (cur < data + data_length) {
++		num++;
++		*output = must_realloc(*output, (num + 1) * sizeof(**output));
++		(*output)[num - 1] = cur;
++		cur += strlen(cur) + 1;
++	}
++	(*output)[num] = NULL;
++	return num;
++}
++
++/*
++ * "Parse" out argv and envp from /proc/self/cmdline and /proc/self/environ.
++ * This is necessary because we are running in a context where we don't have a
++ * main() that we can just get the arguments from.
++ */
++static int fetchve(char ***argv, char ***envp)
++{
++	char *cmdline = NULL, *environ = NULL;
++	size_t cmdline_size, environ_size;
++
++	cmdline = read_file("/proc/self/cmdline", &cmdline_size);
++	if (!cmdline)
++		goto error;
++	environ = read_file("/proc/self/environ", &environ_size);
++	if (!environ)
++		goto error;
++
++	if (parse_xargs(cmdline, cmdline_size, argv) <= 0)
++		goto error;
++	if (parse_xargs(environ, environ_size, envp) <= 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	return 0;
++
++error:
++	free(environ);
++	free(cmdline);
++	return -EINVAL;
++}
++
++#define SENDFILE_MAX 0x7FFFF000 /* sendfile(2) is limited to 2GB. */
++static int clone_binary(void)
++{
++	int binfd, memfd, err;
++	ssize_t sent = 0;
++
++	memfd = memfd_create(OUR_MEMFD_COMMENT, MFD_CLOEXEC | MFD_ALLOW_SEALING);
++	if (memfd < 0)
++		return -ENOTRECOVERABLE;
++
++	binfd = open("/proc/self/exe", O_RDONLY | O_CLOEXEC);
++	if (binfd < 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	sent = sendfile(memfd, binfd, NULL, SENDFILE_MAX);
++	close(binfd);
++	if (sent < 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	err = fcntl(memfd, F_ADD_SEALS, OUR_MEMFD_SEALS);
++	if (err < 0)
++		goto error;
++
++	return memfd;
++
++error:
++	close(memfd);
++	return -EIO;
++}
++
++int ensure_cloned_binary(void)
++{
++	int execfd;
++	char **argv = NULL, **envp = NULL;
++
++	/* Check that we're not self-cloned, and if we are then bail. */
++	int cloned = is_self_cloned();
++	if (cloned > 0 || cloned == -ENOTRECOVERABLE)
++		return cloned;
++
++	if (fetchve(&argv, &envp) < 0)
++		return -EINVAL;
++
++	execfd = clone_binary();
++	if (execfd < 0)
++		return -EIO;
++
++	fexecve(execfd, argv, envp);
++	return -ENOEXEC;
++}
+diff --git a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
+index cb224314..784fd9b0 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
++++ b/libcontainer/nsenter/nsexec.c
+@@ -528,6 +528,9 @@ void join_namespaces(char *nslist)
+ 	free(namespaces);
+ }
+ 
++/* Defined in cloned_binary.c. */
++int ensure_cloned_binary(void);
++
+ void nsexec(void)
+ {
+ 	int pipenum;
+@@ -543,6 +546,14 @@ void nsexec(void)
+ 	if (pipenum == -1)
+ 		return;
+ 
++	/*
++	 * We need to re-exec if we are not in a cloned binary. This is necessary
++	 * to ensure that containers won't be able to access the host binary
++	 * through /proc/self/exe. See CVE-2019-5736.
++	 */
++	if (ensure_cloned_binary() < 0)
++		bail("could not ensure we are a cloned binary");
++
+ 	/* Parse all of the netlink configuration. */
+ 	nl_parse(pipenum, &config);
+ 
+-- 
+2.20.1
+

SOURCES/0001-rootfs-add-mount-destination-validation.patch

@@ -1,540 +0,0 @@
-From 2dd156b190c02476191fc2522f9b0e0a1a098608 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
-From: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
-Date: Mon, 17 May 2021 16:11:35 -0700
-Subject: [PATCH] rootfs: add mount destination validation
-
-This is a manual backport of fix for CVE-2021-30465 to runc-1.0.0-rc10
-(aka -rc90), upstream commit 84c14b43fa703db7 by Aleksa Sarai.
-
-Original description follows.
-
-----
-
-Because the target of a mount is inside a container (which may be a
-volume that is shared with another container), there exists a race
-condition where the target of the mount may change to a path containing
-a symlink after we have sanitised the path -- resulting in us
-inadvertently mounting the path outside of the container.
-
-This is not immediately useful because we are in a mount namespace with
-MS_SLAVE mount propagation applied to "/", so we cannot mount on top of
-host paths in the host namespace. However, if any subsequent mountpoints
-in the configuration use a subdirectory of that host path as a source,
-those subsequent mounts will use an attacker-controlled source path
-(resolved within the host rootfs) -- allowing the bind-mounting of "/"
-into the container.
-
-While arguably configuration issues like this are not entirely within
-runc's threat model, within the context of Kubernetes (and possibly
-other container managers that provide semi-arbitrary container creation
-privileges to untrusted users) this is a legitimate issue. Since we
-cannot block mounting from the host into the container, we need to block
-the first stage of this attack (mounting onto a path outside the
-container).
-
-The long-term plan to solve this would be to migrate to libpathrs, but
-as a stop-gap we implement libpathrs-like path verification through
-readlink(/proc/self/fd/$n) and then do mount operations through the
-procfd once it's been verified to be inside the container. The target
-could move after we've checked it, but if it is inside the container
-then we can assume that it is safe for the same reason that libpathrs
-operations would be safe.
-
-A slight wrinkle is the "copyup" functionality we provide for tmpfs,
-which is the only case where we want to do a mount on the host
-filesystem. To facilitate this, I split out the copy-up functionality
-entirely so that the logic isn't interspersed with the regular tmpfs
-logic. In addition, all dependencies on m.Destination being overwritten
-have been removed since that pattern was just begging to be a source of
-more mount-target bugs (we do still have to modify m.Destination for
-tmpfs-copyup but we only do it temporarily).
-
-Fixes: CVE-2021-30465
-Reported-by: Etienne Champetier <champetier.etienne@gmail.com>
-Co-authored-by: Noah Meyerhans <nmeyerha@amazon.com>
-Reviewed-by: Samuel Karp <skarp@amazon.com>
-Reviewed-by: Akihiro Suda <akihiro.suda.cz@hco.ntt.co.jp>
-Signed-off-by: Aleksa Sarai <cyphar@cyphar.com>
-
-Signed-off-by: Kir Kolyshkin <kolyshkin@gmail.com>
----
- libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go     | 225 ++++++++++++++++---------------
- libcontainer/utils/utils.go      |  54 ++++++++
- libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go |  35 +++++
- 3 files changed, 204 insertions(+), 110 deletions(-)
-
-diff --git a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
-index 106c4c2b..fe9afe48 100644
---- a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
-+++ b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
-@@ -19,8 +19,9 @@ import (
- 	"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/configs"
- 	"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/mount"
- 	"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/system"
--	libcontainerUtils "github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils"
-+	"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer/utils"
- 	"github.com/opencontainers/selinux/go-selinux/label"
-+	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
- 
- 	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
- )
-@@ -30,7 +31,7 @@ const defaultMountFlags = unix.MS_NOEXEC | unix.MS_NOSUID | unix.MS_NODEV
- // needsSetupDev returns true if /dev needs to be set up.
- func needsSetupDev(config *configs.Config) bool {
- 	for _, m := range config.Mounts {
--		if m.Device == "bind" && libcontainerUtils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
-+		if m.Device == "bind" && utils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
- 			return false
- 		}
- 	}
-@@ -131,7 +132,7 @@ func prepareRootfs(pipe io.ReadWriter, iConfig *initConfig) (err error) {
- func finalizeRootfs(config *configs.Config) (err error) {
- 	// remount dev as ro if specified
- 	for _, m := range config.Mounts {
--		if libcontainerUtils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
-+		if utils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
- 			if m.Flags&unix.MS_RDONLY == unix.MS_RDONLY {
- 				if err := remountReadonly(m); err != nil {
- 					return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err, "remounting %q as readonly", m.Destination)
-@@ -200,8 +201,6 @@ func prepareBindMount(m *configs.Mount, rootfs string) error {
- 	if err := checkProcMount(rootfs, dest, m.Source); err != nil {
- 		return err
- 	}
--	// update the mount with the correct dest after symlinks are resolved.
--	m.Destination = dest
- 	if err := createIfNotExists(dest, stat.IsDir()); err != nil {
- 		return err
- 	}
-@@ -238,18 +237,21 @@ func mountCgroupV1(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns b
- 			if err := os.MkdirAll(subsystemPath, 0755); err != nil {
- 				return err
- 			}
--			flags := defaultMountFlags
--			if m.Flags&unix.MS_RDONLY != 0 {
--				flags = flags | unix.MS_RDONLY
--			}
--			cgroupmount := &configs.Mount{
--				Source:      "cgroup",
--				Device:      "cgroup",
--				Destination: subsystemPath,
--				Flags:       flags,
--				Data:        filepath.Base(subsystemPath),
--			}
--			if err := mountNewCgroup(cgroupmount); err != nil {
-+			if err := utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, b.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
-+				flags := defaultMountFlags
-+				if m.Flags&unix.MS_RDONLY != 0 {
-+					flags = flags | unix.MS_RDONLY
-+				}
-+				var (
-+					source = "cgroup"
-+					data   = filepath.Base(subsystemPath)
-+				)
-+				if data == "systemd" {
-+					data = cgroups.CgroupNamePrefix + data
-+					source = "systemd"
-+				}
-+				return unix.Mount(source, procfd, "cgroup", uintptr(flags), data)
-+			}); err != nil {
- 				return err
- 			}
- 		} else {
-@@ -279,22 +281,67 @@ func mountCgroupV2(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns b
- 	if err := os.MkdirAll(cgroupPath, 0755); err != nil {
- 		return err
- 	}
--	if err := unix.Mount(m.Source, cgroupPath, "cgroup2", uintptr(m.Flags), m.Data); err != nil {
--		// when we are in UserNS but CgroupNS is not unshared, we cannot mount cgroup2 (#2158)
--		if err == unix.EPERM || err == unix.EBUSY {
--			return unix.Mount("/sys/fs/cgroup", cgroupPath, "", uintptr(m.Flags)|unix.MS_BIND, "")
-+	return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
-+		if err := unix.Mount(m.Source, procfd, "cgroup2", uintptr(m.Flags), m.Data); err != nil {
-+			// when we are in UserNS but CgroupNS is not unshared, we cannot mount cgroup2 (#2158)
-+			if err == unix.EPERM || err == unix.EBUSY {
-+				return unix.Mount("/sys/fs/cgroup", procfd, "", uintptr(m.Flags)|unix.MS_BIND, "")
-+			}
-+			return err
- 		}
-+		return nil
-+	})
-+}
-+
-+func doTmpfsCopyUp(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string) (Err error) {
-+	// Set up a scratch dir for the tmpfs on the host.
-+	tmpdir, err := prepareTmp("/tmp")
-+	if err != nil {
-+		return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to setup tmpdir")
-+	}
-+	defer cleanupTmp(tmpdir)
-+	tmpDir, err := ioutil.TempDir(tmpdir, "runctmpdir")
-+	if err != nil {
-+		return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to create tmpdir")
-+	}
-+	defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
-+
-+	// Configure the *host* tmpdir as if it's the container mount. We change
-+	// m.Destination since we are going to mount *on the host*.
-+	oldDest := m.Destination
-+	m.Destination = tmpDir
-+	err = mountPropagate(m, "/", mountLabel)
-+	m.Destination = oldDest
-+	if err != nil {
- 		return err
- 	}
--	return nil
-+	defer func() {
-+		if Err != nil {
-+			if err := unix.Unmount(tmpDir, unix.MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
-+				logrus.Warnf("tmpcopyup: failed to unmount tmpdir on error: %v", err)
-+			}
-+		}
-+	}()
-+
-+	return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) (Err error) {
-+		// Copy the container data to the host tmpdir. We append "/" to force
-+		// CopyDirectory to resolve the symlink rather than trying to copy the
-+		// symlink itself.
-+		if err := fileutils.CopyDirectory(procfd+"/", tmpDir); err != nil {
-+			return fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to copy %s to %s (%s): %v", m.Destination, procfd, tmpDir, err)
-+		}
-+		// Now move the mount into the container.
-+		if err := unix.Mount(tmpDir, procfd, "", unix.MS_MOVE, ""); err != nil {
-+			return fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to move mount %s to %s (%s): %v", tmpDir, procfd, m.Destination, err)
-+		}
-+		return nil
-+	})
- }
- 
- func mountToRootfs(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns bool) error {
--	var (
--		dest = m.Destination
--	)
--	if !strings.HasPrefix(dest, rootfs) {
--		dest = filepath.Join(rootfs, dest)
-+	dest, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, m.Destination)
-+	if err != nil {
-+		return err
- 	}
- 
- 	switch m.Device {
-@@ -329,46 +376,21 @@ func mountToRootfs(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns b
- 		}
- 		return nil
- 	case "tmpfs":
--		copyUp := m.Extensions&configs.EXT_COPYUP == configs.EXT_COPYUP
--		tmpDir := ""
- 		stat, err := os.Stat(dest)
- 		if err != nil {
- 			if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0755); err != nil {
- 				return err
- 			}
- 		}
--		if copyUp {
--			tmpdir, err := prepareTmp("/tmp")
--			if err != nil {
--				return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to setup tmpdir")
--			}
--			defer cleanupTmp(tmpdir)
--			tmpDir, err = ioutil.TempDir(tmpdir, "runctmpdir")
--			if err != nil {
--				return newSystemErrorWithCause(err, "tmpcopyup: failed to create tmpdir")
--			}
--			defer os.RemoveAll(tmpDir)
--			m.Destination = tmpDir
-+
-+		if m.Extensions&configs.EXT_COPYUP == configs.EXT_COPYUP {
-+			err = doTmpfsCopyUp(m, rootfs, mountLabel)
-+		} else {
-+			err = mountPropagate(m, rootfs, mountLabel)
- 		}
--		if err := mountPropagate(m, rootfs, mountLabel); err != nil {
-+		if err != nil {
- 			return err
- 		}
--		if copyUp {
--			if err := fileutils.CopyDirectory(dest, tmpDir); err != nil {
--				errMsg := fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to copy %s to %s: %v", dest, tmpDir, err)
--				if err1 := unix.Unmount(tmpDir, unix.MNT_DETACH); err1 != nil {
--					return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err1, "tmpcopyup: %v: failed to unmount", errMsg)
--				}
--				return errMsg
--			}
--			if err := unix.Mount(tmpDir, dest, "", unix.MS_MOVE, ""); err != nil {
--				errMsg := fmt.Errorf("tmpcopyup: failed to move mount %s to %s: %v", tmpDir, dest, err)
--				if err1 := unix.Unmount(tmpDir, unix.MNT_DETACH); err1 != nil {
--					return newSystemErrorWithCausef(err1, "tmpcopyup: %v: failed to unmount", errMsg)
--				}
--				return errMsg
--			}
--		}
- 		if stat != nil {
- 			if err = os.Chmod(dest, stat.Mode()); err != nil {
- 				return err
-@@ -424,19 +446,9 @@ func mountToRootfs(m *configs.Mount, rootfs, mountLabel string, enableCgroupns b
- 			}
- 		}
- 	default:
--		// ensure that the destination of the mount is resolved of symlinks at mount time because
--		// any previous mounts can invalidate the next mount's destination.
--		// this can happen when a user specifies mounts within other mounts to cause breakouts or other
--		// evil stuff to try to escape the container's rootfs.
--		var err error
--		if dest, err = securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, m.Destination); err != nil {
--			return err
--		}
- 		if err := checkProcMount(rootfs, dest, m.Source); err != nil {
- 			return err
- 		}
--		// update the mount with the correct dest after symlinks are resolved.
--		m.Destination = dest
- 		if err := os.MkdirAll(dest, 0755); err != nil {
- 			return err
- 		}
-@@ -611,7 +623,7 @@ func createDevices(config *configs.Config) error {
- 	return nil
- }
- 
--func bindMountDeviceNode(dest string, node *configs.Device) error {
-+func bindMountDeviceNode(rootfs, dest string, node *configs.Device) error {
- 	f, err := os.Create(dest)
- 	if err != nil && !os.IsExist(err) {
- 		return err
-@@ -619,24 +631,29 @@ func bindMountDeviceNode(dest string, node *configs.Device) error {
- 	if f != nil {
- 		f.Close()
- 	}
--	return unix.Mount(node.Path, dest, "bind", unix.MS_BIND, "")
-+	return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, dest, func(procfd string) error {
-+		return unix.Mount(node.Path, procfd, "bind", unix.MS_BIND, "")
-+	})
- }
- 
- // Creates the device node in the rootfs of the container.
- func createDeviceNode(rootfs string, node *configs.Device, bind bool) error {
--	dest := filepath.Join(rootfs, node.Path)
-+	dest, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(rootfs, node.Path)
-+	if err != nil {
-+		return err
-+	}
- 	if err := os.MkdirAll(filepath.Dir(dest), 0755); err != nil {
- 		return err
- 	}
- 
- 	if bind {
--		return bindMountDeviceNode(dest, node)
-+		return bindMountDeviceNode(rootfs, dest, node)
- 	}
- 	if err := mknodDevice(dest, node); err != nil {
- 		if os.IsExist(err) {
- 			return nil
- 		} else if os.IsPermission(err) {
--			return bindMountDeviceNode(dest, node)
-+			return bindMountDeviceNode(rootfs, dest, node)
- 		}
- 		return err
- 	}
-@@ -955,55 +972,43 @@ func writeSystemProperty(key, value string) error {
- }
- 
- func remount(m *configs.Mount, rootfs string) error {
--	var (
--		dest = m.Destination
--	)
--	if !strings.HasPrefix(dest, rootfs) {
--		dest = filepath.Join(rootfs, dest)
--	}
--	return unix.Mount(m.Source, dest, m.Device, uintptr(m.Flags|unix.MS_REMOUNT), "")
-+	return utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
-+		return unix.Mount(m.Source, procfd, m.Device, uintptr(m.Flags|unix.MS_REMOUNT), "")
-+	})
- }
- 
- // Do the mount operation followed by additional mounts required to take care
--// of propagation flags.
-+// of propagation flags.  This will always be scoped inside the container rootfs.
- func mountPropagate(m *configs.Mount, rootfs string, mountLabel string) error {
- 	var (
--		dest  = m.Destination
- 		data  = label.FormatMountLabel(m.Data, mountLabel)
- 		flags = m.Flags
- 	)
--	if libcontainerUtils.CleanPath(dest) == "/dev" {
-+	if utils.CleanPath(m.Destination) == "/dev" {
- 		flags &= ^unix.MS_RDONLY
- 	}
- 
--	copyUp := m.Extensions&configs.EXT_COPYUP == configs.EXT_COPYUP
--	if !(copyUp || strings.HasPrefix(dest, rootfs)) {
--		dest = filepath.Join(rootfs, dest)
--	}
--
--	if err := unix.Mount(m.Source, dest, m.Device, uintptr(flags), data); err != nil {
--		return err
--	}
--
--	for _, pflag := range m.PropagationFlags {
--		if err := unix.Mount("", dest, "", uintptr(pflag), ""); err != nil {
--			return err
-+	// Because the destination is inside a container path which might be
-+	// mutating underneath us, we verify that we are actually going to mount
-+	// inside the container with WithProcfd() -- mounting through a procfd
-+	// mounts on the target.
-+	if err := utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
-+		return unix.Mount(m.Source, procfd, m.Device, uintptr(flags), data)
-+	}); err != nil {
-+		return fmt.Errorf("mount through procfd: %v", err)
-+	}
-+	// We have to apply mount propagation flags in a separate WithProcfd() call
-+	// because the previous call invalidates the passed procfd -- the mount
-+	// target needs to be re-opened.
-+	if err := utils.WithProcfd(rootfs, m.Destination, func(procfd string) error {
-+		for _, pflag := range m.PropagationFlags {
-+			if err := unix.Mount("", procfd, "", uintptr(pflag), ""); err != nil {
-+				return err
-+			}
- 		}
--	}
--	return nil
--}
--
--func mountNewCgroup(m *configs.Mount) error {
--	var (
--		data   = m.Data
--		source = m.Source
--	)
--	if data == "systemd" {
--		data = cgroups.CgroupNamePrefix + data
--		source = "systemd"
--	}
--	if err := unix.Mount(source, m.Destination, m.Device, uintptr(m.Flags), data); err != nil {
--		return err
-+		return nil
-+	}); err != nil {
-+		return fmt.Errorf("change mount propagation through procfd: %v", err)
- 	}
- 	return nil
- }
-diff --git a/libcontainer/utils/utils.go b/libcontainer/utils/utils.go
-index 40ccfaa1..c1418ef9 100644
---- a/libcontainer/utils/utils.go
-+++ b/libcontainer/utils/utils.go
-@@ -2,12 +2,15 @@ package utils
- 
- import (
- 	"encoding/json"
-+	"fmt"
- 	"io"
- 	"os"
- 	"path/filepath"
-+	"strconv"
- 	"strings"
- 	"unsafe"
- 
-+	securejoin "github.com/cyphar/filepath-securejoin"
- 	"golang.org/x/sys/unix"
- )
- 
-@@ -73,6 +76,57 @@ func CleanPath(path string) string {
- 	return filepath.Clean(path)
- }
- 
-+// stripRoot returns the passed path, stripping the root path if it was
-+// (lexicially) inside it. Note that both passed paths will always be treated
-+// as absolute, and the returned path will also always be absolute. In
-+// addition, the paths are cleaned before stripping the root.
-+func stripRoot(root, path string) string {
-+	// Make the paths clean and absolute.
-+	root, path = CleanPath("/"+root), CleanPath("/"+path)
-+	switch {
-+	case path == root:
-+		path = "/"
-+	case root == "/":
-+		// do nothing
-+	case strings.HasPrefix(path, root+"/"):
-+		path = strings.TrimPrefix(path, root+"/")
-+	}
-+	return CleanPath("/" + path)
-+}
-+
-+// WithProcfd runs the passed closure with a procfd path (/proc/self/fd/...)
-+// corresponding to the unsafePath resolved within the root. Before passing the
-+// fd, this path is verified to have been inside the root -- so operating on it
-+// through the passed fdpath should be safe. Do not access this path through
-+// the original path strings, and do not attempt to use the pathname outside of
-+// the passed closure (the file handle will be freed once the closure returns).
-+func WithProcfd(root, unsafePath string, fn func(procfd string) error) error {
-+	// Remove the root then forcefully resolve inside the root.
-+	unsafePath = stripRoot(root, unsafePath)
-+	path, err := securejoin.SecureJoin(root, unsafePath)
-+	if err != nil {
-+		return fmt.Errorf("resolving path inside rootfs failed: %v", err)
-+	}
-+
-+	// Open the target path.
-+	fh, err := os.OpenFile(path, unix.O_PATH|unix.O_CLOEXEC, 0)
-+	if err != nil {
-+		return fmt.Errorf("open o_path procfd: %v", err)
-+	}
-+	defer fh.Close()
-+
-+	// Double-check the path is the one we expected.
-+	procfd := "/proc/self/fd/" + strconv.Itoa(int(fh.Fd()))
-+	if realpath, err := os.Readlink(procfd); err != nil {
-+		return fmt.Errorf("procfd verification failed: %v", err)
-+	} else if realpath != path {
-+		return fmt.Errorf("possibly malicious path detected -- refusing to operate on %s", realpath)
-+	}
-+
-+	// Run the closure.
-+	return fn(procfd)
-+}
-+
- // SearchLabels searches a list of key-value pairs for the provided key and
- // returns the corresponding value. The pairs must be separated with '='.
- func SearchLabels(labels []string, query string) string {
-diff --git a/libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go b/libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go
-index 395eedcf..5b80cac6 100644
---- a/libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go
-+++ b/libcontainer/utils/utils_test.go
-@@ -140,3 +140,38 @@ func TestCleanPath(t *testing.T) {
- 		t.Errorf("expected to receive '/foo' and received %s", path)
- 	}
- }
-+
-+func TestStripRoot(t *testing.T) {
-+	for _, test := range []struct {
-+		root, path, out string
-+	}{
-+		// Works with multiple components.
-+		{"/a/b", "/a/b/c", "/c"},
-+		{"/hello/world", "/hello/world/the/quick-brown/fox", "/the/quick-brown/fox"},
-+		// '/' must be a no-op.
-+		{"/", "/a/b/c", "/a/b/c"},
-+		// Must be the correct order.
-+		{"/a/b", "/a/c/b", "/a/c/b"},
-+		// Must be at start.
-+		{"/abc/def", "/foo/abc/def/bar", "/foo/abc/def/bar"},
-+		// Must be a lexical parent.
-+		{"/foo/bar", "/foo/barSAMECOMPONENT", "/foo/barSAMECOMPONENT"},
-+		// Must only strip the root once.
-+		{"/foo/bar", "/foo/bar/foo/bar/baz", "/foo/bar/baz"},
-+		// Deal with .. in a fairly sane way.
-+		{"/foo/bar", "/foo/bar/../baz", "/foo/baz"},
-+		{"/foo/bar", "../../../../../../foo/bar/baz", "/baz"},
-+		{"/foo/bar", "/../../../../../../foo/bar/baz", "/baz"},
-+		{"/foo/bar/../baz", "/foo/baz/bar", "/bar"},
-+		{"/foo/bar/../baz", "/foo/baz/../bar/../baz/./foo", "/foo"},
-+		// All paths are made absolute before stripping.
-+		{"foo/bar", "/foo/bar/baz/bee", "/baz/bee"},
-+		{"/foo/bar", "foo/bar/baz/beef", "/baz/beef"},
-+		{"foo/bar", "foo/bar/baz/beets", "/baz/beets"},
-+	} {
-+		got := stripRoot(test.root, test.path)
-+		if got != test.out {
-+			t.Errorf("stripRoot(%q, %q) -- got %q, expected %q", test.root, test.path, got, test.out)
-+		}
-+	}
-+}
--- 
-2.31.1
-

SOURCES/1807.patch

@@ -1,178 +1,168 @@
-From 3d99c51e1b38a440804a55c9f314f62cc50b8902 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From ecf53c23545092019602578583031c28fde4d2a1 Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
 From: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
 Date: Fri, 25 May 2018 18:04:06 +0200
 Subject: [PATCH] sd-notify: do not hang when NOTIFY_SOCKET is used with create
 
 if NOTIFY_SOCKET is used, do not block the main runc process waiting
-for events on the notify socket.  Bind mount the parent directory of
+for events on the notify socket.  Change the logic to create a new
-the notify socket, so that "start" can create the socket and it is
+process that monitors exclusively the notify socket until an event is
-still accessible from the container.
+received.
 
 Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
 ---
- notify_socket.go | 112 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++-------------
+ init.go          |  12 +++++++
- signals.go       |   4 +-
+ notify_socket.go | 101 ++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++---------
- start.go         |  13 +++++-
+ signals.go       |   5 +--
- utils_linux.go   |  12 ++++-
+ 3 files changed, 99 insertions(+), 19 deletions(-)
- 4 files changed, 105 insertions(+), 36 deletions(-)
 
+diff --git a/init.go b/init.go
+index c8f453192..6a3d9e91c 100644
+--- a/init.go
++++ b/init.go
+@@ -20,6 +20,18 @@ var initCommand = cli.Command{
+ 	Name:  "init",
+ 	Usage: `initialize the namespaces and launch the process (do not call it outside of runc)`,
+ 	Action: func(context *cli.Context) error {
++		// If NOTIFY_SOCKET is used create a new process that stays around
++		// so to not block "runc start".  It will automatically exits when the
++		// container notifies that it is ready, or when the container is deleted
++		if os.Getenv("_NOTIFY_SOCKET_FD") != "" {
++			fd := os.Getenv("_NOTIFY_SOCKET_FD")
++			pid := os.Getenv("_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PID")
++			hostNotifySocket := os.Getenv("_NOTIFY_SOCKET_HOST")
++			notifySocketPath := os.Getenv("_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH")
++			notifySocketInit(fd, pid, hostNotifySocket, notifySocketPath)
++			os.Exit(0)
++		}
++
+ 		factory, _ := libcontainer.New("")
+ 		if err := factory.StartInitialization(); err != nil {
+ 			// as the error is sent back to the parent there is no need to log
 diff --git a/notify_socket.go b/notify_socket.go
-index e7453c62..d961453a 100644
+index cd6c0a989..e04e9d660 100644
 --- a/notify_socket.go
 +++ b/notify_socket.go
-@@ -7,11 +7,13 @@ import (
+@@ -6,10 +6,13 @@ import (
+ 	"bytes"
  	"fmt"
  	"net"
- 	"os"
++	"os"
-+	"path"
++	"os/exec"
  	"path/filepath"
 +	"strconv"
 +	"time"
  
-+	"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer"
  	"github.com/opencontainers/runtime-spec/specs-go"
 -
--	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
+ 	"github.com/sirupsen/logrus"
  	"github.com/urfave/cli"
  )
- 
+@@ -64,24 +67,94 @@ func (s *notifySocket) setupSocket() error {
-@@ -27,12 +29,12 @@ func newNotifySocket(context *cli.Context, notifySocketHost string, id string) *
- 	}
- 
- 	root := filepath.Join(context.GlobalString("root"), id)
--	path := filepath.Join(root, "notify.sock")
-+	socketPath := filepath.Join(root, "notify", "notify.sock")
- 
- 	notifySocket := &notifySocket{
- 		socket:     nil,
- 		host:       notifySocketHost,
--		socketPath: path,
-+		socketPath: socketPath,
- 	}
- 
- 	return notifySocket
-@@ -44,13 +46,19 @@ func (s *notifySocket) Close() error {
- 
- // If systemd is supporting sd_notify protocol, this function will add support
- // for sd_notify protocol from within the container.
--func (s *notifySocket) setupSpec(context *cli.Context, spec *specs.Spec) {
--	mount := specs.Mount{Destination: s.host, Source: s.socketPath, Options: []string{"bind"}}
-+func (s *notifySocket) setupSpec(context *cli.Context, spec *specs.Spec) error {
-+	pathInContainer := filepath.Join("/run/notify", path.Base(s.socketPath))
-+	mount := specs.Mount{
-+		Destination: path.Dir(pathInContainer),
-+		Source:      path.Dir(s.socketPath),
-+		Options:     []string{"bind", "nosuid", "noexec", "nodev", "ro"},
-+	}
- 	spec.Mounts = append(spec.Mounts, mount)
--	spec.Process.Env = append(spec.Process.Env, fmt.Sprintf("NOTIFY_SOCKET=%s", s.host))
-+	spec.Process.Env = append(spec.Process.Env, fmt.Sprintf("NOTIFY_SOCKET=%s", pathInContainer))
-+	return nil
- }
- 
--func (s *notifySocket) setupSocket() error {
-+func (s *notifySocket) bindSocket() error {
- 	addr := net.UnixAddr{
- 		Name: s.socketPath,
- 		Net:  "unixgram",
-@@ -71,45 +79,89 @@ func (s *notifySocket) setupSocket() error {
  	return nil
  }
  
--// pid1 must be set only with -d, as it is used to set the new process as the main process
++func (notifySocket *notifySocket) notifyNewPid(pid int) {
--// for the service in systemd
++	notifySocketHostAddr := net.UnixAddr{Name: notifySocket.host, Net: "unixgram"}
--func (s *notifySocket) run(pid1 int) {
++	client, err := net.DialUnix("unixgram", nil, &notifySocketHostAddr)
--	buf := make([]byte, 512)
--	notifySocketHostAddr := net.UnixAddr{Name: s.host, Net: "unixgram"}
-+func (s *notifySocket) setupSocketDirectory() error {
-+	return os.Mkdir(path.Dir(s.socketPath), 0755)
-+}
-+
-+func notifySocketStart(context *cli.Context, notifySocketHost, id string) (*notifySocket, error) {
-+	notifySocket := newNotifySocket(context, notifySocketHost, id)
-+	if notifySocket == nil {
-+		return nil, nil
-+	}
-+
-+	if err := notifySocket.bindSocket(); err != nil {
-+		return nil, err
-+	}
-+	return notifySocket, nil
-+}
-+
-+func (n *notifySocket) waitForContainer(container libcontainer.Container) error {
-+	s, err := container.State()
 +	if err != nil {
-+		return err
++		return
 +	}
-+	return n.run(s.InitProcessPid)
++	newPid := fmt.Sprintf("MAINPID=%d\n", pid)
++	client.Write([]byte(newPid))
 +}
 +
-+func (n *notifySocket) run(pid1 int) error {
+ // pid1 must be set only with -d, as it is used to set the new process as the main process
-+	if n.socket == nil {
+ // for the service in systemd
-+		return nil
+ func (notifySocket *notifySocket) run(pid1 int) {
-+	}
+-	buf := make([]byte, 512)
-+	notifySocketHostAddr := net.UnixAddr{Name: n.host, Net: "unixgram"}
+-	notifySocketHostAddr := net.UnixAddr{Name: notifySocket.host, Net: "unixgram"}
- 	client, err := net.DialUnix("unixgram", nil, &notifySocketHostAddr)
+-	client, err := net.DialUnix("unixgram", nil, &notifySocketHostAddr)
++	file, err := notifySocket.socket.File()
  	if err != nil {
--		logrus.Error(err)
+ 		logrus.Error(err)
--		return
+ 		return
-+		return err
  	}
 -	for {
--		r, err := s.socket.Read(buf)
+-		r, err := notifySocket.socket.Read(buf)
 -		if err != nil {
 -			break
++	defer file.Close()
++	defer notifySocket.socket.Close()
 +
-+	ticker := time.NewTicker(time.Millisecond * 100)
++	cmd := exec.Command("/proc/self/exe", "init")
-+	defer ticker.Stop()
++	cmd.ExtraFiles = []*os.File{file}
++	cmd.Env = append(cmd.Env, "_NOTIFY_SOCKET_FD=3",
++		fmt.Sprintf("_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PID=%d", pid1),
++		fmt.Sprintf("_NOTIFY_SOCKET_HOST=%s", notifySocket.host),
++		fmt.Sprintf("_NOTIFY_SOCKET_PATH=%s", notifySocket.socketPath))
++
++	if err := cmd.Start(); err != nil {
++		logrus.Fatal(err)
++	}
++	notifySocket.notifyNewPid(cmd.Process.Pid)
++	cmd.Process.Release()
++}
++
++func notifySocketInit(envFd string, envPid string, notifySocketHost string, notifySocketPath string) {
++	intFd, err := strconv.Atoi(envFd)
++	if err != nil {
++		return
++	}
++	pid1, err := strconv.Atoi(envPid)
++	if err != nil {
++		return
++	}
++
++	file := os.NewFile(uintptr(intFd), "unixgram")
++	defer file.Close()
 +
 +	fileChan := make(chan []byte)
++	exitChan := make(chan bool)
++
 +	go func() {
 +		for {
 +			buf := make([]byte, 512)
-+			r, err := n.socket.Read(buf)
++			r, err := file.Read(buf)
 +			if err != nil {
 +				return
 +			}
-+			got := buf[0:r]
++			fileChan <- buf[0:r]
-+			if !bytes.HasPrefix(got, []byte("READY=")) {
-+				continue
-+			}
-+			fileChan <- got
-+			return
  		}
 -		var out bytes.Buffer
 -		for _, line := range bytes.Split(buf[0:r], []byte{'\n'}) {
 -			if bytes.HasPrefix(line, []byte("READY=")) {
 +	}()
++	go func() {
++		for {
++			if _, err := os.Stat(notifySocketPath); os.IsNotExist(err) {
++				exitChan <- true
++				return
++			}
++			time.Sleep(time.Second)
++		}
++	}()
++
++	notifySocketHostAddr := net.UnixAddr{Name: notifySocketHost, Net: "unixgram"}
++	client, err := net.DialUnix("unixgram", nil, &notifySocketHostAddr)
++	if err != nil {
++		return
++	}
 +
 +	for {
 +		select {
-+		case <-ticker.C:
++		case <-exitChan:
-+			_, err := os.Stat(filepath.Join("/proc", strconv.Itoa(pid1)))
++			return
-+			if err != nil {
-+				return nil
-+			}
 +		case b := <-fileChan:
 +			for _, line := range bytes.Split(b, []byte{'\n'}) {
++				if !bytes.HasPrefix(line, []byte("READY=")) {
++					continue
++				}
++
 +				var out bytes.Buffer
  				_, err = out.Write(line)
  				if err != nil {
--					return
+ 					return
-+					return err
+@@ -98,10 +171,8 @@ func (notifySocket *notifySocket) run(pid1 int) {
- 				}
- 
- 				_, err = out.Write([]byte{'\n'})
- 				if err != nil {
--					return
-+					return err
- 				}
- 
- 				_, err = client.Write(out.Bytes())
- 				if err != nil {
--					return
-+					return err
  				}
  
  				// now we can inform systemd to use pid1 as the pid to monitor
@@ -180,26 +170,25 @@ index e7453c62..d961453a 100644
 -					newPid := fmt.Sprintf("MAINPID=%d\n", pid1)
 -					client.Write([]byte(newPid))
 -				}
--				return
 +				newPid := fmt.Sprintf("MAINPID=%d\n", pid1)
 +				client.Write([]byte(newPid))
-+				return nil
+ 				return
  			}
  		}
- 	}
 diff --git a/signals.go b/signals.go
-index b67f65a0..dd25e094 100644
+index 1811de837..d0988cb39 100644
 --- a/signals.go
 +++ b/signals.go
-@@ -70,6 +70,7 @@ func (h *signalHandler) forward(process *libcontainer.Process, tty *tty, detach
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func (h *signalHandler) forward(process *libcontainer.Process, tty *tty, detach
  			h.notifySocket.run(pid1)
  			return 0, nil
+ 		} else {
+-			go h.notifySocket.run(0)
++			h.notifySocket.run(os.Getpid())
  		}
-+		h.notifySocket.run(os.Getpid())
- 		go h.notifySocket.run(0)
  	}
  
-@@ -97,9 +98,6 @@ func (h *signalHandler) forward(process *libcontainer.Process, tty *tty, detach
+@@ -98,9 +98,6 @@ func (h *signalHandler) forward(process *libcontainer.Process, tty *tty, detach
  					// status because we must ensure that any of the go specific process
  					// fun such as flushing pipes are complete before we return.
  					process.Wait()
@@ -209,70 +198,3 @@ index b67f65a0..dd25e094 100644
  					return e.status, nil
  				}
  			}
-diff --git a/start.go b/start.go
-index 2bb698b2..3a1769a4 100644
---- a/start.go
-+++ b/start.go
-@@ -3,6 +3,7 @@ package main
- import (
- 	"errors"
- 	"fmt"
-+	"os"
- 
- 	"github.com/opencontainers/runc/libcontainer"
- 	"github.com/urfave/cli"
-@@ -31,7 +32,17 @@ your host.`,
- 		}
- 		switch status {
- 		case libcontainer.Created:
--			return container.Exec()
-+			notifySocket, err := notifySocketStart(context, os.Getenv("NOTIFY_SOCKET"), container.ID())
-+			if err != nil {
-+				return err
-+			}
-+			if err := container.Exec(); err != nil {
-+				return err
-+			}
-+			if notifySocket != nil {
-+				return notifySocket.waitForContainer(container)
-+			}
-+			return nil
- 		case libcontainer.Stopped:
- 			return errors.New("cannot start a container that has stopped")
- 		case libcontainer.Running:
-diff --git a/utils_linux.go b/utils_linux.go
-index 984e6b0f..46c26246 100644
---- a/utils_linux.go
-+++ b/utils_linux.go
-@@ -408,7 +408,9 @@ func startContainer(context *cli.Context, spec *specs.Spec, action CtAct, criuOp
- 
- 	notifySocket := newNotifySocket(context, os.Getenv("NOTIFY_SOCKET"), id)
- 	if notifySocket != nil {
--		notifySocket.setupSpec(context, spec)
-+		if err := notifySocket.setupSpec(context, spec); err != nil {
-+			return -1, err
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	container, err := createContainer(context, id, spec)
-@@ -417,10 +419,16 @@ func startContainer(context *cli.Context, spec *specs.Spec, action CtAct, criuOp
- 	}
- 
- 	if notifySocket != nil {
--		err := notifySocket.setupSocket()
-+		err := notifySocket.setupSocketDirectory()
- 		if err != nil {
- 			return -1, err
- 		}
-+		if action == CT_ACT_RUN {
-+			err := notifySocket.bindSocket()
-+			if err != nil {
-+				return -1, err
-+			}
-+		}
- 	}
- 
- 	// Support on-demand socket activation by passing file descriptors into the container init process.
--- 
-2.21.0
-

SOURCES/99-containers.conf

@@ -0,0 +1 @@
+fs.may_detach_mounts=1

SOURCES/change-default-root.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,61 @@
+diff --git a/list.go b/list.go
+index 0313d8c..328798b 100644
+--- a/list.go
++++ b/list.go
+@@ -50,7 +50,7 @@ var listCommand = cli.Command{
+ 	ArgsUsage: `
+ 
+ Where the given root is specified via the global option "--root"
+-(default: "/run/runc").
++(default: "/run/runc-ctrs").
+ 
+ EXAMPLE 1:
+ To list containers created via the default "--root":
+diff --git a/main.go b/main.go
+index 278399a..0f49fce 100644
+--- a/main.go
++++ b/main.go
+@@ -62,7 +62,7 @@ func main() {
+ 	v = append(v, fmt.Sprintf("spec: %s", specs.Version))
+ 	app.Version = strings.Join(v, "\n")
+ 
+-	root := "/run/runc"
++	root := "/run/runc-ctrs"
+ 	rootless, err := isRootless(nil)
+ 	if err != nil {
+ 		fatal(err)
+@@ -70,7 +70,7 @@ func main() {
+ 	if rootless {
+ 		runtimeDir := os.Getenv("XDG_RUNTIME_DIR")
+ 		if runtimeDir != "" {
+-			root = runtimeDir + "/runc"
++			root = runtimeDir + "/runc-ctrs"
+ 			// According to the XDG specification, we need to set anything in
+ 			// XDG_RUNTIME_DIR to have a sticky bit if we don't want it to get
+ 			// auto-pruned.
+diff --git a/man/runc-list.8.md b/man/runc-list.8.md
+index f737424..107220e 100644
+--- a/man/runc-list.8.md
++++ b/man/runc-list.8.md
+@@ -6,7 +6,7 @@
+ 
+ # EXAMPLE
+ Where the given root is specified via the global option "--root"
+-(default: "/run/runc").
++(default: "/run/runc-ctrs").
+ 
+ To list containers created via the default "--root":
+        # runc list
+diff --git a/man/runc.8.md b/man/runc.8.md
+index 6d0ddff..337bc73 100644
+--- a/man/runc.8.md
++++ b/man/runc.8.md
+@@ -51,7 +51,7 @@ value for "bundle" is the current directory.
+    --debug              enable debug output for logging
+    --log value          set the log file path where internal debug information is written (default: "/dev/null")
+    --log-format value   set the format used by logs ('text' (default), or 'json') (default: "text")
+-   --root value         root directory for storage of container state (this should be located in tmpfs) (default: "/run/runc" or $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/runc for rootless containers)
++   --root value         root directory for storage of container state (this should be located in tmpfs) (default: "/run/runc-ctrs" or $XDG_RUNTIME_DIR/runc-ctrs for rootless containers)
+    --criu value         path to the criu binary used for checkpoint and restore (default: "criu")
+    --systemd-cgroup     enable systemd cgroup support, expects cgroupsPath to be of form "slice:prefix:name" for e.g. "system.slice:runc:434234"
+    --rootless value    enable rootless mode ('true', 'false', or 'auto') (default: "auto")

SOURCES/pivot-root.patch

@@ -0,0 +1,72 @@
+From 28a697cce3e4f905dca700eda81d681a30eef9cd Mon Sep 17 00:00:00 2001
+From: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
+Date: Fri, 11 Jan 2019 21:53:45 +0100
+Subject: [PATCH] rootfs: umount all procfs and sysfs with --no-pivot
+
+When creating a new user namespace, the kernel doesn't allow to mount
+a new procfs or sysfs file system if there is not already one instance
+fully visible in the current mount namespace.
+
+When using --no-pivot we were effectively inhibiting this protection
+from the kernel, as /proc and /sys from the host are still present in
+the container mount namespace.
+
+A container without full access to /proc could then create a new user
+namespace, and from there able to mount a fully visible /proc, bypassing
+the limitations in the container.
+
+A simple reproducer for this issue is:
+
+unshare -mrfp sh -c "mount -t proc none /proc && echo c > /proc/sysrq-trigger"
+
+Signed-off-by: Giuseppe Scrivano <gscrivan@redhat.com>
+---
+ libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go | 35 +++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++++
+ 1 file changed, 35 insertions(+)
+
+diff --git a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
+index e7c2f8ada..6bd6da74a 100644
+--- a/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
++++ b/libcontainer/rootfs_linux.go
+@@ -748,6 +748,41 @@ func pivotRoot(rootfs string) error {
+ }
+ 
+ func msMoveRoot(rootfs string) error {
++	mountinfos, err := mount.GetMounts()
++	if err != nil {
++		return err
++	}
++
++	absRootfs, err := filepath.Abs(rootfs)
++	if err != nil {
++		return err
++	}
++
++	for _, info := range mountinfos {
++		p, err := filepath.Abs(info.Mountpoint)
++		if err != nil {
++			return err
++		}
++		// Umount every syfs and proc file systems, except those under the container rootfs
++		if (info.Fstype != "proc" && info.Fstype != "sysfs") || filepath.HasPrefix(p, absRootfs) {
++			continue
++		}
++		// Be sure umount events are not propagated to the host.
++		if err := unix.Mount("", p, "", unix.MS_SLAVE|unix.MS_REC, ""); err != nil {
++			return err
++		}
++		if err := unix.Unmount(p, unix.MNT_DETACH); err != nil {
++			if err != unix.EINVAL && err != unix.EPERM {
++				return err
++			} else {
++				// If we have not privileges for umounting (e.g. rootless), then
++				// cover the path.
++				if err := unix.Mount("tmpfs", p, "tmpfs", 0, ""); err != nil {
++					return err
++				}
++			}
++		}
++	}
+ 	if err := unix.Mount(rootfs, "/", "", unix.MS_MOVE, ""); err != nil {
+ 		return err
+ 	}

SPECS/runc.spec

@@ -12,34 +12,41 @@
 %if 0%{?rhel} > 7 && ! 0%{?fedora}
 %define gobuild(o:) \
 go build -buildmode pie -compiler gc -tags="rpm_crashtraceback no_openssl ${BUILDTAGS:-}" -ldflags "${LDFLAGS:-} -compressdwarf=false -B 0x$(head -c20 /dev/urandom|od -An -tx1|tr -d ' \\n') -extldflags '%__global_ldflags'" -a -v -x %{?**};
-%endif
+%endif # distro
 
 %global provider github
 %global provider_tld com
 %global project opencontainers
 %global repo runc
 # https://github.com/opencontainers/runc
-%global import_path %{provider}.%{provider_tld}/%{project}/%{repo}
+%global provider_prefix %{provider}.%{provider_tld}/%{project}/%{repo}
-%global git0 https://%{import_path}
+%global import_path %{provider_prefix}
-%global commit0 dc9208a3303feef5b3839f4323d9beb36df0a9dd
+%global git0 https://github.com/opencontainers/runc
+%global commit0 2abd837c8c25b0102ac4ce14f17bc0bc7ddffba7
 %global shortcommit0 %(c=%{commit0}; echo ${c:0:7})
 
 Name: %{repo}
 Version: 1.0.0
-Release: 66.rc10%{?dist}
+Release: 56.rc5.dev.git%{shortcommit0}%{?dist}
 Summary: CLI for running Open Containers
 ExcludeArch: %{ix86}
 License: ASL 2.0
-URL: %{git0}
+URL: http//%{provider_prefix}
-Source0: %{git0}/archive/%{commit0}/%{name}-%{shortcommit0}.tar.gz
+Source0: %{git0}/archive/%{commit0}/%{repo}-%{shortcommit0}.tar.gz
-Patch0: 1807.patch
+Source1: 99-containers.conf
-Patch1: 0001-rootfs-add-mount-destination-validation.patch
+Patch0: change-default-root.patch
-BuildRequires: golang >= 1.12.12-4
+Patch1: 0001-Revert-Apply-cgroups-earlier.patch
+Patch2: 1807.patch
+Patch3: 0001-nsenter-clone-proc-self-exe-to-avoid-exposing-host-b-runc.patch
+Patch4: pivot-root.patch
+Requires: criu
+Requires(pre): container-selinux >= 2:2.2-2
+
+# If go_compiler is not set to 1, there is no virtual provide. Use golang instead.
+BuildRequires: %{?go_compiler:compiler(go-compiler)}%{!?go_compiler:golang} >= 1.6.2
 BuildRequires: git
 BuildRequires: go-md2man
 BuildRequires: libseccomp-devel
-Requires: criu
-Requires(pre): container-selinux >= 2:2.2-2
 
 %description
 The runc command can be used to start containers which are packaged
@@ -58,10 +65,9 @@ pushd GOPATH
 popd
 
 pushd GOPATH/src/%{import_path}
-export GO111MODULE=off
 export GOPATH=%{gopath}:$(pwd)/GOPATH
 export BUILDTAGS="selinux seccomp"
-%gobuild -o %{name} %{import_path}
+%gobuild -o %{name} %{import_path} 
 
 pushd man
 ./md2man-all.sh
@@ -91,45 +97,12 @@ install -p -m 0644 contrib/completions/bash/%{name} %{buildroot}%{_datadir}/bash
 %{_datadir}/bash-completion/completions/%{name}
 
 %changelog
-* Wed May 19 2021 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-66.rc10
+* Thu Nov 28 2019 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-56.rc5.dev.git2abd837
-- set GO111MODULE=off to fix build
+- rebuild because of CVE-2019-9512 and CVE-2019-9514
-- Related: #1955651
+- Resolves: #1766328, #1766300
-
-* Wed May 19 2021 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-65.rc10
-- fix CVE-2021-30465
-- Resolves: #1955651
-
-* Thu Feb 13 2020 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-64.rc10
-- address CVE-2019-19921 by updating to rc10
-- Resolves: #1801888
-
-* Wed Dec 11 2019 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-63.rc9
-- use no_openssl in BUILDTAGS (no vendored crypto in runc)
-- Related: RHELPLAN-25139
-
-* Mon Dec 09 2019 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-62.rc9
-- be sure to use golang >= 1.12.12-4
-- Related: RHELPLAN-25139
-
-* Thu Nov 21 2019 Jindrich Novy <jnovy@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-61.rc9
-- update to runc 1.0.0-rc9 release
-- amend golang deps
-- fixes CVE-2019-16884
-- Resolves: #1759651
-
-* Mon Jun 17 2019 Lokesh Mandvekar <lsm5@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-60.rc8
-- Resolves: #1721247 - enable fips mode
-
-* Mon Jun 17 2019 Lokesh Mandvekar <lsm5@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-59.rc8
-- Resolves: #1720654 - rebase to v1.0.0-rc8
-
-* Thu Apr 11 2019 Eduardo Santiago <santiago@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-57.rc5.dev.git2abd837
-- Resolves: #1693424 - podman rootless: cannot specify gid= mount options
-
-* Wed Feb 27 2019 Lokesh Mandvekar <lsm5@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-56.rc5.dev.git2abd837
-- change-default-root patch not needed as there's no docker on rhel8
 
 * Tue Feb 12 2019 Lokesh Mandvekar <lsm5@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-55.rc5.dev.git2abd837
+- Resolves: #1665770 - rootfs: umount all procfs and sysfs with --no-pivot
 - Resolves: CVE-2019-5736
 
 * Tue Dec 18 2018 Frantisek Kluknavsky <fkluknav@redhat.com> - 1.0.0-54.rc5.dev.git2abd837